•-.^^^J^^^^-^^-^ 


Richard  Barksdale  Harwell 


LINCOLN  ROOM 

UNIVERSITY  OF  ILLINOIS 
LIBRARY 


MEMORIAL 

the  Class  of  1901 

founded  by 

HARLAN  HOYT  HORNER 

and 
HENRIETTA  CALHOUN  HORNER 


MILITARY  MEMOIRS   OF  A  CONFEDERATE 


V 


MILITARY  MEMOIRS  OF  A 
CONFEDERATE 

A    CRITICAL  NARRATIVE 


BY 

E.   P.  ALEXANDER 

i 

BRIGADIER-GENERAL   IN   THE    CONFEDERATE   ARMY,   CHIEF   OF 
ARTILLERY,    LONGSTREET'S    CORPS 


WITH  SKETCH-MAPS  BY  THE 
AUTHOR 


NEW  YOEK 

CHARLES    SCRIBNER'S    SONS 
1907 


COPYRIGHT,  1907,  BY 
CHARLES  SCRIBNEB'S  SONS. 


PUBLISHED,  APRIL,  1907. 


Norfoootj 

J.  8.  Cushing  &  Co.  —  Berwick  &  Smith  Co. 
Norwood,  Mass.,  U.S.A. 


TO 

Spemorp  of  tlje 

WHOSE  BRAVERY  WON  THE  GLORY 
WHICH  THE  LIVING  ENJOY 

> 

THE  BAND  IN  THE  PINES 

Oh,  band  in  the  pine-wood,  cease ! 

Cease  with  your  splendid  call ; 
The  living  are  brave  and  noble, 

But  the  dead  were  bravest  of  all ! 

They  throng  to  the  martial  summons, 

To  the  loud  triumphant  strain ; 
And  the  dear,  bright  eyes  of  long  dead  friends 

Come  to  the  heart  again. 

They  come  with  the  ringing  bugle, 

And  the  deep  drum's  mellow  roar, 
Till  the  soul  is  faint  with  longing 

For  the  hands  we  clasp  no  more. 

Oh,  band  in  the  pine-wood,  cease, 

Or  the  heart  will  melt  in  tears 
For  the  gallant  eyes  and  the  smiling  lips 

And  the  voices  of  old  years. 

JOHN  ESTKN  COOKE, 

Ordnance  Officer,  Stuart's  Cavalry. 


THE  POINT  OF  VIEW 

THE  raison  d'etre  of  the  following  pages  is  not  at  all  to  set 
forth  the  valor  of  Confederate  arrns  nor  the  skill  of  Confederate 
generals.  These  are  as  they  may  be,  and  must  here  take  their 
chances  in  an  unpartisan  narrative,  written  with  an  entirely 
different  object.  That  object  is  the  criticism  of  each  campaign 
as  one  would  criticise  a  game  of  chess,  only  to  point  out  the 
good  and  bad  plays  on  each  side,  and  the  moves  which  have 
influenced  the  result.  It  is  far  from  being  a  grateful  task, 
and  the  writer  is,  moreover,  painfully  conscious  of  his  limita- 
tions in  his  effort  to  perform  it  adequately. 

But  it  is  of  great  importance  that  it  should  be  attempted 
even  approximately  not  only  for  the  benefit  of  general  history, 
but  more  particularly  for  that  of  military  students  and  staff- 
officers.  These  will  find  much  of  value  and  interest  in  the 
details,  pointing  out  how  and  why  the  scale  of  battle  was 
turned  upon  each  occasion.  It  is  only  of  recent  years  —  since 
the  publication  by  the  War  Department  of  the  full  Official 
Reports  of  both  armies,  in  135  large  volumes — that  it  has  be- 
come possible  to  write  this  story,  even  approximately.  History, 
meanwhile,  has  been  following  the  incomplete  reports  of  the 
earlier  days  which,  sometimes,  as  at  Seven  Pines  (or  Fair 
Oaks),  have  deliberately  concealed  the  facts,  and  has  always 
felt  the  need  of  the  personal  accounts  covering  the  incidents 
of  every  march,  skirmish,  and  battle. 

Only  among  these  can  be  traced  the  beginnings,  often  obscure 
and  accidental,  of  the  most  important  events ;  and  these  must 
ever  form  an  inexhaustible  mine  for  the  study  by  the  staff- 
officer  of  the  practical  working  and  details  in  every  department 
of  an  army. 

As  to  the  causes  of  the  war,  it  will,  of  course,  be  understood 
that  every  former  Confederate  repudiates  all  accusations  of 


viii  THE   POINT  OF   VIEW 

treason  or  rebellion  in  the  war,  and  even  of  fighting  to  preserve 
the  institution  of  slavery.  The  effort  of  the  enemy  to  destroy 
it  without  compensation  was  practical  robbery,  which,  of  course, 
we  resisted.  The  unanimity  and  the  desperation  of  our  resist- 
ance —  even  to  the  refusal  of  Lincoln's  suggested  compensation 
at  Fortress  Monroe,  after  the  destruction  had  already  occurred 

—  clearly  show  our  struggle  to  have  been  for  that  right  of 
self-government  which  the  Englishman  has  claimed,  and  fought 
for,  as  for  nothing  else,  since  the  days  of  King  John. 

It  has  taken  many  years  for  these  truths  to  gain  acceptance 
against  the  prejudices  left  by  the  war,  even  though  it  has  been 
notorious  from  the  first  that  no  legal  accusation  could  be  brought 
against  any  one,  even  Mr.  Davis.  With  the  adoption  of  this 
view  by  leading  English  authorities,  not  to  mention  distin- 
guished Northern  and  Republican  authors,  the  South  may  be 
content  to  leave  all  such  questions  to  the  final  verdict  of  history, 
admitting  itself  too  close  to  the  event  to  claim  impartiality. 

One  thing  remains  to  be  said.  The  world  has  not  stood  still 
in  the  years  since  we  took  up  arms  for  what  we  deemed  our 
most  invaluable  right  —  that  of  self-government.  We  now 
enjoy  the  rare  privilege  of  seeing  what  we  fought  for  in  the 
retrospect.  It  no  longer  seems  so  desirable.  It  would  now 
prove  only  a  curse.  We  have  good  cause  to  thank  God  for  our 
escape  from  it,  not  alone  for  our  sake,  but  for  that  of  the  whole 
country  and  even  of  the  world. 

Had  our  cause  succeeded,  divergent  interests  must  soon  have 
further  separated  the  States  into  groups,  and  this  continent 
would  have  been  given  over  to  divided  nationalities,  each  weak 
and  unable  to  command  foreign  credit.  Since  the  days  of 
Greece,  Confederacies  have  only  held  together  against  foreign 
enemies,  and  in  times  of  peace  have  soon  disintegrated.  It 
is  surely  not  necessary  to  contrast  what  would  have  been  our 
prospects  as  citizens  of  such  States  with  our  condition  now  as 
citizens  of  the  strongest,  richest,  and  —  strange  for  us  to  say 
who  once  called  ourselves  "conquered"  and  our  cause  "lost" 

—  the  freest  nation  on  earth. 

The  statistics  of  our  commerce,  our  manufactures,  and  our 


THE   POINT   OF   VIEW  ix 

internal  improvements  are  an  object-lesson  of  the  truth  of  old 
./Esop's  fable,  pointing  out  the  increased  strength  of  the  sepa- 
rate sticks  when  bound  together  into  a  fagot.  That  the  whole 
civilized  world  shares  with  us  in  the  far-reaching  blessings  and 
benefits  of  our  civilization,  wealth,  and  political  power  is  mani- 
fest in  our  building  the  Panama  Canal,  and  again,  in  the  Treaty 
of  Peace  between  Russia  and  Japan,  negotiated  through  the 
influence  of  our  President.  These  are  but  the  first-fruits  of 
what  the  future  will  develop,  for  our  Union  is  not  built  to 
perish.  Its  bonds  were  not  formed  by  peaceable  agreements 
in  conventions,  but  were  forged  in  the  white  heat  of  battles, 
in  a  war  fought  out  to  the  bitter  end,  and  are  for  eternity. 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  I 
FROM  THE  U.S.A.  INTO  THE  C.S.A. 

PAGE 

Mormon  War.  Return  to  West  Point.  The  Plains  in  1858.  The 
Signal  System.  Fort  Steilacooin,  1860.  Leaving  Steilacoom.  At 
San  Francisco.  Interview  with  McPherson.  Resign  from  U.  S. 
Army.  New  York  to  Georgia.  Captain  of  Engineers,  C.S.A. 
Impressions  of  Travel.  The  First  Blow.  Instructions  to  Maj. 
Anderson.  Anderson's  Second  Excuse.  Third  Excuse.  Bu- 
chanan's Excuse 1 

CHAPTER  II 

THE  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN  (JULY,  1861) 

At  Richmond.  Gen.  Robert  S.  Garnett.  Orders  Received.  At 
Manassas.  Installing  Signal  Stations.  Strategic  Opportunities. 
Beauregard's  Suggestions.  McDowell's  Moves.  Orders  sent 
Johnston.  Johnston  Marches.  Patterson  remains  Ignorant.  The 
Odds  against  Us.  Masked  Batteries,  etc.  Blackburn's  Ford. 
An  Infantry  Skirmish.  An  Artillery  Duel.  New  Plan  Needed. 
Plan  Adopted.  McDowell  Overpersuaded.  In  the  Confederate 
Lines.  McDowell's  New  Plan.  Beauregard's  Plan.  How  it 
Failed.  Tyler  at  Stone  Bridge.  At  the  Signal  Station.  Beaure- 
gard  Informed.  A  Pause.  The  Dust  Cloud.  The  Action  Begun. 
Bee  and  Bartow  come  in.  The  Generals  go  to  the  Left.  Watch- 
ing the  Battle.  Johnston  and  Beauregard  Arrive.  Reinforcement 
sent  for.  McDowell's  Four  Idle  Brigades.  Two  Hours'  Fighting. 
The  Henry  House  Hill.  Cummings's  Brilliant  Coup.  The 
Federal  Collapse.  Leaving  Signal  Station.  Stragglers  in  the 
Rear.  Davis  and  Jackson.  Lost  Opportunities.  Order  checking 
Kershaw.  Order  stopping  Pursuit.  Affairs  on  the  Right.  Jones 
and  Longstreet.  Bon  ham  takes  the  Lead.  Bonham  Halts.  Over- 
caution  in  New  Commanders.  The  Final  Scene.  Return  from 
the  Field.  Hill's  Report.  Inaction  of  Council  ....  13 

xi 


xii  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  III 
FALL  AND  WINTER  OF  1861 

PAGE 

Ordnance  Service.  Breech-loading  Small-Arms.  Confederate  Arma- 
ments. Richmond  Ordnance  Bureau.  Secret  Service.  McClel- 
lan's  Secret  Service.  Military  Situation.  A  Council  of  War. 
Ball's  Bluff.  Occoquan  Battery.  Winter.  Army  Organization. 
Federal  Organization.  Lines  of  Advance  on  Richmond.  Retreat 
from  Manassas.  The  Valley.  Kernstown 52 

CHAPTER  IV 

YORKTOWN   AND   WlLLIAMSBURG 

McClellan  at  Fortress  Monroe.  Johnston  goes  to  Yorktown.  Reor- 
ganization. Dam  No.  1.  Yorktown  Evacuated.  Retreat  from 
Yorktown.  Battle  of  Williamsburg.  Early's  Attack.  Hancock's 
Report.  Casualties.  Eltham's  Landing 63 

CHAPTER  V 

SEVEN  PINES  OR  FAIR  OAKS 

Drury's  Bluff.  The  Situation.  Attack  Planned.  Johnston's  Plan 
Changed.  Johnston's  Problem.  Battle  of  Seven  Pines  or  Fair 
Oaks.  A  Misunderstanding.  Longstreet's  Mistake.  Huger 
Delayed.  Huger  unjustly  Blamed.  Signal  Given.  Hill's  Battle 
in  Brief.  Losses.  Reinforcements.  Reports.  Wilcox's  Re- 
port. Couch's  Position.  Johnston's  Battle.  Whiting's  Advance. 
A  Second  Attack.  Johnston  Wounded.  G.  W.  Smith  in  Com- 
mand. Smith's  Battle,  June.  The  Confederates  Withdraw.  Lee 
placed  in  Command.  Re'sume'.  Staff  and  Organization.  Artil- 
lery Service.  Davis  and  Johnston  .  .  .  .  .  .71 

CHAPTER  VI 

JACKSON'S  VALLEY  CAMPAIGN 

The  Valley.  Jackson's  Plan.  Battle  of  McDowell.  Shields  joins 
McDowell.  Jackson  attacks  Front  Royal.  Banks  Retreats. 
Winchester  Captured.  Cavalry  not  at  Hand.  Steuart's  Faux 
Pas.  Jackson's  Report.  McDowell's  Delay.  Lincoln  keeps 
Sunday.  Panic  in  Washington.  Jackson  keeps  Sunday.  Jack- 
son's Retreat.  Race  down  the  Valley.  Death  of  Ashby.  Port 
Republic,  June  8.  Cross  Keys,  June  8.  Port  Republic,  June  9. 
Winder  Repulsed.  Taylor's  Charge.  After  Effects  .  .  .94 


CONTENTS  xiii 

CHAPTER  VII 
SEVEN  DAYS'  CAMPAIGN.    THE  ATTACK 

PACK 

Lee  in  Command.  Ives  predicts  Lee's  Audacity.  Lee's  Plan. 
McClellan's  Delay.  Lee's  Opportunity.  Lee's  Order.  Stuart's 
Raid.  Intimations  to  the  Enemy.  Conference  of  Officers.  Jack- 
son's First  Failure.  Jackson's  March.  Stuart  and  Trimble. 
Branch  Moves.  A  P.  Hill  Moves.  Battle  of  Mechanicsville. 
Porter's  Retreat.  A.  P.  Hill's  Advance.  Gaines  Mill  Position. 
The  Chances.  Jackson  at  Cold  Harbor.  Porter's  Account.  Hill's 
Account.  Lee's  Account.  Jackson  ordered  in.  General  Advance. 
Enemy's  Escape.  Casualties.  Remarks 109 

CHAPTER  VIII 

SEVEN  DAYS'  CAMPAIGN.    THE  PURSUIT 

June  28.  June  29.  Magruder's  Report.  Jackson's  Report.  Lee's 
Report.  Lee  to  Magruder.  Savage  Station.  June  30.  Waiting 
in  vain  for  the  Signal.  Holmes's  Division.  Huger's  Division. 
Wright  meets  Jackson.  Huger's  Report.  Jackson,  June  29.  Lee 
to  Magruder.  Jackson,  June  30.  White  Oak  Swamp.  Frank- 
lin's Report.  Jackson's  Account.  The  Cannonade.  Munford's 
Letter.  Hampton's  Crossing.  Franklin's  Comments.  D.  H. 
Hill's  Explanation.  Battle  of  Frazier  Farm.  Bayonet  Fighting. 
A  Successful  Ruse.  Lee's  Report 133 

CHAPTER  IX 

THE  ESCAPE.    BATTLE  OF  MALVERN  HILL 

Enemy's  New  Position.  Line  Formed.  Pendleton's  Artillery.  Artil- 
lery Combats.  Whiting's  Report.  Sumner  seeks  Cover.  Lee's 
Reconnoissance.  Lee  Misled.  Attack  Begun.  Wright's  Report. 
Semmes  and  Kershaw.  D.  H.  Hill's  Report.  Toombs's  Report. 
Casualties.  Lee's  Report.  Stuart  shells  a  Camp.  McClellan 
Writes.  Stuart's  Report.  Attack  Abandoned.  Casualties.  An 
Artillery  Raid.  The  South  Side.  Our  Balloon  .  .  .  .156 

CHAPTER  X 

CEDAR  MOUNTAIN 

Recuperation.  Gen.  Pope  Arrives.  Gen.  Halleck  Arrives.  McClellan 
Recalled.  Lee  Moves.  Jackson  Moves.  Cedar  Mountain.  The 
Night  Action.  Jackson's  Ruse.  Casualties 175 


xiv  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  XI 

SECOND  MANASSAS 

PAGE 

The  Situation,  Aug.  15.  Lee's  Plan.  How  it  Failed.  A  Federal 
Scouting  Party.  Pope  Escapes.  Stuart's  Raid.  Storm  frustrates 
Efforts.  Lee  plans  his  Move.  Ropes's  Criticism.  Jackson's 
March.  Aug.  26.  Manassas  Captured.  Destruction  of  Stores. 
Pope's  Move.  Lee  and  Longstreet's  March.  Pope  Blunders. 
Jackson's  Move.  Orders  Captured.  Johnson's  Skirmish.  Pope 
at  a  Loss.  Ewell  attacks  King.  Hard  Fighting.  Losses.  Thor- 
oughfare Gap.  Flanking  the  Gap.  The  Opposing  Forces.  Sigel's 
Attack.  Reno's  and  Kearny's  Attack.  Hooker's  and  Reno's 
Attack.  Grover's  Brigade.  Porter's  Corps.  Pope  versus  Porter. 
Kearny  and  Reno  Attack.  Longstreet  takes  Position.  Longstreet 
meets  King.  Pope  is  Misled.  Lee  awaits  Attack.  The  Forces. 
The  Lines.  A  Surprise.  Longstreet  comes  in.  The  Henry 
House  Hill.  Night  and  Rain.  No  Pursuit.  Centreville  Turned. 
Affair  at  Ox  Hill.  Stevens  and  Kearny.  Casualties.  The  Am- 
munition Supply 185 

CHAPTER  XII 

BOONSBORO   OR   SOUTH   MOUNTAIN,    AND   HARPER'S    FERRY 

Choice  of  Moves.  Interior  Lines.  Policy  of  Invasion.  Across  the 
Potomac.  Affairs  in  Washington.  McClellan  succeeds  Pope. 
Lee's  Proclamation.  Organizations  and  Strength.  Harper's 
Ferry  Garrison.  Orders  No.  191.  The  Army  Scatters.  The 
Lost  Order.  Lee  Warned.  Battle  of  Boonsboro  or  South  Moun- 
tain. Longstreet  Arrives.  The  Retreat.  Crampton's  Gap. 
Franklin  Attacks.  Jackson  before  Harper's  Ferry.  Preparations 
for  Assault.  Bombardment  and  Surrender.  Borrowed  Wagons. 
Paroles  and  Colors.  Casualties 220 

CHAPTER  XIII 
SHARPSBURG  OR  ANTIETAM 

McLaws  and  Jackson  Recalled.  The  Ordnance  Train.  The  Question 
of  giving  Battle.  Confederate  Straggling.  Ropes's  Comments. 
McClellan's  Pursuit.  Lee's  Line  of  Battle.  Battle  of  Hooker's 
Corps.  Hood's  Counter-stroke.  On  Jackson's  Left.  Battle  of 
Mansfield's  Corps.  Battle  of  Sumner's  Corps.  Sedgwick  Ambus- 
caded. The  Artillery  Fighting.  Fourth  Attack  Prepared. 
French's  Advance.  Swinton's  Account.  The  Bloody  Lane. 
Franklin  is  Halted.  Both  Sides  Exhausted.  Pleasanton  and 
Porter.  Burnside  Advances.  Toombs's  Good  Defence.  The 


CONTENTS  xv 

PACK 

Bridge  Carried.  The  Advance  upon  Sharpsburg.  A.  P.  Hill's 
Counter-stroke.  Lee  in  Council.  Sept.  18.  Faulty  Position  of 
Federal  Cavalry.  The  Pursuit.  The  Counter-stroke.  Captured 
Ordnance  Stores.  Casualties 241 

CHAPTER  XIV 
FALL  OF  1862 

Political  Situation.  Lincoln  orders  Advance.  A  Confederate  Raid. 
Lincoln  Dissatisfied.  Condition  of  Confederates.  Reorganization. 
Lee  moves  to  Culpeper.  McClellan  succeeded  by  Burnside.  Plan 
of  Campaign  Changed.  Burnside's  Strength.  Lee's  Strength. 
Sumner  at  Falmouth.  Non-arrival  of  Pontoons.  Surrender  De- 
manded. Earthworks  Erected.  Jackson  Arrives.  Burnside's 
Plan.  Marye's  Hill.  Building  the  Bridges.  The  Bombardment. 
The  Crossing  Made.  Dec.  12.  The  Plan  Changed.  Jackson's 
Line.  Franklin  Advances.  Gibbon  supports  Meade.  Meade 
strikes  Gregg.  The  Counter-stroke.  Jackson's  Proposed  Attack. 
Casualties.  On  the  Federal  Right.  The  Formations.  French 
and  Hancock  Charge.  Howard  Charges.  Sturgis  Charges. 
Sunken  Road  Reenforced.  Griffin's  Charge.  Humphreys's 
First  Charge.  Humphreys's  Second  Charge.  Humphreys's  Report. 
Tyler's  Report.  Getty's  Charge.  Hawkins's  Account.  A  Federal 
Conference.  Dec.  14,  Sharpshooting.  Dec.  15,  Burnside  Retreats. 
Flag  of  Truce.  Casualties.  New  Plans.  The  Mud  March.  Burn- 
side  Relieved .  .  .  .  .  276 

CHAPTER  XV 

CHANCELLORSVILLE 

Winter  Quarters.  Rations  Reduced.  Hays's  Louisiana  Brigade. 
Officers'  Servants.  Hooker's  Reorganization.  Confederate  Organi- 
zation. Hooker's  Plan  of  Attack.  Lee's  Proposed  Aggressive. 
Hooker  Crosses.  Hooker's  Fatal  Mistake.  Lee's  Prompt  Action. 
The  Wilderness.  Hooker  Advances.  Lee's  Advance.  Hooker 
Retreats.  Hooker  Intrenches.  Lee  Reconnoitres.  Lee's  Plan  of 
Attack.  Jackson's  March.  The  Movement  Discovered.  Sickles 
Advances.  Jackson  Deploys.  Jackson  Attacks.  Colquitt's 
Blunder.  Dowdall's  Tavern.  Casualties.  At  Hooker's  Head- 
quarters. Defensive  Measures.  Jackson  Pauses.  A  Cannonade. 
Wounding  of  Jackson.  Stuart  in  Command.  Formation  for 
Attack.  Sickles's  Midnight  Attack.  Hooker's  Interior  Line. 
Hooker  abandons  Hazel  Grove.  Stuart  Attacks.  Assaults  Re- 
pulsed. Hazel  Grove  Guns.  Federals  Withdraw.  Lee  and 
Stuart  Meet.  Sedgwick's  Advance.  Wilcox  on  Taylor's  Hill. 
Assaults  Renewed.  Early  falls  Back.  Salem  Church.  Casual- 
ties. Early's  Division.  Lee  organizes  an  Attack.  Sedgwick 
driven  Across ,  317 


xvi  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  XVI 
GETTYSBURG  :  THE  FIRST  DAY 

PAGE 

High  Tide.  Opportunity  Open.  Suggestion  Made.  Invasion.  Spe- 
cial Feature.  Feature  Impossible.  Reorganization.  Armament. 
Lee  Moves.  Brandy  Station.  Ewell  in  Valley.  Captured  Prop- 
erty. Hooker  Moves.  Lincoln  Suggests.  Lee  in  Valley.  Stuart 
proposes  Raid.  Conditional  Consent.  Stuart's  Raid.  Carlisle. 
Results  of  Raid.  Across  the  Potomac.  Hooker  Relieved.  Cham- 
bersburg.  Return  of  Scout.  Orders.  Chance  Encounter.  Hill 
to  Gettysburg.  Meade's  Movement.  Reynolds  to  Gettysburg. 
Battle  Opens.  Ai-cher  Captured.  Rodes  Arrives.  Early  Arrives. 
Lee  Orders  Pursuit.  Ewell  stops  Pursuit.  Lee  Confers.  The 
Enemy's  Line.  Best  Point  of  Attack.  Longstreet's  Arrival. 
Federal  Arrivals 363 

ji  CHAPTER  XVII 

GETTYSBURG  :  SECOND  DAY 

The  Situation.  Lee  decides  to  Attack.  The  Attack  to  be  on  our 
Right.  Longstreet's  Flank  March.  Sickles's  Advance.  Meade 
foresees  Sickles's  Defeat.  Progressive  Type  of  Battle.  Hood  pro- 
poses Flank  Movement.  Formation  and  Opening.  Hood's  Front 
Line.  Fight  on  Little  Round  Top.  Hood's  Second  Line.  McLaws 
badly  Needed.  Kershaw  and  Semmes.  Artillery  Fighting. 
Barksdale  and  Wofford.  Anderson's  Division.  Wilcox's  Brigade. 
Wilcox  asks  Help.  Why  No  Help  was  Given.  Lang's  Brigade. 
Wright's  Brigade.  Wright  carries  the  Stone  Wall.  Wright's 
Retreat.  Reinforcements  for  Sickles.  Ayres's  Division.  Con- 
federate Situation.  The  Artillery  Engaged.  Ten  More  Brigades 
in  Sight.  Crawford's  Advance.  Swell's  Cooperation.  The 
Afternoon  Cannonade.  Johnson's  Assault.  Early's  Attack. 
Federal  Account.  Rodes's  Failure  to  Advance.  Rodes's  New 
Position.  Rodes's  Summary,  Second  Day 390 

CHAPTER  XVIII 

GETTYSBURG  :  THIRD  DAY 

The  Plan  of  the  Day.  Johnson  Reenforced.  Johnson's  Battle.  Lee 
joins  Longstreet.  A  Discussion.  The  Decision.  The  Neglected 
Opportunity.  Posting  the  Guns.  Artillery  of  Other  Corps.  In- 
fantry Formation.  Hill's  Cannonade.  The  Nine  Howitzers. 
Note  from  Longstreet.  Talk  with  Wright.  Cannonade  Opens. 
Pickett  called  For.  Pickett  and  Longstreet.  Pickett  Appears. 
The  Repulse.  Lee  on  the  Field.  The  Afternoon.  Nelson's  En- 
filade. Advances  from  Peach  Orchard  .  ,  414 


CONTENTS  xvii 

CHAPTEE  XIX 
BATTLE  OF  CHICKAMAUGA 

PAGE 

Position  of  the  Confederacy  after  Gettysburg  and  Vicksburg.  Reen- 
forcements  of  Bragg.  The  Armies  before  the  Battle  of  Chicka- 
mauga.  The  Order  of  Battle.  Engagement  of  the  19th.  Battle 
of  the  20th.  Eosecrans's  Order  to  Wood.  Longstreet's  Advance. 
The  Casualties.  Thomas  at  Chattanooga.  The  Battle  of  Wau- 
hatchie.  Bragg's  Position.  Battle  of  Chattanooga  or  Missionary 
Ridge.  Positions  of  the  Armies.  The  Attack  on  the  Ridge. 
Bragg's  Retreat.  The  Knoxville  Campaign.  Longstreet's  Expe- 
dition. Fort  Sanders  and  its  Garrison.  Storming  the  Fort.  The 
Retreat.  Casualties  of  the  Campaign 447 

CHAPTEE  XX 

BATTLE  OF  THE  WILDERNESS 

Review.    Lee's  Force.    Situation.    Longstreet's  Position.    Longstreet's 

March.     Ewell's  Advance.     Ewell's  Fight 493 

CHAPTEE  XXI 

THE  MOVEMENT  AGAINST  PETERSBURG 

The  Crisis  of  the  War.  High  Price  of  Gold.  Difficulty  of  Recruiting 
in  the  North.  Grant  crosses  the  James  and  moves  on  Petersburg. 
Hancock's  Corps  Delayed.  Movements  of  Lee.  Beauregard's 
Defence.  Fighting  of  June  16  and  18.  Success  of  Grant's 
Strategy 545 

CHAPTEE  XXII 

THE  MINE 

The  Petersburg  Trenches.  Wilson  and  Kautz's  Cavalry  Raid.  Their 
Rout  on  the  29th.  Early's  Demonstration  toward  Washington. 
The  Mine  at  the  Elliott  Salient.  Extent  of  the  Tunnel  and 
Galleries.  Its  Ventilation.  Countermines.  Plans  for  a  Federal 
Charge  to  follow  the  Explosion.  Movements  of  Hancock.  The 
Explosion  on  the  30th.  The  Crater.  Failure  of  the  Federal 
Assault 560 


XV111 


CONTENTS 


CHAPTEE  XXIII 
THE  FALL  OF  1864 

PAGB 

The  Situation  in  August.  Hood  appointed  to  succeed  Johnston. 
Evacuation  of  Atlanta.  Capture  of  Mobile.  Reelection  of  Lin- 
coln. Battle  of  Franklin.  Sherman's  March.  Fort  Fisher. 
Conference  at  Fortress  Monroe.  Fort  Stedman.  Movements  of 
Grant.  Five  Forks.  Fort  Whitworth  and  Fort  Gregg.  Evacua- 
tion of  Petersburg.  Appomattox.  Correspondence  between  Lee 
and  Grant.  Conversations  with  Lee.  The  Meeting  at  Appomat- 
tox. The  Surrender.  Visit  to  Washington.  Conversations  with 
Mr.  Washburne.  Retimi  Home.  Record  of  the  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia 574 


GENERAL    ALEXANDER 
from  a  photograph  taken  in    1866 


MILITARY  MEMOIRS  OF  A 
CONFEDERATE 

CHAPTER  I 

FROM  THE  U.S.A.  INTO  THE  C.S.A. 

Mormon  War.  Return  to  West  Point.  The  Plains  in  1858.  The  Signal 
System.  Fort  Steilacoom,  1860.  Leaving  Steilacoom.  At  San  Fran- 
cisco. Interview  with  McPherson.  Resign  from  U.  S.  Army.  New 
York  to  Georgia.  Captain  of  Engineers,  C.S.A.  Impressions  of 
Travel.  The  First  Blow.  Instructions  to  Maj.  Anderson.  Ander- 
son's Second  Excuse.  Third  Excuse.  Buchanan's  Excuse. 

THE  year  1861  found  me  a  second  lieutenant  of  Engineers, 
U.S.A.,  on  duty  with  Co.  A,  Engineer  troops,  at  Fort  Steilacoom, 
Washington  Territory.  I  had  entered  West  Point  from  Georgia 
in  1853,  and  graduated  in  1857.  For  three  years  after  my 
graduation  I  served,  generally  at  the  Military  Academy,  as  an 
assistant  instructor,  but  on  two  occasions  was  absent  for  six 
month  at  a  time  upon  special  details. 

On  the  first,  with  Capt.  James  C.  Duane  and  64  men  of  the 
Engineer  Company,  we  were  sent  out  to  Utah  for  duty  with 
Gen.  Albert  Sidney  Johnston  in  what  was  then  called  the  Mor- 
mon War.  In  1857  the  Mormons  had  refused  to  receive  a  gov- 
ernor of  the  territory,  appointed  by  President  Buchanan,  and  as- 
sumed a  hostile  attitude.  Johnston  was  sent  with  about  2000 
men  to  install  the  new  governor,  Alfred  Gumming  of  Georgia. 
The  Mormons  took  arms,  fortified  the  passes  of  the  Wasatch  Moun- 
tains, and  captured  and  burned  trains  of  supplies  for  the  troops. 

The  near  approach  of  winter  decided  the  War  Department  to 
halt  Johnston  and  put  him  in  winter  quarters  at  Fort  Bridger, 
east  of  the  Wasatch,  until  he  could  be  heavily  reenforced  in 
the  spring.  Six  columns  of  reinforcements  were  ordered  from 

1 


2  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

Fort  Leavenworth,  and,  of  these,  our  detachment  and  the  6th 
Infantry  composed  column  No.  1,  and  marched  on  May  6,  1858. 

The  only  travelled  route  at  that  time  passed  by  Fort  Kearney, 
Fort  Laramie,  and  the  Great  South  Pass.  Our  column  was 
ordered  to  open  a  new  route,  following  the  South  Platte  to  Lodge 
Pole  Creek,  and  up  that  stream  to  its  headwaters  in  the  Southern 
Black  Hills,  and  thence,  via  Bridger's  Pass,  to  join  the  old  road  a 
short  distance  east  of  Fort  Bridger.  Only  Fremont,  some  years 
before,  had  ever  gone  through  by  that  route,  and  it  was  thought 
to  be  materially  shorter.  When  we  got  into  the  mountains  we 
found  it  necessary  to  leave  the  6th  Infantry  in  camp,  and  to  go 
ahead  with  our  company  to  make  a  practicable  road.  We  also 
had  to  ferry,  using  iron  wagon  bodies  as  boats,  the  Laramie, 
.the  North  Platte,  and  Green  rivers.  Fort  Bridger  was  reached 
on  Aug.  1  —  86  days,  970  miles.  The  new  route  proved  to  be 
49  miles  shorter  than  the  South  Pass  road. 

Without  mails  for  six  weeks,  it  was  only  on  arrival  at  Fort 
Bridger  we  learned  that  the  "  Mormon  War  "  was  over.  Brigham 
Young,  on  seeing  the  large  force  prepared  to  install  his  rival, 
Gov.  Gumming,  had  wisely  concluded  to  submit  and  forego 
his  dream  of  independence.  Perhaps  he  was  the  wisest  leader 
of  a  people  seeking  freedom,  of  all  his  generation.  At  first,  the 
Mormons  deserted  their  homes,  and  proposed  to  burn  them  and 
migrate  to  Mexico.  Neither  Confederate  nor  Boer  was  more  de- 
voted to  his  cause  than  the  Mormons  to  their  own.  But  Brig- 
ham  Young  knew  when  the  time  to  surrender  had  come,  and  he 
deserves  a  monument  for  knowing  it  and  acting  upon  the  knowl- 
edge; even  though  by  doing  so  he  greatly  disappointed  many 
young  officers,  myself  among  them,  anxious  to  see  active  service. 

Meanwhile  an  important  Indian  war  had  broken  out  in  Oregon, 
and  the  detachment  of  our  company  which  had  been  left  at 
West  Point  was  now  on  its  way  there  via  the  Isthmus  under 
Lts.  Casey  and  Robert.  Orders  had,  therefore,  been  issued 
recalling  our  detachment  to  West  Point,  and  directing  the  6th 
Infantry  to  march  on  by  land  to  Oregon. 

On  Aug.  9  we  set  out  via  the  South  Pass  and  Fort  Laramie 
route  and  reached  Leavenworth,  1019  miles,  on  Oct.  3,  56  days. 
We  laid  over  eight  Sundays  and  one  day  at  Laramie,  and  made 


FROM  THE  U.S.A.  INTO  THE  C.S.A.  3 

47  marches  averaging  22  miles  each.  The  longest  march  was 
27  miles.  These  figures  are  of  interest  for  comparison  with 
marches  made  on  special  occasions  in  the  war.  The  conditions 
of  the  march  were  the  most  favorable  possible,  being  over  good 
roads,  in  good  weather,  by  a  small  body,  with  all  ammunition 
and  knapsacks  carried  in  a  tram  of  nearly  empty  wagons,  and 
officers  and  men  all  anxious  to  make  a  quick  trip.  Distances 
were  carefully  measured  by  an  odometer.  Rests  during  the 
march  were  about  10  minutes  in  each  hour,  and  the  average  rate 
of  movement  on  good  ground  was  a  mile  in  20  minutes. 
From  Leavenworth  we  took  a  boat  to  St.  Louis,  and  thence 
rail  to  New  York  and  West  Point,  arriving  Oct.  13. 

The  Plains  at  this  period  were  in  their  pristine  wildness,  and 
I  had  enjoyed  the  march  greatly.  Buffalo  and  antelope  were 
abundant,  and  I  was  fond  of  hunting.  The  Indians  were  armed 
but  with  bows  and  arrows,  and  dressed  only  in  breech  clouts, 
blankets,-  feathers,  and  paint.  Gold  was  first  discovered  on 
Cherry  Creek,  near  what  is  now  Denver,  during  this  summer, 
and  on  our  return  we  met  the  earliest  emigrants  going  out  to 
that  section.  Within  two  years  there  was  a  considerable  city 
there,  with  theatres  and  daily  papers. 

I  remained  at  West  Point  a  year  as  Assistant  Instructor  in 
Engineering,  and  during  the  summer  of  1859  was  put  in  charge 
of  the  Department  of  Fencing  and  Target  Practice.  In  Oct., 

1859,  I   was  assigned   to  special   duty  with  Assistant-Surgeon 
A.  J.  Myer  to  experiment  with  a  system  of   military  signals 
which  he  had  devised  and  offered  to  the  War  Department.    It 
was  based  upon  the  use  of  Baine's  telegraphic  alphabet,  which 
formed  the  letters  by  the  use  of  only  two  elements  —  dot  and 
dash.    The  Morse  alphabet  uses  four — dot,  short  dash,  long  dash, 
and  interval  between  dashes.     Myer  had  originally  suggested  its 
use  as  a  language  for  the  deaf  and  dumb,  when  he  was  a  medical 
student.     By  the  waving  of  anything  to  the  left  for  dot,  and  to 
the  right  for  dash,  any  letter  could  be  indicated  by  a  few  waves. 

For  three  months  we  experimented  with  flags,  torches,  and 
glasses  between  Fort  Hamilton  and  Sandy  Hook,  and,  in  Jan., 

1860,  we  reported    to   the   War   Department    in   Washington 
with  what  has  been  since  known  as  the  "Wig-wag"  Signal 


4  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

System.  A  bill  was  introduced  into  Congress  to  adopt  the 
system  and  Myer  and  I  were  directed  to  exhibit  it  to  the  Military 
Committees.  I  was  also  assigned  to  temporary  duty  on  a  board 
of  officers  experimenting  with  breech-loading  rifles,  of  which 
there  were  several  models  being  offered  to  the  War  Department. 

By  April,  1860,  the  Signal  Bill  having  been  favorably  reported, 
I  was  relieved  from  special  duty  and  ordered  back  to  West  Point, 
but  was  given  a  leave  of  absence  for  60  days.  During  this  leave 
I  married  Miss  Bettie  Mason  of  King  George  Co.,  Va.  Soon 
after  returning  to  West  Point  I  was  ordered  to  relieve  Lt. 
Robert  at  Fort  Steilacoom  in  Washington  Territory  with  the 
detachment  of  our  company.  With  my  wife  I  sailed  on  the 
steamer  Northern  Light  for  Aspinwall  on  Aug.  10 ;  by  the  John 
L.  Stephens  from  Panama  on  the  19th ;  and  by  the  Cortes  from 
San  Francisco  on  Sept.  8;  landing  at  Steilacoom  City  on  Sept. 
20.  All  steamers  of  those  days  were  side  wheelers. 

The  post  was  commanded  by  Col.  Silas  Casey  of  the  9th  In- 
fantry, and  garrisoned  by  two  companies  of  the  9th  Infantry 
and  our  detachment  of  36  Engineer  troops  under  Lt.  Thomas 
L.  Casey.  There  were  no  duties  but  those  of  company  routine. 
The  post  was  a  very  pleasant  one,  the  woods  and  waters  abounded 
in  game  and  fish,  the  climate  was  mild  and  open,  and  the  fall  and 
winter  passed  rapidly.  But  it  was  a  period  of  great  anxiety  to 
Southern  officers  whose  native  states,  after  debating  the 
question  of  secession,  began  one  after  another  to  take  the 
step. 

There  was  generally  little  active  interest  taken  by  army  officers 
in  political  questions,  but,  with  few  exceptions,  the  creed  was 
held  that,  as  a  matter  of  course,  in  case  war  should  result  from 
secession,  each  officer  would  go  with  his  state.  In  Feb.  we 
received  news  of  the  secession  of  Georgia.  There  seemed  then, 
however,  strong  probability  of  a  peaceful  separation.  In  March 
came  orders  for  the  return  of  our  detachment  to  West  Point. 

No  vessel  was  then  running  to  any  port  in  Puget  Sound,  and 
we  had  to  wait  until  special  arrangements  for  our  transportation 
could  be  made.  Our  Quartermaster  Department,  however, 
maintained  an  armed  vessel,  the  Massachusetts,  upon  the  Sound 
to  keep  off  invasions  of  the  Stikane  Indians,  who  made  raids 


FROM  THE  U.S.A.  INTO  THE  C.S.A.  5 

from  Alaska  in  their  immense  war  canoes.  This  vessel  was 
directed  to  take  us  to  Port  Townsend,  and  there  the  Cortes, 
which  ran  between  San  Francisco  and  Vancouver's  Island,  would 
call  and  get  us. 

We  sailed  from  Steilacoom  City  in  the  afternoon  of  April  9, 
1861.  Four  years  later,  to  an  hour,  I  saw  Gen.  Lee  ride  back 
to  his  lines  from  Appomattox  Court  House,  where  he  had  just 
surrendered  his  army.  On  April  12  we  took  the  Cortes,  and, 
after  touching  at  Squimault  and  Portland,  we  reached  San 
Francisco  on  the  20th.  We  were  too  late  to  catch  the  Panama 
steamer  of  that  date,  as  we  had  hoped,  and  the  next  boat  was 
May  1. 

As  our  steamer  made  fast  to  the  wharf  all  my  personal  plans 
were  upset.  A  special  messenger,  waiting  on  the  wharf,  came 
aboard  and  handed  me  an  order  by  telegraph  and  Pony  Express 
relieving  me  from  duty  with  my  company,  and  ordering  me  to 
report  to  Lt.  McPherson  in  charge  of  Alcatraz  Island,  San 
Francisco  harbor. 

I  was  very  sorry  to  receive  this  order,  as  it  deprived  me  of 
transportation,  leaving  me,  with  my  wife,  over  6000  miles  from 
home  by  the  only  available  route,  and  it  precipitated  my  own 
resignation,  which  I  might  have  reasonably  delayed  until  I  was 
back  in  the  East. 

But  there  was  now  no  longer  any  doubt  that  war  was  inevi- 
table, and,  indeed,  within  a  day  or  two  the  Pony  Express  and 
telegraph  line  brought  news  of  the  fall  of  Fort  Sumter. 

So  when  I  reported  to  McPherson,  in  obedience  to  my  orders, 
I  told  him  that  I  must  resign  and  go  with  my  state,  and  I  begged 
that  he  would  forward  my  resignation,  and  at  the  same  time 
give  me  a  leave  of  absence,  which  would  allow  me  to  go  home 
and  await  the  acceptance  of  my  resignation  there.  He  had 
authority  to  give  such  leave,  and,  unless  he  gave  it,  I  would  be 
compelled  to  remain  in  San  Francisco,  which  would  detain  me 
at  least  two  months. 

While  McPherson  proved  himself  afterward  to  be  a  great 
soldier,  he  was  also  one  of  the  most  attractive  and  universally 
beloved  and  admired  men  whom  I  have  ever  met.  His  reply  to 
my  request  was  like  a  prophecy  in  its  foresight,  and  its  affec- 


6  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

tionate  kindness  appealed  to  me  very  deeply.    I  have  always 
remembered  the  conversation  vividly.     He  said :  — 

"If  you  must  go,  I  will  give  the  leave  of  absence,  and  do  all  in  my 
power  to  facilitate  your  going.  But  don't  go.  These  urgent  orders  to 
stop  you  here  are  meant  to  say  that,  if  you  are  willing  to  keep  out  of  the 
war  on  either  side,  you  can  do  so.  They  mean  that  you  will  not  be  asked 
to  go  into  the  field  against  your  own  people,  but  that  you  will  be  kept  on 
this  coast,  upon  fortification  duty,  as  long  as  the  war  lasts.  Gen.  Tot- 
ten  likes  you  and  wants  to  keep  you  in  the  Corps.  That  is  what  these 
orders  mean.  This  war  is  not  going  to  be  the  ninety  days  affair  that 
papers  and  politicians  are  predicting.  Both  sides  are  in  deadly  earnest, 
and  it  is  going  to  be  fought  out  to  the  bitter  end.  If  you  go,  as  an  educated 
soldier,  you  will  be  put  in  the  front  rank.  God  only  knows  what  may 
happen  to  you  individually,  but  for  your  cause  there  can  be  but  one 
result.  It  must  be  lost.  Your  whole  population  is  only  about  eight  mil- 
lions, while  the  North  has  twenty  millions.  Of  your  eight  millions,  three 
millions  are  slaves  who  may  become  an  element  of  danger.  You  have  no 
army,  no  navy,  no  treasury,  and  practically  none  of  the  manufactures 
and  machine  shops  necessary  for  the  support  of  armies,  and  for  war  on  a 
large  scale.  You  are  but  scattered  agricultural  communities,  and  you 
will  be  cut  off  from  the  rest  of  the  world  by  blockade.  Your  cause  must 
end  in  defeat,  and  the  individual  risks  to  you  must  be  great.  On  the 
other  hand,  if  you  stay  out  here,  you  will  soon  be  left  the  ranking  engineer 
officer  on  this  whole  coast.  Every  one  of  the  older  officers  will  soon  be 
called  East  for  active  service,  and  there  will  be  casualties  and  promotion, 
and  probably  increase  of  the  Corps.  Meanwhile  you  will  have  every 
chance  to  make  a  reputation  for  yourself  as  an  engineer,  and  you  will 
have  charge  of  this  big  Lime  Point  reservation,  about  10,000  acres,  all 
covered  with  wild  oats.  Buy  a  flock  of  sheep  and  put  on  it,  hire  a  Mexican 
to  herd  them,  and  in  four  years  you  will  be  a  rich  man.  The  city  of  San 
Francisco,  too,  is  filling  in  water  lots,  and  the  Engineer  officers  are  con- 
sulted in  fixing  the  harbor  lines.  This  will  give  you  information  and 
opportunities  in  making  good  investments.  Briefly,  remaining  here  you 
have  every  opportunity  for  professional  reputation,  for  promotion,  and 
for  wealth.  Going  home  you  have  every  personal  risk  to  run,  and  in  a 
cause  foredoomed  to  failure." 

I  could  not  but  be  greatly  impressed  by  this  appeal.  It  made 
me  realize,  as  I  had  never  done  before,  the  gravity  of  the  decision 
which  I  had  to  make.  But  one  consideration  was  inexorable : 
/  must  go  with  my  people.  So  I  answered :  — 

"What  you  say  is  probably  all  true.  But  my  situation  is  just  this. 
My  people  are  going  to  war.  They  are  in  deadly  earnest,  believing  it  to 


FROM  THE  U.S.A.  INTO  THE  C.S.A.  7 

be  for  their  liberty.  If  I  don't  come  and  bear  my  part,  they  will  believe 
me  to  be  a  coward.  And  I  shall  not  know  whether  I  am  or  not.  I  have 
just  got  to  go  and  stand  my  chances." 

His  reply  was,  "In  your  situation  I  would  probably  feel  the 
same  way  about  it."  So  I  wrote  my  resignation,  dating  it 
May  1,  and  McPherson  gave  me  leave  of  absence,  and  did  every- 
thing possible  to  make  my  going  easy  and  comfortable.  I  never 
saw  him  again  after  our  sad  parting  on  the  dock,  for,  as  he  had 
foreseen,  he  was  ordered  East,  and,  having  been  made  a  major- 
general  and  won  high  distinction,  was  killed  at  Atlanta  in  July, 
1864. 

My  resignation  was  duly  accepted,  and  notice  reached  me  in 
August,  before  the  mails  to  the  South  through  Kentucky  were 
entirely  discontinued.  We  sailed  on  May  1  in  the  Golden  Age, 
crossed  the  Isthmus  on  the  14th,  and  arrived  in  New  York  on 
steamer  Champion  on  the  24th,  having  lost  two  days  in  a  severe 
gale.  We  landed  early,  and  had  intended  remaining  in  New 
York  for  a  day  or  two,  but  while  we  had  been  upon  our  journey, 
events  had  been  in  progress. 

President  Lincoln  had  called  for  75,000  troops.  All  of  the 
border  states  had  refused  to  furnish  troops,  and  had  taken  part 
with  those  which  had  seceded,  and  a  small  Federal  army  had  been 
collected  at  Washington.  On  the  night  before  our  arrival  a  part 
of  this  force  was  marched  across  into  Virginia,  and  occupied 
Alexandria. 

Col.  Ellsworth,  commanding  the  leading  regiment,  had  entered 
a  hotel  and  torn  down  a  secession  flag  from  its  roof.  The  pro- 
prietor, Jackson,  had  shot  Ellsworth  dead  as  he  came  down- 
stairs, and  had  been  killed  himself. 

My  wife  and  I  were  shopping  in  Canal  Street  about  noon,  when 
a  man  rushed  into  the  store  and  shouted  out  this  news.  The 
excitement  which  this  caused,  and  the  hostility  to  all  Confeder- 
ates evident  in  general  conversation,  warned  me  that  if  I  were 
known  to  be  a  resigned  officer  on  my  way  to  enter  the  Con- 
federate army  I  might  encounter  trouble. 

We  cut  short  our  shopping  and  decided  to  leave  for  Louisville 
by  the  first  train.  Kentucky  was  endeavoring  to  take  a  position 
of  neutrality  in  the  conflict,  and  through  that  state  we  could 


8  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

make  our  way  to  Georgia.  We  left  at  5  P.M.  on  26th  by  the 
Erie  road,  and  going  through  Cleveland,  Cincinnati,  Seymour, 
and  Jefferson,  we  reached  Louisville  on  the  27th  and  Chat- 
tanooga on  May  28.  Here  I  met  the  Confederate  Secretary  of 
War,  Hon.  L.  P.  Walker,  on  his  way  to  Richmond,  Va.,  now 
the  capital  of  the  Confederacy. 

I  called  on  him  and  was  told  that  a  commission  as  captain  of 
Engineers  was  awaiting  my  acceptance.  Of  course  I  accepted, 
and  promised  to  report  in  Richmond  as  soon  as  I  could  leave 
my  wife  in  Washington,  Ga.,  at  my  father's  home.  We  spent 
that  night  in  Atlanta,  and  reached  Washington,  Thursday,  May 
30.  The  next  day  I  left  for  Richmond  and  arrived  there  Satur- 
day night,  June  1. 

One  feature  of  this  eight  days'  journey,  which  I  recall  very 
distinctly,  was  the  comparative  impressions  made  upon  me  by 
the  camps,  and  the  preparations  for  war,  which  I  saw  every- 
where, both  at  the  North  and  in  the  South.  They  recalled 
McPherson's  comparison  of  the  military  strength  of  the  two 
sections,  and  did  not  discredit  his  predictions. 

The  camps  near  the  principal  Northern  towns  were  all  of  regi- 
ments. Those  in  the  South  were  mostly  of  a  company  each. 
The  arms  of  the  Northern  troops  were  generally  the  long-range 
rifled  muskets.  Those  of  the  Southern  troops  were  almost  uni- 
versally the  old-fashioned  smooth-bore  muskets.  The  Northern 
troops  were  always  neatly  uniformed  in  blue,  their  camps  seemed 
well  equipped,  and  there  was  generally  some  visible  show  of  mili- 
tary discipline  about'  them.  The  Confederate  uniforms  were 
blue,  gray,  or  brown,  arid  sometimes  uniforms  were  lacking. 
There  was,  too,  a  noticeable  contrast  in  the  physical  appearance 
of  the  men,  the  Northern  and  Western  men  having  more  flesh 
and  better  color.  As  physical  machines,  to  withstand  hardships, 
a  casual  observer  would  have  pronounced  them  superior  to  their 
antagonists.  But  I  lived  to  see  that  appearances  may  deceive. 
Indeed,  it  became  a  never-ceasing  wonder,  to  the  very  end  at 
Appomattox,  to  see  how  our  lean,  ill-equipped  ranks  would  fight, 
all  the  harder,  it  seemed,  as  the  men  grew  thinner  and  more 
ragged  and  hungry  looking. 

Here  it  is  in  order  to  speak  briefly  of  one  of  the  incidents  lead- 


FROM  THE  U.S.A.  INTO  THE  C.S.A.  9 

ing  up  to  the  attack  upon  Fort  Sumter,  the  history  of  which  is 
instructive. 

This  attack  is  often  spoken  of  as  the  first  hostile  act  of  the  war. 
Really  the  first  hostile  act  was  the  transfer  of  the  garrison  of 
Fort  Moultrie  into  Fort  Sumter,  stealthily  accomplished  during 
the  night  of  Dec.  26,  1860,  the  guns  of  Moultrie  being  spiked, 
and  their  ammunition  destroyed.  It  was  a  military  measure 
which  utterly  changed  the  status  quo. 

Both  the  S.C.  authorities  and  President  Buchanan  were 
earnestly  anxious  to  maintain  this  status,  and  the  War  De- 
partment, in  its  anxiety,  had  sent  a  specially  detailed  officer, 
Maj.  Don  Carlos  Buell  (afterward  Maj.-Gen.)  to  impress  the 
importance  of  it  upon  Maj.  Anderson  in  command.  His  in- 
structions were  to  be  delivered  verbally,  which  is,  surely,  always 
a  mistake  in  a  matter  of  grave  importance.  Conversations  are 
too  often  and  too  easily  misunderstood,  and  exact  words 
forgotten.  In  this  case,  it  is  hard  to  believe  that  Maj.  Anderson 
could  have  so  forgotten,  not  to  say  deliberately  disobeyed,  his 
instructions  as  he  did,  had  they  been  given  in  writing.  In  that 
view  of  the  matter,  it  may  be  said  that  the  war  was  precipitated 
by  giving  important  orders  verbally.  Another  example  will  be 
found  in  the  story  of  the  battle  of  Seven  Pines  which  Gen.  Joseph 
E.  Johnston  lost  by  trusting  to  instructions  given  verbally. 

Maj.  Buell's  memorandum  of  the  verbal  instructions  given 
is  a  paper  of  over  300  words,  and  is  a  fair  sample  of  explicit 
language.  Here  is  the  sentence  especially  referring  to  any 
change  of  position  of  the  garrison  of  Fort  Moultrie :  — 

"  You  are  to  carefully  avoid  every  act  which  would  needlessly  tend  to  pro- 
voke aggression,  and  for  that  reason  you  are  not,  without  evident  and  immi- 
nent necessity,  to  take  up  any  position  which  could  be  construed  into  the 
assumption  of  a  hostile  attitude." 

These  instructions  were  given  Dec.  11.  The  Carolina  author- 
ities were  entirely  satisfied  with  the  assurances  given  that  the 
status  would  be  preserved. 

Both  sides  were,  therefore,  taken  completely  by  surprise  when 
the  morning  of  Dec.  27  dawned,  and  disclosed  what  Anderson 
had  done.  The  Secretary  of  War  telegraphed  him  as  follows : 


10  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

"  Intelligence  has  reached  here  this  morning  that  you  have  abandoned 
Fort  Moultrie,  spiked  your  guns,  burned  the  carriages,  and  gone  to  Fort 
Sumter.  It  is  not  believed,  because  there  is  no  order  for  any  such  move- 
ment. Explain  the  meaning  of  this  report." 

Anderson  made  in  all  three  explanations.  One  had  been 
written  before  being  called  for,'  at  8  P.M.  the  night  before,  when 
his  movement  was  barely  completed.  It  was  as  follows: 
"The  step  which  I  have  taken  was  in  my  opinion  necessary  to 
prevent  the  effusion  of  blood."  Next,  on  receipt  of  the  tele- 
graphic demand  for  explanation,  he  replied :  — 

"I  abandoned  Fort  Moultrie  because  I  was  certain  that  if  attacked 
my  men  must  have  been  sacrificed  and  the  command  of  the  harbor  lost." 

As  the  entire  garrison  numbered  but  75,  including  officers, 
this  was  probably  true.  But  he  had  instructions  from  the 
Secretary  of  War  reading :  — 

"It  is  neither  expected  nor  desired  that  you  should  expose  your 
own  life,  or  that  of  the  men  under  your  command,  in  a  hopeless  conflict 
in  defence  of  these  forts.  If  they  are  invested  or  attacked  by  a  force  so 
superior  that  resistance  would  in  your  judgment  be  a  useless  waste  of 
life,  it  will  be  your  duty  to  yield  to  necessity  and  make  the  best  terms  in 
your  power." 

Anderson  had  been  selected  for  the  command,  as  a  native  of 
a  neutral  state,  Kentucky,  and  as  one  who,  it  was  hoped,  would 
not  be  stampeded  by  imaginary  danger.  But  his  correspondence 
had  indicated  nervousness,  and  this  had  probably  inspired  the 
instructions  here  quoted.  They  evidently,  however,  failed  of 
then"  intended  effect. 

After  sending  the  telegram,  Maj.  Anderson,  for  the  first  time 
apparently,  recalled  that  he  had  been  strictly  cautioned  against 
a  needless  stampede,  and  that  he  would  be  expected  to  show 
some  more  pressing  necessity  for  his  action.  He  accordingly 
wrote  a  third  explanation  as  follows :  — 

"  In  addition  to  my  reasons  given  in  my  telegram,  and  in  my  letter  of 
last  night,  I  will  add,  as  my  opinion,  that  many  things  convinced  me  that 
the  authorities  of  the  state  designed  to  proceed  to  a  hostile  act." 

A  weaker  defence  of  such  gross  disobedience  of  orders  cannot 
be  conceived.  In  all  the  acrimony  of  the  times,  no  one  ever 
alleged  the  existence  of  any  design  to  violate  the  status. 


FROM  THE  U.S.A.  INTO  THE  C.S.A.  11 

President  Buchanan  felt  himself  pledged,  and  decided  to  order 
Anderson  back  to  Fort  Moultrie,  and  acquainted  the  Secretary 
of  War,  Stanton,  with  his  decision.  The  Secretary  immediately 
set  to  work  to  defeat  this  intention.  He  summoned  Dan  Sickles, 
and  planned  with  him  to  have  at  once  salutes  of  100  guns  fired 
in  New  York  and  Philadelphia  in  honor  of  Anderson's  act,  and  to 
have  telegrams  in  hundreds  showered  on  the  President,  congratu- 
lating him  as  a  second  Jackson,  and  a  saviour  of  the  country  by 
his  firmness.1. 

These  demonstrations  were  effectively  made  under  the  joint 
action  of  Sickles  and  John  Russell  Young  in  Washington,  of 
Dougherty  in  Philadelphia,  and  of  Rynders  in  New  York.  They 
worked  upon  the  weak  side  of  Buchanan's  character,  and  Ander- 
son was  allowed  to  remain  in  Fort  Sumter. 

Buchanan  excused  himself  to  the  Carolinians  by  saying  that 
he  would  have  ordered  Anderson  back,  had  they  given  him  time 
before  themselves  taking  possession  of  Moultrie,  and  raising  their 
flag  over  it.  It  was  a  poor  excuse,  but  it  was  an  occasion  when 
any  excuse  would  do.  Passion  was  inflamed  on  both  sides  and 
recriminations  began.  The  position  occupied  by  Anderson  was 
one  of  unstable  equilibrium,  impossible  to  be  long  maintained. 
He  had  indeed  saved  the  "effusion  of  blood"  of  his  own  command, 
but  the  act  made  inevitable  a  deluge  of  other  blood. 

The  crisis  came  in  April,  when  Fort  Sumter  ran  short  of  pro- 
visions, and  here  the  Confederate  leaders  lost  the  opportunity 
of  their  lives  in  not  allowing  provisions  to  be  supplied,  and  other- 
wise maintaining  the  then  status.  They  might  thus  have  avoided 
at  least  the  odium  of  firing  the  first  gun,  and  gained  valuable 
time  for  preparation,  or  for  possible  compromises  through  the 
influence  of  the  border  states.  But  no  compromise  is  ever  pos- 
sible after  the  firing  of  the  first  gun.  There  is  in  it  some  quality 
which  stirs  the  human  heart  as  nothing  else  can  do.  Had  the 
British  not  fired  upon  the  Colonials  at  Lexington  in  1775,  we 
might  all  have  been  Colonials  yet.  For  blood  is  thicker  than 
water,  and  were  it  not  so,  the  development  of  nations  would  often 
prove  painfully  slow. 

1  Men  and  Memories,  Mrs.  J.  R.  Young,  p.  25. 


12 


MILITARY  MEMOIRS 


X      * 

X 

\ 

\ 


/ 


N 


FIELD  OF  BULL  RUN 


CHAPTER  II 
THE.  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN  (JULY,  1861) 

At  Richmond.  Gen.  Robert  S.  Garnett.  Orders  Received.  At  Manas- 
sas.  Installing  Signal  Stations.  Strategic  Opportunities.  Beauregard's 
Suggestions.  McDowell's  Moves.  Orders  sent  Johnston.  Johnston 
Marches.  Patterson  remains  Ignorant.  The  Odds  against  Us. 
Marked  Batteries,  etc.  Blackburn's  Ford.  An  Infantry  Skirmish. 
An  Artillery  Duel.  New  Plan  Needed.  Plan  Adopted.  McDowell  Over- 
persuaded.  In  the  Confederate  Lines.  McDowell's  New  Plan.  Beau- 
regard's  Plan.  How  it  Failed.  Tyler  at  Stone  Bridge.  At  the  Signal 
Station.  Beauregard  Informed.  A  Pause.  The  Dust  Cloud.  The 
Action  Begun.  Bee  and  Bartow  come  in.  The  Generals  go  to  the  Left. 
Watching  the  Battle.  Johnston  and  Beauregard  Arrive.  Reenforce- 
ment  sent  for.  McDowell's  Four  Idle  Brigades.  Two  Hours'  Fighting. 
The  Henry  House  Hill.  Cummings's  Brilliant  Coup.  The  Federal 
Collapse.  Leaving  Signal  Station.  Stragglers  in  the  Rear.  Davis  and 
Jackson.  Lost  Opportunities.  Order  checking  Kershaw.  Order 
stopping  Pursuit.  Affairs  on  the  Right.  Jones  and  Longstreet. 
Bonham  takes  the  Lead.  Bonham  Halts.  Overcaution  in  New 
Commanders.  The  Final  Scene.  Return  from  the  Field.  Hill's 
Report.  Inaction  of  Council. 

I  ARRIVED  in  Richmond,  Saturday  night,  June  1,  reported  for 
duty  Monday  morning,  and  received  my  commission  as  captain 
of  Engineers.  Engineer  officers  were  in  demand,  but  President 
Davis  remembered  my  appearing  with  Maj.  Myer  before  the 
Military  Committee  of  the  Senate,  in  connection  with  the  system 
of  signals,  and  I  was  first  ordered  to  start  in  Richmond  a  little 
factory  of  signal  apparatus,  such  as  torches,  poles,  and  flags.  I 
was  told  that  I  would  soon  be  sent  to  install  the  system  in  some 
one  of  the  small  armies  being  collected  at  several  points. 

I  was  quickly  ready,  and  anxious  for  orders,  which  for  some 
cause  were  delayed.  Gen.  Robert  S.  Garnett  was  in  Richmond 
at  the  time,  organizing  a  force  for  service  in  West  Virginia, 
and  made  application  for  me  upon  his  staff,  but  it  was  refused. 
He  had  been  Commandant  of  the  Corps  of  Cadets  during  my 

13 


14  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

first  year  at  West  Point,  and  the  impression  I  formed  of  him 
as  a  soldier  is  not  lower  than  that  formed  of  any  other  officer 
I  have  ever  known.  In  every  one  else  I  have  seen  some  mere 
human  traits,  but  in  Garnett  every  trait  was  purely  military. 
Had  he  lived,  I  am  sure  he  would  have  been  one  of  our  great 
\.  generals. 

He  lost  his  life,  however,  in  his  first  affair,  July  13,  1861,  near 

YS«\3>    Carrick's  Ford,  Va.,  and  in  a  characteristic  manner.    With  ten 

.y,   of  his  men,  who  were  raw  troops,  he  had  halted  to  delay  the 

enemy  at  a  creek  crossing.     His  men  were  nervous  under  a  sharp 

fire,  and  Garnett  remarked  that  "they  needed  a  little  example." 

He  stepped  out  hi  full  view  of  the  enemy  and  walked  slowly  back 

and  forth,  a  target  for  the  sharpshooters.     He  was  presently 

shot  dead,  just  when  he  was  prepared  to  withdraw. . 

Nearly  the  whole  of  June  passed  while  I  was  kept,  from  day  to 
day,  awaiting  orders.  Near  the  end  of  June,  I  was  ordered  to 
organize  five  batteries  of  artillery  into  a  battalion,  and  prepare 
them  for  the  field.  I  was  forming  classes  for  the  instruction  of 
officers,  and  making  requisitions  for  supplies  when  new  orders 
came,  sending  me  to  signal  duty  with  Beauregard  at  Manassas. 

I  had  just  decided  to  have  my  wife  come  on  to  Richmond,  and 
she  was  en  route  when  I  had  to  leave.  I  regretted  giving  up  the 
Artillery  Battalion.  It  would  have  been  a  decided  step  in  advance 
had  we  inaugurated,  so  soon,  a  battalion  organization  of  several 
batteries.  We  came  to  it  about  a  year  later,  but  meanwhile  our 
batteries  had  been  isolated  and  attached  to  infantry  brigades. 
So  they  fought  singly,  and  in  such  small  units  artillery  can  do 
little. 

On  July  2, 1  arrived  at  Manassas,  reported  to  Beauregard,  was 
assigned  to  duty  upon  his  staff,  and  ordered  to  install  the  system 
of  signals  for  use  in  the  coming  battle.  It  was  certain  that  a 
battle  must  be  fought  soon. 

Federal  armies  were  being  collected  in  West  Virginia  under 
McClellan;  on  the  upper  Potomac  threatening  Winchester, 
under  Patterson;  at  Alexandria  under  McDowell;  and,  at 
Fortress  Monroe,  under  Butler.  These  armies  were  mostly  raw 
troops,  but  among  them  were  the  75,000  three-months  men,  first 
called  out  in  April,  and  they  were  now  fairly  well  disciplined. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN  15 

Their  terms  of  service  would  begin  to  expire  soon  after  the 
middle  of  July,  and  it  was  sure  that  some  use  would  sooner  be 
made  of  them.  For  we  were  then  less  a  military  nation  than 
ever  before  or  since,  and  neither  side  recognized  its  own  unpre- 
paredness. 

By  June  24  McDowell  had  submitted  a  plan  of  aggressive  opera- 
tion, and  July  8  had  been  named  as  the  date  of  the  proposed 
movement.  Gen.  Scott  had  urged  longer  delay,  and  that 
the  three-months  men  should  be  allowed  to  go,  and  their 
places  supplied  with  the  three-years  men  now  being  enlisted. 
Political  necessities,  however,  overruled  his  objections.  For- 
tunately for  the  Confederates,  with  all  their  resources  the  Federal 
forces  were  not  able  to  move  before  the  16th,  and  when  they 
did  move,  they  consumed  four  days  more,  from  the  17th  to  the 
20th  inclusive,  in  about  20  miles  of  marching  and  in  pre- 
liminaries. Battle  was  only  delivered  on  July  21,  and  the 
crisis  of  this  battle  occurred  about  3.30  P.M. 

We  shall  see  that  not  only  every  day  of  that  delay,  but  even 
every  hour  of  it,  was  essential  to  the  Confederate  victory  which 
resulted. 

So  on  my  arrival  at  Manassas,  July  2,  there  was  really  more 
time  to  install  the  signals  than  I  expected,  for  "rumors  of  the 
foe's  advance"  now  swelled  upon  almost  every  breeze.  I  had 
brought  with  me  from  Richmond  all  necessary  equipment  and  I 
had  only  to  select  men  and  train  them.  I  soon  made  acquaint- 
ances and  got  the  names  of  some  intelligent  privates,  who  might 
later  be  promoted.  I  had  these  detailed  and  put  upon  a  course 
of  instruction  and  practice.  Meanwhile  I  procured  a  horse,  and 
between  times  began  an  exploration  of  the  country  to  find  what 
facilities  it  offered  for  lines  of  signals. 

The  topography  was  far  from  favorable.  Our  line  of  battle 
had  been  chosen  behind  the  stream  of  Bull  Run,  about  three 
miles  north  of  Manassas,  and  the  course  of  the  stream  was  gen- 
erally wooded  and  bordered  with  small  fields  and  pastures, 
giving  few  open  stretches.  I  was  not  sanguine  of  rendering 
any  valuable  service,  but  fortunately  had  time  to  examine  the 
country,  and,  as  will  be  seen,  the  line  was  found  which  disclosed 
the  enemy's  attack  in  time  to  defeat  it. 


16  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

About  a  mile  east  of  Manassas,  on  the  farm  of  a  Mr.  Wilcoxen, 
was  a  high  rocky  point  having  a  good  outlook  over  a  valley 
to  the  north  and  west.  I  made  this  point  a  central  station,  and 
by  a  little  clearing  here  and  there  got  two  straight  six-mile 
ranges.  One  was  northwest  to  a  bluff  over  Bull  Run  valley  on  our 
extreme  left,  near  the  house  of  Van  Ness,  just  above  the  Stone 
Bridge  by  which  the  Warrenton  Turnpike  crossed  Bull  Run. 
The  other  was  north,  to  Centreville,  about  three  miles  beyond 
the  Run,  opposite  our  centre.  A  third  station  was  found  near 
the  house  of  McLean,  opposite  our  right  centre,  and  a  fourth 
near  our  headquarters  at  Centreville.  This  was  the  utmost 
the  topography  permitted,  and  the  men  were  encamped  at  the 
stations  and  set  to  practising  by  day  and  night. 

Where  the  opponents  have  each  two  armies  in  the  field,  each 
has  the  opportunity  to  combine  his  whole  force  upon  his  adver- 
sary. 

This  was  the  situation  in  Northern  Virginia.  McDowell, 
at  Alexandria  with  35,000  men,  and  Patterson  near  Harper's 
Ferry,  about  50  miles  away,  with  15,000,  were  opposed  by 
Beauregard  at  Manassas  with  22,000,  and  Johnston  at  Win- 
chester with  11,000. 

No  effort  was  made  by  the  Federal  commander-in-chief  to 
unite  Patterson's  force  with  McDowell's,  but  McDowell  was 
assured  that  Patterson  should  threaten  Johnston,  and  keep  him 
in  the  Valley,  so  that  McDowell  would  have  Beauregard  only 
to  deal  with.  The  Confederate  armies,  unfortunately,  had  no 
commander-in-chief. 

In  theory  the  power  resides  with  the  President,  but  his  action 
is  apt  to  be  slow  and  comparatively  inefficient.  In  the  ap- 
proaching battle  this  was  well  illustrated.  Although  the  enemy 
was  so  slow  as  to  allow  amazing  time,  and  the  battle  was  saved, 
it  was,  as  it  were,  "by  the  skin  of  our  teeth"  and  without  any  of 
the  fruits  of  victory. 

Beauregard  had  proposed  to  the  President  on  June  12  to  take 
the  aggressive  and  unite  the  two  armies  in  an  attack  upon 
Alexandria.  It  was  disapproved,  but  Beauregard  did  not  let 
the  matter  drop. 

On  July  13  he  sent  Col.  Chestnut,  a  staff-officer,  to  Richmond 


THE  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN  17 

to  urge  the  concentration  of  the  two  armies  and  a  prompt  offen- 
sive movement.  A  formal  hearing  was  had  by  the  President, 
with  Cooper  and  Lee,  but  the  proposition  was  rejected,  on  the 
good  ground  that  the  enemy  was  as  yet  practically  within  his 
fortified  lines,  where  he  could  not  be  attacked,  and  could  bring 
up,  at  his  leisure,  Patterson  and  other  reinforcements.  The 
only  effective  way  to  combine  the  two  armies  was  to  make  it  a 
surprise  to  the  enemy  when  away  from  his  fortifications. 

About  noon,  July  16,  McDowell  put  his  army  in  motion.  There 
were  ten  brigades  in  four  divisions,  comprising  about  30,000 
men,  with  49  guns.  He  did  not  bring  his  whole  force,  but  left 
in  reserve,  in  the  works  behind  him,  Runyon's  division  of  over 
5000  men.  This  large  division  would  have  been  of  greater  value 
on  the  field,  and  he  should  have  had  at  least  100  guns,  for  artillery 
is  the  best  arm  against  raw  troops.  The  four  divisions  moved 
by  different  roads,  converging  toward  our  advanced  positions 
about  Fairfax.  They  made  on  the  first  day  only  short  marches 
of  six  or  eight  miles,  going  into  camp  far  oustide  of  our  picket 
lines,  so  as  not  to  divulge  the  movement.  This  was  so  well 
managed  that,  although  rumors  reached  the  Confederates,  yet 
nothing  was  known  until  next  morning.  Then  our  advanced 
posts  were  driven  in  and  a  few  of  our  pickets  were  captured.  At 
this  moment  Johnston's  army  should  have  been  ready  to  march 
to  Beauregard  over  roads  previously  selected  and  reconnoitred. 
The  men  should  even  have  been  kept  for  days  encamped  where 
they  could  quickly  stretch  out  on  the  proper  roads.  For  many 
contingencies  beset  all  marches,  and  preparation  saves  hours 
big  with  fate. 

The  whole  day  of  the  17th  was  lost  to  the  Confederates  by  the 
news  having  to  go  to  the  President.  Beauregard,  sometime 
during  the  day,  telegraphed  him  as  follows :  — 

"MANASSAS,  July  17,  1861. 

"The  enemy  has  assailed  my  outposts  in  heavy  force,  I  have  fallen 
back  on  the  line  of  Bull  Run,  and  will  make  a  stand  at  Mitchell's  Ford. 
If  his  force  is  overwhelming,  I  shall  retire  to  the  Rappahannock  rail- 
road bridge,  saving  my  command  for  defence  there,  and  for  future 
operations.  Please  inform  Johnston  of  this,  via  Staunton,  and  also 
Holmes.  Send  forward  any  reinforcements  at  the  earliest  possible  mo- 
ment, and  by  every  possible  means.  —  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD." 


18  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

Apparently  after  some  deliberation,  the  Executive  acted,  for 
about  1  A.M.  on  July  18,  Johnston  in  Winchester  received  a 
telegram.  It  is  worthy  of  study  as  a  model  not  to  be  followed  in 
such  cases.  It  was  as  follows  :  — 

"RICHMOND,  July  17,  1861. 

"Gen.  Beauregard  is  attacked.  To  strike  the  enemy  a  decisive  blow 
all  of  your  effective  force  will  be  needed.  If  practicable,  make  the 
movement,  sending  your  sick  and  baggage  to  Culpeper  C.  H.  either 
by  railroad  or  by  Warrenton.  In  all  the  arrangements  exercise  your 
discretion.  —  S.  COOPER,  Adj't.  and  Ins.  General." 

When  Johnston  came  to  make  his  report  of  the  battle  of 
Bull  Run  he  wrote  as  follows  of  this  message  :  — 

"About  one  o'clock  in  the  morning  of  July  18  I  received  from  the 
Government  a  telegraphic  despatch  informing  me  that  the  northern  army 
was  advancing  upon  Manassas,  then  held  by  Gen.  Beauregard,  and 
directing  me,  if  practicable,  to  go  to  that  officer's  assistance,  after  send- 
ing my  sick  to  Culpeper  C.  H.  In  the  exercise  of  discretion  conferred 
by  the  terms  of  the  order,  I  at  once  determined  to  march  to  join  Gen. 
Beauregard." 

President  Davis  took  great  offence  at  this  language  and  ordered 
the  word  "after"  before  the  words  "sending  your  sick"  to  be 
erased  from  the  report  in  the  records.  He  resented  also  Beaure- 
gard 's  speaking  of  this  order  in  his  report  as  only  permissive,  and 
not  mandatory.  And  even  in  his  book,  written  after  the  war,  he 
claims  that  the  order  was  a  "positive"  one,  and  considers  it 
"strange  that  any  one  has  construed  it  otherwise." 

The  words  "if  practicable"  are  always  of  such  doubtful 
interpretation  that  they  should  be  excluded  from  all  important 
orders.  They  leave  matters  hi  doubt.  Every  order  should  be 
distinctly  either  the  one  thing  or  the  other.  Lee  used  the 
phrase  at  Gettysburg,  in  ordering  Ewell  to  press  a  routed  enemy, 
and  lost  his  victory  by  it. 

It  is  notable,  too,  that  this  order  not  only  failed  to  urge  haste, 
but,  by  injunctions  concerning  sick  and  baggage  by  rail,  im- 
plied that  time  would  permit,  which  it  did  not.  Exclusive  use 
of  the  railroad  by  the  troops  was  absolutely  necessary. 

Had  Johnston  felt  any  reluctance  to  the  movement,  or  had 
Patterson's  attitude  been  hi  the  least  threatening,  excuses 


THE  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN  19 

would  have  been  easy  to  make  for  non-compliance.  But  John- 
ston was  a  good  soldier,  and  he  lost  no  time  in  taking  the  road. 
He  quickly  arranged  for  the  best  route  of  march,  and  for  the 
indispensable  help  of  the  railroad  in  moving  his  infantry.  His 
leading  brigade  was  under  command  of  Jackson,  soon  to  show 
the  world  the  stuff  of  which  he  was  formed,  and  to  earn  an 
immortal  name.  Jackson's  brigade  left  camp  at  noon,  and  at 
ten  o  'clock  that  night  bivouacked  at  Paris,  17  miles,  fording  the 
Shenandoah  and  crossing  the  Blue  Ridge  en  route.  This  is  an 
average  of  about  one  and  three-quarters  miles  an  hour  and  is  an 
excellent  march  under  the  circumstances. 

The  other  three  brigades,  Bee's,  Bartow's,  and  Elzey's,  made 
about  13  miles,  and  encamped  at  the  Shenandoah,  itself  a  good 
march.  Next  morning,  Friday,  the  19th,  Jackson's  brigade 
covered  the  remaining  six  miles  from  Paris  to  the  railroad  station 
at  Piedmont,  34  miles  from  Manassas  by  8  A.M.  Trains  were 
awaiting  it,  and  by  10  A.M.  it  was  off,  arriving  at  Manassas  about 
1  P.M.  say,  2500  strong  and  coming  57  miles  in  25  hours.  The 
other  brigades  arrived  at  Piedmont  during  the  afternoon;  but 
although  the  railroad  had  promised  to  deliver  all  four  brigades 
in  Manassas  by  sunrise  Saturday,  the  20th,  only  two  more 
regiments,  the  7th  and  8th  Ga.,  of  Bartow's  brigade  —  about 
1400  men  —  were  sent.  The  cavalry  and  artillery  continued 
their  march  by  the  wagon  road,  but  the  infantry  waited  at 
Piedmont,  some  of  it  for  two  days,  and  without  rations.  The 
trouble  was  that  the  railroad  had  no  relays  of  employees,  and  was 
unable  to  hold  its  men  at  constant  work. 

On  the  20th  Johnston  himself  went  with  the  4th  Ala.,  the  2d 
Miss.,  and  two  companies  of  the  llth  Miss.,  about  a  thousand 
men.  These  were  the  last  troops  to  arrive  in  time  for  the  opening 
of  the  battle. 

During  the  night,  the  6th  N.C.,  10th  Va.,  3d  Tenn.,  and  1st 
Md.  were  taken  —  about  2000  men  —  under  Kirby  Smith  and 
Elzey.  These,  arriving  at  Manassas  before  noon  on  Sunday, 
were  hurried  to  the  battlefield,  six  miles,  arrived  at  the  critical 
moment  at  the  critical  point,  and  changed  defeat  into  victory. 
The  remaining  2500  of  Johnston's  11,000  (the  9th  Ga.,  2d  Tenn., 
13th  Va.,  the  Ky.  Battalion,  and  eight  companies  of  the  llth 


20  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

Miss.)  only  arrived  the  day  after  the  battle,  having  been  nearly 
four  days  making  the  57  miles. 

On  the  19th,  while  Johnston  was  waiting  at  Piedmont,  one  of 
Beauregard  's  staff  arrived  to  sugest  that  Johnston  should  march 
by  Aldie,  and  fall  upon  McDowell's  flank  at  Centreville,  while 
Beauregard  attacked  from  Bull  Run.  It  was  an  unwise  scheme, 
and  Johnston's  decision  to  unite  the  two  armies  out  of  the 
presence  of  the  enemy  was  safest. 

Meanwhile,  by  monumental  mismanagement,  Patterson's 
army  might  as  well  have  been  upon  another  planet.  He  had 
been  notified  that  McDowell  would  advance  on  the  16th,  and 
that  he  must  hold  and  occupy  Johnston.  Accordingly,  on  the 
15th  he  advanced  from  Martinsburg  to  Bunker  Hill.  He 
remained  all  day  on  the  16th  at  Bunker  Hill,  and  on  the  17th 
moved  as  far  as  Charlestown,  in  the  direction  of  Harper 's  Ferry. 
Here  he  remained  until  after  the  battle  on  the  21st.  On  the  18th 
he  telegraphed:  — 

"  The  enemy  has  stolen  no  march  on  me.  I  have  kept  him  actively 
employed  and,  by  threats  and  reconnoissances  in  force,  caused  him  to^be 
reenforced.  I  have  accomplished,  in  this  respect,  more  than  the  General- 
in-Chief  asked,  or  could  well  be  expected  in  face  of  an  enemy  far 
superior  in  numbers."  Only  on  the  20th  did  he  find  out  that  something 
had  happened,  and  he  reports :  "  With  a  portion  of  his  force  Johnston  left 
Winchester  by  the  road  to  Millwood  on  the  afternoon  of  the  18th.  His 
whole  force  was  about  35,200." 

These  telegrams  are  fair  specimens  of  the  colossal  misinforma- 
tion often  conveyed  in  official  reports.  Johnston,  in  his  narra- 
tive, humorously  suggests  that  the  overrating  of  each  other's 
strength,  by  opposing  commanders,  resulted  probably  from  the 
same  feeling  which  made  his  antagonist's  sword  seem  to  Gil 
Bias  "  d  'une  longueur  excessive."  If  Johnston 's  sword  had  been 
as  long  as  Patterson  believed,  it  would  have  been  creditable  in 
the  latter  to  approach  even  within  14  miles. 

And  now,  at  sunrise  on  the  17th,  McDowell  is  in  front  of  our 
pickets  at  Fairfax,  and  within  10  miles  of  our  line  of  battle,  and 
he  is  to  have  us  at  the  mercy  of  his  superior  force  until  the  after- 
noon of  the  21st  —  say  four  days  and  a  half.  If  the  shades  of 
departed  warriors  watched  the  contest,  the  odds  among  them 


THE  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN  21 

against  us  at  this  stage  must  have  been  high.  Against  their  force, 
our  position  and  our  organization  were  both  inferior.  Our  line  of 
battle  was  nearly  seven  miles  long,  and  communications  in  rear  of 
it  were  poor  and  crooked.  Our  six  brigades  were  all  independent 
of  each  other,  no  divisions  having  been  formed,  and  there  were, 
besides,  several  unbrigaded  regiments  and  batteries,  making  a 
command  too  complex  to  be  efficiently  handled,  especially  with 
an  inexperienced  staff.  Apart  from  their  superior  numbers,  the 
effective-  division  organization  of  the  Federals,  and  especially 
their  batteries  of  regular  artillery  with  each  division,  would  seem 
enough  to  insure  Federal  victory  even  for  a  front  attack  by  brute 
force.  This  might  have  been  made,  even  on  the  afternoon  of  the 
17th,  by  a  bold  pursuit  of  our  advanced  guard,  which  comprised 
but  one  brigade. 

For  the  slowness  of  the  Federal  advance  that  day  (it  holds  the 
record  for  slowness)  McDowell  was  personally  responsible.  He 
had  issued  to  his  troops  a  good  order  of  march,  in  which  he  called 
attention  to  the  strength  of  each  column,  and  its  ability  to  cope 
with  all  it  was  likely  to  meet,  even  without  the  help  of  the  other 
columns.  But  he  had  spoiled  the  moral  effect  of  his  own  lan- 
guage and  practically  demoralized  his  brigade  commanders  by 
one  unwise  caution. 

It  "would  not  be  pardonable  in  any  commander  to  come  upon  a 
battery  or  breastwork  without  a  knowledge  of  its  position." 
That  caution  meant  more  to  McDowell 's  officers  than  appears 
on  its  face.  For  the  newspaper  reporters  of  those  days,  with 
the  appetite  for  sensations  which  still  distinguishes  the  craft, 
had  made  a  great  bugbear  of  "masked  batteries."  The  term 
originated  at  the  attack  upon  Fort  Sumter,  where  a  certain 
battery  was  constructed,  masked  by  a  house  which  was  destroyed 
just  before  opening  fire.  After  that  masked  batteries  figured  on 
every  field  and  in  every  event.  When  Butler  was  repulsed  at 
Big  Bethel  it  was  a  masked  battery  which  did  it.  When 
Schenck's  railroad  reconnoissance  from  Alexandria  on  June  17, 
accidentally  ran  into  Gregg's  reconnoissance  from  Manassas  at 
Vienna,  and  was  fired  into  by  Kemper's  six-pounders,  the 
mysterious  masked  battery  got  the  credit.  Soon,  to  read  the 
newspapers,  one  might  believe  the  woods  were  infested  with  such 


22  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

batteries,  not  to  mention  "Louisiana  Tigers"  and  "Black  Horse 
Cavalry,"  two  other  scarecrow  names  which  had  caught  the 
reporters'  fancies,  and  been  made  to  do  enormous  duty. 

Now,  the  threat  conveyed  in  McDowell's  order  implied  the 
real  existence  of  formidable  dangers,  and  is  doubtless  responsi- 
ble for  the  excessive  caution  which  consumed  the  day  in  making 
an  advance  scarcely  over  five  miles.  Beauregard's  advanced 
guard  had  not  sought  to  delay  the  Federals,  but  had  fallen  back 
beyond  Centreville,  where  it  bivouacked ;  and,  early  next  morn- 
ing, it  crossed  Bull  Run  and  took  position  in  the  Confederate 
line  of  battle. 

Beauregard  had  concentrated  the  bulk  of  his  force  between 
Union  Mill's  Ford,  on  the  right,  and  Mitchell's  Ford  on  the  left, 
hi  which  space  —  about  three  miles  —  he  had,  in  order  from  the 
right,  Ewell's,  D.  R.  Jones's,  Longstreet 's,  and  Bonham's 
brigades,  with  only  Early  hi  reserve  some  250  yards  behind 
Longstreet.  Cocke's  brigade  held  Ball's  Ford,  and  Evans  with 
the  4th  S.C.  and  Wheat's  La.  Battalion  held  the  Stone  Bridge, 
two  and  three  miles  to  the  left. 

On  the  morning  of  the  18th  the  slow  advance  of  the  Federals 
was  resumed,  and  about  noon  Tyler 's  division  occupied  the  hills 
overlooking  the  valley  of  Bull  Run,  opposite  Blackburn's  and 
Mitchell's  fords.  McDowell  was  not  with  his  advanced  forces. 
He  had  ridden  far  to  the  left  to  reconnoitre,  with  a  view  to  turn- 
ing our  right  flank  —  a  duty  he  might  have  more  wisely  confided 
to  his  staff.  During  his  absence  a  small  affair  occurred  at 
Blackburn's  Ford,  terminating  favorably  for  the  Confederates. 

Tyler's  instructions  were  to  reconnoitre  our  position  and  to 
threaten  our  left  so  as  to  draw  attention  to  that  quarter,  but 
not  to  bring  on  a  general  engagement.  These  instructions  were 
our  salvation,  for  our  army  was  weak  and  badly  posted  and  could 
not  have  withstood  a  vigorous  attack  by  the  force  hi  front  of  us. 
Both  of  our  flanks  were  in  the  air,  and  Bull  Run  could  be  crossed 
by  infantry  in  many  places.  Our  centre  was  a  large  salient 
whose  lines  the  enemy  could  enfilade.  The  ground  on  their 
side  was  commanding  and  afforded  close  approach  under 
excellent  cover.  On  our  side  it  was  low  and  gently  rising  to  the' 
rear,  giving  no  cover  whatever,  except  of  the  woods.  Our  whole 


THE  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN  23 

force  present  on  the  field  was  about  21,000,  of  whom  about 
5000  (Evans's  and  Cocke's  commands)  were  too  far  to  the  left 
to  be  available.  McDowell's  force  available  was  about  37,000.* 

Tyler,  about  noon,  brought  up  some  guns  and  began  firing  at 
the  few  points  in  our  territory  where  he  could  discern  signs  of 
our  presence.2 

After  cannonading  for  some  time  without  drawing  reply,  Tyler 
ordered  Richardson's  brigade  to  scour  the  woods  in  front,  and  a 
squadron  of  cavalry  with  two  guns  to  advance  on  the  road  to 
Mitchell's  Ford.  Two  of  our  guns  under  Kemper  fired  upon  the 
cavalry  when  it  came  into  view.  It  was  quickly  withdrawn,  and 
Tyler  soon  decided  to  withdraw  Richardson  also.  Meanwhile, 
this  brigade  had  suddenly  become  engaged.  It  had  found  itself 
on  a  low  bluff  overlooking  Bull  Run,  scarcely  50  yards  away,  a 
thin  fringe  of  woods  intervening.  Just  across  the  creek  was 
Longstreet's  brigade,  about  1400  strong,  occupying  the  low 
opposite  bank  of  the  stream.  Immediately  both  sides  opened 
fire,  and  a  portion  of  Longstreet's  men,  finding  themselves  in 
the  lower  position  and  on  open  ground,  broke  to  the  rear  badly. 
Longstreet  rode  among  and  rallied  them,  and  soon  led  them 
back,  the  enemy's  line  having  also  withdrawn  under  cover. 
Longstreet  called  upon  Early  for  reinforcement,  and  the  7th 
La.  was  sent  forward  to  him.  Meanwhile  the  Federals  made 
a  second  advance  and  poured  in  another  volley  and  fell 
back.  These  tactics  were  repeated  several  times,  Longstreet 
meanwhile  attempting  to  cross  some  of  his  men  over  the  ford 
to  meet  the  enemy.  The  7th  La.,  however,  on  one  of  the 
Federal  advances,  had  opened  fire  while  still  behind  Longstreet's 
line.  This  fire  in  the  rear  threw  Longstreet  into  such  confusion 
that  the  order  to  cross  was  recalled.  OUT  line  was  in  bad  shape 

1  O.  R.  2,  309. 

1  One  of  these  was  the  Wilmer  McLean  residence,  on  a  shady  knoll  in  the 
cultivated  fields  a  half  mile  in  the  rear  of  Bull  Run,  which  Beauregard  had 
announced  as  his  headquarters  for  the  battle.  One  of  the  earliest  shots 
struck  the  kitchen  and  ruined  the  dinner  being  prepared.  Within  a  year 
the  family  were  compelled  to  abandon  the  plantation  and  remove  to  another, 
which  they  owned,  at  Appomattox  C.  H.,  Va.  Here,  by  remarkable  coin- 
cidence on  April  9,  1865,  the  last  fighting  between  the  same  two  armies 
took  place,  upon  their  land  as  the  first  had  done.  Grant  made  his  head- 
quarters in  their  residence,  and  in  it  Lee  made  the  surrender  of  his  army. 


24  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

when  the  Federal  attack  ceased  and  their  force  was  rapidly  with- 
drawn. Two  companies,  however,  under  Captain  Marye  had 
crossed  the  stream,  and  these  pursued  the  enemy's  retreat  for 
some  distance  and  brought  back  some  20  prisoners  and  100 
muskets.  This  gave  an  air  of  victory  to  the  termination  of  the 
infantry  combat. 

There  then  followed  a  sharp  artillery  duel,  for  about  45  minutes. 
The  Federals  engaged  eight  guns  (two  20-Pr.  and  two  10-Pr. 
Parrott  rifles ;  two  6-Pr.  guns  and  two  12-Pr.  howitzers),  and  fired 
415  rounds.  The  Confederates  engaged  seven  guns,  four  6-Pr. 
guns  and  three  3-inch  iron  rifles,  made  in  Richmond,  firing  a 
6-Pr.  Burton  and  Archer  projectile.  They  fired  310  rounds. 
Our  guns  stood  in  the  open  plateau  about  150  yards  behind  our 
infantry  line,  and  were  hidden  from  the  enemy's  view  by  the 
thin  fringe  of  tall  timber  along  the  creek.  This  saved  us  from  a 
speedy  defeat,  for  our  limbers  and  caissons  were  without  cover 
until  Longstreet  ordered  them  brought  forward  on  the  flanks, 
and  kept  them  behind  the  trees.  Thus  neither  of  the  comba- 
tants could  see  more  of  the  other  than  the  smoke  of  his  guns,  and 
the  fire  was  but  little  better  than  random. 

Our  guns  belonged  to  the  Washington  Arty,  of  New  Orleans, 
the  oldest  and  best  drilled  organization  of  artillery  in  the  Con- 
federacy, and  it  illustrates  the  lack  of  professional  skill  among 
our  volunteers  to  know  that  a  favorable  report  was  made  upon 
the  Burton  and  Archer  projectile,  from  its  performance  in  this 
affair,  where  it  was  used  for  the  first  time.  Yet,  the  first  com- 
petent test,  made  of  it  a  few  weeks  later,  showed  it  to  be  entirely 
worthless  and  caused  its  manufacture  to  be  at  once  discontinued. 
It  would  not  fly  point  foremost,  but  "tumbled"  and  had  no 
range. 

Besides  these  three  rifles  with  ineffective  ammunition,  a  fourth 
Confederate  gun,  a  brass  6-Pr.,  soon  became  useless  from  an 
enlarged  vent.  During  the  first  half  of  the  affair,  however,  the 
enemy's  fire  was  not  accurate  and  all  went  well.  There  was 
then  a  pause  during  which  they  managed  to  improve  their  aim, 
and,  when  they  resumed,  our  men  soon  realized  how  they  were 
overmatched.  Capt.  Eshleman  was  wounded  and  Capt.  Squires 
called  for  reinforcement.  Longstreet  had  no  more  artillery 


THE  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN  25 

available,  and  ordered  Squires  to  withdraw  gradually,  one  gun 
at  a  time,  but  meanwhile  to  keep  up  a  slow  reply. 

Just  then,  as  so  often  happens  when  a  battle  is  becoming 
desperate,  the  enemy  ceased  to  fire,  and  allowed  Squires,  who 
deserved  it,  the  honor  of  the  last  shot,  and  Beauregard  the  in- 
valuable morale  of  the  first  victory.  In  this  duel  the  Confeder- 
ates had  one  killed,  five  wounded,  and  six  horses  disabled.  The 
Federals  two  killed,  two  wounded.  In  the  whole  affair  the  losses 
were :  — 

Confederate :  15  killed,  53  wounded,    0  missing  68  total 

Federal:          19     "       38       "          26      "  83     " 

On  the  night  of  the  18th  McDowell  found  himself  compelled 
to  make  a  change  hi  the  plan  of  attack  which  had  been  decided 
on  in  Washington  before  starting.  That  had  contemplated 
turning  of  our  right  flank.  But  his  reconnoissance  in  that  direc- 
tion had  found  the  country  so  wooded  and  broken,  and  with 
so<  few  good  roads,  as  to  be  unfavorable  for  operations.  His 
next  thought  was  of  direct  attack  upon  our  front.  That  was, 
beyond  question,  his  best  opportunity. 

We  had,  practically,  no  intrenchment,  and  there  were  gaps, 
sometimes  wide  ones,  between  out  brigades.  Holmes's  brigade 
of  two  regiments  (the  2d  Tenn.  and  9th  Ark.),  coming  from 
Acquia  Creek,  did  not  arrive  until  late  on  the  19th.  The  con- 
fusion caused  in  our  ranks  by  Tyler's  demonstration  —  for  it 
can  scarcely  be  called  an  attack  —  indicates  that  a  serious 
effort  with  the  whole  force  at  hand  would  have  succeeded. 

McDowell  had  disapproved  of  Tyler's  affair,  upon  his  return 
from  his  reconnoissance,  and  seems  to  have  misunderstood  the 
facts.  In  his  official  report  he  writes  that  this  affair  had  shown 
us  to  be  too  strong  to  be  attacked  at  Blackburn's  Ford.  He  also 
states  that  the  Stone  Bridge  was  mined  and  defended  by  a 
battery  and  a  heavy  abattis,  and  that  his  only  alternative  was 
to  seek  a  route  to  turn  our  left  flank.  No  one  of  these  state- 
ments was  correct.  At  Stone  Bridge  there  was  neither  abattis, 
earthwork,  nor  mine.  There  were  only  two  6-Pr.  guns  with 
the  4th  S.C.  regiment  and  Wheat's  La.  battalion  —  say  1400 
men.  There  were  no  other  supports  within  a  mile. 


26  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

The  movement  decided  upon,  however,  promised  excellent 
results  if  it  could  be  carried  out  before  Beauregard  was  reen- 
forced.  It  was  decided  to  turn  the  Confederate  left  by  cross- 
ing Bull  Run  above  the  Stone  Bridge.  This  involved  further 
loss  of  time  in  reconnoissance,  but  confidence  was  felt  that 
Patterson  would  keep  Johnston  in  the  valley,  so  the  engineers 
were  ordered  to  find  the  desired  roads.  It  was  not  dreamed 
that  Johnston's  forces  were  crossing  the  Blue  Ridge  as  the  sun 
was  setting  that  afternoon. 

McDowell  proposed  to  make  his  reconnoissance  by  main  force, 
driving  hi  our  pickets  and  developing  our  exact  position  and 
strength,  but  he  weakly  allowed  himself  to  be  persuaded,  in- 
stead, into  a  reconnoissance  by  stealth,  which  is  less  to  be  de- 
pended upon. 

It  is  worthy  of  note  that  upon  three  occasions  in  this  advance 
McDowell  was  persuaded  by  his  leading  subordinates  to  modify 
orders  which  he  had  issued  and  these  modifications  lost  him  the 
battle.  The  first  occasion  was  on  the  17th,  when  his  army  only 
marched  some  five  or  six  miles,  as  already  noted.  McDowell 
wished  to  have  the  march  prolonged  to  12  miles,  but  yielded  to 
persuasion  to  go  into  bivouac  when  half  the  distance  was  covered. 
That  practically  lost  the  entire  day. 

The  second  occasion  was  the  reconnoissance  by  stealth  to  which 
he  now  consented.  It  occupied  a  day  and  a  half  and  went  miles 
astray,  as  may  now  be  seen,  in  finding  the  shortest  route.  It 
was  noon  on  the  20th  when  the  engineers  made  their  report  of 
having  found  a  concealed  road  crossing  Bull  Run  at  Sudley 
Ford,  and  the  march  was  decided  upon.  From  their  present 
camps  the  average  distances  to  be  covered  by  the  turning 
brigades  were  between  nine  and  ten  miles.  McDowell  proposed 
that  they  should  make  four  miles  that  afternoon,  leaving  only 
six  for  the  next  morning.  For  the  third  time  his  officers  pro- 
posed, and  McDowell  consented  to,  a  change.  It  would  be  more 
convenient,  they  urged,  to  remain  in  their  camps  that  afternoon 
and  night,  and  to  march  a  couple  of  hours  earlier  in  the  morn- 
ing, say  at  2.30  A.M.  Orders  were  issued,  accordingly,  for  the 
21st.  When  they  came  to  be  executed,  the  routes  of  various 
commands  were  found  to  interfere,  and  although  there  was  a 


THE  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN  27 

bright  moon,  and  the  country  was  open  and  roads  good,  the 
head  of  column  was  about  four  hours  in  covering  the  first  four 
miles.  This  involved  a  further  loss  of  at  least  two  hours. 

It  is  now  time  to  revert  to  the  Confederate  lines  and  note  what 
had  happened  on  the  19th  and  20th.  An  attack  in  force  by  the 
Federals  had  been  expected  each  morning,  and  its  non-occur- 
rence gratefully  appreciated.  It  might  be  supposed  that  our 
time  would  have  been  busily  used  to  intrench,  erect  batteries, 
and  provide  abattis  and  obstructions,  but  almost  nothing  of  the 
sort  was  done.  It  required  a  year's  experience  to  educate  our 
army  to  the  value  of  such  work,  although  the  enemy  meanwhile 
not  only  set  us  many  examples,  but  had  given  us  some  severe 
object  lessons.  On  the  19th  Holmes's  brigade  had  arrived  from 
Acquia  Creek.  It  took  position  behind  Ewell,  on  our  right  flank. 
Jackson's  brigade  also  arrived  and  was  placed  in  reserve  behind 
Mitchell's  Ford.  On  the  20th  Johnston  arrived  in  person, 
also  the  7th  and  8th  Ga.  of  pBartow's  brigade,  the  4th  Ala., 
and  the  2d  Miss,  of  Bee's.  These  troops  were  placed  in 
reserve  behind  Blackburn's  Ford.  As  already  told,  these  were 
the  only  troops  of  Johnston's  army  to  arrive  in  time  for  the 
beginning  of  the  battle,  though  another  brigade  under  Kirby 
Smith  arrived  in  time  to  turn  the  wavering  scale  about  3  P.M. 
on  the  21st. 

It  is  strange  that  all  this  could  go  on  in  such  close  proximity 
to  the  Federal  army  without  discovery  through  some  negro  or 
deserter.  It  is  still  stranger  that  McDowell  seems  to  have  had 
no  scouts  out,  upon  either  flank,  who  might  easily  have  learned 
it.  Only  one  intimation  reached  him  of  what  was  going  on, 
and  that  he  refused  to  credit.  Gen.  Tyler  was  an  experienced 
railroad  manager,  and  from  the  hills  north  of  Bull  Run,  on  the 
19th,  he  had  listened  to  the  exhaust  of  many  engines  bring- 
ing heavy  loads  into  Manassas  from  the  direction  of  the 
Valley.  He  correctly  guessed  that  they  were  bringing  John- 
ston's army,  and  reported  the  facts  and  his  conclusions  to 
McDowell,  not  only  on  the  19th,  but  again  on  the  20th.  The 
suggestions  were  received  very  coolly,  and  no  steps  were  taken 
to  find  out. 

From  Centreville  the  Warrenton  pike  runs  straight  southwest 


28  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

for  many  miles.  At  two  miles  it  crosses  Cub  Run,  a  tribu- 
tary of  Bull  Run,  on  a  high  wooden  bridge.  In  the  retreat  this 
bridge  became  blocked  and  many  guns  were  lost  there.  At 
four  miles  it  crosses  Bull  Run  on  Stone  Bridge.  A  little  beyond 
Cub  Run  a  farm  road  to  the  right,  by  a  circuitous  route  of  six 
miles,  leads  to  Sudley  Springs  ford  of  Bull  Run,  which  is  two  miles 
above  Stone  Bridge  in  an  air-line.  From  Sudley,  on  the  south 
side  of  Bull  Run,  a  road  to  the  southeast  crosses  the  Warrenton 
pike  a  mile  beyond  Stone  Bridge  and  leads  to  Manassas.  McDow- 
ell's plan  was  as  follows:  Tyler  with  three  brigades  was  to 
take  position  opposite  the  Stone  Bridge,  make  demonstrations, 
and  be  prepared  to  cross.  McDowell  in  person  would  conduct 
the  five  brigades  of  Hunter's  and  Heintzelman's  divisions  by 
the  circuitous  road,  cross  Bull  Run  at  Sudley  Ford,  and  attack 
Stone  Bridge  in  the  rear.  As  soon  as  it  was  carried  Tyler's 
three  brigades  would  cross,  and  the  eight  brigades,  united  be- 
hind our  left  flank,  could  easily  sweep  our  entire  line. 

There  was,  however,  one  bad  feature.  The  circuitous  route 
by  which  the  five  brigades  would  march  would  take  them 
dangerously  far  from  his  other  forces,  should  Beauregard  take 
the  offensive  and  attack  his  left  at  the  moment  when  this  turn- 
ing column  was  entangled  in  the  circuitous  road.  The  fear  of 
such  an  attack  induced  McDowell,  while  actually  on  the  march, 
to  halt  his  rear  brigade  —  Howard's  —  and  leave  it  behind,  until 
the  four  other  brigades  had  crossed  Bull  Run  and  were  in  action 
on  the  south  side.  That  brigade  was  thus  out  of  use  for  four 
critical  hours,  and  when  it  rejoined,  the  battle  had  been  lost. 
Its  only  service  was  in  covering  the  retreat. 

Meanwhile,  by  a  coincidence,  Beauregard  had  planned  to  make 
the  very  attack  which  McDowell  had  feared,  and  at  the  very 
time  when  he  was  stretched  out  on  the  circuitous  road.  As 
Johnston  was  Beauregard's  senior,  he  was  now  in  command  of 
the  joint  forces,  but  as  Beauregard  was  more  familiar  with  the 
situation,  it  was  left  to  him  to  decide  upon  the  order  of  battle. 
By  uniting  the  two  armies,  the  Confederates  had  prepared  a 
surprise  for  the  Federals,  but,  to  reap  the  full  benefit,  it  should 
be  sprung  upon  them  before  they  became  aware  of  their  danger. 
Beauregard's  order  of  battle  proposed  to  cross  Bull  Run  with 


THE  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN  29 

our  three  right  brigades,  envelop  the  enemy's  exposed  left 
flank,  and  drive  it  toward  Centre ville.  As  soon  as  this  battle 
was  joined  it  would  be  taken  up  to  the  left,  by  adjoining  brigades, 
in  succession.  We  now  had  eight  brigades  concentrated  on  a 
front  of  about  three  miles,  and,  opposed  to  them,  McDowell  had 
left  but  three  brigades.  We  could  never  hope  for  a  more  favor- 
able opportunity  to  quickly  crush  these  three  brigades  and  be 
prepared  to  meet  in  detail  those  which  McDowell  would  have 
to  bring  back  from  his  right.  Unfortunately,  however,  we  failed 
to  improve  the  opportunity,  and  it  vanished.  The  history  of 
our  failure  is  as  follows:  — 

Had  Beauregard  been  in  command,  the  so-called  "orders" 
issued  would  have  been  immediate,  and  have  been  put  into 
process  of  execution  at  dawn.  But,  presumably  by  Johnston's 
wish,  they  were  merely  instructions  to  each  brigade  to  "place 
itself  in  position  of  attack  upon  the  enemy,"  and  await  orders. 
The  "orders  to  attack  would  be  given  by  the  Commander-in- 
Chief."  These  instructions  were  sent  out  at  5  A.M.  and  were 
differently  understood  by  the  officers  addressed.  Ewell,  with 
Holmes,  did  not  advance  across  Bull  Run,  but  simply  held  him- 
self in  readiness  on  the  south  side.  Jones  and  Longstreet  crossed 
their  brigades  and  took  position  on  the  north  bank.  Bonham's 
brigade  did  not  move. 

Johnston  had  expected  the  arrival  during  the  night  of  his 
troops  still  in  the  rear.  When  he  found  that  they  had  not 
arrived,  he  determined  not  to  attack,  but  to  await  developments. 
He  consented,  however,  to  a  demonstration  by  Beauregard's 
right,  and  orders  were  sent  Ewell  and  Jones  to  advance.  The 
order  to  Ewell  was  lost.  It  never  reached  him  and  was  never 
found  or  accounted  for  afterward.  Jones  crossed  and  waited 
for  two  hours  before  the  situation  was  developed.  It  was  then 
thought  too  late,  and  he  was  withdrawn. 

About  6  A.M.  Tyler's  division  appeared  before  our  force  under 
Evans  at  Stone  Bridge,  and  presently  opened  a  slow  fire  with  a 
30-Pr.  Parrott  rifle.  The  movement  of  Tyler  toward  Stone 
Bridge  early  in  the  morning  had  been  discovered  by  Longstreet's 
scouts.  He  writes  of  it  in  his  book  (page  45):  "Their  report 
was  sent  promptly  to  headquarters,  and,  after  a  short  delay, 


30  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

the  brigade  [Longstreet's]  was  ordered  back  to  its  position  be- 
hind the  Run." 

About  8  A.M.  Johnston  and  Beauregard,  accompanied  by 
staffs  and  couriers,  rode  to  the  vicinity  of  Mitchell's  Ford,  where 
they  left  their  party  under  cover,  and  took  position  on  an  open 
hill  some  200  yards  to  the  left  of  the  road.  On  the  Federal  side 
of  the  Run,  the  three  brigades,  left  to  amuse  our  line  while  the 
flanking  column  made  its  march  around  us,  had  taken  position 
on  the  hills  about  a  half-mile  north  of  the  creek,  started  to  pro- 
tect itself  with  abattis,  and  opened  fire  with  a  few  guns  upon 
all  movements  which  they  could  discover  on  our  side.  To  this 
fire  we  made  no  reply  and  kept  our  positions  concealed,  but  we 
did  nothing  to  strengthen  them. 

As  he  rode  out  in  the  morning,  Beauregard  directed  me  to  go 
with  a  courier  to  the  Wilcoxen  signal  station  and  remain  in 
general  observation  of  the  field,  sending  messages  of  all  I  could 
discover.  I  went  reluctantly,  as  the  opportunity  seemed  very 
slight  of  rendering  any  service.  There  were  but  two  signal  stations 
on  our  line  of  battle, — one  in  rear  of  McLean's  Ford,  and  one  near 
Van  Ness'  house,  on  a  bluff  a  few  hundred  yards  to  the  left  and 
rear  of  the  Stone  Bridge.  Beyond  the  latter  station  the  broad, 
level  valley  of  Bull  Run  for  some  miles,  with  its  fields  and  pastures, 
as  seen  through  the  glass,  was  foreshortened  into  a  narrow  band 
of  green. 

While  watching  the  flag  of  this  station  with  a  good  glass, 
when  I  had  been  there  about  a  half-hour,  the  sun  being  low  hi 
the  east  behind  me,  my  eye  was  caught  by  a  glitter  in  this 
narrow  band  of  green.  I  recognized  it  at  once  as  the  reflection 
of  the  morning  sun  from  a  brass  field-piece.  Closer  scrutiny 
soon  revealed  the  glittering  of  bayonets  and  musket  barrels. 

It  was  about  8.45  A.M.,  and  I  had  discovered  McDowell's  turn- 
ing column,  the  head  of  which,  at  this  hour,  was  just  arriving  at 
Sudley,  eight  miles  away. 

I  appreciated  how  much  it  might  mean,  and  thought  it  best 
to  give  Evans  immediate  notice,  even  before  sending  word  to 
Beauregard.  So  I  signalled  Evans  quickly,  "Look  out  for  your 
left;  you  are  turned."  Evans  afterwards  told  me  that  a  picket, 
which  he  had  had  at  Sudley,  being  driven  in  by  the  enemy's 


THE  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN  31 

advance  guard,  had  sent  a  courier,  and  the  two  couriers,  one 
with  my  signal  message  and  one  with  the  report  of  the  picket, 
reached  him  together.  The  simultaneous  reports  from  different 
sources  impressed  him,  and  he  acted  at  once  and  with  sound 
judgment.  He  left  four  companies  of  his  command  to  watch 
the  bridge  and  the  enemy  in  his  front,  —  Tyler  and  his  three  bri- 
gades. With  the  remainder  of  his  force  (six  companies  of  the 
4th  S.C.  and  Wheat's  La.  battalion)  he  marched  to  oppose 
and  delay  the  turning  column,  at  the  same  time  notifying  Cocke, 
next  on  his  right,  of  his  movement.  But  he  sent  no  word  to 
Beauregard,  whom  he  supposed  that  I  would  notify. 

Having  sent  Evans  notice  of  his  danger,  I  next  wrote  to 
Beauregard,  as  follows:  — 

"  I  see  a  body  of  troops  crossing  Bull  Run  about  two  miles  above  the 
Stone  Bridge.  The  head  of  the  column  is  in  the  woods  on  this  side. 
The  rear  of  the  column  is  in  the  woods  on  the  other  side.  About  a  half- 
mile  of  its  length  is  visible  in  the  open  ground  between.  I  can  see  both 
infantry  and  artillery." 

In  his  report  of  the  battle,  Beauregard  does  not  mention  this 
note,  but  says,  generally,  that  Capt.  Alexander  gave  him 
"seasonable  and  material  assistance  early  hi  the  day  with  his 
system  of  signals." 

Johnston,  in  his  report,  says :  — 

"About  eight  o'clock  Gen.  Beauregard  and  I  placed  ourselves  on  a 
commanding  hill  in  rear  of  Gen.  Bonham's  left.  Near  nine  o'clock,  the 
signal  officer,  Capt.  Alexander,  reported  that  a  large  body  of  troops 
was  crossing  the  valley  of  Bull  Run  some  two  miles  above  the  bridge. 
Gen.  Bee,  who  had  been  placed  near  Col.  Cocke's  position,  Col.  Hampton 
with  his  legion,  and  Col.  Jackson  from  a  point  near  Gen.  Bonham's  left, 
were  ordered  to  hasten  to  the  left  flank." 

Bee's  force  comprised  the  4th  Ala.  and  2d  Miss.,  with  the 
7th  and  8th  Ga.  under  Bartow.  The  Hampton  Legion  was 
one  regiment,  and  Jackson  had  five  regiments,  the  2d,  4th, 
5th,  27th,  and  33d  Va.  So  10  regiments,  with  an  average 
distance  of  about  three  miles  to  go,  were  now  en  route  to  ree'n- 
force  Evans  with  his  two  half-regiments. 

Now,  for  an  hour  and  a  half,  nothing  took  place  but  the 
enemy's  desultory  artillery  firing  across  Bull  Run.  McDowell's 


32  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

turning  column  was  arriving  at  Sudley,  crossing  the  creek  and 
having  a  half-hour  to  rest,  drink,  and  fill  their  canteens.  Evans 
was  getting  into  a  position  on  the  road  from  Sudley  to  Manassas, 
about  a  mile  in  front  of  McDowell,  and  three-quarters  of  a  mile 
north  of  the  Warrenton  turnpike.  Bee  and  Bartow  were  march- 
ing to  join  Evans.  Hampton's  Legion  was  following,  and  be- 
hind it  Jackson's  brigade  was  also  coming.  In  order  toward  the 
right  were  Cocke,  Bonham,  Longstreet,  and  Early,  south  of  the 
Run ;  Jones  north  of  it ;  and  Ewell,  with  Holmes,  south  of  it  at 
Union  Mill's  Ford,  on  the  extreme  right. 

Meanwhile,  from  my  signal  station,  I  had  watched  McDowell's 
column  arrive  at  Sudley,  and  about  10  A.M.  reported  the  rear  of 
it — except  Howard,  left  halted,  as  already  told,  some  four  miles 
behind.  Soon  after  that  picket  firing  was  heard  and  presently 
an  occasional  gun.  About  10.30,  as  the  sun  grew  hotter,  an 
immense  column  of  dust  began  to  develop,  apparently  about 
10  miles  to  the  northwest.  I  afterward  acquired  more  experience 
with  army  dusts  than  I  then  possessed,  but  never  during  the  war 
did  I  see  a  dust  cloud  tower  higher  or  rise  more  densely  than 
this.  It  proved,  finally,  to  be  the  wagon  trains  of  Johnston's 
forces  on  their  march  down  from  the  Valley.  But,  as  Patter- 
son's army  might  be  expected  to  follow  Johnston,  this  portentous 
dust  seemed  at  first  an  important  phenomenon.  So  I  deter- 
mined to  be  my  own  messenger  to  tell  of  it,  and  perhaps  to 
point  it  out  to  the  generals  as  it  had  now  risen  to  a  high  altitude. 

This  I  was  able  to  do,  and  Johnston  refers  to  it  as  follows :  — 

"  The  signal  officer  soon  called  our  attention  to  a  heavy  cloud  'of  dust 
to  the  northwest  and  about  ten  miles  off,  such  as  the  march  of  an  army 
would  raise.  This  excited  apprehensions  of  Gen.  Patterson's  approach." 

Meanwhile,  quite  a  fire  of  both  musketry  and  artillery  was 
beginning  to  develop  on  the  left,  where  McDowell 's  advance  had 
now  come  in  collision  with  Evans's  little  force. 

As  a  bystander  I  soon  appreciated  that  Johnston  believed  the 
battle  was  to  be  fought  upon  the  left  and  wished  to  go  there,  but 
Beauregard  was  reluctant  to  give  up  the  proposed  attack  on 
Centreville  by  his  right. 

Evans,  with  his  11  companies  and  two  guns,  maintained  a  good 


THE  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN  33 

fight.  He  was  fighting  for  time,  and  he  managed  to  delay  the 
Federal  advance  for  about  an  hour.  The  fighting  was  not  bad 
for  beginners.  Wheat's  Tigers  (the  1st  La.  battalion)  lost 
38  in  killed  and  wounded,  and  Evans's  six  companies  of  the 
4th  S.C.  regiment  doubtless  lost  at  least  50 ;  though  the  exact 
figures  in  the  reports  are  consolidated  with  other  companies. 
It  was  doubtless  influenced  by  the  morale  gained  on  the  18th. 
The  Federal  tactics  were  poor  and  timid.  The  engagement  was 
begun  by  a  single  regiment,  and  this  was  reenforced  by  others 
successively,  but  there  was  lack  of  concert  and  combined  power. 
New  troops  going  into  action  are  very  prone  to  "fire  and  fall 
back,"  —  to  touch  and  let  go, —  as  one  handles  a  piece  of  hot  iron 
when  uncertain  how  hot  it  may  be.  There  were  cases  of  this 
among  the  volunteer  regiments  upon  both  sides. 

When  Jackson,  at  Chancellorsville,  turned  Hooker's  flank,  he 
formed  his  force  into  a  double  line  of  battle,  with  an  interval  of 
about  200  yards  between  the  lines,  before  he  made  his  attack.1 
When  made  it  was  irresistible  and  produced  an  immediate 
panic.  Had  he  begun  it  by  piecemeal,  it  would  have  proved 
a  failure.  Had  McDowell  first  advanced  even  two  brigades, 
formed  in  a  double  line,  Evans's  force  could  scarcely  have  de- 
tained them  ten  minutes. 

As  it  was,  he  was  able  to  hold  on  until  he  was  reenforced  by 
Bee  and  Bartow  with  their  four  regiments.  But  soon  after 
these  had  prolonged  Evans's  line  of  battle,  facing  the  troops 
advancing  from  Sudley,  their  right  was  taken  in  flank  and  rear 
by  Sherman 's  and  Keyes's  brigade  of  Tyler 's  division,  which  had 
found  fords  and  crossed  Bull  Run  about  halfway  between  the 
Stone  Bridge  and  Sudley,  which  McDowell's  reconnoissance  on  the 
19th  had  missed.  The  roar  of  the  young  battle  now  swelled  in 
volume.  There  came  crashes  of  musketry  which  told  that 
whole  brigades  were  coming  in,  and  the  fire  of  the  guns 
increased. 

Of  course  the  Confederate  line  could  not  be  held  long  against 
the  odds  now  opposed  to  it,  but  the  fight  which  it  made  has 
seldom  been  excelled  by  such  raw  troops.  Jackson's  brigade, 

1  Jackson  gave  order  to  form  three  lines,  but  gave  signal  for  advance 
before  the  third  line  had  gotten  up  and  it  followed  in  column. 


34  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

later  that  day,  by  steadfast  fighting,  conferred  the  immortal 
name  of  Stonewall  upon  its  commander.  The  killed  and 
wounded  in  its  five  regiments  were  561,  an  average  of  112  each. 
The  killed  and  wounded  in  Bee's  and  Bartow's  four  regiments 
were  658,  an  average  of  164  each.  The  8th  Ga.,  Bartow's 
own  regiment,  lost  200,  and  the  4th  Ala.  197.  Equally  to 
their  credit  is  the  fact  that  though  forced  back  a  half-mile  they 
were  not  demoralized,  but  on  meeting  the  reinforcements 
many  were  rallied  and  re-formed,  and  fought  throughout  the 
day.  It  was  in  this  later  fighting  that  both  Bee  and  Bartow 
were  killed.  The  victory  could  never  have  been  won  without 
them.1 

We  must  now  return  to  the  hill  near  Mitchell 's  Ford  occupied 
by  the  two  generals.  When  the  sudden  increase  of  fire  broke 
out,  which  marked  the  arrival  on  the  field  of  Bee  and  Bartow, 
Johnston  seemed  so  restless  that  Beauregard  was  moved  to 
despatch  a  staff-officer,  Maj.  Stevens,  with  a  half-dozen  couriers, 
under  orders  to  ride  rapidly,  learn  the  situation,  and  send  back  a 
messenger  every  ten  minutes.  Not  a  word  of  information  had 
yet  come  from  the  left,  except  what  I  had  seen  from  the  signal 
station.  About  11.30  A.M.,  Stevens  having  gone  less  than  a 
half-hour,  there  came  a  further  access  of  fire  both  of  musketry 
and  artillery.  It  was  doubtless  due  to  the  attack  of  Sherman 
and  Keyes  upon  the  flank  of  Bee  and  Bartow.  No  one  who  heard 
it  could  doubt  its  import.  No  messages  from  the  left  were  needed 
now.  All  paused  for  a  moment  and  listened.  Then  Johnston 
said,  "The  battle  is  there!  I  am  going."  Walking  rapidly  to 
his  horse,  he  mounted  and  set  off  at  a  gallop,  followed  by  his  own 
staff,  as  fast  as  they  could  get  their  horses. 

1  In  this  connection  mention  should  be  made  of  Maj.  Robert  Wheat  of 
the  La.  battalion,  known  as  "  The  Tigers."  As  a  boy,  Wheat  had  run 
away  from  home  in  Baltimore  and  served  gallantly  in  the  Mexican  War, 
and,  after  that,  in  desperate  fighting  with  Walker  in  Nicaragua.  In  his 
report  Evans  writes  that  he  was  much  indebted  to  Major  Wheat  "  for  his  great 
experience  and  his  excellent  advice."  He  doubtless  advised  Evans  in  his 
movement  to  the  left.  Early  in  the  action  he  fell,  shot  through  the  lungs. 
He  survived  and  in  June,  1862,  again  led  his  battalion  in  the  bloody  charge 
at  Gaines  Mill.  Just  before  starting,  to  a  friend  who  gave  agreeting,  he  said, 
"  Something  tells  Bob  that  this  is  his  last."  He  had  advanced  but  a  short 
distance  when  he  fell,  only  living  to  exclaim,  "  Bury  me  on  the  field,  boys !  " 


THE  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN  35 

Beauregard  only  paused  to  give  a  few  brief  orders.  Holmes 's 
and  Early 's  brigades,  and  two  regiments  of  Bonham's  with 
Walker's  and  Kemper's  batteries,  were  to  march  to  the  firing. 
Jones's  brigade  was  to  be  recalled  to  our  side  of  Bull  Run.  I  was 
ordered  to  return  to  my  signal  station,  which  I  did  reluctantly. 
From  it  I  watched  the  progress  of  the  battle  for  hours,  but  could 
only  distinguish  a  single  event  to  be  reported.  This  was  the 
arrival  at  Sudley  Ford  between  one  and  two  o'clock  of  another 
Federal  brigade.  This,  I  afterward  learned,  was  Howard's 
brigade,  now  tardily  brought  forward. 

I  was  able  to  follow  the  progress  of  the  conflict  by  the  rising 
clouds  of  smoke  and  the  gradual  approach  of  the  musketry  for 
an  hour  or  two,  after  which,  for  a  long  time,  there  was  little 
change,  and  the  battle  seemed  to  stand  still.  When  Evans  and 
Bee  were  broken  by  Sherman's  attack  upon  the  flank,  their 
retreat  was  specially  pressed  by  the  Federal  artillery.  On 
reaching  the  Warrenton  pike  they  were  met  by  the  Hampton 
Legion,  and  Hampton  made  an  earnest  effort  to  rally  the  retreat- 
ing force  upon  his  command.  The  ground,  however,  was 
unfavorable,  and  though  Hampton  made  a  stubborn  fight 
(losing  121  out  of  600)  and  delaying  the  advance  near 
two  hours  before  leaving  the  pike,  our  whole  line  then  fell 
back  under  the  enemy's  fire.  Here,  however,  its  tenacity 
was  rewarded.  A  fresh  brigade  was  drawn  up  in  line  on 
the  elevated  ground,  since  known  as  the  Henry  house  hill, 
and  its  commander,  till  then  unknown,  was  henceforth  to  be 
called  Stonewall.  Bee  rode  up  and  said  to  him,  "General, 
they  are  driving  us."  "Then,  sir,"  said  Jackson,  "we  will 
give  them  the  bayonet." 

The  hill  was  really  a  ridge,  with  a  plateau-like  top,  some  200 
yards  more  across.  The  inner  edge  of  such  a  ridge  is  a  fairly  good 
position  for  a  defensive  line  of  battle.  It  affords  some  cover 
both  from  view  and  from  fire.  If  the  enemy  bring  their  artillery 
to  the  front  edge  of  it,  they  are  within  musket  range,  and  are 
also  near  enough  to  be  charged.  There  was  a  good  fringe  of 
young  pines,  masking  the  inner  edge  of  the  hill.  Jackson,  while 
marching  to  the  firing,  had  recognized  this  comparatively  good 
position  and  occupied  it.  Bee  galloped  among  his  retreating 


36  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

men  and  called  out  to  them,  "See  Jackson  standing  like  a  stone 
wall.  Rally  behind  the  Virginians."  * 

It  was  at  this  moment,  when  Jackson 's  3000  men  and  Hamp- 
ton's  600  were  the  only  organized  troops  opposing  the  Federal 
advance,  and  Bee,  Bartow,  and  Evans  were  attempting  to  rally 
their  broken  forces,  that  Johnston  and  Beauregard  reached  the 
field.  A  heavy  Federal  fire  was  being  poured  after  the  fugitives. 
The  two  generals  had  picked  up  and  brought  with  them  two 
batteries,  Pendleton  's  and  Alburtis's,  of  four  guns  each.  Their 
first  efforts  were  to  rally  the  stragglers  and,  by  example,  to 
encourage  the  whole  line.  Both  were  veterans  at  such  work. 
Johnston  took  the  colors  of  the  4th  Ala.  and  established  it 
in  the  line  of  battle.  His  ordnance  officer,  Col.  Thomas,  was 
placed  in  command  of  a  battalion  formed  of  fragments  of  all 
commands.  Thomas  was  killed  while  leading  them  through  the 
day.  Beauregard  had  his  horse  killed  under  him.  When  the 
line  of  battle  seemed  well  established,  it  was  agreed  that  its 
immediate  conduct  should  be  left  to  Beauregard,  and  that 
Johnston  should  take  his  position  at  the  Lewis  house,  a  short 
distance  in  the  rear,  whence  he  could  control  the  movements  of  all 
forces,  and  direct  the  reinforcements  as  they  approached  the  field. 

Two  incomplete  regiments  of  Cocke's  brigade,  the  8th  Va., 
of  seven  companies,  and  the  49th,  of  three  companies,  were 
brought  from  Ball's  Ford.  Ewell's  brigade  was  sent  for  from 
Union  Mills.  Orders  to  hasten  were  sent  the  two  regiments  under 
Kershaw,  and  Early's  and  Holmes's  brigades  already  on  the 
march.  Longstreet,  at  his  own  request  by  courier,  was  author- 
ized to  cross  Bull  Run  and  make  demonstrations  against  the 
enemy  in  his  front,  and  Jones  was  authorized  to  join  him. 

Besides  these  there  was  also  on  the  way  Kirby  Smith 's  brigade, 
which,  as  before  told,  had  arrived  at  Manassas  during  the  morn- 
ing, and  was  at  once  started  to  the  field. 

Beauregard 's  task,  therefore,  was  to  hold  his  line  of  battle 

1  It  is  a  coincidence  that  the  same  comparison  was  made  the  same  after- 
noon by  Gen.  Johnston.  I  was  acting  as  his  guide  late  in  the  evening, 
and,  in  speaking  of  the  fighting,  he  instanced  the  4th  Va.  regiment  of 
Jackson's  brigade,  under  Col.  James  F.  Preston,  and  said,  so  impressively 
that  I  always  remembered  it,  "  Preston's  regiment  stood  there  like  a  stone 
wall." 


THE  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN  37 

until  some  of  these  six  bodies  of  reinforcements  could  reach  him. 
It  was  his  last  chance.  And  to  do  it  he  had  about  3000  fresh 
infantry,  and  about  as  much  more  which  had  been  engaged  and 
driven  back,  and  he  had  about  16  guns,  mostly  6-pounders. 
His  great  advantage  was  that  he  had  a  fairly  good  position  and 
was  on  the  defensive. 

It  was  McDowell 's  task — and  it  was  his  last  remaining  of  all  the 
chances  on  his  side  at  the  beginning  —  to  crush  Beauregard's  line 
before  reinforcements  could  reach  it.  He  had  eight  brigades, 
about  20,000  men,  and  24  guns,  mostly  12-pounders,  and  rifles. 
But  he  set  about  the  work  with  only  four  brigades.  Howard's 
brigade,  as  has  already  been  told,  had  been  left  miles  behind, 
when  he  felt  uneasy  about  the  long  flank  march.  He  sent  for  it 
about  this  time,  but  it  arrived  too  late. 

Burnside's  brigade  he  had  weakly  permitted  Burnside  to  beg 
off  for  a  rest,  and  to  replenish  ammunition.  It  was  lying  in  the 
woods,  in  rear  of  where  it  was  first  engaged  in  the  morning,  and 
from  Burnside's  report  it  laid  there  nearly  five  hours  and  was 
not  again  engaged. 

The  third  brigade  missing  from  the  fighting  line  was  Keyes's. 
It  had  followed  Sherman  closely  in  its  arrival  on  the  field,  and 
had  borne  some  part  in  driving  back  the  Confederate  line. 
Then  it  had  borne  to  its  left,  and  gotten  into  the  valley  of  Bull 
Run.  There  was  no  Confederate  infantry  there,  but  it  took 
shelter  in  the  valley  from  a  few  guns  which  looked  after  our  flank 
and  rear  in  that  direction.  Here  it  was  out  of  touch  with  every- 
thing. McDowell  did  not  even  know  where  it  was.  Had  it 
advanced  upon  the  Confederate  guns,  or  had  it  communicated 
with  Schenck's  brigade  on  the  north  side  of  Bull  Run,  and  the 
two  moved  on  Cocke  's  brigade  at  Ball 's  Ford,  —  had  it,  in 
short,  tried  anything,  it  might  have  accomplished  important 
results.  The  fourth  brigade  missing  was  Schenck's,  which 
never  crossed  Bull  Run.  Schenck  still  believed  that  the  bridge 
was  mined,  but  he  had  ventured  to  cross  axemen,  one  at  a  time, 
and  had  them  cutting  out  the  forest  trees  which  had  been  felled 
across  the  Warrenton  pike  in  the  low  ground  beyond  the  bridge. 
The  axemen  got  their  task  completed  just  in  time  for  Keyes's 
brigade  to  retreat  by  that  route. 


38  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

The  absence  of  these  four  brigades,  and  the  losses  suffered  by 
the  other  four,  probably  reduced  McDowell's  fighting  line  to 
about  9000  men,  and  Beauregard's  advantage  in  the  defensive 
equalized  the  remaining  differences.  For  McDowell  made  the 
further  mistake  of  continuing  to  fight  in  front  instead  of  hunting 
for  a  Confederate  flank. 

So  now,  for  over  two  hours,  these  lines  of  battle  fired  away 
at  each  other,  across  the  front  ridge  of  the  plateau,  neither  one 's 
fire  being  very  murderous,  as  each  fired  mostly  at  random  at  the 
other's  smoke.  That,  indeed,  is  the  case  in  nearly  all  battles 
since  long-range  guns  have  come  into  use.  It  is  rare  that  hostile 
lines  get  so  near  together,  and  are  so  exposed  to  each  other's 
view,  that  men  can  select  their  targets.  When  this  does  occur, 
some  decisive  result  is  apt  to  be  reached  quickly.  Fighting 
rarely  consists  now  in  marching  directly  upon  one's  enemy  and 
shooting  him  down  at  close  range.  The  idea  is  now  a  different 
one.  It  rather  consists  in  making  it  rain  projectiles  all  over  the 
enemy's  position.  As  far  as  possible,  while  so  engaged,  one 
seeks  cover  from  the  enemy's  fire  in  return.  But  the  party 
taking  the  offensive  must  necessarily  make  some  advances.  The 
best  advance  is  around  the  enemy's  flanks,  where  one  meets  less 
fire  and  becomes  opposed  by  smaller  numbers.  But  here, 
McDowell,  encouraged  by  his  early  success,  endeavored  to  push 
straight  forward.  All  along  Young 's  Branch,  at  the  foot  of  the 
rolling  slopes,  was  more  or  less  cover  in  which  his  troops  could 
form.  They  could  then  advance,  sheltered  from  view  until 
their  heads  would  begin  to  show  over  the  front  edge  of  the 
plateau,  to  the  Confederate  line  along  its  rear  edge.  Then  they 
would  receive  an  accelerated  and  more  accurate  fire.  They 
would  return  a  volley  or  two  and  then  run  back  down  the  hill 
until  they  found  cover  again.  Some  commands  would  try  it 
over  and  over  again,  a  number  of  times,  but  none  ever  made  a 
lodgment. 

If  McDowell  had  had  some  of  his  absent  brigades  at  hand,  he 
would  doubtless  have  sent  a  single  column  to  do  the  work  in  a 
single  charge.  But  his  successive  attacks  in  partial  force  were 
only  consuming  time,  while  the  Confederate  reinforcements  were 
already  beginning  to  arrive  on  the  field.  And  as  they  came, 


THE  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN  39 

Johnston,  with  good  judgment,  hurried  them  to  the  left  and 
extended  the  Confederate  flank. 

At  length,  as  his  infantry  could  not  make  a  lodgment,  Mc- 
Dowell determined  to  try  it  with  a  dozen  guns,  manned  by 
Griffin's  and  Ricketts's  splendid  companies  of  regulars.  A 
gentle  swale  in  the  face  of  the  ascending  slope  left  the  Henry 
house  on  a  sort  of  knoll  between  the  swale  and  the  Sudley-Ma- 
nassas  road.  Griffin's  and  Ricketts's  batteries  were  ordered  to 
advance  to  the  Henry  house,  and  two  or  three  regiments  were 
directed  forward  to  their  support.  This  was  about  3  P.M. 

The  Henry  house  was  a  two-story  frame,  of  about  two  rooms 
on  each  floor,  in  open  grass  land,  with  a  small  flower  garden  and 
a  few  locust  trees  by  it.  Heretofore  it  had  not  been  in  the  line  of 
fire,  but  there  had  been  enough  near  to  drive  off  all  occupants 
except  Mrs.  Henry  herself,  who,  old  and  bedridden,  had  to  be 
left.  The  house  now  became  suddenly  the  focus  of  a  heavy 
fire.  Mrs.  Henry  was  killed  hi  her  bed,  struck  by  a  cannon  shot 
and  several  musket  balls.  The  enemy  was  within  canister  range 
of  our  lines,  and  the  battle  waxed  hot.  A  regiment  of  Zouaves, 
following  in  support  of  the  Federal  batteries,  were  charged  by 
a  company  of  cavalry  under  Col.  Stuart.  The  Zouaves  took 
cover  in  a  body  of  woods,  and  the  cavalry  lost  9  men  and  18 
horses  in  a  very  few  minutes.  Other  Federal  regiments  sent  in 
support  entered  the  woods,  to  the  right  and  rear  of  the  bat- 
teries, and  found  them  being  occupied  from  the  other  direction 
by  the  Confederate  reinforcements  which  Johnston  was  now 
directing  to  our  left  flank. 

Meanwhile,  Griffin  and  Ricketts  had  fired  but  a  short  while 
when  the  33d  Va.,  under  Col.  A.  C.  Cummings  from  Jack- 
son's left,  leaving  the  shelter  of  the  ridge  and  thickets,  and, 
partly  obscured  from  view  by  a  fence,  marched  boldly  out 
toward  them.  Col.  Cummings  moved  of  his  own  accord 
and  without  orders,  tempted  by  the  enemy's  near  approach. 
The  day  had  been  very  dusty,  and  all  uniforms,  blue  and 
gray,  were  now  of  the  same  dusty  color.  All  over  the  field, 
and  on  both  sides,  cases  of  confusion  had  occurred,  but  the 
most  important  of  all  took  place  now.  Griffin  saw  the  regiment 
coming,  and  prepared  to  give  them  a  blizzard  of  canister.  But 


40  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

the  Federal  chief  of  artillery,  Maj.  Barry,  stopped  him,  saying 
that  it  was  a  Federal  regiment  coming  to  his  support.  One  can 
scarcely  imagine  an  intelligent  officer  becoming  so  confused  as 
to  points  of  the  compass,  but  it  is  often  seen  upon  battle-fields. 
A  few  zigzag  changes  of  direction  upon  unfamiliar  ground  will 
upset  the  "orientation"  of  many  men.  Maj.  Barry  had  been 
fighting  that  regiment  in  Jackson's  line  for  some  hours,  yet  he 
let  it  march  up  to  a  fence  within  70  yards  and  deliver  a 
volley.  That  volley  was  the  end  of  the  two  batteries.  About 
40  men  and  perhaps  75  horses  were  killed  or  disabled  by  it. 
Ricketts  was  badly  wounded  and  captured,  and  his  first  lieuten- 
ant, Ramsay,  was  killed.  Griffin  managed  to  drag  off  three  of 
his  guns,  but  the  other  nine  were  left  isolated  between  the  two 
armies,  surrounded  by  the  dead  and  wounded  men  and  horses. 

McDowell,  however,  did  not  tamely  abandon  his  guns.  The 
33d  Va.  soon  found  itself  too  far  from  home  to  maintain 
its  position,  and  it  had  to  leave  its  captures  and  fall 
back.  Then  there  were  two  or  three  efforts  on  each  side  to  hold 
them  before  the  final  one,  about  4  P.M.  Then  Beauregard  ad- 
vanced his  whole  line  of  battle.  The  Hampton  Legion  and  the 
18th  Va.  finally  swept  over  the  captured  guns,  and  Ferguson 
and  Chisolm,  of  Beauregard 's  staff,  turned  some  of  them  upon 
the  Federal  forces  now  dissolving  into  rout. 

Within  the  last  half-hour,  Kirby  Smith 's  brigade  had  reached 
the  field,  closely  followed  by  Early 's  brigade,  and  with  them 
came  Beckham's  battery.  As  Kirby  Smith  led  in  his  troops, 
extending  our  line  on  the  left,  he  was  severely  wounded  and  had 
to  turn  over  the  command  to  Elzey.  Early  took  Stuart's 
cavalry  and  Beckham  's  battery  and  advanced  across  the  Warren- 
ton  turnpike,  where  the  ground  is  rolling  and  open.  Beckham 
came  into  action  in  a  position  taking  the  Federal  forces  in  flank. 
Having  lost  Griffin  and  Ricketts  from  their  right  flank,  there 
was  little  artillery  available  to  fight  Beckham,  and  meanwhile, 
Beauregard,  in  the  front,  was  now  taking  the  aggressive.  The 
Federal  soldiers  appreciated  that  the  long  and  crooked  road  by 
which  they  had  advanced  would  be  peculiarly  exposed  in  re- 
treat, and  great  numbers  dissolved  ranks  and  started  back  to 
Centreville  by  the  route  they  had  come.  Only  Keyes's  brigade, 


THE  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN  41 

and  some  of  those  nearest  the  left,  took  the  Warrenton  pike  and 
crossed  on  the  Stone  Bridge.  Early  'a  brigade  and  the  cavalry 
followed  the  fugitives  who  went  by  Sudley.  The  infantry  could 
do  but  little  in  this  pursuit,  and  the  cavalry  by  nightfall  had 
loaded  themselves  with  as  many  prisoners  as  they  could  care 
for,  so  most  of  these  commands  halted  at  Sudley  and  bivouacked 
for  that  night. 

We  may  now  return  briefly  to  my  signal  station,  whence  at 
1.15  P.M.  I  sent  my  last  message,  reporting  what  I  now  know  to 
have  been  Howard's  brigade  arriving  at  Sudley  Ford,  and  two 
dust  columns,  both  made  by  Johnston  'a  wagons  coming  from  the 
valley.  My  message  was  dated  at  1.15  P.M.  and  was  as  fol- 
lows :  — 

"Large  reinforcements  are  pushing  toward  the  enemy,  crossing  Bull 
Run  far  above  Stone  Bridge.  The  column  of  dust,  which  has  come  down 
from  toward  the  mountains,  is  going  straight  toward  Manassas  Station. 
It  now  appears  about  three  miles  from  the  Junction.  Another  column 
is  visible  in  the  far  distance  toward  Paris.  Six  pieces  in  battery  at 
Butler  house,  Centreville  road." 

After  two  o'clock  the  roar  of  the  battle  began  to  increase 
again,  and  about  three,  a  new  battery  opened  fire  from  a  point 
farther  to  my  left  than  any  previous  firing.  It  was  plainly 
engaged  in  enfilading  one  of  the  opposing  lines,  and  I  watched 
anxiously  to  see  which.  Presently  one  of  its  shells  burst  high  in 
the  air  over  the  Federal  position.  I  was  satisfied  that  I  could  be 
of  no  further  service  at  the  signal  station,  and  I  rode  for  the 
field.  Had  I  not  seen  the  direction  in  which  that  new  battery 
was  firing  I  would  soon  have  believed  our  army  to  have  been 
already  defeated  from  the  swarms  of  stragglers  met  upon  my 
road.  A  few  had  flesh  wounds,  and  all  had  stories  of  disaster 
which  had  left  few  survivors  of  their  commands.  President 
Davis  had  arrived  at  Manassas  from  Richmond,  early  in  the 
afternoon,  and,  even  then,  stragglers  from  the  field  had  met  the 
train  at  the  Junction,  a  half-mile  from  the  station,  with  such 
alarming  stories  that  the  conductor  feared  to  carry  the  train 
farther.  After  persuasion,  however,  he  sent  the  President  and 
an  aide  up  to  the  station  on  a  locomotive. 

At  the  station  horses  and  a  guide  were  procured,  and  Mr.  Davis 


42  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

rode  to  the  field.  He  soon  encountered  the  procession  of  strag- 
glers and  heard  their  stories.  He  was  so  impressed  by  their 
numbers  that  he  said  to  an  officer  riding  with  him,  "  Fields  are 
not  won  where  men  desert  their  colors  as  ours  are  doing." 

Quite  near  the  field,  the  road  crossed  a  small  stream.  Here 
the  surgeons  had  established  field  hospitals,  and  about  these 
and  under  shade  of  the  trees  the  crowd  of  wounded,  attendants, 
and  stragglers  was  extensive.  As  he  had  ridden  along  the 
road,  the  President  had  frequently  called  upon  men  to  turn 
back  to  the  field,  and  some  had  done  so.  Here  he  seemed  to 
fear  that  the  whole  army  was  in  retreat.  As  he  rode  his  horse 
into  the  stream  he  drew  his  rein,  and  with  a  pale,  stern  face, 
and  in  a  loud,  ringing  voice  he  shouted,  "/  am  President  Davis. 
Follow  me  back  to  the  field!"  Not  far  off,  Stonewall  Jackson, 
who  had  been  shot  through  the  hand,  but  had  disregarded  it 
until  victory  was  assured,  was  now  having  his  hand  dressed  by 
Surgeon  Hunter  McGuire.  Jackson  did  not  catch  the  Presi- 
dent's words,  and  McGuire  repeated  them  to.  him.  Jackson 
quickly  shouted:  "We  have  whipped  them!  They  ran  like 
sheep !  Give  me  5000  fresh  men,  and  I  will  be  in  Washington 
City  to-morrow  morning."  In  that  sentence,  as  we  shall  see, 
appears  almost  the  only  evidence  of  appreciation  among  our 
leaders,  on  that  field,  of  the  great  opportunity  now  before  them. 

The  enemy  were  routed.  Jackson  saw  their  demoralization, 
and  felt  that,  if  rapidly  followed  up,  it  would  spread  and  might 
involve  the  capital  itself.  And  every  soldier  should  have  seen 
in  it  at  least  a  good  chance  to  cut  off  and  capture  many  thou- 
sands of  fugitives  retreating  by  long  and  roundabout  roads. 

There  was  little  effort,  worthy  of  the  name,  even  to  do  this. 
Our  small  bodies  of  cavalry  did  their  best  and  captured  about 
as  many  prisoners  as  they  could  handle.  In  all  871  unwounded 
were  taken.  But  to  fully  improve  such  an  opportunity  much 
more  was  necessary.  All  the  troops  best  situated  to  cut  the  line 
of  retreat  should  have  been  put  in  motion.  Not  only  staff-offi- 
cers, but  generals  themselves,  should  have  followed  up  to  inspire 
and  urge  pursuit.  The  motto  of  our  army  here  would  seem  to 
have  been,  "Build  a  bridge  of  gold  for  a  flying  enemy." 

Jackson's  offer  to  take  Washington  City  the  next  morning 


THE  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN  43 

with  5000  men  had  been  made  to  the  President  as  he  arrived 
upon  the  field,  probably  about  five  o'clock.  It  was  not  sunset 
until  7.15,  and  there  was  a  nearly  full  moon.  But  the  President 
himself  and  both  generals  spent  these  precious  hours  in  riding 
over  the  field  where  the  conflict  had  taken  place.  Doubtless  it 
was  an  interesting  study,  the  dead  and  badly  wounded  of  both 
sides  being  mostly  where  they  had  fallen,  but  it  was  not  war 
to  pause  at  that  moment  to  consider  it.  One  of  the  generals  — 
Beauregard,  for  instance — should  have  crossed  Bull  Run  at  Ball's 
Ford  or  Stone  Bridge  with  all  the  troops  in  that  vicinity,  and 
should  have  pushed  the  pursuit  all  night.  Johnston  should 
have  galloped  rapidly  back  to  Mitchell's  Ford  and  have  marched 
thence  on  Centreville  with  Bonham,  Longstreet,  and  Jones,  who 
had  not  been  engaged.  No  hard  fighting  would  have  been 
needed.  A  threat  upon  either  flank  would  doubtless  have  been 
sufficient ;  and,  when  once  a  retreat  from  Centreville  was  started, 
even  blank  volleys  fired  behind  it  would  have  soon  converted  it 
into  a  panic.  -.. 

It  would  be  vain  to  speculate  how  far  the  pursuit  might  have 
been  pushed  or  what  it  might  have  accomplished  had  all  the 
available  force  been  energetically  used.    We  were  deficient  in 
organization,  discipline,  and  transportation,  but  these  deficiencies 
are  no  sufficient  excuse  for  not  attempting  the  game  of  war.    In 
that  game,  to  use  the  slang  of  more  modern  days,  it  was  now 
"up  to  the  Confederates"  to  pursue  their  routed  enemy  to  the 
very  utmost.     His  line  of  retreat  was  circuitous  and  offered  us 
rare  opportunity  to  cut  it  at  Cub  Run  by  a  short  advance  from 
Stone  Bridge;   or  at  Centreville,  by  an  advance  of  three  miles 
from  Mitchell's  Ford.     Johnston  and  Beauregard  both  sent  orders  \ 
to  different  commands  to  make  such  advances,  but  neither  went  ' 
in  person  to  supervise  and  urge  forward  the  execution  of  the  orders, 
though  time  was  of  the  very  essence.     Both  generals  and  the  Presi-    J  ' 
dent  spent  the  valuable  hours  of  daylight  still  left  in  riding  over    -  ( 
the  battle-field,   as  Napoleon  lost    his  opportunity  to   crush      xtjv  i 
Wellington  at  Quatre  Bras  by  wasting  hours  in  riding  over  the 
field  of  Ligny.,/~0wing  to   their  absence  from  the  field,   the' 
advance  from  Mitchell's  Ford  was  countermanded  by  Major 
Whiting  of  Johnston's  staff,  and  that  from  the  Stone  Bridge, 


44  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

after  being  first  checked,  was  later  countermanded  by  Beaure- 
gard  on  receipt  of  a  false  rumor,  which  would  not  have  been 
credited  had  the  orders  been  in  process  of  execution. 

It  was  my  fortune  to  carry  the  first  order  checking  the  pur- 
suit, and  my  recollection  of  the  circumstances  is  vivid.  When  I 
reached  Beauregard,  coming  from  the  signal  hill,  the  enemy 
was  in  full  flight,  some  retreating  across  the  Stone  Bridge  and 
others  toward  Sudley;  and  orders  were  being  despatched  to 
different  commands  concerning  the  pursuit.  Kershaw,  with  the 
7th  and  8th  S.C.  regiments,  was  ordered  to  pursue  across 
the  Stone  Bridge  and  along  Warrenton  pike.  I  accompanied 
the  general  in  riding  over  the  field  and  in  looking  after 
minor  matters  for  some  time.  About  6  P.M.  I  happened  to  be 
the  only  one  of  his  personal  staff  with  him.  Rather  abruptly, 
and  apropos  of  nothing  that  I  saw  or  heard,  he  said  to  me: 
"Ride  across  the  S.tone  Bridge  and  find  Col.  Kershaw,  who 
is  conducting  the  pursuit  along  the  pike.  Order  him  to  advance 
very  carefully  and  not  to  attack." 

I  had  recently  read  accounts  of  the  affair  at  Big  Bethel,  Va., 
June  10,  in  which  Magruder  had  repulsed  Butler,  whose  troops 
fell  back  to  Fortress  Monroe  in  a  panic,  though  entirely 
unpursued.  I  noted  two  facts:  (1)  That  Magruder's  cavalry, 
which  had  been  ordered  to  pursue,  had  allowed  itself  to  be 
"bluffed"  by  Greble's  U.  S.  Battery.  This  was  entirely  out 
of  ammunition,  but  it  had  turned  back  pursuit  of  our  cav- 
alry by  unlimbering  their  empty  guns.  (2)  That  though  victo- 
rious, Magruder  retreated  to  Yorktown  the  same  afternoon,  though 
perhaps  with  less  haste  than  was  used  in  Butler's  return  to 
Fortress  Monroe.  It  seemed  to  me  now  that  peremptory  orders 
"not  to  attack"  might  result  in  another  such  scandal.  I  hesi- 
tated to  make  any  suggestion,  remembering  army  stories  of 
replies  by  old  generals  to  young  aides  who  had  volunteered  advice. 
But  I  ventured  to  say :  "  Shall  I  tell  him  not  to  attack  under 
any  circumstances,  no  matter  what  the  condition  of  the  enemy 
in  his  front?"  He  replied:  "Kemper's  battery  has  been 
ordered  to  join  him.  Let  him  wait  for  it  to  come  up.  Then 
he  can  pursue,  but  cautiously,  and  he  must  not  attack  unless 
he  has  a  decided  advantage." 


Better  satisfied,  I  rode  on  my  errand.  A  mile  beyond  the 
Stone  Bridge  a  member  of  Congress,  Mr.  Ely  of  N.Y.,  was 
brought  out  of  the  woods  a  prisoner,  as  I  passed,  and  turned 
over  to  the  guard.  A  half-mile  farther  I  overtook  Kershaw 
forming  in  line  of  battle,  a  Federal  gun,  near  the  bridge  over 
Cub  Run,  having  opened  fire  upon  his  column.  After  a  few 
minutes,  during  which  skirmishers  were  advanced,  Kemper's 
battery  arrived  and  opened  fire  with  two  guns  on  the  position  at 
Cub  Run. 

I  then  turned  back  to  rejoin  Beauregard,  and,  at  the  Stone 
Bridge,  met  Elzey's  brigade  coming  over.  It  was  now  nearly 
seven  o'clock  and  the  sun  about  a  half-hour  high  when  on  the 
Stone  Bridge  I  met  Ferguson  of  Beauregard's  staff,  bearing 
orders  not  only  to  stop  the  pursuit,  but  to  recall  all  troops  to 
the  south  side  of  Bull  Run.  I  asked  the  reason  and  was  an- 
swered that  a  message  had  been  brought  to  the  generals,  who 
were  still  on  the  battle-field,  that  a  force  of  the  enemy  had  been 
seen  south  of  Bull  Run  in  rear  of  our  right  flank.  Ferguson 
pronounced  the  message  as  absurd,  and  was  carrying  the  orders 
reluctantly.  I  soon  rejoined  the  two  generals  upon  the  field, 
and  among  the  staff-officers  found  that  no  regard  was  being 
paid  to  the  story.  But  the  orders  already  despatched  were  not 
recalled,  and,  until  late  at  night,  all  the  troops  on  the  north  side 
were  being  brought  back. 

Meanwhile,  Kemper's  fire  on  the  bridge  at  Cub  Run  had 
wrecked  a  team  on  the  bridge,  and  caused  a  panic  and  an  in- 
extricable jam  of  over  fifty  vehicles,  including  guns,  caissons, 
wagons,  and  ambulances,  from  which  the  drivers  had  cut  many 
of  the  teams.  Hundreds  of  the  infantry  also  had  thrown  their 
guns  into  the  stream  as  they  crossed  the  bridge.  Here  Kershaw 
was  joined  by  some  of  our  cavalry  which  had  crossed  Bull  Run 
at  Ball's  Ford,  and  later,  by  some  which  had  followed  the  enemy 
via  Sudley.  When  the  orders  to  return  to  the  south  side  were 
received,  he  left  one  of  his  regiments  of  infantry  and  this  cavalry 
in  charge  of  the  situation.  These  during  the  night  cleared  up 
the  blockade  and  in  the  morning  brought  to  Manassas  17  guns, 
including  the  30-pounder  Parrott,  with  over  20  caissons  and 
many  other  vehicles. 


46  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

It  now  only  remains  of  the  battle,  to  give  the  brief  story  of 
the  five  brigades  of  our  right  and  centre  which  held  the  line  of 
Bull  Run,  opposite  Centreville,  and  were  confronted  by  Miles 
with  three  brigades.  Under  the  confusion  of  orders  in  the 
morning  which  has  been  mentioned,  Ewell,  about  10  A.M.,  started 
to  cross  Bull  Run,  was  recalled;  was  again  sent  across  and  a 
mile  and  a  half  in  advance ;  was  again  recalled,  and,  about  2  P.M., 
was  ordered  to  march  to  the  battle-field.  Here  he  was  followed 
by  Holmes.  They  reached  the  vicinity  of  the  field  after  the 
rout  of  the  enemy.  Then,  on  the  false  alarm  about  6.30  P.M., 
they  were  ordered  to  march  back  to  Union  Mills,  where  they 
arrived  late  at  night,  worn  out  with  dust,  heat,  and  fatigue, 
without  having  fired  a  shot  all  day. 

Next  to  Ewell  and  Holmes  came  Jones,  who  had  crossed  early 
and  waited  for  Ewell,  as  has  been  told.  He  was  also  recalled 
about  11  A.M.  About  noon  he  was  ordered  to  cross  again  and 
to  make  some  demonstrations.  He  did  so  and  attempted  to 
charge  a  battery  with  Jenkins's  S.C.  regiment,  but  became 
entangled  in  difficult  ground  under  sharp  artillery  fire.  After 
losing  14  killed  and  62  wounded,  and  finding  his  effort 
isolated  and  hopeless,  he  fell  back.  Next  to  the  left  of  Jones 
was  Longstreet.  He  also  crossed  and  recrossed  Bull  Run  in 
the  morning,  and  crossed  again  about  noon  as  Jones  did.  In 
the  afternoon  about  four  he  was  called  back  to  the  south  side 
by  orders  from  Johnston.  But  he  had  scarcely  completed  the 
movement,  when,  about  half-past  five,  there  came  from  Johnston 
orders  for  Bonham  and  Longstreet  to  advance  upon  Centreville 
and  intercept  the  routed  forces  from  Stone  Bridge.  Neither  of 
the  generals  came  to  see  this  order  executed,  and  the  manner 
in  which  it  was  ignored  and  disobeyed  is  instructive.  It  shows 
that  the  giving  of  orders  to  go  into  action  is  but  one-half  of  the 
duty  of  a  commanding  general. 

/  Here,  time  was  of  the  essence,  as  the  sun  was  less  than  two 
hours  high.  Longstreet's  brigade,  having  the  advantage  in 
position,  got  the  lead.  It  was  the  strongest  brigade,  having  five 
regiments  present.  Bonham  also  had  five,  but  two,  under 
Kershaw,  were  now  across  Stone  Bridge,  as  has  been  told.  Long- 
street,  with  superfluous  caution,  left  one  regiment  to  hold  Black- 


THE  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN  47 

burn's  Ford.  With  the  other  four  he  was  well  under  way  when 
Bonham,  holding  the  older  commission,  claimed  command  of 
the  joint  operation,  and  put  his  own  brigade  in  front.  Long- 
street  had  to  yield  and  halt,  and  half  the  precious  daylight  was 
sacrificed  to  this  vain  whim.  /In  the  Federal  official  reports  are 
noted  several  incidents  showing  that,  even  after  all  this  delay, 
the  enemy  were  caught  retreating  and  might  have  been  attacked 
at  much  disadvantage.  For  instance,  Lt.  Edwards,  command- 
ing a  battery,  says  that  he  marched  close  along  the  front  of 
a  Confederate  regiment,  drawn  up  in  the  woods,  on  the  side  of 
the  road  he  was  following.  He  says :  — 

"It  was  the  most  dangerous  position  occupied  during  the  day.  One 
shot  was  fired  over  the  battery,  and  there  was  a  simultaneous  movement 
of  muskets  along  the  line  as  if  to  continue  the  fire.  Fortunately  it  was 
not  followed  up." 

After  Bonham  took  the  lead,  the  advance  was  continued  but  a 
short  distance,  when  it  was  halted  and  a  small  squad  of  cavalry 
was  sent  ahead  to  reconnoitre,  —  a  timid  waste  of  time.  They 
came  back  and  reported  the  enemy  drawn  up  on  the  hills  about 
Centreville.  The  rest  of  the  daylight  was  consumed  in  deploy- 
ing the  column  on  both  sides  of  the  road,  and  then,  after  resting 
a  half-hour,  they  fell  back  to  Bull  Run  without  firing  a  single 
shot. 

From  all  accounts  of  the  condition  of  the  enemy  at  this  time, 
had  Bonham  even  stood  still  and  fired  blank  cartridges  to  make 
a  great  roar  and  pretend  that  he  was  coming,  the  panic  at 
Centreville  would  have  been  doubled,  and  soon  he  could  have 
advanced  and  found  it  deserted. 

His  report  of  this  episode  is  an  instructive  picture  of  how 
opportunities  may  be  lost  from  overcaution,  bred  by  the  sense 
of  responsibility  in  commanding  officers  not  inured  to  its  weight. 
Few  who  have  never  felt  it  can  realize  what  this  may  be.  Bonham 
had  served  in  Florida  and  Mexico  and  had  been  wounded  at 
Contreras.  He  was  personally  brave,  but  had  here  no  major- 
general  to  give  him  orders,  and  the  responsibility  overwhelmed 
him.  To  nothing  else  can  we  attribute  the  excessive  caution 
which  here  characterized  the  conduct  of  both  our  generals  and 
of  the  President.  Similar  instances  may  be  found  in  the  stories 


48  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

of  many  battles.  Magruder  had  already  illustrated  it  at  Big 
Bethel.  Meade  afterward  did  likewise  at  Gettysburg,  and,  even 
in  our  most  recent  war,  the  siege  of  Santiago  narrowly  escaped 
being  terminated  by  a  retreat.  The  capture  of  the  Spanish 
fleet  at  Manila  was  delayed  by 'a  suspension  for  breakfast,  and 
for  an  unnecessary  inventory  of  ammunition.  All  these  events 
took  place  under  the  pressure  of  new  responsibilities. 

Longstreet,  in  his  book,  Manassas  to  Appomattox,  p.  52,  gives 
the  following  account  of  the  final  scene :  — 

"When  within  artillery  range  of  the  retreating  column  passing  through 
Centreville,  the  infantry  was  deployed  on  the  sides  of  the  road  under  cover 
of  the  forest,  so  as  to  give  room  for  the  batteries  ordered  into  action  in  the 
open.  Bonham's  brigade  on  the  left,  the  other  on  the  right. 

"As  the  guns  were  about  to  open  there  came  a  message  that  the  enemy, 
instead  of  being  in  precipitate  retreat,  was  marching  around  to  attack 
the  Confederate  right.  With  this  report  came  orders,  or  reports  of  orders, 
for  the  brigades  to  return  to  their  positions  behind  the  Run.  I  denounced 
the  report  as  absurd,  claimed  to  know  a  retreat,  such  as  was  before  me,  and 
ordered  that  the  batteries  open  fire,  when  Maj.  Whiting,  of  Gen.  Johns- 
ton's staff,  rising  in  his  stirrups,  said,  — 

" '  In  the  name  of  Gen.  Johnston,  I  order  that  the  batteries  shall  not  open.' 
"  I  inquired,  '  Did  Gen.  Johnston  send  you  to  communicate  that  order  ? ' 
"Whiting  replied,  'No,  but  I  take  the  responsibility  to  give  it.' 
"  I  claimed  the  privilege  of  responsibility  under  the  circumstances,  and 
when  in  the  act  of  renewing  the  order  to  fire,  Gen.  Bonham  rode  to 
my  side  and  asked  that  the  batteries  should  not  open.     As  the  ranking 
officer  present,  this  settled  the  question.     By  that  time,  too,  it  was  near 
night.     Col.  G.  W.  Lay,  of  Johnston's  staff,  supported  my  views,  not- 
withstanding the  protest  of  Maj.  Whiting. 

"  Soon  there  came  an  order  for  the  brigades  to  withdraw  and  return  to 
their  positions  behind  the  Run.  Gen.  Bonham  marched  his  brigade 
back,  but,  thinking  there  was  a  mistake  somewhere,  I  remained  in  position 
until  the  order  was  renewed,  about  ten  o'clock.  My  brigade  crossed  and 
recrossed  the  Run  six  times  during  the  day  and  night. 

"It  was  afterwards  found  that  some  excitable  person,  seeing  Jones's 
brigade  recrossing  the  Run,  from  its  advance  under  previous  orders,  took 
them  for  Federal  troops  crossing  at  McLean's  Ford,  and,  rushing  to  head- 
quarters at  the  Junction,  reported  that  the  Federals  were  crossing  below 
and  preparing  for  attack  against  our  right.  And  upon  this  report  one 
of  our  staff-officers  sent  orders,  in  the  names  of  the  Confederate  chiefs, 
revoking  the  orders  for  pursuit." 

On  my  return  from  the  message  to  Kershaw  I  rejoined  Beaure- 
gard  on  the  field,  and  was  with  him  until  after  dark,  when  I  was 


THE  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN  49 

sent  to  escort  Gen.  Johnston  back  to  Manassas  Junction  by 
the  Sudley-Manassas  road.  On  the  road  we  were  overtaken  by 
President  Davis  with  Beauregard  and  most  of  his  staff.  Be- 
tween 10  and  11  P.M.  we  all  arrived  at  the  headquarters  in  the 
village.  After  supper  a  conference  was  held  between  the  Presi- 
dent and  the  two  generals  in  an  upper  room.  While  it  was  in  prog- 
ress, probably  about  midnight,  there  arrived  Maj.  R.  C.  Hill,  a 
staff-officer  in  Johnston's  command,  who  had  taken  part  in  the 
pursuit  in  the  afternoon,  and  who  now  came  to  report  that  he  had 
"  made  his  way  into  Centreville,  and  had  found  it  entirely  deserted, 
and  the  streets  blockaded  with  abandoned  artillery  and  caissons." 

This  was  the  first  intimation  which  reached  headquarters  that 
the  enemy's  retreat,  even  without  any  pursuit,  had  degenerated 
into  a  panic,  and  Maj.  Hill  was  taken  at  once  upstairs  to  make 
his  report  in  person  to  the  generals  and  the  President.  He  was 
well  known  under  the  sobriquet  of  "Crazy  Hill,"  to  distinguish 
him  from  another  Hill,  classmate  at  West  Point.  Nothing  that 
he  had  ever  done  had  justified  his  nickname,  but  it  arose  from 
something  peculiar  in  his  eye,  tones,  and  manner,  all  suggestive 
of  suppressed  excitement.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  he  had  not  been 
to  Centreville,  but  only  to  Cub  Run  bridge.  He  had  come  upon 
the  field  with  a  company  of  cavalry,  and  had  seen  the  blockaded 
guns  and  caissons.  There  was  no  other  such  blockade,  at  Centre- 
ville or  elsewhere. 

The  details  of  what  took  place  in  the  council,  after  Hill  had 
told  his  story  and  been  dismissed,  indicate  that  the  case  was 
one  where  too  many  cooks  spoiled  the  broth.  Immediate  ad- 
vance should  have  been  made.  While  Hill  had  not  really  been 
at  Centreville,  an  advance  there  after  midnight  would  have 
found  it  nearly  if  not  entirely  deserted,  and  might  have  over- 
taken the  rear  of  the  retreating  Federals.  Mr.  Davis  suggested 
immediate  pursuit,  and  there  was  some  discussion  as  to  which 
troops  were  in  best  condition  and  most  conveniently  situated. 
Johnston,  who  was  the  commander-in-chief,  offered  no  definite 
motion,  and  there  ensued  a  pause.  Beauregard's  adjutant, 
Col.  Jordan,  then  asked  the  President  if  he  would  dictate 
an  order.  He  complied  and  dictated  one  for  immediate  pursuit. 
Conversation  began  on  whether  pursuit  at  dawn  would  answer, 


50 


MILITARY  MEMOIRS 


and  also  as  to  Hill  and  his  story.  It  was  brought  out  that  Hill 
was  known  as  "Crazy  Hill,"  and,  though  no  one  knew  him  per- 
sonally, some  doubt  was  felt,  and  the  order  was  modified  into 
one  directing  a  reconnoissance  at  dawn  by  Bonham's  and  Cocke's 
brigades  and  infantry. 

At  dawn  next  morning  it  was  pouring  rain  and  it  continued 
most  of  the  day.  This  heavy  precipitation  has  often  been  ap- 
pealed to  by  the  rain-makers  as  confirmation  of  their  theories 
that  rain  may  be  induced  by  heavy  cannonading. 

The  reconnoissances  ordered  were  made  and,  of  course,  found 
the  country  deserted.  Our  cavalry  followed  the  retreat  beyond 
Fairfax  Court  House,  and  picked  up  a  few  stragglers  and  about 
20  wagons.  These  small  matters  and  the  artillery  captured  at 
Cub  Run  and  brought  in  during  the  day  amused  and  interested 
us  while  the  last  hours  of  our  opportunity  passed  away.  Never 
did  an  enemy  make  a  cleaner  escape  out  of  such  an  exposed 
position  after  such  an  utter  rout. 

CASUALTIES.    BULL  RUN,  JULY  21,  1861 
CONFEDERATE 


BRIGADES 

KILLED 

WOUNDED 

MISSING 

TOTAL 

Army  of  Potomac 
Bonham       (5  Reg'ts) 
Ewell           (3            ) 
Jones           (3            ) 
Longstreet  (4            ) 
Cocke          (32/2        ) 
Early           (4             ) 
Evans          (6  Co  s.   ) 
Hampton    (6  Co  s.   ) 

10 
3 
13 

2 
23 
20 
8 
19 

66 
23 
57 
12 
79 
117 
38 
100 

2 
6 
2 
2 

76 
26 
70 
14 
104 
143  ' 
48 
121 

Total 

98 

492 

12 

602 

Army  of  Shenandoah 
Jackson       (5  Reg'ts) 
Bartow        (2       "     ) 
Bee              (2y5  "    ) 
Elzey          (3       "    ) 
6th  N.C.      (1       "     ) 

119 
60 
72 
8 
23 

442 
303 
260 
18 
50 

1 

561 
363 
333 
26 
73 

Total 

282 

1073 

1 

1356 

Total 

380 

1565 

13 

1958 

THE  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN 


51 


FEDERAL.     IST  DIVISION.    TYLER 


Keyes 
Schenck 
Sherman 
Richardson 

19 
19 
20 

50 
15 

208 
not 

154 
16 
253 

engaged. 

223 
50 
481 

Total 

58 

273 

423 

754 

2o  DIVISION.    HUNTER 

Porter 
Burnside 

84 
40 

148 
88 

245 
61 

477 
189 

Total 

124 

236 

306 

666 

3o  DIVISION.    HEINTZELMAN 

Franklin 
Wilcox 
Howard 

71 
71 
50 

197 
172 
115 

26 
186 
180 

294 
429 
345 

Total 

192 

484 

392 

1068 

STH  DIVISION.    MILES 

Blanker 
Davies 

6 
1 

16 
2 

94 
1 

116 
4 

Total 

7 

18 

95 

120 

Aggregate 

481 

1011 

1216 

2708 

CHAPTER  III 
FALL  AND  WINTER  OF  1861 

Ordnance  Service.  Breech-loading  Small-Arms.  Confederate  Arma- 
ments. Richmond  Ordnance  Bureau.  Secret  Service.  McClellan's 
Secret  Service.  Military  Situation.  A  Council  of  War.  Ball's  Bluff. 
Occoquan  Battery.  Winter.  Army  Organization.  Federal  Organi- 
zation. Lines  of  Advance  on  Richmond.  Retreat  from  Manassas. 
The  Valley.  Kernstown. 

ON  the  day  after  Bull  Run  I  was  appointed  Chief  of  Ordnance 
of  Beauregard's  corps,  and  within  a  few  days  Johnston  extended 
my  office  over  the  whole  army,  which,  about  this  period,  took 
the  name  ever  afterwards  used,  —  "The  Army  of  Northern  Vir- 
ginia." The  enemy,  about  the  same  time,  adopted  their  equally 
well-known  title,  "The  Army  of  the  Potomac." 

My  new  duties  largely  absorbed  my  time,  but  I  remained  in 
charge  of  the  signal  service,  the  work  being  now  confined  to 
sending  instructed  parties  to  all  parts  of  the  Confederacy  where 
they  might  be  of  use.  During  the  fall  a  "Department  of  Sig- 
nals" was  organized  in  Richmond,  and  the  charge  of  it,  with  the 
rank  of  colonel,  was  offered  me,  but  declined,  as  I  was  unwilling 
to  leave  the  field.  As  head  of  a  department  I  was  soon  made 
Major,  and,  later,  Lieutenant-Colonel  of  Artillery.  Col.  William 
Norris  of  Baltimore  became  the  Chief  Signal  Officer. 

Briefly,  my  duties  embraced  the  supply  of  arms  and  ammuni- 
tion to  all  troops  in  the  field,  —  infantry,  artillery,  and  cavalry. 
I  organized  the  department,  with  an  ordnance  officer  or  sergeant  in 
every  regiment,  from  whom  I  received  weekly  statements  show- 
ing the  arms  and  ammunition  on  hand  in  cartridge  boxes  and 
regimental  wagons.  Reserve  storehouses  were  provided  at  the 
nearest  railroad  points,  and  reserve  trains  for  brigades  and  divi- 
sions, to  run  between  the  storehouses  and  the  troops.  For  emer- 
gency, under  my  own  control  was  held  a  train  of  ammunition 
and  battery  wagons  equipped  with  tools  and  expert  mechanics 
for  all  sorts  of  repairs  from  a  broken  mainspring  to  a  spiked 

52 


FALL  AND  WINTER  OF  1861  53 

fieldpiece.  I  was  fortunate  in  securing  for  superintendent 
of  this  train,  Maj.  George  Duffy,  an  expert  from  Alexandria, 
who  became  an  institution  in  the  army,  and  remained  with  it 
throughout  the  war. 

In  its  early  stages  we  had  great  trouble  with  the  endless 
variety  of  arms  and  calibres  in  use,  scarcely  ten  per  cent  of  them 
being  the  muzzle-loading  rifled  musket,  calibre  58,  which  was 
then  the  regulation  arm  for  United  States  infantry.  There  were 
several  breech-loading  small-arms  manufactured  at  the  North, 
but  none  had  secured  the  approval  of  the  United  States  Ordnance 
Department,  although  many  of  them  would  have  made  more 
formidable  weapons  than  any  muzzle-loaders. 

The  old  idea  was  still  widely  entertained  that,  because  the 
percentage  of  hits  is  always  small,  the  fire  of  infantry  should  not 
be  rapid,  lest  the  men  waste  too  much  ammunition.  After  a 
year  or  two  some  of  the  best  breech-loaders  got  admission  among 
cavalry  regiments,  and  common  sense  and  experience  gradually 
forced  a  recognition  of  the  value  of  a  heavy  fire.  By  1864,  the 
Spencer  breech-loading  carbine  had  been  adopted  as  the  regula- 
tion arm  for  the  Federal  cavalry,  and  by  the  fall  of  that  year 
brigades  of  infantry  began  to  appear  with  it. 

On  October  7,  1864,  on  the  Darbytown  road,  Field's  division 
was  easily  repulsed  by  two  brigades  armed  with  Spencers,  with 
severe  loss,  including  Genls.  Gregg  killed  and  Bratton  wounded ; 
and  on  Nov.  30,  1864,  at  Franklin,  Tennessee,  Casement's, 
brigade  with  these  arms  decided  that  battle  with  terrific  slaughter, 
It  was  written  of  this  fight  that  "never  before  in  the  history  of 
war  did  a  command,  of  the  approximate  strength  of  Casement's, 
in  so  short  a  period  of  time  kill  and  wound  as  many  men." 

There  is  reason  to  believe  that  had  the  Federal  infantry  been 
armed  from  the  first  with  even  the  breech-loaders  available  in 
1861  the  war  would  have  been  terminated  within  a  year. 

The  old  smooth-bore  musket,  calibre  69,  made  up  the  bulk  of 
the  Confederate  armament  at  the  beginning,  some  of  the  guns, 
even  all  through  1862,  being  old  flint-locks.  But  every  effort 
was  made  to  replace  them  by  rifled  muskets  captured  in  battle, 
brought  through  the  blockade  from  Europe,  or  manufactured  at 
a  few  small  arsenals  which  we  gradually  fitted  up.  Not  until 


54  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

after  the  battle  of  Gettysburg  was  the  whole  army  in  Virginia 
equipped  with  the  rifled  musket.  In  1864  we  captured  some 
Spencer  breech-loaders,  but  we  could  never  use  them  for  lack  of 
proper  cartridges. 

Our  artillery  equipment  at  the  beginning  was  even  more  inade- 
quate than  our  small-arms.  Our  guns  were  principally  smooth- 
bore 6-Prs.  and  12-Pr.  howitzers,  and  their  ammunition  was 
afflicted  with  very  unreliable  fuses.  Our  arsenals  soon  began  to 
manufacture  rifled  guns,  but  'they  always  lacked  the  copper  and 
brass,  and  the  mechanical  skill  necessary  to  turn  out  first-class 
ammunition.  Gradually  we  captured  Federal  guns  to  supply 
most  of  our  needs,  but  we  were  handicapped  by  our  own  am- 
munition until  the  close  of  the  war. 

No  department  of  our  government  deserves  more  credit  than 
our  Ordinance  Bureau  in  Richmond  under  Gen.  Josiah  Gorgas,  for 
its  success  in  supplying  the  enormous  amount  of  ordinance  ma- 
terial consumed  during  the  war.  Although  always  economical 
of  ammunition,  yet  we  never  lost  any  action  from  the  lack  of  it. 
We  were,  however,  finally  very  near  the  end  of  our  resources,  in 
the  supply  of  one  indispensable  article.  To  make  percussion 
caps  nitric  acid,  mercury,  and  copper  were  required.  Our 
Nitre  and  Mining  Bureau  had  learned  to  make  saltpetre  from 
caves,  and  the  earth  under  old  barns  and  smoke  houses,  and  from 
all  kinds  of  nitrogenous  waste  material.  From  the  saltpetre 
our  chemists  could  make  nitric  acid.  Our  quicksilver  came  from 
Mexico,  but  after  the  fall  of  Vicksburg  we  were  cut  off  from  it, 
and  about  the  same  time  the  supply  of  sheet  copper  was  ex- 
hausted. The  chemists  found  out  a  mixture  of  chlorate  of 
potash  and  sulphuret  of  antimony  which  they  could  use  in 
place  of  fulminate  of  mercury;  and  we  collected  all  the  turpen- 
tine and  apple-brandy  stills  in  the  country  and  sent  them  to 
Richmond  to  be  cut  up  and  rerolled  into  copper  strips. 

From  this  copper  and  the  above  chemical  mixture  all  the 
caps  were  made  which  we  used  during  the  last  year  of  the  war, 
but  at  its  close  the  copper  stills  were  exhausted.  It  is  hard  to 
imagine  what  we  would  then  have  done  had  not  the  surrender  at 
Appomattox  relieved  the  quandary. 

In  August  our  line  of  pickets  was  advanced  within  five  miles 


FALL  AND  WINTER  OF  1861  55 

of  the  Potomac,  opposite  Washington,  and  it  included  two  hills, 
Munson  's  and  Mason 's,  from  which  many  houses  in  Washington 
were  plainly  visible.  This  suggested  opening  a  line  of  secret 
signals  from  a  window  in  one  of  these  houses  to  an  observation 
room  on  the  top  of  a  residence  on  Mason's  Hill.  "A  powerful 
telescope  was  borrowed  from  Charleston,  and  an  intelligent 
signal  employee,  E.  P.  Bryan,  of  Maryland,  was  sent  in  disguise 
to  Washington  to  find  a  room  with  an  available  window,  and  to 
install  himself  therein.  The  scheme  was  entirely  feasible,  but 
before  it  could  be  put  into  operation  Johnston  decided  that  it 
was  unwise  to  hold  our  lines  so  close  to  the  enemy,  and  they 
were  withdrawn,  giving  up  the  positions  on  the  two  hills. 

Bryan  then  established  a  signal  line  across  the  Potomac,  some 
15  miles  below  Alexandria,  with  messengers  from  its  termini  to 
Manassas  and  to  our  secret  agents  in  Washington.  The  principal 
business  of  these  agents  was  to  supply  us  with  the  Northern 
papers,  although  for  some  time  careful  account  was  kept  of 
arrivals  of  new  troops  at  Washington.  But  this  was  found  less 
reliable  than  the  accounts  in  the  daily  papers.  From  them  we 
learned  not  only  of  all  arrivals,  but  also  of  assignments  to  brig- 
ades and  divisions,  and,  by  tabulating  these,  we  always  knew  / 
quite  accurately  the  strength  of  the  enemy's  army. 

Why  the  enemy,  by  similar  obvious  methods,  did  not,  also, 
always  know  our  strength,  remains  a  mystery.  But  McClellan 
had  a  bureau  under  Pinkerton  to  estimate  for  him,  from  the 
reports  of  spies,  prisoners,  and  deserters,  and  implicitly  believed, 
by  preference,  the  most  absurd  and  impossible  of  all  their  re- 
ports. As  an  illustration  may  be  taken  his  report  in  October, 
1861,  in  which  he  estimates  the  Confederate  army  on  the  Po- 
tomac as  "not  less  than  150,000  strong,  well-drilled  and  equipped, 
ably  commanded  and  strongly  intrenched." 

In  fact,  the  Confederate  army  at  the  time  was  only  about 
40,000  strong.  It  was  very  poorly  drilled  and  wretchedly 
equipped,  and  it  had,  practically,  no  intrenchments  whatever. 
And  although  it  numbered  able  officers  among  its  generals,  it 
was  badly  commanded,  in  that  it  was  not  organized  into  divisions, 
and  could  not  have  been  well  handled  either  on  a  march  or  in 
action. 


56  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

McClellan,  though  unfit  to  command  in  battle,  had  no  superior 
in  organizing  an  army  t0  take  the  field  as  a  thoroughly  fit 
machine,  able  to  concentrate  its  energies  wherever  needed.  By 
the  end  of  October  he  might  easily  have  advanced  upon  the 
Confederates  with  a  force  three  to  one  hi  numbers  and  twice 
better  armed  and  organized. 

Public  opinion  would  have  forced  McClellan  into  making  an 
attack,  but  for  the  moral  effect  of  the  imaginary  battalions  which 
Pinkerton's  Bureau  had  conjured  into  existence  and  drilled  and 
equipped  so  easily.  And  as  so  good  a  fighting  machine  of 
American  soldiers  would  do  hard  fighting,  even  without  a  gen- 
eral at  their  head,  as  was  abundantly  shown  by  McClellan 's 
subsequent  career,  it  is  entirely  possible  that  the  Confederates 
may  owe  their  escape  from  a  defeat  in  November,  1861,  as  much 
to  yarns  spun  by  their  deserters  as  to  their  own  impudent 
attitude  in  the  field. 

After  the  battle  of  Bull  Run  it  was  apparent  that  if  the  South 
sat  quietly  in  a  defensive  attitude  until  the  enemy  was  ready  to 
advance  again,  he  would  come  in  overwhelming  force.  Conse- 
quently the  burden  was  upon  us  to  bring  on  the  collision  while 
our  comparative  resources  were  greatest.  Johnston  and  Beaure- 
gard  recognized  this,  but  deferred  action  from  day  to  day, 
hoping  to  receive  reinforcements  worth  waiting  for,  and  to  ac- 
cumulate transportation  and  supplies.  President  Davis  recog- 
nized it  also,  and  sent  some  new  regiments  from  time  to  time, 
but  the  demands  upon  him  were  very  great.  He  had  urgent 
appeals  for  more  troops  from  every  quarter,  from  the  Potomac 
to  the  Rio  Grande.  And,  as  scarce  as  men  were,  arms  were  even 
scarcer.  He  divided  out  all  he  had  according  to  his  best  judg- 
ment, but  it  must  be  admitted  that  this  was  often  mistaken. 
Troops  were  certainly  held  at  Pensacola,  Savannah,  Charleston, 
Norfolk,  and  in  West  Virginia,  which  might  have  given  the 
needed  strength  to  the  army  at  Manassas  to  enable  it  to  take  the 
offensive.  As  it  was,  the  new  troops  sent  were  little  more  than 
enough  to  make  good  the  losses  from  sickness  which  befell  the 
army  in  the  summer  of  1861. 

The  entire  country  about  Bull  Run  was  malarial,  and  the 
troops  were  badly  equipped  and  ignorant  about  sanitary  meas- 


FALL  AND  WINTER  OF  1861  57 

ures.  All  our  new  regiments  from  country  districts  were  great 
sufferers  from  measles,  which  often  reduced  their  effective  force 
one-half. 

In  the  latter  part  of  Sept.,  feeling  that  the  opportunity 
was  about  to  pass,  President  Davis  was  induced  to  visit  Johns- 
ton, Beauregard,  and  Smith  at  Manassas,  and  this  matter  was 
discussed.  The  three  generals  asked  for  10,000  or  20,000 
more  men  than  the  40,000  they  had.  With  this  addition 
to  their  numbers  they  proposed  to  cross  the  Potomac  and  make 
an  offensive  campaign  in  Maryland.  Mr.  Davis  seemed  greatly 
disappointed  to  find  so  few  troops  available.  He  acknowledged 
the  force  of  the  argument  for  the  offensive,  but  he  could  not  see 
his  way  to  taking  troops  from  other  points,  and  he  could  not 
provide  more  men  until  he  could  procure  more  arms. 

On  Oct.  21  an  accidental  affair  took  place  at  Ball's  Bluff, 
near  Leesburg,  Virginia,  which  greatly  elated  the  Confederates. 
Evans's  brigade,  of  four  regiments  and  a  battery,  was  held  at 
Leesburg  in  observation  of  the  Potomac,  and  of  a  force  under 
Gen.  Stone  on  the  Maryland  shore.  On  Oct.  19,  McClel- 
lan  had  sent  out  a  strong  reconnoissance  toward  Leesburg 
from  his  main  body  covering  Washington.  The  reconnoissance 
was  scarcely  extended  half-way  to  Leesburg,  but  McClellan 
thought  that  it  might  alarm  Evans  and  cause  him  to  fall  back 
nearer  to  Manassas ;  so  on  Oct.  20  he  wired  Stone,  suggesting 
a  demonstration  on  his  part.  Stone  made  it  by  crossing  the  river 
at  two  points,  Edward's  Ferry  and  Ball's  Bluff,  about  three 
miles  apart.  Both  parties  crossed  without  opposition,  but  the 
Ball's  Bluff  party,  having  occupied  the  high  bluff  on  the  Vir- 
ginia shore,  pushed  out  a  reconnoissance  through  the  woods 
toward  Leesburg,  some  two  miles  off. 

Evans,  with  three  of  his  regiments  and  his  battery,  was  observ- 
ing the  Edward's  Ferry  body,  which  had  taken  a  strong  position 
and  intrenched  itself.  His  fourth  regiment,  the  18th  Miss., 
came  in  contact  with  the  Ball 's  Bluff  advance,  and  drove  it  back 
to  the  main  body  at  the  top  of  the  bluff.  There  the  fight  grew 
hotter.  Gen.  Baker,  commanding  the  Federals,  brought  up  his 
whole  brigade  of  five  regiments  and  three  pieces  of  artillery,  — 
about  3000  men,  —  and  Evans  sent  two  of  his  three  regiments,  the 


58  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

8th  Va.  and  17th  Miss.,  from  in  front  of  Edward's  Ferry, 
making  the  Confederate  force  engaged  about  1600.  After 
a  sharp  and  well-conducted  fight  under  the  inspiration  of  Col. 
Jenifer,  Baker  was  killed,  his  artillery  captured,  and  his  entire 
force  driven  into  the  river,  many  being  drowned.  The  casual- 
ties were :  — 

Federal :  Killed  49,     wounded  158,      missing  714,        total  921 

Confederate:  "     36,  "       117,  "         2,  "     155 

This  affair,  so  soon  following  Bull  Run,  had  a  powerful  in- 
fluence upon  the  Confederate  morale.  About  this  period  we 
unmasked  on  the  Potomac,  near  the  mouth  of  the  Occoquan,  some 
heavy  batteries,  which,  for  some  weeks,  we  had  been  secretly 
constructing  to  blockade  the  river.  The  enemy  submitted  to 
this  blockade  during  the  whole  winter,  although  a  well-planned 
attack  at  any  time  might  have  captured  the  batteries  and 
established  a  very  threatening  lodgment  upon  our  right  flank. 

McClellan's  apparent  apathy  in  this  matter,  taken  in  conjunc- 
tion with  the  disaster  at  Ball's  Bluff,  gradually  gave  rise  in  Mr. 
Lincoln's  mind  to  a  loss  of  confidence  hi  him  as  a  leader  which 
was  never  fully  restored,  and  which  materially  influenced  the 
course  of  events.  Lincoln  was  now  accumulating  a  force  which 
seemed  enormous.  The  expense  incurred  was  certainly  very 
great,  and  he  became  impatient  to  see  reprisals.  McClellan 
calmly  advised  waiting  until  he  had  collected  and  thoroughly 
organized  an  army  of  about  273,000  men,  which  he  said  would 
take  the  blockading  batteries  without  firing  a  gun.  Lincoln 
submitted,  but  his  discontent  was  increased. 

Meanwhile  winter  put  in  its  appearance.  The  vicinity  of 
each  army  became  a  vast  quagmire,  and  all  military  operations 
became  impossible.  The  Confederate  army  was  withdrawn  to 
Centreville  and  the  vicinity  of  Bull  Run,  where  it  went  into 
winter  quarters.  Soon  after  this  Beauregard  was  transferred  to 
the  Western  Army  under  Gen.  A.  S.  Johnston.  His  position  in 
Virginia  had  been  that  of  a  supernumerary,  and  in  his  new 
position  it  was  little  better  until  after  the  battle  of  Shiloh,  where 
Johnston  was  killed  as  he  was  about  to  grasp  a  victory.  Beaure- 
gard was  not  yet  immune  to  attacks  of  overcaution,  the  bane  of 


FALL  AND  WINTER  OF  1861  59 

new  commanders,  and  his  excellent  chance  to  win  a  great  success 
was  lost.  He  recalled  his  attack  just  at  the  critical  moment 
when  it  gave  every  promise  of  developing  a  panic  among  the 
enemy. 

Gen.  Joseph  E.  Johnston  at  this  time  had  organized  his  army 
into  four  divisions,  two  of  four  brigades  each,  commanded  by 
Van  Dorn  and  G.  W.  Smith ;  and  two  of  five  each,  under  Long- 
street  and  E.  Kir  by  Smith.  These  18  brigades  averaged  about 
four  regiments,  and  the  regiments  averaged  about  500  men  each. 
Besides  these  there  were  other  troops  under  Jackson  in  the  valley 
and  under  Holmes  near  Acquia.  The  total  effective  strength  on 
February  28,  1862,  was  47,617,  with  about  175  guns. 

Early  in  March  the  Federal  army  was  organized  into  five 
army  corps  under  McDowell,  Sumner,  Heintzelman,  Keyes,  and 
Banks.  Each  corps  was  generally  composed  of  three  divisions, 
each  division  of  three  brigades,  and  each  brigade  of  four  regi- 
ments. The  regiments  were  generally  fuller  than  ours,  and 
would  average  about  700  men.  The  total  effective  strength  of 
all  arms  on  February  28,  1862,  was  185,420,  with  465  field  guns, 
of  which  100  were  massed  in  a  reserve  under  the  Chief  of  Artillery. 

During  the  winter  the  Federal  engineers  had  completely  sur- 
rounded Washington  with  a  cordon  of  fortifications  consisting  of 
detached  forts  impregnable  to  assault,  with  heavy  guns  and 
permanent  garrisons  connected  by  infantry  parapets,  and  bat- 
teries for  field  guns.  Within  these  lines  a  small  movable  force 
could  defy  any  adversary  not  able  to  sit  down  and  resort  to 
siege  operations.  This  was  amply  shown  when  Lee,  in  August, 
1862,  drove  Pope  into  Washington,  and  also  in  July,  1864,  when 
Early  made  his  demonstration,  but  withdrew  without  venturing 
to  attack. 

The  Federal  government,  however,  had  received  such  a  scare 
in  the  Bull  Run  campaign  that  it  had  small  confidence  in  forti- 
fications without  a  big  army  to  hold  them.  So  when  McClellan 
proposed  to  make  his  next  advance  upon  Richmond,  from 
Fortress  Monroe  as  a  base,  Mr.  Lincoln  gave  but  reluctant  con- 
sent, as  it  involved  the  removal  of  a  large  body  of  troops  from 
their  position  between  the  enemy  and  the  capital.  At  length 
he  agreed  that  about  73,000  would  be  enough  to  keep  for  the 


60  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

defence  of  Washington.  This  would  allow  McClellan  to  have 
about  150,000  at  Fortress  Monroe.  Early  in  April,  however, 
under  some  strong  political  pressure,  Mr.  Lincoln  detached 
Blenker's  division,  about  10,000  men,  from  McClellan's  force 
and  sent  them  to  Fremont  in  West  Virginia. 

Before  taking  up  the  history  of  this  campaign,  it  will  be 
interesting  to  take  a  general  view  of  all  routes  to  Richmond 
which  were  tried  during  the  war. 

There  were  seven  campaigns  under  as  many  different  com- 
manders. 

First.  McDowell  set  out  to  follow  the  Orange  and  Alexan- 
dria Railway,  but  was  defeated  at  Manassas  in  his  first  battle. 

Second.  McClellan  set  out  from  Fortress  Monroe  via  the 
York  River.  As  we  shall  see,  he  had  some  success.  His  ad- 
vance was  within  six  miles  of  Richmond  when  he  was  beaten 
at  Gaines  Mill.  He  found  a  refuge  on  the  James  River,  but  his 
army  was  soon  recalled  to  Washington. 

Third.  Pope,  in  August,  1862,  followed  in  McDowell's  foot- 
steps along  the  railroad  from  Alexandria,  and  was  defeated  upon 
nearly  the  same  ground  which  had  witnessed  McDowell's  defeat. 

Fourth.  Burnside  took  the  railroad  via  Fredericksburg,  and 
in  December,  1863,  met  a  bloody  repulse  at  that  point  and  gave 
up  his  campaign. 

Fifth.  Hooker  also  took  the  Fredericksburg  route,  but  was 
attacked  at  Chancellorsville  so  severely  that  he  also  gave  up 
his  campaign  early  in  May,  1863. 

Sixth.  Meade,  after  repulsing  Lee  at  Gettysburg  in  July, 
1863,  in  November  essayed  an  advance  from  Alexandria  upon 
Lee's  right  -flank  at  Mine  Run,  about  halfway  between  the  two 
railroad  lines.  He  found  Lee  so  strongly  intrenched  that  he 
withdrew  without  attacking. 

Seventh.  On  May  4,  1864,  Grant,  with  the  largest  force  yet 
assembled,  set  out  from  Alexandria  on  a  line  between  Meade's 
Mine  Run  and  Hooker's  Spottsylvania  routes.  Lee  attacked 
his  columns  in  the  Wilderness.  The  battle  thus  joined  raged  for 
over  11  months,  and  only  ended  at  Appomattox  on  April  9,  1865. 
Our  only  concern  here  is  to  note  the  advantages  and  the  dis- 
advantages of  the  different  lines.  The  overland  route  again 


FALL  AND  WINTER  OF  1861  61 

proved  a  failure.  At  Spottsylvania,  North  Anna,  Totopotomoy, 
Cold  Harbor,  and  Petersburg,  Grant  found  Lee  across  his  path, 
and  was  unable  to  drive  him  off.  His  only  recourse,  on  each 
occasion,  was  to  move  to  his  left  and  try  the  next  road  to  the 
eastward.  And  now  every  intermediate  road  had  been  tried> 
and,  after  losing  65,000  men,  he  was  only  on  the  James  River 
with  Fortress  Monroe  as  his  base,  where  his  fleet  might  have 
landed  him  at  the  beginning  and  without  losing  a  man. 

Here  at  last,  literally  driven  into  the  location  in  front  of 
Petersburg,  Grant  found  himself  in  a  position  of  rare  strategic 
advantage;  certain  to  give  him  possession  of  Richmond  when 
properly  utilized.  Indeed,  it  seems  strange  that  it  had  not  been 
realized  in  1862,  that  the  position  astraddle  both  rivers  at  the 
junction  of  the  James  and  Appomattox  was  the  key  to  Richmond. 
For  it  would  force  Lee  to  hold  an  exterior  line  of  such  enormous 
length  —  from  the  Chickahominy  River  to  the  south  of  Peters- 
burg, nearly  30  miles  —  that  it  could  not  be  long  maintained. 

As  McClellan  selected  the  York  River  line  before  the  James 
River  was  opened  (by  the  loss  of  Norfolk  and  of  the  ironclad 
Merrimac),  he  is  entitled  to  the  credit  of  having  selected  the 
best  route  available  at  the  time.  After  his  retreat  from  Rich- 
mond, he  very  nearly  had  stumbled  into  the  key  position  itself. 
His  army  was  recalled  to  Washington  by  the  Executive,  against 
his  strong  protests  and  appeals. 

Johnston  fully  realized  that  his  inferiority  of  force  left  him 
no  recourse  but  to  stand  upon  the  defensive,  and  watch  to  take 
advantage  of  any  blunders  his  enemy  might  make.  And  it 
was  ordered  from  Richmond,  very  prudently,  that  the  army 
should  be  withdrawn  from  Manassas  before  the  roads  .became 
good. 

Johnston's  movement  was  accordingly  begun  on  March  8, 
which  was  some  weeks  before  it  would  have  been  possible  for 
McClellan  to  move  his  army.  He  followed  Johnston's  with- 
drawal slowly,  for  a  short  distance,  but  there  was  no  collision. 
A  considerable  loss  of  provisions  resulted  to  the  Confederates 
from  the  condition  of  the  roads, -and  the  fact  that  their  Com- 
missary Department  had  established  a  meat-packing  depot  on  the 
Manassas  Gap  Railroad  at  Thoroughfare  Gap,  and  accumulated 


62  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

there  an  amount  of  stores  much  greater  than  the  railroad  could 
remove  upon  short  notice. 

The  army  paused  for  a  while  behind  the  Rappahannock,  but 
then  took  a  better  position  behind  the  Rapidan,  where  it  awaited 
developments. 

Meanwhile  on  March  23,  something  took  place  in  the  Valley. 
Stonewall  Jackson  had  been  in  command  there  of  two  small 
brigades  through  the  winter,  but  had  fallen  back,  about  40  miles 
south  of  Winchester,  when  Johnston's  army  abandoned  Manassas. 
Banks's  Federal  Corps  had  been  opposed  to  him,  and  it  was 
now  ordered  to  Manassas.  Jackson  learned  of  the  movement  in 
progress,  and,  believing  that  he  might  surprise  its  rear,  and  at 
least  disconcert  plans,  he  made  a  march  of  36  miles  in  a  day 
and  a  half,  and  fell  upon  his  enemy  at  Kernstown. 

His  attack  was  so  vigorous  that,  for  a  while,  it  bore  promise 
of  success,  but  the  Federal  force  at  hand  was  largely  greater  than 
had  been  anticipated.  It  consisted  of  Shields's  division  of  three 
brigades,  about  10,000  men.  Jackson  had  upon  the  field  only 
about  3500.  Consequently,  when  the  battle  became  fully  de- 
veloped, Jackson  was  driven  off  with  a  loss  of  455  killed  and 
wounded  and  263  captured.  Shields  lost  568  killed  and  wounded, 
and  22  captured.  It  was  a  small  affair,  and  apparently  a 
Federal  victory,  but  it  was  bread  cast  upon  strategic  waters. 

There  soon  followed  a  serious  development.  Jackson's  name 
and  aggressiveness,  and  the  fierceness  of  his  attack,  all  tended 
to  increase  Mr.  Lincoln's  reluctance  to  see  Washington  stripped 
of  any  force  available  for  its  defence.  He  had  already  taken 
Blenker's  division  of  10,000  men  from  McClellan,  and  now,  on 
April  4,  he  took  also  McDowell's  corps  of  37,000,  ordering  it  to 
report  to  the  Secretary  of  War.  As  the  result  of  that  order 
was  to  keep  McDowell  out  of  the  "Seven  Days"  battles  in  June, 
Jackson's  battle  at  Kernstown,  though  generally  reckoned  a 
defeat,  was  really  the  first  step  to  Lee's  victory  in  June. 


CHAPTER  IV 

YORKTOWN   AND   WlLLIAMSBURG 

McClellan  at  Fortress  Monroe.  Johnston  goes  to  Yorktown.  Reorgan- 
ization. Dam  No.  1.  Yorktown  Evacuated.  Retreat  from  York- 
town.  Battle  of  Williamsburg.  Early's  Attack.  Hancock's  Report. 
Casualties.  Eltham's  Landing. 

IN  the  latter  part  of  March,  the  Confederate  signal  lines  began 
to  report  the  movement  of  a  great  army  down  the  Potomac, 
and  it  was  soon  discovered  that  it  was  being  concentrated  at 
Fortress  Monroe.  On  April  5,  some  five  divisions  of  Federal 
infantry,  with  cavalry  and  artillery,  from  that  point,  approached 
the  Confederate  lines  across  the  Peninsula  at  Yorktown.  These 
were  held  by  Gen.  Magruder,  whose  force  at  the  time  was 
only  about  13,000  men.  They  occupied  a  line  about  12  miles 
in  length  —  partly  behind  the  Warwick  River,  and  partly  pro- 
tected by  slight  earthworks.  Another  opportunity  as  good  as 
that  offered  McDowell  at  Bull  Run  was  here  offered  to  McClellan, 
who  could  have  rushed  the  position  anywhere.  He  contented 
himself,  however,  with  some  cannonading  and  sharp-shooting. 
Of  course,  he  was  still  under  the  Pinkerton  delusion  as  to  the 
enemy's  strength.  Magruder,  who  was  expecting  reenforce- 
ments,  made  the  bravest  possible  display,  exhibiting  the  same 
troops  repeatedly  at  different  points.  It  was  just  at  this  junc- 
ture, when  a  great  success  was  in  McClellan's  grasp,  had  he  had 
the  audacity  to  risk  something,  that  the  news  reached  him  that 
Lincoln  had  taken  from  him  McDowell's  37,000  men.  This, 
doubtless,  had  its  effect  in  discouraging  him  and  leading  him  to 
resort  to  siege  operations  against  Yorktown  instead  of  attempt- 
ing to  pass  the  position  by  main  force. 

Meanwhile,  Johnston  had  been  summoned  to  Richmond,  and 
had  advised  Davis  that  a  defence  of  Yorktown  involved  great 
risk,  and  at  best  could  gain  no  important  result.  He  advocated 
its  abandonment,  and  the  concentration  at  Richmond  of  all 

63 


64  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

forces  from  Virginia  to  Georgia.  With  these  McClellan's  force 
should  be  attacked  when  it  came  near  Richmond. 

A  conference  was  called,  which  included  Lee,  Longstreet, 
G.  W.  Smith,  and  the  Sec.  of  War,  Randolph.  It  was  advo- 
cated by  Lee,  and  finally  determined,  that  Johnston  should 
risk  making  all  the  delay  possible  at  Yorktown.  This  was  a  safe 
conclusion  to  reach,  only  in  view  of  the  cautiousness  of  McClellan. 

Johnston  had  already  begun  sending  some  reinforcements  to 
Magruder,  and  had  brought  a  large  part  of  his  army  near  Rich- 
mond. About  Apr.  15  he  went  to  Yorktown,  taking  Smith's 
and  Longstreet's  divisions,  which  gave  him  a  total  force  of  55,633. 

In  the  whole  course  of  the  war  there  was  little  service  as  try- 
ing as  that  in  the  Yorktown  lines.  There  was  much  ram  and 
the  country  was  low  and  flat,  so  that  the  trenches  were  badly 
drained  and  would  frequently  be  flooded  with  water.  The 
general  flatness  left  no  cover  in  rear  of  the  lines.  The  enemy's 
rifle-pits  were  within  range  and  view  at  many  points,  and  the 
fire  of  sharp-shooters  with  telescopic  rifles  was  incessant,  and 
that  of  artillery  was  often  severe.  At  many  important  points, 
the  crowded  ranks  hi  the  trenches  had  to  either  sit  or  crouch 
behind  the  parapet,  in  water  up  to  their  knees,  from  daylight 
until  darkness  permitted  one  to  rise  upright  or  to  step  outside 
of  the  trench.  The  only  rest  at  night  was  to  sleep  in  the  uni- 
versal mud  and  water.  Although  the  men  in  the  worst  locations 
were  relieved  as  often  as  possible,  an  unusual  amount  of  sickness 
resulted.  Gen.  D.  H.  Hill  wrote  in  his  official  report :  — 

"  Our  Revolutionary  sires  did  not  suffer  more  at  Valley  Forge  than  did 
our  army  at  Yorktown,  and  in  the  retreat  from  it.  Notwithstanding  the 
rain,  mud,  cold,  hunger,  watching,  and  fatigue  I  never  heard  a  murmur 
or  witnessed  an  act  of  insubordination.  The  want  of  discipline  manifested 
itself  only  in  straggling  which  was  and  still  is  the  curse  of  our  army. 
This  monstrous  evil  can  only  be  corrected  by  a  more  rigid  government 
and  a  sterner  system  of  punishment  than  have  yet  been  introduced  into 
our  service." 

During  our  stay  here  a  reorganization  of  the  army  took  place. 
The  majority  of  our  troops  had  enlisted  for  a  year  in  the  spring 
of  1861.  It  was  now  necessary  to  reenlist  them  for  the  war. 
Congress  had  enacted  that  reenlistment  furloughs  should  be  given 


YORKTOWN  AND  WILLIAMSBURG  65 

to  a  few  men  at  a  time,  and  that  a  reelection  of  officers  should 
take  place  in  each  regiment.  This  feature  was  very  detrimental 
to  the  standard  of  good  discipline. 

During  the  whole  of  the  siege  there  was  but  one  affair  of  any 
consequence,  and  it  is  of  interest  principally  as  indicating  the 
great  improvement  wrought  in  the  Federal  troops  by  the  disci- 
pline which  had  been  given  them  during  the  fall  and  winter. 

On  Apr.  16,  a  Federal  reconnoissance  was  made  by  W.  F. 
Smith's  division,  of  a  position  on  our  lines  called  Dam  No.  1. 
Here  our  intrenchment,  at  the  upper  part  of  Warwick  Creek, 
was  protected  by  inundations.  Just  below  Dam  No.  1  the  in- 
undation from  No.  2  was  only  about  waist  deep  and  perhaps 
100  yards  wide,  thickly  grown  up  with  trees  and  undergrowth. 
These  facts  were  discovered  by  a  bold  reconnoissance  under  cover 
of  a  heavy  fire.  Four  companies  of  the  3d  Vt.  were  ordered 
to  cross  the  inundation  and  develop  what  we  had  on  the  other 
side. 

They  made  their  advance  very  handsomely,  fording  the  over- 
flow, and  actually  got  possession  of  our  line  of  infantry  parapet 
some  20  yards  on  the  farther  side.  This  was  occupied  at  the 
time  by  only  a  picket  line  of  the  15th  N.C.,  Col.  McKinney, 
the  rest  of  the  regiment  being  at  work  upon  a  second  line 
200  yards  in  the  rear.  McKinney  promptly  formed  his  regi- 
ment and  moved  forward  to  drive  the  enemy  out,  but  was  killed, 
and  his  men  repulsed  in  confusion,  the  enemy  fighting  from  the 
far  side  of  our  parapet.  Presently,  however,  the  brigade  com- 
mander, Howell  Cobb,  arrived,  and  as  the  enemy  were  not  re- 
enforced,  after  holding  their  ground  for  perhaps  a  half  hour, 
they  retreated,  losing  83  men  out  of  192  who  crossed  the  stream. 
The  entire  casualties  of  the  Federals  were  165.  The  casualties 
of  the  15th  N.C.  were  12  killed  and  31  wounded. 

It  was  plain  from  this  affair  that  the  fighting  we  would  soon 
have  to  face  was  to  be  something  better  than  that  of  1861. 

Meanwhile  McClellan  was  preparing  for  Yorktown  a  terrific 
bombardment  by  which  he  hoped  to  wreck  our  water  batteries 
so  that  his  fleet  could  pass  us.  Siege  batteries  mounting  71 
guns,  including  two  200-Pr.  rifles  and  five  100-Prs.  and  several 
13-inch  mortars  were  being  rapidly  mounted.  On  May  1  his 


66  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

100-Pr.  rifles  opened  fire,  and  by  May  6  he  expected  all  the 
other  batteries  to  be  able  to  join  in.  But  Johnston  had  never 
intended  to  risk  siege  operations  at  this  point,  and  at  sundown 
on  May  3  put  his  army  in  motion  toward  Richmond.  His  heavy 
guns  were  fired  actively  all  the  day  before,  and  until  midnight, 
when  the  artillerists  spiked  them  and  withdrew. 

I  recall  that  night's  march  as  particularly  disagreeable.  The 
whole  soil  of  that  section  seemed  to  have  no  bottom  and  no  sup- 
porting power.  The  roads  were  but  long  strings  of  guns,  wagons, 
and  ambulances,  mixed  in  with  infantry,  artillery,  and  cavalry, 
splashing  and  bogging  through  the  darkness  in  a  river  of  mud, 
with  frequent  long  halts  when  some  stalled  vehicle  blocked  the 
road.  Then  men  from  the  nearest  ranks  would  swarm  in  to 
help  the  jaded  horses  pull  the  vehicle  out.  Meanwhile,  every- 
thing in  the  rear  must  halt  and  wait,  and  so  it  went  on  all  night 
—  a  march  of  one  or  two  minutes,  and  halt  for  no  one  could 
guess  how  long.  The  average  time  made  by  the  column  was 
under  a  mile  an  hour. 

Our  movement  was  not  discovered  by  the  enemy  until  after 
daylight  on  the  4th.  His  cavalry  was  at  once  started  in  pursuit, 
and  these  were  followed  during  the  day  by  five  divisions  of 
infantry  under  Smith,  Hooker,  Kearney,  Couch,  and  Casey,  the 
whole  under  command  of  Sumner.  Besides  these,  Franklin's 
division  was  loaded  upon  transports  during  the  day,  and  early 
on  the  6th  sailed  up  the  York  to  intercept  us  near  West  Point. 
Two  other  divisions,  Sedgwick's  and  Richardson's,  were  also  to 
have  been  sent  by  water,  and  McClellan  remained  in  Yorktown 
to  see  them  loaded  and  despatched.  But  the  fighting  next  day 
at  Williamsburg  proved  so  severe  that  he  rode  to  the  front  and 
had  both  divisions  to  follow  him. 

Near  Williamsburg,  Magruder  had,  some  months  before, 
selected  a  line  of  battle  across  the  Peninsula  four  or  five  miles 
long,  on  which  he  had  at  a  few  places  some  slight  intrenchments 
with  slashings  of  timber  in  front,  and,  about  the  centre,  an  en- 
closed fort  of  some  size,  called  Fort  Magruder. 

As  the  rear  of  our  column  came  into  Williamsburg  during  the 
afternoon  of  the  4th,  the  enemy's  cavalry  suddenly  appeared 
so  near  to  this  fort,  that  Semmes's  tired  infantry  brigade  had 


YORKTOWN  AND  WILLIAMSBURG  67 

to  be  taken  back  at  the  double  quick  to  occupy  it,  and  a  sharp 
skirmish  was  fought  before  sundown.  McLaws  reenforced 
Semmes  with  Kershaw  and  two  batteries,  and  we  captured  one 
of  the  enemy's  guns,  stuck  in  the  mud,  ten  horses  being  unable  to 
get  it  off.  After  dark  Kershaw  and  Semmes  were  relieved  by 
Anderson's  and  Pryor's  brigades  of  Longstreet's  division. 

That  night  we  stayed  at  Williamsburg,  and  it  poured  rain  all 
night.  About  2  A.M.  the  leading  divisions  were  pushed  forward. 
Johnston  was  anxious  to  get  his  troops  ahead  to  meet  the  forces 
he  expected  McClellan  to  send  by  water  to  West  Point. 

To  hold  the  enemy  in  check  at  Williamsburg,  Longstreet  re- 
tained his  whole  division  of  six  brigades  as  a  rear-guard.  Soon 
after  daylight  on  the  5th,  the  enemy  developed  their  presence 
before  Pryor  and  Anderson.  Hooker's  and  Smith's  Federal 
divisions  had  reached  the  field  about  dark  on  the  4th. 

The  fighting  began  with  fire  upon  our  lines  from  artillery  and 
skirmishers,  and  gradually  increased  in  volume.  The  whole  of 
Longstreet's  division  was  brought  up,  and  advanced  upon  the 
enemy  in  the  edge  of  the  wood,  where  it  captured  one  of  his 
batteries.  Toward  noon,  when  it  became  evident  from  the  slow 
progress  of  the  marching  columns  that  the  enemy  would  have  to 
be  held  off  until  night,  Johnston  returned  to  the  field,  and  the 
division  of  D.  H.  Hill,  which  had  only  advanced  a  short  distance 
from  Williamsburg,  was  brought  back  as  a  reserve.  One  of  its 
brigades,  Early's,  was  divided,  two  regiments  sent  into  the  fight 
on  our  right,  and  the  other  four  sent  out  in  observation  beyond 
our  left  flank. 

D.  H.  Hill  and  Early  both  went  with  this  left  column,  and 
got  into  trouble  from  a  little  superfluous  aggressiveness. 

On  the  extreme  right  of  the  Federals,  Gen.  Hancock  had 
discovered  some  vacant  intrenchments  —  part  of  Magruder's  old 
line,  before  mentioned.  With  five  regiments,  parts  of  two  bri- 
gades, and  10  guns,  he  occupied  a  commanding  ridge,  and  opened 
artillery  toward  the  Confederate  lines.  Early,  on  lower  ground 
and  in  the  woods,  could  not  see  Hancock's  position,  but  sug- 
gested an  attack  to  Hill.  Hill  approved,  but  referred  the  ques- 
tion to  Johnston.  Johnston,  who  had  left  the  battle  entirely  to 
Longstreet's  direction,  referred  it  to  the  latter.  Longstreet  very 


68  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

properly  refused  to  give  permission,  as  we  fought  only  to  cover 
our  retreat  up  the  Peninsula,  and  it  was  assured.  But  this 
message  taken  to  Hill  did  not  satisfy  him.  He  was  a  brother- 
in-law  of  Stonewall  Jackson  and  was  a  soldier  of  the  same  type. 
He  visited  Longstreet  in  person,  and  Longstreet  now  weakly 
yielded  to  his  appeal.  Rains's  brigade  had  meanwhile  been 
brought  up  behind  Early's,  and  it  would  have  been  possible  to 
organize  an  attack  which  might  have  routed  Hancock.  But 
Hill,  to  lose  no  time,  began  the  formation  of  the  four  regiments 
for  the  charge.  The  distance  to  be  traversed  was  over  half  a 
mile,  much  of  it  wood  and  swamp.  Hill  placed  the  four  regi- 
ments in  a  line  of  battle  extending  through  a  wood,  with  Early 
leading  the  two  left  regiments,  while  he  led  the  two  right.  But 
Early  mistook  one  of  Hill's  commands  to  his  own  wing,  for 
the  order  to  charge,  and  he  led  off  at  once  with  his  left  regi- 
ment, the  24th  Va.,  which  had  open  ground  before  it. 
Hill's  extreme  right  regiment,  the  5th  N.C.,  also  had  open 
ground  in  front,  and,  soon  becoming  aware  that  a  charge  had 
been  begun,  it  also  advanced  without  orders.  Hill,  tangled 
in  wood  and  swamp  with  the  two  centre  regiments,  could  do 
nothing.  After  passing  the  wood  between  them,  the  two  out- 
side regiments  could  see  each  other  and  the  Federal  guns,  now 
scarcely  500  yards  distant  in  front.  These  guns  immediately 
opened  a  severe  fire  of  shell  and  canister.  The  5th  N.C. 
obliqued  to  its  left  to  close  the  wide  gap  between  them  and 
both  advanced  to  the  charge,  reserving  their  fire  generally  until 
within  150  yards  of  the  enemy.  A  large  portion  of  Hancock's 
infantry  lay  concealed  behind  the  crest  of  the  ridge  until  the 
two  regiments,  now  with  ranks  disorganized  by  their  advance, 
were  within  30  yards,  when  the  Federals  raised  and  fired,  advanc- 
ing over  the  crest  and  continuing  the  fire  for  15  or  20  rounds. 
Hancock  says  in  his  official  report :  — 

"The  plunging  fire  from  the  redoubt,  the  direct  fire  from  the  right  and 
the  oblique  fire  from  the  left,  were  so  destructive  that,  after  it  had  been 
ordered  to  cease  and  the  smoke  arose,  it  seemed  that  no  man  had  left 
the  ground  unhurt  who  had  advanced  within  500  yards  of  our  line. 

"  The  enemy's  assault  was  of  the  most  determined  character.  No  troops 
could  have  made  a  more  resolute  charge.  The  5th  North  Carolina 


YORKTOWN  AND  WILLIAMSBURG  69 

was  annihilated.  Nearly  all  of  its  superior  officers  were  left  dead  or 
wounded  on  the  field.  The  24th  Virginia  suffered  greatly  in  superior 
officers  and  men." 

Gen.  Early,  Col.  Terry,  and  Lt.-Col.  Hairston  of  the  24th 
Va.  all  fell  severely  wounded,  and  the  regiment  lost :  killed  30, 
wounded  93,  missing  66,  total  190.  In  the  5th  N.C.  Lt.-Col. 
Badham  was  killed,  and  the  regiment  lost  "about  fifty  per 
cent"  of  its  members,  but  no  official  report  was  made. 

Hancock  reported  his  losses  in  the  affair  as :  killed  10,  wounded 
88,  missing  31,  total  129.  This  affair  about  terminated  the 
fighting.  It  had  rained  nearly  all  day,  and  on  our  right  Long- 
street  simply  kept  back  the  enemy's  advance  by  fire,  and  by 
threatening  their  flanks. 

The  total  Federal  casualties  as  reported  were:  killed  456, 
wounded  1410,  missing  373,  total  2239.  The  Confederate  casual- 
ties [reported  by  Longstreet  only]  were :  officers  102,  men  1458, 
total  1560.  We  captured  12  guns  of  which  five  were  brought 
off,  five  were  chopped  down  with  axes,  and  two  had  to  be  left, 
as  neither  horses  or  axes  were  available.  We  also  brought  off 
about  400  prisoners. 

As  far  as  possible  the  wounded  were  brought  into  Williams- 
burg,  and  soon  after  dark  our  march  was  resumed  over  roads 
now  even  worse  than  any  we  had  had  before.  I  rode  with 
Johnston's  staff,  and  late  in  the  forenoon  of  May  6  we  were  at 
Barhamsville,  and  the  greater  part  of  the  army  was  halted  and 
resting  in  the  vicinity. 

It  had  been  a  special  feature  of  McClellan's  strategy  that  on 
our  retreat  from  Yorktown  we  should  be  intercepted  at  Eltham's 
landing  by  a  large  force.  But  our  battle  at  Williamsburg  had 
proved  a  double  victory,  for  it  had  prevented  Franklin's  division 
from  being  reenforced  so  as  to  be  either  formidable  or  aggressive. 
It  arrived  at  the  mouth  of  the  Pamunkey  at  5  P.M.  on  the  6th. 
During  the  night  it  disembarked  and  next  morning  reconnoitred 
its  vicinity  and  took  a  defensive  position,  sending  Newton's  and 
Slocum's  brigades  through  a  large  wood  to  examine  the  country 
beyond. 

On  the  far  edge  of  that  wood  about  9  A.M.  their  skirmishers 
ran  into  those  of  Hood's  and  Hampton's  brigades  of  Whiting's 


70  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

division,  which  were  there  to  see  that  our  trains  passed  without 
interruption. 

The  Federals  fell  back  and  were  followed  until  they  were 
under  the  protection  of  Franklin's  intrenched  camp,  and  all  our 
trains  passed  unmolested. 

The  Federals  reported :  killed  48,  wounded  110,  missing  28, 
total  186. 

The  Confederate  loss  was  but  8  killed,  and  40  wounded,  and 
they  captured  46  prisoners.  There  was  no  further  effort  to 
interfere  with  our  retreat.  This  was  continued  at  leisure  until 
the  9th,  when  we  halted  on  the  north  bank  of  the  Chickahominy. 


CHAPTER  V 

SEVEN  PINES  OR  FAIR  OAKS 

Drury's  Bluff.  The  Situation.  Attack  Planned.  Johnston's  Plan 
Changed.  Johnston's  Problem.  Battle  of  Seven  Pines  or  Fair  Oaks. 
A  Misunderstanding.  Longstreet's  Mistake.  Huger  Delayed.  Huger 
unjustly  Blamed.  Signal  Given.  Hill's  Battle  in  Brief.  Losses. 
Reinforcements.  Reports.  Wilcox's  Report.  Couch's  Position. 
Johnston's  Battle.  Whiting's  Advance.  A  Second  Attack.  Johnston 
Wounded.  G.  W.  Smith  in  Command.  Smith's  Battle,  June.  The 
Confederates  Withdraw.  Lee  placed  in  Command.  Re'sume'.  Staff 
and  Organization.  Artillery  Service.  Davis  and  Johnston. 

MEANWHILE,  Norfolk  had  now  been  evacuated  by  our  forces, 
which  were  withdrawn  at  first  to  Petersburg  and  then  to  Rich- 
mond. Our  ironclad,  the  Virginia  (the  old  Merrimac),  drawing 
too  much  water  to  ascend  the  James,  had  been  blown  up.  This 
river  was  now  open  to  the  Federal  fleet,  except  for  some  hurriedly 
built  batteries  at  Drury's  Bluff,  about  six  miles  below  Richmond, 
covering  obstructions  made  of  a  row  of  piles  and  some  sunken 
schooners. 

On  May  15  the  fleet,  which  included  three  ironclads,  the 
Monitor,  Galena,  and  Naugatuck,  attacked  the  batteries,  but  was 
repulsed  with  25  killed  and  wounded,  and  considerable  injury 
to  some  of  the  vessels.  Until  that  time  Johnston  had  con- 
templated fighting  on  the  north  of  the  Chickahominy,  but  he 
now  decided  to  concentrate  his  army  nearer  Richmond,  and  on 
May  17  it  was  all  encamped  within  three  or  four  miles  to  the 
east  of  the  city. 

The  situation  had  grown  very  threatening;  for  McDowell's 
army,  still  at  Fredericksburg  with  31,000  men,  had  again  been 
assigned  to  McClellan.  He  only  awaited  the  arrival  of  Shields, 
marching  to  join  him  with  11,000  more,  before  advancing. 

If  it  was  now  in  Johnston's  power  to  do  anything  to  save 
Richmond,  it  must  be  done  before  McDowell  arrived.  It  was 

71 


72 


MILITARY  MEMOIRS 


not  likely  that  McClellan  would  himself  seek  battle  when  such 
a  large  reenforcement  was  near.  Johnston's  only  chance,  there- 
fore, lay  in  taking  the  offensive.  He  had  no  such  works  to  rely 
upon  as  the  Federals  had  around  Washington.  There  were,  in- 
deed, a  few  small  enclosed  forts,  erected  during  the  first  year  of 
the  war,  each  armed  with  a  few  of  the  smooth-bore  guns  of  that 
day,  but  they  were  located  too  near  the  city  limits  to  have  any 
value. 

The  lines  in  which  we  afterward  fought  were  but  light  infantry 


VICINITY  OF  RICHMOND 
(The  dotted  lines  show  roads  of  minor  importance.) 

trenches  with  occasional  barbette  batteries,  usually  thrown  up 
by  the  troops  under  emergency. 

The  enemy  soon  followed  us  up  and  established  a  line  of  bat- 
tle, upon  which  at  different  points  earthworks  began  to  appear. 

His  right  flank,  on  the  north  bank  of  the  Chickahominy, 
rested  upon  Beaver  Dam  Creek,  a  strong  position  which  Johns- 
ton's engineers  had  selected  for  our  own  left  flank,  before  we 
left  Yorktown,  when  Johnston  contemplated  fighting  on  that 
bank.  Thence,  the  Federal  line  extended  southeast  along  the 


SEVEN  PINES  OR  FAIR  OAKS  73 

Chickahominy  some  three  miles  to  New  Bridge.  Then,  crossing 
this  stream,  it  bent  south  and  ran  to  White  Oak  Swamp,  where 
the  left  rested,  giving  about  four  miles  on  the  south  side  in  a  line 
convex  toward  Richmond,  and  scarcely  six  miles  away  at  its 
nearest  point. 

In  observation  of  McDowell  at  Fredericksburg  was  Gen. 
J.  R.  Anderson  at  Hanover  Junction  with  about  9000  men; 
and  near  Hanover  C.  H.  was  Branch's  brigade,  about  4500. 
Johnston  directed  that  these  forces  should  be  drawn  behind  the 
Chickahominy,  on  our  left,  and  united  into  a  new  division  under 
A.  P.  Hill.  Before  this  could  be  accomplished,  however,  Branch 
was  attacked  by  MorelPs  division  and  Warren's  brigade  of 
Porter's  corps,  and  was  forced  back  with  a  loss  of  about  300 
killed  and  wounded,  and  700  prisoners,  the  enemy  reporting  62 
killed,  223  wounded,  and  70  missing,  total  355. 

At  Fredericksburg,  McDowell's  column  was  at  last  joined  by 
Shields,  who  had  been  detached  from  Banks  in  the  Valley,  and 
on  May  26  McDowell  was  put  in  motion.  In  the  forenoon  of 
the  27th  notice  of  his  advance  reached  Johnston,  who  at  once 
recognized  that  he  must  now  attack  before  McDowell  could 
unite  with  McClellan. 

The  latter  had  moved  so  cautiously  as  to  offer  no  favorable 
opportunity  until  his  last  move  which  had  put  his  army 
astride  of  the  Chickahominy.  That  presented  as  fair  a  chance  as 
Johnston  could  now  expect.  So  he  immediately  determined  to 
attack  on  the  29th.  As  McDowell  was  approaching  behind  the 
enemy's  right,  his  strongest  effort  would  be  made  to  crush  that 
flank.  On  the  28th  Johnston  got  his  troops  into  position  to 
attack  at  dawn  on  the  29th.  Three  of  his  seven  divisions  (Whit- 
ing's, A.  P.  Hill's,  and  D.  R.  Jones's)  were  to  attack  Porter's 
corps  at  Beaver  Dam.  The  other  four  divisions  on  the  south 
side  of  the  Chickahominy  (McLaws's,  Longstreet's,  D.  H.  Hill's, 
and  Huger's)  would  be  held  in  observation,  ready  to  cross  when 
Porter's  corps  was  driven  back.  Everything  was  in  readiness 
by  sundown  on  the  28th,  when  further  news  was  received. 
McDowell  had  suddenly  stopped  his  advance,  and  his  troops 
seemed  to  be  falling  back  toward  Manassas.  What  had  hap- 
pened was  that  Jackson  had  again  broken  loose  in  the  Valley  and 


74  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

defeated  Banks  at  Strasburg  on  May  23,  and  at  Winchester  on 
May  25,  and  was  moving  on  the  Potomac,  as  will  be  told  more 
fully  in  a  later  chapter. 

This  had  created  a  panic  at  Washington,  for  rumor  had 
magnified  Jackson's  forces  greatly,  and  McDowell,  just  in  the  nick 
of  time  for  us,  had  been  turned  back  for  the  defence  of  the  capital. 

Johnston  was  glad  of  a  respite,  and  an  opportunity  to  con- 
sider as  an  alternative  an  attack  upon  McClellan's  left.  The 
strength  of  the  position  at  Beaver  Dam  Creek  made  any  direct 
attack  very  dangerous,  and  to  turn  it  would  consume  time. 
To  attack  the  enemy's  left  was  certainly  a  safer  proposition. 
On  the  south  side  his  force  was  smaller  and  was  much  more 
easily  gotten  at.  And  while  it  was  already  partially  fortified  by 
abattis  and  trenches,  quickly  constructed  in  flat  and  wooded 
country,  yet  they  had  had  time  to  do  but  little.  Longstreet 
urged  going  on  with  the  attack  for  which  the  troops  were  already 
in  position,  but  Johnston  decided  to  withdraw  the  troops  north 
of  the  Chickahominy  during  the  night  of  the  28th,  and  to  have 
reconnoissances  made  to  discover  the  location  and  strength  of 
the  enemy's  position  on  the  south  side.  Accordingly,  on  the 
29th,  and  again  on  the  30th,  one  or  two  regiments  were  advanced 
and  drove  in  the  enemy's  pickets  on  our  extreme  right  flank, 
developing  his  presence  and  that  he  was  fortifying.  This  being 
reported  to  Johnston  by  D.  H.  Hill  soon  after  noon  on  the  30th, 
Hill  was  informed  in  reply  that  "he  would  lead  an  attack  upon 
the  enemy  next  morning." 

There  was  nothing  to  gain  by  further  delay ;  for,  by  the  arrival 
at  Richmond  of  Huger's  division  from  Norfolk  on  the  29th, 
Johnston  now  had  all  the  force  possible  to  get.  His  problem  was 
to  defeat  four  divisions  of  the  enemy,  12  brigades  fortified,  and 
crush  them  before  assistance  could  cross  the  Chickahominy  to 
their  relief.  If  he  could  do  this  quickly  his  chance  was  good  to 
involve  in  the  defeat  also  some  of  the  reinforcements  the  enemy 
would  be  sending  across  the  bridges.  He  had  seven  divisions, 
27  brigades,  numbering  about  60,000  infantry  and  artillery. 
The  four  divisions  to  be  attacked  numbered  about  37,000.  Con- 
sidering the  morale  of  our  men,  which  will  appear  more  fully 
after  a  description  of  the  battle,  the  proposition  was  an  easy  one, 


SEVEN  PINES  OR  FAIR  OAKS  75 

if  only  we  could  succeed  in  bringing  our  fighting  strength  to  bear 
in  the  right  places  and  at  the  right  times.  But  just  there  lay 
our  greatest  difficulty  and  weakness.  Our  army  was  not  yet 
organized  into  corps,  our  divisions  were  often  too  large,  and  our 
staff  service,  by  which  information  and  orders  were  disseminated, 
was  insufficient  in  amount  and  deficient  in  technical  training 
and  experience.  Johnston  was  endeavoring  to  remedy  some  of 
these  evils  by  assigning  his  ranking  officers,  G.  W.  Smith,  Long- 
street,  and  Magruder,  to  command  two  or  more  divisions  each, 
which  he  called  wings  and  centre,  but  such  temporary  arrange-  . 
ments  are  always  more  apt  to  mar  than  to  promote  unity  of  ^ 
action.  -<&nd  our  general  himself  was  impatient  and  unmindful 
of  small  detail.  Let  us  now  have  the  story  of  what  happened. ' 

To  use  the  slang  expression,  it  was  "up  to"  Johnston  to  play, 
and  in  a  conference  with  Longstreet  during  the  afternoon  of 
May  30,  the  battle  for  the  next  day  was  planned  in  accordance 
with  the  intimation  given  D.  H.  Hill  about  noon. 

The  conference  was  prolonged  by  the  coming  up  of  a  violent 
rain-storm,  scarcely  second  to  any  in  violence,  according  to  my 
recollection,  that  I  saw  during  the  war.  Over  three  niches  of 
rain  must  have  fallen  in  the  first  two  hours,  and  it  kept  up,  more 
or  less,  until  late  at  night.  It  was  hoped  that  this  rain  would 
make  our  task  easier  by  rendering  the  Chickahominy  impassable 
for  reinforcements  to  the  enemy.  Indeed,  it  did  have  this  effect, 
but  not  until  the  night  of  the  day  after  the  rain.  The  im- 
mediate effect  was  only  to  make  all  of  our  marchings  and  ma- 
noeuvres slower  and  more  difficult,  and  the  flat,  swampy  country 
of  much  of  the  battle-field  was  entirely  inundated. 

During  this  afternoon  —  prolonged  by  the  rain-storm  — 
Johnston  gave  verbal  instructions  to  Longstreet  as  to  the  battle 
of  the  next  day,  and  it  is  hard  to  imagine  how  any  serious  mis- 
understanding of  such  a  simple  movement  could  have  taken 
place  in  a  conversation  prolonged  for  hours.  One  would  need 
to  have  heard  the  whole  of  it  to  tell  how  it  arose.  But  Johnston 
afterward  recognized  the  fact  that  it  had  occurred,  and  wrote  to 
G.  W.  Smith  that  the  misunderstanding  "  may  be  my  fault,  as  I 
told  you  at  the  time."  Smith,  however,  denies  recollection  of 
any  such  telling. 


76  MILITARY   MEMOIRS 

The  following  sketch  will  illustrate   the  misunderstanding 


*»  ^ 


Johnston  intended  to  have  the  battle  begun  at  an  early  hour  by 
D.  H.  Hill's  division  of  four  brigades,  three  of  which  were  al- 
ready in  position,  in  the  front  line,  on  our  extreme  right  on  the 
Williamsburg  road.  Rodes  was  on  picket  on  the  Charles  City 
road,  not  far  off,  and,  unfortunately,  Johnston's  plan  included 
his  being  relieved  and  joining  his  division  before  the  attack  was 
begun.  Any  preliminary  movement,  however  simple  it  may 
appear,  will  usually  turn  up  fated  to  cause  unexpected  delay. 
Rodes  is  ordered  to  be  relieved  by  a  brigade  of  Huger's  division, 
of  three  brigades,  now  in  camp  on  the  north  bank  of  Gilliss  Creek, 
near  Richmond.  This  is  ordered  at  an  early  hour  to  go  down  the 
Charles  City  road  and  relieve  Rodes,  after  which  it  will  guard  and 
protect  Hill's  right  flank  and  render  it  aid  if  opportunity  offers. 
Longstreet's  division  of  five  brigades  is  in  camp  on  the  Nine 
Mile  road  nearest  the  Chickahominy  on  our  left.  Johnston's 
plan  is  that  it  shall  march  straight  down  that  road,  perhaps 
three  miles,  pass  our  line  of  battle,  here  held  by  Magruder's 
division,  form  line  of  battle,  and  listen  for  the  sounds  of  battle 
begun  by  D.  H.  Hill's  attack  upon  Casey's  division,  which  will  be 
within  a  mile  or  two  of  his  front  and  right.  He  will  be  in  a 
position  to  take  Casey  on  the  right  flank  and  with  Hill's  four 
brigades,  having  abundant  force,  can  hope  to  make  short  work  of  it. 


SEVEN  PINES  OR  FAIR  OAKS  77 

Meanwhile,  Whiting's  division  of  five  brigades  (considered  a 
part  of  Smith's  "Wing  ")  had  been  a  part  of  the  attack  proposed 
two  days  before,  and  were  still  encamped  farther  up  the  Nine 
Mile  road.  After  Longstreet  left  Johnston's  headquarters,  the 
rain  having  slacked,  the  latter  sent  word  to  Smith  to  order  Whiting 
to  march  down  the  Nine  Mile  road  early  in  the  morning  and  take 
position  at  our  line  of  battle  behind  Longstreet,  to  further  re- 
enforce  him  in  the  battle. 

Smith  came  in  person,  some  five  miles,  arrived  at  4.30  A.M., 
and  now  first  learned  of  the  proposed  attack,  and  had  it  all 
explained.  Johnston  proposed  to  make  his  own  headquarters 
on  the  Nine  Mile  road  where  he  could  observe  any  efforts  of  the 
enemy  to  cross  the  Chickahominy.  It  would  have  been  much 
wiser  to  have  first  visited  the  right  and  seen  his  battle  started. 
The  whole  Confederate  plan  at  Bull  Run  had  gone  astray  for 
the  lack  of  this  precaution,  and  now  it  turned  out  that  Long- 
street  had  understood  him  either  to  order  or  to  consent  that  his 
division  was  to  be  marched  across  from  the  Nine  Mile  road  to  the 
Williamsburg  road  and  to  go  into  action  behind  D.  H.  Hill's 
division.  It  will  soon  appear  how  utterly  this  wrecked  and 
ruined  Johnston's  excellent  and  simple  plan.  How  the  mis- 
understanding occurred  has  never  been  explained,  for  neither 
Johnston  or  Longstreet  in  their  official  reports  or  other  writings 
ever  gave  any  explanation  or  even  admitted  openly  that  a  mis- 
take was  made.  But  Johnston  induced  G.  W.  Smith  to  change 
his  official  report,  to  avoid  its  being  made  public  therein.  The 
official  reports  also  disclose  that  on  that  day  Longstreet  was 
anxious  to  have  Huger's  division  recognized  as  under  his  com- 
mand, although  Huger  was  the  senior  officer.  Possibly  Long- 
street  made  some  request  of  Johnston  for  authority  over  Huger, 
and  Johnston  in  complying  may  have  thoughtlessly  used  some 
expression  which  Longstreet  interpreted  as  permission  to  go  to 
the  right.  But  the  whole  history  of  this  battle  remains  a  monu- 
ment of  caution  against  verbal  understandings. 

Longstreet 's  division  was  early  upon  the  road,  and  it  soon 
developed  that  its  route  to  the  Williamsburg  road  cut  off  and 
blocked  the  prescribed  marches  of  both  Whiting's  and  Huger's 
divisions  as  they  respectively  came  up. 


78  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

After  some  delay,  Whiting  sent  a  note  to  Johnston's  head- 
quarters, complaining  that  his  march  was  obstructed  by  Long- 
street.  Johnston,  supposing  only  that  Longstreet  was  preceding 
Whiting  down  the  Nine  Mile  road,  as  ordered  to  do,  answered 
to  that  effect,  and  G.  W.  Smith,  who  was  still  with  Johnston, 
sent  an  aid,  Capt.  Beckham,  down  the  Nine  Mile  to  overtake 
Longstreet  and  learn  the  cause  of  any  delay.  Beckham  followed 
this  road  to  Magruder  's  line,  and,  not  finding  Longstreet,  guessed 
that  he  had  gone  across  to  the  Williamsburg  road.  So  he  sent 
back  a  note  saying  that  he  would  continue  his  search  in  that 
direction. 

When  this  note  was  shown  Johnston  about  9  A.M.,  he  was  still 
so  convinced  that  Longstreet  was  upon  the  Nine  Mile  road  that 
he  despatched  his  aide-de-camp,  Lieut.  Washington,  down  the 
same  road  to  find  him. 

Washington  pushed  his  investigation  so  far  as  to  follow  the 
Nine  Mile  into  the  enemy 's  pickets  where  he  was  captured  about 
10  A.M.  His  capture,  and  his  disturbed  manner  when  some  firing 
was  soon  after  heard,  convinced  Gen.  Keyes  that  an  attack  was 
on  foot,  and  Keyes  was  accordingly  alert  and  prepared. 

Meanwhile,  Longstreet 's  column,  having  delayed  Whiting  on 
the  Nine  Mile  road  for  two  or  three  hours  (for  the  column  took 
its  wagons  along),  found  itself  next  blocking  the  column  of 
Huger  at  Gilliss  Greek.  The  creek  was  bank  full  from  the  rain. 
Longstreet  says :  — 

"The  delay  of  an  hour  to  construct  a  bridge  was  preferred  to  the 
encounter  of  more  serious  obstacles  along  the  narrow  lateral  road  flooded 
by  the  storm.  As  we  were  earlier  at  the  creek,  it  gave  us  precedence  of 
Huger's  division,  which  had  to  cross  after  us." 

As  Longstreet  knew  that  one  of  Huger's  brigades  must  re- 
lieve Rodes 's  brigade,  on  the  Charles  City  road,  and  let  it  rejoin 
Hill 's  division  before  the  battle  could  commence,  it  would  have 
saved  much  to  waive  this  precedence  at  least  for  one  brigade. 

Colston,  commanding  one  of  these  brigades,  wrote  as  follows 
of  this  occasion :  — 

"A  little  brook  near  Richmond  was  greatly  swollen,  and  a  long  time  was 
wasted  crossing  it,  on  an  improvised  bridge,  made  of  planks,  a  wagon 
midstream  serving  as  a  trestle.  Over  this  the  division  passed  in  single 


SEVEN  PINES  OR  FAIR  OAKS  79 

file,  you  may  imagine  with  what  delay.  If  the  division  commander  had 
given  orders  for  the  men  to  sling  their  cartridge  boxes,  haversacks,  etc.,  on 
their  muskets  and  wade,  without  breaking  formation,  they  could  have 
crossed  by  fours  with  water  up  to  their  waists,  and  hours  would  have 
been  saved.  When  we  got  across  we  received  orders  to  halt  on  the  roadside 
until  Huger's  division  passed  us.  There  we  waited  five  or  six  hours." 

He  had  just  passed  Huger,  and  now  he  waits  for  Huger  to 
pass  him ! 

When  one  contemplates  the  fact  that  there  was  a  commanding 
officer,  hoping  to  win  a  great  victory,  then  at  his  headquarters 
within  two  miles  of  this  spot  where  nine  brigades  were  thus  wast- 
ing the  precious  hours  passing  and  repassing  each  other,  the  whole 
performance  seems  incredible.  And  when  it  is  further  said  that 
six  of  these  brigades  were  lost,  with  their  commander,  and  that  the 
staff  of  the  general  was  seeking  them  at  that  moment,  high  and 
low,  miles  away  along  the  picket-line,  it  is  almost  ludicrous. 
And  any  friends  of  Huger  may  be  excused  for  finding  even  a 
tragic  side  to  the  situation.  For  when  the  whole  affair  was  over, 
and  had  ended  in  defeat,  Johnston  and  Longstreet  laid  the  entire 
blame  upon  Huger.  I  give  as  illustrations  two  quotations  from 
Johnston,  and  there  were  equally  disparaging  statements  by 
Longstreet. 

"  General  Longstreet,  unwilling  to  make  a  partial  attack  instead  of  the 
combined  movement  which  had  been  planned,  waited  from  hour  to  hour 
for  Huger's  division."  —  "  Had  Huger's  division  been  in  position  and  ready 
for  action  when  those  of  Smith,  Longstreet,  and  Hill  moved,  I  am  satis- 
fied that  Keyes's  Corps  would  have  been  destroyed  instead  of  being  merely 
defeated.  Had  it  gone  into  action  even  at  four  o'clock  the  victory  would 
have  been  much  more  complete." 

After  the  battles  were  over  and  Johnston  was  recovering  from 
his  wound,  Huger  made  vain  effort  to  have  the  injurious  state- 
ments corrected  and  applied  for  a  Court  of  Inquiry.  This  was 
promised  by  the  War  Department,  but  it  was  to  be  held 
"as  soon  as  the  state  of  the  service  will  permit."  The  state 
of  the  service  never  permitted,  and  the  court  was  never 
held. 

About  1  P.M.,  however,  Rodes's  brigade  was  relieved  on  the 
Charles  City  road,  and  hurried  to  join  the  other  three  brigades 


80  MILITARY   MEMOIRS 

under  Hill,  who  had  fretted  greatly  under  the  delay.  He  started 
his  two  brigades  on  the  left  of  the  road  as  soon  as  he  saw 
Rodes  approaching. 

The  formation  was  Garland's  brigade  on  the  left  of  the  road, 
followed  by  G.  B.  Anderson.;  Rodes's  brigade  on  the  right, 
followed  by  Rains.  Each  brigade  marched  in  column  until  the 
enemy  were  met,  when  it  formed  line.  The  rear  brigades  formed 
about  300  yards  behind  the  leading  ones. 

In  Johnston's  Narrative,  he  states  that  "Longstreet  as  rank- 
ing officer  of  the  three  divisions  to  be  united  near  Hill's  camp, 
was  instructed  verbally  to  form  his  own  and  Hill's  division  in 
two  lines  crossing  the  Williamsburg  road  at  right  angles  and  to 
advance  to  the  attack  in  that  order."  But  the  circumstantial 
evidence  is  overwhelming  that  on  the  morning  of  the  battle, 
Johnston  was  expecting  Longstreet  to  be  in  position  on  the  Nine 
Mile  road,  and  to  support  Hill's  attack  upon  the  Williamsburg 
road  by  his  attack  down  the  Nine  Mile.  That  was  the  only  quick 
way  of  bringing  his  large  force  into  proper  action,  and  it  is  hard 
to  see  how  the  two  divisions  could  have  failed  to  crush  the  enemy 
in  their  front. 

It  is  no  wonder  that  Johnston  said  when  he  found  out  where 
Longstreet  was,  that  he  wished  the  troops  were  all  back  in  their 
camps,  for  the  victory  was  surely  his  if  only  he  could  play  his 
game  correctly. 

It  was  being  started  badly.  It  was  on  a  front  of  only  two 
brigades,  supported  by  two  in  a  second  line,  while  nine  other 
brigades  encumbered  the  one  good  road  leading  to  the  battle. 
From  a  glance  at  the  field  one  might  now  confidently  predict 
the  outcome. 

It  is  D.  H.  Hill's  division,  about  8500  strong,  excellent  troops, 
and  there  is  not  living  a  more  honest  fighter  than  D.  H.  Hill. 
They  will  first  meet  Casey's  division,  of  about  equal  strength, 
partly  fortified  with  trenches  and  abattis.  Behind  Casey  are 
three  other  divisions  holding  two  other  lines  partly  intrenched. 
Hill  may  carry  the  first  line  and  even  have  some  success  against 
the  second.  But,  by  that  time,  he  will  be  worn  out,  and  the 
daylight  will  be  gone  before  enough  of  the  nine  brigades  (those 
behind  him)  can  be  gotten  to  him  in  force  to  cut  any  figure.  The 


SEVEN  PINES  OR  FAIR  OAKS 


81 


fight  on  this  road  cannot  amount  to  more  than  a  bloody  draw, 
prolonged  until  night. 

That  is  what  any  one,  knowing  the  conditions,  might  have 
predicted,  and  that  is  just  what  happened.  To  follow  all  the 
details  is  useless,  but  the  list  of  casualties,  and  some  brief  descrip- 
tions of  incidents  will  give  a  good  idea  of  the  fighting. 

The  Confederate  reports  of  casualties,  particularly  in  battles 
fought  during  active  campaigns,  are  far  from  being  full,  and  are 
not  at  all  uniform  in  their  shape  and  detail.  Complete  figures, 
therefore,  for  the  whole  division  cannot  be  given. 

Of  Rains's  brigade,  the  official  report  only  states  that  its  losses 
were  one-seventh  of  the  force.  The  reports  show  that  this 
brigade  was  employed  in  a  flank  movement  around  the  enemy's 
left  which  it  executed  successfully,  but  did  not  repeat  it.  Hill 
expressed  disappointment  and  says  that  Rains  might  have  saved 
Rodes's  brigade  from  suffering  500  casualties.1  Rains  fought  on 
the  left.  Had  Longstreet's  division  that  morning  not  gone 
astray,  all  of  its  brigades  would  have  been  on  the  enemy's  flank, 
and  have  had  similar  chances.  The  other  three  brigades  re- 
ported their  strength  and  losses  as  follows :  — 

SEVEN  PINES,  MAY  31,  1862 


H 

0 
H 

H 

POSITION 

BRIGADE 

i 

H 

Q 

3 

C 
1 

5 

B 

j 

H 
U 

3 

o 

H 

M 

1 

fi 

M 

% 

O 
H 

H 
fi 

Front  right 

Rodes 

2200 

241 

853 

5 

1099 

50 

Front  left 

Garland 

2065 

98 

600 

42 

740 

37 

Rear  left 

Anderson,  G.  B. 

1865 

149 

680 

37 

866 

47 

6130 

488 

2133 

84 

2705 

44 

This  record  shows  great  fighting  power,  and  will  compare 
favorably  for  a  half-day's  fighting  of  an  equal  body  of  men,  with 
any  records  of  the  war. 

1  Rains  was  a  graduate  of  West  Point  of  class  of  1827,  and  was  now  fifty- 
nine  years  of  age.  He  had  had  some  Indian  fighting  in  Florida,  and  had 
been  wounded,  but  he  was  not  in  the  Mexican  War.-  He  was  an  expert  and 
enthusiast  upon  explosives,  and,  soon  after  the  action  at  Seven  Pines,  he 
was  relieved  of  his  brigade  and  assigned  to  the  Torpedo  Bureau,  which  was 
organized  for  submarine  defence  of  our  rivers  and  harbors. 


82  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

At  Waterloo,  the  losses  were:  Allies  20  per  cent,  French  34 
per  cent,  British  regulars  29  per  cent.  At  Balaklava,  the  Light 
Brigade  (600)  lost  49  per  cent. 

On  the  Federal  side  the  battle  was  opened  by  Casey's  division, 
moderately  well  fortified  with  trenches,  batteries,  and  abattis, 
and  soon  supported  by  Peck's  brigade  of  Couch's  division. 
These  four  brigades  were  finally  routed  from  their  first  line  by 
the  Rains's  flank  movement.  They  then  fell  back  upon  the 
second  intrenched  line,  where  they  united  with  Couch's  two  re- 
maining brigades.  Rains's  brigade  now  dropped  out  of  the  fight. 

The  three  other  brigades  pushed  their  attack  upon  the  enemy's 
second  line,  which  was  now  being  reenforced  by  Kearny's  divi- 
sion, but  Hill  received  also  a  reinforcement  of  R.  H.  Anderson's 
brigade,  which  he  divided.  Two  regiments  under  Jenkins  he 
sent  to  the  left  and  the  remainder  under  Anderson  to  his  right. 
A  little  later  also  he  received  two  regiments,  the  llth  Ala.  and 
the  19th  Miss.,  of  Wilcox's  brigade.  With  this  help  the  second 
line  was  carried.  Four  Federal  regiments  and  a  battery  re- 
treated north  toward  the  Chickahominy  unpursued.  The 
remainder  fell  back  slowly  and  night  put  an  end  to  the  fighting. 
Kemper's  brigade  also  arrived,  brought  by  Longstreet  to  Hill's 
aid.  It  came  upon  the  field,  but  too  late  to  take  effective 
part.  On  the  Federal  side  Hooker's  division  also  came  up  as 
the  fighting  ceased. 

Hill's  division  was  now  worn  out,  and  Longstreet  relieved  it 
from  the  seven  idle  brigades  still  left  on  the  Charles  City  and 
Williamsburg  roads. 

Hill's  forces  during  the  battle  had  averaged  about  four  bri- 
gades, for  R.  H.  Anderson  had  come  up,  after  Rains  dropped 
out  with  a  loss  of  only  14  per  cent.  Anderson's  losses  are  not 
given,  but  they  were  severe  and  probably  equalled  the  average 
of  Hill's.  Jenkins's  official  report  says :  — 

"We  never  fought  twice  in  the  same  place,  nor  five  minutes  in  one 
place,  and  steadily  on  the  advance ;  were  under  fire  from  3  P.M.  to  7.40  P.M. 
The  service  we  did  will  be  evidenced  by  our  list  of  killed  and  wounded. 
In  my  two  color  companies  out  of  80  men  who  entered,  40  were  killed  or 
wounded,  and  out  of  11  in  the  color  guard  10  were  shot  down,  and  my 
colors,  pierced  by  9  balls,  passed  through  four  hands  without  touching  the 
ground." 


SEVEN  PINES  OR  FAIR  OAKS 


83 


The  following  shows  a  comparison  of  the  total  casualties  of 
Hill's  part  of  the  battle,  as  nearly  as  they  can  be  ascertained, 
including  the  three  brigades  already  given :  — 

CASUALTIES.    HILL'S  BATTLE.    WILLIAMSBURG  ROAD, 
MAY  31,  1862 


DIVISION 

STRENGTH 

KILLED 

WOUNDED 

MISSINQ 

TOTAL 

Keyes's  Corps 
Keyes's  Corps 
Heintzelman's 

Casey 
Couch1 
Kearny 

8,500 
8,500 
8,500 

177 
195 
193 

927 
773 
816 

325 
127 

82 

1429 
1095 
1091 

Federal 

Total 

25,500 

565 

2516 

534 

3615 

Confederate 

Total2 

12,000 

608 

2751 

156 

3515 

The  Confederates  captured  10  guns,  5000  muskets,  and  about 
400  prisoners.  The  following  extracts  from  official  reports  give 
an  idea  of  the  righting.  Rodes  writes :  — 

"The  total  number  of  men  carried  into  action  was  about  2200.  The 
aggregate  number  present  at  camp  was,  however,  2587.  The  6th  Ala. 
lost  nearly  60  per  cent  of  its  aggregate  force.  Some  of  its  men  were  drowned 
after  having  been  wounded,  as  they  fought  at  times  in  a  swamp  in  which 
the  water  was  from  six  inches  to  two  feet  in  depth.  The  right  company 
of  the  6th  Alabama  was  thrown  back  at  right  angles  to  the  line  of  battle 
by  Col.  Gordon,  to  protect  his  rear,  and  engaged  the  enemy  at  such 
close  quarters  that  its  brave  commander,  Capt.  Bell,  after  having  fallen 
wounded  mortally,  was  able  to  use  his  revolver  with  effect  upon  the 
enemy.  The  company  fought  with  great  heroism.  Its  loss  was  21  killed 
and  23  wounded  out  of  a  total  of  55  "  (80  per  cent). 

It  remains  to  say  a  few  words  of  the  movements  of  the 
unengaged  troops  on  the  Williamsburg  and  Charles  City  roads. 
Longstreet  at  3.30  P.M.  placed  Wilcox  in  charge  of  his  own, 
Pryor's,  and  Colston's  brigades,  and  ordered  him  to  follow  and 
support  Huger.  Soon  after  this  order  was  modified  and  Wilcox 
was  ordered  to  precede  Huger.  But,  having  moved  to  the  front, 
he  was  soon  countermarched  and  ordered  to  return  to  the 
Williamsburg  road,  and  then  to  follow  that  road  to  the  front. 
He  had  retraced  his  steps  about  a  mile  when  his  fourth  order 

1  This  includes  12  killed,  45  wounded,  12  missing,  total  69,  which  oc- 
curred in  Johnston's  battle  on  the  left. 

3  This  omits  Kemper,  who  was  not  seriously  engaged. 


84  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

again  reversed  his  direction.  He  was  now  to  follow  down  the 
Charles  City  road,  keeping  abreast  of  the  firing  which  was  heavy. 
And  soon  a  fifth  order  came,  of  which  Wilcox  writes  in  his  re- 
port :  — 

"Again  orders  were  received  in  writing  to  move  across  to  the  Williams- 
burg  road,  following  country  roads  and  paths  through  woods  and  fields, 
a  guide  being  furnished  to  conduct  the  command.  The  intervening  dis- 
tance between  the  two  roads  was  low  and  flat,  and  in  many  places  covered 
with  water,  at  one  point  waist  deep.  The  march  was  of  necessity  very 
slow.  It  was  about  5  P.M.  when  the  head  of  the  column  reached  the  Wil- 
liamsburg  road." 

It  was  at  this  time  that  the  llth  Ala.  and  19th  Miss,  of  Wil- 
cox's  brigade  were  sent  into  the  action,  as  has  already  been 
told.  Later,  these  brigades  with  the  others  of  Longstreet  and 
Huger,  which  were  brought  up,  relieved  the  troops  which  had 
been  so  heavily  engaged. 

So  terminated  what  should  properly  be  called  "D.  H.  Hill's 
Battle,"  for  the  whole,  as  we  shall  see,  embraced  three  minor 
battles,  at  different  times  and  places,  and  under  different  com- 
manders. Hill's  battle  was  fought  principally  against  Reyes's 
corps ;  and  we  have  seen  that  Couch  with  four  regiments  and  a 
battery  retreated  northward  toward  the  Chickahominy. 

Here  he  soon  found  friends.  Sumner's  corps  on  the  north 
side  of  the  river  had  been  formed  about  1  P.M.,  and  moved 
toward  two  recently  constructed  roadways  and  bridges  across 
the  Chickahominy.  At  2.30  P.M.  orders  to  cross  were  received, 
and  Sumner,  having  two  roads,  was  able  to  cross  quite  rapidly. 
The  river  was  high  and  rising,  and  by  nightfall  and  until  next 
morning  the  stream  was  impassable. 

Now  we  enter  upon  the  second,  which  may  be  called  "John- 
ston's Battle." 

It  has  been  told  how  his  original  plans  were  destroyed  by 
Longstreet's  taking  his  division  to  the  Williamsburg  road.  It 
must  have  been  near  eleven  o'clock  when  Johnston  learned 
where  Longstreet  was,  and  realized  that  it  was  too  late  to  get 
the  troops  back  for  that  day.  He  hesitated  whether  to  wait 
and  prepare  for  the  morrow  or  to  go  on,  and  unfortunately 
decided  to  let  it  go  on.  He  took  no  measures  to  supply  the 


SEVEN  PINES  OR  FAIR  OAKS  85 

place  on  the  Nine  Mile  road  of  the  six  brigades  of  Longstreet. 
Whiting's  five  brigades,  however,  were  at  hand.  Three  of  them, 
Whiting's,  Hood's,  and  Pettigrew's,  were  at  the  fork  of  the  Nine 
Mile  and  New  Bridge  roads;  Hatton's  and  Hampton's  in  re- 
serve near  by. 

Toward  noon  Johnston  left  his  headquarters,  which  were  on 
the  Nine  Mile  road  about  three  miles  from  Richmond,  and  took 
his  position  at  a  house  near  the  fork  of  the  Nine  Mile  and  New 
Bridge  roads.  His  intention  now  was  to  send  Whiting's  division 
down  the  Nine  Mile  road  to  cooperate  with  D.  H.  Hill's  attack 
down  the  Williamsburg  road. 

By  coincidence  of  bad  luck,  his  right  wing  having  lost  several 
hours  in  the  morning,  his  left  wing  lost  about  three  hours  in 
the  afternoon.  The  signal  for  Whiting's  advance  was  to  be 
the  sound  of  Hill's  musketry  on  the  Williamsburg  road,  two 
miles  southeast,  through  a  wooded  country.  This  musketry 
began  about  one  o'clock,  and  was  heard  in  the  Federal  lines, 
five  miles  northeast;  also,  near  Richmond  five  miles  west;  but 
was  not  audible  two  miles  to  the  northwest  at  the  position  occu- 
pied by  Whiting's  division  and  by  Gen.  Johnston.1 

Longstreet  reports  having  sent  a  message,  upon  the  capture" 
of  Casey's  first  line,  but  it  was  not  received,  and  Johnston's  first 
knowledge  of  the  battle  came  about  four  o'clock,  from  an  officer 
whom  he  had  sent  at  three  to  investigate  and  report. 

Soon  after  4  P.M.,  Whiting's  five  brigades  were  put  in  motion, 
with  Hood  in  front.  Hood  was  directed  to  leave  the  Nine  Mile 
road  to  his  left  and  to  push  over  toward  the  York  River  Rail- 
road, and  find  Hill's  troops,  while  the  remaining  brigades  moved 
down  the  railroad.  Already  there  had  been  upon  the  railroad 
all  day  Pickett's  brigade  of  Longstreet's  division,  sent  there  by 
Longstreet  before  the  beginning  of  the  action,  "to  report  any 
advance  of  the  enemy  up  that  road."  It  is  remarkable  that 
Longstreet  contented  himself  with  this,  and  did  not  utilize  this 
road  as  a  route  of  advance  for  some  of  his  many  brigades.  Be- 

1  Such  phenomena,  called  acoustic  shadows,  are  of  common  occurrence 
and  are  to  be  expected  upon  every  battle-field,  in  some  direction;  especially 
in  wooded  localities.  Here  the  intervening  ground  was  moderately  wooded. 
The  artillery  could  be  distinguished,  but  the  amount  of  it  was  not  great. 


86  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

sides  his  own  six  he  could  have  called  on  some  of  Huger's  three, 
and  have  led  a  strong  attack  down  the  railroad,  turning  Casey's 
right  flank.  An  opportunity  for  one  of  the  most  brilliant  strokes 
in  the  war  was  here  overlooked  and  lost.  Soon  after  five  o'clock, 
Whiting's  four  rear  brigades  had  straightened  out  upon  the  Nine 
Mile  road,  with  Whiting's  own  brigade  in  front  near  Fair  Oaks 
Station,  when  a  battery  opened  fire  upon  the  column  from  its 
left. 

It  was  the  battery  with  four  regiments  of  Couch's  division, 
which  had  been  cut  off  from  Casey's  second  line  and  had  re- 
treated northward,  unpursued,  toward  the  Sumner  bridges. 
Here  it  had  met  Sedgwick's  division  of  Sumner 's  corps  and 
Richardson's  division  was  not  far  away.  Johnston  was  riding 
with  Whiting  when  the  Federal  battery  opened  fire,  but  supposing 
the  Chickahominy  to  be  impassable,  he  thought  that  there  could 
be  no  great  force  there,  and  Whiting  was  ordered  to  charge  the 
position  with  his  brigade.  Near  the  Chickahominy  the  ground 
was  rolling,  and  the  enemy's  guns  secured  fine  positions.  For 
fully  800  yards  the  Confederate  advance  was  exposed  to 
fire. 

The  reception  which  it  met,  however,  made  it  speedily  ap- 
parent that  the  errand  upon  which  it  had  been  sent  was  much 
beyond  the  dimensions  of  a  brigade. 

Johnston  was  impatient,  and  directed  the  attack  to  be  renewed 
at  once  by  all  the  brigades  present.  Hood 's  brigade  might  have 
been  recalled,  and  several  batteries  of  artillery,  not  far  off,  could 
have  found  positions  against  the  two  batteries  the  enemy  pres- 
ently had  in  action.  But  a  very  hurried  formation  of  the  three  re- 
maining brigades — Hatton's,  Hampton's,  and  Pettigrew's — was 
made,  and  the  attack  was  renewed  without  bringing  up  artillery, 
although  there  was  much  of  it  near.  It  was  met  by  Sedgwick's 
division  and  Abercrombie  's  four  regiments,  and  received  a  bloody 
repulse,  to  which  the  enemy's  artillery  contributed  largely, 
having  a  fair  sweep  and  no  artillery  opposing  them.  Hatton 
was  killed,  Pettigrew  wounded  and  captured,  and  Hampton 
wounded. 

The  casualties  of  the  division  for  the  day  were  reported  as 
follows :  — 


SEVEN  PINES  OR  FAIR  OAKS 


87 


JOHNSTON'S  BATTLE 

STRENGTH 

KILLED 

WOUNDED 

MISSING 

TOTAL 

Hood's  Brigade 
Hampton's 
Whiting's  (Law) 
Pettigrew's 
Hatton's 

1,922 
2,225 
2,398 
2,017 
2,030 

45 
28 
47 
44 

13 

284 
286 
240 
187 

42 
54 
13 

13 
329 
356 
341 

244 

Total  Confederate 

10,592 

164 

1010 

109 

1283 

Sedgwick's  Division 

8,000 

62 

282 

3 

347 

Abercrombie's  Brigade 

2,000 

12 

45 

12 

69 

Total  Federal 

10,000 

74 

327 

15 

416 

Before  sundown  Johnston  recognized  that  his  attack  was  a 
failure,  and  he  was  about  to  arrange  that  his  troops  should  sleep 
on  their  arms  and  renew  the  fight  at  dawn,  when  he  received  two 
wounds.  The  first  was  a  flesh  wound  in  the  shoulder  from  a 
musket  ball,  and  the  second,  a  few  moments  later,  was  a  blow  in 
the  chest  from  a  heavy  fragment  of  shell,  knocking  him  from  his 
horse.  He  was  placed  in  an  ambulance  and  started  toward  his 
headquarters,  but  suffered  such  pain  from  the  motion  caused  by 
the  fearful  roads  that  a  litter  had  to  be  substituted.  He  was  in- 
capacitated for  service  until  the  middle  of  November,  when  he 
was  assigned  to  the  principal  command  of  the  Army  in  the  West. 

G.  W.  Smith  succeeded  Johnston  in  the  command,  and  the 
action  of  the  next  day  is  therefore  to  be  called  "Smith's  Battle." 
It  is  sometimes  stated  in  Confederate  accounts,  that  this  day 
offered  the  Confederates  their  best  opportunity  to  crush  the 
enemy,  because  it  is  supposed  that  the  Chickahominy  was  now 
entirely  impassable.  This  is  a  mistake.  The  railroad  bridge 
had  been  repaired  and  covered  with  plank,  and  was  always 
available  for  infantry  and  for  horses,  though  not  for  vehicles. 
By  8  A.M.,  June  1,  the  Federal  engineers  had  built  a  pontoon  bridge 
at  the  site  of  the  New  Bridge,  but  it  was  under  Confederate  fire, 
and  the  approaches  to  it  were  impassable  during  the  flood.  By 
noon  Sumner's  upper  bridge  was  again  practicable  for  infantry, 
and  by  dark  the  lower  one.  By  morning,  June  1,  therefore,  the 
Federal  army  was  practically  safe  from  any  Confederate  attack. 
It  had  six  divisions  on  the  ground  and  a  good  line  of  battle, 
extending  across  the  railroad  nearly  parallel  to  the  Nine  Mile 


88  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

road,  with  its  left  flank  retired  and  protected  by  White  Oak 
Swamp.  The  only  chance  of  a  successful  assault  by  the  Con- 
federates would  have  been  with  a  heavy  artillery  fire  upon  the 
obtuse  angle  where  Sedgwick's  line  bent  back  to  connect  with 
the  other  divisions.  The  condition  of  the  ground,  as  well  as  the 
unorganized  state  of  the  Confederate  artillery  service,  made  such 
an  attack  impossible,  and  no  effort  at  it  seems  to  have  been 
made.  Late  at  night,  May  31,  Longstreet  reported  to  Smith, 
and  received  orders  to  attack  in  the  morning  from  the  Williams- 
burg  road  northward,  Smith  proposing  to  take  up  the  battle, 
with  Whiting  and  other  troops,  when  it  was  well  developed. 

It  is  easy  to  see  that  the  Federals  had  nothing  to  fear  from 
anything  the  Confederates  were  likely  to  do. 

Early  in  the  morning  there  was  some  sharp  firing  at  many 
points  along  the  line,  where  daylight  brought  into  view  troops 
and  skirmishers  which  had  been  posted  after  dark;  and,  in 
accordance  with  Smith's  instructions,  four  of  Longstreet 's  bri- 
gades —  Pickett  's,  Wilcox's,  Pryor's,  and  Colston's  —  and  two  of 
Huger's,  Mahone's  and  Armistead's,  advanced  upon  the  enemy's 
position,  which  ran  largely  through  the  woods.  There  resulted 
a  number  of  more  or  less  severe  affairs  at  different  points,  which 
were  waged  with  varying  fortunes  for  some  hours.  The  brigades 
which  had  been  engaged  the  day  before  were  held  in  reserve 
near  the  captured  redoubt.  Meanwhile,  with  daylight,  the 
enemy's  position  of  the  afternoon  before,  opposite  Whiting, 
showed  itself  strengthened  by  intrenchments,  and  Smith  thought 
there  was  evidence  of  additional  reinforcements  being  sent  from 
the  north  side.  So  the  battle  in  Whiting 's  front  was  not  renewed. 
Longstreet,  too,  soon  began  to  call  for  reinforcements.  The 
following  notes  were  received  from  him  in  quick  succession :  — 

"  June  1st.  Yours  of  to-day  received.  The  entire  army  seems  to  be 
opposed  to  me.  I  trust  that  some  diversion  may  be  made  in  my  favor 
during  these  attacks,  else  my  troops  cannot  stand  it.  The  ammunition 
gives  out  too  easily." 

"10  A.M.,  June  1.  Can  you  reenforce  me?  The  entire  army  seems 
to  be  opposed  to  me.  We  cannot  hold  out  unless  we  get  help.  If  we 
can  fight  together,  we  can  finish  the  work  to-day  and  Mac's  time  will  be  up. 
If  I  can't  get  help,  I  fear  that  I  must  fall  back." 

On  receipt   of    these  notes,   Smith   ordered    5000    men    to 


SEVEN   PINES  OR  FAIR  OAKS 


89 


be  withdrawn  from  Magruder's  force  along  the  Chickahominy, 
above  New  Bridge,  and  sent  to  Longstreet,  but  meanwhile 
D.  H.  Hill,  seeing  that  the  fighting  was  accomplishing  nothing, 
sent  orders  withdrawing  the  troops  to  the  line  of  the  night  before. 
This  was  done  rapidly  at  some  points,  and  more  slowly  at  others, 
but  the  enemy  made  no  marked  advance,  and  the  action  soon 
died  out,  it  being  now  about  11  A.M. 

About  1.30  P.M.  President  Davis  arrived  at  Smith's  head- 
quarters, and  informed  him  that  Lee  had  been  assigned  to  the 
command  of  the  army,  and  Lee  himself  soon  arrived.  The 
party  then  rode  over  to  Hill's  position,  whence  Magruder's 
troops,  which  had  arrived,  were  ordered  back  to  the  Chicka- 
hominy. After  dark  orders  were  received  by  Hill  from  Long- 
street  for  all  troops  to  return  to  their  camps  within  the  Con- 
federate lines.  In  his  official  report,  Hill  says  :  "The  thirteen 
brigades  were  not  got  together  until  near  midnight.  .  .  .  We 
regained  our  own  intrenchments  near  sunrise."  The  moon 
that  night  was  about  five  days  old. 

The  official  reports  do  not  show  separately  the  casualties  either 
of  this  last  action  or  of  Hill's  battle  on  the  31st,  though  those 
of  Johnston's  battle  are  given  by  both  sides.  But  Kearny's 
division  and  some  of  Longstreet 's  brigades  were  engaged  both 
on  the  31st  and  the  1st,  and,  on  the  latter  day,  two  of  Huger's. 
The  totals  of  the  whole  affair,  as  nearly  as  can  be  estimated, 
are  shown  in  the  following  table,  averaging  where  exact  figures 
are  wanting : — 

TOTAL  CASUALTIES.  SEVEN  PINES  OR  FAIR  OAKS 


BATTLE 

ENGAGED 

KILLED 

WOUNDED 

MISSING 

TOTAL 

Hill's 
May  31 

Confederate 
Federal 

11,642 
18,000 

608 
565 

2751 
2516 

156 
534 

3515 
3615 

Johnston's 
May  31 

Confederate 
Federal 

10,592 
10,500 

164 

74 

1010 
327 

109 
15 

1283 
416 

Smith's 
June  1 

Confederate 
Federal 

14,136 
17,000 

208 
151 

988 
751 

140 

98 

1336 
1000 

Aggregate 

Confederate 
Federal 

36,370 
45,500 

980 
790 

4749 
3594 

405 
647 

6134 
5031 

90  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

A  glance  at  this  table  suggests  at  once  the  weakness  of  our 
army.  Three  separate  times  we  advanced  to  give  offensive 
battle,  expecting  to  meet  and  to  crush  two  Federal  corps  which 
we  knew  would  average  over  15,000  men  each.  We  had  about 
50,000  men  to  dp  it  with,  and  it  was  necessary  to  do  it  quickly 
when  once  begun,  for  three  other  Federal  corps  were  close  at 
hand.  On  neither  of  the  three  occasions  did  we  succeed  in  getting 
over  about  14,000  men  into  action  at  all. 

/    The  fighting  qualities  of  the  troops  engaged  proved  excellent, 

but  the  trouble  was  in  our  organization,  which  could  not  handle 

1,      the  available  force  effectively.    That  was  due  partly  to  our  lack 

\o*A  °f  staff -officers  trained  to  military  routine,  partly  to  the  unwieldy 

structure  of  our  army  into  large  divisions,  instead  of  into  corps, 

and  partly  to  the  personal  peculiarities  of  our  commander, 

whose  impatience  of  detail  appears  in  the  misunderstanding 

between  himself  and  Longstreet,  and  in  the  lack  of  written 

orders  to  officers  charged  with  carrying  into  effect  important 

\    plans. 

Perhaps  our  greatest  deficiency  at  this  period  was  in  the 
artillery  service.  None  of  our  batteries  were  combined  into 
battalions,  but  each  infantry  brigade  had  a  battery  attached  to  it. 
There  were  no  field-officers  of  artillery,  charged  with  combining 
batteries  and  massing  them  to  concentrate  heavy  fire  upon  im- 
portant points.  There  was  never  greater  need  or  better  op- 
portunity for  this  than  in  Johnston's  battle  of  the  31st.  The 
enemy  had  but  two  batteries,  Kirby's  and  Brady's,  and  no  more 
were  available.  They  did  not  receive  a  single  hostile  cannon 
shot,  and  were  able  to  devote  their  whole  fire  to  our  infantry 
lines,  which  in  every  case  seemed  to  be  finally  repulsed  only 
by  heavy  canister  at  close  quarters. 

We  had  no  lack  of  batteries.  The  roads  were  full  of  them,  but 
there  was  no  organization  to  make  them  effective.  Both  roads 
and  open  fields  were  in  very  miry  condition,  and  all  movements 
would  have  been  slow,  but  a  competent  officer  by  doubling 
teams  could  have  brought  up  guns  with  little  delay. 

The  opportunity  to  place  Lee  in  command  of  the  army  was  a 
very  gratifying  one  to  President  Davis,  and  it  increased  our 
chances  of  success  to  have  cordial  relations  established  between 


SEVEN   PINES  OR  FAIR  OAKS  91 

the  War  Department,  under  the  Chief  Executive,  and  the  army 
under  its  commander. 

Relations  had  not  been  cordial  before,  and  at  this  particular 
time  the  strain  upon  them  was  being  increased  daily  by  Davis's 
feeling  that  he  was  not  being  taken  into  Johnston 's  confidence 
as  to  his  plans. 

In  Volume  II  of  his  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Confederacy,  Davis 
writes  of  this  period  as  follows :  — 

"  Seeing  no  preparation  to  keep  the  enemy  at  a  distance,  and  kept  in 
ignorance  of  any  plan  for  such  purpose,  I  sent  for  Gen.  Lee,  then  at 
Richmond  in  general  charge  of  army  operations,  and  told  him  why  and 
how  I  was  dissatisfied  with  the  condition  of  affairs. 

"He  asked  me  what  I  thought  it  was  proper  to  do.  I  answered  that 
McClellan  should  be  attacked  on  the  other  side  of  the  Chickahominy 
before  he  matured  his  preparations  for  a  siege  of  Richmond.  To  this  he 
promptly  assented,  as  I  anticipated  he  would,  for  I  knew  it  had  been  his 
own  opinion.  He  then  said:  'Gen.  Johnston  should,  of  course,  advise 
you  of  what  he  expects  or  proposes  to  do.  Let  me  go  and  see  him  and 
defer  this  discussion  until  I  return.'" 

No  date  is  given,  but  in  the  War  Records  the  following  letter 
from  Lee  to  Johnston  appears,  and  it  was  probably  the  result  of 
this  conversation : — 

"May  21,  1862. 

"  (Wednesday.) 
"  GEN.  JOSEPH  E.  JOHNSTON  :  — 

"  General :  The  President  desires  to  know  the  number  of  troops  around 
Richmond,  how  they  are  posted,  and  the  organization  of  the  divisions 
and  brigades ;  also  the  programme  of  operations  which  you  propose. 

"The  information  relative  to  the  composition  and  position  of  your  army 
can  readily  be  furnished,  but  your  plan  of  operations,  dependent  upon 
circumstances,  perhaps  yet  to  be  developed,  may  not  be  so  easily  explained, 
nor  may  it  be  prudent  to  commit  it  to  paper.  I  would,  therefore,  respect- 
fully suggest  that  you  communicate  your  views  on  this  subject  personally 
to  the  President,  which  perhaps  would  be  more  convenient  to  you  and 
satisfactory  to  him.  I  am,  etc., 

"  R.  E.  LEE,  General." 

The  War  Records  follow  this  letter  with  a  statement  of  the 
army's  complete  organization,  and  its  strength  (53,688),  but 
there  is  nowhere  record  of  any  other  reply.  From  Mr.  Davis's 
narrative  it  is  clear  that  no  further  communication  took  place. 
The  narrative  goes  on :  — 


92  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

"When  Gen.  Lee  came  back,  he  told  me  that  Gen.  Johnston  pro- 
posed, on  the  next  Thursday,  to  move  against  the  enemy  as  follows : 
Gen.  A.  P.  Hill  was  to  move  down  the  right  flank  and  rear  of  the  enemy ; 
Gen.  G.  W.  Smith,  as  soon  as  Hill's  guns  opened,  was  to  cross  the  Chicka- 
hominy  at  the  Meadow  bridge,  attack  the  enemy  in  flank,  and  by  the 
conjunction  of  the  two  it  was  expected  to  double  him  up.  Then  Long- 
street  was  to  cross  on  the  Mechanicsville  bridge,  and  attack  him  in  front. 
From  this  plan  the  best  results  were  hoped  for  by  both  of  us." 

The  "next  Thursday"  was  May  29.  In  the  Records  appear 
no  signs  of  battle  until  May  27.  On  that  day  came  news  that 
McDowell  was  starting  south  from  Fredericksburg.  Johnston 
immediately  ordered  troops  into  position  for  the  attack  at  dawn 
on  the  29th.  But,  as  has  been  told,  on  the  28th  he  received 
news  of  McDowell 's  recall  north.  That  night  he  countermanded 
the  battle  orders,  and  had  the  troops  withdrawn  under  cover  of 
darkness  from  all  advanced  positions. 

The  President's  narrative  goes  on:  — 

"On  the  morning  of  the  day  proposed,  I  hastily  despatched  my  office 
business  and  rode  out  toward  the  Meadow  bridge  to  see  the  action  com- 
mence. On  the  road  I  found  Smith's  division  halted,  and  the  men  dis- 
persed in  the  woods.  Looking  for  some  one  from  whom  I  could  get 
information,  I  finally  saw  Gen.  Hood,  and  asked  him  the  meaning  of 
what  I  saw.  He  told  me  that  he  did  not  know  anything  more  than  that 
they  had  been  halted.  Riding  on  to  the  main  road,  which  led  to  the 
Mechanicsville  bridge,  I  found  Gen.  Longstreet,  walking  to  and  fro  in 
an  impatient,  it  might  be  said,  fretful  manner.  Before  speaking  to  him, 
he  said  his  division  had  been  under  arms  all  day  waiting  for  orders  to 
advance,  and  that  the  day  was  now  so  far  spent  that  he  did  not  know 
what  was  the  matter.  Thus  ended  the  offensive-defensive  programme 
from  which  Lee  expected  much,  and  of  which  I  was  hopeful." 

But  two  days  afterward,  May  31,  the  President  rode  out  again 
late  in  the  afternoon,  and  when  on  the  Nine  Mile  road,  heard 
firing  in  the  direction  of  Seven  Pines.  Mr.  Davis  writes :  — 

"As  I  drew  nearer  I  saw  Gen.  Whiting  with  part  of  Gen.  Smith's 
division  file  into  the  road  in  front  of  me;  at  the  same  time  I 
saw  Gen.  Johnston  ride  across  the  field  from  a  house  before  which 
Gen.  Lee's  horse  was  standing.1  I  turned  down  to  the  house  and 

1  Among  the  staff-officers  who  saw  this  incident,  it  -was  believed  that  Gen. 
Johnston  saw  Mr.  Davis  approaching,  and  that  he  sought  to  avoid  a  meet- 
ing by  mounting  quickly  and  riding  rapidly  to  the  extreme  front,  where 
he  remained  until  he  received  his  wounds.  I  was  a  witness  of  the  scene. 


SEVEN  PINES  OR  FAIR  OAKS  93 

asked  Gen.  Lee  what  the  musketry  firing  meant.  He  replied  by  asking 
whether  I  had  heard  it,  and  being  answered  in  the  affirmative,  he  said 
he  had  been  under  that  impression  himself;  but  Gen.  Johnston  had 
assured  him  that  it  could  be  nothing  more  than  an  artillery  duel.  It  is 
scarcely  necessary  to  add  that  neither  of  us  had  been  advised  of  a  design 
to  attack  the  enemy  that  day." 

It  seems  clear  from  this  narrative  that  Gen.  Johnston  en- 
tirely disregarded  the  letter  of  May  21,  so  far  as  it  required 
him  to  acquaint  the  President  with  his  proposed  programme  of 
operations.  The  verbal  message  conveyed  by  Lee,  that  he  pro- 
posed to  attack  north  of  the  Chickahominy  on  the  29th,  may 
serve  to  acquit  him  of  literal  disobedience;  but  the  change  of 
programme  was  neither  notified  beforehand,  or  explained  after- 
ward, nor  was  any  notice  given  of  the  attack  at  Seven  Pines  on 
the  31st,  although  there  was  ample  opportunity  to  do  so. 

It  is  not  probable,  however,  that  Johnston  intended  his  course 
to  be  one  either  of  disrespect  or  disobedience.  It  had  its  source, 
doubtless,  in  his  aversion  to  detail,  or  to  committing  himself  as 
to  what  he  proposed  to  do,  when  he  was  fighting  a  superior  force 
and  was  really  waiting  for  opportunities  to  turn  up. 

It  must  be  admitted  that  at  Seven  Pines  our  prospects,  hao\ 
Johnston  not  been  wounded,  would  have  been  dismal.     Besides 
the  lack  of  cordial  relations  between  the  President  and  Johns-    ,A 
ton,  the  latter 's  effort  to  handle  the  army  in  battle  had  been  an          >U! 
utter  failure.     His  orders  were  given,  he  says,  "  for  the  concen- 
tration of  23  of  our  27  brigades  against  McClellan's  left  wing." 
Yet  nowhere  were  ever  over  four  brigades  in  action  at  one  time,     v 
No  complaint  is  made  of  any  disobedience,  slowness,  or  non- 
performance,  by  any  officer,  except  Huger,  and  the  facts  in  his 
case  distinctly  relieve  him  from  any  blame  whatever.    Indeed,  it 
is  almost  tragic  the  way  in  which  he  became  the  scapegoat  of  this 
occasion,  the  true  history  of  which  is  even  yet  not  generally 
understood.     Gen.  Smith,  however,  in   1891,  published  all  the 
facts  for  the  first  time  with  documentary  proof. 


CHAPTER  VI 

JACKSON'S  VALLEY  CAMPAIGN 

The  Valley.  Jackson's  Plan.  Battle  of  McDowell.  Shields  joins  Mc- 
Dowell. Jackson  attacks  Front  Royal.  Banks  Retreats.  Winchester 
Captured.  Cavalry  not  at  Hand.  Steuart's  Faux  Pas.  Jackson's 
Report.  McDowell's  Delay.  Lincoln  keeps  Sunday.  Panic  in  Wash- 
ington. Jackson  keeps  Sunday.  Jackson's  Retreat.  Race  down  the 
Valley.  Death  of  Ashby.  Port  Republic,  June  8.  Cross  Keys, 
June  8.  Port  Republic,  June  9.  Winder  Repulsed.  Taylor's  Charge. 
After  Effects. 

BEFORE  taking  up  the  history  of  affairs  before  Richmond  in 
June,  1862,  with  Lee  at  the  head  of  the  army,  it  is  necessary  to 
review  events  in  the  Valley  of  Virginia. 

This  Valley  constituted  the  only  route  by  which  a  Con- 
federate army  could  invade  Maryland  and  threaten  Washington 
City  in  rear. 

Cool  judgment  at  the  head  of  affairs,  after  Washington  had 
once  been  fortified  against  an  attack  by  open  assault,  might 
have  laughed  at  any  idea  of  real  danger  from  such  an  invasion. 
It  should  have  been  clear  to  all  that  no  invasion  could  maintain 
itself  long  enough  to  carry  on  a  siege,  or  to  do  more  than  to  fight 
one  great  battle.  The  trouble  was  the  lack  of  railroad  trans- 
portation. Wagons  alone  would  have  to  be  relied  upon  to 
bring  all  supplies  from  Staunton,  Va.,  a  distance  via  the  Valley 
roads  of  nearly  200  miles  to  Washington.  But  fear,  approach- 
ing panic,  took  possession  of  Washington  whenever  a  Confederate 
force  appeared  in  the  Valley,  and  every  other  operation  would 
be  suspended  to  concentrate  all  efforts  upon  driving  it  out. 

This  oversensitiveness  of  the  Federals  cut  its  greatest  figure 
hi  1862,  and  was,  more  than  once,  the  only  salvation  of  Rich- 
mond. For  the  Confederate  generals  understood  it,  and  as  the 
situation  in  front  of  Richmond  became  more  threatening,  they 
sought  more  earnestly  to  reenforce  the  Valley. 

94 


JACKSON'S    VALLEY    CAMPAIGN  95 

It  happened  that  Stonewall  Jackson  had  been  assigned  as 
the  commander  of  the  Valley  District  in  Nov.,  '61,  and  the 
reader  has  already  been  told  of  the  battle  of  Kernstown,  which 
he  fought  there  on  Mar.  23,  '62. 

After  that  battle  he  had  fallen  back  with  his  division,  about 
8000  strong,  to  Swift  Run  Gap.  Ewell,  with  about  as  many 
more,  was  at  Gordonsville,  and  Edward  Johnson,  with  about 
3000,  was  near  Staunton. 

The  Federals  had  made  hi  West  Virginia  two  separate  de- 
partments. That  of  the  Shenandoah,  under  Banks,  included 
the  Valley  in  which  Banks  had,  in  April,  about  19,000  men  near 
Harrisonburg. 

About  40  miles  west  in  the  mountains  was  Fremont,  com- 
manding what  was  called  the  Mountain  Department,  in  which 
he  had  about  15,000  men.  About  3700  of  these,  under  Milroy, 
were  at  McDowell,  a  point  25  miles  west  of  Staunton. 

On  April  29,  Jackson  proposed  to  Lee  in  Richmond  that  he, 
Jackson,  should  unite  his  own  force  and  Johnston's  and  attack 
Milroy  and  Fremont,  and  drive  them  back  into  the  mountains. 
Then  returning  quickly,  and  being  joined  by  Ewell,  his  whole 
force  should  fall  upon  Banks.  Lee  approved  the  project  and 
committed  its  entire  execution  to  Jackson. 

Ewell's  division  was  brought  up  to  Swift  Run  Gap  to  observe 
Banks,  while  Jackson  concealed  his  object  by  marching  his  own 
division  back  across  the  Blue  Ridge  toward  Charlottesville,  and 
moving  from  a  railroad  station  near  Charlottesville  by  rail  to 
Staunton.  Here  he  united  with  Johnson  and  marched  rapidly 
upon  Milroy.  He  had  started  on  April  30,  and,  taking  a  country 
road,  had  been  three  days  in  moving  his  guns  and  trains  through 
12  miles  of  mud  to  reach  a  metalled  road.  He  had  intended 
to  rest  over  Sunday,  May  4,  but  news  of  Fremont's  cavalry 
having  advanced,  induced  him  reluctantly  to  put  his  infantry 
upon  the  cars  and  move  to  Staunton  on  that  day.  On  May  7, 
he  left  Staunton,  and  on  May  8  he  confronted  Milroy  at  McDowell. 
Milroy  had  been  reenforced  by  Schenck's  brigade.  Jackson  kept 
most  of  his  force  concealed,  and  about  2500  Federals  were  ad- 
vanced against  him  in  the  afternoon.  A  sharp  affair  ensued 
with  about  2800  of  Jackson's  force,  holding  the  crest  of  a  steep 


96 


MILITARY  MEMOIRS 


JACKSON'S  VALLEY  CAMPAIGN,  MAT  AND  JUNE,  1862 


JACKSON'S    VALLEY   CAMPAIGN  97 

ridge  more  exposed  to  fire  than  was  the  enemy.  The  latter 
only  lost  about  250  killed  and  wounded,  while  the  Confederates 
lost  498;  but  next  morning  the  Federals  had  retreated.  Jackson 
pursued  for  two  or  three  days,  going  nearly  to  Franklin,  and 
then  on  May  12  turned  back,  damaging  and  obstructing  all 
roads  behind  him,  and  thus  practically  neutralizing  for  a  while 
Fremont's  whole  force.  He  now  marched  to  unite  with  Ewell 
and  to  strike  at  Banks.  Friday,  May  16,  had  been  appointed 
by  the  Confederate  President  a  day  of  fasting  and  prayer,  and 
it  was  spent  in  camp  at  Lebanon  Springs  near  Staunton. 

Meanwhile,  during  Jackson's  absence,  the  situation  in  the 
Valley  had  changed.  Shields's  division,  about  9000  men,  had 
been  taken  from  Banks  and  ordered  to  join  McDowell  at  Fred- 
ericksburg,  where  the  latter  would  await  it  before  advancing  to 
join  McClellan  before  Richmond.  This  reduced  Banks's  force  to 
about  10,000,  and  he  had  been  withdrawn  down  the  Valley  to 
Strasburg,  which  he  was  ordered  to  fortify  and  hold. 

Jackson  had  now  with  Swell's  division  about  16,000  men. 
On  May  20  he  arrived  at  New  Market,  whence  there  were  two 
roads  to  Winchester.  The  western,  the  most  direct  and  shortest, 
going  by  Strasburg,  and  the  eastern,  crossing  the  Massanutten 
Mountains  to  Luray,  followed  the  valley  of  the  South  Fork  of 
the  Shenandoah  to  Front  Royal,  about  12  miles  east  of  Stras- 
burg. Then,  crossing  the  river,  it  united  with  the  direct  road 
at  Newtown,  within  12  miles  of  Winchester. 

His  march  was  by  the  eastern  route  and  was  conducted  with 
such  secrecy  that  the  enemy  had  no  idea  that  he  was  within 
60  miles,  when,  at  1  P.M.,  May  23,  his  skirmishers  attacked  a 
Federal  outpost  at  Front  Royal  held  by  Col.  Kenly  with  about 
a  thousand  men  and  two  guns.  Kenly,  seeing  a  much  supe- 
rior force,  set  fire  to  his  camp,  and,  crossing  the  Shenandoah, 
also  set  fire  to  the  bridge  behind  him,  but  Jackson's  men  rushed 
in  and  saved  it,  though  so  damaged  as  to  make  the  use  of  it  slow 
and  difficult. 

Jackson,  crossing  at  a  ford  with  the  6th  Va.  Cav.,  under 
Col.  Flournoy,  charged  the  enemy,  capturing  the  two  guns  and 
600  prisoners,  the  enemy  losing  154  killed  and  wounded,  and 
the  Confederates  only  26. 


98  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

Even  a  more  brilliant  success  might  have  resulted  here  but 
for  an  unfortunate  failure  of  our  staff  service,  as  follows :  — 

As  he  approached  Front  Royal  from  the  south,  about  three 
and  a  half  miles  from  the  town,  a  rough  country  road 
diverged  to  the  east  and  gave  a  second  approach  to  the 
town  by  an  obscure  route  of  about  eight  miles  over  some 
steep  hills. 

The  more  surely  to  avoid  the  enemy's  pickets  and  to  execute 
a  surprise,  Jackson  had  taken  the  head  of  his  column  by  this 
road.  But  after  striking  the  enemy's  pickets  near  Front  Royal, 
he  sent  back  orders  for  the  rear  brigades  to  follow  the  short  and 
nearly  level  highway  to  the  town.  As  usual  at  that  time  in  the 
Confederate  armies,  the  courier  service  was  performed  by  a 
small  detachment  of  cavalry,  temporarily  detailed;  not  by 
specially  selected  men,  as  was  later  practised. 

In  this  case  the  courier  selected  to  carry  the  order  not  only 
failed  to  deliver  it,  but  took  himself  off,  and  was  never  heard  of 
again.  It  resulted  that  Jackson  waited  in  vain  the  whole  after- 
noon for  the  coming  up  of  most  of  his  artillery  and  infantry. 
Part  of  it  only  arrived  after  dark,  completely  exhausted  by  its 
laborious  march;  and  one  of  his  brigades,  tired  out,  encamped 
four  miles  short  of  Front  Royal.  The  cream  of  the  whole  occa- 
sion was  thus  lost. 

Banks  did  not  appreciate  the  situation  until  next  morning, 
and  only  toward  10  o'clock  did  he  get  off  from  Strasburg  in 
retreat  for  Winchester.  Jackson,  too,  was  able  to  make  only  a 
late  start,  and,  being  delayed  by  forces  sent  out  by  Banks  to 
protect  his  right  flank,  he  missed,  by  two  hours,  intercepting 
Banks's  infantry,  though  he  captured  and  destroyed  about  100 
wagons,  and  took  some  prisoners.  There  was  much  delay,  also, 
from  poor  discipline  in  both  the  Confederate  infantry  and 
cavalry,  especially  in  the  latter.  It  was  not  easy  for  either  to 
resist  the  temptations  offered  by  so  many  wagons  loaded  with 
articles  of  food  and  clothing,  calculated  to  appeal  strongly  to 
Confederate  wants. 

But  if  time  was  thus  wasted,  Jackson  made  it  up  by  pushing 
his  march  for  the  greater  part  of  the  night.  It  was  3  A.M.  when 
he  finally  allowed  his  exhausted  men  to  lie  down  and  sleep,  and 


JACKSON'S  VALLEY  CAMPAIGN  99 

they  were  now  near  enough  to  Winchester  to  make  it  sure  that 
Banks  could  not  get  away  without  a  battle. 

Early  in  the  morning  Jackson  attacked  Winchester.  The 
enemy  made  a  stubborn  resistance,  having  good  position  but  an 
inferior  force.  He  was  finally,  however,  broken  and  driven  from 
the  town  in  great  confusion.  Jackson,  in  his  official  report,  says 
of  the  occasion :  — 

"Never  have  I  seen  an  opportunity  when  it  was  in  the  power  of  cavalry 
to  reap  a  richer  harvest  of  the  fruits  of  victory.  Hoping  that  the  cavalry 
would  soon  come  up,  the  artillery,  followed  by  infantry,  was  pressed  for- 
ward for  about  two  hours  for  the  purpose  of  preventing  by  artillery  fire 
a  re-forming  of  the  enemy ;  but  as  nothing  was  heard  of  the  cavalry,  and 
as  but  little  or  nothing  could  be  accomplished  without  it  in  the  exhausted 
condition  of  our  infantry,  between  which  and  the  enemy  the  distance  was 
constantly  increasing,  I  ordered  a  halt  and  issued  orders  for  going  into 
camp  and  refreshing  the  men." 

This  had  been  the  critical  moment  of  Jackson's  whole  strategic 
movement.  He  had  successfully  concentrated  a  superior  force 
upon  his  enemy,  and  routed  him,  and  needed  but  his  cavalry  to 
reap  the  full  fruits  of  a  great  success.  He  had  three  regiments 
of  cavalry,  —  the  7th  under  Col.  Turner  Ashby,  and  the  2d  and 
6th,  which,  the  day  before,  had  been  placed  under  the  command 
of  Gen.  Geo.  H.  Steuart.  Ashby's  regiment  was  recruited  in 
the  Valley  and  was  noted  for  every  good  quality  except  disci- 
pline. Being  near  their  homes,  the  opportunity  to  loot  the 
captured  trains  had  been  peculiarly  seductive,  and  the  regi- 
ment for  some  days  was  but  little  more  than  a  company.  With 
his  small  force  remaining,  Ashby,  unfortunately,  the  night  before, 
had  ridden  to  Berryville,  fearing  the  enemy  might  attempt  to 
escape  by  Snicker's  Gap.  The  2d  and  6th  regiments  under 
Steuart  were  with  Swell's  troops  on  the  right  of  the  attack, 
Jackson  being  with  the  left.  There  was  no  reason,  therefore, 
except  our  fatal  facility  of  blundering,  why  these  two  regiments 
should  not  have  been  promptly  at  hand,  and,  for  once,  the 
spectacle  be  seen  of  a  Confederate  army  reaping  the  fruits  of 
victory. 

The  story  is  a  curious  one,  and  is  told  in  Jackson's  official 
report  as  follows:  — 


100 


MILITARY  MEMOIRS 


"I  had  seen  but  some  50  of  Ashby's  cavalry  since  prior  to  the  pillag- 
ing scenes  of  the  previous  evening,  and  none  since  an  early  hour  of  the 
past  night.  The  2d  and  6th  Va.  regiments  of  cavalry  were  under 
the  command  of  Brig. -Gen.  Geo.  H.  Steuart  of  Ewell's  command. 
After  the  pursuit  had  been  continued  for  some  distance  beyond  the  town, 
and  seeing  nothing  of  the  cavalry,  I  despatched  my  aide-de-camp, 
Lt.  Pendleton,  to  Gen.  Steuart  with  an  order  '  to  move  as  rapidly  as 
possible  and  join  me  on  the  Martinsburg  turnpike  and  carry  on  the  pur- 
suit of  the  enemy  with  vigor.'  His  reply  was  that  he  was  under  the  com- 
mand of  Gen.  Ewell  and  the  order  must  come  through  him.  Such  con- 
duct and  consequent  delay  has  induced  me  to  require  of  Lt.  (now  Maj.) 
Pendleton  a  full  statement  of  the  case,  which  is  forwarded  herewith." 

Pendleton  tells  how  Steuart,  who  was  a  graduate  of  West 
Point  and  an  officer  of  the  old  army,  had  refused  and  failed  to 
obey  Jackson's  order  for  immediate  action,  because  not  given 
through  a  division  commander. 

Gen.  Jackson  then  goes  on  to  say :  — 

"About  an  hour  after  the  halt  of  the  main  body  had  been  ordered, 
Brig.-Geno  Geo.  H.  Steuart,  with  his  cavalry,  came  up,  and  renewing  the 
pursuit  pushed  forward  in  a  highly  creditable  manner  and  succeeded 
in  capturing  a  number  of  prisoners ;  but  the  main  body  of  Banks's  army 
was  now  beyond  the  reach  of  successful  pursuit,  and  effected  its  escape 
across  the  Potomac. 

"Before  reaching  Bunker  Hill  Gen.  Steuart  was  joined  by  Gen. 
Ashby  with  a  small  portion  of  his  cavalry.  Upon  my  inquiring  of  Gen. 
Ashby  why  he  was  not  where  I  desired  him  at  the  close  of  the  engage- 
ment, he  stated  that  he  had  moved  to  the  enemy's  left  for  the  purpose  of 
cutting  off  a  portion  of  his  force.  Gen.  Steuart  pushed  on  to  Martins- 
burg,  where  he  captured  a  large  amount  of  army  stores. 

"There  is  good  reason  for  believing  that  had  the  cavalry  played  its 
part  in  this  pursuit  as  well  as  the  four  companies  had  done  under  Col. 
Flournoy  two  days  before  in  the  pursuit  from  Front  Royal,  but  a  small 
portion  of  Banks's  army  would  have  made  its  escape  to  the  Potomac." 

This  narrative  shows  how  our  efficiency  was  impaired  by  our 
deficiencies  of  discipline.  Our  strategy,  marching  and  fighting, 
had  all  been  excellent.  Yet,  owing  to  the  failure  of  one  courier, 
and  a  single  mistake  of  narrow-mindedness  in  a  general,  Banks 
had  escaped  with  but  trifling  loss  of  men  or  material.  The 
campaign,  however,  had  not  been  undertaken  to  capture  men 
or  material.  Its  great  object  was  to  break  up  McDowell's  pro- 
posed march  from  Fredericksburg  to  reenforce  McClellan  in  front 


JACKSON'S  VALLEY  CAMPAIGN  101 

of  Richmond.  This,  it  will  be  seen,  was  fully  accomplished  by 
the  help  of  the  following  chapter  of  accidents  and  just  at  the 
critical  moment. 

McDowell  had  been  ordered  to  march  as  soon  as  he  was  joined 
by  Shields's  division.  It  arrived  on  May  22.  Only  one  day  was 
needed  to  equip  it  for  the  march  to  Richmond,  but  the  loss  of 
three  days  followed.  Its  artillery  ammunition  had  been  con- 
demned by  an  inspector  and  a  second  day  was  lost,  waiting 
for  ammunition  which  had  been  delayed  by  the  grounding 
of  a  schooner  near  Alexandria.  Everything,  however,  was 
ready  by  the  night  of  the  24th,  and  McDowell  was  anxious  to 
march  on  Sunday,  the  25th.  But  a  third  day's  delay  now  en- 
sued from  Mr.  Lincoln's  superstitious  feeling  that  his  chances  of 
success  might  be  improved  by  showing  some  special  regard  for 
the  Sabbath. 

McDowell's  official  report  says : *  — 

"  I  was  now  ready  to  march  with  over  40,000  men  and  over  100  pieces 
of  artillery.  Though  I  could  have  started,  and  would  have  started,  Sun- 
day, yet  it  was  resolved  not  to  march  till  Monday ;  this  out  of  deference 
to  the  wishes  of  the  President,  who  was  with  me  at  the  time,  having  come 
down  Friday  night,  and  with  the  concurrence  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  on 
account  of  the  day." 

When  it  is  remembered  that  the  distance  to  unite  with  McClellan 
could  have  been  easily  covered  within  three  marches,  one  is  im- 
pressed with  the  influence  of  small  events  upon  great  matters, 
especially  when  the  small  events  involve  the  loss  of  time,  even 
of  hours.  It  has  already  been  told  how  McDowell  did  actually 
start,  but,  having  made  only  a  part  of  a  day's  march,  he  was  re- 
called, and  sent  after  Jackson.  Had  he  made  even  a  full  day,  it  is 
very  doubtful  if  he  would  have  been  recalled. 

On  the  morning  of  Sunday,  the  25th,  everything  in  Washington 
was  serene.  Those  best  posted,  and  in  highest  authority,  con- 
fidently expected  the  early  fall  of  Richmond,  and  had  good 
reason  for  their  expectations  Indeed,  the  New  York  Herald  that 
morning  had  had  a  leader  headed, "  Fall  of  Richmond."  By  noon 
the  papers  were  issuing  extras  headed, "  Defeat  of  Banks,  Washing- 
ton in  Danger."  A  volcanic  eruption  could  scarcely  have  startled 

1  O.  R.  15,  282. 


102  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

the  administration  more.  Telegrams  were  sent  the  governors 
of  a  dozen  states  calling  for  instant  help  to  save  the  capital. 
Reinforcements  were  rushed  to  Williamsport  and  Harper's  Ferry 
to  assist  Banks.  McDowell's  march,  already  begun  before  orders 
could  reach  it,  was  countermanded,  and  half  his  force,  under 
Shields  and  Ord,  was  hurried  to  the  Valley  to  attack  Jackson 
from  the  east,  while  Fremont's  15,000  attacked  from  the  west. 

McDowell,  who  was  a  good  soldier,  appreciated  that  no  force 
possible  for  Jackson  to  have  collected,  could  accomplish  any 
serious  results,  and  remonstrated,  and  begged  in  vain,  to  be 
allowed  to  carry  out  his  projected  march  upon  Richmond.  When 
this  was  refused,  he  suggested  that  he  be  directed  upon  Gordons- 
ville,  but  this  too  was  overruled,  and  Shields  and  Ord  were 
directed  to  march  upon  Strasburg,  toward  which  point  also 
Fremont  was  approaching. 

Meanwhile,  Jackson,  having  gone  into  camp  about  noon  on 
Sunday,  the  25th,  when  his  infantry  and  artillery  could  no  longer 
pursue  the  enemy,  felt  moved,  even  as  Lincoln  had  done,  to 
recognize  the  Sabbath  by  making  up  for  the  services  missed  in 
the  morning. 

His  official  report  says :  — 

"On  the  following  day  (the  26th),  divine  service  was  held  for  the  pur- 
pose of  rendering  thanks  to  God  for  the  success  with  which  He  had  blessed 
our  arms,  and  to  implore  His  continued  favor." 

During  the  next  two  or  three  days  he  made  demonstrations 
toward  the  Potomac,  advancing  his  troops  to  Charlestown,  and 
within  two  miles  of  Harper's  Ferry;  but  these  demonstrations 
were  only  for  their  moral  effect  at  the  North,  and  to  occupy 
time,  while  he  filled  his  wagons  with  captured  stores  and  pre- 
pared a  convoy  of  a  double  line  of  wagons  near  seven  miles  long 
and  about  2300  prisoners.  Only  on  the  30th  did  he  put  his 
columns  in  motion  toward  the  rear. 

Had  his  opponents  acted  boldly  and  swiftly,  their  positions 
would  now  have  enabled  them  to  cut  off  Jackson's  retreat  and 
to  overwhelm  him.  But  the  moral  effect  of  his  reputation  doubt- 
less caused  some  hesitation,  and  Jackson's  entire  force  and  his 
whole  convoy,  with  some  skirmishing  at  Front  Royal  with 


JACKSON'S  VALLEY  CAMPAIGN  103 

Shields,  and  at  Wardensville  with  Fre'mont,  passed  between  his 
converging  foes  at  Strasburg  on  the  31st,  a  portion  of  one  of 
his  brigades  making  in  one  day  a  march  of  36  miles. 

Besides  the  prisoners  and  stores  brought  off,  Jackson  left  about 
700  Federal  sick  and  wounded  at  Winchester,  and  burned  many 
stores  for  which  he  had  no  transportation.  Two  guns  and  over 
9000  muskets  were  saved. 

After  passing  Strasburg  on  the  31st,  the  race  was  continued 
up  the  main  Shenandoah  Valley,  with  Jackson  leading  and 
Fre'mont  following  in  his  tracks,  while  Shields  advanced  up  the 
Luray  Valley  on  the  east. 

At  New  Market  the  road  from  Luray  enters  the  Valley  through 
Massanutten  Gap,  but  Jackson  had  sent  cavalry  ahead  who 
burned  the  bridges  by  which  Shields  might  have  had  access. 

At  Conrad's  store  another  bridge  across  the  South  Fork  gave  a 
road  to  Harrisonburg,  and  Shields  rushed  his  cavalry  ahead  to 
gain  possession  of  it,  but  again  he  was  too  late.  Meanwhile, 
there  had  been  a  severe  rain-storm  on  June  2,  and  though  Shields 
could  hear  the  guns  of  Jackson's  rear-guard  and  Fremont's  ad- 
vance on  the  other  side  of  the  Massanutten  Mountains,  he  was 
powerless  to  cross. 

On  Thursday,  June  5,  Jackson  reached  Harrisonburg,  and  here 
diverged  east  to  cross  the  South  Fork  upon  the  bridge  at  Port 
Republic  .•'""On  the  6th,  in  a  severe  cavalry  affair  of  the  rear- 
guard, Gen.  Turner  Ashby  was  killed.  Of  the  civilian  soldiers 
whom  the  war  produced,  such  as  Forrest,  Morgan,  and  others, 
scarcely  one  gave  such  early  and  marked  inoUcation  of  rare 
military  genius  as  Ashby.1 

1  Col.  Henderson  writes  of  Ashby  as  follows:  — 

"  The  death  of  Ashby  was  a  terrible  blow  to  the  Army  of  the  Valley.  From 
the  outbreak  of  the  war  he  had  been  employed  on  the  Shenandoah,  and  from 
Staunton  to  the  Potomac  his  was  the  most  familiar  figure  in  the  Confederate 
ranks.  His  daring  rides  on  his  famous  white  charger  were  already  the  theme 
of  song  and  story,  and  if  the  tale  of  his  exploits,  as  told  in  camp  and  farm, 
sometimes  bordered  on  the  marvellous,  the  bare  truth  stripped  of  all  exaggera- 
tion was  sufficient  in  itself  to  make  him  a  hero.  His  reckless  courage,  his 
fine  horsemanship,  his  skill  in  handling  his  command,  and  his  power 'of 
stimulating  devotion,  were  not  the  only  attributes  which  incited  admira- 
tion. With  such  qualities,  it  is  said,  were  united  the  utmost  generosity 
and  unselfishness,  and  a  delicacy  of  feeling  equal  to  a  woman's." 


, 


104  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

On  the  7th  Jackson's  advance  at  night  reached  the  vicinity  of 
Port  Republic.  This  village  is  situated  in  the  angle  between 
the  North  and  South  rivers,  which  here  unite  and  form  the 
South  Fork  of  the  Shenandoah.  The  North  River  is  the  larger 
of  the  two,  and  the  road  from  Harrisonburg  crosses  it  by  a  wooden 
bridge.  The  South  River  was  fordable. 

On  the  morning  of  Sunday,  the  8th,  Jackson  had  sent  two  com- 
panies of  cavalry  across  the  river  to  scout  on  the  Luray  road 
toward  Shields's  advance.  About  8  A.M.  these  companies  were 
driven  back  in  a  rout  and  followed  into  the  village  by  a  body  of 
Federal  cavalry,  who,  with  four  guns  and  a  brigade  of  infantry 
following,  formed  Shields's  advance. 

Jackson  himself  was  in  the  village  and  narrowly  escaped  cap- 
ture, riding  across  the  bridge  over  the  North  River.  Three  of 
his  staff  were  captured,  but  afterward  escaped.  Three  brigades 
of  infantry,  however,  and  three  batteries  were  near  at  hand,  and 
the  Federals  were  soon  brought  under  a  fire  that  sent  them  back 
in  confusion  with  a  loss  of  about  40  men  and  two  guns,  which 
had  been  brought  across  the  South  River.  As  then-  leading 
brigade,  Carroll's,  fell  back,  it  met  a  second  brigade  of  Shields's 
division,  Tyler's,  with  artillery,  and  the  two  brigades,  selecting  a 
position  about  two  miles  north,  decided  to  await  the  arrival  of 
Shields  with  the  rest  of  the  division. 

Jackson  left  two  brigades  to  protect  the  bridge,  and  with  the 
remainder  of  his  force  marched  back  about  four  miles  to  Cross 
Keys,  where  he  had  left  Swell's  division  holding  a  selected  posi- 
tion against  Fremont.  Fremont  was  now  in  reach  of  Jackson, 
and,  by  all  the  maxims  of  war,  should  have  exerted  his  utmost 
strength  to  crush  him.  He  could  afford  to  risk  righting  his  last  , 
reserves,  and  even  to  wreck  his  army,  if  he  might  thereby  detain 
or  cripple  Jackson,  for  other  armies  were  coming  to  his  help 
and  were  near  at  hand.  His  attack,  however,  was  weak.  He 
had  about  10,000  infantry,  2000  cavalry,  and  12  batteries.  Ewell 
had  at  first  but  6000  infantry  and  500  cavalry.  Fre'mont  brought 
into  play  about  all  of  his  artillery,  but  he  advanced  only  one 
brigade  of  infantry  from  his  left  flank.  This  was  repulsed  and 
followed,  and  the  whole  of  Fremont's  left  wing  driven  back  to 
the  shelter  of  his  line  of  guns.  Elsewhere  there  was  no  more 


JACKSON'S  VALLEY  CAMPAIGN  105 

than  skirmishing  and  artillery  duelling,  of  which  the  Federals 
usually  had  the  best  with  their  superior  metal  and  ammunition. 
It  was  Jackson's  role  to  fight  only  defensive  battle,  until  he  had 
shaken  off  the  superior  force  which  beset  him;  so  the  battle 
lingered  along  all  day,  the  casualties  being :  — 

Federal :          killed  114,     wounded  443,   missing  127,   total  684 
Confederate:      "        41,  "         232,         "        15,       "    288 

During  the  night  of  the  8th,  Jackson  returned  to  Port  Republic 
and  improvised  a  foot-bridge  to  carry  his  infantry  dry  shod 
across  the  South  River.  Early  next  morning,  leaving  a  rear- 
guard of  two  brigades  under  Trimble  and  Patton  to  delay 
Fremont,  the  rest  of  his  force  was  put  in  motion  to  find  and 
attack  Shields's  two  brigades,  which  had  unwisely  halted  about 
two  miles  from  Port  Republic  the  day  before. 

I  say  unwisely,  because  they  were  only  about  4000  men  and 
16  guns,  but  they  had  a  position  so  beautiful  that  they  were 
excusable  just  for  the  chance  of  fighting  from  it. 

From  the  river  on  the  right  it  extended  straight  across  a  mile 
of  open  plain,  along  a  hollow  road  running  between  good  banks, 
strongly  fenced,  to  a  considerable  ravine  in  the  wooded  foot-hills 
of  the  Blue  Ridge.  The  key  of  the  position  was  a  high  retired 
shoulder  on  the  Federal  left,  on  which  were  posted  seven  guns, 
strongly  supported  by  infantry  sheltered  hi  the  near-by  wood, 
and  commanding  every  foot  of  the  plain. 

Jackson,  this  morning,  proposed  to  himself  a  double  victory, 
and  he  built  the  foot-bridge  across  the  South  River  to  enable 
him  to  win  it.  He  intended,  by  making  a  very  early  start,  to 
fall  upon  Shields's  two  brigades  and  crush  them,  and  then  doubling 
back  upon  his  track  to  recross  the  rivers  and  meet  Fremont, 
whom  he  would  expect  to  find  advancing  toward  Port  Republic, 
against  the  opposition  which  Trimble  and  Patton  would  make. 
It  was  a  good  plan  and  entirely  feasible,  but  two  things  went 
wrong  in  its  execution. 

The  first  was  with  the  foot-bridge  over  the  South  River.  This 
was  rudely  constructed  of  a  plank  footway,  supported  upon  the 
running-gear  of  wagons  standing  in  the  stream,  which  was  about 
breast  deep.  Such  a  bridge  may  be  made  quite  serviceable, 


106  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

but  this  one  was  not  strongly  built,  and  before  it  had  been  in 
use  long,  it  became  impassable,  except  in  single  file.  This  made 
the  passage  of  each  brigade  over  twice  as  long  as  it  should  have 
been. 

The  second  trouble  was  Jackson's  impatience,  which  defeated 
his  own  purpose.  Winder's  brigade,  leading  his  column,  began 
to  cross  the  bridge  about  4.45  A.M.,  and  Jackson  was  near  the 
head  of  the  column.  When  the  enemy's  position  was  discovered, 
it  was  plain  that  the  key  position  above  noted  was  its  most  as- 
sailable point.  Time  and  blood  would  both  have  been  saved  by 
bringing  up  at  once  a  force  amply  sufficient  to  overwhelm  it. 
As  he  had  five  brigades  at  hand,  and  an  abundance  of  artillery, 
there  need  have  been  no  failure,  and  no  more  delay  than  the 
time  needed  to  bring  up  his  troops.  Going  into  battle  before 
enough  troops  were  brought  up,  was  sure  to  result  in  more  or  less 
disaster. 

Winder's  brigade,  about  1500  strong,  with  two  batteries,  first 
attacked  the  Federal  centre.  It  was  not  only  badly  repulsed, 
but  the  enemy  gave  a  counterstroke,  pursuing  the  fugitives  and 
capturing  a  gun  which  they  succeeded  in  carrying  off.  Other 
troops  were  arriving  to  reenforce  Winder,  but  they  were  arriving 
too  slowly.  The  Federal  commander  saw  a  chance  to  defeat  his 
adversary  by  taking  him  in  detail,  and  was  swift  to  take  ad- 
vantage of  it.  He  brought  forward  two  fresh  regiments  from 
his  left  to  reenforce  an  advance  from  his  centre. 

In  vain  Jackson  himself  rode  among  his  own  old  brigade, 
exposing  his  life  freely  and  endeavoring  to  rally  them.  Their 
thin  lines  had  been  for  the  time  practically  wrecked  against  supe- 
rior numbers  in  a  position  almost  impregnable.  Fortunately,  at 
the  critical  moment,  relief  came  suddenly. 

Jackson  had  recognized  the  key  position  held  by  the  enemy's 
seven-gun  battery,  early  in  the  morning,  and  had  directed  Taylor's 
fine  La.  brigade  to  attack  it,  and  later,  sent  a  second  brigade  to 
follow  Taylor. 

Their  approach  was  made  through  forest,  and  the  enemy  were 
unaware  of  it.  Taylor  urged  his  march  to  the  utmost,  and  was 
admonished  by  the  sounds  of  the  battle  in  the  open  country  on 
his  left  that  his  friends  were  in  need  of  assistance.  So,  without 


JACKSON'S  VALLEY  CAMPAIGN  107 

waiting  for  the  brigade  which  followed  him,  he  broke  cover  and 
charged  boldly  on  the  Federal  battery  at  just  the  critical  moment 
for  Jackson  on  the  left. 

The  sudden  bursting  out  of  so  severe  a  battle  at  this  vital  point 
at  once  relieved  the  pressure  upon  Winder's  centre.  Taylor  had 
a  desperate  fight,  the  battery  being  taken  and  retaken  and  taken 
again,  before  six  of  its  guns  and  all  of  its  caissons  were  finally 
held,  and  its  fire  opened  upon  the  now  retreating  Federals. 
Taylor's  brigade  lost  288  men  in  this  action,  but  accomplished 
its  victory  before  the  arrival  of  its  support. 

It  was  now  about  10.30  A.M.  About  nine  Jackson  had  realized 
that  he  would  not  be  able  to  accomplish  the  double  victory  he 
had  hoped  for,  and  had  sent  word  to  Patton  and  Trimble  to  come 
across  the  bridges  at  Port  Republic  and  to  burn  them.  They 
had  not  been  followed  closely  by  Fremont.  He  only  showed  up 
on  the  opposite  bank  at  noon,  having  had  but  seven  miles  to 
come. 

He  had  a  pontoon  train,  but  made  no  effort  to  cross,  and  con- 
fined his  activity  to  cannonading  the  Confederates  from  the 
north  bank,  wherever  he  could  find  an  opportunity,  during 
the  whole  afternoon.  It  accomplished  little  harm  except  to  the 
Federal  wounded,  driving  off  the  ambulances  which  were  gath- 
ering them. 

Jackson  pressed  the  retreat  of  Tyler's  two  brigades  for  about 
nine  miles  down  the  river,  capturing  about  500.  He  then  with- 
drew by  roads  which  avoided  Fremont's  guns  on  the  west  bank, 
and  went  into  camp  between  midnight  and  dawn  on  the  10th  in 
Brown's  Gap  on  the  Blue  Ridge,  some  of  his  regiments  having 
marched  over  20  miles. 

The  casualties  in  this  action  were  as  follows,  the  Federals 
having  but  two  brigades  engaged  and  the  Confederates  four :  — 

Confederate :    killed   94,     wounded  703,   missing  36,  total  833 
Federal:  "      67,  "          393,       "       558,      "    1018 

The  entire  casualties  for  the  whole  campaign  sum  up  as  follows 
for  the  two  armies :  — 

Confederate :    killed  266,    wounded  1580,  missing  36,  total  1903 
Federal:  "       269,  "        1306,         "    2402,    "      3977 


108  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

When,  in  his  retreat,  Jackson  had  gotten  safely  past  Stras- 
burg,  the  Federal  War  Department  gave  up  all  hope  of  capturing 
him,  and  began  to  take  measures  to  renew  McDowell's  advance 
upon  Richmond.  One  of  McDowell's  divisions,  McCall's,  had 
been  held  at  Fredericksburg,  and,  about  June  6,  it  had  been 
sent  by  water  to  join  McClellan  upon  the  Peninsula.  On  the  8th 
orders  were  sent  for  McDowell  himself  with  Shields's  and  Ord's 
divisions  to  march  for  Fredericksburg;  but  before  these  orders 
could  have  any  effect  there  came  the  news  of  Jackson's  sharp 
counterstrokes  at  Cross  Keys  and  Port  Republic,  which  had  the 
purely  moral  effect  of  causing  the  order  to  be  countermanded. 
It  remained  countermanded,  and  McDowell  and  his  two  divisions 
were  kept  in  the  valley  about  Front  Royal  until  June  20.  This 
delay  took  away  his  last  possible  chance  to  reenforce  McClellan 
before  Lee  took  the  offensive.  Indeed,  the  movement  to  Fred- 
ericksburg, resumed  about  June  20,  was  stopped  on  June  26  by 
the  formation  of  a  new  army  to  be  commanded  by  Gen.  John 
Pope.  It  comprised  the  entire  forces  of  Fremont,  Banks,  and 
McDowell,  and  was  charged  with  the  duty  of  overcoming  the 
forces  under  Jackson. 

So  we  may  now  leave  him  and  his  gallant  but  wearied  foot 
cavalry  to  enjoy  about  five  days  of  rest  on  the  banks  of  the 
Shenandoah,  and  take  up  the  story  of  Lee  before  Richmond. 


CHAPTER   VII 
SEVEN  DAYS'  CAMPAIGN.    THE  ATTACK      . 

Lee  in  Command.  Ives  predicts  Lee's  Audacity.  Lee's  Plan.  McClel- 
lan's  Delay.  Lee's  Opportunity.  Lee's  Order.  Stuart's  Raid.  Inti- 
mations to  the  Enemy.  Conference  of  Officers.  Jackson's  First 
Failure.  Jackson's  March.  Stuart  and  Trimble.  Branch  Moves. 
A.  P.  Hill  Moves.  Battle  of  Mechanicsville.  Porter's  Retreat.  A.  P. 
Hill's  Advance.  Gaines  Mill  Position.  The  Chances.  Jackson  at 
Cold  Harbor.  Porter's  Account.  Hill's  Account.  Lee's  Account. 
Jackson  ordered  in.  General  Advance.  Enemy's  Escape.  Casualties. 
Remarks. 

WHEN  Gen.  Lee,  on  June  1,  1862,  took  command  of  the 
Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  he  brought  with  him  his  personal 
staff,  —  Col.  R.  H.  Chilton,  Adjutant,  Col.  A.  L.  Long,  Military 
Secretary,  and  Majs.  Taylor,  Venable,  Marshall,  and  Talcotlk 
as  Aides.  He  retained  the  chiefs  of  all  departments,  —  Corley  as 
Quartermaster,  Cole  as  Commissary,  Guild  as  Medical  Director, 
and  myself  as  Ordnance  Officer,  —  and  all  matters  of  routine  went 
on  as  before. 

The  chances  of  a  successful  campaign  against  McClellan  had 
increased  greatly  when  Johnston  fell,  wounded,  as  has  been 
already  told.  Johnston  had  proposed  the  concentration  at 
Richmond  of  a  large  force,  to  be  drawn  from  points  farther 
south.  Lee  would  be  able  to  bring  this  about  more  effectively, 
occupying,  as  he  had  done,  the  position  of  Military  Adviser  to  the 
President.  He  had,  as  yet,  never  commanded  an  army,  and  his 
accession  to  his  present  command  did  not  at  once  inspire  popular 
enthusiasm.  His  only  active  service  had  been  in  West  Virginia, 
where  he  was  Department  Commander  in  the  fall  of  1861.  This 
campaign  had  generally  been  considered  a  failure,  but  should 
have  been  recognized  as  a  success,  for  there  had  been  at  least  no 
loss  of  men,  nor  any  serious  reverse.  It  was  absurd  for  the  Con- 
federacy to  seek  to  occupy  so  extensive  and  mountainous  a 

109 


110  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

country  as  West  Virginia,  so  close  to  the  great  state  of  Ohio, 
and  with  a  population  strongly  favoring  the  Federal  cause.  It 
was  impossible  to  supply  our  armies  over  their  long  and  difficult 
roads.  Mountain  barriers  in  that  section  not  only  gave  the 
country  to  the  Federals,  but  proclaimed  peace.  This  came  to  be 
recognized  after  one  compaign.  With  this  for  a  result,  and  no 
battles  having  been  fought,  an  idea  arose  that  Lee  would  not  be 
an  aggressive  commander.  This  was  strengthened  when  Lee's 
first  care  was  to  select  a  line  of  battle  and  begin  to  fortify  it. 
To  some  of  the  amateur  critics,  who  wrote  for  the  public  press, 
this  seemed  little  better  than  a  confession  of  cowardice. 

The  Richmond  Examiner,  edited  by  Pollard,  was  conspicuous 
in  the  bitterness  of  its  attacks.  Through  some  of  these  I  chanced 
upon  an  interview  which  impressed  me  very  forcibly  at  the  time, 
and  which  proved  to  be  quite  a  prophetic  estimate  of  Lee  as  a 
commander.  It  came  about  as  follows  :  On  the  staff  of  the 
President  was  Col.  Joseph  C.  Ives,  a  graduate  of  West  Point  in 
the  class  of  '52.  He  was  born  in  New  York  and  appointed 
from  Connecticut,  but  had  married  in  the  well-known  Semmes 
family  of  Georgia  and  Alabama,  and  had  joined  his  fortunes  with 
the  South.  He  served  on  the  staff  of  President  Davis  during  the 
whole  of  the  war.  While  in  no  way  conspicuous,  he  impressed 
all  who  met  him  as  particularly  intellectual,  and  as  an  unusually 
accomplished  officer. 

When  Lee  had  been  in  command  about  two  weeks,  I  had  a 
long  ride  with  Ives  about  our  lines,  one  afternoon,  during  which 
he  referred  to  these  newspaper  attacks  and  asked  if  I  thought 
they  in  any  way  impaired  the  confidence  of  the  army  in  Lee.  I 
had  seen  no  such  effect  and  told  him  so,  and  then  went  on  to 
say:  "Ives,  tell  me  this.  We  are  here  fortifying  our  lines,  but 
apparently  leaving  the  enemy  all  the  time  he  needs  to  accumulate 
his  superior  forces,  and  then  to  move  on  us  in  the  way  he  thinks 
best.  Has  Gen.  Lee  the  audacity  that  is  going  to  be  required 
for  our  inferior  force  to  meet  the  enemy's  superior  force, — to 
take  the  aggressive,  and  to  run  risks  and  stand  chances?" 

Ives's  reply  was  so  impressive,  both  in  manner  and  matter, 
that  it  has  always  been  remembered  as  vividly  as  if  to-day. 
He  reined  up  his  horse,  stopped  in  the  road,  and,  turning  to  me, 


SEVEN  DAYS'  CAMPAIGN.    THE  ATTACK  111 

said:  "Alexander,  if  there  is  one  man  in  either  army,  Con- 
federate or  Federal,  head  and  shoulders  above  every  other  in 
audacity,  it  is  Gen.  Lee !  His  name  might  be  Audacity.  He 
will  take  more  desperate  chances  and  take  them  quicker  than 
any  other  general  in  this  country,  North  or  South ;  and  you  will 
live  to  see  it,  too." 

It  is  needless  to  say  that  I  did  live  to  see  it  many  times  over. 
But  it  seems,  even  yet,  a  mystery  how,  at  that  time,  Ives  or 
President  Davis  or  any  other  living  man  had  divined  it.  No 
one  could  meet  Lee  and  fail  to  be  impressed  with  his  dignity  of 
character,  his  intellectual  power,  and  his  calm  self-reliance ; 
but  all  those  qualities  might  be  recognized  without  deducing  from 
them,  also,  the  existence  of  such  phenomenal  audacity,  except  by 
an  inspiration  of  genius. 

The  principal  feature  of  Lee 's  proposed  plan  had  long  been  the 
bringing  down  of  Jackson  from  the  Valley  to  attack  the  enemy's 
right  wing.  Even  before  Jackson  had  extricated  himself  from 
the  pursuit  of  his  enemies,  on  June  8,  Lee  had  written  him  to  set 
on  foot  the  arrangements  to  mislead  the  enemy  as  to  his  inten- 
tions. 

The  arrangements  adopted  were  both  elaborate  and  effective. 
Not  only  were  all  sorts  of  exciting  false  rumors  set  on  foot 
throughout  the  Valley,  but  Whiting's  division,  from  before 
Richmond,  and  Lawton  's  large  brigade  —  arriving  from  Georgia 
nearly  4000  strong  —  were  sent  by  rail  from  Richmond  to  Staun- 
ton  about  June  11,  to  create  the  impression  that  Jackson's  raid 
was  about  to  be  repeated  with  a  much  larger  force.  Meanwhile, 
Jackson's  force  was  marched  again  to  the  Shenandoah  near 
Port  Republic,  about  the  llth,  after  Shields  and  Fremont  had 
fallen  back  to  the  neighborhood  of  Strasburg.  Here  Jackson 
took  five  days  of  rest  preparatory  to  the  movement  upon  Rich- 
mond. 

During  most  of  this  period,  by  all  the  rules  of  the  game,  Mc- 
Clellan  was  in  default  for  not  attacking.  He  had  come  within 
arm's  length,  but  allowed  the  initiative  to  Lee.  McDowell  had 
been  taken  from  him,  so  that  he  had  nothing  to  gain  by  wait- 
ing, while  his  enemy  had  the  opportunity  both  of  reinforcement 
and  of  fortification.  Lee  was,  indeed,  doing  his  utmost  in 


112  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

each  direction.  McClellan  seemed  to  have  been  subconsciously 
aware  that  he  ought  to  attack,  and  that  his  advantage  was  being 
lost  by  every  day's  delay ;  for  his  reports  to  Washington  repre- 
sented his  army,  from  day  to  day,  as  being  only  held  back  from 
a  general  advance  by  waiting  for  some  slight  additional  advan- 
tage, which  a  day  or  two  would  bring. 

On  June  2,  which  was  his  best  opportunity,  he  was  only  waiting 
for  the  water  to  fall  in  the  Chickahominy.  On  June  7  he  was 
waiting  for  McCall's  division  (about  10,000  strong)  which  ar- 
rived on  the  12th  and  13th.  On  June  16  he  was  waiting  for  two 
days  to  let  the  ground  harden.  On  June  18  the  general  en- 
gagement might  begin  at  any  hour.  On  June  25  "  the  action  will 
probably  occur  to-morrow,  or  within  a  short  time."  And  at  last 
he  was  right,  for  Lee  began  it  on  the  26th,  and  during  the  inter- 
val, since  June  2,  the  advantage  nad  shifted  from  McClellan 's 
side  to  Lee's. 

As  the  game  and  the  players  now  stood,  the  game  was  Lee's 
for  a  great  success,  —  the  greatest  ever  so  fairly  offered  to  any 
Confederate  general.  His  strategy  had  Been  good  and  had  been 
carried  through  without  a  flaw.  Jackson's  entire  army,  ree'n- 
forced  by  Whiting's  division  and  Lawton's  brigade,  had  been 
brought  down  secretly  from  the  Valley  and,  on  the  night  of  June 
25,  was  encamped  at  Ashland  within  13  miles  of  Mechanicsville. 
It  was  about  18,500  strong.  Meanwhile,  Lee  had  drawn  together, 
available  for  battle,  around  Richmond,  about  65,000  other  troops, 
and  had  fortified  his  lines  on  the  southeast  between  the  Chicka- 
hominy and  the  James,  enough  to  make  them  quite  secure  with 
half  his  force.  McClellan 's  right  flank  was  but  a  single  corps, 
Porter 's  not  over  30,000  strong,  and  separated  from  the  Federal 
centre  by  the  Chickahominy  River  and  about  four  miles  of  dis- 
tance. Under  these  circumstances,  with  even  fairly  good  *  tac- 
tics, Porter 's  corps  should  have  been  practically  destroyed,  and 
with  it  the  Federal  line  of  supply  from  the  York  River.  That 
once  accomplished,  the  capture  or  destruction  of  the  remainder 
of  McClellan 's  army,  during  their  retreat  to  the  James  River, 
would  have  been  an  easier  task  than  the  first. 

All  this  was  in  the  game  which  Lee  set  out  to  play  on  June  26, 
and  the  stakes  were  already  his  if  his  execution  were  even  half  as 


SEVEN  DAYS'  CAMPAIGN.    THE  ATTACK  113 

good  as  his  plan.  At  the  beginning  there  was  every  promise  that 
it  would  be.  Two  days  before,  a  confidential  order  had  been 
issued  to  general  officers  and  heads  of  departments,  which  is 
given  in  part,  in  contrast  with  Johnston 's  method,  as  developed 
at  Seven  Pines. 

"GENERAL  ORDERS  No.  75. 

"Headquarters  in  the  field,  June  24,  1862. 

"Gen.  Jackson's  command  will  proceed  to-morrow  from  Ashland 
toward  the  Stark  (or  Merry  Oaks)  Church,  and  encamp  at  some  convenient 
point  west  of  the  Central  Railroad.  Branch's  brigade  of  A.  P.  Hill's 
division  will  also,  to-morrow  evening,  take  position  on  the  Chickahominy 
near  Half-Sink. 

"At  three  o'clock  Thursday  morning,  26th  inst.,  Gen.  Jackson  will 
advance  on  the  road  leading  to  Pole  Green  Church,  communicating  his 
march  to  Gen.  Branch,  who  will  immediately  cross  the  Chickahominy  and 
take  the  road  leading  to  Mechanicsville. 

"As  soon  as  the  movements  of  these  columns  are  discovered,  Gen. 
A.  P.  Hill,  with  the  rest  of  his  division,  will  cross  the  Chickahominy  near 
Meadow  Bridge  and  move  direct  upon  Mechanicsville. 

"To  aid  his  advance  the  heavy  batteries  on  the  Chickahominy  will,  at 
the  proper  time,  open  upon  the  batteries  at  Mechanicsville.  The  enemy 
being  driven  from  Mechanicsville  and  the  passage  across  the  bridge  opened, 
Gen.  Longstreet,  with  his  division  and  that  of  Gen.  D.  H.  Hill,  will  cross 
the  Chickahominy  at  or  near  that  point,  Gen.  D.  H.  Hill  moving  to  the 
support  of  Gen.  Jackson,  and  Gen.  Longstreet  supporting  Gen.  A.  P. 
Hill.  The  four  divisions  keeping  in  communication  with  each  other  and 
moving  en  echelon  on  separate  roads,  if  practicable,  the  left  division  in 
advance,  with  skirmishers  and  sharp-shooters  extending  their  front,  will 
sweep  down  the  Chickahominy  and  endeavor  to  drive  the  enemy  from 
his  position  above  New  Bridge,  Gen.  Jackson  bearing  well  to  his  left, 
turning  Beaver  Dam  Creek,  taking  the  direction  toward  Cold  Harbor. 

"They  will  then  press  forward  toward  the  York  River  Railroad, 
closing  upon  the  enemy's  rear  and  forcing  him  down  the  Chickahominy. 
Any  advance  of  the  enemy  toward  Richmond  will  be  prevented  by  vig- 
orously following  his  rear  and  crippling  and  arresting  his  progress.  .  .  ." 

But  one  grave  error  had  been  committed.  Among  the 
preparations  which  Lee  had  made  for  the  occasion  had  been 
a  forced  reconnoissance  of  the  enemy's  rear,  which  was  made 
by  his  cavalry  commander,  Stuart,  between  June  11  and 
15.  Stuart,  with  about  1200  men  and  two  guns,  passing  well 
behind  the  enemy 's  right,  had  gotten  into  his  rear  and  discovered 


114  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

that  his  right  flank  did  not  extend  for  any  distance  northward 
from  the  Chickahominy  and  rested  on  no  natural  obstacle.  But 
the  expedition  could  not  safely  return,  Stuart  thought,  by  the 
route  taken  hi  going.  He  determined,  therefore,  to  make  the 
circuit  of  the  Federal  army,  crossing  the  Chickahominy  below 
by  a  bridge  which  he  expected  to  find. 

In  this  he  was  disappointed,  but  with  great  resource  he 
got  safely  across,  partly  by  swimming,  and  partly  by  rebuilding 
a  bridge,  and  brought  off  his  guns  and  a  few  prisoners. 

But  this  raid,  though  ordered  by  Lee  and  handsomely  con- 
ducted, had  one  unfortunate  effect.  It  would  have  been  much 
better  to  have  obtained  the  necessary  information  by  scouts. 
It  seriously,  alarmed  McClellan  for  his  rear.  But  for  it  the 
probabilities*  are  that  he  would  never  have  given  the  subject  any 
thought,  and  he  would  certainly  not  have  been  prepared  with  a 
fleet  of  loaded  transports  on  hand  when  he  was,  soon  after, 
forced  to  change  his  base  to  Harrison's  Landing  on  the  James 
River.  It  is  hard  to  estimate  the  difference  in  the  result,  had 
McClellan  been  taken  by  surprise  on  this  occasion  and  been 
forced,  perhaps,  to  retreat  down  the  Peninsula.  On  the  whole, 
therefore,  the  eclat  of  our  brilliant  raid  cost  us  much  more  than 
its  results  were  worth.  Where  important  strategy  is  on  foot,  too 
great  care  can  scarcely  be  used  to  avoid  making  any  such  power- 
ful suggestions  to  the  enemy  as  resulted  in  this  case. 

It  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  enemy  got  no  intimations 
of  what  was  going  on  until  June  24.  On  that  day  a  deserter 
from  Jackson's  force  was  brought  in.  After  trying  in  vain  to 
pass  himself  off  as  a  Union  prisoner,  escaped  from  Jackson,  he  had 
told  of  Jackson's  march  and  its  supposed  intent  to  attack  Mc- 
Clellan's  flank. 

McClellan  wired  the  story  to  Stanton,  and  also  sent  out  two 
negroes  to  go  along  the  railroad  and  investigate,  but  Stuart's 
pickets  were  too  vigilant  for  the  negroes  to  pass  them.  Stanton 
gave  some  credence  to  the  deserter's  story,  but  it  cut  small 
figure  among  the  rumors  which  McClellan  was  receiving  from 
his  detective  bureau.  He  believed  that  Beauregard  had  ar- 
rived and  that  Lee  now  had  200,000  men. 

On  June  25  he  made  his  first  forward  movement  by  advancing 


SEVEN  DAYS'  CAMPAIGN.    THE  ATTACK  115 

the  skirmish-lines  of  several  brigades  and  taking  up  a  portion  of 
the  neutral  ground  in  front  of  our  picket-lines,  near  the  Will- 
iamsburg  road.  Sharp  skirmishing  ensued  and  lasted  all  day, 
the  Federal  losses  being  reported  as  about  700,  and  our  own 
about  400.  The  affair  was  called  Orchard  or  Oak  Grove 
Skirmish. 

Before  issuing  order  of  battle  No.  75,  Lee  had  had  on  June  23 
Longstreet,  A.  P.  Hill,  D.  H.  Hill,  and  Jackson,  to  meet  in  con- 
ference at  his  headquarters  to  arrange  all  details.  Longstreet 
had  asked  Jackson  to  fix  the  date  on  which  the  attack  should  be 
made.  The  latter  named  June  25.  Longstreet  suggested  that 
he  allow  more  time,  and  the  26th  was  agreed  to. 

When  summoned  to  this  meeting  by  Lee  on  Saturday,  June  21, 
Jackson  was  near  Gordonsville.  He  started  on  a  freight  train 
bound  to  Richmond,  but  left  the  train  before  midnight  that  night 
at  a  station  where  he  spent  Sunday,  attending  church  twice.1 
At  midnight  he  set  out  on  horseback  for  the  conference  at 
Richmond  about  50  miles  away,  arriving  about  3  P.M. 

Had  he  kept  on  the  freight  train  to  Richmond,  he  would  have 
arrived  early  Sunday  morning.  His  brigades  on  the  march  also 
kept  Sunday  in  camp.  It  was  usually  the  general's  custom  to 
keep  account  of  Sundays  spent  in  fighting  or  marching,  and  to 
make  up  for  each  by  a  week-day  rest,  and  sermons,  at  the  earliest 
opportunity. 

On  the  march  from  Gordonsville  the  railroad  was  utilized  for 
the  infantry,  as  far  as  could  be  done,  by  picking  up  the  rear 
brigades  and  carrying  them  forward.  Artillery  and  cavalry 
marched'  all  the  way. 

On  Tuesday  morning,  June  24,  Jackson's  infantry  was  at 
Beaver  Dam  Station,  on  the  Virginia  Central  road,  about  18 
miles  from  Ashland,  where  they  were  expected  to  encamp  that 
night,  and  about  25  miles  from  the  Virginia  Central  R.R.  near 
the  Stark  Church,  whence  order  No.  75  required  Jackson  to 
march  at  3  A.M.,  Thursday,  June  26. 

We  now  enter  upon  the  story  of  performances.  The  orders 
governing  the  beginning  of  the  action  were  simple  and  explicit. 
Every  officer  must  have  realized  the  supreme  importance  of 

1  Henderson  says  it  was  Frederick  Hall,  other  reports  say  Louisa  C.  H. 


116  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

time,  even  without  the  hint  given  by  Lee  in  his  order  fixing  the 
hour  of  Jackson's  march  at  3  A.M. 

It  is,  therefore,  a  great  surprise  to  see  that  instead  of  crossing 
the  Virginia  Central  R.R.  at  3  A.M.  on  the  26th,  they  do  not 
begin  to  cross  it  until  10  A.M.  on  that  date.  That  is  practically 
a  whole  day  late,  because,  with  the  distance  still  to  be  traversed, 
it  will  be  too  late  to  commence  the  great  battle  intended,  in  time 
to  win  it  and  gather  the  fruits  of  victory. 

Had  Jackson  pushed  his  march  to  Ashland  on  the  night  of  the 
24th,  about  18  miles  from  Beaver  Dam,  as  Lee's  order  contem- 
plated, he  would  have  had  only  six  miles  to  march  on  the  25th, 
and  his  men  would  have  been  in  excellent  condition  to  set  out 
at  3  A.M.  on  the  26th,  with  less  than  10  miles  to  go  to  reach  the 
enemy.  The  result  of  crossing  the  Central  R.R.  at  10  A.M. 
was  to  fight  the  battle  a  day  late  and  at  Gaines  Mill,  three  miles 
nearer  McClellan 's  main  army,  thus  losing  the  opportunity  to 
cut  off  Porter's  corps  at  Beaver  Dam.  This  opportunity,  the 
cream  of  the  whole  campaign,  was  lost  by  Jackson's  not 
demanding  of  his  troops  better  marching  on  the  24th  and 
25th. 

His  biographers  have  found  many  excuses  for  him,  but,  how- 
ever good  or  bad  these  excuses  may  be,  they  will  not  be  dwelt 
upon  here  for  two  reasons :  — 

First.  The  object  of  the  narrative  is  neither  praise  nor 
blame,  but  only  that  military  students  may  realize,  more  fully 
than  they  could  without  such  an  example,  the  infinite  value  of 
hours  when  a  battle  is  on  foot,  and  how  easily  hours  may  be 
lost. 

Second.  The  excuses  of  the  biographers  will  best  be  given 
after  finishing  the  whole  story;  for,  unfortunately,  this  loss 
of  the  first  day  is  not  the  only,  nor  is  it  the  worst,  failure  of 
Jackson  during  these  Seven  Days,  to  come  to  time  as  was  ex- 
pected of  him.  He  nowhere,  even  distantly,  approached  his 
record  as  a  soldier  won  in  his  every  other  battle,  either  before  or 
afterward.  As  one  reads  of  his  weak  and  dilatory  performance 
day  after  day,  and  recalls  what  he  had  always  been  before,  and 
always  was  afterward,  one  feels  that  during  these  Seven  Days  he 
was  really  not  Jackson.  He  was  a  different  individual.  He  was 


SEVEN  DAYS'  CAMPAIGN.    THE  ATTACK  117 

under  a  spell !  Nothing  that  he  had  to  do  was  done  with  the 
vigor  which  marked  all  the  rest  of  his  career. 

Crossing  the  Central  R.R.  at  10  A.M.  on  the  26th,  he  marched 
but  eight  miles  farther  that  day,  going  into  bivouac  about  five 
o'clock,  at  Hundley's  Corner.  He  was  here  in  easy  reach  of 
Porter's  rear  and  in  full  hearing  of  the  heavy  cannonading  and 
musketry  going  on  at  Mechanicsville,  which  will  be  told  of 
presently. 

He  describes  the  march,  as  follows,  in  his  official  report :  — 

"Pursuing  the  Ashcake  road  we  crossed  the  Central  R.R.  about 
10  A.M.  Approaching  the  Totopotomoy  Creek,  the  Federal  picket  crossed 
to  the  south  side  of  the  stream,  and  partially  destroyed  the  bridge,  and, 
by  felling  trees  across  the  road  farther  on,  attempted  to  delay  our  advance. 
After  the  Texas  skirmishers  had  gallantly  crossed  over,  Reilly  shelled  the 
woods  for  the  purpose  of  driving  the  enemy  from  it,  in  order  that  we  might 
safely  effect  a  lodgment  beyond  the  creek.  Whiting  rapidly  repaired 
the  bridge  and  the  march  was  resumed.  That  night  the  three  divisions 
bivouacked  near  Hundley's  Corner.  .  .  .  We  distinctly  heard  the  rapid 
and  continued  discharges  of  cannon  which  announced  the  engagement 
of  Gen.  A.  P.  Hill  with  the  extreme  right  of  the  enemy." 

Gen.  Stuart,  in  his  official  report,  says :  — 

"At  Dr.  Shelton's  we  awaited  the  arrival  of  Gen.  Jackson,  sending 
a  squadron  in  advance  to  seize  and  hold  the  bridge  at  the  Totopotomoy. 
The  enemy,  anticipating  us,  had  torn  up  the  bridge,  and  held  the  opposite 
bank,  and  obstructed  the  road,  without,  however,  making  any  determined 
stand.  Capt.  W.  W.  Blackford,  Corps  of  Engineers,  assigned  to  duty 
with  my  command,  set  about  repairing  the  bridge,  and  in  a  half-hour,  with 
the  details  furnished  him,  the  bridge  was  ready.  Passing  Pole  Green 
Church,  Gen.  Jackson's  march  led  directly  toward  the  crossing  of  Beaver 
Dam  Creek  opposite  Richardson's.  Reaching  that  point  he  bivouacked 
for  the  night." 

Gen.  Trimble,  in  his  official  report,  writes :  — 

"On  the  26th  we  moved,  with  the  army,  from  Ashland  in  a  southerly 
direction,  passing  to  the  east  of  Mechanicsville  in  the  afternoon,  and  at 
4  P.M.  distinctly  heard  the  volleys  of  artillery  and  musketry  in  the  engage- 
ment of  Gen.  Hill  with  the  enemy.  Before  sundown  the  firing  was  not 
more  than  two  miles  distant,  and,  in  my  opinion,  we  should  have  marched 
to  the  support  of  Gen.  Hill  that  evening." 

Now  we  will  go  back  to  the  Chickahominy,  where  Branch's 
brigade,  some  eight  miles  above  the  rest  of  A.  P.  Hill's  division 


118  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

at  Meadow  Bridge,  is  under  arms  and  expecting  to  receive  the 
signal  to  advance  not  later  than  4  A.M.  It  does  not  come  until 
after  10  o'clock.  As  soon  as  it  was  received,  Branch  crossed 
the  Chickahominy  and  moved  toward  Mechanicsville,  the  ene- 
my's  pickets  falling  back  before  him. 

At  one  point  the  road  pursued  by  Branch  approached,  within 
a  short  distance,  a  road  upon  its  left,  which  was  being  followed 
by  Swell's  column,  and  the  two  generals  had  a  brief  meeting, 
but  there  was  no  other  communication  between  the  columns 
until  the  next  day.  Meanwhile,  since  an  early  hour  in  the 
morning,  the  divisions  of  A.  P.  Hill  at  Meadow  Bridge,  and  of 
D.  H.  Hill  and  Longstreet  at  the  Mechanicsville  bridge,  two 
miles  below,  had  been  under  arms  and  anxiously  awaiting  the 
sound  of  Jackson's  guns. 

President  Davis  was  on  the  ground,  having  ridden  out  from 
Richmond,  not  only  to  see,  but  anxious  to  participate  in,  the 
coming  battle.  A  few  siege-guns  had  been  mounted  on  the  low 
bluffs  along  the  Chickahominy  Valley,  and  they  were  now  manned 
for  use,  in  case  our  crossing  at  the  Mechanicsville  bridge  was 
resisted.  But  hour  after  hour  passed,  and  there  came  no  sound 
of  conflict  from  the  direction  of  Jackson's  advance. 

At  3  P.M.  A.  P.  Hill,  of  his  own  motion,  decided  to  wait  for 
Jackson  no  longer.  It  is  strange  that  he  should  have  taken  this 
responsibility  without  orders  from  Lee,  who  was  within  two  miles, 
and  who,  it  seems,  would  not  have  approved  it.  Henderson 
states  that,  "A  message  from  Lee,  ordering  Hill  to  postpone  all 
further  movement,  arrived  too  late."  l  Doubtless  Lee  wished, 
now,  to  make  a  fresh  start  on  the  morrow,  as  Johnston  had 
wished  at  Seven  Pines. 

The  enemy  made  slight  resistance  to  Hill's  advance,  and  fell 
back  through  Mechanicsville  to  his  works  behind  Beaver  Dam 
Creek,  opening  the  road  to  Longstreet 's  and  D.  H.  Hill's  divi- 
sions. A.  P.  Hill's  division  moved  so  rapidly  that  it  arrived 
at  Mechanicsville  a  mile  and  a  half  ahead  of  Branch's  brigade. 
No  advantage  was  gained,  however,  by  thus  anticipating  the 
coming  up  of  Jackson.  The  enemy  held,  behind  Beaver  Dam 
Creek,  an  intrenched  position  quite  impregnable  to  assault. 

1  Hend.  II.,  16. 


SEVEN  DAYS'  CAMPAIGN.    THE  ATTACK  119 

It  had  not  been  intended  to  attack  it  with  infantry,  but  to 
threaten  it  with  artillery,  while  Jackson  passed  to  the  rear  and 
cut  off  the  enemy's  retreat. 

Already  Jackson,  in  spite  of  his  slow  march  and  the  time 
wasted  at  Totopotomoy  Creek,  was  within  three  miles  of  the 
enemy's  line  of  retreat  and  with  no  force  opposing  him  but  a  few 
cavalry.  But  here  he  stopped  his  march,  which  had  only  been 
about  13  miles  that  day,  and  went  into  bivouac,  regardless  of 
the  roar,  not  only  of  artillery,  but,  presently,  of  musketry  also, 
appealing  to  him  from  Mechanicsville.  For  with  haste  and  poor 
judgment  Davis,  Lee,  Longstreet,  and  the  two  Hills,  not  content 
to  merely  cannonade  the  enemy  in  his  position,  were  beginning 
to  wreck  whole  brigades  of  infantry,  as  must  now  be  told. 

The  position  was  one  hi  which  good  troops  could  repulse 
treble  their  numbers  if  assailed  in  front,  but  it  was  easily  turned. 
Jackson,  three  miles  off  to  the  northeast,  was  already  in  easy 
reach  of  Porter 's  line  of  retreat,  and  had  but  to  push  his  advance 
a  mile  or  two,  and  Porter  would  have  been  compelled  to  retreat 
precipitately  or  be  caught  in  a  trap. 

On  the  26th  of  June,  in  the  latitude  of  Richmond,  the  sun 
rises  at  4.38  A.M.  and  sets  at  7.27  P.M.  and  twilight  lasts  until 
about  8.30  P.M.  There  was  no  moon.  As  already  told,  Gen. 
Jackson  arrived  at  Hundley's  Corner  at  4.30  P.M.  and  went  into 
bivouac  there  for  the  night,  after  having  marched  from  Ash- 
land about  11  miles  off  in  an  air  line,  and  perhaps  12  to  14  by  the 
roads  traversed. 

At  Mechanicsville  the  firing  commenced  at  three  o  'clock,  and 
rapidly  grew  heavy.  It  was  at  first  a  long-range  duel  with  the 
Confederate  siege-guns  on  the  Chickahominy,  and  then  with  the 
field-batteries  accompanying  Confederate  brigades  as  they 
came  up.  A.  P.  Hill's  five  brigades  of  infantry  were  also  put 
into  action  as  soon  as  they  could  be  formed,  and  advanced  within 
range  of  the  enemy's  intrenched  lines,  when  they  opened  fire 
both  of  artillery  and  infantry.  Thus  the  battle  was  maintained 
until  dark.  Meanwhile,  as  the  hours  of  daylight  were  closing, 
under  urgent  messages  from  Lee  and  President  Davis,  two 
regiments  of  Ripley's  brigade  of  D.  H.  Hill's  division  were 
launched  in  a  direct  charge  on  perhaps  the  very  strongest  point 


120 


MILITARY  MEMOIRS 


w 


SEVEN  DAYS'  CAMPAIGN.    THE  ATTACK  121 

of  the  whole  Federal  position.  A  more  hopeless  charge  was 
never  entered  upon.  They  were  the  1st  N.C.  and  the 
44th  Ga.,  raw  regiments,  which  had  never  before  been  under 
fire.  Their  behavior  illustrated  the  morale  inspiring  the  army. 
Had  they  been  given  anything  to  do  which  it  was  possible  to  do, 
they  would  have  done  it,  and  become  seasoned  veterans  in  their 
first  battle. 

They  dashed  across  a  wide  plain  through  a  storm  of  musketry, 
shells,  and  canister,  and  some  even  went  across  Beaver  J)am 
and  into  the  entangled  slashing  close  under  the  Federal  lines. 
There  they  were  killed  until  their  bodies  laid,  as  a  Federal 
account  described  it,  "as  thick  as  flies  in  a  bowl  of  sugar," 
before  the  survivors  realized  the  trap  into  which  they  had  been 
sent,  and  got  back  as  best  they  could. 

The  1st  N.C.  suffered  142  casualties,  including  all  three 
field-officers  and  the  adjutant.  The  44th  Ga.  lost  335,  includ- 
ing its  Col.  and  Lt.-Col.,  —  a  regimental  loss  seldom  equalled 
in  so  short  a  time.  The  total  casualties  of  this  battle  were 
about  1350  and  included  14  field-officers.  The  Federals  re- 
ported their  loss  as  361. 

Porter,  in  his  report,  says  that  only  during  the  night,  by  reports 
from  scouts  and  outposts,  did  the  Federals  become  aware  of 
the  close  proximity  of  Jackson's  force,  and  it  was  recognized  at 
once  that  McClellan  's  army  was  in  a  very  critical  condition.  He 
writes :  — 

"  But  for  the  conception  of  the  idea  of  a  flank  movement,  changing  our 
base  by  the  left  flank  to  the  James  River,  our  position  would  have  left 
but  one  alternative  —  a  hasty  abandonment  of  our  attack  on  Richmond, 
and  a  retirement  by  the  way  we  had  advanced." 

This  conception,  as  before  told,  had  been  developed  two 
weeks  before  by  Stuart's  raid,  and  it  had  not  only  been  de- 
veloped, but,  what  was  much  more  important,  already  transports 
had  been  loaded  and  many  important  preparations  for  carrying 
it  into  execution  had  been  made  in  advance.  The  matter  was 
decided  in  McClellan 's  mind  during  that  night,  though  no 
orders  were  issued.  Porter 's  corps  was  ordered  to  withdraw  to  a 
strong  position  upon  the  north  bank  of  the  Chickahominy  in 
close  connection  with  the  rest  of  his  army. 


122  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

This  position,  about  three  miles  in  rear  of  Beaver  Dam,  had 
already  been  noted  and  selected  by  the  Chief  Engineer,  Gen. 
Barnard. 

Porter,  however,  remained  in  his  intrenched  position  until 
daylight,  and  then  began  to  withdraw  down  the  Chickahominy 
in  good  order,  carrying  with  him  guns  of  position  which  had  been 
posted  along  the  Chickahominy.  The  Confederate  batteries 
reopened  their  fire  at  dawn,  and  the  Federal  rear-guard  replied 
heavily  for  over  two  hours.  Had  Jackson's  corps  made  an 
early  start,  and  been  pushed  as  Jackson  was  wont  to  push,  both 
before  and  after  this  Seven  Days'  spell,  he  would  have  struck 
Porter's  corps  on  the  flank  as  it  marched  toward  Cold  Harbor. 
But  the  advance  was  so  late  and  slow  that  when  at  last,  about  eight 
o  'clock,  it  appeared  in  rear  of  Porter 's  position,  having  marched 
about  three  miles,  the  last  Federal  soldier  had  withdrawn,  and 
Jackson 's  artillery  fired  by  mistake  into  the  head  of  Hill 's  advanc- 
ing column.  The  trap  was  sprung,  but  the  bird  had  flown. 

Gen.  Gregg  gives  the  following  account:  — 

"Early  in  the  morning  of  the  27th  I  received  orders  from  Gen.  A.  P. 
Hill  to  take  the  advance  with  the  2d  brigade  and  to  drive  the  enemy 
from  their  position  on  Beaver  Dam  Creek  at  Ellison's  Mill.  The  brigade 
advanced  to  the  attack.  Slight  resistance  was  made  here  by  the  enemy, 
and  the  passage  of  the  stream,  which  presented  a  strong  natural  obstacle, 
was  gained.  Many  Confederate  soldiers,  wounded  or  killed  in  a  preceding 
unsuccessful  assault,  lay  in  the  road  toward  the  crossing  of  the  creek,  and 
had  to  be  moved  aside  to  allow  the  passage  of  our  artillery.  A  small 
bridge,  broken  up  by  the  enemy,  had  also  to  be  repaired.  This  was  toward 
eight  o'clock  in  the  morning.  Crossing  Beaver  Dam  Creek,  the  brigade  ad- 
vanced along  the  road  among  piles  of  knapsacks  and  other  property,  and 
burning  stores  abandoned  by  the  enemy,  with  skirmishers  —  out  to  the 
front  and  left.  Coming  into  the  edge  of  an  open  field,  Capt.  Cordero's 
company,  1st  S.C.,  deployed  as  skirmishers,  were  fired  on  by  ar- 
tillery in  front,  and  Lt.  Heise  and  a  soldier  were  wounded.  Capt. 
W.  T.  Haskell's  company  of  the  same  regiment,  advancing  in  open  order, 
discovered  that  the  forces  meeting  us  in  front  from  the  left  were  those  of 
Maj.-Gen.  Jackson,  and  entered  into  communication  with  them  so  as  to 
to  avoid  the  risk  of  future  mischiefs." 

At  last  then,  the  morning  half  gone,  the  four  Confederate 
divisions  were  united  and  within  three  miles  of  the  enemy. 
Porter  had  gone  into  the  position  selected  behind  Boatswains' 


SEVEN   DAYS'  CAMPAIGN.    THE  ATTACK  123 

Creek,  with  three  divisions  of  infantry,  six  regiments  of  cavalry, 
and  20  batteries,  —  in  all  about  27,000  men  and  80  guns.  The 
position  was  naturally  strong,  and  it  was  being  strengthened 
hourly  with  abattis  and  rifle-pits. 

Its  development  covered  only  about  two  miles  of  convex 
front.  Its  left  flank  rested  on  the  open  Chickahominy  bottom, 
where  heavy  batteries  from  the  south  side  secured  it  from  being 
turned.  Its  right  flank  was  its  weak  point,  its  protection  there 
being  only  tangled  thickets  which  also  covered  much  of  the  front. 
Where  this  was  lacking  were  generally  three  lines  of  infantry, 
partially  under  cover,  and  abundant  artillery  so  placed  that  its 
fire  was  over  the  heads  of  the  infantry.  His  force  was  enough 
to  cover  his  front  six  deep.  Two  bridges  gave  connection  to  the 
south  side,  and  over  them,  during  the  action,  McClellan  sent 
Slocum's  division  (9000)  of  Franklin's  corps  with  two  batteries, 
and  French 's  and  Meagher  's  brigades  of  Sumner  's  corps,  as  re- 
enforcements,  —  say  about  14,000  men.  Porter  himself  was, 
perhaps,  the  hardest  opponent  to  fight  in  the  Federal  army. 
No  one  in  it  knew  better  how  to  occupy  and  prepare  his  ground  for 
defence,  or  was  more  diligent  to  do  it ;  and  in  his  corps  were  con- 
centrated all  of  the  regular  regiments  of  the  old  Federal  army. 

To  attack  such  a  position  was  no  easy  proposition,  and  Lee's 
force,  checked  and  1300  weakened  by  the  ill-advised  affair  at 
Mechanicsville,  had  no  margin  to  spare  over  the  size  of  its  task. 
Indeed,  had  McClellan  reenforced  Porter  as  he  should  have  done, 
with  a  whole  corps,  he  might  have  won  a  great  victory.  But 
he  allowed  himself  to  be  imposed  upon  by  the  demonstrations 
made  by  Magruder  and  Huger,  under  orders  from  Lee,  and 
neither  attacked  with  his  left,  nor  strengthened  his  right  suffi- 
ciently. He  weakly  left  the  question  of  sending  reinforcements  to 
his  four  corps  commanders.  Franklin  sent  Slocum's  division, 
and  Sumner  sent  French's  and  Meagher 's  brigades,  but  Keyes 
and  Heintzelman  reported  that  they  could  spare  nothing. 

As  it  was,  therefore,  the  fight  should  result  in  Lee's  favor  by  a 
reasonable  margin,  provided  it  was  well  managed  and  its  force 
not  squandered  in  partial  attacks.  But  this  took  place  to  an 
extent  perilously  near  losing  the  battle.  It  did  lose  the  precious 
hours  of  daylight  necessary  to  gather  any  fruits  of  victory,  and 


124  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

made  the  victory  much  more  bloody  than  it  need  have  been. 
The  importance  of  time  should  have  been  appreciated  and  the 
march  pushed  to  locate  the  enemy's  new  position  and  develop 
it  with  strong  skirmish-lines.  Then,  at  the  most  favorable 
points,  our  utmost  strength  should  have  been  marshalled  and 
concentrated  for  simultaneous  assaults  of  infantry,  supported 
upon  each  flank  by  concentrations  of  batteries.  It  was  but 
waste  of  time  and  blood  to  launch  any  small  assault  against  that 
position,  as  had  been  done  at  Beaver  Dam. 

The  fact  that  we  finally  carried  the  position  by  a  general 
charge,  after  the  repulse  of  many  partial  ones,  shows  that  our 
men  were  good  enough  and  that  we  had  enough  of  them  to  have 
made  a  success  early  in  the  afternoon,  had  our  energies  been 
first  concentrated  for  the  effort. 

During  the  morning  of  the  27th,  the  Confederates  moved  with 
a  slowness  only  to  be  understood  by  remembering  the  inex- 
perience, in  handling  such  large  bodies,  of  many  of  our  generals 
and  staff-officers.  By  noon,  however,  we  had  developed  the 
enemy 's  position.  On  our  left  Jackson  was  at  Cold  Harbor  with 
four  divisions, — his  own,  Ewell  's,  Whiting 's,  D.  H.  Hill 's,  —  and 
Lawton's  large  brigade  in  addition.  He  confronted  the  Federal 
right.  A.  P.  Hill,  with  Longstreet  in  reserve,  confronted  their 
left. 

Porter,  in  the  Century,  writes:  — 

"The  advance  column  of  these  troops  [Jackson's]  came  a  little  earlier 
than  those  under  Longstreet  and  A.  P.  Hill,  but  were  more  cautious,  and, 
for  some  hours,  not  so  aggressive." 

What  happened  was  this:  D.  H.  Hill's  division,  crossing  the 
Chickahominy  behind  A.  P.  Hill,  had  been  pushed  out  to  the 
left  by  Lee 's  battle  order  and  brought  up  behind  and  in  support 
of  Jackson's  forces  early  on  the  27th.  But  in  the  slow  marching 
of  the  morning,  D.  H.  Hill,  with  characteristic  aggressiveness,  had 
managed  to  pass  Jackson's  force  and  to  take  the  lead.  On 
approaching  Cold  Harbor  and  discovering  the  enemy's  position, 
Hill  at  once  moved  his  division  up  to  the  edge  of  the  swamp  held 
by  the  enemy  upon  the  other  side,  and  opened  upon  them  with  a 
battery.  His  battery  was  quickly  answered  by  10  guns,  and 


SEVEN  DAYS'  CAMPAIGN.    THE  ATTACK  125 

after  a  brief  action  was  withdrawn,  crippled.  Just  at  that 
juncture  came  orders  from  Jackson  withdrawing  Hill  into  some 
woods  in  rear,  where  the  head  of  Jackson's  long  column  was 
already  standing  halted.  In  his  official  report,  Jackson  thus 
explains  his  object  in  this  manoeuvre:  — 

"  Soon  after,  Gen.  A.  P.  Hill  became  engaged,  and,  being  unacquainted 
with  the  ground,  and  apprehensive,  from  what  appeared  to  me  to  be  the 
respective  positions  of  the  Confederate  and  Federal  forces  engaged,  that, 
if  I  then  pressed  forward,  our  troops  would  be  mistaken  for  the  enemy  and 
be  fired  into,  and  hoping  that  Gen.  A.  P.  Hill  and  Longstreet  would  drive 
the  Federals  toward  me,  I  directed  Gen.  D.  H.  Hill  to  move  his  division 
to  the  left  of  the  road,  so  as  to  leave  between  him  and  the  wood  on  the 
right  of  the  road  [from  which  he  is  withdrawing  D.  H.  Hill],  an  open 
space  across  which  I  hoped  the  enemy  would  be  driven.  Thus  arranged, 
it  was  in  our  power  to  distinguish  friend  from  foe  in  case  the  enemy  should 
be  driven  as  expected." 

It  is  not  necessary  to  comment  upon  this  too  elaborate  ex- 
planation of  how  more  than  a  half  of  Lee's  army  was  paralyzed 
for  three  hours,  just  on  the  verge  of  battle,  further  than  to  say 
that  the  inaction,  and  the  excuse  for  it,  are  both  unlike  anything 
ever  seen  in  Jackson  before  or  after  these  Seven  Days.  D.  H. 
Hill  was  withdrawn  about  2  P.M.  It  was  about  2.30  P.M.  when 
A.  P.  Hill's  advance,  pressed  as  rapidly  as  he  was  able  to  bring 
up  his  six  brigades,  developed  into  a  battle. 

Porter,  in  Battles  and  Leaders,  further  describes  the  fight  made 
by  this  single  division  (about  12,000  men)  which  had  had,  only 
the  evening  before,  sharp  losses  at  Ellison's  Mill. 

"  Soon  after  2  P.M.,  A.  P.  Hill's  force,  between  us  and  New  Cold  Harbor, 
again  began  to  show  an  aggressive  disposition,  independent  of  its  own 
troops  on  its  flanks,  by  advancing  from  under  cover  of  the  woods,  in  lines 
well  formed  and  extending,  as  the  contest  progressed  from  in  front  of 
Martin's  battery  to  Morell's  left. 

"Dashing  across  the  intervening  plains,  floundering  in  the  swamps, 
and  struggling  against  the  tangled  brushwood,  brigade  after  brigade 
seemed  to  almost  melt  away  before  the  concentrated  fire  of  our  artillery 
and  infantry ;  yet  others  pressed  on,  followed  by  supports  as  dashing  and 
as  brave  as  their  predecessors,  despite  their  heavy  losses  and  the  dis- 
heartening effect  of  having  to  clamber  over  many  of  their  disabled  and 
dead,  and  to  meet  their  surviving  comrades  rushing  back  in  great  dis- 
order from  the  deadly  contest.  For  nearly  two  hours  the  battle  raged, 
extending  more  or  less  along  the  whole  line  to  our  extreme  right. 


126 


MILITARY  MEMOIRS 


"The  fierce  firing  of  artillery  and  infantry,  the  crash  of  the  shot,  the 
bursting  of  shells,  and  the  whizzing  of  bullets  heard  above  the  roar  of 
artillery  and  the  volleys  of  musketry,  all  combined,  was  something  fearful. 

"Regiments  quickly  replenished  their  exhausted  ammunition  by  bor- 


V 


rowing  from  more  bountifully  supplied  and  generous  companions;  some 
withdrew  temporarily  for  ammunition,  and  fresh  regiments  took  their 
places,  ready  to  repulse,  sometimes  to  pursue,  their  desperate  enemy, 
for  the  purpose  of  retaking  ground  from  which  we  had  been  pressed,  and 
which  it  was  necessary  to  occupy  in  order  to  hold  our  position." 


SEVEN  DAYS'  CAMPAIGN.    THE  ATTACK  127 

It  is  to  make  one  almost  sick  of  regret  to  read  of  such  desperate 
valor  so  lavishly  wasted  upon  an  impossible  effort,  while  three 
times  as  many  men  stood  by  and  looked  on.  A.  P.  Hill's  account 
of  it  in  his  official  report  is  as  follows :  — 

"The  incessant  roar  of  musketry  and  deep  thunder  of  artillery  told 
that  the  whole  force  of  the  enemy  was  in  my  front.  Branch  becoming 
hard  pressed,  Fender  was  sent  in  to  his  relief.  Field  and  Archer  were 
also  directed  to  do  their  part  in  this  murderous  contest.  Braxton's 
battery,  accompanying  Archer,  had  already  opened.  They  were  ordered 
to  turn  the  enemy's  left.  These  two  brigades  under  their  heroic  leaders, 
moving  across  the  open  field,  met  the  enemy  behind  an  abattis  and  strong 
intrenchments  at  the  base  of  a  long  wooded  hill,  the  enemy  being  in  three 
lines  on  the  side  of  this  declivity,  its  crest  falling  off  into  a  plateau,  and  this 
plateau  studded  with  guns. 

"My  front  now  presented  a  curved  line,  its  convexity  toward  the  enemy. 
Desperate  but  unavailing  attempts  were  made  to  force  the  enemy's 
positions.  The  14th  S.C.,  Col.  McGowan  (having  hurried  up  from  picket 
duty  on  the  other  side  of  the  Chickahominy,  and  arriving  in  the  thickest 
of  the  fight),  on  the  extreme  left,  made  several  daring  charges.  The  16th 
N.C.,  Col.  McElroy,  and  22d,  Lt.-Col.  Gray,  at  one  time  carried  the  crest 
of  the  hill,  and  were  in  the  enemy's  camp,  but  were  driven  back  by  over- 
whelming numbers.  The  35th  Ga.,  Col.  Thomas,  also  drove  through  the 
enemy's  line  like  a  wedge,  but  it  was  all  of  no  avail.  Gregg  and 
Branch  fought  with  varying  success,  Gregg  having  before  him  the 
vaunted  Zouaves  and  Sykes's  regulars.  Fender's  brigade  was  suffering 
heavily,  but  stubbornly  held  its  own.  Field  and  Archer  met  a  wither- 
ing storm  of  bullets,  but  pressed  on  to  within  a  short  distance  of  the 
enemy's  works,  but  the  storm  was  too  fierce  for  such  a  handful  of 
men.  They  recoiled  and  were  again  pressed  to  the  charge,  but  with 
no  better  success.  These  brave  men  had  done  all  that  any  soldiers 
could  do.  Directing  their  men  to  lie  down,  the  fight  was  continued 
and  help  awaited.  From  having  been  the  attacking,  I  now  became 
the  attacked,  but  stubbornly,  gallantly,  was  the  ground  held.  My 
division  was  thus  engaged  fully  two  hours  before  assistance  was 
received.  We  failed  to  carry  the  enemy's  lines,  but  we  paved  the 
way  for  the  successful  attacks  afterward,  in  which  attacks  it  was 
necessary  to  employ  the  whole  of  our  army  on  that  side  of  the  Chicka- 
hominy. 

"About  four  o'clock  reinforcements  came  up  on  my  right  from  Gen. 
Longstreet,  and  later,  Jackson's  men  on  my  right  and  centre,  and  my 
division  was  relieved  of  the  weight  of  the  contest.  It  was  then  con- 
tinued on  more  equal  terms,  and  finally  the  extreme  left  of  the  enemy's 
line  was  most  gallantly  carried  by  Hood's  brigade. 

"At  seven  o'clock  the  General-in-chief,  in  person,  gave  me  an  order  to 


128  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

advance  my  whole  line  and  to  communicate  this  order  as  far  as  I  could 
to  all  commanders  of  troops.  This  was  done,  and  .a  general  advance 
being  made,  the  enemy  were  swept  from  the  field  and  the  pursuit  only 
stopped  by  nightfall,  and  the  exhaustion  of  our  troops.  The  batteries 
of  Crenshaw,  Johnson,  Braxton,  and  Pegram  were  actively  engaged, 
Crenshaw  and  Johnson  pretty  well  knocked  to  pieces.  Pegram,  with 
indomitable  energy  and  earnestness  of  purpose,  though  having  lost  47 
men  and  many  horses  at  Mechanicsville,  had  put  his  battery  in  condition 
for  this  fight  also." 

Lee's  official  report  of  this  battle  was  not  written  until  eight 
months  afterward,  during  which  period  Jackson's  great  military 
genius  had  manifested  itself  undimmed  by  any  spell;  and  with 
increasing  brilliancy  on  the  fields  of  Cedar  Mountain,  Second 
Manassas,  Harper's  Ferry,  Sharpsburg,  and  Fredericksburg. 
There  was,  most  wisely  and  properly,  every  disposition  to  ignore 
and  forget  the  disappointments  felt  during  the  Seven  Days,  and 
the  facts  are  glossed  over  with  but  brief  and,  as  it  were,  casual 
mention,  but  they  are  plainly  apparent. 

Lee  by  no  means  designed  that  A.  P.  Hill  should  alone  engage 
the  whole  of  Porter's  force.  He  had  had  a  personal  interview 
with  Jackson  during  the  morning,  and  he  knew  that  the  head 
of  his  column  was  at  Cold  Harbor  before  2  P.M.  He  expected  it 
to  immediately  envelop  and  to  turn  Porter's  right.  He  says 
that  Hill  — 

"Immediately  formed  his  line  nearly  parallel  to  the  road  toward 
McGehee's  house,  and  soon  became  hotly  engaged.  The  arrival  of  Jack- 
son on  our  left  was  momentarily  expected,  and  it  was  supposed  that  his 
approach  would  cause  the  extension  of  the  enemy's  line  in  that  direction. 
Under  this  impression  Longstreet  was  held  back  until  this  movement 
should  commence." 

Hill  went  into  action  anticipating  that  Jackson's  whole  force 
would  almost  immediately  be  demonstrating  or  attacking  upon 
the  enemy's  right  flank.  Why  were  they  not?  The  head  of 
the  -column  was  up,  but  it  was  hidden  from  the  enemy's  view 
in  the  woods,  and  its  whole  length,  stretching  for  miles  back, 
was  simply  standing  idle  in  the  road.  Had  the  divisions  even 
been  closed  up  and  disentangled  from  ordnance  wagons,  artillery, 
and  ambulances,  and  massed  near  Cold  Harbor,  the  time  would 
not  have  been  entirely  wasted,  but  this  was  not  done.  Stern 


SEVEN  DAYS'  CAMPAIGN.    THE  ATTACK  129 

necessity,  at  length,  forced  Lee  to  call  upon  Longstreet's  division 
to  aid  A.  P.  Hill.  Three  brigades  were  advanced  within  musket 
range  as  supports,  but  held  back  from  the  charge  while  the  re- 
maining three  were  held  near  at  hand  and  ready  for  action.  At 
length,  —  probably  about  4.30,  —  aroused  to  action  both  by  the 
receding  sounds  of  A.  P.  Hill's  battle,  and  by  urgent  messages 
from  Lee,  Jackson  sent  D.  H.  Hill's  division  back  into  the  wood 
from  which  he  had  withdrawn  it  before  two  o'clock.  He  also 
sent  a  staff-officer  to  his  other  divisions  with  instructions,  quoted 
by  Henderson,  as  follows :  — 

"The  troops  are  standing  at  ease  along  our  line  of  march.  Ride  back 
rapidly  along  the  line,  and  tell  the  commanders  to  advance  instantly  in 
echelon  from  the  left.  Each  brigade  is  to  follow  as  a  guide,  the  right  regi- 
ment of  the  brigade  on  the  left,  and  to  keep  within  supporting  distance. 
Tell  the  commanders  if  this  formation  fails  at  any  point,  to  form  line  of 
battle  and  move  to  the  front,  pressing  to  the  sound  of  the  heaviest  firing, 
and  attack  the  enemy  vigorously  wherever  found.  As  to  artillery,  each 
commander  must  use  his  discretion.  If  the  ground  will  at  all  permit,  tell 
them  to  take  in  their  field-batteries  and  use  them.  If  not,  post  them  in 
the  rear." 

That  the  troops  were  still  standing  halted  along  the*  line  of 
march  appears  in  the  official  reports,  as  well  as  in  the  time  con- 
sumed before  they  were  able  to  make  their  power  felt  in  the 
battle.  This  required  from  one  to  two  hours. 

Winder,  commanding  Jackson's  division,  reports :  — 

"  Left  bivouac  near  Totopotomoy  Creek  at  about  5  A.M.,  being  in  the 
rear  of  the  column,  except  one  brigade.  The  march  was  slow  and  tedi- 
ous [about  seven  miles  during  the  whole  day].  Firing  was  heard  on 
the  right.  Between  4  and  5  P.M.  I  received  orders  from  Gen.  Ewell 
to  move  up  rapidly.  I  ordered  the  ordnance  wagons  and  artillery  to  halt, 
and  moved  the  brigade  from  the  column  filing  to  the  right  through  a  wood 
and  swamp,  to  the  point  where  I  heard  the  heaviest  fire." 

Lawton's  official  report  says :  — 

"  In  the  order  of  march  toward  the  battle-field  on  that  day  my  brigade 
brought  up  the  rear  of  Gen.  Jackson's  army,  and  was,  therefore,  the 
last  to  engage  the  enemy.  I  had  remained  at  a  halt  for  several  hours, 
more  than  two  miles  from  the  point  where  the  brigade  afterward  entered 
the  field,  and  was  not  ordered  forward  until  nearly  5  P.M.  I  then  marched 
rapidly  on,  retarded  much  by  the  artillery  and  ambulances  which  blocked 
up  the  narrow  road." 


130  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

While  Jackson's  troops  were  being  brought  up,  the  noise  of 
battle  waned,  until  an  ominous  silence  seemed  to  possess  the 
field  as  the  sun  drew  near  the  horizon.  Then  the  storm  arose 
again  and  soon  swelled  to  a  magnitude  never  before  heard  on  this 
continent. 

It  was  about  seven  o'clock  when  at  last  D.  H.  Hill,  Ewell, 
Lawton,  and  a  part  of  Winder  were  all  hotly  engaged  in  the 
swampy  tangle  in  front  of  the  Federal  right,  and,  though  in 
great  confusion,  were  making  headway  through  it,  and  several 
Confederate  batteries  were  returning  the  Federal  fire.  Opposite 
their  left,  Whiting's  two  brigades  had  just  arrived,  being  directed 
by  Lee  as  they  approached  from  Cold  Harbor,  and  two  of  Winder's 
brigades  were  also  close  at  hand.  A.  P.  Hill's  brigades,  though 
much  diminished,  were  still  holding  their  lines,  and  Longstreet 
was  all  in  position.  It  was,  practically,  anybody's  fight.  A 
fresh  division  to  Porter  would  have  easily  held  his  lines  until 
night.  It  might  even  have  enabled  him  to  make  an  effective 
counterstroke,  though  the  natural  obstacles  behind  which  his 
lines  were  located,  offered  but  one  or  two  possible  opportunities. 
Two  fresh  brigades,  French's  and  Meagher's,  were  en  route  to 
him,  but  were  yet  too  far  off  to  lend  any  aid. 

But  Lee,  at  last,  was  putting  forth  his  whole  strength.  He 
issued  orders  for  an  advance  of  every  command,  regardless  of 
the  troops  upon  its  right  or  left.  A  general  advance  was  made, 
not  simultaneous  in  its  beginnings,  but  pressed  to  success  by 
Whiting's  two  brigades  supported  by  Longstreet  on  our  extreme 
right,  by  Lawton's  and  Winder's  brigades  in  the  centre,  and  by 
D.  H.  Hill  with  Garland's  and  parts  of  Ripley's  and  Rodes's 
brigades  upon  our  left. 

Had  it  been  made  two  hours  earlier,  the  fruits  of  the  victory 
would  have  been  important.  As  it  was,  they  were  so  trifling 
as  scarcely  to  be  worth  mention.  Porter  fell  back  in  fairly  good 
order  under  cover  of  his  superior  artillery,  and  our  artillery  could 
not  be  gotten  forward  across  the  swamps.  Blessed  night,  for 
which  the  defeated  pray,  had  let  down  her  mantle  while  the 
firing  was  still  severe,  and  before  we  could  even  feel  fully  assured 
of  our  victory.  Under  its  friendly  cover,  and  the  protection  of 
the  French  and  Meagher  brigades,  by  4  A.M.  the  whole  Federal 


SEVEN  DAYS'  CAMPAIGN.    THE  ATTACK  131 

army  had  crossed  the  Chickahominy,  damaging  the  bridges  be- 
hind them,  and  leaving  us,  as  the  fruits  of  victory,  but  22  guns, 
2836  prisoners,  and  about  10,000  small-arms. 

The  Federal  casualties  were  reported  as:  killed  894,  wounded 
3107,  missing  2836,  total  6837. 

The  Confederate  casualties  cannot  be  exactly  divided,  but  I 
estimate  the  total  losses  of  the  different  divisions  for  this  battle, 
as  follows :  — 

A.  P.  Hill's     division,    6  brigades,  2688 


Longstreet's 
D.  H.  Hill's 
Whiting's 
EweU's 
Jackson's 


Lawton's         brigade   _1 


1883  (Only  5  engaged.) 

1423 

1017 

764 
91    (Only  1  engaged.) 

492 


Totals  26  8358 

The  heavy  character  of  much  of  the  fighting  is  shown  by  some 
of  the  regimental  losses,  although  in  many  instances  the  reports 
give  only  the  total  casualties  for  the  Seven  Days,  and  do  not 
distinguish  between  the  battles.  The  charge  by  Whiting's  two 
brigades,  under  Hood  and  Law,  was  notable  for  being  driven 
home  on  the  first  effort,  without  halting  to  open  fire.  The  4th 
Tex.,  the  first  regiment  to  enter  the  enemy's  works,  lost  44 
killed  and  206  wounded.  There  was  no  thicket  or  obstruction 
to  seriously  check  the  advance  at  this  portion  of  the  field,  and 
part  of  the  ground  traversed  was  exposed  to  but  little  artillery 
fire. 

Trimble,  of  Swell's  division,  made  the  following  observations 
in  his  official  report :  — 

"  The  subjoined  list  of  killed  and  wounded  best  shows  the  severity  of  the 
conflict,  and  a  comparison  of  those  of  different  regiments  fairly  illustrates 
the  superiority  of  a  rapid  charge  over  a  standing  fight,  not  only  as  the 
best  mode  of  securing  victories,  but  doing  it  with  smaller  loss.  The 
15th  Ala.  and  21st  Ga.,  numbering  1315  men,  stood  under  a  destructive 
fire  for  an  hour  or  more,  returning  the  enemy's  volleys  all  the  time, 
and  advanced  half  a  mile,  with  only  fragments  of  companies,  at  the  close 
of  the  day.  Their  loss  in  killed  and  wounded  was  251  men.  The  16th 
Miss,  and  21st  N.C.,  numbering  1244  men,  passed  under  as  hot  a  fire  an 
equal  distance  in  15  minutes,  losing  in  killed  and  wounded  only  85  men." 


132  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

Briefly,  it  may  be  said  of  this  battle  that  it  seems  to  have  been 
left  in  the  hands  of  the  division  commanders  until  it  was  nearly 
lost.  Only  at  the  last  moment  was  the  hand  of  the  general  in 
command  revealed.  But  had  Jackson's  march  that  morning 
been  pushed  with  the  fierce  swiftness  natural  to  him  on  such 
occasions,  and  had  he,  during  A.  P.  Hill's  attack,  thrown  his 
whole  force  upon  McClellan's  right,  a  comparatively  easy  victory 
would  have  resulted.  As  has  been  stated,  the  enemy's  right  flank 
was  his  weakest  point.  It  was  not  found.  D.  H.  Hill  would 
have  attacked  it  even  before  A.  P.  Hill's  battle,  had  not  Jack- 
son stopped  and  withdrawn  him,  instead  of  reenforcing  and 
pushing  him,  as  it  was  naturally  expected  that  Jackson  would 
do  —  although  no  man  ever  needed  pushing  less  than  D.  H.  Hill. 
In  the  Century  War  Book,  he  wrote  of  this  occasion :  — 

"Had  Jackson's  command  gone  in  on  the  left  of  the  road  running  by 
the  McGehee  House,  Porter's  position  would  have  been  turned  and  the 
line  of  retreat  cut  off." 


CHAPTER  VIII 
SEVEN  DAYS'  CAMPAIGN.    THE  PURSUIT 

June  28.  June  29.  Magruder's  Report.  Jackson's  Report.  Lee's 
Report.  Lee  to  Magruder.  Savage  Station.  June  30.  Waiting  in 
vain  for  the  Signal.  Holmes's  Division.,  Huger's  Division.  Wright 
meets  Jackson.  Huger's  Report.  Jackson,  June  29.  Lee  to  Ma- 
gruder. Jackson,  June  30.  White  Oak  Swamp.  Franklin's  Report. 
Jackson's  Account.  The  Cannonade.  Munford's  letter.  Hampton's 
Crossing.  Franklin's  Comments.  D.  H.  Hill's  Explanation.  Battle 
of  Frazier  Farm.  Bayonet  Fighting.  A  Successful  Ruse.  Lee's 
Report. 

THE  day  after  the  battle,  Saturday,  the  28th,  was  given  to  the 
care  of  the  wounded,  the  burial  of  the  dead,  and  the  collection 
of  the  scattered  troops.  During  the  night  McClellan  had  begun 
his  retreat  to  the  James,  ordering  Keyes,  with  the  4th  corps,  to 
cross  White  Oak  Swamp  and  take  position  to  cover  the  passage 
of  his  trains,  which  were  put  in  motion  early  on  the  28th.  On 
the  28th,  also,  the  troops  which  had  fought  under  Porter  on  the 
27th  were  sent  forward  across  White  Oak  Swamp. 

On  the  Confederate  side  it  was  not  yet  clear  what  the  enemy 
would  do.  EwelFs  and  Jackson's  divisions  had  not  been  seriously 
engaged,  and  Ewell's  was  sent  down  the  Chickahominy  about  seven 
miles  to  Despatch  Station,  to  see  if  they  showed  any  disposition 
to  cross  the  stream  and  retreat  down  the  Peninsula.  Stuart's 
cavalry  followed  the  railroad  toward  White  House.  Bottom's 
bridge  was  found  burned,  and  the  next  morning  White  House 
was  also  burned  and  evacuated.  On  Sunday  morning,  the  29th, 
the  enemy's  intrenchments  opposite  Magruder  and  Huger  were 
found  abandoned,  and  his  camps  and  depots  were  being  burned. 
It  was  then  apparent  that  his  destination  was  the  James  River, 
and  Lee,  no  longer  hesitating,  issued  orders  to  his  whole  army 
for  a  vigorous  pursuit.  His  best  chance,  that  of  destroying 
Porter's  corps,  had  been  lost ;  but  his  adversary  was  on  foot  in 

133 


134  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

the  woods,  encumbered  with  enormous  trains  which  he  would 
try  to  defend,  and  there  should  be  opportunities  to  overwhelm 
him  in  detail,  and  unprotected  by  breastworks. 

Magruder,  immediately  behind  the  enemy  on  the  Williamsburg 
road,  was  ordered  to  pursue  down  that  road.  Huger,  on  the 
Charles  City  road,  was  ordered  down  that  road.  From  the 
battle-field  of  the  27th,  A.  P.  Hill  and  Longstreet  were  ordered 
to  cross  the  Chickahominy  at  New  Bridge,  and  passing  in  rear 
of  Magruder  and  Huger  to  move  by  the  Darbytown,  the  next 
road  to  the  right.  Ewell  from  Despatch  Station  was  to  rejoin 
Jackson.  Jackson,  with  the  largest  force,  was  directed  to  pursue 
by  the  shortest  and  most  direct  route.  He  was  to  cross  the 
Chickahominy  over  the  Grapevine  bridge,  across  which  Porter 
had  retreated,  and  which  he  had  partially  torn  up,  and  to  press 
directly  upon  McClellan's  rear  with  his  whole  force.  This  com- 
prised his  own  three  brigades  under  Winder,  Ewell's  three, 
D.  H.  Hill's  five,  Whiting's  two,  and  Lawton's  one,  —  in  all  14 
brigades,  nearly  25,000  strong. 

Looking  back  upon  the  course  of  events,  it  is  interesting  to 
inquire  wherein  lay  the  weakness  of  this  order,  apparently  so 
simple  and  obvious  in  its  execution.  Yet  the  pursuit,  from 
this  moment,  was  bootless  and  a  failure.  It  did  capture  a  few 
guns  and  prisoners,  but  it  paid  for  them  in  blood  a  price  far  be- 
yond their  value.  There  were  two  ways  in  which  Lee  might  have 
pursued.  One  is  that  just  set  forth.  The  recommendation  of 
that  method  is  that  it  seemed  to  reach  the  enemy  with  his  largest 
forces  by  the  shortest  roads.  But,  per  contra,  is  the  considera- 
tion that  on  the  shortest  roads  will  be  found  the  enemy's  most 
formidable  rear-guards  and  obstructions.  With  energetic  lieu- 
tenants these  may  be  overcome ;  but  the  chance  exists  whether 
the  proper  leaders  will  be  at  the  right  places.  The  alternate 
course  would  have  been  to  leave  the  direct  pursuit  over  the 
obstructed  roads,  and  against  the  enemy's  rear-guards,  to  but  two 
divisions,  —  those  of  Magruder  and  Huger,  —  while  Lee  himself 
with  Jackson,  Longstreet,  and  A.  P.  Hill,  moving  swiftly  around 
the  rear  by  good  roads,  and  reenforced  by  Holmes,  put  the 
bulk  of  his  army,  flushed  with  its  recent  victory,  directly  across 
McClellan's  path  near  Malvern  Hill. 


SEVEN  DAYS'  CAMPAIGN.    THE  PURSUIT  135 

Not  only  would  it  count  for  a  great  deal  that  all  the  divisions 
should  be  under  the  personal  eye  of  the  commander,  but  there 
was  strong  probability  that  Lee  might  be  able  to  force  upon 
McClellan  the  disadvantage  of  having  to  take  the  offensive.  On 
this  occasion,  as  it  turned  out,  Jackson  was  still  under  his  "spell," 
and  did  nothing.  Lee,  having  gone  with  Longstreet  and  A.  P. 
Hill,  lost  touch  of  all  three,  —  Jackson,  Magruder,  and  Huger,  — 
and  entirely  failed  to  get  any  service  from  them  for  the  two 
critical  days,  the  29th  and  30th. 

The  orders  for  the  pursuit  were  given  soon  after  sunrise  on 
Sunday,  the  29th.  Magruder  had  not  entirely  absorbed  Lee's 
confidence  that  McClellan  did  not  have  in  him  the  risking  of  a 
counterstroke.  He  knew  that  there  were  on  the  south  side  fully 
60,000  Federals,  and  that  between  them  and  Richmond  there 
were  now  but  25,000  Confederates.  His  official  report  thus 
describes  the  situation:  — 

"I  received  repeated  instructions  during  Saturday  night  from  Gen. 
Lee's  headquarters  enjoining  upon  my  command  the  utmost  vigilance, 
directing  the  men  to  sleep  on  their  arms,  and  to  be  prepared  for  whatever 
might  occur.  These  orders  were  promptly  communicated  by  me  to  the 
different  commanders  of  my  forces,  and  were  also  transmitted  to  Gen. 
Huger  on  my  right.  I  passed  the  night  without  sleep  and  in  superin- 
tendence of  their  execution.  Had  McClellan  massed  his  whole  force  in 
column  and  advanced  against  any  point  in  our  line  .  .  .  though  the  head 
of  his  column  would  have  suffered  greatly,  its  momentum  would  have 
insured  him  success.  His  failure  to  do  so  is  the  best  evidence  that  our 
wise  commander  fully  understood  the  character  of  his  opponent. 

"Our  relief  was  therefore  great  when  intelligence  reached  us  almost 
simultaneously  from  Col.  Chilton  and  one  of  my  staff,  that  the  enemy, 
whose  presence  had  been  ascertained  as  late  as  3.30  A.M.,  had  evacuated 
his  works  and  was  retreating. 

"Col.  Chilton,  who  rode  into  my  camp  on  Sunday  morning,  hurried 
me  off  to  see  Gen.  Lee  on  the  Nine  Mile  road,  and  I  gave,  while  riding 
with  him,  the  necessary  orders  to  put  in  motion  my  whole  command, 
which  extended  over  a  distance  of  some  miles,  directing  Gen.  Griffith's 
brigade,  which  was  nearest  to  the  road,  to  advance  at  once  from  the 
centre,  and  ordering  Gen.  Jones's  division,  in  advancing,  to  incline 
toward  Fair  Oaks  Station,  as  I  had  been  informed  that  Maj. -Gen- 
Jackson  had  crossed,  or  was  crossing,  the  Grapevine  bridge,  and  would 
operate  down  the  Chickahominy.  Having  overtaken  Gen.  Lee,  we  rode 
together  down  the  Nine  Mile  road,  and  the  general  informed  me  of  the 


136  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

plans  which  he  had  adopted  for  the  pursuit  of  the  enemy.  They  were 
as  follows :  Longstreet's  division  was  to  have  crossed  the  New  Bridge  and 
to  take  position  on  our  extreme  right,  so  as  to  intercept  the  enemy  in  his 
attempt  to  reach  James  River;  Huger's  division  to  march  down  the 
Williamsburg  road  on  my  right  flank,  and  Maj.-Gen.  Jackson's  divi- 
sion, which  he  stated  had  crossed  or  was  crossing  the  Grapevine  bridge, 
over  the  Chickahominy  River,  was  to  operate  down  that  river  on  its  right 
bank,  while  my  own  command  would  press  him  vigorously  in  front. 

"  At  Fair  Oaks  Station  .  .  .  Gen.  Lee,  having  repeated  his  instructions, 
left  the  ground.  .  .  . 

"I  also  despatched  a  staff -officer  toward  Grapevine  Bridge,  some  three 
miles  off,  to  ascertain  the  position  of  Maj.-Gen.  Jackson's  troops, 
which  I  had  supposed  from  the  statements  above  given  had  already 
crossed.  ...  In  the  meantime,  Maj.  Bryan,  the  staff -officer  who  had 
been  sent  to  Maj.-Gen.  Jackson,  returned  with  his  [Jackson's]  engineer, 
Lt.  Boswell,  who  reported  that  Maj.-Gen.  Jackson  was  compelled  to 
rebuild  the  bridge,  which  would  be  completed  in  about  two  hours.  Maj. 
Bryan  reported  that  Maj.-Gen.  Jackson  had  crossed  but  a  small  portion 
of  his  infantry,  not  more  than  three  companies,  over  the  broken  bridge." 

It  is  plain  from  this  narrative  that  Lee's  orders  to  Jackson  to 
pursue  by  the  Grapevine  bridge  road,  above  referred  to,  con- 
templated immediate  performance  on  Jackson's  part,  and  were 
given  at  an  early  hour  on  Sunday,  the  29th.  The  name  Grape- 
vine, applied  to  this  bridge,  was  taken  from  a  ford  of  the  Chicka- 
hominy well  known  in  the  neighborhood,  and  reached  by  a  coun- 
try road  which  crossed  the  swamp  by  the  ford.  In  building  a 
bridge  the  Federals  utilized  the  road,  and  built  the  bridge  near 
it,  but  without  disturbing  the  ford,  which  was  practicable  at  this 
time,  the  river  being  low,  even  while  waiting  to  repair  the 
bridge. 

Meanwhile,  too,  New  Bridge  and  another  bridge,  three-quarters 
of  a  mile  above  it,  were  opened  by  Lee's  order  on  Saturday,  the 
28th.  The  extra  distance,  which  would  have  been  involved  in 
marching  from  the  battle-field  to  Savage  Station  by  the  New 
Bridge,  instead  of  by  the  Grapevine  route,  was  only  about  three 
miles.  But  this  was  Sunday,  and  Jackson  gave  it  strict  observ- 
ance. The  greater  part  of  his  troops  remained  in  camp  all 
day  and  until  after  midnight  Sunday  night.  Then  they  made  a 
start  at,  or  before,  2.30  A.M.  His  official  report  entirely  ignores 
the  receipt  of  any  orders  from  Gen.  Lee,  but  says :  — 


SEVEN  DAYS'  CAMPAIGN.    THE  PURSUIT  137 

"  The  28th  and  29th  were  occupied  in  disposing  of  the  dead  and  wounded 
and  repairing  Grapevine  bridge  over  the  Chickahominy,  which  McClel- 
lan's  forces  had  used  in  their  retreat  and  destroyed  in  their  rear.  During 
the  night  of  the  29th  we  commenced  crossing  the  Chickahominy,  and  on 
the  following  morning  arrived  at  Savage  Station." 

Lee,  in  his  official  report,  written  as  before  told,  eight  months 
later,  accepts  the  excuse  of  Grapevine  bridge,  as  follows :  — 

"Jackson's  route  led  to  the  flank  and  rear  of  Savage  Station,  but  he 
was  delayed  by  the  necessity  of  reconstructing  Grapevine  bridge.  Late 
in  the  afternoon,  Magruder  attacked  the  enemy  with  one  of  his  three 
divisions  [two  brigades  each],  and  two  regiments  of  another.  A  severe 
action  ensued,  and  continued  about  two  hours,  when  it  was  terminated 
by  night.  The  troops  displayed  great  gallantry,  and  inflicted  heavy 
loss  upon  the  enemy ;  but,  owing  to  the  lateness  of  the  hour  and  the  small 
force  employed,  the  result  was  not  decisive,  and  the  enemy  continued  his 
retreat  under  cover  of  darkness,  leaving  several  hundred  prisoners,  with 
his  dead  and  wounded,  in  our  hands." 

This  was  the  insignificant  outcome  of  the  day,  and  in  his  refer- 
ence to  Jackson's  delay  and  to  the  lateness  of  the  hour  and  the 
small  force  engaged,  one  may  easily  read  that  he  had  hoped  to 
have  had  a  very  different  story. 

After  giving  Magruder  his  orders,  but  unfortunately  without 
waiting  to  see  that  Jackson  failed  to  arrive,  Lee  had  gone  over 
to  the  Charles  City  road,  where  Huger  was  advancing,  and  thence 
he  passed  on  to  the  Darbytown  road  to  join  A.  P.  Hill  and 
Longstreet.  Soon  after  being  left  alone,  finding  that  Jackson 
was  not  near,  Magruder  became  alarmed  at  a  demonstration  of 
the  enemy's  rear-guard,  and  sent  such  urgent  calls  for  aid  to 
Huger  that  the  latter  halted  two  of  his  four  brigades,  and  marched 
back  with  them  to  Seven  Pines.  This  lost  for  his  division  the 
cream  of  the  day.  Here  he  discovered  the  needlessness  of 
Magruder's  alarm,  and,  getting  urgent  messages  from  Lee,  he 
returned  to  the  Charles  City  road,  marched  down  it  until  he 
found  the  enemy's  pickets,  late  in  the  afternoon,  and  went  into 
bivouac. 

Lee  was  much  disappointed  that  evening  at  the  lack  of  results, 
and  wrote  Magruder  the  following  note:1  — 

1O.  R.  13,687. 


138  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

"  General,  I  regret  much  that  you  have  made  so  little  progress  to-day 
in  the  pursuit  of  the  enemy.  In  order  to  reap  the  fruits  of  our  victory  the 
pursuit  should  be  most  vigorous.  I  must  urge  you  then  again  to  press 
on  his  rear,  rapidly  and  steadily.  We  must  lose  no  more  time  or  he  will 
escape  us  entirely." 

This  note  had  also  a  postscript  which  will  be  quoted  presently 
in  another  connection. 

Magruder  had  only  brought  into  action  two  brigades, — 
Kershaw's  and  Semmes's, — and  a  half  of  Barksdale's.  The  force 
engaged  against  him  had  been  Sumner's  corps,  and  Smith's  divi- 
sion of  Franklin's.  Heintzelman's  corps  had  also  been  present  in 
the  morning,  but  in  the  afternoon  it  had  crossed  White  Oak  Swamp 
at  Brackett's  Ford.  The  remaining  nine  Federal  brigades  were, 
doubtless,  too  heavy  a  task  for  Magruder  with  only  six,  but  had 
Jackson  with  his  14  brigades  been  present  in  the  morning,  the 
enemy  should  have  been  routed.  Doubtless  Magruder  should 
have  employed  twice  the  force  he  did  engage,  and  taken  chances. 
His  two  and  a  half  brigades  were  overmatched,  though  they 
fought  until  dark,  losing  over  400  men,  and  capturing  prisoners 
from  each  of  the  three  divisions  opposed  to  them.  They  re- 
ported next  morning  400  dead  left  by  the  enemy  on  the  field, 
but  such  reports  are  always  overestimated. 

Jackson  arrived  in  person  at  Magruder 's  headquarters  near 
Savage  Station  at  3.30  A.M.  on  Monday,  the  30th,  and  informed 
Magruder  that  his  troops  would  be  up  soon  after  daylight. 

During  the  night,  the  entire  Federal  force  had  crossed  the 
White  Oak  Swamp  and  McClellan  had  accomplished  one-half  his 
retreat  safely.  He  had  had  only  about  16  miles  to  traverse,  and 
his  trains  were  now  upon  the  last  half  of  it,  with  his  army  well 
concentrated  to  protect  his  flank.  With  one  more  day  his  column 
would  be  so  shortened  that  no  exposed  flank  would  be  left,  and 
his  whole  army  could  be  united  in  the  rear  of  the  train. 

This  was,  therefore,  the  critical  day.  Serious  blows  had 
threatened  the  Federals  on  the  26th  at  Beaver  Dam,  on  the  27th 
at  Gaines  Mill,  and  on  the  29th  at  Savage  Station ;  but  all  had 
been  escaped  by  bad  handling  on  the  part  of  the  Confederates. 
Now  a  final  opportunity  was  offered  to  repair  all  shortcomings, 
and  every  condition  seemed  favorable.  Holmes's  division,  6000 


SEVEN  DAYS'  CAMPAIGN.    THE  PURSUIT  139 

strong,  with  six  batteries,  had  been  brought  from  south  of  the 
James  River,  and  was  at  New  Market  at  10  A.M.  on  the  30th. 
Longstreet,  with  his  own  and  A.  P.  Hill's  divisions,  had  bivouacked 
on  the  Darbytown  road,  the  night  before,  and  this  morning  they 
moved  into  the  Long  Bridge  road,  and  soon  found  the  enemy's 
line  covering  Charles  City  cross-roads  at  Frazer's  Farm  or  Glen- 
dale,  and  extending  down  the  Quaker  road  toward  Malvern  Hill. 
These  three  divisions,  14  brigades,  numbered  about  23,000  men. 

In  addition  to  these,  Lee,  early  on  the  30th,  had  withdrawn 
Magruder's  six  brigades,  now  about  12,000  strong,  from  Savage 
Station,  and  brought  them  down  the  Darbytown  road  within 
striking  distance  by  2  P.M.,  and  had  halted  them  at  that  hour 
near  Timberlake's  store. 

Huger's  four  brigades,  about  9000  men,  were  advancing  down 
the  Charles  City  road,  and  were  expected  to  open  the  action  on 
this  part  of  the  field  at  an  early  hour.  Either  his  guns  or  Jack- 
son's would  be  the  signal  for  Longstreet  and  A.  P.  Hill  to  take 
up  the  battle. 

Meanwhile,  Jackson,  only  four  miles  off  in  an  air  line,  but  all 
of  15  miles  by  the  public  roads,  —  the  only  ones  generally  known,  — 
was  confidently  expected  to  make  up  for  his  non-appearance  of 
the  day  before  by  an  early  and  very  vigorous  one  this  morning, 
assaulting  the  enemy's  rear-guard  with  his  14  brigades,  25,000 
strong,  and  emulating  the  reputation  he  had  made  in  the  Valley. 
Thus,  with  44,000  men,  all  close  at  hand  upon  the  enemy's 
flank,  and  Stonewall  Jackson  with  25,000  in  his  rear,  fortune 
seemed  at  last  about  to  smile  broadly  for  once  upon  the  Con- 
federate cause.  Unknown  to  us,  another  circumstance  was 
rarely  in  our  favor.  The  Federal  army  was  temporarily  with- 
out a  head.  On  the  29th,  30th,  and  July  1,  McClellan,  on  each 
day,  left  his  army  without  placing  any  one  in  command  during 
his  absence,  while  he  did  engineer's  duty,  examining  the  locali- 
ties toward  which  he  was  marching.  Had  the  Confederates 
accomplished  their  reasonable  expectations,  the  criticism  of 
McClellan  would  have  been  very  severe. 

On  the  Confederate  side,  Lee,  with  Longstreet  and  Hill,  in  a 
field  of  broom-grass  and  small  pines,  waited  impatiently  for  the 
signal. 


140  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

He  was  so  close  in  rear  of  his  line  of  battle  that  men  and 
horses  among  the  couriers  and  staff,  were  wounded  by  random 
shots.  For  quite  a  time,  too,  President  Davis  and  his  staff 
were  present,  in  conference  with  the  generals,  while  missiles 
grew  more  frequent,  and  wounded  men  began  to  come  in  from 
the  front. 

For  hours  we  stood  there  waiting  —  waiting  for  something 
which  never  happened.  Every  minute  that  we  waited  was 
priceless  time  thrown  away.  Twelve  o'clock  came  and  the  pre- 
cious day  was  half  gone.  One  o'clock,  two  o'clock,  three  o'clock 
followed.  Even  four  o'clock  drew  near,  and  now,  whatever  was 
started,  would  be  cut  short  by  night.  Our  great  opportunity 
was  practically  over,  and  we  had  not  yet  pulled  a  trigger.  We 
had  waited  for  either  Huger  or  Jackson  or  both  to  begin,  and 
neither  had  begun.  As  Beauregard,  at  Bull  Run,  had  sent  word 
to  Ewell  to  begin,  and  then  had  gone  to  the  centre  and  waited; 
as  Johnston,  at  Seven  Pines,  had  given  orders  to  Hill  and  Long- 
street  about  beginning,  and  then  gone  to  the  left  and  waited; 
so  now,  Lee,  having  given  orders  beforehand  to  both  Jackson 
and  Huger,  had  passed  on  to  the  right  and  was  waiting ;  and  in 
every  case  the  opportunity  passed  unimproved. 

Briefly,  this  is  what  had  happened,  beginning  with  the  extreme 
right  column  under  Holmes,  which,  with  Magruder's  column, 
was  to  support  Longstreet's  right :  — 

The  river  road  from  New  Market  to  Harrison's  Landing  passed 
under  and  around  Malvern  Heights,  between  them  and  the  river. 
From  a  point  on  this  road,  perhaps  a  mile  and  a  half  from  the 
river,  across  low,  flat  ground,  one  could  see  a  considerable  ex- 
panse of  the  Malvern  Heights,  1000  yards  off  across  the  meadows 
.  on  the  left;  and  over  these  heights  were  passing  many  of  the 
5000  wagons  composing  McClellan's  trains.  No  target  is  more 
attractive  to  an  artillerist  than  his  enemy's  wagon  tram,  and  six 
rifle  guns  of  Holmes's  were  sent  down  in  the  meadows  to  fire 
upon  these  wagons.  Lee  also  saw  the  position,  and  approved 
the  attack,  and  directed  Holmes  to  bring  up  his  whole  division 
to  support  the  guns.  But  no  sooner  did  the  six  guns  open  than 
they  were  replied  to  by  30  of  the  heaviest  rifles  of  the  Federal 
Artillery  Reserve,  which,  escorted  by  only  about  1500  infantry 


SEVEN  DAYS'  CAMPAIGN.    THE  PURSUIT  141 

under  Fitz-John  Porter,  had  just  arrived  on  Malvern  Heights 
to  occupy  the  position.  The  fierce  fire  of  this  great  battery 
was  quickly  aided  by  the  fire  of  heavy  guns  from  the  gunboats 
in  the  James  —  lying  in  Turkey  Bend,  and  directing  their  fire 
by  wigwag  signals  between  their  mastheads  —  and  the  Federals 
on  the  Heights.  The  six  guns  were  quickly  wrecked.  Two 
caissons  were  exploded,  and  so  many  horses  killed  that  the  guns 
were  with  difficulty  withdrawn.  No  fire  is  so  appalling  to  un- 
seasoned troops  as  that  of  heavy  artillery  received  in  a  thick 
wood  where  every  shot  cuts  limbs  and  smashes  trees  around 
them,  even  though  the  actual  damage  from  it  may  be  trifling. 
Holmes's  whole  division,  concealed  in  the  woods  in  the  vicinity  of 
the  six  guns  engaged,  was  now  exposed  to  such  a  fire,  converg- 
ing from  opposite  quarters.  There  was  but  one  thing  to  do,  and 
that  was  to  get  away.  Some  commands,  especially  among  the 
infantry,  behaved  well,  and  withdrew  in  perfect  order;  some 
were  thrown  into  confusion,  and  among  some  cavalry  commands 
and  light  artillery  a  stampede  took  place.  Two  guns  which  had 
not  been  engaged  were  entangled  in  the  woods  and  abandoned, 
and  many  men  were  run  over  and  injured.  Altogether,  the  con- 
fusion was  so  great  that  Lee  directed  Magruder's  six  brigades 
to  march  to  Holmes's  support,  though  they  could  have  done  no 
good,  as  there  was  nothing  for  them  to  attack  or  defend. 

Thus,  Holmes  and  Magruder,  18,000  men,  were  diverted  from 
the  real  work  of  the  day.  This  was  just  about  to  begin  when 
this  side  issue  of  the  cannonade  of  Malvern  Hill  was  ventured 
upon.  The  total  casualties  in  Holmes's  division  (including  15 
wounded  among  the  six  guns)  were  two  killed  and  49  wounded, 
besides  some  injured  in  the  stampede. 

Let  us  next  turn  to  Huger's  division.  On  Sunday,  the  29th, 
the  division  made  but  a  very  short  distance  down  the  Charles 
City  road  for  two  reasons.  Two  of  its  brigades  were  called  back, 
and  had  some  miles  of  extra  marching  and  countermarching  in 
the  hot  sun  by  Magruder's  false  alarm  when  he  found  that  he 
was  not  supported  by  the  proximity  of  Jackson,  as  has  been 
already  told. 

The  other  two  brigades  thought  it  imprudent  to  pass  any  road 
on  their  left  leading  across  White  Oak  Swamp,  until  it  had  been 


142  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

reconnoitred,  as  it  was  known  that  a  large  force  of  the  enemy 
was  still  on  the  other  side. 

At  the  first  of  these  cross-roads,  a  force  of  the  enemy  was  dis- 
covered attempting  to  cross  to  the  south  side.  It  was  driven 
back,  and  the  resulting  skirmish  consumed  the  day. 

It  seems  strange  that  Lee,  though  at  no  great  distance  on 
the  next  day  (the  30th),  should  have  still  failed  to  see  Huger, 
and  either  to  bring  him  to  the  battle,  which  was  waiting  for  his 
arrival,  or  to  order  it  to  proceed  without  him.  But  there  is  no 
intimation  in  the  reports,  of  any  communication ;  nor,  in  Huger's 
proceedings,  of  any  consciousness  that  important  action  was 
waiting  upon  him. 

At  another  swamp  crossing,  called  Fisher's,  Huger's  column, 
Monday  morning,  discovered  that  the  enemy's  forces  on  the 
opposite  side  had  been  withdrawn.  Wright's  brigade  was  then 
ordered  to  investigate.  He  crossed  the  swamp  with  his  brigade 
and  got  into  the  deserted  camps  of  the  enemy  on  the  north  side, 
picking  up  a  few  prisoners  and  finding  some  abandoned  stores. 

By  2.30  P.M.  he  had  made  his  way  entirely  across  to  the  main 
road  where  Jackson,  as  is  yet  to  be  told,  with  his  14  brigades,  was 
standing  at  bay  at  the  main  crossing,  called  the  White  Oak 
Bridge.  Jackson  seems  to  have  taken  no  special  interest  in 
Wright's  arrival,  though  it  proved  that  at  least  one  unob- 
structed crossing  of  the  swamp  was  within  three  miles.  Jackson 
ordered  Wright  to  return  along  the  edge  of  the  swamp,  to  look 
for  crossings  as  he  went,  and  if  he  found  one,  to  try  and  force 
it;  but  he  sent  neither  staff-officer  to  bring  back  a  report,  or  re- 
enforcements  to  aid  if  any  favorable  point  should  be  found. 
Apparently,  he  was  satisfied  to  remain  where  he  was  and  to  do 
only  what  he  was  doing  —  nothing.  Wright  started  back,  and 
at  one  and  a  half  miles  came  to  Brackett's  Ford,  a  well-known 
road,  across  which  a  large  part  of  the  Federal  forces  had  crossed 
during  the  night,  and  which  they  had  then  obstructed  by  cutting 
down  trees  and  destroying  a  small  bridge.  Pushing  two  com- 
panies of  skirmishers  through  the  swamp,  Wright  captured  the 
enemy's  picket  force  on  the  south  side,  but  saw,  beyond  the 
picket,  a  force  of  the  enemy  with  artillery,  too  strong  for  his 
brigade ;  so  he  withdrew.  Continuing  his  march  along  the  edge 


SEVEN  DAYS'  CAMPAIGN.    THE  PURSUIT  143 

of  the  swamp  another  mile  and  a  half,  he  found  a  cow  trail 
which  led  him  across  it  about  three-fourths  of  a  mile  below  his 
crossing  of  the  morning,  and  here  he  encamped.  The  occupa- 
tion of  Huger's  other  brigades  during  the  day  is  given  as  follows 
in  his  official  report :  — 

"  The  troops  bivouacked  in  their  position  while  it  was  dark,  and  resumed 
the  march  at  daylight  (Monday,  June  30).  Mahone  advanced  cautiously, 
captured  many  prisoners,  and  killed  some  cavalry  scouts,  one  bearing  an 
order  to  Kearny  to  retire  and  keep  a  strong  battery  of  artillery  with  his 
rear-guard.  After  passing  Fisher's  house,  we  found  the  road  obstructed 
by  trees  felled  all  across  it.  Gen.  Mahone  found  it  best  to  cut  a  road 
around  the  obstructions.  For  such  work  we  were  deficient  in  tools.  The 
column  was  delayed  while  the  work  was  going  on,  and  it  was  evening 
before  we  got  through  and  drove  off  the  workmen  who  were  still  cutting 
down  other  trees.  As  we  advanced  through  the  woods  and  came  to  an 
open  field  on  high  ground  (P.  Williams  on  map),  a  powerful  battery  of 
rifled  guns  opened  on  us.  Gen.  Mahone  disposed  his  troops  and  ad- 
vanced a  battery  of  artillery,  Moorman's,  and  a  sharp  artillery  fire  was 
kept  up  for  some  time.  The  enemy's  fire  was  very  severe  and  we  had 
many  men  killed  and  wounded.  List  of  casualties  sent  herewith  (25 
killed,  53  wounded,  total  78).  I  went  to  the  front  and  examined  the 
position.  I  withdrew  most  of  our  guns,  and  only  kept  up  a  moderate 
fire.  On  our  left  the  White  Oak  Swamp  approached  very  near.  The  right 
appeared  to  be  good  ground,  and  I  determined  to  turn  the  battery  by  mov- 
ing a  column  of  infantry  to  my  right.  It  was  now  dark." 

It  seems  incredible  that  this  division,  within  four  miles  of 
Lee,  could  have  been  allowed  to  spend  the  whole  day  in  a  mere 
contest  of  axemen,  wherein  the  Federals,  with  the  most  axes, 
had  only  to  cut  down,  and  the  Confederates,  with  the  fewest, 
to  cut  up  and  remove.  The  result  could  scarcely  have  been 
doubtful.  Our  army  at  this  time  compared  with  an  organized 
and  disciplined  army  about  as  a  confederacy  would  compare 
with  a  nation.  Each  division  was  an  allied  but  independent 
command,  rather  than  a  part  of  a  single  army. 

This  will  be  even  more  evident  in  the  story  of  Jackson's  col- 
umn, now  to  be  told.  His  command  had  always  before  acted 
alone  and  independently.  Lee's  instructions  to  him  were  very 
brief  and  general,  in  supreme  confidence  that  the  Jackson  of  the 
Valley  would  win  even  brighter  laurels  on  the  Chickahominy. 
The  shortest  route  was  assigned  to  him  and  the  largest  force  was 


144  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

given  him.  Lee  then  took  himself  off  to  the  farthest  flank,  as  if 
generously  to  leave  to  Jackson  the  opportunity  of  the  most 
brilliant  victory  of  the  war. 

His  failure  is  not  so  much  a  military  as  a  psychological 
phenomenon.  He  did  not  try  and  fail.  He  simply  made  no 
effort.  The  story  embraces  two  days.  He  spent  the  29th  in 
camp  in  disregard  of  Lee 's  instructions,  and  he  spent  the  30th 
in  equal  idleness  at  White  Oak  Swamp.  His  25,000  infantry 
practically  did  not  fire  a  shot  in  the  two  days. 

Here  is  the  story:  It  has  already  been  related  that  early 
Sunday  morning,  Lee,  coming  from  Jackson's  direction,  told 
Magruder  that  Jackson  had  been  ordered  to  pursue,  and  was 
even  then  supposed  to  be  crossing  the  Chickahominy.  Magruder 
was  also  ordered  to  attack  the  enemy,  and  he  and  his  lieutenants 
soon  sent  messengers  to  establish  communication  with  Jack- 
son. Later,  Magruder  received  a  severe  shock  in  the  following 
note  from  Gen.  Jones,  commanding  one  of  his  three  divisions, 
of  two  brigades  each:  — 

"  MAJ.-GEN.  MAGRUDER  : 

"My  line  is  formed  to  the  left  and  somewhat  to  the  front  of  Gen.  Cobb. 
...  I  do  not  think  it  prudent  for  me  to  attack  with  my  small  force, 
unless  there  be  a  simultaneous  attack  all  along  our  lines.  I  will  keep  a 
good  lookout  on  my  left.  I  had  hoped  that  Jackson  would  have  cooperated 
with  me  on  my  left,  but  he  sends  me  word  that  he  cannot,  as  he  has  other 
important  duty  to  perform.1 

"Respectfully,  D.  R.  JONES,  Brig.-Gen." 

This  note,  taken  in  connection  with  the  withdrawal  of  the 
two  brigades  which  Huger  had  sent,  depressed  Magruder  very 
much.  Later  in  the  evening  he  received  some  encouragement. 
Maj.  Taylor  of  Lee's  staff,  bearing  a  message,  arrived,  hunting 
for  Jackson.  Upon  being  told  that  Jackson  had  been  "ordered 
elsewhere,"  as  Magruder  loosely  quoted  his  message  to  Jones, 
Taylor  did  not  hesitate  to  say  that  there  must  be  some  mistake. 
As  he  did  not  know  the  country,  and  Magruder  had  upon  his 
staff  a  Chaplain  Allen'  who  did  know  it,  the  message  for  Jackson 

1  13  W.  R.,  675,  incorrectly  dated  June  28.  On  the  28th  the  retreat 
of  the  enemy  was  not  known,  and  there  were  no  orders  to  attack,  or  for 
Jackson  to  cross  the  Chickahominy.  The  situation  is  that  of  the  29th. 
The  italics  are  mine. 


SEVEN  DAYS'  CAMPAIGN.    THE  PURSUIT  145 

was  intrusted  to  Allen,  and  Taylor  returned  to  Lee.  But  Lee's 
note  that  night  to  Magruder,  already  quoted  (p.  138),  contained 
a  postscript,  as  follows :  — 

"P.S.  Since  the  above  was  written  I  learn  from  Maj.  Taylor  that 
you  are  under  the  impression  that  Gen.  Jackson  has  been  ordered  not 
to  support  you.  On  the  contrary,  he  has  been  directed  to  do  so,  and  to 
push  the  pursuit  vigorously." 

It  scarcely  needs  the  corroboration  of  Lee's  word  to  know  that, 
upon  his  discovery  of  McClellan's  retreat,  and  his  putting  the 
rest  of  his  army  in  motion  with  orders  to  press  the  enemy,  he  must 
have  given  similar  orders  to  Jackson;  and  his  statement  to 
Magruder,  that  Jackson  was  even  then  crossing  at  Grapevine 
bridge,  and  his  sending  Taylor  later  with  a  message  to  Jackson, 
show  that  he  believed  his  orders  were  being  executed. 

The  explanation  of  Jackson's  message  to  Jones  is  clear  in  the 
light  of  his  regard  for  the  Sabbath  and  from  the  particular  ex- 
pression used.  He  mentions  no  physical  obstacle  nor  any  other 
demand  upon  his  troops,  who,  indeed,  are  all  resting  quietly  in 
their  camps,  but  the  "important  duty"  to  be  performed  seems  to 
concern  himself  rather  than  his  command,  and  to  be  entirely 
personal  in  character.  Evidently,  Jackson  excused  not  only 
himself,  but  his  troops  also,  because  it  was  Sunday.  He  cer- 
tainly considered  attendance  upon  divine  service  an  "impor- 
tant duty"  of  the  first  magnitude.  He  confidently  believed 
that  marked  regard  for  the  Sabbath  would  often  be  followed  by 
God 's  favor  upon  one 's  secular  enterprises.  If  so,  why  not  upon 
a  battle  or  a  campaign  ?  We  have  seen  even  Lincoln  share  the 
same  belief  when  he  stopped  the  advance  of  McDowell  from 
Fredericksburg  on  Sunday,  and  thus  broke  up  McClellan's 
campaign,  as  has  been  told.  (See  p.  101.) 

The  rebuilding  of  Grapevine  bridge  was  not  a  serious  matter. 
Lee  clearly  anticipated  no  delay  there  whatever.  Jackson's 
engineer,  early  Sunday  morning,  reported  that  it  would  be  finished 
in  two  hours.  There  was  a  ford  close  by,  and  other  bridges  within 
a  few  miles,  but  most  of  Jackson 's  troops  spent  the  entire  day  in 
camp. 

His  early  start  next  morning  would  seem  to  promise  more  vigor 


146  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

in  the  performance  for  that  day,  but  its  history  does  not  bear 
out  the  promise.  It  was  but  seven  miles  from  the  bivouacs  which 
his  men  left  about  2.30  A.M.  to  White  Oak  Bridge  where  they 
went  into  bivouac  at  night.  No  obstacle  to  a  swift  march  existed, 
but  the  earliest  arrival  noted  in  the  reports  is  at  9.30  A.M.  by 
Col.  Crutchfield  of  the  Artillery.  Jackson  himself  puts  it  later. 

White  Oak  Swamp  rises  between  the  Charles  City  and  the 
Williamsburg  road  near  where  the  Confederate  lines  crossed 
them,  five  miles  from  Richmond.  The  course  of  the  stream  is 
southeast,  almost  parallel  to  that  of  the  Charles  City  road  for 
about  six  miles.  Then  it  turns  and  runs  directly  toward  the 
Chickahominy  some  three  miles  away.  Just  above  this  bend  was 
Brackett's  Ford,  and  about  a  mile  below  it  was  the  main  road 
crossing  at  which  Jackson  arrived  about  9.30  A.M.,  Monday.  The 
stream  itself  was  a  small  creek,  averaging  10  to  15  feet  wide 
and  six  inches  deep,  with  sandy  bottom.  The  swamp  was  merely  a 
flat  area  densely  grown  up  in  trees  and  bushes,  more  or  less  wet  hi 
places,  but  generally  with  firm  footing.  Small  farms  and  settle- 
ments were  scattered  along  its  edges,  and  residents  and  cattle 
had  many  paths  in  and  through  it.  It  was  widest  near  its  source, 
where  the  country  was  flatter.  Near  the  bridge  the  country  was 
rolling  and  the  swamp  grew  narrow.  Four  crossings  above  the 
bridge  were  well  known  to  the  natives, — Chapman's  (or  Good- 
man's), Jourdan's,  Fisher's,  and  Brackett's, — and  one  below 
called  Carter 's ;  but  besides  these  were  many  less-known  paths. 

The  road  crossing  was  held  by  Franklin,  who  thus  describes 
the  operations  of  the  day  in  his  official  report: — 

"About  noon  I  was  directed  by  the  commanding  general  to  assume 
command  at  the  position  guarding  the  crossing  of  the  swamp,  and  repaired 
there  at  once.  I  found  that  a  terrific  cannonade  had  been  opened 
by  the  enemy  upon  the  divisions  of  Gen.  Smith  and  Gen.  Richardson 
and  the  brigade  of  Gen.  Naglee.  The  two  latter  had  been  placed  under 
my  command  by  the  commanding  general.  The  casualties  in  Richard- 
son's division  were  quite  numerous,  but  I  have  received  no  report  of  the 
action  from  him.  In  Gen.  Smith's  division  and  in  Gen.  Naglee 's  brigade 
the  number  lost  was  insignificant. 

"The  enemy  kept  up  the  firing  during  the  whole  day  and  crossed  some 
infantry  below  our  position,  but  he  made  no  very  serious  attempt  to  cross 
during  the  day,  and  contented  himself  with  the  cannonading  and  the  firing 


SEVEN  DAYS'  CAMPAIGN.    THE  PURSUIT  147 

of  his  sharp-shooters.  Nightfall  having  arrived,  and  the  wagons  having 
all  disappeared,  I  took  the  responsibility  of  moving  my  command  to  the 
James  River  by  a  road  to  the  left  which  had  not  been  much  used,  and 
arrived  at  headquarters  safely  about  daylight." 

The  infantry  referred  to  by  Franklin  as  having  crossed  were 
only  D.  H.  Hill 's  skirmish-line.  No  effort  was  made  to  cross  any- 
thing more.  Jackson 's  own  account  of  the  day  is  as  follows :  — 

"About  noon  we  reached  White  Oak  Swamp,  and  here  the  enemy  made 
a  determined  effort  to  retard  our  advance,  and  thereby  prevent  an  im- 
meditate  junction  between  Gen.  Longstreet  and  myself.  We  found  the 
bridge  destroyed  and  the  ordinary  place  of  crossing  commanded  by  their 
batteries  on  the  opposite  side  and  all  approach  to  it  barred  by  detach- 
ments of  sharp-shooters  concealed  in  a  dense  wood  close  by.  A  battery 
of  28  guns  from  Hill's  and  Whiting's  artillery  was  placed  by  Col. 
Crutchfield  in  a  favorable  position  for  driving  off  or  silencing  the  opposing 
artillery.  About  2  P.M.  it  opened  suddenly  upon  the  enemy.  He  fired  a  few 
shots  in  reply,  and  then  withdrew  from  that  position,  abandoning  part  of  his 
artillery.  Capt.  Wooding  was  immediately  ordered  near  the  bridge  to  shell 
the  sharp-shooters  from  the  woods,  which  was  accomplished,  and  Munford's 
cavalry  crossed  the  creek,  but  was  soon  compelled  to  retire.  It  was  soon  seen 
that  the  enemy  occupied  such  a  position  beyond  a  thick  intervening  wood  on 
the  right  of  the  road  as  enabled  him  to  command  the  crossing.  Capt. 
Wooding's  batteries  turned  in  the  new  direction.  The  fire  so  opened  on  both 
sides  was  kept  up  until  dark.  We  bivouacked  that  night  near  the  swamp. 

"  A  heavy  cannonading  in  front  announced  the  engagement  of  Gen.  Long- 
street  at  Frazier's  Farm  and  made  me  anxious  to  press  forward,  but  the 
marshy  character  of  the  soil,  the  destruction  of  the  bridge  over  the  marsh  and 
creek,  and  the  strong  position  of  the  enemy  for  defending  the  passage  pre- 
vented my  advancing  until  the  following  morning.  During  the  night  the 
Federals  retired." 

Considered  as  an  excuse  for  Jackson's  inaction  during  the 
whole  day  this  report  is  simply  farcical. 

It  appears  from  subordinate  reports  that  the  long  delay  be- 
tween the  arrival  of  the  head  of  Jackson 's  column  and  the  open- 
ing of  his  28  guns  was  caused  by  cutting  a  road  to  enable  the  guns 
to  be  kept  concealed  while  getting  position.  Concealment  here 
was  of  little  value,  and  the  time  thus  lost  by  the  artillery,  and  the 
sending  across  of  Munford's  cavalry  at  the  road  crossing,  illus- 
trate the  prominent  feature  of  Jackson's  conduct  during  the 
whole  Seven  Days,  —  to  wit :  a  reluctance  to  bring  his  infan- 
try into  action.  Here  infantry  alone  could  accomplish  anything, 


148  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

but  only  cavalry  and  artillery  were  called  upon.  He  could 
have  crossed  a  brigade  of  infantry  as  easily  as  Munford  's  cavalry, 
and  that  brigade  could  have  been  the  entering  wedge  which 
would  split  apart  the  Federal  defence  and  let  in  the  13  brigades 
which  followed.  The  bridge,  whose  destruction  is  mentioned, 
was  not  necessary  to  a  crossing.  It  was  only  a  high-water 
bridge  with  a  ford  by  it  which  was  preferably  used  except  in 
freshets.  Now  the  floor  of  the  bridge,  made  of  poles,  had  been 
thrown  into  the  ford,  but  Munford 's  cavalry  got  through  with- 
out trouble,  and  infantry  could  have  swarmed  across. 

The  cannonade,  which  was  kept  up  during  all  the  rest  of  the 
day,  was  not  only  a  delusion,  but  a  useless  burning  both  of  daylight 
and  ammunition,  for  it  was  all  random  fire.  The  Federal  and 
Confederate  artillery  could  not  see  each  other  at  all.  They 
could  scarcely  even  see  the  high-floating  smoke  clouds  of  each 
other 's  guns.  They  fired  by  sound,  at  a  distance  of  three-quar- 
ters of  a  mile,  across  a  tall  dense  wood,  until  they  exhausted  their 
ammunition.  One  Federal  battery  reported  the  expenditure  of 
1600  rounds.  The  noise  was  terrific,  and  some  firing  was  kept  up 
until  nine  o  'clock  at  night,  but  the  casualties,  on  each  side  were 
naturally  but  trifling.  Only  one  Confederate  battery,  Rhett's, 
mentions  any,  and  it  reported  but  two  killed  and  five  wounded. 

No  reconnoissance  was  made  for  other  crossings,  even  of  Brack- 
ett's,  over  which  much  of  the  Federal  force  had  passed,  until 
Wright's  brigade  arrived  and  was  sent  back,  as  has  been  told. 
Meanwhile,  two  other  crossings  available  for  infantry  were  dis- 
covered within  a  very  short  distance  below,  and  were  both  at 
once  reported  to  Jackson  by  the  officers  discovering  them 
—  Col.  Munford,  commanding  his  cavalry,  and  Gen.  Hamp- 
ton, commanding  the  3d  brigade  of  Jackson's  division.  I 
have  in  possession  letters  from  Munford  to  Hampton,  and  from 
Hampton  to  myself,  giving  the  following  details. 

I  have  already  quoted  from  Jackson  'sjeport  that  his  cavalry, 
sent  across  the  creek  at  first,  was  forced  to  retire.  Col.  Munford 
in  a  letter  to  Gen.  Hampton,  dated  Mar.  23,  1901,  writes:  — 

"At  the  battle  of  White  Oak  Swamp,  after  Col.  Crutchfield's  artillery 
had  disabled  one  gun,  and  driven  the  cannoneers  from  the  battery  which 
commanded  the  crossing  at  the  old  bridge  at  White  Oak  Swamp,  Gen. 


SEVEN  DAYS'  CAMPAIGN.    THE  PURSUIT  149 

Jackson  directed  me  to  cross  the  creek,  with  my  regiment,  at  the  ford, 
and  to  secure  the  guns  in  front  of  us.  The  enemy's  sharp-shooters  were 
stationed  in  rear  of  the  building  overlooking  the  ford  ;  and  as  soon  as 
we  neared  the  abandoned  battery  of  the  enemy,  these  sharp-shooters, 
and  another  battery  stationed  in  the  road  at  the  edge  of  the  woods,  and 
commanding  the  road  and  the  ford  over  which  we  had  passed,  opened  a 
furious  fire  upon  us,  and  I  was  forced  to  move  a  quarter  of  a  mile  lower 
down  the  creek,  where  I  found  a  cow  path  which  led  me  over  the  swamp. 
But  en  route,  I  found  where  Gen.  Franklin's  troops  had  been  located, 
having  now  changed  front.  They  had  left  a  long  line  of  knapsacks  and 
blankets,  from  which  I  allowed  my  men  to  take  what  they  pleased ;  and 
among  their  things  were  many  late  newspapers  from  Washington,  which 
I  despatched  by  a  courier  to  Gen.  Jackson,  giving  him  full  information 
of  what  I  had  seen  and  how  and  where  I  had  crossed. 

"Thirty-nine  years  is  too  long  a  time  to  attempt  to  say  what  I  wrote 
him,  but  I  know  that  I  thought,  all  the  time,  that  he  could  have  crossed 
his  infantry  where  we  recrossed.  I  had  seen  his  infantry  cross  far  worse 
places,  and  I  expected  that  he  would  attempt  it. 

"  We  remained  near  where  we  recrossed  all  day,  with  a  vidette  on  the 
other  side  of  the  swamp.  He  put  his  sharp-shooters  in  on  the  right  of  the 
ford,  and  made  no  attempt  to  cross  where  we  recrossed. 

"Why,  I  never  understood. 

"Yours  sincerely,  THOMAS  T.  MUNFORD." 

All  the  crossings  so  far  described  were  paths  already  marked 
by  use  of  men  and  cattle,  but  another  opportunity  was  discovered 
and  brought  to  Jackson's  notice  by  Hampton,  who  was  an 
expert  woodsman  and  hunter.  While  the  infantry  stood  idly 
by  and  the  useless  cannonade  went  on,  nothing  was  more  natural 
to  Hampton  than  a  personal  reconnoissance  in  front.  He  found 
a  crossing  and  the  flank  of  the  enemy's  infantry  line.  He 
returned  and  reported  it  to  Jackson.  In  the  last  year  of  his  life 
he  wrote  out  the  story  as  given  below.  He  has  only  omitted  from 
it,  modestly,  the  fact  that,  when  he  reported  to  Jackson  his 
discovery,  he  begged  permission  to  take  his  brigade  across  im- 
mediately and  attack  it.  This  request  was  at  first  put  off  by  the 
order  to  go  and  build  a  bridge.  After  the  bridge  was  reported 
finished,  the  whole  matter  was  silently  ignored,  as  his  narrative 
describes. 

Hampton 's  narrative  is  as  follows :  — 

"We  left  the  Chickahominy  on  Monday  morning,  June  30,  though  my 
impression  is  that  the  Grapevine  bridge  could  have  been  used  on  Sunday,  and 


150  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

at  any  rate  there  was  a  good  ford  of  the  stream  not  far  below  the  bridge, 
near  the  road  followed  by  the  retreating  enemy.  Early  on  the  morning 
of  Monday  we  reached  the  White  Oak  crossing,  my  brigade  being  in  ad- 
vance ;  and  about  the  same  time  the  2d  Va.  Cav.  under  Col.  Munford 
came  up.  This  regiment  had  accompanied  Gen.  Jackson  from  the  Valley 
covering  his  advance. 

"We  found  a  large  hospital  tent  on  the  brow  of  the  hill  overlooking 
the  crossing  of  the  small  stream  over  which  a  little  bridge  of  poles  had  been 
made.  The  enemy  had  pulled  off  the  poles  and  thrown  them  in  the  stream 
above  the  bridge,  and  a  battery  of  four  guns  on  the  opposite  hill  commanded 
the  causeway  and  the  ford  of  the  stream.  Gen.  Jackson  ran  up  some 
guns  and  soon  silenced  those  of  the  enemy,  disabling  one  of  them.  The 
battery  was  withdrawn,  and  Gen.  Jackson,  accompanied  by  the  regi- 
ment of  cavalry,  crossed  with  a  view,  I  suppose,  of  capturing  the  disabled 
gun,  or  of  ascertaining  the  position  of  the  enemy — none  of  whom  were  in 
sight  except  those  manning  the  gun.  In  a  few  minutes  the  General 
returned  alone,  while  Munford  took  his  regiment  a  short  distance  down 
the  stream,  where  he  crossed  without  difficulty.  As  there  were  no  further 
hostile  demonstrations  where  we  were,  I  placed  my  brigade  in  a  pine  forest 
on  the  left  of  the  road  leading  to  the  ford,  directing  the  men  to  lie  down ; 
and,  desiring  to  ascertain  the  character  of  the  ground  in  front  of  us,  I 
rode  to  the  edge  of  the  swamp,  accompanied  by  Capt.  Rawlins  Lowndes, 
and  my  son  Wade,  who  was  serving  on  my  staff  at  that  time.  The  swamp 
was  comparatively  open,  the  ground  not  at  all  boggy,  and  we  soon  struck 
the  stream. 

"This  was  very  shallow,  with  a  clear  sandy  bottom,  and  not  more  than 
10  or  15  feet  wide.  Crossing  this,  we  soon  came  in  sight  of  the  open  land 
opposite  our  position. 

"We  could  see  a  very  wide  and  deep  ravine  in  which  was  a  line  of 
Federals  lying  down  in  line  of  battle,  and  evidently  expecting,  if  any 
attack  was  made  upon  them,  it  would  be  from  the  open  field  below  the 
ford  of  the  stream.  In  this  event  their  position  would  have  been  very 
strong. 

"Withdrawing  without  attracting  their  notice,  I  returned  across  the 
swamp  and  gave  to  Gen.  Jackson  all  the  facts  stated  above. 

"  He  asked  if  I  could  make  a  bridge  across  the  stream,  to  which  I  replied 
that  I  could  make  one  for  the  infantry,  but  not  for  artillery,  as  cutting  a 
road  would  disclose  our  position.  He  directed  me  to  make  the  bridge. 
Ordering  a  detail  of  my  men  to  cut  some  poles  where  they  were  standing 
and  to  carry  them  into  the  swamp,  a  bridge  was  made  in  a  few  minutes. 
I  then  again  reconnoitred  the  position  of  the  enemy  whom  I  found  per- 
fectly quiet  —  unsuspecting.  On  my  return  to  our  side  of  the  swamp,  I 
found  Gen.  Jackson  seated  on  a  fallen  pine  alongside  of  the  road  that 
led  down  to  the  ford,  and  seating  myself  by  him,  I  reported  the  completion 
of  the  bridge  and  the  exposed  position  of  the  enemy.  He  drew  his  cap 


SEVEN  DAYS'  CAMPAIGN.    THE  PURSUIT  151 

down  over  his  eyes  which  were  closed,  and  after  listening  to  me  for  some 
minutes,  he  rose  without  speaking,  and  the  next  morning  we  found  Frank- 
lin with  the  rest  of  the  Federal  troops  concentrated  on  Malvern  Hill. 

"  While  we  were  waiting  at  the  White  Oak  crossing  we  heard  the  noise 
of  Longstreet's  battle  at  Frazier's  Farm,  and  Capt.  or  Maj.  Fairfax 
of  Longstreet's  staff  came  with  a  message  from  the  general  to  Gen. 
Jackson.  Though  I  heard  this  message,  I  cannot  recall  it.  ...  In  speak- 
ing to  Gen.  Lee  in  1868  on  this  subject  he  expressed  the  greatest  sur- 
prise at  my  account  of  this  matter,  and  he  said  that  he  never  had  under- 
stood why  the  delay  had  occurred.  .  .  . 

"  Gen.  Jackson  was  too  great  a  soldier,  and  I  was  too  much  attached 
to  him,  for  me  to  venture  to  criticise  his  actions  or  his  plans,  but  it  seems 
to  me  that  everything  which  throws  light  on  the  plans  of  our  great 
chief,  Gen.  Lee,  should  go  down  in  history.  I  believe  that  if  Franklin, 
who  opposed  us  at  White  Oak,  could  have  been  defeated,  the  Federal 
army  would  have  been  destroyed.  .  .  . 

"  Yours  truly, 

"WADE  HAMPTON." 

Much  comment  suggests  itself,  but  little  is  needed :  Who  that 
fought  with  Lee  can  picture  to  himself  without  emotion  what 
might  have  happened  had  the  Jackson  of  the  Valley  had  the 
opportunity  presented  to  him  which  Gen.  Hampton  has  de- 
scribed as  offered  in  vain  to  the  Jackson  of  the  Chickahominy. 

Franklin,  commanding  the  Federal  force  here  opposed  to 
Jackson,  wrote  of  this  occasion  as  follows  (Battles  and 
Leaders,  II.,  381):  — 

"Jackson  seems  to  have  been  ignorant  of  what  Gen.  Lee  expected 
of  him,  and  badly  informed  about  Brackett's  Ford.  When  he  found  how 
strenuous  was  our  defence  at  the  bridge,  he  should  have  turned  his  atten- 
tion to  Brackett's  Ford,  also.  A  force  could  have  been  as  quietly  gathered 
there  as  at  the  bridge ;  a  strong  infantry  movement  at  the  ford  would  have 
easily  overrun  our  small  force  there,  placing  our  right  at  Glendale,  held 
by  Slocum's  division,  in  great  jeopardy,  and  turning  our  force  at  the 
bridge  by  getting  between  it  and  Glendale.  In  fact,  it  is  likely  that  we 
should  have  been  defeated  that  day,  had  Gen.  Jackson  done  what  his 
great  reputation  seems  to  have  made  it  imperative  he  should  have  done." 

D.  H.  Hill  (who  was  Jackson's  brother-in-law),  writing  in  the 
Century  of  this  occasion  many  years  after  the  war,  says :  — 

"Our  cavalry  (Munford's  regiment)  returned  by  the  lower  ford  and 
pronounced  it  perfectly  practicable  for  infantry;  but  Jackson  did  not 
advance.  Why  was  this  ?  It  was  the  critical  day  for  both  commanders, 


152  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

but  especially  for  McClellan.  With  consummate  skill  he  had  crossed  his 
vast  train  of  5000  wagons,  and  his  immense  parks  of  artillery,  safely  over 
White  Oak  Swamp,  but  he  was  more  exposed  now  than  at  any  time  in 
his  flank  march.  Three  columns  of  attack  were  converging  on  him  and 
a  strong  corps  was  pressing  upon  his  rear.  Escape  seemed  impossible 
for  him,  but  he  did  escape.  .  .  .  Gen.  Lee,  through  no  fault  in  his 
plans,  was  to  see  his  splendid  prize  slip  through  his  hands.  Longstreet 
and  A.  P.  Hill  struck  the  enemy  at  Frazier's  Farm  (or  Glendale)  at  3  P.M., 
and  both  being  always  ready  for  a  fight,  immediately  attacked.  .  .  . 
There  were  five  divisions  within  sound  of  the  firing  and  within  supporting 
distance,  but  not  one  of  them  moved.  .  .  .  Maj.  Dabney,  in  his  life  of 
Jackson,  thus  comments  on  the  inaction  of  that  affair :  '  On  this  occasion 
it  would  appear,  if  the  vast  interests  dependent  upon  Gen.  Jackson's 
cooperation  with  the  proposed  attack  upon  the  centre  were  considered, 
that  he  came  short  of  the  efficiency  in  action  for  which  he  was  elsewhere 
noted.' 

"  After  showing  how  the  crossing  of  White  Oak  might  have  been  effected, 
Dabney  adds :  '  The  list  of  casualties  might  have  been  longer  than  that 
presented  on  the  30th,  of  one  cannoneer  wounded,  but  how  much  shorter 
would  have  been  the  bloody  lis^  filled  up  the  next  day  at  Malvern  Hill  ? 
This  temporary  eclipse  of  Jackson's  genius  was  probably  to  be  explained 
by  physical  causes.  The  labor  of  the  previous  days,  the  sleeplessness,  the 
wear  of  gigantic  cares,  with  the  drenching  of  the  comfortless  night,  had 
sunk  the  elasticity  of  his  will  and  the  quickness  of  his  invention,  for  the 
nonce,  below  their  wonted  tension.'" 

D.  H.  Hill  does  not  comment  upon  this  explanation,  but  it 
will  not  bear  examination.  For  two  days  Jackson  and  his  com- 
mand had  been  quietly  in  camp ;  and  his  lapse  from  duty,  while 
culminating  only  on  June  29  and  30,  in  fact  dated  from  the  very 
first  of  the  Seven  Days.  Hill  submits  his  own  explanation  of  the 
matter  as  follows :  — 

"  I  think  that  an  important  factor  in  this  inaction  was  Jackson's  pity 
for  his  own  corps,  worn  out  by  long  and  exhausting  marches,  and  reduced 
in  numbers  by  its  numerous  sanguinary  battles.  He  thought  that  the  gar- 
rison of  Richmond  ought  now  to  bear  the  brunt  of  the  fighting."  l 

This  last  expression  is  but  another  form  of  a  rumor  which, 
to  my  knowledge,  had  private  circulation  at  the  time  among  the 
staff-officers  of  some  of  the  leading  generals.  It  was  reported 
that  Jackson  had  said  that "  he  did  not  intend  that  his  men  should 
do  all  the  fighting." 

1  The  italics  are  mine. 


SEVEN  DAYS'  CAMPAIGN.    THE  PURSUIT  153 

Jackson's  troops  (his  own  and  Ewell's  divisions)  had  had  a 
sharp  campaign  in  the  Valley,  but  the  rest  of  the  army  at  York- 
town,  Williamsburg,  and  Seven  Pines  had  suffered  just  as  many 
hardships,  and  done  even  more  severe  fighting,  as  the  casualties 
will  attest.  There  were  no  arrears  to  be  made  up.  The  total 
killed  and  wounded  of  Jackson's  six  brigades  in  the  Valley  cam- 
paign from  Kernstown  (March  23)  to  Port  Republic  (June  9) 
were  but  2311.  Three  brigades — Rodes's,  Garland's,  and  G.  B. 
Anderson's  of  D.  H.  Hill's  division — had  had  killed  and  wounded 
the  first  day  at  Seven  Pines  2621.  During  the  Seven  Days  they 
lost  2277  more,  while  Jackson's  six  brigades  lost  but  1152. 

It  is  only  natural  and  right  that  every  division  commander 
should  feel  both  pity  and  affection  for  his  own  men,  but  to  mani- 
fest either  by  shirking  battle  is  no  real  kindness  to  them,  apart 
from  the  tremendous  consequences  to  the  army  and  the  nation. 

We  may  now  return  to  Lee,  Longstreet,  and  A.  P.  Hill  at 
Frazier's  Farm  or  Glendale,  where  we  left  them  waiting  vainly 
for  the  sounds  of  battle  from  Huger  and  Jackson.  Between 
three  and  four  o'clock  the  enemy,  aware  of  their  proximity, 
unwisely  increased  the  fire  of  one  of  their  batteries.  Longstreet 
ordered  Jenkins,  second  to  none  in  either  courage  or  ambition, 
to  charge  it.  Jenkins  charged  the  battery  and  got  possession, 
but  was  attacked  by  the  infantry  in  support.  This  brought  on 
the  battle  at  once,  though  not  in  the  best  shape ;  for,  instead  of 
one  simultaneous  attack  by  the  whole  force,  more  time  was 
wasted,  and  the  brigades  came  in  in  piecemeal.  A  very  desperate 
fight  ensued,  and  lasted  until  long  after  dark,  with  varying 
fortunes.  There  were  present  but  the  two  Confederate  divi- 
sions, 12  brigades,  which  had  borne  the  brunt  of  the  27th 
at  Gaines  Mill,  and  had  lost  4300  men  out  of  22,000  engaged. 
They  were  taking  the  aggressive  against  Kearny's,  McCall's,  and 
Hooker's  divisions  (about  25,000  men),  carefully  posted,  with 
some  protection  and  obstructions. 

A  fourth  division,  Sedgwick's,  was  in  reserve  in  a  second  line 
behind  McCall,  and  a  fifth,  Slocum's,  was  near  on  the  right,  each 
over  8000  strong.  Almost  the  whole  of  these  40,000  troops  took 
part  in  the  battle.  Within  an  hour's  march  were  Richardson's 
and  Smith's  divisions  and  Naglee's  brigade,  23,000  more,  which 


154  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

could  have  been  called  in  if  needed.  It  goes  without  saying  that 
while  the  Confederates  might  have  more  or  less  success,  at  the 
beginning,  depending  upon  the  cooperation  of  their  brigades, 
only  the  approach  of  night  could  prevent  their  being  finally 
repulsed  and  driven  from  the  field,  with  losses  proportionate  to 
the  persistence  of  their  attacks. 

No  more  desperate  encounter  took  place  in  the  war;  and  no- 
where else,  to  my  knowledge,  so  much  actual  personal  fighting 
with  bayonet  and  butt  of  gun.  Randol's  battery,  over  which  it 
began,  was  taken  and  retaken  several  times.  Once,  when  in  pos- 
session of  the  llth  Ala.  regiment  of  Wilcox's  brigade,  it  was 
charged  by  McCall's  Pa.  Reserves,  and  after  a  desperate  bayonet 
fight  each  side  fell  back  to  adjacent  woods,  leaving  the  guns  de- 
serted, but  under  fire  from  both  sides.  Wilcox's  report  gives 
illustrations  of  the  character  of  the  fighting:  — 

"Capt.  W.  C.  Y.  Parker  had  two  successive  encounters  with  Federal 
officers,  both  of  whom  he  felled  with  his  sword,  and,  beset  by  others  of 
the  enemy,  he  was  severely  wounded,  having  received  two  bayonet 
wounds  in  the  breast  and  one  in  his  side,  and  a  musket  ball  breaking  his 
left  thigh. 

"  Lt.  Michie  had  a  hand-to-hand  collision  with  an  officer,  and  having 
just  dealt  a  severe  blow  upon  his  adversary,  he  fell,  cut  over  the 
head  with  a  sabre-bayonet  from  behind,  and  had  afterward  three  bayonet 
wounds  in  the  face  and  two  in  the  breast, — all  severe  wounds  which  he 
survived,  however,  for  three  days." 

A  little  later,  Field's  brigade  of  Hill's  division,  in  a  counter- 
charge, again  had  bayonet  fighting,  and  drove  McCall's  line  back 
for  a  half-mile,  and  held  the  ground  until  the  captured  guns  were 
carried  safely  to  the  rear.  Severe  fighting  continued  to  take 
place  until  after  dark.  The  enemy  became  so  aggressive  that 
Lee  felt  it  necessary  to  send  for  Magruder's  six  brigades  which 
had  been  unwisely  marched  to  reenforce  Holmes,  and  which 
had  lost  distance  and  time  by  confusion  of  roads  and  guides. 
These  unfortunate  troops,  which  had  been  marching  all  day, 
were  now  marched  and  countermarched  until  long  after  mid- 
night, so  that  they  were  thoroughly  exhausted  when  they  reached 
the  field,  and  were  put  in  front  of  those  who  had  been  equally 
worn  out  in  the  desperate  fighting.  Meanwhile  a  ruse  which 
had  been  practised  seems  to  have  been  successful  in  bringing 


SEVEN  DAYS'  CAMPAIGN.    THE  PURSUIT  155 

the  pressure  of  the  enemy's  fresh  battalions  to  an  end.     A.  P. 
Hill  thus  describes  it :  — 

"About  dark  the  enemy  were  pressing  us  hard  along  our  whole  line, 
and  my  last  reserve,  Gen.  J.  R.  Anderson,  with  his  Ga.  brigade,  was 
directed  to  advance  cautiously,  and  be  careful  not  to  fire  on  our  friends. 
His  brigade  was  formed  in  line,  two  regiments  on  each  side  of  the  road, 
and,  obeying  my  instructions  to  the  letter,  received  the  fire  of  the  enemy 
at  70  paces  before  engaging  themselves.  Heavy  reinforcements  to  the 
enemy  were  brought  up  at  this  time,  and  it  seemed  that  a  tremendous 
effort  was  being  made  to  turn  the  fortunes  of  the  battle.  The  volume  of 
fire  that,  approaching,  rolled  along  the  line,  was  terrific.  Seeing  some 
troops  of  Wilcox's  brigade,  with  the  assistance  of  Lt.  Chamberlayne 
and  other  members  of  my  staff,  they  were  rapidly  formed,  and  being  di- 
rected to  cheer  long  and  loudly  moved  again  to  the  fight.  This  seemed 
to  end  the  contest,  and  in  less  than  five  minutes  all  firing  ceased  and  the 
enemy  retired." 

In  this  battle  the  losses  of  Longstreet's  division  were  about 
2600  and  in  A.  P.  Hill's  about  1700;  total  4300.  The  Federal 
losses  are  not  given  separately,  but  were,  doubtless,  not  very  un- 
equal. McCall  was  captured,  riding  into  our  lines  by  mistake, 
and  we  also  secured  18  guns,  besides  some  prisoners,  and  the 
gleanings  of  the  field  in  small-arms. 

Lee,  an  example  for  all  time  of  restraint  in  expressing  per- 
sonal feeling,  wrote  in  his  report  of  this  battle :  — 

"  Could  the  other  commands  have  cooperated  in  this  action,  the  result 
would  have  proved  most  disastrous  to  the  enemy." 

I  have  often  thought  that  in  his  retrospect  of  the  war  no  one 
day  of  the  whole  four  years  would  seem  to  him  more  unfortunate 
than  June  30,  1862.  It  was,  undoubtedly,  the  opportunity  of 
his  life,  for  the  Confederacy  was  then  in  its  prime,  with  more 
men  available  than  ever  before  or  after.  And  at  no  other  period 
would  the  moral  or  the  physical  effect  of  a  victory  have  been  so 
great  as  upon  this  occasion. 


CHAPTER  IX 
THE  ESCAPE.    BATTLE  OF  MALVERN  HILL 

Enemy's  New  Position.  Line  Formed.  Pendleton's  Artillery.  Artillery 
Combats.  Whiting's  Report.  Sumner  seeks  Cover.  Lee's  Recon- 
noissance.  Lee  Misled.  Attack  Begun.  Wright's  Report.  Semmes 
and  Kershaw.  D.  H.  Hill's  Report.  Toombs's  Report.  Casualties. 
Lee's  Report.  Stuart  shells  a  Camp.  McClellan  Writes.  Stuart's 
Report.  Attack  Abandoned.  Casualties.  An  Artillery  Raid.  The 
South  Side.  Our  Balloon. 

NEXT  morning  (Tuesday,  July  1)  we  began  to  pay  the  pen- 
alty for  our  unimproved  opportunity  of  the  day  before. 

Of  course,  the  enemy  was  gone,  and  about  three  miles  down  the 
road  we  came  upon  his  whole  army,  now  united  and  massed,  upon 
Malvern  Hill. 

This  position  is  a  high  plateau  stretching  north  from  the  low- 
lands along  the  valley  of  James  River,  over  which  it  dominates 
in  high  steep  hills,  with  Turkey  Run  on  the  west,  and  Western 
Run  on  the  east.  It  is  about  a  mile  wide  and,  for  two  miles 
from  the  river,  is  open  land,  rolling  and  sloping  toward  the 
north  where  it  ends  in  a  heavy  forest,  intersected  by  marshy 
streams,  with  only  one  good  road  leading  through  the  forest  out 
upon  the  plateau.  The  Rev.  L.  W.  Allen,  already  mentioned  as 
on  the  staff  of  Magruder,  was  a  native  of  this  section,  and  had  de- 
scribed to  D.  H.  Hill  its  striking  features,  noting,  — 

"its  commanding  height,  the  difficulties  of  approach,  its  amphitheatri- 
cal  form  and  ample  area,  which  would  enable  McClellan  to  arrange  his 
350  field  guns,  tier  above  tier,  and  sweep  the  plain  in  every  direction." 

Hill  writes  in  the  Century  Magazine :  — 

"Jackson  moved  over  White  Oak  Swamp  on  July  1,  Whiting's  divi- 
sion leading.  Our  march  was  much  delayed  by  the  crossing  of  troops 
and  trains.  At  Willis's  Church  I  met  Gen.  Lee.  He  bore  grandly  his 
terrible  disappointment  of  the  day  before,  and  made  no  allusion  to  it. 
I  gave  him  Mr.  Allen's  description  of  Malvern  Hill  and  presumed  to  say, 

156 


THE  ESCAPE.    BATTLE  OF  MALVERN  HILL          157 

'If  Gen.  McClellan  is  there  in  force,  we  had  better  let  him  alone.'  Long- 
street  laughed  and  said,  'Don't  get  scared,  now  that  we  have  got  him 
whipped.'" 

Reconnoissance,  ordered  by  Longstreet  on  the  right,  found  a 
position  favorable  if  we  could  employ  a  heavy  force  of  artillery. 
A  hill  across  Turkey  Creek  on  the  west  gave  ground  whence 
40  or  more  guns  could  enfilade  the  enemy's  batteries  and  lines 
of  battle.  A  wheat-field  to  the  northeast  gave  positions  whence 
a  hundred  guns  could  cross  fire  with  them.  Could  we  mass  and 
open  two  such  batteries,  and  follow  their  fire  by  a  simultaneous 
charge  of  heavy  columns,  we  would  have  a  chance  of  winning  a 
victory.  Lee  ordered  the  plan  carried  into  effect.  Meanwhile, 
a  line  of  battle  had  been  formed  through  the  woods  and  fields. 
Whiting  was  on  the  left  with  three  brigades  (one  of  Jackson's 
under  Hampton,  and  two  of  his  own).  D.  H.  Hill  came  next 
with  five,  then  two  of  Huger's,  six  of  Magruder's,  and  two  more 
of  Huger's,  including  Ransom's,  detached  from  Holmes's  division. 
The  remainder  of  Holmes's  was  held  on  the  River  road,  and  was 
not  engaged.  Longstreet  and  Hill  were  in  reserve  behind  Magru- 
der ;  and  Swell's  and  Jackson's  own  division,  behind  Jackson.  The 
enemy's  batteries  kept  up  a  severe  fire  through  the  woods  and 
along  the  roads,  and  the  gunboats  in  the  James  participated 
for  some  hours  with  their  heavy  guns,  until  at  length  some  shells 
burst  prematurely  over  their  own  lines,  when  their  fire  was  or- 
dered to  cease. 

The  order  to  charge  the  enemy's  lines  was,  however,  not  made 
absolute.  Magruder,  Huger,  and  D.  H.  Hill,  with  their  14  bri- 
gades, were  notified  as  follows  about  noon :  — 

"July  1,  1862. 

"Batteries  have  been  established  to  rake  the  enemy's  line.  If  it  is 
broken,  as  is  probable,  Armistead,  who  can  witness  the  effect  of  the  fire, 
has  been  ordered  to  charge  with  a  yell.  Do  the  same.  By  order  of 
Gen.  Lee. 

"R.  H.  CHILTON,  A.  A.  G." 

The  charge,  therefore,  was  made  to  depend  upon  our  being 
able  to  inaugurate  and  conduct  with  success  an  artillery  duel  of 
some  magnitude. 

Pioneers  were  sent  to  open  a  road  to  the  left,  and  it  was  ex- 


158  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

pected  that  artillery  would  act  upon  both  flanks;  but  here  our 
organization  broke  down.  Gen.  Pendleton,  Lee's  Chief  of  Artil- 
lery, had  a  large  artillery  reserve,  organized  in  four  battalions  of 
several  batteries  each,  including  our  best  rifled  guns ;  but  he  was 
not  able  to  bring  a  single  one  of  his  batteries  into  action.  His 
official  report  of  the  day  is  as  follows :  — 

"Tuesday,  July  1,  was  spent  by  me  in  seeking,  for  some  time,  the 
commanding  general,  that  I  might  get  orders,  and,  by  reason  of  the  in- 
tricacy of  routes,  failing  in  this,  in  examining  positions  near  the  two  armies 
toward  ascertaining  what  could  be  best  done  with  a  large  artillery  force, 
and  especially  whether  any  position  could  be  reached  whence  our  large 
guns  could  be  used  to  good  purpose.  These  endeavors  had,  of  course,  to 
be  made  again  and  again  under  the  enemy's  shells  ;  yet  no  site  was  found 
from  which  the  large  guns  could  play  upon  the  enemy  without  endanger- 
ing our  own  troops,  and  no  occasion  was  presented  for  bringing  up  the 
reserve  artillery.  Indeed,  it  seemed  that  not  one-half  of  the  division 
batteries  were  brought  into  action  on  either  Monday  or  Tuesday.  To 
remain  near  by,  therefore,  and  await  events  and  orders  in  readiness  for 
whatever  service  might  be  called  for,  was  all  that  I  could  do.  Here  again 
it  was  my  privilege  to  be  thrown  with  the  President,  he  having  arrived 
sometime  after  nightfall  at  the  house  near  the  battle-field,  where  I  had  just 
before  sought  a  resting-place." 

Between  the  lines  one  can  but  read  a  disappointing  story. 
Pendleton  did  not  find  Lee  all  day  long,  nor  did  any  orders  from 
Lee  find  him.  He  implies  that  his  reserve  artillery  was  not  ex- 
pected to  go  in  until  all  the  division  batteries  were  first  engaged. 
The  division  batteries  were  not  organized  into  battalions,  and, 
acting  separately,  were  easily  overpowered  when  brought  out, 
one  by  one,  in  the  face  of  many  guns  already  in  position.  Pen- 
dleton's  battalions  of  from  three  to  six  batteries  each,  would  have 
stood  much  better  chances;  and  while  there  were  not  many 
places,  there  were  two  extensive  ones,  in  either  of  which  all  of 
these  battalions  could  have  been  used  —  Poindexter's  field, 
and  the  position  on  Magruder's  right,  to  which  Lee  made  the 
pioneers  open  a  road.  As  matters  were,  our  whole  reserve  ar- 
tillery stood  idle  all  day. 

Pendleton  graduated  at  West  Point  in  1830,  one  year  after 
Lee.  He  resigned  in  1833,  and  entered  the  ministry  in  1837. 
In  1861,  he  returned  to  military  life,  and  was  appointed  Chief 
of  Artillery  of  the  Army  about  Oct.,  1861,  under  Gen.  Johns- 


THE  ESCAPE.    BATTLE  OF  MALVERN  HILL          159 

ton.  His  command  did  little  during  the  Seven  Days,  and  Col. 
Brown,  commanding  his  largest  battalion,  in  his  report  men- 
tions "  the  great  superabundance  of  artillery  and  the  scanty  use 
that  was  made  of  it." 

Col.  Cutts,  commanding  another  battalion,  also  reported :  — 

"  My  own  small  command  (seven  guns)  was  assigned  a  place  near  the 
battle-field  of  Tuesday,  the  1st  inst.,  and  although  I  am  sure  that 
more  artillery  could  have  been  used  with  advantage  in  this  engagement, 
and  also  that  my  company  could  have  done  good  service,  yet  I  received 
no  orders  ;  therefore,  I  have  not  had  the  honor  to  participate  in  any  of 
the  many  engagements  for  the  protection  of  our  capital." 

Several  field-batteries  were  brought  in,  one  or  two  at  a  time, 
upon  both  flanks,  but  each  was  quickly  overwhelmed.  The 
artillery  under  D.  H.  Hill,  which  had  been  engaged  at  White 
Oak  Swamp  the  afternoon  of  the  30th,  had  entirely  exhausted 
its  ammunition  and  been  sent  to  the  rear  to  replenish.  In  the 
demand  for  guns,  A.  P.  Hill  sent  two  of  his  batteries,  Davidson's 
and  Pegram's.  Pegram  had  been  engaged  in  every  battle,  be- 
ginning with  Mechanicsville.  Including  Malvern  Hill,  he  had 
60  casualties  out  of  80  men,  and  was  only  able  to  man  a  single 
gun  at  the  close.  This  fighting,  the  artillery  part  of  the  action, 
began  about  noon  and  continued  until  about  half-past  three 
o'clock.  D.  H.  Hill  thus  describes  that  in  his  front,  — 

"Instead  of  ordering  up  100  of  200  pieces  of  artillery  to  play  on  the 
Yankees,  a  single  battery,  Moorman's,  was  ordered  up,  and  knocked  to 
pieces  in  a  few  minutes.  One  or  two  others  shared  the  same  fate  of  being 
beat  in  detail.  Not  knowing  how  to  act  under  the  circumstances,  I  wrote 
to  Gen.  Jackson  that  the  firing  from  our  batteries  was  of  the  most 
farcical  character." 

Whiting,  on  Hill's  left,  says :  — 

"To  our  left  was  a  very  large  wheat-field  which  afforded  a  good  view 
of  the  enemy's  position,  and  fair  opportunities  for  artillery.  Batteries  were 
ordered  up.  ...  The  first  battery  ordered  into  Poindexter's  field  found 
itself  exposed  to  a  vastly  superior  cross-fire  and  was  soon  compelled  to 
retire  with  loss.  Balthis's  battery,  better  posted  and  better  covered  by 
the  ground,  fought  well  and  continued  the  action  until  their  ammunition 
was  exhausted.  Other  batteries  were  ordered  up.  Our  gunners  replied 
with  spirit,  but  from  want  of  ammunition  the  contest  was  too  unequal, 
and  I  caused  them  successively  to  withdraw.  This  cross-fire  was  ex- 
cessively severe  upon  the  supporting  troops." 


160  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

Of  the  artillery  fighting  on  the  right  flank,  Gen.  Armistead 
reported :  — 

"  By  a  reconnoissance  first  made  by  Col.  E.  C.  Edmonds  of  the  38th  Va. 
...  I  found  that  the  enemy  were  in,  near,  and  around  Crew's  house, 
and  that  the  hill  in  front  of  the  ravine  we  occupied  was  a  good  position 
for  artillery.  It  was  asked  for,  and  Capt.  Pegram's  and  Grimes's  bat- 
teries were  sent.  The  fire  was  a  terrible  one  and  the  men  stood  it  well. 
The  enemy  must  have  had  30  or  40  pieces  opposed  to  ours  and  of  superior 
calibre.  No  men  could  have  behaved  better  than  Capts.  Pegram  and 
Grimes.  They  worked  their  guns  after  their  men  were  cut  down,  and 
only  retired  when  entirely  disabled.  I  sent  for  more  artillery  repeatedly." 

These  extracts  sufficiently  illustrate  the  character  of  the  fight- 
ing during  the  hours  devoted  in  theory  to  bringing  a  heavy 
enfilading  and  cross-fire  of  artillery  to  bear  upon  the  enemy  in 
his  crowded  position.  The  one  advantage  which  we  had  was  that 
all  our  shots  were  converging  toward  his  centre,  and  stood  fair 
chances  of  finding  some  of  his  troops,  even  when  they  missed  their 
special  targets.  And,  thin,  scattered,  and  meagre  as  our  artillery 
fire  was,  —  "  almost  farcical,"  as  D.  H.  Hill  pronounced  it,  and  di- 
rected entirely  at  the  enemy's  batteries,  its  effect  upon  his  infantry 
lines  was  such  that  Sumner  withdrew  his  whole  corps  from  their  po- 
sitions, and  took  refuge  under  the  crest  of  the  hills  nearest  the  river, 
and  he  ordered  Porter  also  to  withdraw.  Porter  reports  that  he  — 

"protested  against  such  a  movement  as  disastrous  to  us,  adding  that 
as  the  major-general  commanding  had  seen  and  approved  my  disposition, 
and  also  Gen.  Couch's,  I  could  not  change  without  his  order,  which 
could  soon  be  obtained  if  desirable.  He  desisted  and  the  enemy  was 
soon  upon  us,  compelling  him  to  recall  his  own  corps." 

How  eloquent  is  this  episode  of  what  might  have  been  the 
effect  of  bold  and  energetic  use,  early  in  the  day,  not  only  of 
our  large  artillery  reserve,  but  of  all  our  brigade  and  division 
batteries,  brought  in  under  their  protection,  as  might  have  been 
done  under  efficient  management. 

As  it  was,  this  inefficient  artillery  service  so  discouraged  the 
prospects  of  an  assault  that  before  three  o'clock  Lee  abandoned 
his  intention  to  assault.  Longstreet  was  informed,1  but  no  no- 

1  His  report  says,  —  "A  little  after  3  P.M.,  I  understood  that  we  would 
not  be  able  to  attack  the  enemy  that  day,  inasmuch  as  his  position  was 
too  strong  to  admit  of  it." 


THE  ESCAPE.    BATTLE  OF  MALVERN  HILL          161 

tice  was  sent  to  other  generals,  as  there  seemed  no  apparent  need. 
The  aggressive  efforts  had  grown  gradually  weaker,  and  by 
three  o'clock  the  firing  on  both  sides  had  almost  ceased. 

Shortly  before  this,  Lee  had  taken  Longstreet  and  ridden  over 
to  our  left  in  search  of  some  route  by  which  the  enemy's  position 
could  be  turned. 

This  should  have  been  done  early  that  morning,  not  by  Lee  in 
person,  but  by  staff-officers  under  cavalry  escorts.  Jackson,  on 
the  left  flank,  had  with  him  a  fair  supply  of  staff,  and  Munford's 
regiment  of  cavalry.  In  the  Valley  he  would  have  done  it  with- 
out waiting  for  orders.  By  a  movement  inaugurated  that  day, 
a  force  might  easily  have  reached  the  high  ground  known  as  Eve- 
lington  Heights,  overlooking  Westover  (of  which  there  will  be 
more  to  tell  later),  or  any  nearer  point  threatening  the  enemy's 
line  of  retreat,  where  a  Confederate  force  in  position  might  com- 
pel the  enemy  to  take  the  offensive  at  a  disadvantage. 

A  short  reconnoissance  induced  Lee  to  order  Longstreet  at 
once  to  move  his  own  division  and  Hill's  to  the  left :  Longstreet 
had  rejoined  his  troops  and  was  putting  them  in  motion,  when,  to 
his  surprise,  he  heard  the  sounds  of  battle  break  forth.  He 
thought  the  enemy  had  taken  the  offensive,  and  that  Magruder 
would  soon  be  calling  for  reinforcements.  His  two  divisions 
were,  therefore,  moved  up  to  secure  the  right  flank,  though 
they  did  not  become  engaged. 

Longstreet,  in  his  narrative,  states  that  the  battle  was  precipi- 
tated by  accident,  but  this  is  a  mistake.  It  was  begun  by  a 
direct  order  from  Lee  given  hastily  under  the  influence  of  a  mis- 
apprehension of  fact,  which  occurred  as  follows :  — 

When  Sumner  withdrew  his  corps  under  the  cover  of  the  hills, 
as  has  been  told  in  the  quotation  from  Porter,  the  movement 
was  observed  from  our  left  by  Whiting.  He  reported  to  Lee 
that  the  enemy  were  withdrawing  both  trains  and  troops.  About 
the  same  time,  a  body  of  the  enemy's  skirmishers  being  advanced 
in  front  of  Armistead's  brigade,  was  attacked  and  easily  driven 
back  by  three  of  his  regiments.  These  followed  the  fugitives 
a  short  distance  and  occupied  advanced  ground,  in  a  swale 
which  afforded  some  shelter.  This  affair  was  considered  a  suc- 
cess, and  it  was  also  reported  to  Lee  as  he  was  returning  from 


162  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

his  reconnoissance  with  Longstreet.  Had  Simmer's  movement, 
and  the  advance  and  easy  retreat  of  the  Federal  skirmishers, 
been  planned  as  a  ruse  to  decoy  us  into  a  charge,  its  success 
would  have  been  brilliant.  That  part  of  our  plan  which  had 
called  for  a  tremendous  preliminary  cannonade  was  forgotten. 
Lee  believed  that  his  enemy  was  retreating  and  about  to  escape 
him,  and  he  hastened  to  send  a  verbal  order  to  Magruder 
through  Capt.  Dickinson  of  Magruder's  staff,  who  wrote  the 
order  as  follows :  — 

"  Gen.  Lee  expects  you  to  advance  rapidly.  He  says  it  is  reported 
the  enemy  is  getting  off.  Press  forward  your  whole  line  and  follow  up 
Armistead's  success."  . 

Under  Magruder's  orders  the  advance  was  commenced  by 
Wright's  Ga.  and  La.  brigade,  followed  by  Mahone's  Va.  bri- 
gade, both  of  Huger's  division.  These  two  brigades  formed  our 
extreme  right,  and  went  into  action  only  about  2500  strong, 
many  stragglers  having  been  lost  from  the  ranks  in  the  march- 
ings and  skirmishes  of  the  three  previous  days. 

To  the  left  of  Wright  was  Armistead  of  Huger's  division,  fol- 
lowed by  Cobb's  and  Semmes's  brigades.  In  support  of  these 
were  all  the  rest  of  Magruder's  and  Huger's  10  brigades,  Ransom, 
of  Holmes's  division,  being  also  temporarily  attached  to  Huger. 
Farther  to  the  left  came  D.  H.  Hill's  five  brigades.  Magruder's 
brigades  consumed  a  little  time  in  developing  a  full  roar  of  mus- 
ketry, but  no  sooner  was  it  heard  than  D.  H.  Hill's  division  was 
also  put  in. 

Fitz-John  Porter,  in  Battles  and  Leaders,  thus  describes  the 
opening  of  the  battle  from  the  Federal  point  of  view :  — 

"The  spasmodic,  though  sometimes  formidable,  attack  of  our  antago- 
nists, at  different  points  along  our  whole  front,  up  to  about  four  o'clock 
were,  presumably,  demonstrations  or  feelers  preparatory  to  their  engaging 
in  more  serious  work.  An  ominous  silence,  similar  to  that  which  had 
preceded  the  attack  in  force  at  Games'  Mill,  now  intervened,  until,  at 
about  5.30  o'clock,  the  enemy  opened  upon  both  Morell  and  Couch  with 
artillery  from  nearly  the  whole  of  his  front,  and  soon  after  pressed  forward 
in  columns  of  infantry,  first  on  one,  then  on  the  other,  or  on  both. 

"  As  if  moved  by  a  reckless  disregard  of  life  equal  to  that  displayed  at 
Gaines  Mill,  with  a  determination  to  capture  our  army  or  destroy  it  by 
driving  us  into  the  river,  brigade  after  brigade  rushed  at  our  batteries; 


THE  ESCAPE.    BATTLE  OF  MALVERN  HILL          163 

but  the  artillery  of  both  Morell  and  Couch  mowed  them  down  with 
shrapnel,  grape,  and  canister,  while  our  infantry,  withholding  their  fire 
until  the  enemy  were  in  short  range,  scattered  the  remnants  of  their 
columns,  sometimes  following  them  up  and  capturing  prisoners  and  colors." 

One  can  scarcely  read  the  full  story  of  this  charge  without 
believing  that,  made  early  in  the  day  with  the  aid  of  all  our  re- 
serve artillery  on  the  flanks  and  of  the  22  brigades  of  infantry 
who  were  spectators,  we  might,  by  main  force,  have  crushed  the 
enemy's  army  as  it  stood.  Porter  himself,  who  was  practically 
in  command  of  the  field,  and  the  most  accomplished  of  the  Federal 
corps  commanders,  records  that,  at  one  period  of  the  action,  as 
he  rode  to  bring  up  reinforcements,  he  felt  such  apprehensions 
of  soon  becoming  our  prisoner,  that  he  took  from  his  pocket  and 
tore  up  his  "diary  and  despatch  book  of  the  campaign." 

That  the  ground  was  less  unfavorable  for  an  assault  from  our 
right  flank  appears  from  the  reports  of  Wright  and  Mahone,  whose 
small  force  was  not  driven  back  at  all,  but  made  a  lodgment  and 
held  their  ground  all  night.  Gen.  Wright  reports  as  follows :  — 

"At  4.45  o'clock  I  received  an  order  from  Gen.  Magruder  through 
Capt.  Henry  Bryan,  one  of  his  staff,  to  advance  immediately  and  charge 
the  enemy's  batteries.  No  other  troops  had  yet  come  upon  the  field. 
I  ordered  my  men  forward,  and,  springing  before  them,  led  my  brigade, 
less  than  1000  men,  against  a  force  I  knew  to  be  superior  in  the  ratio  of 
at  least  20  to  1.  Onward  we  pressed,  warmly  and  strongly  supported  by 
Gen.  Mahone 's  brigade,  under  a  murderous  fire  of  shot,  shell,  canister,  and 
musketry.  At  every  step  my  brave  men  fell  around  me,  but  the  survivors 
pressed  on  until  we  had  reached  a  hollow  about  300  yards  from  the  enemy's 
batteries  on  the  right.  Here  I  perceived  that  a  strong  force  had  been 
sent  forward  on  our  left,  by  the  enemy,  with  a  view  of  flanking  and  cutting 
us  off  from  our  support,  now  more  than  1000  yards  in  our  rear.  I  im- 
mediately threw  the  left  of  the  3d  Ga.  a  little  back  along  the  upper 
margin  of  the  hollow,  and,  suddenly  changing  front  of  the  regiment,  poured 
a  galling  fire  upon  the  enemy,  which  he  returned  with  spirit,  aided  by  a 
fearful  direct  and  cross-fire  from  his  batteries.  Here  the  contest  raged 
with  varying  success  for  more  than  three-quarters  of  an  hour;  finally 
the  line  of  the  enemy  was  broken,  and  he  gave  way  in  great  disorder. 

"In  the  meantime,  my  front,  supported  by  Gen.  Mahone,  had  been 
subjected  to  a  heavy  fire  of  artillery  and  musketry,  and  had  begun  to 
waver,  and  I  feared  I  would  be  compelled  to  fall  back.  Just  at  this 
moment  firing  was  heard  far  away  to  our  feft,  and  soon  we  saw  our  columns 
advancing  upon  the  enemy's  centre.  This  diverted  a  portion  of  the 
enemy's  fire  from  us,  and  I  succeeded  in  keeping  my  men  steady.  We 


164  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

had  now  approached  within  a  few  hundred  yards  of  the  enemy's  advanced 
batteries,  and  I  again  gave  the  order  to  charge,  which  was  obeyed  with 
promptness  and  alacrity. 

"We  rushed  forward,  up  the  side  of  the  hill  under  the  brow  of  which 
we  had  been  for  some  time  halted,  and  dashing  over  the  hill,  reached  an- 
other hollow  or  ravine  immediately  in  front  of,  and,  as  it  were,  under,  the 
enemy's  guns.  This  ravine  was  occupied  by  a  line  of  Yankee  infantry 
posted  there  to  protect  their  batteries.  Upon  this  we  rushed  with  such 
impetuosity  that  the  enemy  broke  in  great  disorder  and  fled.  .  .  . 

"The  firing  had  now  become  general  along  the  left  and  centre  of  our 
line,  and  night  setting  in,  it  was  difficult  to  distinguish  friend  from  foe. 

"Several  of  my  command  were  killed  by  our  own  friends,  who  had 
come  up  on  our  immediate  left,  and  who  commenced  firing  long  before 
they  came  within  range  of  the  enemy.  This  firing  upon  us  from  our 
friends,  together  with  the  increasing  darkness,  made  our  position  peculiarly 
hazardous,  but  I  determined  to  maintain  it  at  all  hazards,  as  long  as  a 
man  should  be  left  to  fire  a  gun.  The  fire  was  terrific  now,  beyond  any- 
thing I  had  ever  witnessed,  —  indeed,  the  hideous  shrieking  of  shells 
through  the  dusky  gloom  of  closing  night,  the  loud  and  incessant  roll  of 
artillery  and  small-arms,  were  enough  to  make  the  stoutest  heart  quail. 
Still  my  shattered  little  command,  now  reduced  to  less  than  300,  with 
about  an  equal  number  of  Gen.  Mahone's  brigade,  held  our  positions 
under  the  very  muzzles  of  the  enemy's  guns,  and  poured  volley  after 
volley  with  murderous  precision  into  their  serried  ranks.  .  .  . 

"Just  at  this  time  a  portion  of  Col.  Ramseur's  49th  N.C.  regiment, 
having  got  lost  upon  the  field,  was  hailed  by  me  and  ordered  to 
fall  in  with  my  brigade.  A  strong  picket  was  advanced  all  around  our 
isolated  position,  and  the  wearied,  hungry  soldiers  threw  themselves 
upon  the  earth  to  snatch  a  few  hours'  rest.  Detachments  were  ordered 
to  search  for  water  and  administer  to  our  poor  wounded  men,  whose  cries 
rent  the  air  in  every  direction.  Soon  the  enemy  were  seen  with  lanterns, 
busily  engaged  in  moving  their  killed  and  wounded,  and  friend  and  foe 
freely  mingled  on  that  gloomy  night  in  administering  to  the  wants  of 
wounded  and  dying  comrades.  .  .  . 

"Early  on  the  morning  of  July  2,  Gen.  Ewell  rode  upon  the  field,  and 
coming  to  the  position  where  my  men  lay,  I  reported  to  him  and  was  re- 
lieved from  further  watching  on  the  field.  .  .  .  My  loss  in  this  engagement 
was  very  severe,  amounting  to  55  killed,  243  wounded,  and  64  missing 
(total  362) .  I  have  no  means  of  determining  the  loss  of  the  enemy,  though 

I  am  satisfied  it  was  very  heavy." 

• 

Gen.  Mahone  reports  that  his  brigade  carried  into  action 
1226,  and  lost  39  killed,  164  wounded,  and  120  missing  (total  323). 

Wright's  report  gives  a  clear  idea  of  the  fighting  upon  our  right 
flank.  Next,  on  the  left,  Semmes  and  Kershaw  also  made,  per- 


THE  ESCAPE.    BATTLE  OF  MALVERN  HILL          165 

haps,  the  farthest  advance  of  the  attack,  actually  getting  among 
the  enemy's  guns,  where  lay  the  body  of  a  handsome  young 
Louisiana  officer,  next  morning,  the  farthest  jetsam  of  the  red 
wave  which  had  stained  all  the  green  fields  of  our  advance.  Both 
of  these  brigades  had  been  forced  to  fall  back,  not  so  much  from 
the  fire  of  the  enemy  in  their  front,  as  from  that  of  their  friends 
farther  on  the  left,  advancing  on  converging  lines  in  the  dusk. 
There  were  more  troops  concentrated  in  the  forest  in  a  small  space 
than  could  be  well  handled,  even  in  daylight;  and  the  plateau 
over  which  their  charge  was  to  be  made,  when  they  got  free  of 
the  wood,  was  so  bare  of  shelter,  and  swept  by  such  fire  of  mus- 
ketry and  artillery,  that  not  a  single  brigade  faced  it  long  without 
being  driven  back.  The  official  reports  show  that  in  the  storm 
and  smoke  around  them  single  brigades  often  thought  themselves 
to  be  the  only  ones  engaged. 

D.  H.  Hill,  whose  advance  was  across  the  plateau,  thus  de- 
scribes the  attack  by  his  division :  — • 

"While  conversing  with  my  brigade  commanders,  shouting  was  heard 
on  our  right,  followed  by  the  roar  of  musketry.  We  all  agreed  that 
this  was  the  signal  agreed  upon,  and  I  ordered  my  division  to  advance. 
This,  as  near  as  I  could  judge,  was  about  an  hour  and  a  half  before  sun- 
down. .  .  . 

"The  division  fought  heroically  and  well,  but  fought  in  vain.  Garland, 
in  my  immediate  front,  showed  all  his  wonted  courage  and  enthusiasm, 
but  he  needed  and  asked  for  reinforcements.  I  sent  Lt.-Col.  New- 
ton, 6th  Ga.,  to  his  support,  and,  observing  a  brigade  by  a  fence  in 
our  rear,  I  galloped  back  to  it  and  found  it  to  be  that  of  Gen.  Toombs. 
I  ordered  it  forward  to  support  Garland,  and  accompanied  it.  The  bri- 
gade advanced  handsomely  to  the  brow  of  the  hill,  but  soon  retreated  in 
disorder.  Gordon,  commanding  Rodes's  brigade,  pushed  gallantly  for- 
ward and  gained  considerable  ground,  but  was  forced  back.  The  gallant 
and  accomplished  Meares,  3d  N.C.,  Ripley's  brigade,  had  fallen  at 
the  head  of  his  regiment,  and  that  brigade  was  streaming  to  the  rear. 
Colquitt's  and  Anderson's  brigades  had  also  fallen  back.  Ransom's 
brigade  had  come  up  to  my  support  from  Gen.  Huger.  It  moved  too 
far  to  the  left  and  became  mixed  up  with  a  mass  of  troops  near  the 
parsonage  on  the  Quaker  road,  suffering  much  and  effecting  little.  Gen. 
Winder  was  sent  up  by  Gen.  Jackson,  but  he  came  too  late,  and  also 
went  to  the  same  belt  of  woods  near  the  parsonage,  already  overcrowded 
with  troops.  Finally  Gen.  Ewell  came  up,  but  it  was  after  dark,  and 
nothing  could  be  accomplished.  I  advised  him  to  hold  the  ground  he 
had  gained  and  not  to  attempt  a  forward  movement." 


166  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

Gen.  Toombs's  account  of  the  advance  of  his  brigade  will  give 
some  idea  of  the  confusion  of  commands  upon  the  field  after 
the  battle  was  in  full  tide :  — 

"Accordingly,  I  advanced  rapidly  in  line  of  battle  through  the  dense 
woods,  intersected  by  ravines,  occasionally  thick  brier  patches,  and  other 
obstructions,  guided  only  by  the  enemy's  fire  in  keeping  direction,  fre- 
quently retarded  and  sometimes  broken,  by  troops  in  front  of  me,  until 
the  command  reached  the  open  field  on  the  elevated  plateau  immediately 
in  front  of,  and  in  short  range  of,  the  enemy's  guns.  Here,  coming  up 
with  a  portion  of  the  troops  which  I  was  ordered  to  support,  I  halted  my 
line  for  the  purpose  of  rectifying  it  and  of  allowing  many  of  the  troops 
whom  I  was  to  support,  to  pass  me  and  form.  These  objects  were  but 
imperfectly  accomplished  by  me,  as  well  as  by  the  rest  of  the  troops 
within  my  view,  from  the  great  confusion  and  disorder  in  the  field  — • 
arising  much  from  the  difficulties  of  the  ground  over  which  they  had  to 
pass,  and  in  part  from  the  heavy  fire  of  grape  and  canister  and  shells, 
which  the  enemy's  batteries  were  pouring  in  upon  them.  But,  having 
accomplished  what  could  be  done  of  this  work,  I  ordered  my  brigade  to 
advance.  It  moved  forward  steadily  and  firmly  until  it  came  up  with 
the  troops  in  advance,  who  had  halted.  I  then  ordered  it  to  halt,  and 
ordered  the  men  to  lie  down,  which  they  did,  and  received  the  enemy's 
fire  for  a  considerable  time,  when  an  order  was  repeated  along  my  line, 
coming  from  the  left,  directing  the  line  to  oblique  to  the  left.  This  order 
I  immediately  and  promptly  countermanded  as  soon  as  it  reached  the 
part  of  the  line  where  I  stood,  and  arrested  it  in  part.  I  saw  that  the 
immediate  effect  of  the  movement  was  to  throw  the  troops  into  the 
woods  and  ravines  on  the  left  of  the  plateau,  and  necessarily  throw  them 
into  great  confusion.  .  .  . 

"In  the  meantime  Gen.  Kershaw  came  into  the  field  with  his  bri- 
gade, near  one  of  my  regiments,  the  2d  Ga.,  which  still  remained  in 
very  good  order;  and  my  adjutant,  Capt.  Du  Bose,  proposad  to  him 
to  unite  that,  and  some  other  companies  of  other  regiments,  with  his 
command  in  the  attack  on  the  enemy's  batteries,  to  which  he  assented; 
and  this  command,  under  Cols.  Butt  and  Holmes,  accompanied  by 
Capt.  Du  Bose  and  Maj.  Alexander  (my  quartermaster,  who  acted  as 
one  of  my  aides  on  the  field)  advanced  with  Gen.  Kershaw's  brigade 
beyond  the  edge  of  the  wood  into  the  open  field,  but,  under  the  destructive 
fire  of  the  enemy's  cannon  and  small-arms,  wavered  and  fell  back  into  the 
road  skirting  the  pine  thicket.  .  .  . 

"My  losses  were  very  severe,  the  total  being  194  killed  and  wounded, 
out  of  about  1200  carried  into  action.  I  am  happy  to  add  that  the  dis- 
orders which  did  arise  were  due  rather  to  the  difficulties  of  the  ground, 
and  the  nature  of  the  attack,  than  from  any  other  cause,  and  that  as  far 
as  my  observation  went,  they  extended  to  all  troops  engaged  on  the 


THE  ESCAPE.    BATTLE  OF  MALVERN  HILL          167 

plateau  in  front  of  the  enemy's  guns.  This  is  further  evidenced  by  the 
fact  that  at  roll-call  next  morning  over  800  of  my  command  answered  to 
their  names,  leaving  under  200  unaccounted  for,  many  of  whom  soon 
made  their  appearance." 

There  is  no  doubt  that  the  entire  force  which  had  been  engaged 
was  wrecked  for  the  time  being,  and  that,  had  the  enemy  been 
in  position  for  a  counterstroke,  the  fragments  could  have  made 
but  little  opposition.  But  A.  P.  Hill  and  Longstreet  were  close 
in  rear,  and  Whiting's,  Jackson's,  and  Swell's  divisions  were  on  the 
left,  and  Holmes  a  few  miles  off  on  the  right.  The  enemy,  more- 
over, having  sent  ahead  all  of  their  trains,  were  now  very  low 
both  in  ammunition  and  provisions,  and  could  scarcely  have 
ventured  anything  serious. 

Whiting's  division  had  suffered  175  casualties  in  its  two 
brigades,  and  19  in  Hampton's  brigade,  from  the  enemy's 
artillery  fire,  while  lying  in  support  of  our  artillery  in  Poindex- 
ter's  field.  Including  with  these  the  losses  in  Jackson's  and 
Swell's  divisions  and  Lawton's  brigade,  the  casualties  were  599. 
In  Magruder's  division  the  casualties  were  2014,  and  in  Huger's, 
including  Ransom's  brigade,  1609.  In  Rodes's,  Colquitt's,  and 
Ripley's  brigades  of  D.  H.  Hill's  division,  the  casualties  were 
making  889,  a  total,  so  far,  of  5111.  The  other  two  brigades, 
Anderson's  and  Garland's,  report  only  their  total  casualties  for 
the  campaign  as  863  and  844,  a  total  of  1707.  A  half,  854,  is  a 
moderate  estimate  for  their  losses  at  Malvern. 

This  would  make  our  total  losses  5965  or  more ;  those  of  the 
enemy  could  scarcely  have  reached  2000,  but  the  casualties  of 
different  battles  are  not  separated. 

Of  Jackson's  part  in  this  action  there  is  very  little  to  be  said. 
He  took  no  initiative,  though  complying  promptly  with  orders 
or  requests  as  received.  But  had  he  been  the  Jackson  of  the 
Valley,  being  on  the  left  flank  that  morning,  he  would  have  turned 
Malvern  Hill  by  his  left,  and  taken  position  commanding  the 
road  somewhere  beyond  Turkey  Creek.  Malvern  should  not  have 
been  attacked ;  only  the  enemy  observed  and  held  by  Longstreet, 
while  Jackson  got  a  position  which  they  would  be  forced  to  assault. 

Lee's  report  sums  up  the  subsequent  operations  briefly,  as  fol- 
lows :  — 


168  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

"  On  July  2,  it  was  discovered  that  the  enemy  had  withdrawn  during 
the  night,  leaving  the  ground  covered  with  his  dead  and  wounded,  and  his 
route  exhibiting  abundant  evidence  of  precipitate  retreat.  The  pursuit  was 
commenced,  Gen.  Stuart  with  his  cavalry  in  the  advance,  but  a  violent  storm 
which  prevailed  throughout  the  day  greatly  retarded  our  progress.  The 
enemy,  harassed  and  followed  closely  by  the  cavalry,  succeeded  in  gaining 
Westover  and  the  protection  of  his  gunboats.  He  immediately  began  to 
fortify  his  position,  which  was  one  of  great  natural  strength,  flanked  on  each 
side  by  a  creek,  and  the  approach  to  his  front  commanded  by  the  heavy 
guns  of  his  shipping  in  addition  to  those  mounted  in  his  intrenchments.  It 
was  deemed  inexpedient  to  attack  him,  and  in  view  of  the  condition  of  our 
troops,  who  had  been  marching  and  fighting  almost  incessantly  for  seven 
days,  under  the  most  trying  circumstances,  it  was  determined  to  withdraw 
in  order  to  afford  them  the  repose  of  which  they  stood  so  much  in  need." 

One  episode  of  the  pursuit,  however,  is  worthy  of  note.  On 
July  2,  but  little  progress  was  made  by  the  infantry,  owing  to  the 
heavy  rain-storm,  but  Stuart's  cavalry  (which  had  recrossed  the 
Chickahominy  by  fording  at  Forge  Bridge  on  the  afternoon  of 
July  1)  followed  the  enemy  and  endeavored  to  shell  his  columns 
wherever  opportunity  offered.  About  5  P.M.  the  last  of  these 
columns  had  arrived  at  its  destination  on  the  James  River, 
Harrison's  Landing,  —  a  peninsula  about  four  miles  long  by  one 
and  a  half  wide,  formed  by  Herring  Creek  on  the  northeast, 
running  for  that  distance  nearly  parallel  to  the  James  before 
emptying  into  it.  At  its  head  a  small  inlet  from  the  river  on 
the  southwest  left  but  a  narrow  front  exposed  to  attack. 

But,  across  Herring  Creek,  an  extensive  plateau  called  Eve- 
lington  Heights  dominates  the  upper  part  of  this  peninsula  so 
that,  if  held  by  artillery,  the  enemy  would  be  forced  to  attack 
at  a  disadvantage  —  the  creek  being  impassable  for  some  distance 
above.  During  Wednesday  night,  Stuart  received  a  report  from 
Pelham,  commanding  his  artillery,  describing  this  position  and 
recommending  its  being  seized.  He  forwarded  the  report  to 
Lee,  through  Jackson,  and  early  on  the  3d,  with  a  few  cavalry 
and  a  single  howitzer,  nearly  out  of  ammunition,  he  ran  off  a 
Federal  squadron  and  took  possession  of  the  heights.  It  is  a 
pity  that  there  was  any  ammunition,  for  Stuart  writes  that  — 

"  the  howitzer  was  brought  in  action  in  the  river  road  to  fire  upon  the 
enemy's  camp  below.  Judging  from  the  great  commotion  and  excitement 
below,  it  must  have  had  considerable  effect." 


THE  ESCAPE.    BATTLE  OF  MALVERN  HILL          169 

It  did  have  considerable  effect  of  a  most  unfortunate  kind  for 
us.  It  awaked  the  enemy  to  instant  appreciation  of  the  fact  that 
it  was  essential  for  him  to  hold  that  ground,  and  that  it  behooved 
him  to  take  it  before  we  brought  up  any  more  force.  A  military 
lesson  is  to  be  learned  from  the  result,  to  wit,  that  dangers  lurk 
in  excess  of  enterprise  as  well  as  in  its  deficiency.  In  this  cam- 
paign our  cavalry  affords  two  instances.  Stuart's  zeal,  without 
necessity,  led  him  to  make  the  circuit  of  McClellan's  army, 
June  11-15.  The  result  was  that  McClellan  was  prepared  to 
change  his  base  to  the  James  as  soon  as  he  found  Lee  threatening 
his  communications.  Now,  the  temptation  to  shell  a  camp  and 
wagon  trains  loses  to  our  army  its  last  chance  to  take  a  position 
which  would  compel  the  enemy  to  assume  the  offensive.  One 
howitzer  could,  of  course,  accomplish  nothing  but  to  alarm  the 
enemy,  and  precipitate  their  attack. 

When  Stuart  opened  fire,  he  thought  that  both  Longstreet  and 
Jackson  were  near.  In  fact,  neither  was  within  miles.  Jackson 
had  been  sent  in  direct  pursuit,  being  nearest  the  most  direct 
roads,  and  his  troops  having  been  least  engaged  during  the 
Seven  Days.  Two  of  the  four  brigades  of  his  own  division  had 
been  so  little  exposed  as  to  have  had  together  but  two  killed  and 
26  wounded,  in  the  whole  campaign.  His  3d  brigade,  Winder's, 
had  had  but  75  casualties  at  Gaines  Mill,  and  104  at  Malvern. 
Lawton's  brigade,  and  Swell's  and  Whiting's  divisions,  had  only 
been  severely  engaged  at  Gaines  Mill. 

Longstreet,  with  A.  P.  Hill's  and  his  own  divisions,  was  on  the 
2d  moved  around  the  field  of  battle  to  Poindexter's  house, 
and  on  the  3d  was  sent  by  roads  to  the  left  of  Jackson.  By 
mistake  of  the  guides  he  was  conducted  too  far  to  the  left,  and 
only  reached  Evelington  Heights  about  dark  on  the  3d;  Jack- 
son's troops  came  up  at  the  same  time  by  the  direct  road. 

Jackson's  official  report  says :  — 

"On  the  morning  of  the  3d,  my  command  arrived  near  the  landing 
and  drove  in  the  enemy's  skirmishers,"  but  the  date  is  shown  by  all  other 
reports  to  be  a  clerical  error  for  the  4th. 

Had  Stuart  not  opened  fire,  the  enemy  would  not  have  dis- 
turbed him  that  day.  During  it  McClellan  wrote  to  the  Secretary 
of  War,  as  follows :  — 


170  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

"  I  am  in  hopes  the  enemy  is  as  completely  worn  out  as  we  are.  He 
was  certainly  very  severely  punished  in  the  last  battle.  The  roads  are 
now  very  bad.  For  these  reasons  I  hope  we  shall  now  have  enough 
breathing  space  to  reorganize  and  rest  the  men,  and  get  them  into  posi- 
tion before  the  enemy  can  attack  again.  ...  It  is,  of  course,  impossible 
to  estimate,  as  yet,  our  losses,  but  I  doubt  whether  there  are  to-day  more 
than  50,000  men  with  their  colors." 

By  the  next  morning  21  Confederate  brigades  had  arrived 
and  would  have  been  upon  Evelington  Heights  had  Stuart  not 
forced  the  enemy  to  come  over  and  occupy  them.  McClellan's 
50,000  men  would  then  have  had  the  task  of  removing  them. 

Stuart  thus  describes  his  resistance :  — 

"I  held  the  ground  from  9  A.M.  till  2  P.M.,  when  the  enemy  had  con- 
trived to  get  one  battery  into  position  on  this  side  the  creek.  The  fire 
was,  however,  kept  up  until  a  body  of  infantry  was  found  approaching 
by  our  right  flank.  I  had  no  apprehension,  however,  as  I  felt  sure  Long- 
street  was  near  by,  and,  although  Pelham  had  but  two  rounds  of  ammuni- 
tion left,  I  held  out,  knowing  how  important  it  was  to  hold  the  ground 
till  Longstreet  arrived. 

"The  enemy's  infantry  advanced,  and  his  battery  kept  up  its  fire.  I 
just  then  learned  that  Longstreet  had  taken  the  wrong  road  and  was 
then  at  Nance's  shop,  six  or  seven  miles  off.  Pelham  fired  his  last  round, 
and  the  sharp-shooters,  strongly  posted  in  the  skirt  of  woods  bordering 
the  plateau,  exhausted  every  cartridge,  but  had  at  last  to  retire.  .  .  . 
The  next  day,  July  4,  Gen.  Jackson's  command  drove  in  the  enemy's  ad- 
vanced pickets.  I  pointed  out  the  position  of  the  enemy,  now  occupying, 
apparently  in  force,  the  plateau  from  which  I  shelled  their  camp  the 
day  before,  and  showed  him  the  routes  by  which  the  plateau  could  be 
reached,  to  the  left,  and  submitted  my  plan  for  dispossessing  the  enemy 
and  attacking  his  camp.  This  was  subsequently  laid  before  the  com- 
manding general." 

From  the  Federal  reports  it  appears  that  the  enemy  occupied 
the  heights  on  the  afternoon  of  July  3  with  Franklin's  division. 
The  next  morning  Longstreet  was  up  with  his  own  and  A.  P. 
Hill's  division  and  two  brigades  of  Magruder's.  Jackson  was 
also  up  with  his  own,  Ewell's,  Whiting's,  and  D.  H.  Hill's  divi- 
sions. Lee  did  not  reach  the  field  until  noon,  and,  as  Longstreet 
ranked  Jackson,  he  ordered  the  enemy's  pickets  driven  in  and 
preparation  made  for  an  attack. 

A  favorable  opportunity  was  presented  to  regain  the  Eveling- 
ton Heights  by  main  force.  They  were  occupied  by  but  one 


THE  ESCAPE.    BATTLE  OF  MALVERN  HILL  171 

division,  and,  being  across  Herring  Creek  from  the  rest  of  the 
Federal  army,  it  could  not  have  been  rapidly  reenforced.  There 
would  have  been  very  small  risk  in  making  the  effort  so  earnestly 
urged  by  Stuart,  for  McClellan  would  never  have  dared  a  counter- 
stroke,  had  we  failed.  The  enemy's  gunboats  could  have  ren- 
dered little  assistance,  as  their  own  camps  and  lines  intervened. 
Briefly,  the  game  seems  to  have  been  worth  the  candle,  and  it 
should  have  been  played. 

Jackson's  troops,  however,  were  in  front,  and  Jackson  pro- 
tested against  the  attack,  saying  that  the  troops  were  not  in 
proper  condition,  and  asking  for  delay  until  Lee  should  reach 
the  field.  To  this  Longstreet  consented,  and  when  Lee  arrived, 
Jackson's  arguments  prevailed  and  the  attack  was  given  up. 
It  was  entirely  unlike  Lee,  and  he  must  have  reluctantly  yielded 
to  Jackson's  persuasion.  Evidently,  Jackson  was  still  not  the 
Jackson  of  the  Valley. 

The  next  day  the  troops  were  moved  back  toward  Richmond, 
and  the  campaign  was  ended. 

The  total  casualties  of  the  two  armies  for  the  Seven  Days 
were :  — 

Confederate :  killed  3286,  wounded  15,909,  missing  946,  total  20,141 
Federal:  "     1734,         "          8,062,       "       6053,      "    15,849 

Including  the  Federal  wounded,  we  took  about  10,000  prisoners 
and  captured  52  guns  and  about  35,000  muskets.  We  lost  two 
guns  in  the  stampede  in  Holmes's  division. 

For  a  week  after  McClellan  had  established  himself  at  West- 
over,  he  neglected  to  occupy  the  opposite  bank  of  the  James. 
As  the  fire  of  his  gunboats  commanded  it,  he  could  do  so  at 
pleasure,  but  as  long  as  he  did  not,  it  was  much  better  for  us 
that  he  should  not.  Again,  however,  the  temptation  to  shell  a 
camp  proved  irresistible,  and  Lee  was  persuaded  to  authorize 
an  expedition  for  the  purpose  under  Pendleton's  supervision. 

On  July  12  some  47  rifled  guns  were  collected,  positions  chosen, 
and  ranges  marked  for  night  firing.  After  midnight  they  opened 
fire  upon  the  Federal  transports,  wharves,  and  camps,  and  used 
up  their  small  supplies  of  ammunition  in  a  random  cannonade. 
The  enemy  replied  in  like  fashion,  both  from  the  shore  and  from 
gunboats.  Of  course,  there  was  much  commotion  in  the  Fed- 


172  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

eral  camps,  but  the  actual  damage  done  was  trifling.  Some  40 
casualties  are  reported  among  the  Federals,  and  two  or  three 
among  the  Confederate  artillerists. 

The  next  day  the  Federals  established  themselves  on  the  South 
Side.  The  strategic  advantages  of  a  position  astraddle  of  the 
James  River  have  already  been  referred  to  (page  61,  Chap.  III.), 
but  they  were  not  yet  generally  appreciated.  Fortunately  for 
us,  Lincoln  and  Halleck  recalled  McClellan  and  his  army  to 
Washington  without  ever  realizing  them;  although  McClellan 
had  tried  hard  to  impress  them  upon  his  superiors.  Fortunately, 
too,  for  us,  Gen.  S.  G.  French,  in  command  at  Petersburg,  saw 
and  appreciated  the  threat  of  the  position,  and  immediately 
began  the  construction  of  a  line  of  intrenchments  about  that 
city.  These  intrenchments,  in  1864,  defeated  some  attempts  at 
surprise;  and  at  last  enabled  Beauregard,  with  two  divisions, 
to  withstand  the  attack  of  Grant's  whole  army,  between  June  15 
and  18  of  that  year. 

My  personal  duties  during  the  Seven  Days  were  the  supervi- 
sion and  distribution  of  our  ammunition  supplies.  Our  organ- 
ized division  supply  trains  and  brigade  wagons  worked  smoothly, 
and  no  scarcity  was  felt  anywhere. 

In  addition  to  these  duties,  I  was  placed  in  charge  of  a  balloon 
which  had  been  manufactured  in  Savannah  by  Dr.  Edward 
Cheves,  and  sent  to  Gen.  Lee  for  use  in  reconnoitring  the 
enemy's  lines.  It  was  made  from  silk  of  many  patterns,  var- 
nished with  gutta-percha  car-springs  dissolved  in  naphtha,  and 
inflated  at  the  Richmond  Gas  Works  with  ordinary  city  gas. 

I  saw  the  battle  of  Gaines  Mill  from  it,  and  signalled  informa- 
tion of  the  movement  of  Slocum's  division  across  the  Chicka- 
hominy  to  reenforce  Porter.  Ascensions  were  made  daily,  and 
when  the  enemy  reached  Malvern  Hill,  the  inflated  balloon  would 
be  carried  down  the  river  and  ascensions  made  from  the  deck 
of  a  boat.  Unfortunately,  on  July  4,  the  boat  —  the  Teaser,  a 
small  armed  tug  —  got  aground  below  Malvern  Hill  on  a  falling 
tide,  and  a  large  Federal  gunboat,  the  Maritanza,  came  up  and 
captured  both  boat  and  balloon,  the  crew  escaping. 

We  could  never  build  another  balloon,  but  my  experience 
with  this  gave  me  a  high  idea  of  the  possible  efficiency  of  balloons 


THE  ESCAPE.    BATTLE  OF  MALVERN  HILL  173 

in  active  campaigns.  Especially  did  we  find,  too,  that  the 
balloons  of  the  enemy  forced  upon  us  constant  troublesome  pre- 
cautions in  efforts  to  conceal  our  marches. 


MALVERN  HILL  TO  WESTOVER 

As  affording  a  bird's-eye  view  of  our  organization  and  of  the 
forces  engaged  in  the  different  actions,  and  the  severity  of  the 
conflicts,  a  table  of  Confederate  division  casualties  is  attached, 
showing  as  accurately  as  can  be  determined,  the  losses  of  each 


174 


MILITARY  MEMOIRS 


command  for  each  action.  The  total  Federal  losses  in  killed 
and  wounded  (excluding  prisoners)  is  also  approximately  divided 
for  the  principal  actions  as  nearly  as  records  permit. 

DIVISION  CASUALTIES.    SEVEN  DAYS  BEFORE  RICHMOND 


DIVISIONS 

No.  OF  BBIGADES 

MECHANICKVILLE 

GAINES  MILL 

SAVAGE  STATION 

FBAZIEB'S  FABM 

MALVEBN  HILL 

OTHEB  AFFAIBS 

TOTALS 

Whiting's  Div. 

2 

1017 

175 

1192 

Jackson's  Div. 

3 

91 

117 

208 

Lawton's  Brig. 

1 

492 

75 

567 

Ewell's  Div. 

4 

764 

223 

987 

D.  H.  Hill's  Div. 

5 

586 

1423 

1743 

15 

3767 

D.  R.  Jones's 

-;        Div. 

2 

424 

455 

879 

O  PH 

P  g  i  McLaws's  Div. 

tf  O 

2 

357 

315 

672 

g        Magruder's 
Div. 

2 

84 

874 

9 

967 

Longstreet's  Div. 

6 

1883 

2555 

4438 

Huger's  Div. 

3 

1137 

394 

1531 

A.  P.  Hill's  Div. 

6 

764 

2688 

750 

8 

4210 

Holmes  's  Div. 

3 

499 

178 

677 

Pendleton's  Art. 

2 

2 

Stuart's  Cav. 

71 

71 

Totals 
10  Divisions 

30 

1350 

8358 

441 

3305 

5590 

1124 

20168 

Federal  Losses 
(killed  and  wounded 
only) 

361 

4001 

400 

2034 

2000 

1000 

9796 

CHAPTER    X 

CEDAR  MOUNTAIN 

Recuperation.  Gen.  Pope  Arrives.  Gen.  Halleck  Arrives.  McClellan 
Recalled.  Lee  Moves.  Jackson  Moves.  Cedar  Mountain.  The  Night 
Action.  Jackson's  Ruse.  Casualties. 

THE  close  of  the  Seven  Days  found  both  armies  greatly  in 
need  of  rest.  Lincoln  called  upon  the  governors  of  the  Northern 
States  for  300,000  more  men,  and  bounties,  State  and  Federal, 
were  offered  to  secure  them  rapidly.  They  were  easily  obtained, 
but  a  mistake  was  made  in  putting  the  recruits  in  the  field. 
They  were  organized  into  entirely  new  regiments,  which  were 
generally  hurried  to  the  field  after  but  little  drilling  and  train- 
ing. President  Davis  also  called  for  conscripts,  —  all  that  could 
be  gotten.  No  great  number  were  obtained,  for  those  arriving 
at  the  age  of  conscription  usually  volunteered  in  some  selected 
regiment.  Those  who  were  conscripted  were  also  distributed 
among  veteran  regiments  to  repair  the  losses  of  the  campaign, 
and  this  was  done  as  rapidly  as  the  men  could  be  gotten  to  the 
front.  Although  this  method  allowed  no  time  for  drill  or  train- 
ing, yet  it  was  far  more  effective  in  maintaining  the  strength  of 
the  army  than  the  method  pursued  by  the  Federals. 

During  the  short  intermission  from  active  operations,  some- 
thing was  accomplished,  too,  to  improve  our  organizations,  though 
leaving  us  still  greatly  behind  the  example  long  before  set  us 
by  the  enemy.  Longstreet  and  Jackson  were  still  but  major- 
generals  commanding  divisions,  but  each  now  habitually  com- 
manded other  divisions  besides  his  own,  called  a  Wing,  and  the 
old  divisions  became  known  by  the  names  of  new  commanders. 
Thus,  Jackson's  old  division  now  became  Taliaferro's,  and  Long- 
street's  division  became  Pickett's,  while  Longstreet  and  Jackson 
each  commanded  a  Wing,  so  called. 

It  was  not  until  another  brief  rest  in  October,  after  the  battle 

175 


176  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

of  Sharpsburg,  that  Longstreet  and  Jackson  were  made  lieu- 
tenant-generals, and  the  whole  army  was  definitely  organized -into 
corps.  Some  improvement  was  also  made  in  our  armament  by 
the  guns  and  rifled  muskets  captured  during  the  Seven  Days,  and 
my  reserve  ordnance  train  was  enlarged.  Lines  of  light  earth- 
works were  constructed,  protecting  Chaffin's  Bluff  batteries  on 
the  James  River,  and  stretching  across  the  peninsula  to  connect 
with  the  lines  already  built  from  the  Chickahominy  to  the  head 
of  White  Oak  Swamp. 

Gen.  D.  H.  Hill  also  constructed  lines  on  the  south  side  of  the 
James,  protecting  Drury's  Bluff  and  Richmond  from  an  advance 
in  that  quarter;  and  Gen.  French  at  Petersburg,  as  already 
mentioned,  threw  lines  around  that  city,  from  the  river  below  to 
the  river  above. 

Just  at  the  beginning  of  the  Seven  Days'  Battles,  President 
Lincoln  had  called  from  the  West  Maj.-Gen.  John  Pope,  and 
placed  him  in  command  of  the  three  separate  armies  of  Fremont 
and  Banks,  in  the  Valley  of  Virginia,  and  McDowell  near  Fred- 
ericksburg.  The  union  of  the  three  into  one  was  a  wise  measure, 
but  the  selection  of  a  commander  was  as  eminently  unwise. 
One  from  the  army  in  Virginia,  other  things  being  equal,  would 
have  possessed  many  advantages,  and  there  was  no  lack  of  men  of 
far  sounder  reputation  than  Pope  had  borne  among  his  comrades 
in  the  old  U.  S.  Army.  He  had  spent  some  years  hi  Texas 
boring  for  artesian  water  on  the  Staked  Plains,  and  making 
oversanguine  reports  of  his  prospects  of  success.  An  army 
song  had  summed  up  his  reputation  in  a  brief  parody  of  some 
well-known  lines,  "Hope  told  a  flattering  tale,"  as  follows:  — 

"Pope  told  a  flattering  tale, 

Which  proved  to  be  bravado, 
About  the  streams  which  spout  like  ale 
On  the  Llano  Estacado." 

Pope  arrived  early  in  July  and  began  to  concentrate  and  or- 
ganize his  army.  A  characteristic  "flattering  tale"  is  told  in 
an  address  to  his  troops,  July  14,  dated  "Headquarters  in  the 
Saddle":  — 

"  Let  us  understand  each  other.  I  come  to  you  from  the  West  where 
we  have  always  seen  the  backs  of  our  enemies ;  from  an  army  whose  busi- 


CEDAR  MOUNTAIN  177 

ness  it  has  been  tf)  seek  the  adversary,  and  beat  him  when  he  was  found ; 
whose  policy  has  been  attack  and  not  defence.  ...  I  presume  I  have  been 
called  here  to  pursue  the  same  system,  and  to  lead  you  against  the  enemy. . . . 
Meantime,  I  desire  you  to  dismiss  from  your  minds  certain  phrases,  which 
I  am  sorry  to  find  so  much  in  vogue  amongst  you.  I  hear  constantly  of 
'taking  strong  positions  and  holding  them';  of  'lines  of  retreat,'  and  of 
'  bases  of  supplies. '  Let  us  discard  such  ideas. . . .  Let  us  study  the  probable 
lines  of  retreat  of  our  opponents  and  leave  our  own  to  take  care  of  them- 
selves. . . .  Success  and  glory  are  in  the  advance.  Disaster  and  shame  lurk 
in  the  rear.  .  .  ." 

The  arrogance  of  this  address  was  not  calculated  to  impress 
favorably  officers  of  greater  experience  in  actual  warfare,  who 
were  now  overslaughed  by  his  promotion.  McDowell  would 
have  been  the  fittest  selection,  but  he  and  Banks,  both  seniors 
to  Pope,  submitted  without  a  word;  as  did  also  Sumner,  Franklin, 
Porter,  Heintzelman,  and  all  the  major-generals  of  McClellan's 
army.  But  Fremont  protested,  asked  to  be  relieved,  and  practi- 
cally retired  from  active  service. 

Meanwhile,  after  the  discomfiture  of  McClellan,  Mr.  Lincoln 
felt  the  want  of  a  military  advisor,  and,  on  July  11,  appointed 
Gen.  Halleck  commander-in-chief  of  all  the  armies  of  the 
United  States,  and  summoned  him  to  Washington  City.  Pope's 
Story  of  the  Civil  War  thus  comments  upon  this  appointment :  — 

"It  is  easy  to  see  how  this  unfortunate  selection  came  to  be  made: 
Halleck  was  at  that  time  the  most  successful  general  in  the  Federal  service ; 
it  was  perfectly  natural  that  he  should  be  the  choice  of  the  President  and 
Secretary  of  War,  to  whom  his  serious  defects  as  a  military  man  could 
not  have  become  known.  His  appointment  was  also  satisfactory  to  the 
public,  for,  as  so  much  had  been  effected  under  his  command  in  the  West, 
he  was  generally  credited  with  great  strategic  ability.  .  .  .  But  both  the 
people  and  the  President  were  before  long  to  find  out  how  slender  was 
Halleck 's  intellectual  capacity,  how  entirely  unmilitary  was  the  cast  of 
his  mind,  and  how  repugnant  to  his  whole  character  was  the  assumption 
of  any  personal  and  direct  control  of  an  army  in  the  field." 

Halleck  arrived  in  Washington  and  took  charge  on  July  22. 
He  found,  awaiting  for  his  decision,  a  grave  problem.  It  was 
whether  McClellan's  army,  now  intrenched  at  Westover  on  the 
James,  should  be  heavily  reenforced  and  allowed  to  enter  upon 
another  active  campaign  from  that  point  as  a  base,  or  whether 
it  should  abandon  the  James  River  entirely,  and  be  brought 


178  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

back,  by  water,  to  unite  with  the  army  now  'under  Pope,  in 
front  of  Washington. 

McClellan  earnestly  begged  for  reinforcements,  and  confidently 
predicted  success  if  they  were  given  him.  He  had  begun  to 
appreciate  the  strategic  advantages  of  his  position,  and  he  was 
even  proposing  as  his  first  movement  the  capture  of  Petersburg 
by  a  coup-de-main.  This  would  not  have  been,  at  that  time,  a 
difficult  operation.  McClellan  had  90,000  men  available,  for  he 
could  have  even  abandoned  his  position  on  the  north  side  and 
used  his  whole  force.  As  to  its  effect,  it  would  probably  have 
finally  compelled  the  evacuation  of  Richmond,  as  it  did  in  1865. 
Had  McClellan  possessed  enterprise  and  audacity,  he  would  have 
waited  neither  for  permission  nor  reinforcements,  but  have  made 
the  dash  on  his  own  responsibility  as  soon  as  he  found  that 
there  was  serious  thought  of  recalling  his  army.  All  of  this  time, 
however,  McClellan  was  still  representing  to  his  government 
that  Lee  had  200,000  men.  If  he  really  believed  this,  it  is  not 
strange  that  he  kept  closely  within  his  intrenchments ;  but  Mr. 
Ropes,  the  most  careful  historian  of  the  war,  asserts  that  nei- 
ther McClellan  nor  Halleck  believed  this  "preposterous  story." 
McClellan  told  it,  and  stuck  to  it,  trying  to  scare  the  administra- 
tion into  giving  him  unlimited  reinforcements :  but  his  real 
belief,  Mr.  Ropes  thinks,  is  apparent  in  his  offer  to  undertake 
the  new  campaign  with  only  20,000  reinforcements,  raising  his 
force  to  only  110,000.  Mr.  Ropes  says  that  Halleck  saw  and 
appreciated  McClellan's  insincerity,  but,  wishing  to  have  the 
army  brought  back,  he  affected  to  believe  in  the  200,000  men, 
and  easily  confounded  McClellan's  arguments  by  pointing  out 
what  such  a  force  might  do  under  such  generals  as  Lee  and 
Jackson. 

Halleck  had  visited  McClellan  on  the  James  soon  after  his 
arrival  in  Washington,  and  the  matter  was  argued,  pro  and  con, 
in  correspondence  afterward  for  some  weeks. 

McClellan  ended  with  a  strong  appeal,  pointing  out  that  he 
could  deliver  his  battle  within  10  miles  of  Richmond,  which 
was  the  heart  of  the  Confederacy,  while  a  victory  70  miles  off 
might  count  for  little.  Halleck  answered  that  it  was  unsafe  to 
have  a  divided  army  in  the  face  of  Lee's  force ;  that  the  location 


CEDAR  MOUNTAIN  179 

on  the  James  River  was  very  unhealthy  in  the  fall  months,  and 
that  most  of  McClellan's  leading  generals  favored  the  withdrawal 
of  the  army.  So  orders  were  given,  and  the  Federal  army,  on 
Aug.  14,  began  the  evacuation  of  the  only  position  from  which 
it  could  soon  have  forced  the  evacuation  of  Richmond.  They 
were  only  to  find  it  again  after  two  years'  fighting,  and  the  loss 
of  over  100,000  men;  and  they  would  find  it  then,  only  by  being 
defeated  upon  every  other  possible  line  of  advance.  The  army 
was  marched  to  Fortress  Monroe,  whence,  as  rapidly  as  boats 
could  be  furnished,  it  was  carried  up  the  Potomac  to  Acquia 
Creek  or  Alexandria.  Thence,  each  corps,  as  fast  as  it  arrived, 
was  marched  to  join  Pope's  army,  it  being  designed  to  concen- 
trate everything  behind  the  Rappahannock. 

Now  let  us  turn  to  Lee,  and  see  how  he  met  the  difficulties  of 
his  situation,  and  what  fortune  attended  his  efforts.  He  realized 
that  the  immediate  danger  was  that  McClellan  should  be  re- 
enforced  and  renew  his  campaign  from  his  new  base.  The  first 
solicitude  was  to  have  McClellan's  army  recalled.  Some  early 
efforts  were  made  to  demoralize  the  transport  vessels,  on  the 
James,  by  which  the  army  was  supplied.  Light  guns  were -sent 
to  various  points  along  the  river,  whence  they  could,  as  it  were, 
ambush  passing  vessels  and  fire  upon  them.  But  the  Federal 
gunboats  had  soon  learned  the  danger  points  and  how  to  pro- 
tect transports  passing  them,  and  no  serious  result  could  be  ac- 
complished. There  were,  however,  persistent  rumors  that  the 
Confederates  were  constructing  one  or  more  ironclads  at  Rich- 
mond, which  would  soon  come  down  the  James  and  destroy  the 
whole  Federal  fleet.  The  uneasiness  caused  in  Washington  by 
these  rumors  may  have  contributed  to  the  result  finally  reached. 
But  Lee  could  not  afford  to  wait  at  Richmond  for  the  enemy  to 
make  up  his  mind  slowly.  His  only  chance  was  to  strike  Pope's 
army  before  it  could  be  joined  by  McClellan's.  As  early,  there- 
fore, as  July  13,  he  had  ordered  Jackson,  with  Taliaferro's  and 
Ewell's  divisions,  to  Gordonsville,  to  oppose  reported  advances 
of  Pope.  The  latter  had,  on  July  14,  ordered  Gen.  Hatch  to 
seize  Gordonsville,  then  held  by  only  about  200  infantry  and  a 
few  cavalry.  Hatch,  however,  lost  time  by  listening  to  false 
reports  that  the  Confederates  were  near  at  hand,  and  by  waiting 


180  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

to  take  infantry,  artillery,  and  a  wagon-train,  along  with  the 
considerable  cavalry  force  which  Pope  had  intended  should  alone 
be  used.  It  alone  would  have  been  ample,  as  Jackson's  troops 
did  not  reach  Gordonsville  until  July  19.  Hatch's  expedition, 
therefore,  was  a  failure. 

Jackson,  on  his  arrival,  was  anxious  to  undertake  some  aggres- 
sive operation  against  Pope,  but  found  his  force  —  only  about 
12,000  men  —  inadequate  to  accomplish  anything  against  Pope's 
47,000 ;  so  he  appealed  to  Lee  for  reinforcement.  Not  yet  assured 
that  McClellan  would  not  soon  resume  the  offensive,  Lee  hesi- 
tated ;  but,  on  July  27,  ordered  A.  P.  Hill's  division,  about  12,000 
strong,  to  Gordonsville.  Hill  joined  Jackson  on  Aug.  2. 
Meanwhile,  Pope  had  received  instructions  from  Halleck  to  make 
demonstrations  toward  Gordonsville,  with  the  view  of  occupy- 
ing Lee's  attention,  and  preventing  his  interference  with  the 
contemplated  withdrawal  of  McClellan's  force  from  the  Peninsula. 

On  Aug.  6,  Pope  began  to  cross  his  infantry  over  the  Rappa- 
hannock  to  concentrate  about  Culpeper.  With  swift  apprecia- 
tion of  the  opportunity,  Jackson,  on  the  7th,  put  his  whole  force 
in  motion  to  fall  upon  that  portion  of  the  enemy  which  first 
reached  Culpeper.  Could  he  defeat  one  of  Pope's  three  corps, 
and  occupy  that  central  position  in  time,  he  might  deal  with 
the  other  two  in  succession,  as  he  had  dealt  with  Shields  and 
Fremont  at  Port  Republic.  His  strategy  was  excellent,  but  it 
was  defeated  by  his  own  logistics.  On  the  7th  the  march  was  but 
eight  miles,  having  only  been  begun  in  the  afternoon.  On  the  8th 
there  were  20  miles  to  go  to  reach  Culpeper,  with  the  Rapidan 
and  Robertson  rivers  to  ford,  the  latter  river  being  held  by  the 
Federal  cavalry,  about  12  miles  in  front  of  the  town.  The 
weather  was  intensely  hot,  and  it  could  hardly  be  expected  that 
the  Confederates  would  make  the  march  in  time  to  give  battle 
on  the  same  day.  It  would  have  been,  however,  only  an  easy 
march  to  reach  a  point,  so  close  to  the  enemy,  that  battle  could 
be  delivered  at  an  early  hour  on  the  9th,  allowing  time  to  reap 
the  fruits  of  victory,  if  successful.  But  on  the  8th,  some  little 
blunders  and  omissions  in  giving  the  orders  to  the  three  divi- 
sions utterly  confounded  the  march,  and  the  head  of  the  column 
only  made  eight  miles,  and  the  rear  of  it  but  two. 


CEDAR  MOUNTAIN  181 

In  the  first  place,  each  division  was  allowed  to  take  its  own 
wagon-train  behind  it  on  the  road,  instead  of  concentrating  all 
three  into  one  train  behind  the  whole  force.  In  the  next  place, 
Ewell's  division,  which  was  to  lead  and  be  followed  by  Hill's, 
had  its  route  changed  without  Hill's  being  informed.  This  led 
to  delay  on  Hill's  part;  and  to  Jackson's  division  (now  com- 
manded by  Winder)  getting  ahead.  Winder  presently  found 
his  line  of  march  intersected  by  Ewell's.  -It  was  also  charged 
that  Hill  showed  little  zeal,  being  offended  that  Jackson,  with 
his  usual  reticence,  had  given  him  no  information  of  his  plans. 

Lee,  indeed,  in  a  recent  letter  had  given  Jackson  a  hint  that 
his  reticence  might  be  carried  too  far.  He  had  said:  — 

"A.  P.  Hill  you  will,  I  think,  find  a  good  officer,  with  whom  you  can 
consult,  and,  by  advising  with  your  division  commanders  as  to  your 
movements,  much  trouble  will  be  saved  you  in  arranging  details,  and  they 
can  aid  more  intelligently." 

The  whole  incident  shows  that  our  staff  service  was  poorly 
organized,  and  not  efficient  in  its  operations.  The  result  of  all 
this  delay  was  that  it  was  about  3  P.M.  on  the  9th  before  Swell's 
division  on  the  right,  and  Winder's  on  the  left,  had  formed  line 
in  front  of  Banks's  corps,  which  had  been  encountered  at  Cedar 
Mountain,  some  seven  miles  south  of  Culpeper.  Lawton's  large 
brigade  of  Ewell's  division  and  Gregg's  of  Hill's  division,  had 
been  left  behind  to  guard  the  wagon-trains  against  the  enemy's 
superior  force  of  cavalry.  The  remainder  of  Hill's  division  was 
not  yet  up,  and,  while  waiting  their  arrival,  26  rifled  guns  were 
brought  up  by  Jackson  and  opened  upon  the  enemy's  lines  and 
batteries. 

The  left  of  Winder's  division  rested  along  the  front  edge  of  a 
considerable  body  of  wood,  which  had  not  been  thoroughly 
examined.  Pope,  in  his  report,  asserts  that  Banks  had  been 
ordered  to  take  a  strong  position  and  hold  it,  awaiting  reenforce- 
ments,  which  were  rapidly  coming  up.  This  should  have  been 
his  play;  but  Pope  had  used  expressions  in  orders,  sent  by  his 
Chief  of  Cavalry,  which  Banks  understood  as  permission  to  attack 
if  the  enemy  were  not  in  great  force.  Being,  personally,  both 
brave  and  aggressive,  Banks  thought  the  opportunity  had  arrived, 


182  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

and  before  Jackson  was  ready  to  advance,  between  5  and  6  P.M., 
^he  attacked  with  his  whole  force. '  The  right  of  his  line  over- 
lapped the  left  of  Winder's  division,  and  taking  it  in  flank  and 
\tf  pressing  vigorously,  it  entirely  routed  the  left  brigade  under 
, '  Garnett,  and  threw  the  whole  division  into  much  confusion. 
Winder  himself  had  been  killed  by  a  cannon-shot  in  the  pre- 
liminary artillery  righting. 

Just  at  this  juncture,  however,  Hill's  division  arrived  upon 
the  field,  and  not  only  restored  the  battle,  but  drove  the  enemy 
from  the  field  and  across  Cedar  Creek,  a  short  distance  in  rear. 
By  this  time  it  was  about  dark,  but  Jackson  was  determined  to 
lose  no  possible  chance.  Favored  by  a  moon  but  little  past  the 
full,  he  brought  forward  two  fresh  brigades,  —  Field's  and  Staf- 
ford's, and  Pegram's  battery,  —  crossed  the  creek,  and  continued 
the  pursuit. 

Banks's  corps,  however,  had,  in  its  retreat,  met  Ricketts's  divi- 
sion of  McDowell's  corps,  accompanied  by  Pope  in  person,  and 
followed  also  by  the  leading  troops  of  Sigel's  corps.  About  one 
and  a  half  miles  beyond  Cedar  Creek  the  Confederate  advance 
found  itself  close  in  front  of  a  strong  line  of  battle,  composed  of 
Ricketts's  four  brigades,  with  four  batteries  of  artillery.  Pegram's 
four  guns  were  pushed  to  the  front,  and,  at  close  canister  range, 
opened  upon  the  enemy.  They  were  replied  to  by  a  dozen  guns, 
but  continued  the  action  until  they  were  practically  cut  to 
pieces.  It  was  now  nearly  midnight,  and  Jackson,  having 
learned  from  the  cavalry  of  the  capture  of  prisoners  from  Sigel's 
corps,  was  constrained  to  halt  for  the  night.  By  morning  he 
found  that  the  greater  part  of  Pope's  army  was  now  united  in 
his  front,  and  that  his  opportunity  to  attack  the  enemy  in  de- 
tail had  passed,  —  lost  by  the  bad  marching  on  the  8th.  He 
still,  however,  felt  able  to  defeat  them  if  they  could  be  induced 
to  attack  him  in  position,  as  Pope  was  pledged  to  do  in  his  order 
75,  so  he  withdrew  his  line  across  the  creek,  and  occupied  him-- 
self  in  gleaning  the  battle-field  of  arms.  Pope  showed  too  much 
wisdom  to  accept  the  gage  of  further  battle.  Heavy  reenforce- 
ments  were  coming  to  him,  and  it  was  as  clearly  his  game  to 
await  their  arrival  as  it  had  been  Jackson's  to  anticipate  it.  So, 
on  the  llth,  he  sent  in  a  flag  of  truce  asking  permission  to  bury 


CEDAR  MOUNTAIN  183 

his  dead  of  the  9th,  which  were  still  within  Jackson's  lines.  It 
was  granted,  until  noon,  and  then  extended  until  sundown. 

On  the  12th,  finding  that  Pope  would  not  be  tempted  to  attack 
him  there,  he  tried  another  ruse.  He  fell  back  from  the  battle- 
field, not  only  to  the  south  side  of  the  Rapidan,  where  he  might 
easily  have  halted  and  maintained  himself,  but  he  continued 
his  retreat  through  Orange  C.  H.  and  on  to  Gordonsville.  He 
hoped  that  Pope  would  construe  the  move  as  a  confession  of 
weakness  and  would  be  inspired  by  it  and  his  own  boastings  to 
follow.  This  strategy  was  very  nearly  successful.  On  Aug. 
12,  Pope,  having  heard  that  the  reinforcements  under  Burn- 
side  would  soon  join  him,  wired  Halleck  that,  on  their  arrival, 
he  would  cross  the  Rapidan  and  advance  upon  Louisa  C.  H. 
This  would  have  given  the  Confederates  the  very  opportunity 
desired.  On  Aug.  13,  Lee  had  ordered  Longstreet  and  Hood, 
with  12  brigades,  to  proceed  by  rail  to  Gordonsville,  and,  on 
the  14th,  he  also  ordered  up  Anderson's  division  of  infantry, 
three  brigades,  and  Stuart's  cavalry.  On  the  15th  he  went  up 
in  person  and  took  the  command. 

The  casualties  at  Cedar  Mountain  had  been  as  follows :  — 

Confederate :  killed  229,  wounded  1047,  missing  31,  total  1307 
Federal:  "  314,  "  1445,  "  622,  "  2381 

The  Confederate  losses  were  distributed  among  nine  brigades 
of  infantry  and  one  of  cavalry,  and  were  greatest  in  Garnett's 
and  Taliaferro's,  of  Jackson's  division,  slightly  over  300  in  each. 
The  Federal  losses  were  in  eight  brigades  of  infantry  and  one  of 
cavalry.  Crawford's  brigade  lost  857,  Geary's  465,  Prince's  452, 
and  Gordon's  344.  The  fighting  upon  Jackson's  left,  where 
Garnett's  and  Taliaferro's  brigades  were  broken  by  the  charge 
of  Crawford's  and  Gordon's  brigades,  and  the  line  reestablished, 
by  Branch's,  Archer's,  and  Winder's  brigades,  was  very  desperate, 
as  is  shown  by  the  casualties  of  some  of  the  Federal  regiments.1 

1  Gen.  Williams,  in  his  official  report,  says :  — 

"The  3d  Wis.,  especially,  fell  under  a  partial  flank  fire  from  the  under- 
brush, and  woods,  which  swept  its  right  companies  with  great  destruction, 
and  under  which  Lt.-Col.  Crane  fell  pierced  with  several  fatal  wounds,  and  the 
regiment  was  obliged  to  give  way.  The  enemy  was,  however,  driven  out  of 
the  open  field  by  the  other  regiments  and  some  distance  into  the  woods, 


184  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

An  incident  of  the  battle  was  a  charge  upon  Taliaferro's  brigade 
by  two  squadrons  of  the  1st  Pa.  Cav.,  under  Maj.  Falls,  when  the 
brigade,  in  some  disorder,  was  pressing  hard  upon  the  retreat  of 
the  Federal  infantry.  The  charge  successfully  rode  through 
the  Confederate  skirmish-line,  but  was  driven  back  by  the  fire 
of  the  line  of  battle  with  the  loss  of  93  men  out  of  164. 

where,  being  strongly  reenforced,  their  fire  became  overwhelming.  No  better 
proof  of  its  terrific  character  can  be  given  than  the  fact  that  of  the  three 
remaining  regiments  which  continued  the  charge  (28th  N.Y.,  46th  Pa.,  and 
5th  Conn.)  every  field-officer  and  every  adjutant  was  killed  or  disabled.  In 
the  28th  N.Y.,  every  Company  officer  was  killed  or  wounded;  in  the  26th 
Pa.,  all  but  five,  and  in  the  5th  Conn,  all  but  eight.  A  combat  more  persist- 
ent or  heroic  can  scarcely  be  found  in  the  history  of  the  war,  but  men,  even 
of  this  unequalled  heroism,  could  not  withstand  the  overwhelming  numbers 
of  the  enemy,  especially  when  left  without  the  encouragement  and  direc- 
tion of  officers." 


CHAPTER  XI 

SECOND  MANASSAS 

The  Situation,  Aug.  15.  Lee's  Plan.  How  it  Failed.  A  Federal  Scout- 
ing Party.  Pope  Escapes.  Stuart's  Raid.  Storm  frustrates  Efforts 
Lee  plans  his  Move.  Ropes's  Criticism.  Jackson's  March.  Aug.  26 
Manassas  Captured.  Destruction  of  Stores.  Pope's  Move.  Lee  and 
Longstreet's  March.  Pope  Blunders.  Jackson's  Move.  Orders  Cap- 
tured. Johnson's  Skirmish.  Pope  at  a  Loss.  Ewell  attacks  King. 
Hard  Fighting.  Losses.  Thoroughfare  Gap.  Flanking  the  Gap.  The 
Opposing  Forces.  Sigel's  Attack.  Reno's  and  Kearny's  Attack. 
Hooker's  and  Reno's  Attack.  Grover's  Brigade.  Porter's  Corps. 
Pope  versus  Porter.  Kearny  and  Reno  Attack.  Longstreet  takes 
Position.  Longstreet' meets  King.  Pope  is  Misled.  Lee  awaits  At- 
tack. The  Forces.  The  Lines.  A  Surprise.  Longstreet  comes  in. 
The  Henry  House  Hill.  Night  and  Rain.  No  Pursuit.  Centreville 
Turned.  Affair  at  Ox  Hill.  Stevens  and  Kearny.  Casualties.  The 
Ammunition  Supply. 

GEN.  LEE  had  arrived  at  Gordonsville  early  on  Aug.  15, 
and  taken  command.  On  the  13th  McClellan  had  abandoned 
his  camp  at  Harrison's  Landing  and  marched  for  Fortress  Mon- 
roe. Lee  now  left  at  Richmond  but  two  brigades  of  infantry 
to  protect  the  city  against  cavalry  raids,  and  took  the  rest  of  his 
army  to  the  vicinity  of  Gordonsville  for  an  aggressive  campaign 
against  Pope.  He  now  occupied  interior  lines  between  McClellan 
and  Pope,  and  it  behooved  him  to  crush  Pope  before  McClellan's 
forces  could  join  him.  Lee  understood  this  thoroughly,  and 
Halleck  and  Pope  understood  it  equally  well;  but  Pope,  per- 
haps inspired  by  his  own  boast  that  he  was  about  to  "seek  the 
adversary  and  beat  him  when  he  was  found,"  and  tempted,  also, 
by  Jackson's  retreat  from  Cedar  Mountain,  had  decided  to  cross 
the  Rapidan  and  advance  upon  Louisa  C.  H.  Nothing  could 
have  suited  Lee's  plans  better,  but  Halleck  had  not  taken  entire 
leave  of  his  senses,  and  he  no  sooner  heard  of  Pope's  de- 
sign to  cross  the  Rapidan  than  he  promptly  forbade  it.  He 

185 


186  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

also,  in  another  letter,  told  Pope  that  he  had  much  better  be 
north  of  the  Rappahannock.  Lee's  idea  of  the  game  the  Federals 
should  have  played  was  to  retreat  to  the  north  side  of  Bull  Run. 

Pope's  army  had  now  been  reenforced  by  Burnside,  and  num- 
bered about  52,000  men.  Its  left  flank  rested  near  Raccoon  Ford 
of  the  Rapidan,  some  four  miles  east  of  Mitchell  Station  on  the 
O.  &  A.  R.  R.  His  centre  was  at  Cedar  Mountain,  and  his  right  on 
Robertson's  River,  about  five  miles  west  of  the  railroad.  He  was, 
therefore,  directly  opposite  Gordonsville,  where  Jackson's  forces 
had  arrived  on  the  13th. 

About  two  miles  below  Rapidan  Station  was  a  high  hill 
called  Clark's  Mountain,  close  to  the  Rapidan,  and  giving  from 
its  top  an  extensive  view  of  the  flat  lands  of  Culpeper,  across  the 
river.  A  signal  station  was  maintained  there,  and  from  it  the 
white  tents  of  the  Federal  camps,  marking  out  their  positions, 
were  plainly  visible.  Spurs  of  Clark's  Mountain,  running  parallel 
to  the  Rapidan,  extended  eastward  down  the  river  about  three 
miles,  to  the  vicinity  of  a  ford  called  Somerville's,  two  miles 
above  Raccoon  Ford.  Raccoon  Ford  was  within  ten  miles  of 
Culpeper  C.  H.,  almost  as  near  it  as  the  position  of  Pope's  army. 

Lee,  on  arriving  about  8  A.M.  on  the  15th,  and  learning  the  de- 
tails of  the  situation,  lost  no  time.  The  topography  gave  him 
a  beautiful  opportunity  to  mass  his  army  (now  about  54,000 
men)  behind  Clark's  Mountain,  to  cross  at  Somerville  Ford, 
fall  upon  Pope's  left  flank  and  sweep  around  it  with  a  su- 
perior force,  cutting  off  Pope's  retreat  to  Washington.  Prob- 
ably at  no  time  during  the  war  was  a  more  brilliant  opportunity 
put  so  easily  within  his  grasp.  He  appreciated  it,  and  promptly 
issued  the  necessary  orders  on  the  very  day  of  his  arrival.  His 
army,  however,  was  not  yet  sufficiently  well  organized  to  be  called 
a  "military  machine,"  or  to  be  relied  upon  to  carry  out  orders 
strictly.  On  the  contrary,  in  some  respects,  it  might  be  called  a 
very  "unmilitary"  machine,  as  the  history  of  the  failure  in  this 
case  will  illustrate. 

Lee,  hi  his  report,  tells  the  story  very  briefly.    He  says,  — 

"The  movement,  as  explained  in  the  accompanying  order,  was  ap- 
pointed for  Aug.  18,  but  the  necessary  preparations  not  having  been  com- 
pleted, its  execution  was  postponed  until  the  20th." 


SECOND  MANASSAS  187 

This  postponement  was  the  fatal  act,  for  on  the  18th  the  enemy 
discovered  his  danger,  and  in  great  haste  put  his  army  in  motion 
to  the  rear  and  fell  back  behind  the  Rappahannock,  during  that 
day  and  the  next. 

The  principal  failure  in  the  preparations  was  the  non-arrival 
of  Fitz-Lee's  brigade  of  cavalry  at  the  appointed  rendezvous  at 
Verdiersville,  near  Raccoon  Ford,  where  it  was  to  cross  on  the 
morning  of  the  18th  to  act  upon  the  right  flank  of  the  army.  Its 
commander  had  duly  received  orders  from  Stuart,  but  had  taken 
the  liberty  to  delay  their  execution  for  a  day,  not  supposing  that 
it  would  make  any  material  difference.  Stuart's  report  gives  the 
following  details :  — 

"On  Aug.  16,  1862,  in  pursuance  of  the  commanding  general's  secret 
instructions,  I  put  this  brigade  (Fitz-Lee's)  on  the  march  for  the 
vicinity  of  Raccoon  Ford,  near  which  point  the  army  under  Gen.  Lee 's 
command  was  rapidly  concentrating.  Gen.  Fitzhugh  Lee  was  directed 
by  me  to  proceed  the  next  day,  from  near  Davenport 's  Bridge,  opposite 
Beaver  Dam,  across  to  the  vicinity  of  Raccoon  Ford,  where  I  promised  to 
join  him  on  that  evening  (17th).  I  proceeded  on  the  cars  directly  to 
the  commanding  general,  whom  I  found  near  Orange  C.  H." 

After  dark  on  the  17th  Stuart  arrived  at  Verdiersville  with 
his  staff,  having  ridden  from  Orange  C.  H.,  but  to  his  surprise 
could  find  or  hear  nothing  of  Fitz-Lee's  brigade.  As  it  was 
highly  important  to  communicate  with  it,  he  despatched  a  staff- 
officer  on  the  road  by  which  the  brigade  was  expected,  to  find  it. 
Unfortunately,  he  selected  his  adjutant -general,  Maj.  Fitzhugh, 
who  carried  Stuart's  copy  of  Lee's  order  of  the  15th,  disclosing 
his  plan. 

This  was  careless  practice,  and  some  blame  must,  also,  rest 
upon  Stuart,  for  not  having  given  his  orders  to  Fitz-Lee  so  ex- 
plicitly that  the  latter  could  neither  misunderstand  or  disobey 
them.  For  the  latter  had  deliberately  marched  on  the  17th 
from  near  Davenport's  Bridge  to  Louisa  C.  H.  instead  of  to 
Verdiersville,  as  ordered.  These  three  points  are  very  nearly 
at  the  angles  of  an  equilateral  triangle,  with  sides  of  about  20 
miles  each.  Taking  his  route  by  Louisa  not  only  occupied  two 
days,  but  so  exhausted  his  horses  that  a  third  day  was  required 
to  rest  them  before  the  proposed  movement  could  be  begun. 


188  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

Fitz-Lee  made  no  official  report,  but  in  his  life  of  Gen.  Lee 
refers  to  this  occasion,  as  follows :  — 

"The  brigade  commander  [Fitz-Lee]  he  [Stuart]  had  expected  [at 
Verdiersville]  did  not  understand  from  any  instructions  he  had  received 
that  it  was  necessary  to  be  at  this  point  on  that  particular  afternoon,  and 
had  marched  a  little  out  of  his  direct  road  in  order  to  reach  his  wagons, 
and  get  from  them  a  full  supply  of  rations  and  ammunition."1 

Such  loose  practices  may  occur  a  hundred  times  without  any 
serious  result,  but  once  in  a  while  the  fate  of  campaigns  will  be 
changed  by  them,  and  this  was  such  an  occasion.  A  scouting 
party  of  Federal  cavalry  had  been  sent  across  Raccoon  Ford  on 
the  evening  of  the  17th,  and,  in  the  darkness  of  the  night,  Maj. 
Fitzhugh,  searching  for  the  lost  brigade,  rode  into  it  and  was 
captured.  His  copy  of  Lee's  order  was  taken  from  him,  and  on 
the  18th  was  delivered  to  Pope. 

Meanwhile,  Stuart  and  his  staff  had  slept  in  the  porch  of  a  house 
at  Verdiersville,  and  in  the  morning  had  been  surprised  by  the 
Federal  scouting  party.  All  managed  to  escape,  but  the  enemy 
secured  Stuart's  cloak  and  plumed  hat.  But  the  end  of  the 
matter  was  not  yet.  When  no  cavalry  appeared  at  Verdiersville, 
as  expected  on  the  night  of  the  17th,  Longstreet  ordered  two 
regiments  of  infantry  to  be  put  on  picket  on  the  road  to  Raccoon 
Ford.  The  order  was  brought  to  Toombs's  brigade,  when  he  was 
absent,  visiting  a  neighboring  brigadier.  The  senior  colonel, 
however,  sent  out  the  regiments,  and  they  were  duly  posted. 
Not  long  afterward  Toombs,  returning,  came  upon  the  regiments, 
and  finding  them  to  be  a  part  of  his  brigade,  ordered  them  back 
to  camp,  claiming  that  no  orders  should  be  obeyed  from  su- 
perior officers  which  did  not  come  through  himself.  Thus  it 
had  happened  that  the  Federal  scouting  party  got  within  our 
lines  unannounced.  When  these  facts  were  developed,  Long- 
street's  adjutant,  in  sword  and  sash,  was  sent  to  place  Toombs 
in  arrest.  He  was  afterward  ordered  to  Gordonsville  and  to  con- 
fine himself  to  the  limits  of  the  town.  After  a  few  days,  how- 
ever, he  sent  an  apology  and  was  restored  to  duty,  followed  the 
army,  overtook  it,  and  rejoined  his  brigade,  to  their  great  de- 
light, on  Aug.  30,  in  the  heat  of  the  battle  of  Second  Manassas. 

1  Fitz-Lee's  Lee,  p.  183. 


SECOND  MANASSAS  189 

When  Lee  learned  of  the  absence  of  the  cavalry,  he  at  first 
proposed  to  defer  the  attack  only  a  single  day.  Jackson  is  said 
to  have  urged  that  it  would  be  best  to  make  no  delay  at  all,  but 
to  go  ahead  with  the  infantry.  But  the  reports  from  the  signal 
station  on  Clark's  Mountain  represented  the  enemy  as  quiet, 
and  Lee  decided  to  wait.  Later,  a  telegraphic  despatch  from 
Fitzhugh  Lee  representing  his  animals  as  in  bad  condition,  it 
was  decided  to  postpone  the  movement  until  the  20th,  and  or- 
ders were  issued  accordingly. 

Doubtless,  Lee  found  it  hard  to  believe  that  Pope,  so  soon  after 
his  boasting  order,  and  still  sooner  after  the  "victory"  he  had 
claimed  at  Cedar  Mountain,  would  now  turn  his  back  and  fly 
without  firing  a  shot ;  but,  later  on  that  day,  there  came  reports 
of  activity  and  stir  among  the  enemy's  camps,  and  on  the  19th 
Lee  and  Longstreet,  going  up  the  mountain  to  see  for  themselves, 
saw  Pope's  whole  army  march  away  to  the  Rappahannock. 

On  the  20th  Lee's  advance  took  place,  but  although  the  march 
was  rapidly  made  in  hopes  of  overtaking  some  delayed  portion  of 
the  enemy,  the  hopes  proved  vain. 

On  the  north  side  of  the  Rappahannock,  Pope  found  such 
advantages  of  position  that,  although  for  five  precious  days  Lee 
sought  diligently  by  feints  and  demonstrations  to  find  a  favorable 
opening,  his  efforts  were  vain.  But  to  do  nothing  was  to  lose  the 
campaign.  By  a  bold  raid  of  Stuart's,  however,  Lee  now  had  the 
good  luck  to  turn  the  tables  and  come  into  possession  of  Pope's 
private  despatch  book,  with  copies  of  his  most  important  corre- 
spondence with  Lincoln,  Halleck,  and  others.  Stuart  had  gotten 
Lee's  permission  to  try  to  burn  a  railroad  bridge  over  Cedar  Run, 
near  Catlett's  Station,  some  12  miles  in  rear  of  Pope's  army. 
With  about  1500  cavalry  and  two  guns,  he  crossed  the  Rappa- 
hannock at  Waterloo  Bridge,  above  Pope's  right  flank,  on  Aug. 
22,  and  pushed  on  through  Warrenton  toward  Catlett's  Station. 
A  terrific  rain-storm  came  on  late  in  the  afternoon,  and  in  it  the 
command  captured  the  enemy's  picket  and  surprised  the  Federal 
encampments.  The  night  was  memorable  for  black  darkness, 
the  time  being  just  at  the  change  of  the  moon.  A  negro  recog- 
nized Stuart  and  volunteered  to  lead  him  to  the  camp  of  Pope's 
staff  and  baggage.  A  regiment  under  W.  H.  F.  Lee  raided  this 


190  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

camp,  while  other  regiments  raided  other  camps  in  the  vicinity, 
and  a  force  was  sent  to  burn  the  bridge.  This  was  impossible 
on  account  of  the  rain,  the  structure  being  a  two-story  trestle. 
The  party  had  no  torpedoes,  so  a  few  axes  were  found  and  all 
damage  possible  was  done  with  them,  but  it  was  not  serious. 

The  storm  which  had  prevented  Stuart  from  burning  the  bridge 
and  hastened  his  return,  also  nipped  in  the  bud  aggressive  opera- 
tions by  both  commanders.  Jackson,  on  Lee's  left,  had  crossed 
Early's  brigade  at  Sulphur  Springs,  upon  an  old  dam  across  the 
river,  while  his  pioneers  were  repairing  the  broken  bridge  for  a 
crossing  hi  force.  Pope,  upon  his  own  left,  had  designed  to  cross 
the  Rappahannock  and  attack  Lee's  right  flank.  The  freshet 
in  the  river  not  only  called  a  halt  upon  both  operations,  but 
prevented  all  the  Federal  concentrations.  Pope  made  a  feeble 
effort  to  crush  Early's  brigade,  but  it  was  repulsed,  and  when  a 
larger  force  had  been  brought  up  by  the  Federals,  Early  had  with- 
drawn over  the  completed  bridge. 

Meanwhile,  the  information  gained  from  Pope's  correspondence 
showed  Lee  that  his  campaign  was  to  be  an  utter  failure,  unless, 
within  the  next  seven  days,  he  could  bring  Pope  to  battle  upon 
open  ground.  For,  already,  two  of  the  corps  of  McClellan's 
army,  the  3d  and  the  5th,  and  with  Reynolds's  Pa.  Reserves, 
in  all  20,000  men,  were  within  two  days  of  juncture  with  Pope, 
and  the  2d,  4th,  and  6th,  with  Sturgis's  division,  and  Cox's 
7000  men  from  Kanawha,  could  not  be  more  than  five  days  later. 
Lee  had  but  about  55,000  men.  In  two  days  Pope  would  have 
about  50,000,  and  in  five  days  more  he  would  have  near  130,000. 
The  situation  was  desperate,  and  it  required  a  desperate  remedy. 
Two  divisions  of  infantry,  —  D.  H.  Hill's  and  McLaws's,  —  two 
brigades  under  Walker,  and  a  brigade  of  cavalry  under  Hampton, 
which  all  together  would  raise  Lee's  force  to  75,000,  had  been 
ordered  up  from  Richmond,  but  could  not  be  expected  in  time  for 
the  present  emergency.  Immediate  action  was  necessary.  It 
was  taken  with  the  quick  decision  characteristic  of  Lee. 

Jackson,  with  three  divisions  of  infantry  (14  brigades  about 
22,000)  and  Stuart's  cavalry  (two  brigades  about  2000),  set  out 
in  light  marching  order,  with  no  trains  but  ordnance,  ambu- 
lances, and  a  few  wagons  with  cooking  utensils,  by  a  roundabout 


SECOND  MANASSAS  191 

march  of  over  50  miles,  to  fall,  upon  Pope's  depot  of  supplies  at 
Manassas  Junction,  24  miles  in  Pope's  rear,  and  only  26  miles  from 
Alexandria.  Lee,  with  Longstreet  and  about  30,000  men,  would 
hold  the  line  of  the  Rappahannock,  and  occupy  Pope's  attention, 
while  Jackson  was  making  his  forced  march.  Lee's  army,  then, 
of  55,000,  would  be  split  in  half,  and  Pope's  army  of  about  80,000 
would  be  about  midway  between  the  two  halves.  Any  military 
student  would  pronounce  such  a  situation  absolutely  ruinous  to 
the  divided  army. 

In  his  History  of  the  Civil  War,  Mr.  Ropes  writes  of  Lee's 
strategy :  — 

"  The  disparity  between  Pope's  force  and  that  of  Jackson  is  so  enor- 
mous that  it  is  impossible  not  to  be  amazed  at  the  audacity  of  the  con- 
federate general,  in  thus  risking  an  encounter  in  which  the  very  exist- 
ence of  Jackson 's  command  would  be  imperilled,  and  to  ask  what  was  the 
object  which  Gen.  Lee  considered  as  warranting  such  an  extremely  dan- 
gerous manoeuvre.  The  answer  is  not  an  easy  one.  .  .  .  We  shall  .  .  . 
only  remark  here  that  this  move  of  Gen.  Lee 's  in  dividing  his  army,  was 
an  illustration  of  the  daring,  not  to  say  hazardous,  policy  which  he  pursued 
in  this  summer  of  1862." 

The  best  answer  is  the  one  given  by  Lee  himself,  who  is  reported 
in  Allan's  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  to  have  said,  in  referring  to 
some  discussion  of  this  matter,  — 

"  Such  criticism  is  obvious,  but  the  disparity  of  force  between  the  con- 
tending forces  rendered  the  risks  unavoidable." 

It  was  scarcely  60  days  since  Ives,  as  has  been  told,  stopped  his 
horse  hi  the  road  to  say  to  me, — 

"  If  there  is  a  man  in  either  army,  head  and  shoulders  above  all  others 
in  audacity,  that  man  is  Lee,  and  you  will  live  to  see  it." 

There  has  been  speculation  whether  this  turning  movement 
originated  with  Lee  or  Jackson.  Lee's  report  only  says,  — 

"  In  pursuance  of  the  plan  of  operations  determined  upon,  Jackson  was 
directed  on  the  25th  to  cross  above  Waterloo,"  etc. 

Jackson's  report  says,  — 

"  Pursuing  the  instructions  of  the  commanding  general,  I  left  Jeffer- 
sonton  on  the  morning  of  the  25th,"  etc. 


192  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

The  most  natural  supposition  would  ascribe  the  plan  to  Lee. 
His  own  words  would  seem  to  confirm  the  supposition,  and 
Jackson's  form  of  expression  to  indorse  it. 

Col.  Henderson,  who  would  certainly  assert  a  claim  for 
Jackson,  if  it  were  possible,  has  written:1  — 

"  It  is  only  certain  that  we  have  record  of  few  enterprises  of  greater  dar- 
ing than  that  which  was  there  decided  on ;  and  no  matter  from  whose  brain 
it  emanated,  on  Lee  fell  the  burden  of  the  responsibility.  It  is  easy  to 
conceive.  It  is  less  easy  to  execute,  but  to  risk  cause  and  country,  name 
and  reputation,  on  a  single  throw,  and  to  abide  the  issue  with  unflinching 
heart,  is  the  supreme  exhibition  of  the  soldier's  fortitude." 

Early  on  Aug.  25,  Jackson  set  out  upon  what  Henderson  calls 
"his  most  famous  march."  He  marched  26  miles  that  day,  and 
bivouacked  very  late  that  night  at  Salem.  His  course  was  first 
northwest  to  Amissville,  and  thence  about  north  to  Salem.  As 
his  march  was  intended  to  be  a  surprise,  it  had  been  favored  by 
the  storm  of  the  23d.  This  tended  to  prevent  large  columns  of 
dust,  which  so  great  a  movement  would  surely  have  raised  in  dry 
weather.  Considering  the  object  of  the  march,  it  was  a  mistake 
to  allow  the  infantry  regiments  to  carry  their  banners  displayed. 
For  the  country  was  moderately  flat,  and  was  dominated  on  the 
east  by  the  Bull  Run  Mountains;  upon  which  it  was  to  be  ex- 
pected the  enemy  would  have  scouts  and  signal  stations.  This 
was  actually  the  case,  and  the  march  of  the  column  was  observed 
by  8  A.M.  on  the  25th,  and  it  was  watched  for  15  miles,  and  fair 
estimates  were  made  of  its  strength  from  counting  the  regimental 
flags  and  the  batteries.  It  was  plainly  seen  that  their  immediate 
destination  was  Salem. 

This  information  was  promptly  communicated  to  Pope,  Hal- 
leek,  and  the  leading  generals,  who  began  to  guess  what  the  move- 
ment meant.  Naturally,  no  one  guessed  correctly ;  for  the  simple 
reason  that  no  one  could  imagine  that  Lee  would  deliberately 
place  his  army  in  a  position  where  Pope  could  deal  with  the  two 
halves  of  it  separately.  It  was  correctly  guessed  that  the  troops 
marching  to  Salem  were  Jackson's,  but  Pope  supposed  them  to  be 
on  their  way  to  the  Valley  and  probably  covering  the  flank  of 
Lee's  main  body,  which  might  be  on  their  left  moving  upon  Front 
Royal. 

1  S.  J.  II.,  124. 


SECOND  MANASSAS  193 

He  has  been  justly  blamed  for  not  ordering  a  strong  recon- 
noissance  to  develop  the  true  state  of  affairs.  His  proper  move 
at  the  time,  as,  indeed,  it  had  been  for  some  days,  was  to  fall  back 
with  his  whole  army  to  Manassas.  He  would,  perhaps,  have  done 
this  but  that  Halleck  had  ordered  him  to  hold  especially  the 
lower  Rappahannock,  covering  Falmouth,  and  to  "fight  like  the 
devil." 

On  the  26th,  Jackson  marched  at  dawn,  and  now  the  head  of  his 
column  was  turned  to  the  east,  and  his  men  knew  where  they  were 
going.  In  front  of  them  was  Thoroughfare  Gap,  through  the  Bull 
Run  Mountains,  which  debouched  upon  the  heart  of  the  enemy's 
territory,  held  by  six  times  their  numbers.  A  march  of  about 
20  miles  brought  Jackson  to  Gainesville,  on  the  Warrenton  and 
Alexandria  pike,  by  mid-afternoon.  Here  he  was  overtaken 
by  Stuart  with  the  cavalry.  These  had  skirmished  at  Waterloo 
Bridge  all  day  of  the  25th,  and  marched  at  2  A.M.  on  the  26th 
to  follow  Jackson's  route.  Near  Salem,  finding  the  roads  blocked 
by  Jackson's  artillery  and  trains,  they  had  left  the  roads,  and  with 
skilful  guides  had  found  passes  through  the  Bull  Run  Moun- 
tains, without  going  through  Thoroughfare  Gap.  Here  Jackson, 
instead  of  marching  directly  upon  Manassas  Junction,  where 
Pope's  depot  of  supplies  was  located,  took  the  road  to  Bristoe 
Station,  seven  miles  south  of  Manassas.  There  the  railroad 
was  crossed  by  Broad  Run.  Jackson  designed  to  destroy  the 
bridge  and  place  a  force  in  position  to  delay  the  enemy's  ap- 
proach, while  he  burned  the  supplies  at  Manassas.  The  head  of 
Ewell's  column  reached  Bristoe  about  sunset,  having  marched 
about  25  miles. 

So  far,  during  this  whole  day,  no  report  of  Jackson's  march  had 
reached  the  Federals.  Now,  a  train  of  empty  cars,  running  the 
gantlet  of  a  hot  fire  and  knocking  some  cross-ties  off  the  track, 
escaped  going  to  Manassas,  and  gave  the  alarm.  While  Ewell's 
division  took  position  to  hold  off  the  enemy,  Gen.  Trimble 
volunteered,  with  two  regiments,  the  21st  Ga.  and  21st 
N.C.,  to  march  back  and  capture  Manassas,  before  it  could  be 
reenforced  from  Alexandria. 

Proceeding  cautiously  in  line  of  battle,  it  was  nearly  midnight 
when  these  troops  were  fired  upon  with  artillery  from  the  Ma- 


194  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

nassas  works.  Losing  only  15  wounded,  they  charged  the  lines, 
and  took  them  with  eight  guns.  Our  cavalry,  following  the  move- 
ment, gathered  300  prisoners.  Next  morning  Jackson  came  up 
with  Taliaferro's  and  Hill's  divisions  at  an  early  hour,  and,  about 
the  same  time,  a  Federal  brigade,  sent  by  rail  from  Alexandria, 
advanced  from  Bull  Run  in  line  of  battle,  expecting  to  drive  off 
a  raid  of  cavalry.  Had  the  Confederates  restrained  their  im- 
patience, and  permitted  the  enemy  to  approach,  the  whole  bri- 
gade might  have  been  captured.  But  their  artillery  could  not 
resist  the  temptation  to  open  upon  the  unsuspecting  advance,  and 
it  retreated  so  rapidly  that,  although  it  was  pursued  for  some 
miles,  its  whole  loss  was  but  135  killed  and  wounded,  and  204  pris- 
oners. The  Federal  general,  Taylor,  was  killed. 

The  Federal  and  sutler's  supplies  stored  at  Manassas  presented 
a  sight  to  the  ragged  and  half-starved  Confederates,  such  as  they 
had  never  before  imagined.  Not  only  were  there  acres  of  ware- 
houses filled  to  overflowing,  but  loaded  cars  covered  about  two 
miles  of  side-tracks,  and  great  quantities  of  goods  were  stacked  in 
regular  order  in  the  open  fields,  under  tarpaulin  covers.  The  sup- 
plies embraced  everything  eatable,  drinkable,  wearable,  or  usable, 
and  in  immense  profusion.  During  the  day,  Jackson  turned  his 
men  loose  to  feast  and  help  themselves.  At  night,  after  aston- 
ishing their  palates  with  real  coffee,  with  cheese,  sardines,  and 
champagne,  and  improving  their  underwear,  apparel,  and  foot- 
gear, and  filling  their  haversacks,  the  torch  was  systematically 
applied.  When  Pope  next  day  looked  upon  the  ashes,  he  must 
have  felt  that  it  was  bad  advice,  when  he  said,  "Let  us  study 
the  probable  lines  of  retreat  of  our  opponents  and  leave  our  own 
to  take  care  of  themselves." 

Meanwhile,  at  Bristoe,  Ewell  had  been  unmolested  until  near 
three  o'clock.  About  that  time  he  was  attacked  by  Hooker's 
division.  This  Pope  had  sent  to  develop  the  situation  at  Ma- 
nassas, of  which  he  was  as  yet  not  informed.  Hooker  had  only 
about  5500  men,  —  less  than  Ewell  had  at  hand,  —  but  his  attack 
was  so  vigorous  that  the  latter,  whose  orders  were  not  to  bring 
on  a  general  engagement,  after  an  hour's  fighting,  withdrew  across 
Broad  Run  (having  fought  on  the  south  side)  and  marched  to 
join  Jackson  at  Manassas,  without  being  followed. 


SECOND  MANASSAS  195 

Jackson  had  now  accomplished  the  first  object  of  his  expedi- 
tion —  the  destruction  of  the  Manassas  Depot.  Pope  would 
have  to  abandon  his  line  on  the  Rappahannock,  and  would,  of 
course,  move  at  once  to  crush  Jackson.  A  Napoleon,  in  his  place, 
might  have  cut  loose  from  his  base  and  marched  upon  Rich- 
mond, leaving  Lee  to  wreck  his  army  on  the  fortified  lines  around 
Washington,  but  Pope  was  no  Napoleon.  When  he  realized  the 
situation,  however,  his  first  orders  were  very  judicious,  a  safer 
play  if  less  brilliant  than  a  Napoleonic  advance  upon  Rich- 
mond would  have  been.  He  ordered  the  two  corps  of  Mc- 
Dowell and  Sigel,  with  Reynolds's  division,  about  40,000  men,  to 
Gainesville.  In  support  of  them,  to  Greenwich,  he  sent  Heintzel- 
man  with  three  divisions.  Hooker  was  sent  to  Bristoe  to  attack 
Ewell,  with  Porter  marching  to  support  him.  Banks,  in  the  rear, 
protected  the  trains.  The  best  part  of  all  of  these  orders  was  the 
occupation  of  Gainesville  with  a  strong  force,  for  Gainesville  was 
directly  between  Jackson  and  Longstreet.  It  behooved  Pope  to 
prevent  any  possible  junction  between  these  two,  and  now  on  the 
night  of  the  27th  at  Gainesville  he  held  the  key  to  the  whole  posi- 
tion. 

But,  unfortunately  for  Pope,  as  yet  he  had  no  conception  that 
Lee,  with  Longstreet 's  corps,  would  be  hurrying  to  throw  him- 
self into  the  lion 's  den  by  the  side  of  Jackson.  He  seems  to  have 
thought  that  his  effort  should  be  to  "bag  Jackson,"  rather  than 
to  keep  him  from  uniting  with  Lee. 

Let  us  now  turn  to  Lee  and  Longstreet.  On  the  26th,  Jackson 
having  about  a  day  and  a  half  the  start,  Longstreet 's  corps  set 
out  to  follow.  One  division,  Anderson's,  of  four  brigades,  was 
left  at  Sulphur  Springs,  in  observation  of  the  enemy,  while  the 
remaining  17  brigades,  somewhat  loosely  organized  into  about 
five  divisions,  say  25,000  men,  were  put  hi  motion  to  follow  in 
Jackson 's  track.  Lee  rode  with  this  command,  and  they  biv- 
ouacked for  the  night  near  Orleans.  At  dawn  on  the  27th  the 
march  was  resumed.  He  was  delayed  at  Salem  by  some  cavalry 
demonstrations  from  the  direction  of  Warrenton,  and,  having 
no  cavalry,  he  went  into  bivouac  at  White  Plains,  having 
marched  about  18  miles. 

I  have  already  told  of  the  course  of  events  having  been  twice 


196  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

modified  in  this  campaign,  by  the  commanders  coming  into  pos- 
session of  their  rival 's  plans  or  orders,  by  virtue  of  some  accident, 
and  there  is  yet  to  tell  of  other  similar  occurrences.  Besides 
these  there  was  also  a  narrow  escape  from  capture  by  Lee 
himself.  A  Confederate  quartermaster,  on  the  morning  of  the 
27th,  was  riding  some  distance  ahead  of  Longstreet  's  column  on 
the  march  northward  from  Orleans.  Approaching  Salem,  he  sud- 
denly came  upon  the  head  of  a  Federal  squadron.  He  turned  and 
took  to  flight,  and  the  squadron,  breaking  into  a  gallop,  pursued 
him.  Within  a  short  distance  the  fugitive  came  upon 
Lee  with  some  ten  or  twelve  staff-officers  and  couriers.  He 
yelled  out  as  he  approached,  "  The  Federal  cavalry  are  upon  you, " 
and  almost  at  the  same  instant,  the  head  of  the  galloping 
squadron  came  into  view,  only  a  few  hundred  yards  away.  It 
was  a  critical  moment,  but  the  staff-officers  acted  with  good 
judgment.  Telling  the  general  to  ride  rapidly  to  the  rear,  they 
formed  a  line  across  the  road  and  stood,  proposing  to  delay  the 
Federals  until  Lee  could  gain  a  safe  distance.  This  regular 
formation  deceived  the  enemy  into  the  belief  that  it  was  the  head 
of  a  Confederate  squadron.  They  halted,  gazed  for  a  while,  and 
then,  wheeling  about,  turned  back,  never  dreaming  of  the  prize 
so  near. 

On  the  night  of  the  27th,  while  Jackson  is  burning  Manassas, 
Lee  and  Longstreet  are  in  bivouac  at  White  Plains,  24  miles  west 
and  beyond  Thoroughfare  Gap,  while  McDowell,  Sigel,  and  Rey- 
nolds are  about  Gainsville,  directly  between  them.  In  this  situa- 
tion, the  game  is  in  Pope's  hands,  but,  as  already  said,  instead 
of  trying  to  keep  Lee  and  Jackson  apart,  his  ambition  is  to  make 
short  work  of  Jackson,  who,  he  probably  supposed,  would  fight  in 
the  earthworks  around  Manassas.  In  some  such  belief,  during 
the  night  he  issued  further  orders.  All  of  his  forces  were  ordered 
to  march  upon  Manassas  at  dawn  on  the  28th.  This  is  the  order 
which  lost  Pope  his  campaign. 

It  is  now  time  to  return  to  Jackson.  He  knew  that  Lee  and 
Longstreet  were  coming,  and  his  most  obvious  move,  perhaps, 
would  have  been  to  march  for  Thoroughfare  Gap  by  some  route 
which  would  avoid  McDowell  at  Gainesville.  His  movement, 
however,  had  not  been  made  solely  to  destroy  the  depot  at 


SECOND  MANASSAS  197 

Manassas.  That  was  but  the  first  step  necessary  to  get  Pope 
out  of  his  strong  position.  Now  it  was  necessary  to  bring  him 
to  battle  quickly,  but  in  detail.  His  decision  was  a  master- 
piece of  strategy,  unexcelled  during  the  war,  and  the  credit  of 
it  seems  solely  due  to  Jackson  himself. 

Soon  after  nightfall  Taliaferro's  division  was  started  on  the  road 
toward  Sudley  's  Ford  of  Bull  Run,  to  cross  the  Warrenton  turn- 
pike and  bivouac  in  the  woods  north  of  Groveton.  A.  P.  Hill's 
division  was  sent  by  the  Blackburn 's  Ford  road  to  Centreville. 
After  midnight,  Ewell,  who  had  arrived  from  Bristoe  and  gotten 
some  supplies,  followed  Hill  across  Bull  Run.  Then  he  turned  up 
the  stream,  and  made  his  way  on  the  north  side  to  the  Stone 
Bridge.  This  he  crossed  and  made  a  junction  with  Taliaferro's 
division.  Hill  remained  at  Centreville  until  about  10  A.M.,  when 
he  moved  down  the  Warrenton  turnpike,  also  crossed  at  Stone 
Bridge,  and,  moving  up  toward  Sudley,  took  position  on  Jack- 
son's left.  His  march  and  Ewell 's  were  each  about  14  miles. 
The  wagon-trains  all  went  with  Taliaferro's  division,  which 
marched  about  nine  miles.  The  sending  of  two  divisions  across 
Bull  Run  was  doubtless  to  be  in  position  to  interpose  if  Pope 
attempted  to  move  past  him  toward  Alexandria.  Perhaps,  also, 
it  had  in  it  the  idea  of  misleading  the  enemy,  for  it  certainly  had 
that  desirable  effect.  It  happened  that  a  part  of  Stuart's 
cavalry,  which  was  on  that  flank,  during  the  morning  raided 
Burke 's  Station  on  the  railroad,  only  12  miles  from  Alexandria. 
This,  with  the  reported  presence  of  Hill  at  Centreville,  entirely 
misled  Pope  as  to  Jackson's  true  location. 

Early  on  the  28th,  two  Federal  couriers  were  captured,  bearing 
important  orders.  Those  of  the  first  were  from  McDowell  to 
Sigel,  directing  him  to  march  to  Manassas  Junction.  This  order 
was  taken  to  Jackson,  and  he  seems  to  have  interpreted  the 
movement  to  mean  that  Pope  was  about  to  retreat  to  Alex- 
andria, for  he  at  once  sent  orders  to  A.  P.  Hill,  at  Centreville,  to 
move  down  to  the  fords  of  Bull  Run  to  intercept  the  enemy. 
But,  fortunately,  the  other  captured  courier  bore  orders  from 
Pope  to  McDowell,  ordering  the  formation  of  his  line  of  battle  for 
the  next  day  on  Manassas  plains,  and  these  orders,  being  brought 
to  Hill,  he  appreciated  that  the  enemy  was  not  retreating  and 


\ 


198  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

that  it  would  be  dangerous  to  separate  his  division  from  the  other 
two.  So,  as  has  been  told,  about  10  A.M.  he  marched  to  join 
them. 

Though  it  was  Jackson's  desire  now  to  conceal  his  where- 
abouts until  Longstreet  was  near,  yet  one  of  his  brigadiers, 
Col.  Johnson,  came  near,  bringing  the  force  which  was  now 
marching  from  Gainesville  toward  Manasses,  down  upon  the 
right  flank  of  Taliaferro's  and  Swell's  divisions.  Johnson, 
with  two  guns,  was  on  a  high  hill,  a  little  out  from  Jackson's 
extreme  right.  He  saw  the  head  of  a  column,  and  skirmishers 
advancing,  as  he  thought,  upon  his  position.  It  was  the  head  of 
Reynolds 's  division,  on  McDowell's  left,  straightening  itself  out 
for  its  prescribed  march  to  Manassas,  ten  miles  to  the  southeast. 
Johnson  opened  fire  upon  them  with  his  guns.  The  enemy 
promptly  deployed  his  column,  advanced  skirmishers,  and 
brought  into  action  a  superior  force  of  artillery,  on  which  John- 
son abandoned  his  hill  and  withdrew  his  small  force  to  Jackson's 
lines.  The  enemy 's  skirmishers  advanced  and  occupied  the  hill, 
but  the  Confederate  force  was  now  nowhere  to  be  seen.  So  it 
was  supposed  that  the  affair  was  only  a  demonstration  by  some 
reconnoitring  party,  and,  after  caring  for  a  few  killed  and 
wounded,  the  division  marched  for  Manassas,  where  it  was  still 
supposed  that  Jackson  was  awaiting  them. 

The  Federal  marches  were  not  rapid,  and  it  was  not  until  near 
noon  that  Pope  himself  arrived  at  Manassas,  and  found  that 
Jackson  had  mysteriously  vanished.  He  was  utterly  at  a  loss  to 
guess  where  he  had  gone.  His  first  supposition  was  that  he  had 
gone  toward  Leesburg,  and  he  ordered  McDowell  to  move  to 
Gum  Springs  in  pursuit.  He  soon  countermanded  that  order,  and 
hearing  of  Hill's  having  been  at  Centreville,  and  of  the  cavalry 
attack  upon  Burke 's  station,  he  ordered  a  general  concentration 
of  his  troops  at  Centreville.  This  was  his  last  order  for  that  day, 
and  all  was  now  quiet  for  some  hours.  Jackson  and  his  three 
divisions  lay  hidden  in  the  woods  within  seven  miles  of  the  ruins 
of  Manassas,  until  5  P.M.  At  that  hour  King's  division  of  Mc- 
Dowell's corps, — four  brigades  about  10,000  strong,  with  four 
batteries, — appeared  upon  the  Warrenton  pike,  in  front  of  Jack- 
son's ambush,  marching  toward  Centreville  in  pursuance  of 


SECOND  MANASSAS  199 

Pope's  order.  King  had  been  marching  from  Gainesville  to 
Manassas,  and  Pope's  orders  had  intercepted  the  march  and 
changed  its  direction.  Jackson,  about  a  mile  from  the  road, 
might  have  remained  hidden  and  allowed  King  to  pass.  Had 
he  known  that,  at  that  moment,  Lee  and  Longstreet  were  still 
beyond  Thoroughfare  Gap,  and  that  Ricketts's  division  of  Mc- 
Dowell 's  corps  was  at  the  gap,  one  might  suppose  that  he  would 
hesitate  to  disclose  himself.  But  if  Pope  was  allowed  to  with- 
draw behind  Bull  Run,  the  result  of  the  whole  campaign  would 
be  merely  to  force  Pope  into  an  impregnable  position.  It  was 
the  fear  of  this  which  led  Jackson  to  attack  King  immediately, 
even  though  he  knew  that  it  would  draw  upon  him  Pope's  whole 
force. 

Leaving  Hill's  division  in  position  on  his  left  (holding  the 
road  to  Aldie  by  which  he  might  retreat  in  case  of  emergency), 
Jackson  formed  a  double  line  of  battle,  with  Taliaferro  's  division 
on  the  right  and  Ewell's  on  the  left.  Taliaferro  (W.B.)  had  in 
his  front  line  from  left  to  right  the  old  Stonewall  brigade,  now 
under  Baylor,  and  that  of  A.  B.  Taliaferro,  and  in  rear  the 
brigade  of  Starke.  His  fourth  brigade  under  Bradley  Johnson 
was  detached  and  in  observation  near  Groveton.  Ewell  had  in 
his  front  line  Lawton  's  and  Trimble 's  brigades,  and  in  his  second 
Early 's  and  Forno's, — in  all  about  8000  infantry.  Orders  were 
sent  for  20  pieces  of  artillery,  but  owing  to  difficulties  of  the 
ground  only  two  small  batteries  arrived  in  time  to  be  engaged. 
These  were  isolated  and  could  not  be  maintained  against  the 
superior  metal  of  the  enemy.  King's  division,  not  dreaming  of 
the  proximity  of  the  enemy,  was  marching  down  the  pike  with 
only  a  small  advanced  guard  and  a  few  skirmishers  in  front. 
The  brigades  were  in  the  following  order:  Hatch's,  Gibbon's, 
Doubleday  's,  Patrick 's. 

The  action  which  now  ensued  was  somewhat  remarkable  in 
several  features.  It  was  fought  principally  by  the  brigadiers  on 
each  side.  McDowell,  in  command  of  the  Federal  corps,  was 
absent,  having  gone  to  find  Pope  and  have  a  personal  conference.  C* 
The  division  commander,  King,  was  absent,  sick  at  Gainesville, 
only  about  two  miles  off.  Ewell  and  Taliaferro  (W.B.),  the  two 
Confederate  major-generals,  were  both  seriously  wounded,  Ewell 


200  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

losing  his  leg.  Probably,  for  these  reasons,  less  than  a  half  of 
either  force  was  brought  into  the  brunt  of  the  action^/  When 
"this  had  developed  itself,  Jackson  ordered  Swell's  second  line, 
Early  and  Forno,  to  turn  the  enemy 's  right  flank.  In  the  dark- 
ness, they  were  unable  to  make  their  way  in  time  through  the 
woods,  and  across  the  deep  cuts  and  high  fills  of  an  unfinished 
railroad,  stretching  from  near  Sudley  's  Ford  toward  Gainesville. 
The  fighting,  meanwhile,  had  ceased.  The  notable  part  of  this 
action  was  fought  by  Gibbon 's  brigade  of  three  Wisconsin  regi- 
ments, and  one  Indiana  reenforced  by  two  regiments  of  Double- 
day's,— the  56th  Pa.  and  the  76th  N.Y.,  —  in  all  about  3000 
men.  Opposed  was  Taliaf erro  's  front  line  of  two  brigades  (A.  G. 
Taliaferro's  on  the  right,  and  the  Stonewall  brigade,  now  only 
about  600  strong,  under  Baylor,  on  the  left)  with  some  help  also 
from  Swell's  front  line  of  Lawton's  brigade,  and  Trimble's. 
These  troops  were  all  veteran  infantry,  and  it  is  to  be  noted  that 
the  decidedly  smaller  force  of  the  Federals  had  never  before  been 
seriously  engaged.  They  had,  indeed,  the  great  aid  and  support 
of  two  excellent  batteries,  but  their  desperate  infantry  fight, 
attested  by  their  losses,  illustrates  the  high  state  of  efficiency  to 
which  troops  may  be  brought  solely  by  drill  and  discipline.  It 
may  be  a  sort  of  mechanical  valor  which  is  imparted  by  long- 
trained  obedience  to  military  commands,  but  it  has  its  advan- 
tages, even  though  there  may  be  appreciable  differences  in  it 
from  the  more  personal  courage  inspired  by  a  loved  cause. 

A  good  idea  of  this  contest  is  given  in  the  official  report  of 
Gen.  W.  B.  Taliaferro:  — 

"At  this  time  our  lines  were  advanced  from  the  woods  in  which  they 
had  been  concealed  to  the  open  field.  The  troops  moved  forward  with 
splendid  gallantry  and  in  most  perfect  order.  Twice  our  lines  were 
advanced  until  we  had  reached  a  farm-house  and  orchard  on  the  right  of 
our  line,  and  were  within  80  yards  of  a  greatly  superior  force  of  the  enemy. 
Here  one  of  the  most  terrific  conflicts  that  can  be  conceived  of  occurred. 
Our  troops  held  the  farm-house  and  one  edge  of  the  orchard,  while  the 
enemy  held  the  orchard  and  the  enclosure  next  to  the  turnpike.  To  our 
left  there  was  no  cover,  and  our  men  stood  in  the  open  field  without  cover 
of  any  kind.  The  enemy,  although  reenforced,  never  once  attempted  to 
advance  upon  our  position,  but  withstood  with  great  determination  the 
terrible  fire  which  our  lines  poured  upon  them.  For  two  hours  and  a  half, 


SECOND  MANASSAS 


201 


without  an  instant 's  cessation  of  the  most  deadly  discharges  of  musketry, 
round  shot  and  shell,  both  lines  stood  unmoved,  neither  advancing  and 
neither  broken  or  yielding  until  at  last,  about  nine  o  'clock  at  night,  the 
enemy  slowly  and  sullenly  fell  back  and  yielded  the  field  to  OUT  victo- 
rious troops." 

Separate  returns  for  this  action  were  made  only  for  Lawton's 
and  Trimble's  brigades.  Only  partial  statements  for  the  other 
commands  are  found  in  the  few  official  reports.  Of  many  com- 
mands there  are  no  reports,  owing  to  the  number  of  commanding 
officers  who  were  killed  or  disabled  in  succeeding  battles.  The 
returns  of  Lawton's  and  Trimble's  brigades  are  as  follows:  — 


KILLED 

WOUNDED 

MISSING 

AGGREGATE 

OFFICERS 

MEN 

OFFICERS 

MEN 

MEN 

Lawton's 
Trimble's 

8 

8 

105 

82 

23 
12 

273 
202 

5 
6 

414 
310 

Total 

16 

187 

35 

375 

11 

724 

The  Stonewall  brigade,  out  of  its  small  force  of  600  muskets, 
lost  three  colonels,  two  majors,  and  over  200  men,  killed  and  &*^ 
wounded.  Taliaferro's  brigade  lost  a  lieutenant-colonel  and 
two  majors.  Its  other  casualties  were  probably  about  100. 
Gibbon's  brigade,  out  of  2300  men,  lost  about  750,  and  Double- 
day's  two  regiments,  about  800  strong,  lost  about  350.  Hatch's 
brigade,  from  the  front,  and  Patrick's  from  the  rear,  were  not 
engaged,  partly  because  of  the  length  to  which  the  marching 
column  had  been  strung  out  upon  the  march,  and  partly,  perhaps, 
because  of  the  absence  of  Gen.  King.  But  he  came  upon 
hearing  of  the  action,  and  at  1  A.M.  on  the  29th,  by  his  order,  the 
division  was  put  in  motion  for  Manassas  Junction.  He  thought 
himself  in  the  presence  of  superior  forces,  and  decided  that  it  was 
best  to  get  nearer  to  reinforcements. 

It  is  now  time  to  return  to  Lee  and  Longstreet,  who  bivouacked 
between  White  Plains  and  Thoroughfare  Gap  rather  early  in  the 
afternoon  of  the  27th.  Scouts  sent  ahead  by  Longstreet  re- 
ported the  Gap  clear,  and  messages  were  received  from  Jack- 
son that  he  was  in  ambush  upon  the  Warrenton  road.  To  make 


202  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

sure  of  the  passage  through  Thoroughfare  Gap,  D.  R.  Jones's 
division  was  sent  forward  to  occupy  it.  The  Gap  is  a  narrow 
pass,  only  80  yards  in  width,  bounded  on  the  north  by  basaltic 
cliffs  over  200  feet  in  height  and  on  the  south  by  steep  hills, 
rocky,  and  covered  with  vines  and  undergrowth.  A  small  force 
in  possession  could  hold  the  pass  against  any  front  attack.  As 
Jones's  column  drew  near  the  Gap,  officers  riding  ahead  discovered 
the  approach  of  a  large  Federal  force.  It  was  Ricketts  's  division, 
sent  by  McDowell  upon  his  own  responsibility,  to  prevent  the 
advance  of  reinforcements  to  Jackson.  It  was  a  move  which, 
quickly  made  and  strongly  backed,  might  have  brought  victory  to 
the  Federals. 

Jones  deployed  the  9th  Ga.  of  Anderson 's  brigade,  and  sent 
them  through  the  Gap.  They  met  and  drove  back  the  Federal 
pickets,  until,  meeting  heavier  forces  with  artillery,  they  were 
themselves  driven  into  the  Gap,  where  the  whole  brigade  formed, 
and  essayed  to  scale  the  mountain  on  the  left.  This  was  only 
possible  at  a  few  places,  but  the  1st  Ga.  succeeded  and  got 
into  a  good  position,  and  repulsed  with  loss  an  attack  by  the 
enemy  who  came  so  near  that  some  were  killed  by  pistol  fire  of 
the  officers. 

Meanwhile,  Benning,  commanding  Toombs's  brigade,  was 
ordered  to  occupy  the  mountain  on  the  right  of  the  pass.  He 
started  off  at  the  double-quick,  through  a  hot  fire  of  artillery, 
and  after  a  stiff  climb  occupied  the  crest  just  in  time  to  repulse 
the  enemy  advancing  upon  it  from  the  other  side. 

Sharp  skirmishing  took  place  until  dark.  Jones's  division  had 
no  artillery,  and  it  could  only  oppose  the  enemy's  by  selecting 
men  armed  with  rifled  muskets,  and  sending  them  as  skirmishers 
to  pick  off  the  cannoneers  and  horses;  yet  this  was  done  so 
successfully  that  the  enemy's  batteries  were  often  compelled  to 
move,  and  Ricketts  speaks  of  his  total  losses  as  "severe." 
Jones's  total  casualties  were  "about  25." 

One  great  disadvantage  under  which  the  whole  Confederate 
army  was  still  laboring  at  this  period  was  that  most  of  its  arms 
were  the  old  "  calibre  69,"  smooth-bore  musket,  using  the  round 
ball  with  effective  range  of  only  about  200  yards.  When 
Benning  collected  from  two  regiments  all  rifled  muskets,  he 


SECOND  MANASSAS  203 

got  only  about  30  from  the  20th  Ga.,  and  10  or  12  from  the  2d 
Ga. 

When  the  enemy's  heavy  fire  of  artillery  disclosed  his  force  in 
front  of  the  Gap,  Longstreet  at  once  took  measures  to  turn  the 
position.  Hood,  with  his  two  brigades,  was  ordered  to  cross 
the  mountain  by  a  cattle  trail  a  short  distance  to  the  north,  and 
Wilcox's  division  of  three  brigades  was  ordered  to  force  a  pas- 
sage, if  necessary,  through  Hopewell  Gap,  three  miles  to  the 
north. 

Both  of  these  flank  movements  were  accomplished  during  the 
night,  but  Ricketts  had  decided  not  to  wait.  He  had  been  so 
discouraged  by  his  reception,  that  he  scarcely  waited  until 
nightfall  to  start  back  to  Gainesville;  and  at  daylight  next 
morning,  having  learned  that  King's  division  had  fallen  back  to 
Manassas,  Ricketts  took  the  road  to  Bristoe. 

The  departure  of  the  enemy  from  their  front  at  dark  on  the 
27th  was  observed  by  the  Confederates,  and  on  the  morning  of 
the  28th  the  remainder  of  Jones's  division  marched  through  the 
Gap,  and  was  joined  by  Hood  and  Wilcox  from  their  respective 
routes  by  the  cattle  trail  and  Hopewell  Gap.  By  noon  Lee  and 
Longstreet  had  arrived  at  Gainesville,  and  connected  with  Jack- 
son, and  the  second  great  step  in  Lee's  strategy  had  been  success- 
fully accomplished.  The  third  and  last,  also,  by  that  time  was 
in  a  fair  way  of  accomplishment,  for  Pope,  instead  of  concen- 
trating his  forces  behind  Bull  Run,  had  taken  the  offensive,  and 
had  already  begun  his  attack  upon  Jackson.  Of  that  action  it  is 
now  to  tell. 

Jackson's  whereabouts  had  been  disclosed  to  Pope  by  the 
attack  upon  King's  division,  but  Pope  failed  to  note  that  Jackson 
was  the  aggressor.  He  supposed  that  King  had  intercepted 
Jackson  in  an  effort  to  escape  through  Thoroughfare  Gap.  His 
available  forces,  on  the  morning  of  the  29th,  were  as  follows :  — 

On  Bull  Run,  two  miles  east  of  Jackson,  were  Sigel's 
corps,  three  divisions,  and  Milroy's  independent  brigade, 
together  about  11,000  strong,  and  Reynolds's  division  of  Pa. 
Reserves,  about  8000,  with  14  batteries.  At  Centreville,  seven 
miles  to  the  northeast,  were  the  three  divisions  of  Hooker, 
Kearny,  and  Reno,  about  18,000.  About  seven  miles  to  the 


204  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

southeast  at  Manassas,  and  between  there  and  Bristoe  were  the 
corps  of  McDowell  and  Porter,  about  27,000, — in  all  about 
64,000. 

Jackson's  forces,  now  about  18,000  infantry,  with  40  guns, 
were  formed  along  the  unfinished  railroad  line,  which  stretched 
south  from  Sudley's  Ford  to  the  Warrenton  pike,  about  three 
miles.  Of  this  the  two  miles  nearest  Sudley  were  held  in  force; 
the  rest  by  skirmishers,  except  that  the  right  flank,  on  the  Warren- 
ton  pike,  was  held  by  Early's  and  Forno's  brigades  of  EwelFs 
division.  The  left  of  the  line  was  held  by  A.  P.  Hill's  strong 
division  of  six  brigades.  In  front  of  the  extreme  left  was  wide, 
open  ground  for  a  half  mile.  Then  came  about  a  mile  of  wood 
from  200  to  600  yards  wide,  and  then  again  the  open,  rolling 
fields.  Hill's  division  was  formed  in  three  lines  of  battle,  with 
16  guns  to  command  the  open  ground  in  his  front. 

Swell's  division,  now  under  Lawton,  held  the  centre,  with  the 
brigades  of  Lawton  and  Trimble,  in  two  lines.  Taliaferro's  divi- 
sion, now  commanded  by  Starke,  held  the  right,  formed  in  three 
lines  of  battle,  with  24  guns  massed  to  fire  over  the  open  ground 
in  front. 

Pope  was  not  obliged  to  fight  —  certainly  not  to  take  the 
offensive.  He  might  have  withdrawn  across  Bull  Run,  and 
awaited  the  arrival,  within  two  or  three  days,  of  Sumner's  and 
Franklin's  corps  and  Cox's  division.  If  he  did  fight,  he  would 
have  stood  a  fair  chance  of  success,  had  he  first  massed  his  army, 
and  concentrated  its  power  in  united  effort,  with  reserves  to 
follow  up  every  success.  But  he  was  sure  to  lose  if  he  allowed 
his  divisions  to  fight  in  piecemeal. 

As  Jackson  was  forming  his  lines  at  sunrise,  Sigel's  and  Rey- 
nolds's  columns  were  visible,  nearly  two  miles  away,  deploying 
for  the  attack.  Sigel  held  the  right,  with  three  divisions,  sup- 
ported by  Milroy's  brigade.  Reynolds  held  the  left.  The 
enemy's  line  was  not  parallel  to  Jackson's,  their  right  being 
nearest  to  Jackson's  left,  and  their  left  somewhat  retired.  About 
seven  o'clock  the  enemy's  batteries  were  brought  forward  and 
opened  fire.  Their  skirmishers  were  advanced,  and  the  lines  of 
battle  followed.  On  the  right  and  the  left  of  Groveton  wood 
(the  wood  in  front  of  Jackson's  left  centre),  the  Confederate 


SECOND  MANASSAS  205 

batteries,  having  fair  play,  held  back  the  enemy's  advance. 
Opposite  the  wood  the  enemy  encountered  only  skirmish  fire, 
and  they  easily  entered.  But  when  they  approached  the  Con- 
federate line  of  battle  and  met  its  fire,  the  conflict  was  short  and 
the  Federals  retreated,  Gregg's  brigade  following  them.  Milroy's 
brigade  came  to  their  help,  but  Thomas's  brigade  came  to  Gregg's, 
and  the  Federals  were  driven  completely  through  the  wood  and 
pursued  by  the  Confederate  fire  as  they  retreated  across  the 
fields. 

This  much  was  over  by  10.30  A.M.  The  best  of  Pope's  oppor- 
tunity would  be  lost  by  1  P.M.,  for  by  that  hour  Longstreet's 
troops  would  be  on  hand.  But  now  Reno  and  Kearny,  from 
Centreville,  were  beginning  to  come  upon  the  field,  and  Sigel, 
calling  upon  Reno  for  reinforcements,  again  made  a  desperate 
assault,  which  reached  the  Confederate  line  in  such  strength  as 
to  necessitate  the  calling  up  of  Branch's  brigade  from  Hill's 
third  line.  With  this  brigade  the  wood  was  again  cleared  and 
Sigel's  divisions  were  practically  put  hors  du  combat.  It  was 
now  about  noon,  and  Pope,  who  had  been  at  Centreville,  not 
realizing  the  size  of  the  affair  near  Groveton,  arrived  upon  the 
field.  He  immediately  organized  a  fresh  attack  with  the  three 
divisions  of  Kearny,  Hooker,  and  Reno.  Had  he  awaited  their 
arrival  before  wrecking  Sigel  in  vain  efforts,  his  chances  would 
have  been  be.tter. 

These  three  divisions  made  their  assault  about  one  o'clock. 
As  before,  the  division  on  the  extreme  right,  Kearny's,  was  held 
off  by  the  16  guns  firing  over  the  open  ground  on  Jackson's  left. 
The  other  two  divisions  came  through  the  wood,  and  this  time 
portions  of  the  assaulting  column  actually  crossed  the  railroad 
line,  and  fierce  hand-to-hand  fighting  ensued,  the  brunt  of  it 
falling  upon  Field's  and  Thomas's  brigades.  Field  was  severely 
wounded;  but  Fender's  brigade,  from  Hill's  third  line,  joining 
in  the  melee,  the  Federals  were  again  borne  back,  and  again 
pursued,  not  only  through  the  wood,  but  out  into  the  open  ground 
beyond,  where  Pender  incautiously  followed.  Here  he  met  a 
hot  fire  of  artillery,  and  fell  back  to  the  woods. 

On  seeing  his  retreat,  Grover's  brigade  of  Hooker's  division, 
being  in  reserve,  was  sent  forward  for  a  counterstroke.  Advanc- 


206  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

ing  slowly  through  the  wood,  it  gave  a  volley  and  then  rushed 
the  somewhat  disorganized  Confederate  line,  and  carried  a  con- 
siderable space.  Had  they  had  prompt  and  ample  support, 
victory  was  within  their  grasp. 

By  this  time,  Longstreet's  troops  had  connected  with  Jackson's 
extreme  right,  relieving  the  brigades  of  Early  and  Forno.  These 
had  been  brought  from  their  isolated  position  on  the  right  flank, 
and  placed  in  the  rear  of  the  centre.  Jackson  had  seen  Grover's 
advance,  and  now  sent  Forno 's  Louisianians  and  a  regiment  of 
Lawton's  Georgians  to  the  onset.  Johnson's  and  Starke's  bri- 
gades were  also  brought  to  fire  upon  Grover's  left  flank.  So, 
caught  in  the  whirlwind  of  fire  which  burst  upon  him  in  the  high 
tide  of  his  success,  Grover  was  swept  back  across  the  line  and 
out  of  the  wood,  and  driven  beyond  the  Warrenton  pike,  with  a 
loss  of  one-fourth  of  his  command. 

Four  determined  assaults  had  now  been  made  through  the 
Groveton  wood,  and  each  had  met  with  a  bloody  repulse.  At 
least  4000  Federals  had  fallen  in  them.  Not  one  attack  had  had 
any  chance  of  success,  for  each  had  been  made  with  too  few 
men;  but  the  continuous  fighting  from  7  A.M.  until  4  P.M.,  had 
also  thinned  the  Confederate  lines,  and  had  greatly  reduced  the 
ammunition  supply  of  many  of  the  brigades.  There  was  now  a 
lull  in  the  battle  for  a  while,  during  which  many  Confederates 
collected  cartridges  from  the  bodies  of  the  fallen.  .  On  the  right 
and  left  of  the  Groveton  wood  the  fighting  had  been  largely  of 
artillery,  or  musketry,  at  long  range,  and  there  had  been  no  actual 
collisions. 

Pope  had  been  very  sanguine  in  the  morning  that  he  was 
about  to  "bag  Jackson,"  and  he  was  now  unwilling  to  give  up 
the  effort,  while  the  sun  was  still  high  above  the  horizon,  and 
while  he  still  had  comparatively  fresh  troops.  Kearny's  three 
brigades  opposite  the  open  ground  on  Hill's  left,  had  had  no  close 
fighting,  and  Reno's  two  brigades  were  also  in  good  condition. 
Besides  these,  he  looked  for  help  from  Porter's  corps,  and  from 
King's  and  Ricketts's  divisions  of  McDowell's  corps.  Ricketts 
could  have  been  with  him,  but  for  his  blunder  in  the  morning, 
when  he  took  the  road  to  Bristoe  on  learning  that  King  had 
fallen  back  to  Manassas.  Thus,  Jackson's  attack  upon  King 


SECOND  MANASSAS  207 

had  produced  the  effect  of  keeping  two  divisions  out  of  the  next 
day's  fight.  As  to  Porter,  there  is  much  interesting  history 
which  can  only  be  briefly  summarized  here. 

Porter,  in  the  Seven  Days,  had  proved  himself  not  only  a 
hard  fighter,  but  a  skilful  commander.  He  would  have  made  a 
good  leader  of  an  army ;  but  he  had  a  low  opinion  of  Pope,  and, 
in  his  correspondence  with  brother  officers  about  this  period,  did 
not  conceal  it.  It  so  happened  that,  under  Pope's  orders,  Porter's 
corps  had  that  morning  marched  from  Bristoe  by  Manassas  for 
Gainesville.  Now,  at  4.30  P.M.,  supposing  Porter  in  position  at 
Gainesville,  Pope  sent  him  peremptory  orders  to  immediately 
attack  Jackson's  right  flank. 

But  Porter  was  not  at  Gainesville.  When,  about  11.30  A.M., 
he  reached  a  little  stream  called  Dawkins  Branch,  about  three 
and  a  half  miles  short  of  Gainesville,  he  found  Confederate 
cavalry  in  his  front.  He  deployed  a  brigade  in  line  of  battle, 
and,  advancing  a  strong  skirmish-line,  captured  some  of  Long- 
street's  scouts.  Meanwhile,  clouds  of  dust,  extending  back  10 
miles  to  Thoroughfare  Gap,  indicated  that  a  large  force  was  arriv- 
ing at  Gainesville.  Stuart,  to  notify  Jackson  of  his  approach,  had 
made  some  cavalry  drag  brush  in  the  roads.  Nevertheless, 
Porter  prepared  to  force  his  way.  He  deployed  his  corps  of  two 
divisions  in  two  lines,  and  advanced  a  brigade  across  the  stream. 
King's  division,  which  was  marching  in  rear  of  Porter,  closed  up, 
but  remained  in  column.  About  this  time  McDowell  came  upon 
the  field  and  remonstrated  with  Porter,  saying,  "  You  are  too  far 
out;  this  is  no  place  to  fight  a  battle." 

As  McDowell  ranked  Porter,  when  their  troops  were  together, 
McDowell  was  in  command.  Just  before  meeting  Porter,  he  had 
learned  that  at  8.45  that  morning  17  regiments  of  Confederate 
infantry  and  a  battery  had  passed,  marching  down  the  Warren- 
ton  road  toward  Groveton.  After  some  reconnoissance,  McDowell 
decided  to  leave  Porter  where  he  was,  and  to  take  King  back  to 
a  road  by  which  he  could  reach  the  left  flank  of  Reynolds's  divi- 
sion, now  engaged  with  Jackson's  right.  Ricketts's  division,  re- 
turning from  its  march  to  Bristoe,  was  now  following  King,  but 
both  divisions  were  exhausted  by  from  12  to  18  hours'  marchings. 
When  McDowell  left,  with  King  and  Ricketts,  Porter  considered 


208  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

himself  too  weak  to  venture  an  attack  upon  the  Confederates  in 
his  front.  His  force  was  only  between  9000  and  10,000.  He 
had  no  reinforcements  at  hand  and  he  had  in  his  front  Long- 
street's  corps  of  nearly  25,000.  His  course  was  proper,  and  his 
threatening  position  practically  neutralized  an  equal  number  of 
the  Confederates,  for  D.  R.  Jones's  division  of  three  brigades, 
and  Wilcox's  of  three,  were  each  deployed  and  held  in  observa- 
tion of  Porter  all  the  afternoon. 

Pope,  having  sent  his  order  to  Porter  to  attack  at  4.30,  waited 
a  half-hour  to  allow  time  for  the  message  to  reach  Porter,  and 
at  five  ordered  Kearny  and  Reno  with  their  five  brigades  to 
attack  Jackson's  left.  To  finish  with  Porter  first :  The  4.30 
order  did  not  reach  him  until  about  6.30.  He  at  once  ordered 
his  leading  division,  Morell's,  to  advance,  but  before  the  necessary 
arrangements  could  be  made,  darkness  had  come  on,  and  he  was 
compelled  to  abandon  the  idea  of  attacking.  For  this,  and  some 
other  minor  incidents,  Pope,  soon  after  the  battle,  preferred 
charges  against  Porter.  He  was  tried,  and  on  Jan.  10,  1863, 
was  convicted  of  violations  of  articles  of  war,  and  sentenced  to 
dismissal  from  the  army,  and  to  be  disqualified  from  ever  again 
holding  office  under  the  United  States. 

Thus  was  the  Federal  army  deprived  of  the  services  of  one  among 
its  officers  of  the  very  highest  type.  The  ex-Federal  Confederates 
who  had  known  Porter  considered  this  result  as  one  of  the  best 
fruits  of  their  victory.  The  gist  of  the  charges  against  Porter 
lay  in  Pope's  claim  that  Longstreet's  troops  had  not  reached 
Gainesville  until  late  hi  the  afternoon,  and  that  Porter  could 
have  fallen  upon  Jackson's  exposed  right  flank.  After  the  war, 
when  official  reports  of  the  Confederates  were  published,  the 
actual  facts  became  so  notorious  that,  in  1878,  the  proceedings 
of  the  court  were  reviewed  by  a  board  appointed  by  the  Presi- 
dent. They  found  the  facts  and  recommended  the  remission  of 
Porter's  sentence,  though  condemning  the  terms  in  which  Porter 
had  criticised  Pope,  in  his  correspondence  above  referred  to. 
This  report  of  the  board  was  referred  to  Congress,  which  took 
no  action.  Finally  on  May  4,  1882,  President  Arthur  remitted 
the  sentence. 

From  this  digression  let  us  return  to  the  attack  at  5  P.M.  on 


SECOND  MANASSAS  209 

the  29th,  by  the  two  divisions  of  Kearny  and  Reno  with  their 
five  brigades.  Like  the  four  preceding  attacks,  it  is  a  predestined 
failure,  for  it  is  another  case  of  a  boy  sent  upon  a  man's  errand. 
But,  unlike  the  previous  efforts,  this  gained  a  temporary  success 
over  the  thin  brigades  of  A.  P.  Hill,  which  had  repelled  all  the 
preceding  ones,  and  was  now  poorly  supplied  with  ammunition. 
Here  the  thin  lines  were  overrun  by  the  superior  numbers,  in  a 
very  gallant  and  persistent  attack.  Hill's  troops  were  forced 
back  so  far  that  Pope  believed  that  Jackson's  left  "  was  doubled 
back  upon  his  centre."  He  ordered  King's  division,  which 
McDowell  had  now  brought  upon  the  field,  to  advance  down  the 
Pike  and  fall  upon  Jackson's  right,  where,  too,  he  was  momentarily 
expecting  Porter  to  attack. 

But  Hill,  though  forced  back  for  perhaps  300  yards,  was  not 
broken,  and  was  still  making  a  desperate  fight,  when,  to  his  aid, 
came  Early's  and  Lawton's  brigades.  The  Federals  were  in  dis- 
order, and  the  fresh  Confederate  line  had  an  easy  victory,  driving 
the  enemy  and  pursuing  them  far  across  the  railroad,  before  it 
could  be  halted  and  brought  back.  Meanwhile,  King's  division, 
though  worn  by  its  march  to  Manassas  and  back  since  1  A.M.  of 
the  previous  night,  had  advanced  boldly  down  the  Warrenton 
pike,  stimulated  by  Pope's  "flattering  tale"  that  Jackson  was 
"doubled  back  upon  his  centre." 

Now  we  must  take  up  the  story  of  Longstreet's  corps  to  ex- 
plain the  genesis  of  the  sixth  and  last  combat  of  the  day.  Like 
all  the  preceding,  it,  too,  was  made  by  an  insufficient  force.  Long- 
street,  on  his  arrival,  had  formed  his  line,  not  in  prolongation  of 
Jackson's,  but  inclining  forward,  making  a  large  obtuse  angle. 
A  few  of  his  guns  were  pushed  to  the  front,  firing  upon  the  left 
of  Reynolds's  line,  and  assisting  Jackson's  right  in  keeping 
Reynolds's  from  coming  to  close  quarters.  At  the  extreme  right 
Jones's  division  was  bent  back,  almost  at  right  angles,  to  oppose 
a  front  to  Porter's  corps,  and  Wilcox's  three  brigades  were  held 
in  reserve  behind  Jones. 

Now  that  his  army  was  again  united,  Lee  was  inclined  to  en- 
gage at  once,  but  Longstreet  asked  to  be  allowed  first  to  make  a 
personal  reconnoissance.  After  making  one,  occupying  an  hour, 
he  reported  adversely  on  account  of  the  easy  approach  open  on 


210  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

his  right  to  large  Federal  forces  reported  to  be  at  Manassas. 
Lee  was  not  satisfied  with  this  report,  and  recurred  to  the  idea 
of  attacking  down  the  turnpike.  It  was  now  so  late  in  the  after- 
noon, however,  that  Longstreet  suggested  making  only  a  recon- 
noissance  in  force,  reserving  the  attack  until  dawn  next  morn- 
ing, and  to  this  Lee  agreed. 

Accordingly,  Hood's  and  Evans's  brigades  were  ordered  to 
advance  for  the  reconnoissance,  and  Wilcox's  division  was  with- 
drawn from  the  rear  of  Jones,  as  a  support  to  the  movement. 

Thus  it  happened  that  when  King's  division  advanced,  expect- 
ing to  find  Jackson  in  retreat,  it  met  Longstreet  advancing.  The 
fight  which  ensued  was  prolonged  until  9  P.M.  It  was  fierce 
and  bloody,  but  the  first  half -hour  of  it  converted  King's  advance 
into  a  retreat.  He  was  pursued  until  he  found  refuge  hi  the 
heavy  lines  holding  the  high  ground  about  Pope's  centre,  with 
the  loss  of  a  gun,  several  flags,  and  some  prisoners.  Longstreet 
then  withdrew  his  attacking  brigades  back  to  the  ground  from 
which  they  had  advanced.  It  had  happened  also  that,  although 
Jackson  had  been  entirely  successful  on  the  left,  his  victorious 
troops,  being  withdrawn  from  the  pursuit,  had  not  halted  at  the 
railroad  cut, — their  line  during  the  day, — but  had  been  carried 
back  to  a  line  a  short  distance  in  rear,  selected  by  Jackson. 
Thus,  on  both  flanks,  the  Federals,  although  defeated,  were  left 
during  the  night  with  deserted  battle-fields  in  their  front.  They 
discovered  the  fact  before  midnight,  and  this  discovery  proved 
to  Pope  a  fatal  delusion  and  a  snare.  Had  it  been  a  deliberate 
ruse,  it  would  have  been  a  masterpiece.  Pope  thought  it  could 
have  but  one  meaning  —  that  the  Confederates  were  retreating 
toward  Thoroughfare  Gap.  At  daybreak  he  had  wired  Halleck 
as  follows :  — 

"We  fought  a  terrific  battle  here  yesterday,  with  combined  forces  of 
the  enemy,  which  lasted  with  continuous  firing  from  daylight  until  dark, 
by  which  time  the  enemy  was  driven  from  the  field  which  we  now  occupy. 
The  enemy  is  still  in  our  front,  but  badly  used  up.  We  lost  not  less  than 
8000  killed  and  wounded,  but  from  the  appearance  of  the  field,  the  enemy 
lost  at  least  two  to  one.  The  news  has  just  reached  me  from  the  front  that 
the  enemy  is  retreating  toward  the  mountains." 

Pope  clearly  believed  this  story  on  the  insufficient  evidence 


SECOND  MANASSAS  211 

before  him,  and  this  error  made  him  the  aggressor  next  morning 
and  cost  him  the  battle,  as  we  shall  see. 

The  object  of  the  Confederate  advance  on  the  afternoon  of 
the  29th,  as  we  have  seen,  was  a  reconnoissance  preparatory  to 
an  attack  at  dawn,  which  Longstreet  had  suggested  as  better 
than  one  so  late  in  the  afternoon.  Hood  and  Evans  had  been 
charged  to  examine  the  enemy's  positions  carefully,  and  to  re- 
port as  to  the  feasibility  of  the  morning  attack.  About  mid- 
night reports  were  brought,  by  each,  adverse  to  making  it.  Upon 
these  reports  Lee  decided  to  stand  his  ground  for  the  day,  and 
see  if  the  enemy  would  attack.  If  he  did  not,  Lee  proposed  to 
inaugurate  a  fresh  turning  movement  around  Pope's  right,  during 
the  night  of  the  30th.  His  force  upon  the  field,  including  2500 
cavalry,  was  now  nearly  50,000.  Jackson,  reduced  by  casual- 
ties, had  about  17,000.  Longstreet  had,  with  R.  H.  Anderson, 
about  30,000. 

Pope,  at  last,  had  united  his  whole  army,  except  Banks's  corps. 
This  had  hardly  recovered  from  its  so-called  "victory"  at  Cedar 
Mountain,  and  was  hi  charge  of  the  wagon-trains  about  Bristoe. 
Before  daylight  orders  had  been  sent  withdrawing  Porter  from 
his  isolated  position  on  the  extreme  left,  and  bringing  him  around 
to  the  centre.  And  now  Pope,  believing  his  victory  already  half 
won,  had  massed,  almost  under  his  own  eye,  about  65,000  men  and 
28  batteries.  Two  corps,  Sumner's  and  Franklin's,  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac,  and  two  extra  divisions,  Cox's  and  Sturgis's,  — 
in  all  about  42,000, — were  coming  from  Alexandria,  25  miles  off, 
as  fast  as  possible.  With  these,  Pope  would  have  about  107,000 
in  the  field.  Lee  also  had  some  reinforcements  coming,  and 
already  at  the  Rappahannock  River.  They  were  the  divisions 
of  McLaws  and  D.  H.  Hill,  each  about  7000 ;  Walker's  division 
about  4000 ;  Hampton's  cavalry  1500,  and  Pendleton's  reserve 
artillery  1000  —  total  20,500. 

Having  telegraphed  Halleck  that  the  Confederates  were  re- 
treating, Pope  now  began  to  set  his  army  in  battle  array  to  press 
the  retreat.  Some  hours  were  consumed,  but  they  were  well 
spent  in  forming  his  troops,  thus  avoiding  the  isolated  efforts  of 
the  previous  day,  and  arranging  for  a  simultaneous  attack  along 
the  whole  line.  Meanwhile,  there  was  some  artillery  firing  at 


212  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

rather  long  range  by  each  side,  and  skirmishers  in  front  were 
everywhere  in  easy  range  and  sharply  engaged. 

The  Federal  line  was  short  and  strong.  From  its  right  on 
Bull  Run  in  front  of  Jackson's  left,  to  its  left  across  the  Warren- 
ton  pike,  near  Groveton,  was  less  than  three  miles.  Within  this 
space  were  deployed  about  20,000  infantry  in  the  front  line,  and 
behind  it  40,000  more  were  held  in  masses  to  be  thrown  where 
needed.  Lee's  line  covered  at  least  four  miles.  Jackson,  on  the 
left,  had  proved  the  strength  of  his  unfinished  railroad  as  a 
defensive  line  of  battle,  and  had  no  wish  to  change.  But,  with 
his  instinctive  desire  to  mystify  his  opponent,  he  had  withdrawn 
his  men  into  the  nearest  woods  and  hollows,  where  he  kept  them 
carefully  out  of  sight.  He  had  had  but  one  ree'nf  or  cement  from 
Longstreet's  corps  —  a  battalion  of  18  guns  under  Col.  S.  D.  Lee, 
which  early  that  morning  had  taken  position  on  his  right  flank, 
where  it  could  support  the  fire  of  the  large  battery  near  his 
centre.  Longstreet's  line,  as  before  said,  was  not  a  prolongation 
of  Jackson's,  but  bent  to  the  front  —  the  two  forming  a  rather 
flat  crescent,  its  right  flank  overlapping  Pope's  left  considerably. 
The  Federal  army  made  a  finer  display  than  was  often  seen  on  a 
battle-field  in  the  war,  being  closely  concentrated  upon  ground 
unusually  open,  and  Pope,  from  one  of  the  hills  close  in  rear  of 
the  centre,  viewed  it  with  pride  and  confidence.  Of  his  oppo- 
nents he  could  see  little  but  a  few  batteries,  supported  by  little 
more  than  skirmishers;  and  he  so  firmly  believed  that  Jackson 
was  already  retreating,  that  he  would  not  be  convinced  by  those 
of  his  officers  who  had  had  evidence  of  large  forces  near  at  hand, 
behind  the  Confederate  skirmish-lines.  A  Federal  who  had  been 
captured,  and  held  a  prisoner  in  the  Confederate  lines  during  the 
night,  but  who  had  escaped,  reported  that  he  had  overheard 
Jackson's  men  say  that  they  were  going  to  join  Longstreet. 
Porter  had  sent  the  man  to  Pope,  with  a  message  discrediting 
the  story,  and  suggesting  that  he  might  have  been  deceived  or 
sent  as  a  ruse.  Reynolds,  on  the  left,  had  discovered  that  the 
Confederate  line  overlapped  the  Federal,  and  had  had  a  nar- 
row escape  from  capture.  Ricketts  had  fought  Longstreet  at 
Thoroughfare  Gap  on  the  28th  and  retreated  before  his  advance ; 
but  the  tale  of  the  escaped  prisoner  was  credited  in  preference 


SECOND  MANASSAS  213 

to  any  other  theory.  About  noon  a  swarm  of  skirmishers  ad- 
vanced along  the  whole  Federal  front,  and  were  followed  by  the 
Federal  line  of  battle,  arrayed  generally,  three  lines  deep  in  front. 

The  Confederate  artillery  wasted  but  little  fire  on  the  skir- 
mishers. When,  however,  the  triple  lines  of  battle  revealed  them- 
selves, there  happened  something  for  which  Pope  was  not  prepared. 
Not  only  did  every  Confederate  gun  open  a  rapid  fire,  but  above 
their  roar  could  be  heard  the  infantry  bugles  of  Jackson's  corps, 
and  from  the  woods  a  wave  of  bayonets  swept  down  to  the  un- 
finished railroad,  and  now  Jackson  and  Longstreet  were  united, 
and  Pope,  with  a  force  only  30  per  cent  superior,  was  committed 
to  the  attack.  Possibly  the  Confederates  may  have  flattered 
themselves  that  their  victories  in  the  six  assaults  made  on  the 
previous  day  would  have  diminished  the  ardor  of  the  coming 
attack,  but  if  so,  they  were  to  be  disappointed.  The  value  of 
discipline  and  training  was  again  illustrated,  and  the  battle  which 
followed  was  scarcely  surpassed  for  desperation  upon  either  side 
in  the  war.  The  whole  weight  of  the  assault  fell  upon  Jackson's 
corps.  His  men  defended  themselves  with  courage  and  the  con- 
fidence inspired  by  their  recent  successes.  When,  at  one  point 
of  the  line,  the  ammunition  ran  low,  men  laid  down  muskets, 
and  standing  on  the  railroad  embankment,  made  formidable 
missiles  of  an  abundant  outcrop  of  large  pebbles.  At  length 
Pope's  superior  force  produced  such  a  pressure  that  Jackson 
called  for  assistance,  and  Lee  ordered  Longstreet  to  send  a  division 
of  infantry.  But  Longstreet  had  discovered  that  the  left  flank 
of  the  attack  upon  Jackson  had  now  advanced  into  the  reentrant 
angle  between  his  front  and  Jackson's,  so  far  that  its  lines  of 
battle  now  presented  their  flanks  and  could  be  enfiladed.  He 
believed  that  he  could  most  quickly  relieve  Jackson  by  a  severe 
enfilade  fire  of  artillery. 

Several  batteries  of  artillery  were  rushed  into  a  suitable  posi- 
tion and  opened  upon  the  enemy's  flank  at  easy  range  a  raking 
fire  which  nothing  could  withstand.  Within  15  minutes  the 
aspect  of  the  field  was  changed. 

When  Pope  had  first  seen  Jackson's  corps  disclose  itself  and 
re-occupy  its  defensive  line  along  the  unfinished  railroad,  he  had 
very  injudiciously  withdrawn  Reynolds 's  division  from  his  ex- 


214  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

treme  left  and  placed  it  in  support  of  Porter's  corps,  although 
Milroy's  corps,  from  among  his  masses  in  reserve,  was  equally 
available.  In  vain,  now,  were  Reynolds  and  all  his  other  re- 
enforcements  advanced  to  stem  the  tide  of  retreat  across  the 
open  meadows,  under  the  Confederate  fire.  Porter's  triple  lines 
had  been  practically  merged  into  one,  as  the  successive  brigades 
came  to  the  support  of  those  in  front.  The  merged  forces  were 
still  pressing  forward,  and  in  close  proximity  to  the  Confederate 
line,  when  the  flanking  fire  of  the  artillery  opened,  and  quickly 
disorganized  the  attack.  Jackson  added  to  the  confusion  by 
advancing  two  brigades  in  a  counter-stroke,  and  Pope's  battle 
was  lost.  Unfortunately  for  Lee,  Pope  had  not  opened  his 
battle  early  enough  in  the  day  to  allow  time  for  the  Confederates 
to  win  a  victory  and  to  reap  its  full  fruits.  It  was  now  about 
4  P.M.  when  Lee,  seeing  the  effects  of  Longstreet's  fire,  ordered 
his  whole  force  to  be  advanced  for  a  counter-stroke.  Had  the 
Confederate  army  been  a  well-organized  force,  able  to  bring 
quickly  into  play  its  full  powers,  much  fruit  might  even  yet 
have  been  gathered. 

The  objective  point  aimed  at  by  Longstreet's  advance  was  the 
plateau  of  the  celebrated  Henry  house,  upon  which  Jackson's 
brigade,  "standing  like  a  stone  wall,"  had  made  his  name  im- 
mortal 13  months  before. 

Around  this  plateau  the  regulars  and  others  of  the  best  Federal 
troops,  both  of  infantry,  cavalry,  and  artillery,  now  made 
desperate  stands,  appreciating  that  its  possession  by  the  Con- 
federates would  cut  off  the  Federal  retreat  across  Bull  Run,  via 
the  pike  and  the  Stone  Bridge.  Their  stand  was  also  aided  by 
two  circumstances.  First,  Jackson's  division,  now  greatly  worn 
and  reduced  by  their  incessant  fighting  for  three  days,  and  having 
more  exposed  ground  to  advance  over,  were  not  able  to  push  the 
enemy's  retreat  as  rapidly  in  the  counter-stroke  as  Longstreet 
could  upon  the  right.  Consequently  Pope  was  able  to  bring 
over  some  reinforcements  to  his  left  flank  from  his  right,  and 
his  artillery  was  able  to  take  in  flank  those  of  Longstreet's  forces 
which  led  the  assault  upon  the  Henry  hill.  Secondly,  three  of 
Longstreet's  brigades  were  lost  from  his  attack  from  looseness  of 
organization.  Wilcox's,  Pryor's,  and  Featherstone's  brigades 


SECOND  MANASSAS  215 

had  been  called  a  division,  and  Wilcox  ordered  to  command  them 
as  such.  In  the  progress  of  the  fighting,  during  the  afternoon, 
Pryor's  and  Featherstone's  brigades  had  become  separated  from 
Wilcox's,  just  when  it  was  called  for  by  Longstreet,  and  carried 
to  assist  the  attack  upon  the  Henry  hill.  The  other  two  took 
some  part  upon  the  right  flank  of  Jackson,  but  the  weight  of 
the  division  as  a  whole  was  lost.  Drayton's  brigade  of  D.  R. 
Jones's  division,  also  without  orders,  was  taken  by  some  un- 
authorized person  to  oppose  a  rumored  advance  of  cavalry  upon 
our  right  flank.  The  rumor  proved  to  be  unfounded,  but  the 
brigade  was  kept  out  of  the  action  until  the  fighting  was  ter- 
minated by  darkness. 

Daylight  was  shortened  by  heavy  clouds,  and  a  rain  which  set 
in  about  dusk  and  continued  during  the  night  and  much  of  the 
next  day.  Although  the  firing  was  kept  up  quite  severely  for 
some  time  after  dark,  the  attack  was  practically  over  as  soon  as 
daylight  was  gone.  For  the  irregular  and  disconnected  lines, 
though  with  ample  spirit  and  force  to  carry  the  position,  had 
time  permitted  them  to  envelop  it,  were  paralyzed  by  the  danger 
of  firing  into  each  other  in  the  darkness. 

In  the  Federal  army  the  confusion  was  very  great,  as  troops 
and  trains  intermixed  groped  through  the  rain,  and  poured 
across  the  bridge  and  along  the  pike  toward  Centre ville.  There 
Franklin's  corps  had  arrived  about  6  P.M.,  only  a  few  hours  too 
late  to  have  come  upon  the  field  and  have  saved  the  day.  Upon 
this  corps  Pope  ordered  his  whole  army  to  concentrate. 

An  officer  of  the  regular  army,  Capt.  W.  H.  Powell,  describing 
this  night  march,  wrote  hi  the  Century  War  Book,  as  follows :  — 

"  As  we  neared  the  bridge  we  came  upon  confusion.  Men,  singly  and 
in  detachments,  were  mingled  with  sutler's  wagons,  artillery  caissons, 
supply  wagons,  and  ambulances,  each  striving  to  get  ahead  of  the  other. 
Vehicles  rushed  through  organized  bodies,  and  broke  the  column  into 
fragments.  Little  detachments  gathered  by  the  roadside,  after  crossing 
the  bridge,  crying  out  the  numbers  of  their  regiments  as  a  guide  to  scat- 
tered comrades.  And  what  a  night  it  was!  Dark,  gloomy,  and  be- 
clouded by  the  volumes  of  smoke  which  had  risen  from  the  battle-field." 

Had  Longstreet  pushed  rifled  guns  to  the  front,  upon  the  turn- 
pike, and  fired  at  high  elevations  down  its  straight  course,  he 


216  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

might  have  landed  shells  in  this  retreating  column  as  far  as  the 
Stone  Bridge.  This  would  probably  have  blocked  the  column 
and  added  much  to  the  captured  property.  But  the  Confederates 
as  yet  had  no  artillery  organization  which  could  quickly  appre- 
ciate and  improve  all  the  passing  opportunities  of  a  battle-field. 
Indeed,  as  before  stated,  the  army  was  only  a  mass  of  divisions, 
associated  by  temporary  assignments  to  Longstreet  and  Jackson, 
who  were  themselves  only  division  commanders. 

On  the  morning  of  the  31st,  Lee  lost  no  time  in  renewing  his 
advance.  As  the  position  at  Centreville  was  strong,  and  had 
been  fortified  by  the  Confederates  in  1861,  he  ordered  Jackson's 
corps  to  turn  Centreville,  crossing  Bull  Run  at  Sudley,  and 
moving  by  the  Little  River  turnpike  upon  Fairfax  C.  H. 
Stuart's  cavalry  were  to  precede  Jackson.  Longstreet  was  to 
glean  the  battle-field  and  then  to  follow  Jackson.  All  progress 
was  slow  on  account  of  the  rain  and  mud.  This  was  the  third 
battle  within  14  months  which  had  been  closely  followed  by 
heavy  ram, — Bull  Run,  Malvern  Hill,  and  Second  Manassas.  The 
theory  took  root  that  cannonading  has  rain-making  virtue. 

On  the  31st  Jackson,  over  wretched  roads  and  through  con- 
tinued rain,  advanced  only  about  10  miles,  and  bivouacked  at 
Pleasant  Valley  on  the  Little  River  pike.  Longstreet's  advance 
reached  Sudley  Ford,  and  the  care  of  the  battle-field  was  left  to 
the  reinforcements  from  Richmond,  which  were  now  coming  up. 
On  Sept.  1,  the  march  was  resumed  by  Jackson  at  an  early 
hour,  and  Longstreet  followed  over  the  same  road.  Pope,  in  a 
despatch  to  Halleck  during  the  night,  had  reported  his  falling 
back  to  Centreville,  but  had  still  claimed  a  victory,  saying: 
"The  enemy  is  badly  whipped  and  we  shall  do  well  enough. 
Do  not  be  uneasy.  We  will  hold  our  own  here."  Yet  he  had 
left  30  guns  and  2000  wounded  on  the  battle-field,  and  had 
ordered  Banks  at  Bristoe  Station,  in  charge  of  his  trains,  to 
destroy  all  supplies  and  to  come  to  join  him  at  Centreville,  with 
his  troops,  by  a  night  march.  With  Franklin's,  Banks's,  and 
Sumner's  corps,  which  arrived  early  on  the  31st,  he  had  now 
30,000  fresh  men,  but  his  delay  at  Centreville  was  limited  to  a 
single  day.  That  evening  the  presence  of  Stuart's  cavalry, 
shelling  his  trains  near  Fairfax  C.  H.,  became  known,  and  next 


SECOND  MANASSAS  217 

morning  reports  reached  him  of  Jackson's  corps  on  the  Little 
River  turnpike. 

Finding  his  position  again  turned,  Centreville  was  abandoned, 
and  a  new  one  ordered  to  be  taken  at  Fairfax  C.  H.  This 
move  practically  placed  him  beyond  pursuit.  His  whole  army 
was  now  united,  and  too  close  to  its  fortified  lines  to  be  again 
flanked  out  of  position.  And,  although  there  was  demoraliza- 
tion in  some  organizations,  yet  there  were  many  excellent  divi- 
sion and  brigade  commanders,  leading  veteran  troops  so  well 
trained  and  disciplined  that  their  fighting  was  of  the  highest 
type.  An  illustration  of  this  took  place  late  in  the  afternoon 
of  the  1st.  Jackson's  corps,  approaching  the  junction  of  the 
Little  River  and  Warrenton  pikes,  had  formed  line  of  battle  at 
Ox  Hill,  with  A.  P.  Hill's  division  upon  the  right.  Two  of  Hill's 
brigades,  under  Branch  and  Brockenbrough,  were  sent  forward 
to  develop  the  enemy,  who  were  known  to  be  near.  A  terrific 
thunder  storm,  with  strong  wind  and  blinding  rain  directly  in 
their  faces,  came  on  just  as  this  advance  was  being  made.  With 
this  storm  on  their  backs,  Stevens's  division  of  Reno's  corps, 
the  9th,  charged  the  approaching  Confederates  in  front  and 
flank,  and  drove  them  back  in  much  confusion.  The  division 
making  the  charge  had  been  engaged  on  both  the  29th  and  30th, 
and  had  been  defeated  on  both  days.  Its  fine  behavior  and 
hard  fighting  was  the  feature  which  makes  this  engagement 
notable.  It  was,  under  the  circumstances,  a  useless  affair. 
There  was  little  chance  of  either  side  accomplishing  any  result 
beyond  the  killing  of  a  few  opponents,  with  probably  equal  loss 
to  itself.  Hill  sent  strong  reinforcements  to  restore  his  battle, 
and  Kearny's  division  of  the  3d  corps  came  to  Stevens's  assist- 
ance. Stevens  was  shot  through  the  head.  Kearny,  riding  into 
the  Confederate  lines  in  the  dusk,  was  also  shot  dead,  as  he  tried 
to  escape  capture  by  wheeling  his  horse  and  dashing  off,  leaning 
behind  his  horse's  neck.  The  fighting  on  both  sides  was  desper- 
ate and  bloody,  but  the  Federals  were  driven  back.  During  the 
night,  the  whole  Federal  army  was  withdrawn  from  the  vicinity 
of  Fairfax,  and  took  refuge  within  the  fortified  lines  about 
Alexandria. 

Stevens  and  Kearny  were  both  prominent  and  distinguished 


218  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

officers.  The  advantage  to  the  Confederates  of  their  being  taken 
off,  like  the  cashiering  of  Fitz-John  Porter,  was  among  the  few 
fruits  of  their  victory.  Indeed,  at  the  moment  when  Stevens 
fell,  bearing  the  colors  of  a  regiment  which  he  had  taken  from 
the  hands  of  a  dying  color-bearer,  the  authorities  in  Washington 
were  about  to  supersede  Pope,  and  place  Stevens  in  command 
of  the  now  united  armies  of  Pope  and  McClellan.  He  had 
graduated  at  the  head  of  Halleck's  class  at  West  Point  in  1839, 
and  Halleck  was  well  acquainted  with  his  military  attainments. 
Both  Stevens  and  Kearny  were  favorites  in  the  old  army,  had 
served  most  creditably  in  Mexico,  and  both  had  been  severely 
wounded  in  the  capture  of  the  city,  Kearny  losing  his  left  arm. 
Kearny's  body  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  Confederates,  and  be- 
ing recognized,  it  had  been  sent  the  next  day,  under  a  flag  of 
truce,  by  Lee,  into  the  Federal  lines  with  a  note  to  Pope, 
saying:  — 

"  The  body  of  Gen.  Philip  Kearny  was  brought  from  the  field  last  night, 
and  he  was  reported  dead.  I  send  it  forward  under  a  flag  of  truce,  think- 
ing the  possession  of  his  remains  may  be  a  consolation  to  his  family." 

This  affair  ended  the  battle.  On  the  morning  of  Sept.  2 
it  was  apparent  that  the  enemy  had  escaped,  and  Lee  allowed 
his  whole  army  to  lie  in  camp  and  have  a  little  much-needed 
rest.  While  he  had  fallen  short  of  destroying  his  greatly  superior 
adversaries,  he  could  yet  look  back  with  pride  upon  the  record 
he  had  made  within  the  90  days  since  taking  command  on  June  1. 
He  had  had  the  use  of  about  85,000  men,  and  the  enemy  had  had 
the  use,  in  all,  of  fully  200,000. 

At  the  beginning,  the  enemy  had  been  within  six  miles  of 
Richmond.  He  was  now  driven  within  the  fortifications  of 
Washington,  with  a  loss  in  the  two  campaigns  of  about  33,000 
men,  82  guns,  and  58,000  small-arms.  Lee's  own  losses  had 
been  about  31,000  men  and  two  guns. 

The  critics  who  had  declared  that  he  would  never  fight  were 
forever  silenced  and  pilloried  in  shame.  In  the  last  affair  at  Ox 
Hill,  on  Sept.  1,  the  casualties  in  A.  P.  Hill's  corps  were  39 
killed  and  267  wounded,  and  in  Ewell's  were  44  killed  and  156 
wounded,  a  total  of  83  killed  and  423  wounded;  506  total. 


SECOND  MANASSAS 


219 


There  were  no  reports  in  the  Federal  army  of  this  particular 
affair,  but  probably  the  losses  were  not  very  unequal. 

The  losses  of  the  two  armies  for  the  whole  campaign  are  sum- 
marized as  follows.  No  report  was  made  of  casualties  in  the 
Confederate  cavalry,  which  were  probably  about  100. 


CONFEDERATES 

KILLED 

WOUNDED 

MISSING 

TOTAL 

Jackson's  Corps 
Longstreet's  Corps 

805 
663 

3547 
4016 

35 
46 

4,387 
4,725 

Total 

1468 

7563 

81 

9,112 

FEDERALS 

KILLED 

WOUNDED 

MISSING 

TOTAL 

Army  of  Virginia 
Army  of  Potomac 
Ninth  Army  Corps 
Kanawha  Division 

929 
600 
204 
14 

4389 
3013 
1000 
50 

2787 
1151 
319 
42 

8,105 
4,728 
1,523 
106 

Total 

1747 

8452 

4263 

14,462 

Thirty  guns  and  over  20,000  small-arms  were  collected  from 
the  field. 

My  own  share  in  this  campaign  was  limited  to  keeping  up  the 
supply  of  the  ammunition  consumed.  I  had  the  satisfaction  of 
seeing  the  organization  and  working  of  my  department  stand 
well  the  test  of  a  severe  campaign,  and  a  considerable  separa- 
tion from  its  depots.  Both  in  the  artillery  and  infantry,  the 
fighting  was  incessant  and  severe,  but  the  supply  of  ammunition 
never  failed,  and,  at  the  close  of  the  campaign,  without  a  day's 
delay,  the  army  was  prepared  to  undertake  an  even  more  dis- 
tant and  desperate  adventure.  When  Lee  moved  from  Gor- 
donsville  to  cross  the  Rapidan,  I  was  ordered  to  follow  with 
my  reserve  ordnance  train  from  near  Richmond.  I  followed  as 
rapidly  as  possible,  but  could  not  overtake  the  army  until  after 
Chantilly.  Then  I  replenished  all  expenditures,  so  that  the 
troops  advanced  into  Maryland  with  everything  full. 

Thereafter  I  kept  myself  and  train  in  close  proximity  to  Lee's 
headquarters  in  all  the  movements,  and,  with  my  wagons  run- 
ning between  our  successive  positions  and  Staunton,  Va.,  we  were 
able  to  meet  all  demands. 


CHAPTER  XII 

BOONSBORO   OR  SOUTH  MOUNTAIN,   AND   HARPER'S  FERRY 

Choice  of  Moves.  Interior  Lines.  Policy  of  Invasion.  Across  the  Po- 
tomac. Affairs  in  Washington.  McClellan  succeeds  Pope.  Lee's 
•  Proclamation.  Organizations  and  Strength.  Harper's  Ferry  Garrison. 
Orders  No.  191.  The  Army  Scatters.  The  Lost  Order.  Lee  Warned. 
Battle  of  Boonsboro  or  South  Mountain.  Longstreet  Arrives.  The 
Retreat.  Crampton's  Gap.  Franklin  Attacks.  Jackson  before  Har- 
per's Ferry.  Preparations  for  Assault.  Bombardment  and  Surrender. 
Borrowed  Wagons.  Paroles  and  Colors.  Casualties. 

THE  enemy  having  taken  refuge  within  lines  impregnable  to 
assault,  Lee  had  no  alternative  but  to  take  the  offensive  else- 
where. He  could  not  afford  to  sit  down  before  Washington  and 
await  the  enemy's  pleasure. 

There  were  two  openings  for  offensive  operations,  each  with 
I  some  chances  of  success.  The  safest  would  have  been  to  with- 
draw behind  the  Rappahannock,  where  he  might  occupy  a  strong 
line  with  one-half  of  his  forces,  under  Jackson,  while  the  other 
half,  under  himself  and  Longstreet,  was  sent  by  railroad  to 
Chattanooga  via  Bristol.  At  the  time,  in  Tennessee,  the  Con- 
federates were  conducting  two  campaigns  aimed  at  Louisville; 
the  design  being  to  drive  the  Federals  from  Kentucky.  Kirby 
Smith,  with  an  army  of  about  15,000,  from  Knoxville,  had  opened 
the  road  through  Cumberland  Gap,  and  on  Aug.  30  had  won 
a  victory  over  a  Federal  force  at  Richmond,  Ky.,  and  on 
Sept.  2  had  occupied  Lexington.  Bragg,  with  about  30,000 
men,  from  Chattanooga  had  moved  northward  up  the  Sequatchie 
t  Valley,  and,  crossing  the  Cumberland  Mountains,  was,  on  Sept. 
5,  at  Sparta,  Tenn.,  turning  the  Federal  position  at  Murfrees- 
boro,  where  Buell  was  in  command  with  about  50,000  men. 

Such  a  movement  by  Lee  would  have  been  utilizing  our 
"Interior  Lines,"  the  one  game  in  which  the  Confederacy  had 
an  advantage  over  the  Federals.  On  a  small  scale  it  had  been 

220 


BOONSBORO  AND  HARPER'S  FERRY  221 

played  both  at  Bull  Run  and  in  the  Richmond  campaign;  the 
troops  from  the  valley  in  both  cases  leaving  the  Federal  armies 
opposite  them,  and  quickly  doubling  on  the  point  of  attack. 

Opportunities  to  do  the  same  upon  a  larger  scale  were  re- 
peatedly offered  between  the  Confederate  armies  before  Rich- 
mond and  those  about  Chattanooga.  One  had  already  occurred 
in  the  summer  just  passed.  On  May  30,  Beauregard  had  evacu- 
ated Corinth  with  52,000  men,  and  withdrawn  to  Tupelo, 
Miss.  He  was  not  followed,  and  the  Federal  army  under 
Halleck  of  100,000,  was  dispersed  in  different  directions  from 
Arkansas  to  Cumberland  Gap.  Beauregard  was  allowed  two 
months  of  idleness  and  rest.  It  would  have  been  possible  to 
bring  20,000  of  his  veterans  to  Richmond  by  the  26th  of  June 
to  reenforce  Lee  for  the  Seven  Days'  Campaign.  With  then- 
assistance  McClellan  should  have  been  destroyed.  Then  the 
Western  troops  could  have  returned,  and,  if  necessary,  carried 
large  reinforcements  with  them.  Now  a  second  opportunity  was 
offered  for  similar  strategy.  Others  were  offered  later,  as  we 
shall  see,  whenever  one  of  the  Confederate  armies,  from  any  cause, 
was  free  from  the  prospect  of  an  early  attack  by  its  opponent. 

On  this  occasion,  the  joint  campaign  of  Bragg  and  Smith  in 
Kentucky,  and  the  Maryland  campaign,  both  failed.  Had  we 
utilized  our  interior  lines,  one  of  them  at  the  least  should  have 
been  made  sure.  It  was  hoped,  indeed,  when  the  campaigns 
were  entered  upon,  that  the  Southern  sympathies  of  the  Mary- 
landers  and  Kentuckians  would  cut  real  figures  in  the  struggle 
by  bringing  thousands  of  recruits  to  the  Confederates,  but  this 
hope  proved  vain  in  both  cases.  There  had  been  already  enough 
observation  of  the  war  to  destroy  its  romance,  and  to  make  the 
most  careless  realize  what  a  grave  step  one  would  take  who 
shouldered  a  musket  under  the  Starry  Cross.  Many  sympathized 
with  our  cause,  and  wished  us  well.  But  few  were  willing  to 
abandon  homes  and  take  sides  before  we  had  shown  ourselves 
able  to  remain  in  their  States  for  at  least  a  few  weeks. 

And  this,  in  the  case  of  Maryland,  was  utterly  out  of  the  question 
for  the  simple  reason  that  there  was  no  railroad  communication 
possible ;  and  no  army  large  enough  to  meet  the  Federal  army, 
could  support  and  supply  itself  by  wagon-trains  from  Staunton, 


222 


MILITARY  MEMOIRS 


nearly  150  miles  away,  for  any  length  of  time.  Whenever, 
therefore,  we  crossed  the  Potomac  going  northward,  we  were  as 
certain  to  have  to  recross  it  coming  southward,  in  a  few  weeks, 
as  a  stone  thrown  upward  is  certain  to  come  down. 

In  a  letter  to  President  Davis,  on  Sept.  2,  Lee  gave  as  reasons 


VICINITY  OF  HARPER'S  FERRY 

for  the  invasion  of  Maryland  that  it  would  relieve  the  Confeder- 
acy from  the  presence  of  hostile  armies  on  her  soil;  and  that 
the  position  of  the  army  would  be  favorable  for  reaping  the  fruits 
of  a  victory,  if  one  could  be  gained.  Mr.  Davis  approved,  and 
the  campaign  was  made ;  but  no  victory  was  gained,  nor  is  it 
easy  to  see  where  and  how  the  chances  of  pursuit  would  have 


BOONSBORO  AND  HARPER'S  FERRY  223 

been  improved,  had  it  been.  Apparently  Kentucky  might  have 
offered  more  favorable  ones. 

After  a  rest  of  a  day,  on  Sept.  4,  with  Jackson  in  the  lead, 
the  army  was  put  in  motion  for  the  fords  of  the  Potomac,  near 
Leesburg.  With  the  reinforcements  which  had  joined,  Lee  had 
now  about  55,000  men,  all  in  fine  spirits  and  with  their  cartridge 
boxes  full,  but  otherwise  not  in  the  best  condition.  The  dif- 
ferent divisions  were  still  only  associated,  not  formed,  into 
corps,  and  in  the  matter  of  shoes,  clothing,  and  food  the  army  was, 
upon  the  whole,  probably  worse  off  during  this  brief  campaign 
than  it  had  ever  been  before  or  ever  was  again.  About  one-half 
of  the  small-arms  were  still  the  old  smooth-bore  muskets  of  short 
range,  and  our  rifled  cannon  ammunition  was  always  inferior  in 
quality.  The  lack  of  shoes  was  deplorable,  and  barefooted  men 
with  bleeding  feet  were  no  uncommon  sight.  Of  clothing,  our 
supply  was  so  poor  that  it  seemed  no  wonder  the  Marylanders 
held  aloof  from  our  shabby  ranks.  For  rations,  we  were  in- 
debted mostly  to  the  fields  of  roasting  ears,  and  to  the  apple 
orchards.  Such  diet  does  not  compare  with  bacon  and  hard- 
tack for  long  marches,  and,  before  the  campaign  was  over,  the 
straggling  from  all  causes  assumed  great  proportions.  Brigades 
were  often  reduced  nearly  to  the  size  of  regiments,  and  regiments 
to  the  size  of  companies.  On  Sept.  5  the  army  began  to  cross 
the  Potomac,  and  on  Sept.  7  the  advance  reached  Frederick. 

It  is  now  to  tell  of  events  in  Washington  City.  There  was 
great  alarm  when  Pope,  with  the  combined  armies  of  Virginia 
and  the  Potomac,  fell  back  within  the  fortifications,  almost  in  a 
state  of  rout.  Col.  Kelton  of  Halleck's  staff,  sent  to  find  out 
the  actual  state  of  affairs,  reported  that  there  were  30,000 
stragglers  upon  the  roads.  It  was  said  that  the  money  from  the 
Treasury  was  being  shipped  to  New  York,  and  that  an  armed 
naval  vessel,  with  steam  up,  was  kept  near  at  hand  in  the  Poto- 
mac. Pope,  making  a  virtue  of  necessity,  applied  to  be  re- 
lieved from  command.  There  was  no  formal  order  relieving 
him  until  Sept.  5,  when  he  was  sent  to  the  Northwest,  where 
there  were  some  Indian  disturbances;  but  he  was  deprived 
of  his  army  on  Sept.  2,  when  McClellan  was  assigned  to  the 
defense  of  Washington,  and  the  command  of  all  the  troops 


224  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

engaged  in  it.  As  this  included  the  whole  of  both  armies,  Pope 
was  left  without  a  man.  Yet  neither  Lincoln  nor  Halleck  had 
confidence  in  McClellan,  and  there  was  great  reluctance  to  use 
him.  Only  the  day  before  he  had  been  instructed  that  he  "had 
nothing  to  do  with  the  troops  engaged  in  active  operations  un- 
der Gen.  Pope,  but  that  his  command  was  limited  to  the  im- 
mediate garrison  of  Washington."  At  that  time  Pope  himself 
had  already  been  adjudged  incompetent,  and  the  decision  would 
surely  have  been  made  to  place  Stevens  hi  command  had  he  been 
alive. 

But  the  death  of  Stevens,  and  the  disorderly  retreat  of  Pope 's 
forces  within  the  fortifications,  had  demoralized  the  government. 
McClellan  alone  was  supposed  to  have  the  confidence  of  the 
army.  It  was  the  day  of  his  triumph,  and  one  of  humiliation 
to  both  Lincoln  and  Halleck. 

Yet  McClellan  was  out  of  place.  He  would  have  been  an 
excellent  chief  of  staff,  but  was  unfit  for  the  command  of  an 
army.  He  was  as  utterly  without  audacity,  as  Lee  was  full  of  it. 
His  one  fine  quality  was  his  ability  to  organize  and  discipline. 
He  constructed  a  superb  machine,  which,  being  once  con- 
structed, would  fight  a  battle  with  skill  and  courage  if  only  let 
alone.  McClellan,  during  the  Seven  Days,  let  it  alone,  absenting 
himself  as  if  by  instinct.  Never  but  at  the  battle  of  Sharpsburg 
was  he  present  on  any  field,  and  his  presence,  by  keeping  Porter 's 
corps  out  of  the  action,  made  a  drawn  fight  of  what  would  other- 
wise have  been  a  Federal  victory,  as  will  duly  appear. 

So  now,  Sept.  2,  while  Lee's  army  is  resting  on  the  field  of 
Ox  Hill,  McClellan  begins  to  reorganize  the  120,000  troops  at 
his  disposal  within  the  lines  of  Washington.  It  is  quick  and 
easy  work,  for  his  own  old  army  composes  two-thirds  of  it. 
By  Sept.  7,  when  Lee's  army  is  concentrated  about  Frederick, 
McClellan  had  six  corps  in  the  field,  holding  a  line  covering 
Washington. 

Lee,  perhaps  unfortunately,  was  not  then  seeking  an  action. 
He  had  issued  a  proclamation  to  the  people  of  Maryland,  and  for 
a  few  days  he  wished  to  observe  its  effect.  It  told  the  Mary- 
landers,  briefly,  that  the  liberty  of  free  choice  between  the 
Union  and  the  Confederacy  had  been  denied  them  by  the  United 


BOONSBORO  AND  HARPER'S  FERRY  225 

States,  and  that  he  had  come  to  assist  them  in  regaining  their 
rights,  and  would  respect  their  decision.  It  took  but  a  short 
while  to  show  that  very  few  had  any  interest  in  the  matter. 
When  our  troops  forded  the  Potomac,  the  bands  playing  "Mary- 
land, my  Maryland,"  there  was  great  enthusiasm,  but  it  was 
confined  to  the  invaders.  The  invaded  were  conspicuously 
absent,  attending  to  their  daily  occupations,  and  evidently  not 
ambitious  to  offer  their  fertile  and  prosperous  fields  for  the 
movements  and  conflicts  of  armies. 

I  think  the  only  real  effect  of  that  proclamation  was  subjective, 
or  upon  Gen.  Lee  himself.  Necessarily,  in  it  he  was  compelled 
to  appear  as  a  deliverer  who  had  come  to  free  the  Marylanders 
from  a  yoke.  A  few  days  later,  as  will  be  seen,  there  was  an 
opportunity  for  him  to  avoid  a  great  risk  of  grave  disaster  by 
withdrawal  into  Virginia,  without  serious  loss  of  men  or  impair- 
ment of  prestige,  and  with  richer  booty  in  prisoners,  guns,  and 
ammunition  than  he  had  ever  gathered  from  a  battle-field. 

In  his  decision  to  stand  his  ground  and  fight,  his  attitude  as 
deliverer  probably  had  a  large  share. 

The  organization  and  strength  of  the  two  armies  is  given 
on  pages  226  and  227.  As  before  noted,  the  Confederate  organ- 
ization into  corps  was  slowly  developing.  What  is  here  given 
is  what  was  reached  at  the  close  of  the  campaign.  In  its  earlier 
stages,  there  was  much  independence  of  action  by  some  divisions. 
This  independent  communication  with  headquarters,  it  will  pres- 
ently be  seen,  resulted  in  a  mishap  —  the  loss  of  an  order  of  prime 
importance  to  the  issues  of  the  campaign.  It  is  but  an  illustra- 
tion of  how  gravest  results  hang  on  care  in  most  trifling  details. 

It  was  Lee 's  plan  to  draw  the  Federal  army  away  from  Wash- 
ington before  delivering  battle.  To  do  this  he  contemplated  an 
advance  into  Pennsylvania  west  of  the  Blue  Ridge.  This  plan 
was  frustrated  by  the  Federal  forces  at  Harper's  Ferry  and 
Martinsburg,  continuing  to  hold  their  positions  after  Lee  had 
crossed  into  Maryland.  As  they  were  exposed  to  capture,  he  had 
expected  them  to  withdraw.  McClellan  had  desired  to  withdraw 
them,  but  Halleck  objected  that  there  was  then  no  way  by  which 
Miles  could  withdraw.  McClellan  then  suggested  that  Miles 
should  cross  the  river  and  occupy  Maryland  Heights,  where  he 


(N 

CO 

oo 


I 

CO 


O 
tf 


tf 

H 
W 

S 

O 

^ 

fe 
o 


§ 


tsj 

1-H 
{25 

s 


CO 

H 
H 

iO  ^  ^f  O^  CO  O 

i-H 

00 

I>1>  CO  TH 

01 

<M  CO 

1-H 

£ 

H 

_bp  & 

g| 

CO 

a 

| 

O 

Q 

a 

O  ™ 

w      a* 

0 

w  oT 

S3.S 
,219 

*  g 

O 

(N 

T—  I 
I—  1 

o      O 
H  a>CQ 

O 

rH 

o 

r     ^""* 

co" 

k^ 

»T 

CO 

S 

BRIGADES 

o>    ~  ^"        .2 

o3   O   &.            'cS 

^o  ^^  o          *+^ 

CQ     JH     M                    -£ 
r*y*   ^  ,      Q}                          03 

«oT   *.           02 
C2  +^                •* 

rfll        J 

"ii  i  a     « 

rirflM 

l||i^l 

^j    .^H       g       TO       ^       TO 

21  Brigades,  28  Batterie 

Lawton,  Trimble,  Early,  Hays 
Branch,  Archer,  Gregg,  Fender,  Field 
Winder,  Jones,  J.  K.,  Taliaferro,  Star 
Ripley,  Garland,  Rodes,  Anderson,  G 

19  Brigades,  24  Batterie! 

Pendleton's  Reserve,  58  Guns 
Hampton,  Lee  F.,  Robertson,  14  Gun 

O 
?* 

00 
(N 

1 
.S3 

n 

CO 

CO 

a 

o 

'55 

CO 

00 

J,^ 

G 

Q 

g 

i 

o 

w 

0 
|w 

.2 

Q 

05 

M 

•      j     S 

'> 

0 

Q 

M    OQ      -         a, 

p 

O 

p  .      hrt 

P 

a 

o 

d 

1 

^2      -  S    03    > 
|l||l   j 

IrfiS 

<D  jj 

11 

G    3 

a 

(N 

S^^iwtf 

wa^S 

0)  ^s 

f^nco 

CO 

00 

O 

o 

•S 

00 

E 

CO 

O 

O 

03 

1 

*^  -^ 

-*^ 

*"C 

B 

0 

GO    H> 

CO 

m 

(M 

II 

O    GO 

^ 

CO  ~J 

3 

fe£ 

< 

r^   tiD 

O 

r^  S3 

o 

—    o2 

^j   fl 

H 

o 

E~i 

*-3  > 

CO    ^ 

T3    03 

^•j    03 

i-H  W 

(M  -•» 

•^J  O 

BO 

E 

^(N^ 

(N  C^  CO 

CO  CO(N 

^  CO  ^ 

<N  <N  »-l  CO 

CO1* 

^ 

S 

pq 

03 

d 

'£ 

5 

03 

pQ 

Q 

oT 

^ 

"o 

OS 

co 

d 

g, 

aT 

H 

i 

2 

1 

0       ^ 

' 

1 

o 

S 

3 

O 

M 

Phelps,  Doubleday,  Patrick, 
Duryea,  Christian,  Hartsuff 
Seymour,  Magilton,  Gallaghe 

Caldwell,  Meagher,  Brooke 
Gorman,  Howard,  Dana 
Kimball,  Morris,  Weber 

Barnes,  Griffin,  Stockton 
Buchanan,  Lovell,  Warren 
Humphreys,  Tyler,  Allabach 

Torbert,  Bartlett,  Newton 
Hancock,  Brooks,  Irwin 
Devens,  Howe,  Cochrane 

Christ,  Welsh 
Nagle,  Ferrero 
Fairchild,  Harland 
Scammon,  Crook 

Crawford,  Gordon 
Tyndale,  Stainrook,  Goodricl 

Whiting,  Farnsworth,  Rush, 

CO 
of 

bC 

•c 

pq 

09 

d 

09 

•^ 

H 
o 

P 

i 

. 

PQ 

OS 
^H 

Q 

• 

vii 

s  «  s 

d 
§,M 

T3  o 

S'g-S 

^3  &0d 

0  ^    <1) 

M 

•—  i     p, 

|*a 

O 

a 

55  co  o3 

jg'bb| 

• 

S    <X> 

.2  fl 

easanton 

1 
O 

O 
o 

SSs 

PHOO£ 

|j»S 

J2  S  o 
0200O 

^ojtfo 

gj 

S 

S 

CO 

0} 

E 

bO 

N 

4) 

o 

Q 

03 

03 

73 

Q.  d 

cl  ® 

«2 

bb 

O    03 

1*1 

O    fa 

0  « 

<§1 

Jl 

,      ;_, 

£X  o 
0* 

o  a 

b 

1 

" 

-*-^    O 

H 

•^  o 

_^r  2 

•5  3 

CM  .tf 

03 

»5'M 

N  C» 

io  PM 

«5  fe 

o« 

CN  — 

I-H  S 

O 

228  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

could  defend  himself,  but  the  suggestion  was  not  adopted  by 
Miles,  who  felt  himself  obliged  by  his  orders  to  hold  the  village 
itself.  As  Lee  could  not  advance  freely  into  Pennsylvania  with 
Miles 's  force  so  close  in  his  rear,  he  determined  to  capture  the 
Harper's  Ferry  garrison.  Discussing  the  matter  with  Long- 
street,  the  latter  advised  against  it,  saying  that  it  would  require 
a  wide  separation  of  our  divisions,  with  rivers  between  them, 
which  would  be  dangerous  so  near  the  enemy.  Lee,  however, 
believed  that  it  was  possible  to  capture  Harper 's  Ferry  and  re- 
unite his  army  before  McClellan  could  fully  apprehend  his  plans. 

As  Jackson  took  the  same  view,  the  enterprise  was  committed 
to  him,  and  a  carefully  drawn  order  was  prepared,  "  No.  191," 
detailing  the  march  of  each  division.  Jackson,  with  his  corps  (ex- 
cept D.  H.  Hill's  division)  was  ordered  via  Williamsport  to 
drive  the  Federals  from  Martinsburg  into  Harper 's  Ferry,  which 
he  would  then  attack  from  the  south.  Walker's  division  was 
to  cross  the  Potomac  below  Harper's  Ferry  and  occupy  Loudon 
Heights.  McLaws,  with  his  own  and  Anderson 's  divisions,  was 
to  move  by  the  most  direct  route  and  possess  himself  of  Maryland 
Heights,  overlooking  Harper's  Ferry,  whence  he  could  with 
artillery,  and  even  with  musketry,  command  the  town. 

Longstreet,  with  the  two  divisions  of  D.  R.  Jones  and  Evans, 
was  to  march  to  Boonsboro  and  await  the  return  of  the  forces 
from  Harper's  Ferry.  Finally,  D.  H.  Hill's  division  was  to  act 
as  rear-guard  at  Turner's  Gap  in  South  Mountain. 

On  Sept.  10,  the  army  marched  at  daylight.  On  the  road 
Longstreet  was  ordered  to  continue  his  movement  to  Hagers- 
town,  while  D.  H.  Hill,  leaving  two  brigades  in  Turner's  Gap, 
came  on  to  Boonsboro.  This  change  was  caused  by  the  collec- 
tion of  a  force  of  Pennsylvania  militia  at  Chambersburg.  It  was 
not  formidable,  as  the  regiments  refused  to  leave  the  State,  yet 
its  formation  materially  affected  the  course  of  events.  For  it 
will  be  seen  that  this  separation  of  Longstreet  by  13  miles  from 
D.  H.  Hill,  caused  the  loss  of  the  position  at  Turner's  Gap.  The 
loss  of  that  gap  brought  on  at  Sharpsburg  the  battle  which  would 
otherwise  have  probably  been  fought  upon  the  mountain. 

Meanwhile,  there  had  occurred  the  mishap  already  referred  to, 
which  gave  to  McClellan  an  opportunity  rarely  presented  to  a 


BOONSBORO  AND  HARPER'S  FERRY  229 

general.  An  official  copy  of  Lee's  order  No.  191,  addressed  to 
D.  H.  Hill,  fell  into  McClellan's  hands  on  Sept.  13  soon  after 
his  arrival  at  Frederick. 

The  incident  occurred  from  our  unsettled  organization.  D.  H. 
Hill's  division  had  been  attached  to  Jackson's  command  upon  its 
crossing  the  Potomac.  No  order  should  have  issued  from  Lee's 
office  for  Hill.  Jackson  so  understood  it,  and,  with  his  usual 
cautious  habit,  on  receipt  of  the  order,  with  his  own  hand  made  a 
copy  for  Hill,  and  sent  it.  This  copy  Hill  received  and  carefully 
preserved,  and  produced  it  after  the  war,  when  the  matter  was 
first  inquired  into.  But  Lee 's  office  had  also  prepared  an  official 
copy  for  Hill,  and  this  copy  serving  as  a  wrapper  to  three  cigars 
was  picked  up  by  a  private  soldier  of  the  12th  corps  in  an 
abandoned  camp  near  Frederick.  When  found,  it  was  promptly 
carried  to  McClellan,  reaching  him  before  noon  on  the  13th.  Its 
importance  was  recognized,  and  its  authenticity  proved  by  the 
fact  that  the  different  Confederate  divisions  had  all  pursued  the 
roads  assigned  them  in  the  order.  Already  McClellan  had  learned 
of  the  crossing  of  the  Potomac  by  Walker  at  Point  of  Rocks,  and 
by  Jackson  at  Williamsport,  but  he  had  not  understood  the 
object.  There  had  been  fear  that  it  might  mean  a  dash  at  the 
lines  about  Alexandria.  Now  the  whole  situation  was  explained. 
Lee  and  Longstreet  with  only  14  brigades  were  about  Boonsboro. 
McLaws  and  Anderson  with  10  brigades  were  between  Harper's 
Ferry  and  Crampton's  Gap,  eight  miles  south  of  Turner's  Gap. 
Jackson,  with  14  brigades,  was  southwest  of  Harper 's  Ferry,  and 
Walker,  with  two  brigades,  was  southeast  of  it,  across  the 
Shenandoah.  By  all  the  maxims  of  strategy  Lee  had  put  it 
in  the  power  of  McClellan  to  destroy  his  army.  He  had  not  only 
divided  his  force  into  four  parts  and  scattered  them,  with  rivers 
and  mountains  between,  but  he  had  scattered  more  than  was 
necessary.  There  was  no  need  to  place  Longstreet  as  far  away 
even  as  Boonsboro.  A  safer  movement  would  have  been  to 
unite  Longstreet  with  McLaws  and  Anderson  at  Crampton  's  Gap, 
that  it  might  be  more  securely  held,  and  the  capture  of  Maryland 
Heights  be  expedited,  and  that  the  distances  separating  his 
forces  should  be  the  least  possible. 

McClellan's  opportunity  was  obvious.    It  was  to  take  quick 


230  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

advantage  of  the  separation  and  move  in  between  the  parts. 
Then  to  overwhelm  each  in  detail.  This  could  be  done  by 
forcing  the  bulk  of  his  army  through  Crampton's  Gap.  This 
move  would  have  the  further  advantage  of  most  speedily  reliev- 
ing Harper's  Ferry.  But  just  as  Pope  had  lost  his  campaign  by 
moving  directly  upon  Jackson,  as  he  supposed,  at  Manassas 
Junction,  instead  of  upon  Gainesville,  where  he  would  have  been 
between  Jackson  and  Lee,  here  McClellan  lost  his  campaign  by 
moving  directly  after  Lee  upon  Turner 's  Gap.  Even  that  he  did 
with  deliberation  strangely  out  of  place  for  the  occasion.  By 
night  marches,  over  good  roads  with  a  good  moon,  he  might  have 
attacked  and  carried  both  Turner's  and  Crampton's  gaps  by 
sunrise  on  the  14th,  for  each  was  then  held  by  only  cavalry  and  a 
single  brigade  of  infantry. 

Fortunately  for  Lee,  a  citizen  of  Frederick  whose  sympathies 
were  with  the  Confederate  cause,  was  accidentally  present  at 
McClellan 's  headquarters  during  the  afternoon  of  the  13th  and 
heard  expressions  of  gratification  at  the  finding  of  the  order,  and 
learned  of  directions  being  given  for  a  vigorous  advance  the 
next  morning.  With  full  appreciation  of  its  importance  he  made 
his  way  through  the  Federal  lines,  and  brought  the  information, 
after  dark,  to  Stuart,  who  at  once  sent  it  on  to  Lee,  then  in 
camp  at  Hagerstown.  Four  brigades  of  Hill's  division  were  at 
different  points,  from  two  to  five  miles  west  of  Turner 's  Pass. 
They  were  ordered  back,  and  barely  arrived  in  time  to  save  it 
from  being  seized  by  the  enemy.  Meanwhile,  too,  Jones's  and 
Evans 's  divisions  were  ordered  to  march  in  the  morning  to  re- 
enforce  Hill,  and  Lee  and  Longstreet  returned  with  them  to 
Turner's  Gap. 

It  was  between  three  and  four  o'clock  when  they  reached  the 
scene  of  action,  after  an  oppressively  hot  and  dusty  march  of  14 
miles.  There  were  eight  brigades  in  the  column,  Toombs  being 
left  at  Hagerstown  to  protect  the  trains.  Hill  had  already  had 
severe  fighting.  Turner's  Pass  was  flanked  upon  each  side  by 
secondary  passes  within  a  mile,  through  each  of  which  roads 
reached  the  crest,  and  cross-roads  connected  both  with  the  main 
pike.  On  the  right  Garland's  brigade  had  been  attacked  at 
7  A.M.  by  a  superior  force;  Gen.  Garland,  an  officer  of  great 


BOONSBORO  AND  HARPER'S  FERRY  231 

promise,  had  been  killed,  and  his  brigade  driven  back  in  con- 
fusion, but  the  enemy  did  not  follow  up,  and  Anderson's  bri- 
gade arrived  in  time  to  hold  the  position.  D.  H.  Hill  never 
failed  to  get  good  fighting  out  of  his  veteran  division,  and 
from  7  A.M.  to  3  P.M.,  without  support,  he  held  the  Gap  success- 
fully. But  two  corps  of  the  enemy,  the  1st  and  9th,  comprising 
18  brigades  and  18  batteries,  were  attacking  it  and  gradually 
outflanking  Hill's  positions.  By  3  P.M.  they  had  occupied  ground 
on  the  Confederate  left  which  assured  their  final  success  in  spite 
of  all  that  could  be  accomplished  by  the  eight  tired  brigades 
newly  arrived.  These,  however,  began  to  climb  the  hills  from 
the  west  in  support  of  Hill's  five  brigades,  now  much  reduced 
by  then*  long  conflict,  dill,  in  his  report,  says :  — 

"  Had  Longstreet  's  division  been  with  mine  at  daylight  in  the  morning, 
the  Yankees  would  have  been  disastrously  repulsed,  but  they  had  gained 
important  positions  before  the  arrival  of  reinforcements.  These  came 
up,  after  a  long,  hurried,  and  exhausting  march,  to  defend  localities  of 
which  they  were  ignorant,  and  to  fight  a  foe  flushed  with  partial  success 
and  already  holding  key  points  to  farther  advance.  Had  our  forces  never 
been  separated,  the  battle  of  Sharpsburg  never  would  have  been  fought." 

On  the  arrival  of  the  head  of  Longstreet's  column,  Evans  was 
sent  to  the  left  to  support  Rodes,  and  Kemper,  Jenkins,  and 
Picketts  were  sent  to  the  right  at  the  foot  of  the  mountain,  by 
a  rough  road,  to  meet  a  force  of  the  enemy  said  to  be  crossing 
the  mountain  in  that  direction.  After  marching  a  mile  and  a 
half,  the  report  having  been  found  to  be  erroneous,  they  were 
called  to  hasten  to  the  top  of  the  mountain  by  obscure  by-roads 
and  across  fields,  and  on  reaching  the  top  they  were  at  once 
sharply  engaged.  Longstreet  writes :  — 

"  They  were  put  in  as  they  arrived  to  try  to  cover  the  right  of  Rodes 
and  Evans,  and  fill  the  intervening  space  to  the  turnpike.  As  they 
marched  the  men  dropped  along  the  road  as  rapidly  as  if  under  severe 
skirmish.  So  manifest  was  it  that  nature  was  exhausted  that  no  one 
urged  them  to  get  up  and  try  to  keep  their  ranks." 

Before  their  ranks  could  be  formed  they  were  under  fire,  and 
the  action  was  kept  up  until  darkness  finally  called  its  truce 
upon  the  field. 

At  this  time  both  Lee  and  Jackson  were  disabled,  and  com- 


232  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

pelled  to  ride  in  ambulances.  On  Aug.  31,  Lee,  in  recon- 
noitring Pope's  lines,  had  dismounted,  and  was  holding  his 
horse  by  the  bridle  when  an  alarm  of  Federal  cavalry  had 
startled  the  party,  and  the  general's  horse  had  jerked  him  to  the 
ground,  fracturing  some  of  the  bones  of  his  right  hand.  It  now 
was  carried  in  a  sling,  and  he  could  not  handle  his  reins.  Jackson 
at  Frederick  had  been  presented  with  a  fine  horse,  but  the  animal 
was  not  well  broken  and  had  reared  up  and  fallen  over,  bruising 
him  so  that  he,  too,  was  an  invalid. 

Lee  was  now  halted  at  the  foot  of  the  mountain,  and  thither 
Longstreet  and  Hill  repaired  as  the  firing  ceased.  Hill  made  a 
report  of  the  situation.  Darkness  had  saved  the  Confederate 
line  from  serious  disaster.  The  tired  troops  and  trains  could 
not  be  allowed  to  rest,  but  must  at  once  be  put  in  motion  to  the 
rear.  At  first  Lee  designated  Keedysville  as  the  point  at  which 
the  troops  would  halt;  but  later  news  reached  him  that  the 
enemy  had  also  gotten  possession  of  Crampton's  Gap  and  he 
changed  the  order,  and  directed  that  the  new  position  should  be 
at  Sharpsburg,  behind  the  Antietam  River,  distant  from  Turner's 
Gap  about  10  miles.  D.  H.  Hill's  troops  were  first  withdrawn, 
and  were  followed  by  the  rest  of  the  infantry  and  artillery. 
Fitz-Lee's  brigade  of  cavalry  and  Hood's  and  Whiting's  brigades 
of  infantry  acted  as  rear-guard  to  the  column. 

My  reserve  ordnance  train,  of  about  80  wagons,  had  accom- 
panied Lee's  headquarters  to  Hagerstown,  and  had  also  followed 
the  march  back  to  Boonsboro.  I  was  now  ordered  to  cross  the 
Potomac  at  Williamsport,  and  go  thence  to  Shepherdstown, 
where  I  should  leave  the  train  and  come  in  person  to  Sharps- 
burg.  The  moon  was  rising  as  I  started,  and  about  daylight  I 
forded  the  Potomac,  unaware  of  having  had  a  narrow  escape 
from  capture,  with  my  train,  by  Gregg's  brigade  of  cavalry.  This 
brigade  had  escaped  that  night  from  Harper's  Ferry,  and  crossed 
our  line  of  retreat  from  Boonsboro.  It  had  captured  and  de- 
stroyed the  reserve  ordnance  train,  of  45  wagons  of  Longstreet's 
corps. 

It  is  now  necessary  to  describe  what  took  place  at  Crampton's 
Gap,  where  McClellan  should  have  gone  in  person,  as  that  posi- 
tion was  the  key-point  of  the  whole  situation.  Only  Franklin's 


BOONSBORO  AND  HARPER'S  FERRY  233 

corps  of  nine  brigades  was  sent  there.  They  might  have  marched 
on  the  13th  from  their  position,  three  miles  east  of  Jefferson,  but 
did  not  until  the  14th.  Having  only  about  10  miles  to  go,  they 
arrived  in  the  forenoon,  and  at  once  deployed  and  formed  for 
attack.  The  Gap  offered  fairly  good  positions  for  defence  of  its 
eastern  outlet,  had  there  been  troops  enough  to  hold  its  flanks; 
but  the  task  imposed  upon  McLaws,  with  his  four  brigades  and 
Anderson's  six,  was  beyond  his  strength.  To  protect  his  own 
rear,  and  to  prevent  the  escape  from  Harper's  Ferry  of  the  13,000 
men  to  be  besieged  there,  while  he  captured  the  heights  above 
them  and  cannonaded  them  into  a  surrender,  it  was  essential 
that  he  should  occupy  Pleasant  Valley.  This  lay  between  the 
Blue  Ridge  (here  called  South  Mountain)  on  the  east,  and  Elk 
Ridge  (or  Maryland  Heights)  on  the  west.  The  protection  of 
his  rear  required  him  to  hold  in  force  Crampton's  Gap  in  the 
Blue  Ridge,  and  to  observe  Brownsville  Gap,  about  a  mile  south 
of  it,  and  also  Solomon's  Gap  in  Elk  Ridge  opposite  on  the  west. 
At  Weverton,  where  the  Potomac  breaks  through  the  Blue 
Ridge,  five  miles  from  Crampton's,  he  had  to  protect  against  an 
advance  from  the  direction  of  Washington,  and  at  Sandy  Hook, 
where  the  road  from  Harper's  Ferry  comes  around  South  Moun- 
tain into  Pleasant  Valley,  he  had  to  guard  against  an  attack  by 
the  whole  garrison  of  Harper's  Ferry.  Besides  this,  he  had  to 
send  a  force  along  Elk  Ridge  strong  enough  to  defeat  the  in- 
trenched brigade  which  held  the  extremity,  overlooking  Harper's 
Ferry,  and  to  hold  it  while  his  guns  bombarded  the  town.  There 
was  thus  one  point  to  be  attacked,  two  others  to  be  observed, 
and  three  to  be  defended  against  large  forces.  The  two  most 
important  points,  —  Crampton's  Gap  and  Sandy  Hook,  —  were 
over  five  miles  apart.  Considering  the  proximity  of  the  immense 
Federal  force,  McLaws  and  Anderson  were  within  the  lion's 
mouth,  and  that  they  ever  got  out  of  it  was  no  less  due  to  good 
management,  than  it  was  to  good  luck  on  their  part,  and  mis- 
management by  the  enemy. 

Holding  Crampton's  Gap  were  only  Munford's  cavalry  and 
Mahone's  brigade  of  infantry,  under  Parham.  Cobb's  brigade 
and  part  of  Semmes's  were  near  in  reserve.  From  noon  on  the 
14th  until  near  five  o'clock  there  was  sharp  skirmishing  and 


234  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

artillery  fire,  while  the  enemy  deployed  Slocum's  division  on  his 
right  and  Smith's  on  his  left.  Having,  by  then,  gotten  the 
measure  of  their  enemy,  and  deployed  lines  which  outflanked  him 
upon  both  sides,  a  handsome  charge  was  made  by  four  brigades, 
—  Bartlett's,  Newton's,  Torbert's,  and  Brooke's.  Of  course, 
there  could  be  no  effective  resistance.  The  whole  Confederate 
line  was  overwhelmed  and  driven  back  in  confusion.  The  re- 
serve endeavored  to  rally  the  fugitives,  but  the  small  force  — 
only  about  2200  men  in  all  —  were  so  far  outflanked  by  the 
Federal  lines  that  no  stand  could  be  held  until  darkness  put  an 
end  to  the  Federal  pursuit,  the  whole  Gap  being  now  in  their 
possession. 

The  battle  was  well  contested,  as  shown  by  the  losses  inflicted 
upon  the  enemy,  531  killed  and  wounded.  The  Confederates 
were  fortunate  to  get  off  with  a  loss  as  reported  by  Franklin  of 
only  400  prisoners  and  450  killed  and  wounded  left  upon  the 
field,  and  a  single  gun. 

In  the  scattered  condition  of  McLaws's  command,  he  was  now 
in  great  danger.  His  one  chance  of  safety  was  in  an  early  sur- 
render of  Harper's  Ferry  to  afford  him  an  outlet  for  escape.  He 
acted  promptly  and  with  good  judgment.  Drawing  the  brigades 
of  Kershaw,  Wilcox,  and  Barksdale  from  the  forces  on  South 
Mountain,  with  the  remnants  of  Semmes,  Cobb,  and  Mahone,  he 
threw  a  line  of  battle  across  Pleasant  Valley  about  a  mile  and  a 
half  below  Crampton's  Gap,  with  its  left  flank  upon  Elk  Ridge, 
and  its  right  upon  South  Mountain.  Here  he  made  a  bold  front 
on  the  morning  of  the  15th  against  Franklin  and  his  whole  corps. 
Of  course,  Franklin,  about  12,000  strong,  could  have  run  over 
him,  and  was  under  orders,  too,  to  do  so.  Franklin  was  pre- 
paring to  undertake  the  work,  when,  about  eight  o'clock,  heavy 
firing  which  had  been  going  on  for  over  two  hours  at  Harper's 
Ferry,  suddenly  ceased.  Franklin  correctly  interpreted  this  to 
mean  that  Miles,  at  Harper's  Ferry,  had  surrendered,  and  he 
abandoned  his  proposed  attack.  This  was  a  gross  blunder.  It 
lost  an  easy  opportunity  to  defeat  six  of  Lee's  brigades.  One 
can  but  wonder  if  McClellan  had  communicated  to  Franklin  a 
copy  of  Lee's  order  No.  191,  for,  with  the  knowledge  of  the  situa- 
tion given  by  that  order,  it  seems  impossible  that  the  latter  could 


BOONSBORO  AND  HARPER'S  FERRY  235 

have  remained  idle  so  near  a  divided  enemy  for  two  whole  days, 
as  he  now  did  on  the  15th  and  16th,  receiving,  meanwhile,  no 
orders  from  McClellan. 

McClellan  either  did  not  himself  appreciate  the  value  of  the 
opportunity  chance  had  given  him,  or  did  not  choose  to  let 
Halleck  know  it.  His  letters  to  them  seem  vague  and  non- 
committal. He  cannot  be  held  blameless  for  Franklin's  small 
performance  in  view  of  the  opportunity. 

Let  us  now  turn  to  Harper's  Ferry.  Jackson,  with  his  three 
divisions  under  Jones,  Lawton,  and  A.  P.  Hill,  marching  from 
Frederick  on  Sept.  10,  had  much  the  longest  march-  to  make, 
about  62  miles,  nearly  double  those  of  McLaws  and  Walker.  He 
made  it,  however,  hi  good  time,  his  marches  being  on  the  10th, 
14  miles;  on  the  llth,  20  miles;  on  the  12th,  16  miles;  and  on 
the  13th  by  11  A.M.,  12  miles,  which  brought  him  to  the  Harper's 
Ferry  pickets.  The  other  commands  reached  their  destinations 
about  the  same  time,  and  the  next  morning,  signal  parties  opened 
wigwag  communication  between  all. 

McLaws  had  had  some  fighting  to  get  in  position  on  South 
Mountain,  for  it  had  been  held  by  a  brigade  and  two  batteries 
under  Col.  Ford.  Ford  did  not  make  a  good  defence  and  was 
afterward  court-martialled  and  dismissed. 

During  the  forenoon  of  the  14th,  Walker,  on  Loudon  Heights, 
reported  six  rifled  guns  in  position,  but  Jackson  ordered  him  not 
to  open  fire  until  McLaws  was  ready  Jackson,  before  opening 
fire,  intended  to  demand  a  surrender,  and  to  allow  time  for  non- 
combatants  to  be  removed.  Before  this  could  be  done,  however, 
the  sounds  of  battle  at  Turner's  and  Crampton's  gaps  admonished 
him  of  the  importance  of  hours,  and,  about  4  P.M.,  McLaws  being 
prepared,  a  heavy  cannonade  was  opened  and  kept  up  during 
the  rest  of  the  afternoon.  Its  effect,  however,  was  more  moral 
than  physical.  The  rifled  ammunition  of  the  Confederates  was 
decidedly  inferior  to  that  of  the  enemy,  many  of  their  shells 
failing  to  burst,  or  bursting  prematurely,  or  tumbling ;  and  even 
the  smooth-bore  shells  often  burst  near  the  guns.  The  part  of 
the  town  near  the  rivers  was  within  effective  range  of  McLaws 
and  Walker,  but  Bolivar  Heights,  where  the  most  of  the  Federal 
force  was  located,  was  beyond  it. 


236  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

Meanwhile,  Jackson  arranged  a  direct  assault  upon  Bolivar 
Heights.  Ten  of  Walker's  rifles  were  brought  across  the 
Shenandoah,  about  four  miles  above  the  town,  and  found  good 
positions  to  take  in  rear  the  Federal  left  from  spurs  near  the 
river.  A.  P.  Hill's  infantry,  on  Jackson's  right,  worked  down 
the  river  bank  over  ground  the  Federals  had  thought  impassable, 
and  found  lodgment  in  rear  of  the  Federal  line ;  and  Hill's  artillery 
established  several  batteries  on  the  very  ridge  held  by  the  Federals, 
and  in  easy  range.  On  the  left,  near  the  Potomac,  Jones's  division 
drove  off  Federal  outposts  and  also  established  batteries  in 
effective  range  on  commanding  hills. 

Opposite  the  centre,  Ewell's  division'under  Lawton  was  moved 
up  near  the  works,  and  its  smooth-bores  posted  for  direct  fire. 
All  was  ready  by  the  morning  of  the  15th,  and  Jackson  had  the 
game  in  his  hands.  The  Federals,  indeed,  were  naturally  de- 
pressed. Their  affair  on  Maryland  Heights,  with  McLaws,  had 
been  discouraging,  and  now  they  saw  guns  being  posted  to  com- 
mand all  of  their  positions.  Col.  Davis,  with  about  1200 
cavalry,  got  permission  to  make  his  escape  during  the  night. 
The  road  to  Sharpsburg,  on  the  north  bank  of  the  river,  was  un- 
guarded, save  by  a  picket  some  four  miles  out.  The  cavalry 
crossed  on  the  pontoon  bridge  and  made  its  escape,  riding  by 
the  picket  at  a  gallop  in  the  moonlight.  On  their  march  to 
Hagerstown  they  had  the  luck  to  meet  Longstreet's  reserve 
ordnance  train,  as  already  told,  and  burned  45  wagons  of  am- 
munition. This  train  had  a  guard,  but,  unfortunately,  it  was 
concentrated  at  the  rear,  where  alone  was  danger  apprehended. 

Before  sunrise  on  the  15th,  Jackson  opened  all  his  guns  from 
seven  points,  and  prepared  to  storm  the  Federal  lines  after  a 
severe  cannonade.  His  new  positions  gave  effective  enfilade  fire 
at  fair  ranges.  Lt.  Binney,  of  Miles's  staff,  writes  in  his 
journal :  — 

"  We  are  surrounded  by  enemy's  batteries ;  they  open  from  Loudon 
Mountain  and  Loudon  farm,  Maryland  Heights,  Charlestown  road, 
Shepherdstown  road.  Nothing  could  stand  before  such  a  raking  cannon- 
ade. Col.  Miles  was  everywhere,  exposing  himself  to  danger  with  the 
bravest,  encouraging  his  artillerists,  and  met  with  many  narrow  escapes 
from  the  bursting  shells  of  the  enemy.  At  8  A.M.  our  battery  officers 


BOONSBORO  AND  HARPER'S  FERRY  237 

report  their  ammunition  exhausted.  Gen.  White  meets  Col.  Miles  on 
the  crest  of  heights  and  consults.  .  .  .  The  white  flag  is  exhibited,  the 
artillery  stops  firing  for  about  15  minutes,  when  the  enemy  again  open 
with  a  terrific  cannonade.  .  .  .  Col.  Miles  and  Lt.  Binney,  aide-de- 
camp, started  down  the  eastern  slope  of  the  heights,  where  every  inch  of 
ground  is  being  torn  up  by  the  enemy's  fire.  Col.  Miles  took  Lt. 
Binney 's  hand  and  remarked,  '  Well,  Mr.  Binney,  we  have  done  our 
duty,  but  where  can  McClellan  be  ?  The  rebels  have  opened  on  us  again ! 
What  do  they  mean?'  Immediately  after  a  shell  passed  us,  striking  and 
exploding  immediately  behind  us,  a  piece  of  which  tore  the  flesh  entirely 
from  his  left  calf,  and  a  small  piece  cutting  his  right  calf  slightly.  Lt. 
Binney  immediately  tied  his  handkerchief  above  the  knee  and  called  for 
assistance,  put  him  in  a  blanket,  and,  obtaining  six  men,  dragged  him  to 
an  ambulance  and  sent  word  to  Gen.  White." 

Col.  Miles  only  survived  for  a  day.  A  military  commission 
which  reported  upon  the  circumstances  of  the  surrender  severely 
criticised  it  as  premature.  It  may  be  said,  however,  that  the 
immediate  necessity  for  surrender  was,  not  to  escape  the  fire  of 
the  artillery,  which  was  so  much  in  evidence,  but  the  charge  of 
the  infantry  which  was  about  to  follow. 

The  actual  casualties  of  the  Federals  were  217.  The  total 
number  surrendered  was  about  12,500.  Jackson,  in  his  official 
report,  says :  — 

"  In  an  hour  the  enemy 's  fire  seemed  to  be  silenced,  and  the  batteries 
of  Gen.  Hill  were  ordered  to  cease  their  fire,  which  was  the  signal  for 
storming  the  works.  Gen.  Fender  had  commenced  his  advance,  when 
the  enemy  again  opening,  Pegram  and  Crenshaw  moved  forward  their 
batteries,  and  poured  a  rapid  fire  into  the  enemy.  The  white  flag  was  now 
displayed,  and,  shortly  afterward,  Gen.  White  (the  commanding  officer, 
Col.  D.  S.  Miles  having  been  mortally  wounded),  with  a  garrison  of  about 
11,000  men,  surrendered  as  prisoners  of  war.  Under  this  capitulation 
we  took  possession  of  73  pieces  of  artillery,  some  13,000  small-arms, 
and  other  stores.  Liberal  terms  were  granted  to  Gen.  White  and  the 
officers  under  his  command  in  the  surrender,  which,  I  regret  to  say,  do  not 
seem  from  subsequent  events  to  have  been  properly  appreciated  by  their 
Government." 

It  is  interesting  to  inquire  why  this  criticism?  The  official 
reports  contain  two  documents  which  may  explain.  The  first 
is  a  letter  from  Gen.  White  to  Gen.  D.  Tyler  at  Annapolis,  as 
follows : l  — 

1  O.  R.  27,  801. 


238  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

"GENERAL:  I  have  the  honor  to  state  that,  after  capitulating  at 
Harper 's  Ferry,  I  was  allowed  by  Gen.  A.  P.  Hill,  commanding  at  that 
post  the  forces  of  the  enemy,  some  24  wagons  for  the  transportation  of 
officers'  baggage,  after  my  pledge  to  return  them  to  the  enemy's  lines. 
I  respectfully  request,  therefore,  that  the  quartermaster  be  directed  to 
forward  them  back." 

Tyler,  however,  instead  of  returning  them,  forwarded  White's 
letter  to  Halleck's  office,  calling  it  a  "strange  arrangement,"  and 
asks  "shall  the  wagons  be  returned,  and  how?"  What  Tyler 
saw  "strange"  in  it  is  not  clear;  but  the  tone  of  the  letter  sug- 
gests that  difficulty  was  made,  which  is  confirmed  by  Hill's  re- 
port that  "the  wagons  which  were  loaned  to  carry  off  the  private 
baggage  of  the  officers  were  not  returned  for  nearly  two  months, 
and  not  until  repeated  calls  had  been  made  for  them." 

The  second  document,  by  Lt.  Bacon,  adjutant  of  D'Utassy's 
brigade,  concerns  the  paroling  of  the  Federals.1 

A  difference  arose  between  Col.  D'Utassy  and  Gen.  Branch, 
in  charge  of  the  details,  as  to  the  meaning  of  the  words 
"will  not  serve  against  the  Confederate  States  until  regularly  ex- 
changed." A  pass  to  the  brigade,  allowing  it  to  cross  the  bridge, 
was  refused  until  the  matter  was  adjusted.  D'Utassy  claimed 
that  they  might  go  West  and  serve  against  the  Indians.  The 
question  was  referred  to  Gen.  A.  P.  Hill  who  refused  to  admit 
that  understanding.  This  was  about  9  P.M.  About  6  A.M.  Lt. 
Bacon  reports  that  he  — 

"handed  the  muster-rolls  to  Gen.  Hill  at  his  headquarters  and  asked  a 
pass  for  the  brigade.  Hill  asked  if  the  brigade  was  paroled.  I  replied, 
evasively,  'I  thought  so.'  He  then  sat  down  and  wrote  a  pass,  upon 
which  we  immediately  crossed  the  river,  thus  giving  them  the  slip. 

"  Upon  the  announcement  of  the  surrender,  Col.  D  'Utassy  ordered  the 
colors  of  all  the  regiments  of  our  brigade  to  be  conveyed  to  his  head- 
quarters. This  was  done,  and  two  hours  were  spent  in  removing  the 
various  colors  from  their  staffs  and  packing  them  in  the  Colonel 's  private 
trunk.  The  Adjutant  General  of  Gen.  Gregg  made  several  demands 
on  me  for  the  colors,  where  I  was  engaged  on  the  hill  turning  over  the 
arms.  I  informed  him  that  they  had  been  sent  to  our  brigade  head- 
quarters. He  left,  but  shortly  returned,  saying  that  he  could  not  find 
them.  I  said  I  regretted  it  but  could  not  aid  him,  that  he  must  see  my 

1  O.  R.  27,  552. 


BOONSBORO  AND  HARPER'S  FERRY 


239 


Colonel.  These  flags  are  now  in  my  Colonel 's  private  trunks  in  this  city. 
These  are  the  simple  facts  which  on  my  honor  as  a  gentleman  I  certify 
to." 

A  military  commission  which  investigated  found  nothing  that 
called  for  censure  in  these  matters,  and  per  contra  had  a  complaint 
of  its  own,  as  follows :  — 

"During  the  week  previous  to  the  evacuation  of  Maryland  Heights 
a  Lt.  Rouse  of  the  12th  Va.  Cav.,  who'  had  been  engaged  in  a  raid 
upon  a  train  from  Harper's  Ferry  to  Winchester  a  short  time  before, 
was  captured  and  brought  into  Harper's  Ferry.  He  escaped  while 
on  the  way  to  the  hospital,  he  pretending  to  be  sick,  but  was  retaken. 
He  was  paroled,  but  returned  in  command  of  some  rebel  cavalry  on  the 
morning  of  the  surrender.  The  attention  of  Gen.  A.  P.  Hill  was  called 
to  the  fact  that  Lt.  Rouse  was  a  paroled  prisoner,  but  no  attention 
was  paid  to  it.  Lt.  Rouse,  on  being  spoken  to  about  it,  laughed  at  the 
idea  of  observing  his  parole." 

The  casualties  of  the  campaign  are  shown  in  the  following 
table :  — 

CASUALTIES,  SIEGE  OF  HARPER'S  FERRY,  SEPT.  13-15,  1862 


Q 
H 

NDED 

e 
g 

J 

& 

00 

^J 

« 

O 

s 

1 

Sept. 

13.  McLaws's  Div.,  Md.  Hgts. 

35 

178 

213 

u 

14.                     "     ,  Crampton's  Gap 

62 

208 

479 

749 

11 

14.  Mahone's  Brig.,  Crampton's  Gap 

8 

92 

127 

227 

11 

14-15.   A.  P.  Hill's  Div.,  Bol.  Hgts. 

3 

66 

69 

tt 

14-15.   Walker's      "   ,  Loudon" 

1 

4 

5 

Aggregate 

109 

548 

606 

1,263 

Total 
u 

Fed.,  Crampton's  Gap 
"    ,  Harper's  Ferry 

115 

44 

416 
173 

2 

12,520 

533 
12,737 

Aggregate 

159 

589 

12,522 

13,270 

The  casualties  given  in  Mahone's  brigade  include  those  of  the 
battle  of  Sharpsburg,  which  was  not  reported  separately.  No 
reports  were  made  by  the  Confederate  cavalry. 

The  Confederate  casualties  at  Boonsboro  are  not  reported 
separately,  except  Rodes's  brigade,  which  reports:  killed  61, 
wounded  151,  missing  204,  total  522.  It  was  most  severely 


240 


MILITARY  MEMOIRS 


engaged  of  any,  except,  possibly,  Garland's,  which  was  routed 
when  he  was  killed.  Garland's  losses  for  the  whole  campaign 
are  given  as:  killed  86,  wounded  440,  total  526. 

Livermore's  Numbers  and  Losses  in  the  Civil  War  estimates 
the  totals  for  the  two  armies  at  South  Mountain,  as  follows :  — 


FORCE  ENGAGED 

KILLED 

WOUNDED 

MISSING 

TOTAL 

Confederates 
Federals 

17,852 
28,480 

325 
325 

1560 
1403 

800 

85 

2685 
1831 

CHAPTER  XIII 
SHARPSBURG  OR  ANTIETAM 

McLaws  and  Jackson  Recalled.  The  Ordnance  Train.  The  Question  of 
giving  Battle.  Confederate  Straggling.  Ropes's  Comments.  McClel- 
lan's  Pursuit.  Lee's  Line  of  Battle.  Battle  of  Hooker's  Corps.  Hood's 
Counter-stroke.  On  Jackson's  Left.  Battle  of  Mansfield's  Corps. 
Battle  of  Sumner's  Corps.  Sedgwick  Ambuscaded.  The  Artillery 
Fighting.  Fourth  Attack  Prepared.  French's  Advance.  Swinton's  Ac- 
count. The  Bloody  Lane.  Franklin  is  Halted.  Both  Sides  Exhausted. 
Pleasanton  and  Porter.  Burnside  Advances.  Toombs's  Good  Defence. 
The  Bridge  Carried.  The  Advance  upon  Sharpsburg.  A.  P.  Hill's 
Counter-stroke.  Lee  in  Council.  Sept.  18.  Faulty  position  of  Fed- 
eral Cavalry.  The  Pursuit.  The  Counter-stroke.  Captured  Ordnance 
Stores.  Casualties. 

THE  surrender  of  Harper's  Ferry  had  come  in  the  very  nick  of 
time  for  the  Confederates.  Fortunately  for  them,  Franklin  at 
Crampton's  Gap,  as  already  told,  interpreted  the  cessation  of 
firing  as  an  indication  that  there  was  now  no  use  in  his  attacking 
the  enemy  in  his  front.  For  orders  were  on  the  way  from  Lee 
summoning  McLaws  to  — 

"withdraw  immediately  from  your  position  on  Maryland  Heights  and 
join  us  here.  If  you  cannot  get  off  any  other  way,  you  must  cross  the 
mountain.  The  utmost  despatch  is  required." 

Jackson,  too,  had  been  urgently  summoned.  As  soon  as  the 
terms  of  capitulation  were  agreed  upon,  he  ordered  Hill  to  su- 
perintend the  paroling  of  the  Federals,  cooked  two  days'  rations, 
and  set  out,  with  his  own  and  Walker's  divisions,  at  1  A.M.,  for 
Sharpsburg,  distant  17  miles.  By  a  rapid  night  march  he  arrived 
early  on  the  16th,  having  forded  the  Potomac  at  daylight,  at 
Boteler's  Ford  near  Shepherdstown.  McLaws  extricated  him- 
self from  Pleasant  Valley  by  coming  into  Harper's  Ferry.  Here 
he  was  much  delayed  in  crossing  the  pontoon  bridge  with  his 
trains  and  getting  through  the  crowded  streets.  It  was  after 

241 


242  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

dark  on  the  16th  when  his  tired  and  hungry  troops  bivouacked 
within  two  miles  of  Shepherdstown.  /\\  £  /_ 

At  midnight,  summoned  by  Lee,  he  marched  again,  and,  cross- 
ing the  ford  before  daylight,  the  head  of  his  column  reported  to 
Lee  about  sunrise  on  the  17th.  A.  P.  Hill's  division  was  detained 
in  Harper's  Ferry  until  the  morning  of  the  17th.  He  marched 
at  7.30  A.M.  with  five  brigades,  leaving  Thomas's  to  look  after 
the  captured  property,  to  remove  which  Jackson  had  requested 
Lee  to  send  his  chief  quartermaster  and  ordnance  officer. 

Thus  it  happened  that,  when  I  arrived  at  Shepherdstown,  about 
noon  on  the  16th,  with  my  ordnance  train,  and  rode  across 
the  river  and  reported  to  Lee,  I  was  -ordered  to  collect  all  empty 
wagons  and  go  to  Harper's  Ferry  and  take  charge  of  the  sur- 
rendered ammunition;  bringing  back  to  Sharpsburg  all  suiting 
our  calibres,  and  sending  to  Winchester  whatever  we  could  not 
use  in  the  field.  The  prospect  of  this  addition  to  our  supply 
was  grateful,  for  the  expenditures  had  been  something,  at  Boons- 
boro,  Crampton's  Gap,  and  Harper's  Ferry;  and  the  loss  of 
the  45  loads,  burned  by  the  cavalry,  had  been  a  severe  blow  at 
such  a  distance  from  our  base  at  Culpeper.  I  was  soon  on  my 
way  back,  and  encamped  that  night  with  many  wagons  not  far 
from  Harper's  Ferry. 

It  had  been  easily  within  Lee's  power,  all  day  on  the  15th,  to 
cross  the  river  into  Virginia,  without  loss,  and  to  reunite  his 
scattered  divisions  and  collect  his  multitude  of  stragglers  behind 
the  Potomac.  The  more  that  one  studies  the  situation,  the  more 
amazed  he  must  be  at  the  audacity  which  deliberately  sought  a 
pitched  battle  in  the  open  field,  without  a  yard  of  earthworks, 
against  a  better-equipped  army  of  double  his  force,  and  with  a 
river  close  behind  him,  to  be  crossed  by  a  single  ford,  peculiarly 
bad  and  exposed,  in  case  he  had  to  retreat.  A  defeat  would  cer- 
tainly involve  the  utter  destruction  of  his  army.  At  Manassas, 
at  Ox  Hill,  and  even  at  Boonsboro  and  Crampton's  Gap,  he  had 
had  recent  evidence  that  there  was  in  the  Federal  army,  and, 
especially  in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  no  lack  of  veteran  troops, 
well  organized,  well  led,  and  capable  of  strong  offence  and  stub- 
born defence.  Let  us  analyze  the  conditions,  and  balance  roughly 
the  pros  and  the  cons. 


SHARPSBURG  OR  ANTIETAM 


243 


The  actual  number  which  McClellan  brought  upon  the  field  of 
Sharpsburg  during  the  battle,  he  states  at  87,164.  Besides  these, 
Couch's  and  Humphrey's  divisions,  14,000  men,  were  within-  a 
day's  march  and  arrived,  on  the  18th,  in  time  for  use  either  in 
defeat  or  victory. 


FIELD  OF  SHARPSBURG 


Lee's  force  should  have  been  about  55,000  men ;  but  we  have 
already  referred  to  the  enormous  amount  of  straggling,  caused 
by  poor  discipline,  lack  of  shoes,  and  hard  marches,  on  the  in- 
sufficient diet  of  green  corn  and  apples.  That  the  effects  were 


244  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

not  unknown  to  Lee  is  shown  by  the  following  extracts  from 
his  letters  to  President  Davis. 
On  Sept.  13,  from  Hagerstown,  he  wrote : l  — 

"Our  great  embarrassment  is  the  reduction  of  our  ranks  by  straggling, 
which  it  seems  impossible  to  prevent  with  our  present  regimental  officers. 
Our  ranks  are  very  much  diminished,  —  I  fear  from  a  third  to  one-half  of 
our  original  numbers,  —  though  I  have  reason  to  hope  our  casualties  in 
battle  will  not  exceed  5000  men."  2 

After  the  battle  of  Sharpsburg,  on  Sept.  21,  he  wrote  more 
fully,  as  follows :  — 

"  A  great  many  men  belonging  to  the  army  never  entered  Maryland  at 
all;  many  returned  after  getting  there,  while  others  who  crossed  the 
river  kept  aloof.  The  stream  has  not  lessened  since  crossing  the  Potomac, 
though  the  cavalry  has  been  constantly  employed  in  endeavoring  to  arrest 
it.  ...  Some  immediate  legislation,  in  my  opinion,  is  required,  and  the 
most  summary  punishment  should  be  authorized.  It  ought  to  be  construed 
into  desertion  in  face  of  the  enemy,  and  thus  brought  under  the  Rules 
and  Articles  of  War. 

"To  give  you  an  idea  of  its  extent,  in  some  brigades,  I  will  mention 
that  on  the  morning  after  the  battle  of  the  17th,  Gen.  Evans  reported 
to  me  on  the  field,  where  he  was  holding  the  front  position,  that  he  had 
but  120  of  his  brigade  present,  and  that  the  next  brigade  to  his,  that  of 
Gen.  Garnett,  consisted  of  but  100  'men.  Gen.  Pendleton  reported  that 
the  brigades  of  Gens.  Lawton  and  Armistead,  left  to  guard  the  ford  at 
Shepherdstown,  together  contained  but  600  men.  This  is  a  woful  condi- 
tion of  affairs." 

Lawton's  brigade  had  been  the  largest  in  the  army,  and  it  had 
carried  into  action  at  Gaines  Mill,  on  June  27,  3500  men.  It  has 
seemed  incredible  to  many  writers  that  the  small  forces  men- 
tioned in  many  of  the  official  reports,  as  engaged  at  Sharpsburg, 
could  be  correctly  stated;  but  I  am  satisfied  from  my  own 
observations  at  the  time  that  the  following  estimate  by  Col. 
Walter  H.  Taylor,  Gen.  Lee's  adjutant,  is  essentially  correct. 

Col.  Taylor,  in  his  book  Four  Years  with  Lee,  writes :  — 

"The  following  recapitulation  is  established  upon  indisputable  and 
contemporaneous  authority,  being  nothing  less  than  the  testimony  of 
the  commanding  officers,  as  shown  by  their  official  reports  made  at  the 
time. 

1  O.  R.  28,  606. 

2  His  losses  at  Second  Manassas  were  actually  9112. 


SHARPSBURG  OR  ANTIETAM  245 

Longstreet's  Command 6,262  (9  Brigades). 

Jackson's  Command 5,000  (8  Brigades). 

D.  H.  Hill's  Division 3,000  (5  Brigades). 

R.  H.  Anderson's  Division 3,500  (6  Brigades). 

A.  P.  Hill's  Division 3,400  (5  Brigades). 

McLaws's  Division 2,893  (4  Brigades). 

J.  G.  Walker's  Division 3,200  (2  Brigades). 

Total  Effective  Infantry  27,255    (39  Brigades). 

"  I  cannot  verify  the  estimate  made  for  the  cavalry  and  artillery,  viz. 
8000,  but  I  am  sure  it  is  rather  excessive  than  the  reverse.  This  would 
make  Gen.  Lee's  entire  strength  35,255." 

It  must  be  noted,  also,  that  the  Federal  equipment  was  far  su- 
perior to  that  of  the  Confederates.  Not  only  was  their  artillery 
more  numerous  and  with  a  greater  proportion  of  20-pounder 
rifles  and  12-pounder  guns  (as  against  10-pounder  rifles  and  six- 
pounder  guns  of  the  Confederates)  and  with  better  qualities  of 
projectiles  and  fuses,  but  their  infantry  was  almost  entirely  sup- 
plied with  rifled  muskets,  while  the  Confederate  infantry  carried 
about  30  per  cent  of  smooth-bore  muskets. 

Per  contra.  There  is  a  single  item,  but  it  is  an  important  one. 
Not  only  did  McClellan  bring  upon  the  field  his  87,176  well- 
equipped  men,  against  Lee's  35,255  ragged  and  poorly  equipped ; 
but  he  brought  himself  also.  Perhaps  the  anticipation  of  that 
fact  encouraged  Lee  to  risk  the  odds,  and  if  so,  the  event  justified 
his  judgment.  McClellan  not  only  fought  his  battle  in  detail, 
engaging  not  more  than  two  of  his  six  corps  simultaneously,  but 
he  held  two  of  them  out  of  the  battle  almost  entirely,  —  Porter's 
5th  corps  with  19,586  men,  and  Franklin's  6th  with  12,300.  The 
total  casualties,  in  these  two  corps,  "31,886  strong,  were  but  109 
in  the  5th  corps  and  439  in  the  6th,  —  less  than  were  experienced 
in  many  single  brigades.  So  when  the  proper  deduction  is  made 
from  the  Federal  forces  for  McClellan's  presence;  and  a  fair 
allowance  for  the  disadvantage  of  the  Federals  in  having  to  take 
the  offensive,  all  that  would  otherwise  seem  incredible  about  the 
battle  disappears;  and  it  is  seen  to  be  both  natural  and  reason- 
able that  the  game  should  result  in  a  draw.  For  the  fighting 
was  of  about  47,000  Federals  attacking  35,000  Confederates, 


246  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

under  Lee,  Jackson,  and  Longstreet,  in  a  fairly  good  defensive 
position. 

Next  to  the  comparative  forces  of  the  combatants  the  most 
important  feature  of  the  situation  was  the  topography  of  the 
battle-field  which  Lee  had  chosen.  It  was  a  fairly  good  one  for 
defence  as  positions  go  in  a  well-settled  agricultural  country,  but 
it  was  by  no  means  as  strong  as  it  is  often  said  to  be.  The  line 
was  somewhat  over  three  miles  long,  from  its  left  flank  on  the 
Potomac  to  its  right  at  Burnside's  Bridge  across  the  Antietam. 
Its  left  flank  had  an  excellent  position  for  defence  against 
cavalry,  and  it  was  held  by  Stuart's  cavalry  and  artillery  success- 
fully against  the  Federal  cavalry  which  was  opposed  to  it .  Thence, 
running  southeast  about  a  mile,  generally  behind  fences  and 
across  open  ground,  it  crossed  the  Hagerstown  pike,  and  became 
parallel  to  it  and  about  a  quarter  of  a  mile  in  front  of  it.  At 
this  point  the  Antietam  is  about  a  mile  away  to  the  eastward, 
winding  its  way  a  little  west  of  south.  After  holding  these 
courses  for  about  a  mile  and  a  half  the  turnpike  reaches  Sharps- 
burg,  the  line  of  battle  here  being  a  fourth  of  a  mile  in  front  of 
the  village,  and  a  half-mile  in  rear  of  the  river.  Here  the  pike 
and  the  line  turn  more  to  the  east  and  unite  at  Burnside's  Bridge 
about  a  mile  away.  This  bridge  is  over  two  miles  above  the 
junction  of  the  Antietam  with  the  Potomac.  This  flank  was  the 
weakest  part  of  the  line,  for  the  river  below  was  crossable  by 
infantry  at  several  points,  and  the  flank  was,  therefore,  practically 
"in  the  air." 

A  strong  feature  of  our  centre  was  that  the  Antietam  cut  in 
half  the  ground  over  which  the  enemy  must  manoeuvre,  and 
would  more  or  less  embarrass  any  infantry  attack  upon  it ;  but, 
per  contra,  there  were  two  ugly  features:  (1)  The  country 
is  a  rolling  one  and  the  hills  near  the  stream  are  often 
quite  steep,  thus  giving  the  enemy  fairly  close  approach  under 
cover.  (2)  Our  whole  line  except  the  cavalry  on  the  left  was 
within  range  of  the  enemy's  rifle-guns  planted  along  the  high 
ridges  east  of  the  Antietam,  beyond  the  effective  range  of  our 
guns.  Thence,  perfectly  safe  themselves,  they  practised  upon 
us  at  leisure  all  day.  Hunt,  the  Federal  chief  of  artillery,  de- 
scribes the  location  of  10  heavy  batteries  of  the  reserve  artillery, 
and  says :  — 


SHARPSBURG  OR  ANTIETAM  247 

"They  overlooked  the  enemy  and  swept  most  of  the  ground  between 
them  and  our  troops.  They  were  well  served,  especially  the  guns  of 
Benjamin's  battery.  Their  field  of  fire  was  extensive,  and  they  were  use- 
fully employed  all  day  and  so  constantly  that  the  supply  of  ammunition 
for  the  20-pounders  ran  short." 

As  to  how  our  artillery  fared  in  opposition,  we  may  judge  from 
a  remark  made  to  me  two  months  later  by  Col.  S.  D.  Lee,  upon 
my  being  transferred  to  the  artillery  service:  "Pray  that  you 
may  never  see  another  Sharpsburg.  Sharpsburg  was  Artillery 
Hell." 

D.  H.  Hill,  in  his  report,  says  that  he  had  nearly  50  guns 
available,  and  writes :  — 

"Positions  were  selected  for  as  many  of  these  guns  as  could  be  used, 
but  all  the  ground  in  my  front  was  commanded  by  the  long-range  artillery 
of  the  Yankees,  on  the  other  side  of  the  Antietam,  which  concentrated 
their  fire  upon  every  gun  that  opened  and  soon  disabled  it." 

Whatever  the  advantages  or  disadvantages  of  the  field,  there 
was  one  feature  of  it  which  should  have  been  conclusive  against 
giving  battle  there.  That  feature  was  the  Potomac  River.  We 
were  back'ed  up  against  it,  within  two  miles,  and  there  was  no 
bridge  and  but  a  single  ford  accessible,  and  that  a  bad  one, 
rocky  and  deep.  On  the  Maryland  side,  a  mile  of  hilltops, 
some  of  them  beyond  the  Antietam,  offered  sites  for  rifled  guns 
to  rake  the  ford  and  entirely  cut  off  any  retreat,  should  we  meet 
with  a  reverse.  This  single  feature  of  the  field  should  have 
been  conclusive  against  giving  battle  there.  I  believe  that  Lee 
would  never  have  done  so,  had  he  ever  before  crossed  the  ford 
in  person.  Briefly,  the  most  sanguine  hope  which  Lee  could 
reasonably  entertain,  with  his  inferior  force,  was  to  fight  a  drawn 
battle,  and  then  safely  withdraw  what  was  left  of  his  army. 
Against  it  he  risked  its  utter  destruction,  which  would  have  been 
the  speedy  end  of  the  Confederacy.  Ropes,  the  best  critic  and 
the  best-informed  writer  upon  the  war,  comments  as  follows 
upon  the  situation  at  this  time.1 

"This  decision,  to  stand  and  fight  at  Sharpsburg,  which  Gen.  Lee 
took  on  the  evening  of  Sept.  14,  just  after  his  troops  had  been  driven 
from  the  South  Mountain  passes,  is,  beyond  controversy,  one  of  the  bold- 

1  Ropes,  2,  349. 


248  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

est  and  most  hazardous  decisions  in  his  whole  military  career.  In 
truth,  it  is  so  bold  and  so  hazardous  that  one  is  bewildered  that  he 
should  even  have  thought  seriously  of  making  it.  Nearly  the  whole 
force  which  he  had  on  the  north  bank  of  the  Potomac  had  been  engaged 
that  afternoon,  in  an  unsuccessful  attempt  to  hold  a  defensive  position, 
and  it  had  been  badly  beaten.  ...  Of  his  two  principal  lieutenants,  one, 
Longstreet,  was  opposed  to  this  perilous  course.  Jackson,  however,  was, 
as  we  know,  in  favor  of  making  a  stand  at  Sharpsburg." 

From  a  careful  study  of  all  the  reports  upon  both  sides,  not 
only  of  the  text  but  between  the  lines,  I  believe  that  the  course 
of  Lee  was  largely  influenced  by  the  hope,  and  that  of 
McClellan  by  the  fear,  of  events  whose  improbability  surpassed 
that  of  an  earthquake.  To  McClellan  they  evidently  seemed, 
however,  easily  possible.  So  much  so,  that  in  explaining  why 
he  did  not  renew  the  battle  on  Sept.  18th,  he  was  not  ashamed 
to  give  frank  expression  to  his  fear  as  follows :  "  At  that  criti- 
cal juncture,  I  should  have  had  a  narrow  view  of  the  condition 
of  the  country,  had  I  been  willing  to  hazard  another  battle 
with  less  than  an  absolute  assurance  of  success.  At  that 
moment,  Virginia  'ost,  Washington  menaced,  Maryland  invaded, 
the  national  cause  could  afford  no  risk  of  defeat.  One  battle 
lost  and  almost  all  would  have  been  lost.  Lee's  army  might 
then  have  marched  as  it  pleased  on  Washington,  Baltimore, 
Philadelphia,  or  New  York." 

If  McClellan  entertained  such  fears  at  the  close  of  the  battle, 
must  it  not  have  been  these  fears  which  made  his  coming  to  the 
battle  so  slow  and  deliberate  as  to  allow  Lee  even  superfluous 
time  to  make  his  escape  if  he  wished?  Considering  the  rare 
opportunity  which  chance  had  given  him  for  brilliant  and 
decisive  work,  he  displayed  little  ambition  to  be  at  it,  and  his 
conduct  was  more  suggestive  of  providing  a  bridge  for  a  flying 
enemy. 

Lee's  hopes  were  by  no  means  so  exaggerated  as  McClellan's 
fears.  He  counted  upon  no  hope  from  Maryland,  until  his  own 
army  should  have  demonstrated  its  ability  to  maintain  itself 
within  the  state.  He  hardly  hoped  for  more  than  "  to  detain 
the  enemy  upon  the  northern  frontier  until  the  approach  of 
winter  should  render  his  advance  into  Virginia  difficult,  if  not 
impracticable."  But  he  did  entertain  hopes  of  a  decisive 


SHARPSBURG  OR  ANTIETAM  249 

victory  here  on  a  field  more  remote  from  a  safe  place  of  refuge 
for  the  enemy  than  his  victories  of  the  Seven  Days  and  of  2d 
Manassas  had  been.  The  hope  would  have  been  reasonable  had 
his  army  been  larger  and  his  armament  better,  but  under  all 
the  circumstances  and  conditions  it  was  as  improbable  of  real- 
ization as  the  chance  of  an  earthquake  would  have  been.  He 
did,  indeed,  win  a  complete  victory  over  all  the  infantry  which 
the  enemy  engaged,  but  their  position  was  more  favorable 
to  prevent  his  making  a  counter-stroke  than  was  his  to  resist 
their  attack.  Their  heavy  guns  across  the  Antietam  gave  him 
protection,  just  as  at  Fredericksburg  the  Federal  artillery  on 
the  Stafford  heights,  afterward  in  two  battles,  safely  covered  the 
Federal  infantry  on  the  opposite  shore. 

Briefly,  Lee  took  a  great  risk  for  no  chance  of  gain  except 
the  killing  of  some  thousands  of  his  enemy  with  the  loss  of,  per- 
haps, two-thirds  as  many  of  his  own  men.  That  was  a  losing 
game  for  the  Confederacy.  Its  supply  of  men  was  limited ;  that 
of  the  enemy  was  not.  That  was  not  war !  Yet  now,  who  would 
have  it  otherwise  ?  History  must  be  history  and  could  not  afford 
to  lose  this  battle  from  its  records.  For  the  nation  is  immortal 
and  will  forever  prize  and  cherish  the  record  made  that  day  by 
both  sides,  as  actors  in  the  boldest  and  the  bloodiest  battle  ever 
fought  upon  this  continent. 

Longstreet  and  D.  H.  Hill,  after  their  night  march  from  Boons- 
boro,  took  line  of  battle  in  front  of  Sharpsburg  early  on  the  morn- 
ing of  Sept.  15.  During  the  morning  the  news  of  the  surrender 
of  Harper's  Ferry  was  received,  and  gave  a  different  complexion 
to  the  whole  situation.  Until  that  time  Lee  had  contemplated 
crossing  the  river  at  Shepherdstown,  and  he  had  directed 
Jackson  to  move  to  that  vicinity  to  cover  the  crossing;  but 
Jackson  replied  that  he  could  bring  his  divisions  over  to  Sharps- 
burg,  upon  which  he  was  ordered  to  do  so.1 

On  the  morning  of  the  15th  McClellan  hi  person  started  in 
pursuit  of  Lee  from  Turner 's  Gap  with  four  corps,  —  the  1st,  2d, 
5th,  and  12th,  —  comprising  33  brigades  of  infantry.  After  a 
march  of  about  seven  miles  he  found  Lee,  with  the  14  brigades 
under  Longstreet  and  D.  H.  Hill,  in  line  of  battle  hi  front  of 

1  Ropes,  2,  348. 


250  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

Sharpsburg  about  noon.  They  scarcely  numbered  10,000  infan- 
try, and  McClellan  must  have  known  that  all  the  remainder  of 
Lee 's  army  was  concentrated  about  Harper 's  Ferry.  He  could 
never  wish  for  a  fairer  chance  to  crush  an  adversary,  but  he  did 
nothing  that  afternoon  or  the  next  morning.  During  the  16th 
he  was  joined  by  the  9th  corps,  and  at  7.30  P.M.  he  ordered  two 
divisions  of  the  6th  corps  from  Pleasant  Valley,  under  Franklin, 
to  join  him  next  day,  while  the  3d  division  under  Couch  was 
ordered  to  occupy  Maryland  Heights;  for  what  useful  purpose 
it  is  hard  to  divine. 

Meanwhile,  his  plan  of  battle  had  been  formed.  It  was  to 
send  the  1st,  2d,  and  12th  corps,  over  30,000  men,  across  the 
Antietam  above  the  Confederate  lines,  to  turn  their  left  flank, 
while  the  9th  corps  under  Burnside,  about  10,000,  should  attack 
their  right  at  Burnside  Bridge  as  soon  as  things  looked  favorable 
above.  The  5th  and  6th  corps,  Porter  and  Franklin,  would  be  in 
reserve  opposite  our  centre  with  31,339  infantry  and  artillery 
besides  a  considerable  force  of  cavalry  and  horse  artillery.  The 
plan  was  not  a  good  one,  involving  as  it  did  a  piecemeal  beginning. 
The  three  corps  to  attack  the  Confederate  left  should  have  been 
under  one  commander,  and  should  have  moved  together.  In- 
stead, the  1st  corps,  under  Hooker,  was  started  about  2  P.M.  on 
the  16th;  the  12th  corps,  under  Mansfield,  not  until  11.30  P.M. 
The  2d  corps,  under  Sumner,  was  ordered  to  be  ready  to  march  an 
hour  before  daylight.  It  was  ready,  but  received  no  orders. 
After  daylight,  the  battle  having  opened  and  the  firing  become 
heavy,  Sumner  rode  to  McClellan 's  headquarters  to  ask  for  orders, 
and  waited  an  hour  or  more  without  being  able  to  see  him. 
Orders  to  advance  finally  reached  him  at  7.30  A.M.  The  sun  had 
risen  at  5.45  and  Hooker  had  become  engaged  soon  after  daylight, 
probably  about  five  o'clock.  Sumner  had  some  distance  to 
march,  and  was  only  able  to  get  into  action  after  10  A.M.  By 
this  time,  as  we  shall  see,  Hooker  and  Mansfield  had  been 
wrecked,  and  Sumner 's  wreck  soon  followed. 

When  Lee  formed  his  line  on  the  16th,  Jackson's  two  divisions 
held  the  left,  between  the  Hagerstown  pike  and  Stuart 's  cavalry, 
which  held  a  road  nearer  the  river.  Hood's  two  brigades  had 
their  left  upon  the  pike,  and  on  their  right  D.  H.  Hill's  division 


SHARPSBURG  OR  ANTIETAM  251 

formed  a  curve  by  which  the  line  swept  around  parallel  to  the 
pike.  Longstreet,  with  Jones's  division  and  Evans's  brigade, 
extended  the  line  to  the  Burnside  bridge.  Walker 's  division  was 
in  reserve  behind  the  extreme  right  flank.  McLaws's,  Anderson 's, 
and  A.  P.  Hill's  divisions  had  not  yet  arrived.  Some  artillery 
duelling  across  the  Antietam  took  place,  but  the  first  infantry 
affair  occurred  late  in  the  afternoon,  when  Hooker 's  corps  came 
in  contact  with  Hood 's  pickets.  Hooker 's  orders  were  to  attack.  - 
It  is  hard  to  believe  that  McClellan  deliberately  sent  a  single 
corps  so  far  away  from  prompt  support  to  attack  Lee's  whole 
army  in  position,  and  had  daylight  lasted,  Hooker  would  probably 
have  been  overwhelmed  that  afternoon.  McClellan  had  ridden 
with  Hooker  in  the  beginning  of  his  march,  and  Hooker  had 
called  his  attention  to  the  hazard  of  sending  him  so  far  upon  such 
a  serious  errand.  It  was  probably  this  remonstrance  of  Hooker 's 
which  moved  McClellan  to  send  Mansfield  at  11.30  P.M.  and  to 
order  Sumner  to  be  ready  to  move  an  hour  before  daylight.  The 
time  of  these  orders  is  much  more  suggestive  of  a  gradually 
developed  plan,  than  of  one  formulated  beforehand,  and  it 
resulted  in  four  extensive  combats  instead  of  in  one  great  battle. 

The  engagement  in  the  afternoon  between  Hood  and  Hooker 's 
advance  was  quite  sharp,  Hood  advancing  Law 's  brigade  to  the 
support  of  his  skirmishers  and  driving  back  until  dark  the 
enemy's  advance.  In  this  affair  Col.  Liddell  of  llth  Miss, 
and  Col.  McNeil  of  the  1st  Pa.  (Bucktail)  Rifles,  both  distin- 
guished and  promising  officers,  fell  mortally  wounded.  The 
fighting  ceased  at  dark,  and  pickets  were  established  on  each 
side,  in  such  close  proximity  that  they  could  hear  each  other 's 
voices.  About  nine  a  light  rain  began  to  fall  and  continued 
most  of  the  night.  When  all  was  quiet  Hood 's  brigades  were 
withdrawn  to  cook  rations,  they  having  been  without  food,  but 
one  half  ration  of  meat,  for  three  days.  Their  positions  were 
filled  by  Lawton's  and  Trimble's  brigades,  of  Lawton's  divi- 
sion (which  were  in  reserve  near  Jackson's  line),  with  Hays's 
brigade  in  support. 

At  early  dawn  the  fight  was  renewed,  and  Hooker's  three 
fine  divisions  advanced  in  columns  of  brigades  in  line.  Double- 
day  on  the  right,  Ricketts  on  the  left,  and  Meade  in  reserve  close 


252  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

behind,  — 10  brigades  with  10  batteries.  The  fighting  even 
before  sunrise  had  become  very  severe.  In  his  official  report, 
Hooker  gives  the  folio  whig  incident:  — 

"We  had  not  proceeded  far  before  I  discovered  that  a  heavy  force  of 
the  enemy  had  taken  possession  of  a  corn-field  (I  have  since  learned  about 
a  30-acre  field)  in  my  immediate  front,  and  from  the  sun's  rays  falling 
on  their  bayonets  projecting  above  the  corn,  could  see  that  the  field  was 
filled  with  the  enemy  with  arms  in  their  hands,  standing  apparently  at  a 
'support  arms.'  Instructions  were  immediately  given  for  the  assemblage 
of  all  my  spare  batteries  near  at  hand,  of  which,  I  think,  there^were  five 
or  six,  to  spring  into  battery  on  the  right  of  this  field  and  to  open  with 
canister  at  once.  In  the  time  I  am  writing  every  stalk  of  corn  in  the 
northern  and  greater  part  of  the  field  was  cut  as  closely  as  could  have 
been  done  with  a  knife,  and  the  slain  lay  in  rows,  precisely  as  they  had 
stood  in  their  ranks  a  few  moments  before.  It  was  never  my  fortune  to 
witness  a  more  bloody,  dismal  battle-field.  Those  that  escaped  fled  in 
the  opposite  direction  from  our  advance,  and  sought  refuge  behind  the 
trees,  fences,  and  stone  ledges  nearly  on  a  line  with  the  Dunker  Church, 
as  there  was  no  resisting  this  torrent  of  death-dealing  missives." 

This  attack  fell  principally  upon  Lawton's  and  Hays's  brigades 
extending  from  the  Hagerstown  pike  through  the  corn-field  to  the 
right.  Trimble's  brigade,  on  their  right,  connected  with  D.  H. 
Hill's  division.  Hays's  brigade  had  also  just  been  brought  up  in 
rear  of  Lawton's  as  a  support.  Across  the  pike,  Doubleday's 
division  had,  at  the  same  time,  made  a  furious  attack  upon  the  old 
Jackson  division  under  J.  R.  Jones.  This  division,  though  of 
four  brigades,  was  one  of  the  smallest  in  the  army,  Jones  reporting 
that  it  went  into  action  with  only  1600  men.  Its  position,  on  the 
extreme  left,  was  exposed  to  the  view  of,  and  enfiladed  and  taken 
in  reverse  by,  the  enemy 's  rifle  batteries,  across  the  Antietam,  at 
a  range  of  about  3000  yards.  Hooker 's  troops  were  well  handled ; 
both  his  infantry  and  artillery  and  the  full  fighting  power  of  his 
whole  corps  was  soon  brought  into  play  and  skilfully  applied. 
The  Confederate  resistance  was  desperate,  and  the  slaughter 
upon  both  sides  great ;  Lawton  and  J.  R.  Jones  were  both  borne 
off  wounded  within  an  hour.  Jones  was  succeeded  by  Starke  of 
Louisiana,  who  "soon  after  fell  pierced  by  three  balls  and  sur- 
vived but  a  few  moments."  Col.  Douglas,  commanding  Law- 
ton's  brigade,  was  killed,  and  five  out  of  six  regimental  com- 
manders, the  brigade  losing  554  killed  and  wounded  out  of  1150. 


SHARPSBURG  OR  ANTIETAM  253 

Hays 's  brigade  lost  323  out  of  550,  including  all  of  his  staff  and 
every  regimental  commander.  In  Trimble's  brigade,  Col. 
Walker,  commanding  the  brigade,  was  wounded,  with  one  of  his 
staff,  and  the  brigade  lost  three  out  of  four  regimental  com- 
manders and  228  men  out  of  700  present. 

Early 's,  the  remaining  brigade  of  Swell's  division,  had  been 
sent  about  dawn  to  the  extreme  left,  as  a  support  to  Stuart's 
cavalry,  which  occupied  a  position  whence  our  artillery  could 
annoy  the  flank  of  Hooker's  attack.  When  Lawton  was 
wounded,  Early  and  his  brigade  were  sent  for.  Leaving  the 
13th  Va.,  numbering  less  than  100  men,  with  Stuart,  at  his 
request,  Early  started  back  toward  the  position  where  he  had 
left  the  other  brigades  of  the  division,  but  soon  came  upon 
Cols.  Grigsby  and  Stafford,  with  about  300  men,  who  were  the 
remnant  of  J.  R.  Jones's  division.  He  learned  that  Lawton  and 
Hays  had  also  been  driven  back  with  great  losses,  and  that  only 
a  handful  were  left,  who  were  probably  not  in  condition  to  go  into 
action  again. 

The  10  brigades  of  Hooker  had  carried  the  whole  line  held 
in  their  front  by  the  seven  brigades  which  they  had  struck,  with 
such  losses  of  men  and  officers,  as  practically  to  put  the  Con- 
federate brigades  out  of  action  for  the  day,  and  to  make  a  great 
gap  in  Lee's  line  from  Early 's  brigade  on  the  left  to  D.  H.  Hill's 
line  upon  the  right.  In  this  gap  was  Hooker's  corps,  badly 
shaken  by  the  desperate  resistance  which  it  had  overcome,  but 
with  the  12th  corps  just  arriving  to  its  support. 

Not  far  in  their  front  were  Hood's  two  unfortunate  brigades 
who  had  not  yet  gotten  their  last  night's  suppers.  When  the 
fighting  ceased  the  night  before,  Hood,  moved  by  the  hunger  of 
his  men,  had  gone  to  Lee  and  asked  for  two  brigades  to  take  his 
place  in  the  line  of  battle  for  the  night,  that  he  might  have  time 
to  cook.  Lee  had  answered  that  he  would  gladly  send  them, 
but  that  he  had  none  available.  He  suggested,  however,  that 
Hood  should  see  Jackson.  Hood  rode  a  long  time  in  search  of 
Jackson,  and  at  last  found  him  alone,  asleep  on  the  ground  at  the 
root  of  a  tree.  Jackson  at  once  gave  the  orders  which  had  put 
Lawton 's  and  Trimble 's  brigades  in  the  place  of  Hood  and  Law, 
and  also  sent  Hays  in  support  of  Lawton ;  but  he  had  exacted 


254  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

from  Hood  a  promise  that  he  would  come  instantly,  when  called 
to  support  the  line.  Hood  then  rode  to  find  his  wagons  and  bring 
up  the  rations,  but  the  darkness  caused  such  delay  that  it  was 
already  dawn,  and  the  sound  of  battle  was  heard  in  front  before 
many  of  the  men  had  time  to  do  more  than  to  prepare  their 
dough.  No  meat  had  been  issued  for  several  days,  and  only 
reduced  rations  of  flour.  Soon  afterward,  a  staff-officer  of 
Lawton's  dashed  up  with  the  message,  "Gen.  Lawton's 
compliments,  and  will  you  come  at  once  to  his  support."  "To 
arms"  was  instantly  sounded,  and  the  lines  formed  and  marched 
to  the  front,  leaving  the  half-cooked  dough  in  camp.  Near  the 
Bunker  Church  they  passed  Lawton,  being  borne  to  the  rear  on 
a  litter,  and  here  Hood  found  Hays  with  about  40  men,  whom  he 
had  rallied,  but  all  out  of  ammunition.  He  suggested  to  Hays  to 
withdraw  and  collect  his  men,  and  replenish  ammunition.  He 
then  launched  his  two  brigades,  about  2000  men,  under  Wofford 
and  Law,  through  the  bloody  corn-field,  already  thickly  strewn 
with  dead  and  dying.  Hood 's  brigades  had  made  the  successful 
charge  at  Gaines  Mill,  which  broke  through  Porter's  intrenched 
line,  but  he  wrote  in  his  report  that  here  he  "witnessed  the  most 
terrific  clash  of  arms,  by  far,  that  has  occurred  during  the  war." 
Hooker  was  wounded,  and  the  enemy  was  driven  back  so  far  as  to 
be  forced  to  abandon  some  of  his  guns. 

Meanwhile,  Early 's  brigade  on  his  left,  in  the  long  body  of 
woods  called  the  West  Woods,  on  the  left  of  the  Hagerstown  pike, 
was  able  to  hold  the  enemy  at  bay  and  to  protect  Stuart 's  flank. 
When  Early  left  with  Stuart  but  one  small  regiment  of  infantry, 
Stuart  withdrew  from  his  advanced  position  to  a  hill  a  little 
nearer  our  line.  Here  he  had  13  pieces  of  artillery,  and  was 
able  to  greatly  annoy  the  Federal  infantry  near  the  Hagerstown 
pike.  On  Hood's  right  the  battle  had  been  held  by  three  bri- 
gades, which  D.  H.  Hill  had  had  near  at  hand  and  in  reserve,  — 
Colquitt  's,  Ripley  's,  and  Garland 's,  the  last  now  under  MacRae. 
On  Hood's  left,  Lee  had  sent  Walker's  two  brigades  and  the 
Ga.  brigade  of  G.  T.  Anderson,  of  D.  R.  Jones's  division,  which 
he  had  withdrawn  from  his  right  flank,  opposite  the  Burnside 
bridge. 

Mansfield's  12th  corps  had  reenforced  Hooker  just  in  time 


SHARPSBURG  OR  ANTIETAM  255 

to  save  the  1st  corps  from  being  routed  by  the  counter-stroke, 
given  so  heavily  by  Hood  and  his  reinforcements.  Hooker's 
corps  had  now  lost  2590  men  and  was  practically  put  out  of 
action.  Meade  succeeded  to  the  command  of  the  corps,  when 
Hooker  was  wounded,  and  he  withdrew  from  the  field  to  a  com- 
manding ridge  about  a  mile  in  rear,  where  he  endeavored  to 
collect  the  remnants,  and  on  which  he  now  established  a  battery 
of  30  guns.  In  his  official  report,  McClellan  says  that  the  1st 
corps  — 

"was  for  the  time  much  scattered  and  somewhat  demoralized,"  and 
that  "there  were  but  6729  men  present  on  the  18th,  whereas,  on  the 
morning  of  the  22d,  there  were  13,093  present  for  duty  in  the  same  corps, 
showing  that  previous  to  and  during  the  battle,  6364  men  were  separated 
from  their  commands." 

The  defeat  of  Hooker's  corps  may  be  considered  as  ending 
the  first  affair  of  the  day,  but  the  ending  of  that,  and  the  begin- 
ning of  the  second,  with  Mansfield's  12th  corps,  somewhat  over- 
lapped each  other  in  occurrence.  Mansfield  had  but  two  divisions 
— Williams 's  with  two  brigades  and  Greene's  with  three.  These 
troops  had  composed  Banks 's  army  in  the  Valley  and  under  Pope. 
The  fight  which  now  followed  can  scarcely  be  told  in  detail.  It 
was  one  continuous  exchange  of  heavy  musketry  and  artillery 
at  quarters  sometimes  as  near  as  fifty  yards  or  less,  sometimes  in 
woods  and  sometimes  in  the  open  ground;  sometimes  receding 
and  again  advancing.  Action  and  reaction,  in  such  affairs,  are 
usually  not  very  unequal,  and  six  of  the  nine  Confederate  brigades 
now  conducting  it  (MacRae,  Ripley,  Colquitt,  Law,  Wofford,  and 
Early)  had  exhausted  a  part  of  their  strength  upon  Hooker. 
After  nearly  two  hours  of  this  heavy  fighting,  with  ammunition 
nearly  gone  and  supplied  principally  with  cartridges  ob- 
tained from  the  dead  and  wounded,  —  with  ranks  reduced  to 
skeletons,  —  the  gap  which  Hooker  had  originally  opened  again 
yawned,  even  more  widely,  and  Greene's  division  had  entered  it 
and  was  in  possession  of  the  Bunker  Church  and  a  portion  of 
the  woods  near  it. 

But  the  12th  corps  had  now,  itself,  lost  all  of  its  aggressiveness, 
and  was  glad  to  pause  and  await  reinforcement.  Mansfield  had 
been  killed  early  in  the  action,  and  his  corps  now  under  Williams 


256  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

had  sustained  a  loss  of  1746  men  out  of  8000.  Williams's  division 
had  suffered  so  severely  that  it  was  withdrawn  to  the  rear  to  rest 
and  replenish  ammunition.  Here  may  be  said  to  end  in  a  draw 
the  second  affair.  The  combatants  upon  both  sides  were  worn 
out  to  frazzles,  and  the  firing  had  ceased  entirely.  The  rem- 
nant of  Hood's  division  was  also  withdrawn  to  replenish  am- 
munition. The  Tex.  brigade  under  Wofford  had  lost  548  men 
out  of  864  carried  into  action.  The  1st  Tex.  regiment  had  lost 
45  killed,  141  wounded,  and  12  missing  from  227.  Law's  brigade 
had  lost  454. 

But  this  truce  was  of  short  duration.  From  the  northwest 
heavy  masses  of  blue,  and  from  the  south  long  lines  of  gray,  were 
marching  rapidly  toward  the  fields,  already  so  thickly  strewn 
with  killed  and  wounded.  A  third  encounter  equally  desperate 
and  bloody  was  now  to  take  place  over  the  bodies  of  slam  and 
wounded,  friends  and  foes.  At  7.20  A.M.  Sumner  had,  at  last, 
received  his  needlessly  delayed  orders  to  advance.  If  his  nine 
brigades  of  veterans  had  been  put  into  action  along  with  Mans- 
field's five,  they  would  have  made  decisive  work  upon  Lee's  left 
flank,  and  have  opened  the  road  to  Porter's  corps  to  attack  his 
centre.  Here  McClellan  threw  away  another  one  of  his  many 
chances  for  a  decisive  victory,  though  it  was  by  no  means  his 
last. 

The  march  of  Sumner 's  columns  could  be  seen  from  com- 
manding points  upon  the  Confederate  lines,  and  movement  was 
also  seen  in  Porter 's  corps,  suggestive  of  preparation  for  assault ; 
several  of  his  battalions  crossing  the  Boonsboro  bridge  and  com- 
ing to  the  support  of  his  cavalry  and  horse  artillery.  Meanwhile, 
Lee  was  sending  to  the  front  his  last  reserves  —  McLaws's  and 
R.  H.  Anderson's  divisions  — which  had  marched  from  Harper's 
Ferry  at  3  P.M.  on  the  16th,  and  arrived  near  Sharpsburg  soon 
after  sunrise.  These  troops  had  had  hard  marching  in  with- 
drawing from  Pleasant  Valley  and  passing  through  Sharpsburg, 
and,  on  arrival,  were  allowed  a  rest  of  about  an  hour.  By  that 
time  it  was  seen  that  Sumner 's  attack  was  imminent,  and  they 
were  ordered  to  the  front.  R.  H.  Anderson's  six  brigades, 
about  3600  strong,  were  sent  to  D.  H.  Hill's  division.  But 
Armistead's  brigade  was  presently  withdrawn  and  added  to 


SHARPSBURG  OR  ANTIETAM  257 

McLaws's  division.  McLaws's  four  brigades,  about  3000  strong, 
were  directed  to  the  woods  behind  the  Dunker  Church,  under 
the  guidance  of  Hood,  who  was  acquainted  with  the  ground. 

At  the  time  of  this  lull  in  the  firing,  it  was,  perhaps,  a  little 
after  nine  o  'clock.  Sumner  had  been  impatient  at  the  three  hours' 
delay  imposed  upon  his  corps,  and,  as  he  listened  to  the  tremen- 
dous musketry  and  artillery  of  the  two  first  combats,  he  doubt- 
less recalled  the  field  of  Seven  Pines,  where  he  had  arrived  in 
time  to  save  the  battle.  His  corps  had  not  fought  at  2d  Ma- 
nassas,  and  consequently  it  was  large,  numbering  in  its  nine 
brigades  over  17,000  men.  It  came  upon  the  field  led  by  Sedg- 
wick's  three  brigades  in  column  of  brigade  front.  Sumner  rode 
with  this  division.  French's  and  Richardson's  divisions  fol- 
lowed in  echelon  to  the  left  and  rear.  Before  the  Committee  on 
the  Conduct  of  the  War,  Sumner  afterward  testified  as  follows :  — 

"On  going  upon  the  field  I  found  that  Hooker's  corps  had  been  dis- 
persed and  routed.  I  passed  him  some  distance  in  the  rear  where  he 
had  been  carried  wounded,  but  I  saw  nothing  of  his  corps  at  all,  as  I  was 
advancing  with  my  command  on  the  field.  There  were  some  troops 
lying  down  on  the  left,  which  I  took  to  belong  to  Mansfield's  command. 
In  the  meantime  Mansfield  had  been  killed,  and  a  portion  of  his  corps 
(formerly  Banks's),  had  been  thrown  into  confusion." 

The  troops  of  the  12th  corps  which  Sumner  saw  lying  down 
were  the  remains  of  Greene's  division,  about  the  Dunker 
Church,  and  it  were  better  for  Sumner  had  they  not  held  ground 
so  far  in  front  of  their  general  line.  For  Sumner  did  not  realize 
that  he  was  now  within  the  Confederate  lines,  and  he  continued 
his  advance  into  the  woods,  leaving  the  church  and  Greene's 
forces  on  his  left.  The  formation  of  his  division  was  in  too  close 
order  to  be  safely  brought  under  fire.  He  should  have  taken 
greater  intervals  between  his  brigades.  It  is  said  that  they  were 
only  between  50  and  100  feet  apart.1 

1  When  troops  are  in  masses,  only  the  outside  men  can  fire.  The  out- 
side men  are  comparatively  few,  and  hence  the  mass  is  weak  for  either 
offence  or  defence,  until  it  can  deploy  into  lines  from  which  every  individual 
can  fire  freely  to  the  front.  Hence  troops,  once  broken,  become  almost 
helpless,  and  unable  to  defend  themselves.  As  lines  can  only  fire  efficiently 
squarely  to  the  front,  or  very  nearly  so,  they  also  are  helpless  against  fire 
coming  from  the  flanks.  Flank  fire,  too,  is  naturally  of  the  most  con- 
centrated and  fatal  character,  and  troops  exposed  to  it  are  quickly  broken 
and  helpless. 


258  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

In  this  formation  he  pushed  through  the  rather  open  woods 
with  occasional  rocky  ledges,  and  passed,  without  being  aware 
of  it,  Early 's  brigade  upon  his  right  with  the  remnants  of  Jones 's 
division  under  Grigsby  and  Stafford ;  and  on  his  left,  he  passed 
the  remnants  of  Walker's  two  brigades,  who  were  holding  in 
front  of  Greene's  troops  about  the  church.  Early,  himself 
unseen  by  reason  of  a  ridge  between  them,  moved  down  par- 
allel to  Sedgwick's  march,  leaving  Grisby  and  Stafford  behind,  to 
hold  his  rear  against  some  troops  in  echelon  behind  Sedgwick's 
right,  who  seemed  disposed  to  follow.  As  soon  as  Early  passed 
the  ridge  which  had  concealed  him,  he  opened  fire  upon  the  flank 
of  Sedgwick  's  column.  This  was  in  such  close  formation  that  it 
could  not  deploy  an  opposing  front.  Just  at  this  time  the  head 
of  the  column  emerged  from  the  woods  on  the  far  side,  and  found 
itself  presenting  its  left  front  angle  to  McLaws's  division,  which 
was  deploying  from  column  into  line  of  battle  within  close  range. 
Sedgwick  had  practically  marched  into  an  ambuscade. 

McLaws  opened  fire  quickly  from  a  front  of  a  brigade  and  a 
half.  The  remaining  brigades  came  into  line  at  double-quick 
and  soon  poured  a  terrific  fire,  taking  Sedgwick's  column  so 
obliquely  that  it  could  not  be  effectively  replied  to.  At  the  same 
time  the  remnants  of  Walker 's  two  brigades  lined  up  against  the 
left  flank  of  the  column,  now  almost  helpless  between  converg- 
ing fires. 

It  has  rarely  happened  that  heavier  losses  have  been  incurred 
more  rapidly.  Sedgwick  himself  was  wounded,  with  Dana,  one 
of  his  brigadiers,  and  the  losses  of  the  division  were  2210.  It  is 
stated  by  Ropes  that  Sedgwick's  loss  was  all  suffered  "in  a  very 
few  minutes."  In  endeavoring  to  meet  the  flank  fires,  the  rear 
brigade  was  ordered  to  face  about.  Fortunately,  this  order  was 
understood  by  the  brigade  to  mean  a  rearward  march  which 
was  soon  begun,  and  was  hastily  followed  by  the  other  brigades. 
The  Confederates  followed  in  pursuit,  and  once  more  the  tide  of 
battle  swept  across  the  ghastly  corn-field,  and  the  adjacent  open 
ground  between  the  Dunkard  or  West  wood,  and  an  East 
wood  about  700  yards  east  of  its  northern  end.  Some  of  the 
brigades  of  D.  H.  Hill's  left  joined  in  the  counter-stroke,  and  the 
Federals  were  driven  to  the  shelter  of  their  strong  line  of  artillery 


SHARPSBURG  OR  ANTIETAM  259 

in  front  of  the  North  wood,  which  bounded  the  open  fields  to  the 
northward.  McLaws  pushed  his  assault  much  too  far,  for  his 
numbers  were  too  light  to  hope  for  any  great  result,  and  the 
favorable  ground  enabled  the  enemy's  artillery  to  punish  severely 
all  open  exposures.  Thus,  McLaws  lost  1103  out  of  2893  carried 
into  action  in  his  four  brigades,  —  Kershaw  's,  Semmes's,  Barks- 
dale's,  and  Cobb  's,  —  an  average  of  39  per  cent.  These  losses  oc- 
curred mostly  in  the  pursuit  after  Sedgwick,  and  mostly  befell 
within  two  hours.  At  the  same  time  that  Sedgwick  was  driven 
back,  Greene 's  men  about  the  Dunker  Church  were  also  forced 
back  to  the  Federal  guns,  leaving  the  Confederate  line  practi- 
cally the  same  that  it  had  been  in  the  morning,  although  now 
held  only  by  scattered  fragments  and  almost  entirely  destitute 
of  artillery. 

In  each  of  these  three  affairs  the  division  batteries  had  been 
effectively  fought  against  the  enemy's  infantry,  but  gradually 
they  had  nearly  all  been  put  out  of  action.  As  an  illustration  of 
their  experiences,  and  of  the  condition  of  our  line  at  this  time, 
McLaws,  in  his  report,  says :  — 

"Capt.  Read's  battery  had  been  placed  in  position  on  the  right  of 
the  woods  which  we  had  entered,  and  did  most  excellent  service,  but  it 
was  exposed  to  such  a  severe  fire  Gen.  Kershaw  ordered  it  back,  after 
losing  14  officers  and  men  and  16  horses.  Another  battery,  Capt. 
Carlton's,  which  I  had  ordered  into  position  in  the  woods  in  front  of 
Gen.  Ransom's  brigade,  was  so  severely  cut  up  in  a  short  time  by  the 
direct  and  cross-fire  of  numerous  batteries,  that  I  ordered  it  to  retire.  .  .  ." 

This  finished  the  third  affair  of  the  day,  though  there  were 
still  upon  the  field  Sumner's  two  other  large  divisions  to  be  reck- 
oned with,  equal  in  strength  to  the  whole  of  the  12th  corps;  and, 
in  addition,  there  could  be  seen  across  the  Antietam,  but  moving 
to  support  the  attack  upon  our  left,  the  6th  corps  under  Franklin. 
It  was  plain  that  a  fourth  and  even  more  terrible  struggle  was  to 
come,  but  it  befell  principally  over  new  ground  bordering  the 
scene  of  the  previous  fighting  upon  the  east,  and  extending 
southward.  Here  the  division  of  D.  H.  Hill  held  the  salient  east 
of  the  Hagerstown  pike  where  our  line  of  battle  changed  direction 
and  became  parallel  to  the  pike.  The  ground  was  open  and 
moderately  rolling  and  had  but  one  good  feature  for  defence. 


260  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

This  was  a  sunken  road,  an  excellent  thing  when  it  has  the  right 
direction,  perpendicular  to  the  enemy's  line  of  approach,  but  a 
dangerous  trap  if  the  enemy,  can  obtain  an  enfilading  position. 
The  salient  outline  here  involved  this  danger. 

In  the  second  affair  of  the  day,  as  has  been  told,  D.  H.  Hill  had 
sent  three  of  his  five  brigades  forward  to  support  the  flank  of 
Hood's  attack,  and  these  brigades  (Colquitt's,  Ripley's,  and 
Garland's)  had  remained  holding  'advanced  ground  about  the 
Roulette  house,  a  few  hundred  yards  in  front  of  the  sunken  road 
before  referred  to.  Here  they  had  already  suffered  severe 
losses. 

When  Sedgwick's  division  was  driven  back  and  hardly  pressed, 
Sumner  had  sent  word  to  French  and  Richardson  to  attack,  in 
order  to  make  a  diversion.  From  his  position  in  echelon,  on 
Sedgwick's  left  and  rear,  French  soon  came  into  collision  with 
D.  H.  Hill 's  advanced  brigades.  These  made  a  stubborn  defence 
for  a  while,  but  their  front  was  narrow  and  on  its  exposed  right 
flank  was  Garland's  brigade,  which,  on  the  14th,  had  been 
routed  and  badly  cut  up  at  Turner's  Gap.  Hill  reports:  — 

"Garland's  brigade  (Col.  MacRae  commanding),  had  been  much 
demoralized  by  the  fight  on  South  Mountain,  but  the  men  advanced  with 
alacrity,  secured  a  good  position,  and  were  fighting  bravely  when  Capt. 
Thompson,  5th  N.C.,  cried  out,  'They  are  flanking  us.'  This  cry  spread 
like  an  electric  shock  along  the  ranks,  bringing  up  vivid  recollections 
of  the  flank  fire  at  South  Mountain.  In  a  moment  they  broke  and  fled  to 
the  rear ;  Col.  MacRae,  though  wounded,  remained  on  the  field  all  day  and 
succeeded  in  gathering  up  some  stragglers  and  personally  rendered  much 
efficient  service.  The  23d  N.C.  of  this  brigade  was  brought  off  by  the 
gallant  Lt.-Col.  Johnston  and  posted  by  my  orders  in  the  old  road  already 
described.  Ripley's  brigade  had  united  with  Walker's  and  fallen  back 
with  it  behind  the  ridge  to  the  left  of  this  road  and  near  to  it.  We  had 
now  lost  all  the  ground  wrested  from  the  enemy,  and  were  occupying  the 
position  held  in  the  morning ;  but  three  of  my  brigades  had  been  broken 
and  much  demoralized,  and  all  of  the  artillery  had  been  withdrawn  from 
my  front." 

Out  of  10  field-officers  in  Colquitt's  brigade,  which  had  fought 
after  the  giving  way  of  Garland's  brigade  until  its  ranks  were 
nearly  mingled  with  the  enemy's,  four  were  killed  and  six 
wounded. 

Hill  now  had  left  in  the  sunken  road  only  two  of  his  original 


SHARPSBURG  OR  ANTIETAM  261 

five  brigades,  — G.  B.  Anderson,  comparatively  fresh,  and  Rodes 
who  had  been  severely  engaged  at  Boonsboro,  losing  one-third  of 
his  force.  Here  Hill  received  the  united  attacks  of  both  French 's 
and  Richardson's  divisions,  and  for  some  time  successfully 
repulsed  them.  He  was  aided  by  R.  H.  Anderson 's  division  — 
"some  three  or  four  thousand  men,"  Hill  reports,  which  had 
taken  position  in  his  rear.  Anderson  was  soon  severely  wounded, 
and  no  one  seems  to  have  exercised  active  command  of  the 
division  after  he  left  the  field,  nor  are  any  reports  published  of 
the  division  or  any  of  its  brigades  or  regiments,  except  the 
casualties.  These,  in  the  five  brigades  of  Wilcox,  Mahone, 
Pryor,  Featherstone,  and  Wright,  amounted  to  1430  killed, 
wounded,  and  missing,  —  over  one-third  of  the  force  engaged. 
Swinton  describes  the  conflict  at  this  period,  as  follows:  — 

"The  action  here  was  of  a  very  animated  nature,  for  Hill,  being  re- 
enforced  by  the  division  of  Anderson,  assumed  a  vigorous  offensive,  and 
endeavored  to  seize  a  piece  of  high  ground  on  the  Union  left  with  the  view 
of  turning  that  flank.  This  manoeuvre  was,  however,  frustrated  by  the 
skill  and  promptitude  of  Col.  Cross  of  the  5th  N.H.,  Caldwell's  brigade, 
who,  detecting  the  danger,  moved  his  regiments  toward  the  menaced  point. 
Between  his  command  and  the  Confederate  force  there  then  ensued  a 
spirited  contest,  each  endeavoring  to  reach  the  high  ground,  and  both 
delivering  their  fire  as  they  marched  in  parallel  lines  by  the  flank.  The 
effort  to  flank  on  the  right  was  handsomely  checked  by  Brooke,  French, 
and  Barlow  —  the  latter  of  whom  changing  front,  with  his  two  regiments, 
obliquely  to  the  right,  poured  in  a  rapid  fire,  compelling  the  surrender  of 
300  prisoners  with  two  standards." 

When  this  fighting  had  lasted  perhaps  an  hour,  the  Federals 
had  gradually  brought  in  the  whole  of  French's  and  Richardson's 
divisions,  and  extended  their  lines.  At  last  they  reached  a 
position  from  which  a  portion  of  the  sunken  lane  could  be 
enfiladed.  This  being  reported  to  Rodes  by  the  Lt.-Col.  of  the 
6th  Ala.,  he  was  directed  to  throw  his  right  wing  back  and 
out  of  the  road.  Rodes  reports :  — 

"Instead  of  executing  the  order  he  moved  briskly  to  the  rear  of  the 
regiment  and  gave  the  command,  'Sixth  Alabama  about  face;  forward 
march.'  Maj.  Hobson  of  the  5th,  seeing  this,  asked  if  the  order  was  in- 
tended for  the  whole  brigade.  He  said,  'Yes/  and  thereupon  the  5th 
and  the  other  troops  on  their  left  retreated.  I  did  not  see  their  retrograde 


262  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

movement  until  it  was  too  late  to  rally  them ;  and  for  this  reason :  Just 
as  I  was  moving  on  I  heard  a  shot  strike  Lt.  Berney,  Aide,  who 
was  immediately  behind  me.  Wheeling  around,  I  found  him  falling,  and 
that  he  had  been  struck  in  the  face.  He  found  that  he  could  walk,  after 
I  raised  him.  ...  As  I  turned  to  the  brigade  I  was  struck  heavily  by  a 
piece  of  shell  on  the  thigh.  At  first  I  thought  that  the  wound  was  serious, 
but,  finding  upon  examination  that  it  was  slight,  I  turned  toward  the 
brigade,  when  I  discovered  it,  without  visible  cause  to  me,  retreating  in 
confusion.  I  hastened  to  intercept  it  at  the  Hagerstown  road.  I  found 
though  that  with  the  exception  of  a  few  men,  .  .  .  not  more  than  40  in  all, 
the  brigade  had  disappeared  from  this  portion  of  the  field.  This  small 
number,  together  with  some  Mississippians  and  North  Carolinians,  about 
150  in  all,  I  rallied  and  stationed  behind  a  small  ridge  leading  from  the 
Hagerstown  road." 

.  '  When,  by  this  misunderstanding  between  Rodes  and  Lt.- 
Jp  Col.  Lightfoot,  Rodes's  brigade  abandoned  this  sunken  road, 
—  ever  since  known  as  "The  Bloody  Lane,"  —  Lee's  army 
was  ruined  and  the  end  of  the  Confederacy  was  in  sight. 
Even  the  rank  and  file  in  the  5th  corps,  looking  on  from  across* 
the  Antietam,  saw  and  appreciated  the  situation.  "Now  is  the 
x^time"  was  a  general  comment.  McClellan,  from  his  headquarters 
at  the  Fry  house,  looked  on,  but  he  did  not  come  and  he  issued 
no  order.  The  gap  left  by  Rodes  was  speedily  filled  by  the  en- 
couraged Federals,  and  now  the  whole  lane  was  enfiladed,  and  the 
slaughter  which  took  place  in  it  strewed  it  with  dead  and  wounded, 
probably  as  thickly  as  has  ever  been  seen  in  this  country.  G.  B. 
Anderson's  brigade,  next  on  the  left,  attempted  to  stay  the  tide, 
but  Anderson  was  killed,  and,  in  the  rout  which  followed,  the 
supporting  troops  of  R.  H.  Anderson's  division  were  involved, 
and  only  small  squads  of  stragglers  could  be  rallied  at  scattered 
points  in  the  rear.  The  Confederates  had,  however,  exacted 
severe  penalties  from  French  and  Richardson.  Neither  suffered 
to  quite  the  extent  that  Sedgwick  had  done,  though  each  of  them 
lost  heavily  and  Sumner  himself  had  much  of  his  ardor  cooled. 
Richardson  lost  1165,  and  was  himself  mortally  wounded. 
French  lost  1750. 

But  the  danger  to  the  Confederates  now  lay  in  the  presence 
on  the  field  of  Franklin,  with  Slocum's  and  Smith's  divisions  of 
the  6th  corps  of  about  6000  each,  fine  troops  and  well  com- 
manded. Franklin,  too,  was  anxious  to  attack.  Already  he 


SHARPSBURG  OR  ANTIETAM  263 

had  sent  one  brigade,  Irwin's,  to  the  relief  of  Greene,  when  he 
was  pursued  out  of  the  Dunkard  woods,  and  this  brigade  found 
work  enough  to  do  to  suffer  342  casualties.  Another  brigade, 
Hancock's,  though  not  seriously  engaged, — 

"formed  as  support  to  two  of  Gen.  Sunnier 's  batteries,  then  severely 
pressed  by  the  enemy,  drove  away  his  skirmishers  who  had  already  ad- 
vanced close  to  the  batteries,  and  occupied  some  buildings  and  fences 
in  front  of  his  position.  This  brigade  was  the  means  of  saving  the  two 
batteries." 

But,  just  as  Franklin  was  about  to  attack,  Sumner  met  him, 
and,  being  the  ranking  officer,  he  ordered  the  attack  postponed. 
Meanwhile,  however,  under  the  personal  direction  of  Richardson 
himself  and  of  Barlow  commanding  two  regiments  in  Caldwell's 
brigade,  the  battle  was  kept  up  by  the  troops  already  engaged, 
who  were  encouraged  by  their  recent  success  and  were  quite 
disposed  to  follow  it  up.  But  there  were  no  fighters  in  the 
Confederate  army  capable  of  more  desperate  and  pertinacious 
defence  than  Longstreet  and  D.  H.  Hill.  The  latter's  official 
report  thus  briefly  summarizes  what  followed :  — 

"Col.  Bennett  of  the  14th,  and  Maj.  Sellers  of  the  30th  N.C.  regiment 
rallied  a  portion  of  their  men.  There  were  no  troops  near  to  hold  the 
centre  except  a  few  hundred  rallied  from  various  brigades.  The  Yankees 
crossed  the  old  road  which  we  had  occupied  in  the  morning  and  occupied 
a  corn-field  and  orchard  in  advance  of  it.  They  had  now  got  within  a  few 
hundred  yards  of  the  hill  which  commanded  Sharpsburg,  and  our  rear. 
Affairs  looked  very  critical.  I  found  a  battery  concealed  in  a  corn-field, 
and  ordered  it  to  move  out  and  open  upon  the  Yankee  columns.  This 
proved  to  be  Boyce  's  S.C.  battery.  It  moved  out  most  gallantly,  al- 
though exposed  to  a  direct  and  reverse  fire  from  the  long-range  artillery 
across  the  Antietam.  A  caisson  exploded,  but  the  battery  unlimbered, 
and  with  grape  and  canister  drove  the  enemy  back.  [Boyce  fired  70 
rounds  of  canister,  and  lost  19  men  and  15  horses.]  I  was  now  satisfied  that 
the  Yankees  were  so  demoralized  that  a  single  regiment  of  fresh  men  could 
drive  the  whole  of  them  in  our  front  across  the  Antietam. 

"  I  got  up  about  200  men  who  said  they  would  advance  to  the  attack 
if  I  would  lead  them.  We  met,  however,  with  a  warm  reception,  and  the 
little  command  was  broken  and  dispersed.  Maj .  Hobson  and  Lt.  I.  M. 
Goff  of  the  5th  Ala.  acquitted  themselves  handsomely  in  this  charge.  Col. 
Alfred  Iverson,  20th  N.C.,  Col.  D.  H.  Christie,  23d  N.C.,  Capt.  Garret,  5th 
N.C.,  Adjt.  J.  M.  Taylor  and  Lt.  Isaac  E.  Pearce  of  the  same  regiment 


264  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

had  gathered  up  about  200  men,  and  I  sent  them  to  the  right  to  attack  the 
Yankees  in  flank.  They  drove  them  back  a  short  distance,  but  were  in 
1  turn  repulsed.  These  two  attacks,  however,  had  a  most  happy  effect. 
The  Yankees  were  completely  deceived  by  their  boldness,  and  induced 
to  believe  that  there  was  a  large  force  in  our  centre.  They  made  no 
further  attempt  to  pierce  our  centre."  These  details  give  an  instructive 
lesson  in  the  value  of  pertinacity ;  Longstreet  with  his  staff  helped  man 
two  guns  of  the  Washington  Artillery  and  materially  aided  in  the  result. 

While  Richardson's  advance  was  still  being  pushed,  Pleasanton 
advanced  about  three  brigades  of  cavalry  and  four  batteries 
across  the  Antietam,  by  the  Boonsboro  bridge.  The  batteries 
crowned  the  hills  upon  our  side  and  opened  fire,  supported  by  the 
cavalry,  and  by  a  regiment  of  regulars  deployed  as  skirmishers. 
Presently  the  line  was  reenforced  by  three  more  batteries  of  the 
5th  corps  and  Buchanan's  brigade  of  regulars.  These  troops  felt 
of  our  line  quite  heavily,  the  pressure  coming  upon  Evans's  bri- 
gade and  parts  of  the  brigades  of  Wilcox,  Featherstone,  and  Pryor 
of  R.  H.  Anderson's  division,  and  G.  T.  Anderson  of  D.  R.  Jones's- 
division.  D.  H.  Hill,  himself  on  foot  (having  had  three  horses 
killed  under  him  during  the  morning)  and  carrying  a  musket, 
led  some  of  these  troops  which  he  had  rallied^  S.  D.  Lee's 
battalion  of  artillery  was  also  now  back  upon  the  field  with 
ammunition  replenished,  and  this  demonstration  was  presently 
driven  back  under  cover  of  the  hills  bordering  the  Antietam. 

Pleasanton,  who  appreciated  the  opportunity,  called  for  re- 
enforcements,  but  McClellan  had  started  on  a  visit  to  his  right 
flank,  and  had  ordered  two  brigades  of  regulars  of  the  5th  corps 
to  follow  him.  The  absence  of  these  brigades  prevented  Porter 
from  complying  with  Pleasanton's  request.  So  his  demonstra- 
tion was  abandoned,  and  his  troops  and  artillery  were  with- 
drawn, having  suffered  something  over  100  casualties. 

When  McClellan  reached  the  field  on  his  right,  he  conferred 
with  Sumner  and  Franklin.  The  latter  urged  a  renewal  of  the 
attack,  but  Sumner  advised  against  it,  and  McClellan  took  his 
advice.  Franklin  was  ordered  simply  to  stand  on  the  defensive. 
The  two  brigades  of  regulars  brought  over  from  the  centre  were 
marched  back.  Thus,  McClellan's  expedition  to  the  right  at  a 
critical  time  saved  the  shattered  Confederate  lines  from  two 
assaults  by  fresh  troops,  on  their  left  and  on  their  centre,  just 


SHARPSBURG  OR  ANTIETAM  265 

at  the  time  when  Burnside  was  beginning  to  get  in  serious  work 
upon  their  right.  The  battle  was  now  practically  finished  upon 
the  Federal  right  and  centre,  and  finished  in  a  draw.  We  may 
now  turn  to  their  left. 

In  his  final  report,  dated  Aug.  4,  1863,  McClellan  writes  that 
he  sent  an  order  to  Burnside  to  carry  the  bridge  in  front  of  him 
at  8  A.M.,  but  in  his  preliminary  report,  Oct.  15,  1862,  he 
says  the  order  was  communicated  at  10  A.M.  Burnside's  report, 
dated  Sept.  30,  gives  the  same  hour.  Gen.  Cox,  who  had 
charge  of  the  initial  operations,  in  his  report,  dated  Sept. 
23,  gives  the  hour  as  9  A.M.,  and  all  the  circumstantial  evi- 
dence bears  this  out  as  correct.  The  immediate  defence  of 
the  bridge  was  made  by  Toombs  with  the  2d,  20th,  and  £6th 
Ga.  regiments,  about  600  men,  supported  by  Richardson's, 
Eshleman's,  and  Eubank's  batteries.  His  infantry  was  partially 
covered  by  a  thin  wood,  but  the  ground,  sloping  toward  the 
stream,  gave  little  shelter  from  the  enemy's  fire. 

Burnside's  corps  comprised  four  divisions  of  two  brigades  each, 
averaging  about  1500  men  to  each  brigade.  Rodman's  division 
was  sent  to  the  extreme  left,  to  make  its  attack  upon  a  ford  a 
half  mile  below  the  bridge,  where  a  reentrant  angle  gave  the 
Federals  a  strong  attack.  There  was  here  only  a  Confederate 
picket. 

The  other  Federal  divisions  were  under  cover  opposite  the 
bridge,  with  abundant  artillery  on  the  hills.  When  the  orders 
to  attack  were  received,  the  artillery  fire,  of  which  there  had 
been  some  all  the  morning,  was  redoubled,  and  skirmishers  were 
pushed  forward  close  to  the  stream.  Crook's  brigade  was  directed 
to  approach  as  nearly  as  possible,  unobserved,  and  then  to  make  a 
dash  for  the  bridge.  But  Crook  missed  his  direction,  and  when 
he  came  near  the  stream  he  found  himself  somewhat  above  the 
bridge,  and  under  such  a  heavy  fire  that  he  could  not  approach 
closer.  He  took  what  cover  he  could  get  and  opened  fire  on  the 
Confederate  position.  So  the  first  Federal  effort  was  a  failure. 

A  second  effort  was  soon  organized  to  be  made  by  Sturgis's 
division.  Sturgis  sent  two  regiments  from  Nagle's  brigade, 
covered  by  the  fire  of  the  rest  of  this  brigade  and  of  Ferrero's 
brigade.  Their  hot  reception  by  Toombs's  Georgians  checked 


266  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

the  advance  before  they  could  reach  the  bridge,  and  the  second 
effort  was  also  a  failure. 

Meanwhile,  more  urgent  orders  from  McClellan  were  coming  to 
Burnside,  and  being  reiterated  by  him  to  his  subordinates  as  the 
battle  upon  the  Federal  right  grew  more  desperate.  Of  course, 
Toombs's  three  regiments  and  three  batteries,  fighting  without 
intrenchments,  and  in  the  open  country  along  the  Antietam, 
could  not  hope  to  do  more  than  merely  to  delay  four  divisions 
with  eight  or  ten  batteries.  By  this  time  the  enemy  had  dis- 
covered all  our  weak  points,  and  their  own  strong  ones,  and 
Toombs's  ammunition  was  getting  low,  for  he  could  not  re- 
plenish under  the  enemy's  fire.  Moreover,  Rodman's  division 
had  already  driven  off  the  picket  force  at  the  ford  below,  and 
Toombs  knew  that  it  would  soon  appear  in  his  rear.  He  had, 
however,  not  only  saved  three  precious  hours,  but  he  had  put 
up  a  fight  which  had  so  exhausted,  both  the  energy  and  am- 
munition of  his  adversary,  as  to  entail  upon  them  the  loss  of 
three  hours  more,  before  they  would  be  across  the  bridge  and 
prepared  to  begin  their  attack  on  our  right. 

f  \  \  \V  During  all  these  six  hours,  A.  P.  Hill  would  be  marching  rapidly. 
It  was  said  that  on  this  march  he  stimulated  laggards  with  the 
point  of  his  dress  sword.  For  his  third  attack,  Cox  took  two 
regiments,  marching  by  the  flank,  side  by  side.  The  regiment 
on  the  right  was  left  in  front ;  and  the  one  on  the  left  was  right 
in  front.  Crook,  too,  organized  five  companies  of  the  28th  0. 
to  cross  at  a  ford  opposite  his  position,  a  short  distance  above 
the  bridge.  About  1  P.M.  the  charge  was  made.  /Toombs  knew 
'  that  his  game  was  played,  and  all  that  remained  to  make  it  a 

ivy)  perfect  success  was  to  safely  withdraw  his  men.  He  did  this 
with  combined  skill  and  good  luck.  He  gave  the  enemy  a  fare- 
well volley,  ran  safely  to  the  rear,  replenished  his  ammunition, 

•rt^  got  together  parts  of  his  brigade  which  had  been  detached,  and 
took  an  active  part  in  the  final  assault  of  the  day,  which  drove 
the  enemy  to  cover  in  the  valley  of  the  Antietam. 
^  Rodman  had  gotten  over,  practically  without  opposition,  be- 
fore the  charge  upon  the  bridge,  and  Crook  had  carried  the  ford 
above  the  bridge,  at  the  same  time  with  the  charge.  The  losses  on 
either  side  in  this  affair  are  not  given;  but  the  total  killed  and 


SHARPSBURG  OR  ANTIETAM  267 

wounded  for  the  whole  day,  in  the  three  Georgia  regiments,  was 
217,  about  38  per  cent.  But  they  had  saved  the  day,  for,  while 
the  Federals  were  crossing  the  Antietam,  A.  P.  Hill  forded  the 
Potomac. 

Having  crossed  the  bridge,  Burnside's  first  task  was  to  secure 
his  possession  of  it,  against  any  counter-stroke,  by  bringing  over 
a  number  of  batteries.  With  these  he  crowned  the  adjacent 
heights,  while  his  infantry  deployed  under  their  crests.  Mean- 
while came  urgent  orders  from  McClellan  to  press  his  advance. 
But  the  three  brigades  of  Nagle,  Ferrero,  and  Crook,  which  had 
been  engaged,  reported  their  ammunition  as  nearly  exhausted. 
Sturgis  also  reported  Nagle  and  Ferrero  as  too  exhausted  physi- 
cally to  be  fit  for  an  immediate  advance.  On  this  Willcox's  divi- 
sion, with  an  ammunition  train,  was  ordered  across  the  creek, 
and  Willcox  relieved  Sturgis  in  the  advance.  These  arrange- 
ments just  consumed  the  time  remaining  in  which  an  advance 
could  have  been  opposed  only  with  four  of  Jones's  brigades,  under 
Dray  ton,  Garnett,  Walker,  and  Kemper,  and  the  fragments  of 
earlier  battles  which  could  be  rallied  in  the  rear. 

Wilcox's  division  formed  the  right  wing  of  the  line  of  battle, 
and  Rodman's  the  left ;  Cox's  division  gave  Crook's  brigade  to 
support  Willcox,  and  Scammon's  to  support '  Rodman,  while 
Sturgis  in  reserve  held  the  heights  near  the  bridge.  At  4  P.M. 
the  advance  was  made  in  handsome  style,  somewhat  to  the  right 
oblique,  so  as  to  envelop  the  village  of  Sharpsburg.  In  front 
of  this  village  it  struck  Jones's  four  brigades,  which  had  been  held 
all  day  unengaged,  but  exposed  to  the  enemy's  rifle  fire  across 
the  Antietam.  Though  now  scarcely  numbering  2000  men,  they 
made  a  desperate  fight,  as  the  casualties  upon  both  sides  attest  ; 
but  the  long  Federal  lines  gradually  overlapped  their  narrow 
fronts  and  the  Federal  progress,  though  slow,  was  sure.  The 
Confederates  hurried  to  oppose  them  with  all  the  artillery  and 
the  fragments  of  infantry  which  could  be  drawn  from  their  left, 
many  of  those  going  being  already  wounded.  Before  the  advanc- 
ing troops  of  A.  P.  Hill  appeared  upon  the  scene,  the  leading 
Federals  had  crossed  the  brook  running  east  from  the  town  into 
the  Antietam,  and  were  well  up  on  the  slope  of  Cemetery  Hill, 
while  others  occupied  the  eastern  part  of  the  village. 


268  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

It  had  been  about  3  P.M.,  when  A.  P.  Hill  coming  up  from  the 
ford  with  his  five  brigades,  had  first  reported  in  person  to  Lee. 
Getting  information  as  to  localities  from  D.  R.  Jones,  he  formed 
three  brigades  on  the  right  of  Jones  and  advanced  to  the  attack. 
The  other  two  brigades  (Fender  and  Brockenbrough)  were  placed 
on  his  extreme  right  looking  to  a  road  coming  from  across  the 
Antietam  at  its  mouth.  One  of  his  batteries,  under  Mclntosh, 
which  had  been  sent  ahead  to  the  relief  of  Jones,  had  been  left 
unsupported  as  Jones  was  driven  back.  The  guns  had  fired 
canister  until  the  enemy's  line  was  within  60  yards,  when  the 
limbers  and  caissons  were  withdrawn,  leaving  the  guns  in  the 
hands  of  the  enemy. 

Meantime,  in  the  enemy's  oblique  advance  a  gap  had  opened 
between  Willcox  on  the  right  and  Rodman  on  the  left,  now  be- 
come the  rear.  In  fact,  the  movement  had  converted  the  line 
into  a  formation  of  brigades  in  echelon,  and  the  interval  between 
Willcox  and  Rodman  had  widened  as  Willcox,  over  less  exposed 
ground,  had  advanced  more  rapidly.  Now,  having  gained  a 
foothold  on  the  edge  of  Sharpsburg,  he  had  stopped  his  advance 
to  bring  up  his  ammunition  wagons. 

Rodman  had  found  the  enemy  extending  to  his  left  and  was 
passing,  on  his  extreme  left,  some  fields  of  high  corn,  which  cut 
off  his  view  upon  that  flank.  The  four  Confederate  brigades  ad- 
vanced to  the  attack  in  the  order  from  the  left,  — Toombs,  Archer, 
Branch,  and  Gregg, — not  in  a  continuous  line,  but  with  intervals 
of  from  100  to  300  yards  between  them,  which  enabled  them  to 
overlap  both  of  the  Federal  flanks. 

Gregg's  brigade  on  the  right,  having  replenished  their  tattered 
wardrobes  from  the  blue  Federal  uniforms  captured  at  Harper's 
Ferry,  were  at  first  mistaken  for  friends,  and  approached  to 
close  quarters  through  the  high  corn  before  they  opened  fire. 
The  weight  of  the  attack  fell  upon  the  three  brigades  under 
Rodman,  say  4500  men.  The  Confederates  probably  numbered 
2700,  but  the  attack  was  furious,  and,  enveloping  both  flanks,  it 
was  successful  from  the  first.  Rodman  was  killed  early  in  its 
progress.  Among  the  Confederates,  Branch  was  killed  and 
Gregg  wounded.  Mclntosh's  guns  were  recaptured,  and  the 
whole  Federal  line,  although  resisting,  was  forced  back  toward 


SHARPSBURG  OR  ANTIETAM  269 

the  Antietam.  Cox  at  once  ordered  forward  Sturgis's  division, 
to  support  the  line,  and  also  sent  orders  to  Willcox  to  withdraw 
his  three  brigades  from  the  vicinity  of  Sharpsburg  to  the  place 
where  his  division  had  formed,  under  cover  near  the  river.  With 
the  assistance  of  Sturgis  the  Confederate  pursuit  was  finally 
checked,  but  not  until  all  the  ground  over  which  the  enemy  had 
advanced  had  been  recovered,  and  the  approach  of  night  had  at 
last  put  an  end  to  the  battle. 

As  darkness  enveloped  the  scene,  the  Confederates,  worn  and 
exhausted  by  eight  days  of  marching  and  fighting,  dropped  down 
where  they  stood  to  sleep  and  could  scarcely  be  roused  even  to 
eat  the  cooked  rations  brought  up  from  their  camps  in  the  rear. 

When  all  was  quiet,  the  division  commanders  met  where  Lee 
had  taken  his  position  on  the  road  near  the  village,  and  made 
their  separate  reports  of  the  condition  of  their  commands. 

Without  exception  all  reported  heavy  losses  and  the  men  ex- 
hausted, and  all  considered  it  necessary  to  withdraw  from  the 
field  during  the  night.     Lee,  alone,  was  in  no  wise  moved.     He 
had  read  McClellan's  inmost  soul  and  knew  he  was  not  to  be 
feared.    Without  a  word  of  explanation  or  asking  advice  from  / 
either  Jackson  or  Longstreet  or  any  one  else,  he  directed  all  to  I 
collect  their  stragglers,  strengthen  their  lines,  and  be  prepared  } 
to  renew  the  battle  in  the  morning. 

When  the  morning  dawned,  disclosing  the  opposing  skirmishers 
in  easy  range,  and  the  hostile  guns  nowhere  out  of  range,  but  no 
shot  being  fired  on  either  side,  the  Confederates  drew  long  breaths 
of  relief.  Many  men  already  half  understood  McClellan,  but 
Lee  alone  had  read  him  thoroughly  and  speculated  boldly  upon 
the  knowledge.  Indeed,  when  the  advancing  hours  of  the  fore- 
noon had  made  it  certain  that  McClellan  did  not  intend  to  attack 
that  day,  Lee  recurred  to  a  proposed  plan  of  the  day  before  to 
turn  McClellan's  right,  and  he  abandoned  it  reluctantly  only 
after  careful  reconnoissance  by  Col.  S.  D.  Lee,  on  learning  of  the 
peculiar  strength  and  heavy  preparation  of  the  enemy  at  that 
point. 

Now  there  was  nothing  left  to  do  but  to  recross  into  Vir- 
ginia. That  afternoon  the  orders  were  given  and  the  trains  were 
started.  Soon  after  dark  the  movement  of  the  troops  began, 


270  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

and  when  the  sun  was  two  hours  high  on  the  morning  of  the  19th, 
everything  was  safely  across.  Gen.  Walker,  in  an  account  of 
the  battle  in  Battles  and  Leaders  of  the  Civil  War,  writes:  — 

"  Detained  in  superintending  the  removal  of  a  number  of  the  wounded 
of  my  division,  I  was  among  the  last  to  cross  the  Potomac.  As  I  rode 
into  the  river  I  passed  Gen.  Lee  sitting  on  his  horse  in  the  stream, 
watching  the  crossing  of  wagons  and  artillery.  Returning  my  greeting, 
he  inquired  as  to  what  was  still  behind.  There  was  nothing  but  the 
wagons  containing  my  wounded,  and  a  battery  of  artillery,  and  I  told 
him  so.  'Thank  God/  I  heard  him  say,  as  I  rode  on." 

In  offering  battle  on  the  18th  Lee  had  everything  to  lose  and 
nothing  to  gain ;  McClellan,  on  the  contrary,  in  accepting  battle, 
would  have  had  everything  to  gain  both  for  himself  and  his 
cause,  and  nothing  to  lose.  He  had  24,000  men  who  had  not 
been  seriously  engaged,  and  12,000  more  near  enough  to  come 
into  the  battle  before  noon.  Couch's  division,  6000  strong, 
recalled  from  its  useless  expedition  to  Maryland  Heights,  re- 
joined the  army  early  in  the  morning  on  the  18th,  and  Meade's 
division,  6000  strong,  arrived  by  11  A.M.  It  is  strange  but  true 
that,  with  36,000  fresh  men  at  hand,  neither  McClellan  nor  any  of 
his  six  corps  commanders,  except  Franklin,  approved  the  idea  of 
an  attack.  Ropes  says  that  Franklin  alone  — 

"recognized  the  importance  of  the  high  ground  held  by  Stuart  and 
desired  to  begin  by  driving  him  and  his  artillery  from  it." 

This  point  was  indeed  one  of  the  key-points  of  Lee's  line,  but 
the  dominant  feature  of  the  whole  situation  was  the  fact  that  Lee 
was  fighting  with  his  back  to  a  river,  which  he  could  not  have 
crossed  under  fire.  McClellan  fought  with  a  safe  retreat  assured 
to  him,  in  case  of  disaster,  by  the  Antietam  in  his  front  and  the 
powerful  artillery  on  the  hills  behind  it.  The  battle-field  is 
unique,  among  the  fields  of  the  war,  in  offering  all  the  prizes  to 
the  Federals  and  all  the  risks  to  the  Confederates.  To  Mc- 
Clellan it  was  the  opportunity  of  a  lifetime. 

One  other  feature  of  this  battle  is  worthy  of  special  note  as 
unique.  McClellan  concentrated  his  powerful  cavalry  and  horse- 
artillery  force,  not  upon  either  flank,  and  especially  not  upon  his 
left  flank  where  were  great  opportunities  for  it,  but  at  his  centre, 
where  it  would  have  been  in  the  way  of  his  infantry,  and  where 


SHARPSBURG  OR  ANTIETAM  271 

the  ground  was  much  cut  up  with  fences  and  cultivation.  On 
his  right  it  might  have  been  able  to  drive  Stuart  from  his  com- 
manding hill.  On  his  left,  from  which  direction  he  should 
have  expected  Jackson 's  troops,  it  might  have  crossed  the  bridge 
over  the  Antietam  near  its  mouth.  Where  it  was,  it  was  super- 
fluous. 

When,  on  the  morning  of  the  19th,  it  was  discovered  that  Lee 
had  retreated,  a  brigade  of  cavalry  was  ordered  in  pursuit  and 
was  soon  followed  by  Porter's  corps.  I  have  before,  in  the 
account  of  the  battle  of  Malvern  Hill,  spoken  of  our  reserve 
artillery  under  the  command  of  Pendleton,  and  not  attached  to 
any  division.  It  had  been  left  in  Richmond,  when  Lee  with 
Jackson  and  Longstreet  advanced  against  Pope.  After  Mc- 
Clellan  was  withdrawn  from  the  James,  it  marched  with  D.  H. 
Hill's  division,  and  joined  the  army  in  Maryland  on  Sept.  8. 
On  the  10th  and  llth  it  marched  to  Hagerstown,  with  Long- 
street's  corps,  and  on  the  14th  returned  with  it  to  Boonsboro. 
That  night,  when  the  army  was  put  in  motion  for  Sharpsburg, 
Pendleton  was  ordered  to  take  the  reserve  artillery  across  the 
Potomac  at  Williamsport,  and  distribute  it  to  guard  the  fords  of 
the  Potomac  at  that  point,  and  below  to  Shepherdstown.  Hence 
it  happened  that  on  the  morning  of  the  19th  the  hills  on  the 
Virginia  side  of  Boteler's  Ford  were  being  held  by  15  light  rifle 
guns,  and  19  smooth-bores  of  Pendleton 's  reserve,  while  10  other 
smooth-bores  were  held  close  by. 

In  his  advance  to  the  river  Pleasanton's  cavalry  picked  up 
167  stragglers,  one  abandoned  gun,  and  one  color.  When  he 
approached  the  river  he  was  opened  upon  by  Pendleton 's  ar- 
tillery. Gibson's,  Tidball's,  and  Robertson's  batteries  of  horse 
artillery,  18  guns,  went  into  action  and  replied  so  effectively 
as  to  silence  most  of  the  Confederate  guns  and  also  to  run  off 
all  camps  and  wagon-trains  in  sight  near  the  river. 

After  two  hours  of  this,  the  Federal  cavalry  and  its  artillery 
were  relieved  by  the  arrival  of  the  5th  corps,  by  which  the  affair 
was  kept  up  until  night.  The  canal  bank  along  the  river  on  the 
Maryland  side  served  the  purpose  of  a  parapet,  and  enabled  the 
enemy  to  aid  their  artillery  fire  with  a  heavy  fire  of  musketry 
against  the  Confederate  guns  and  sharp-shooters  on  the  Virginia 


272  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

side,  where  there  was  but  little  cover.  During  the  afternoon  this 
combined  fire  compelled  the  abandonment  of  several  guns. 
Seeing  this,  the  4th  Mich,  forded  the  stream  and  took  pos- 
session of  four  of  them.  After  dark  this  regiment  was  with- 
drawn, but  early  on  the  20th  Porter  started  to  cross  the  two 
divisions  of  Morell  and  Sykes,  and  a  brigade  of  cavalry. 

Meanwhile,  Pendleton  during  the  night  had  found  Lee  and 
reported,  and  Lee  had  ordered  Jackson  to  send  back  his  nearest 
division.  This  was  A.  P.  Hill's.  Fortunately,  Hill  moved 
early,  and,  forming  in  two  lines  of  battle,  he  approached  the  ford 
before  Porter  had  gotten  more  than  a  half  of  his  men  across. 
Porter,  informed  that  a  large  force  was  approaching,  decided  to 
withdraw,  and  did  so  with  but  little  loss.  One  regiment,  however, 
the  118th  Pa.,  was  thrown  into  confusion  and  driven  over 
a  steep  descent  and  across  the  river  under  fire,  losing  269  men. 
The  total  losses  reported  by  the  Federals  for  this  affair  were  363. 
A.  P.  Hill  reported  30  killed  and  231  wounded.  Pendleton  re- 
ported three  killed  and  four  wounded  of  his  reserve  artillery. 

I  have  already  told  of  my  being  sent  on  the  16th  to  Harper's 
Ferry  to  remove  the  captured  ordnance  stores  and  to  bring  what 
was  available  for  use  to  Sharpsburg.  I  sent  to  Winchester 
49  field-pieces  and  24  mountain  howitzers,  and  quite  a  lot  of 
artillery  ammunition  not  suitable  for  our  calibres.  Of  what  was 
suitable  the  supply  was  small,  except  of  canister.  There  was 
also  a  fair  amount  of  small-arm  ammunition.  Much  of  it  had 
been  brought  from  the  depots,  and  unloaded  along  Miles 's  in- 
trenchments,  ready  for  use.  While  gathering  this  in  the  after- 
noon from  Bolivar  Heights,  I  could  see  the  smoke  of  the  conflict 
and  the  incessant  bursting  in  the  air  of  shells  and  shrapnel  over 
the  field  where  Burnside  made  his  advance  and  was  beaten  back 
by  A.  P.  Hill.  I  could  not  tell  how  the  fight  was  going,  but  at 
that  time  no  Confederate  expected  anything  less  than  victory. 
I  was  until  late  at  night  despatching  wagons  to  Winchester,  and 
to  the  ford  near  the  battle-field.  I  finished  the  work  next  morn- 
ing, and  returned  to  the  vicinity  of  the  ford  in  the  afternoon. 
Here  I  found  orders  to  await  the  army,  which  would  recross 
the  river  that  night,  and  here  the  next  morning  we  received  a 
liberal  shelling  from  the  enemy's  horse  batteries  across  the 


SHARPSBURG  OR  ANTIETAM 


273 


river,  which  perforated  some  of  our  wagons,  but  did  no  other 
harm. 

The  Confederate  casualties  by  brigades  are  given  below  from 
the  War  Records  as  far  as  they  appear.  Also,  in  a  second  table, 
the  Federal  casualties  are  distributed  among  the  different  actions. 

CONFEDERATE  CASUALTIES.    MARYLAND   CAMPAIGN 


BRIGADES 

KILLED 

WOUNDED 

MISSING 

TOTAL 

{Kershaw 

107 

455 

6 

568 

Semmes 

56 

274 

43 

373 

Cobb 

76 

318 

452 

846 

Barksdale 
Total 

35 

272 

4 

311 

274 

1319 

505 

2098 

f  Wilcox 

34 

181 

29 

244 

I  Armistead 

5 

29 

1 

35 

R.  H.  Anderson's  1  Mahone 

8 

92 

127 

227 

Div.            1  Pryor 
Featherstone 

48 
45 

285 
238 

49 
36 

382 
319 

I  Wright 
Total 

32 

192 

34 

258 

172 

1017 

276 

1465 

r  Toombs 

16 

122 

22 

160 

Drayton 
D.  R.  Jones's     Garnett 

82 
30 

280 
199 

179 
32 

541 
261 

Div.          "  Jenkins 

27 

196 

12 

235 

Kemper 
.  Anderson,  Geo.  T. 

Total 

15 

8 

102 
80 

27 
6 

144 
94 

178 

979 

278 

1435 

Walker's  5  Manning 
Div.      (  Ransom 

Total 

140 
41 

684 
141 

93 

4 

97 

917 
186 

181 

825 

1103 

Hood'sffofford 
D.       <  Law 

1V'    (Artillery 

69 
53 

4 

417 
390 
19 

62 
25 

548 
468 
23 

Total 

126 

826 

87 

1039 

Evans's  Brigade 

40 

185 

65 

290 

S.  D.  Lee's  Art. 

11 

75 

86 

Washington  Art. 

4 

28 

2 

34 

Agg.  Longstreet's  Corps 

986 

5254 

1310 

7550 

274 


MILITARY  MEMOIRS 


BRIGADES 

KILLED 

WOUNDED 

MISSING 

TOTAL 

986 

5254 

1310 

7550 

f  Lawton 

106 

447 

21 

574 

Ewell's  1  Trimble 

27 

203 

8 

238 

Div.     ]  Early 

18 

167 

9 

194 

LHays 

45 

289 

2 

336 

Total 

196 

1106 

40 

1342 

"  Branch 

24 

154 

4 

182 

Archer 

22 

161 

183 

A.  P.  Hill's   "Gregg 

38 

188 

2 

228 

Div.        ]  Fender 

12 

103 

115 

Field  l 

Thomas  2 

Total 

96 

606 

6 

708 

{Winder 

11 

77 

88 

Johnson,  B.  T.3 

36 

116 

152 

Taliaferro 

41 

132 

173 

Starke 

81 

189 

17 

287 

Total 

169 

514 

17 

700 

r  Ripley 
Garland 

110 
46 

506 
210 

124 
187 

740 
443 

D.  H.  Hill's  1  Rodes 

111 

289 

225 

625 

Div.         j  Anderson 

64 

299 

202 

565 

Colquitt 

129 

518 

184 

831 

I  Hill's  Art. 

4 

30 

3 

37 

Total 

464 

1852 

925 

3241 

Reserve  Artillery 

3 

4 

7 

Cavalry 

10 

45 

6 

61 

Agg.  Jackson's  Corps 

938 

4127 

994 

6059 

Grand  Aggregate  Confed. 

1924 

9381 

2304 

13,609 

1  Field's  not  engaged. 

2  Thomas's  brigade  absent. 

3  Johnson  made  no  brigade  report,  but  losses  have  been  estimated  to 
conform  to  the  division  report. 


SHARPSBURG  OR  ANTIETAM  275 

FEDERAL  CASUALTIES.    MARYLAND  CAMPAIGN 


KILLED 

WOUNDED 

MISSING 

TOTAL 

Cavalry  Affairs,  Sept.  3-20 
Boonsboro  or  South  Mountain,Sept.l4 
Crampton's  Pass,  Sept.  14 
Harper's  Ferry,  Sept.  14-15 
Sharpsburg,  Sept.  16-18 
Shepherdstown  Ford,  Sept.  20 

Grand  Aggregate,  Federal 

12 
325 
113 
44 

2,708 
71 

52 
1,403 
418 
173 
9,549 
161 

20 
85 
2 
12,347 
753 
131 

84 
1,813 
533 
12,564 
12,410 
363 

3,273 

11,756 

13,338 

27,767 

The  casualties  among  general  and  field-officers  were  unusually 
heavy.  Among  the  Federals'  commanding  corps  were  Reno  and 
Mansfield  killed,  and  Hooker  wounded.  Commanding  Divisions 
or  Brigades  were,  killed :  Richardson,  Rodman,  Goodrich,  and 
Miles.  Among  the  wounded  were  Hatch,  Hartsuff,  Sedgwick, 
Crawford,  Dana,  Weber,  Wainwright,  Gallagher,  Barlow,  and 
Tyndale. 

Among  the  Confederate  generals  were,  killed :  Garland,  G.  B. 
Anderson,  Branch,  Starke,  and  Douglas.  Among  the  wounded 
were  Lawton,  R.  H.  Anderson,  Wright,  Ripley,  J.  R.  Jones,  and 
MacRae. 


CHAPTER  XIV 

FALL  OF  1862 

Political  Situation.  Lincoln  orders  Advance.  A  Confederate  Raid. 
Lincoln  Dissatisfied.  Condition  of  Confederates.  Reorganization. 
Lee  moves  to  Culpeper.  McClellan  succeeded  by  Burnside.  Plan  of 
Campaign  Changed.  Burnside's  Strength.  Lee's  Strength.  Sumner 
at  Falmouth.  Non-arrival  of  Pontoons.  Surrender  Demanded. 
Earthworks  Erected.  Jackson  Arrives.  Burnside's  Plan.  Marye's 
Hill.  Building  the  Bridges.  The  Bombardment.  The  Crossing 
Made.  Dec.  12.  The  Plan  Changed.  Jackson's  Line.  Franklin 
Advances.  Gibbon  supports  Meade.  Meade  strikes  Gregg.  The 
Counter-stroke.  Jackson's  Proposed  Attack.  Casualties.  On  the  Fed- 
eral Right.  The  Formations.  French  and  Hancock  Charge.  How- 
ard Charges.  Sturgis  Charges.  Sunken  Road  Reenforced.  Griffin's 
Charge.  Humphreys 's  First  Charge.  Humphrey s's  Second  Charge. 
Humphreys 's  Report.  Tyler's  Report.  Getty's  Charge.  Hawkins's 
Account.  A  Federal  Conference.  Dec.  14,  Sharp-shooting. 
Dec.  15,  Burnside  Retreats.  Flag  of  Truce.  Casualties.  New 
Plans.  The  Mud  March.  Burnside  Relieved. 

AFTER  the  battle  of  Sharpsburg,  rest,  reorganization,  and  sup- 
plies were  badly  needed  by  both  armies,  and,  as  the  initiative 
was  now  McClellan's,  he  determined  not  to  move  until  he  was 
thoroughly  prepared.  Lincoln  had  two  months  before  drawn 
up  his  Emancipation  Proclamation  and  was  waiting  for  a  vic- 
tory to  produce  a  favorable  state  of  feeling  for  its  issuance. 
Sharpsburg  was  now  claimed  as  a  victory,  and,  on  Sept.  22,  the 
Proclamation  was  issued,  freeing  all  slaves  in  any  State  which 
should  be  in  rebellion  on  the  coming  Jan.  1.  This  was  supposed 
to  be  a  war  measure,  though  nothing  could  have  been  more  void 
of  effect  than  it  proved.  McClellan  did  not  approve  of  the 
Proclamation,  and  he  let  his  sentiments  on  the  subject  be  known, 
although  he  issued  a  very  proper  order  to  the  army,  deprecating 
political  discussion.  His  attitude,  however,  alienated  him  from 
the  administration,  and  the  party  in  power  in  Washington. 

A  few  days  after  the  battle,  Lincoln  had  visited  the  army,  and, 

276 


FALL  OF  1862  277 

on  parting  from  McClellan,  had  expressed  himself  as  entirely 
satisfied,  and  had  told  McClellan  that  he  should  not  be  forced  to 
advance  until  he  was  ready.  But  when  two  weeks  had  passed, 
during  which  great  quantities  of  supplies  of  all  kinds  were  rushed 
to  the  army  by  every  channel,  McClellan  on  Oct.  7  received 
instructions  to  "  cross  the  Potomac  and  give  battle  to  the 
enemy,  or  drive  him  south.  The  army  must  move  now  while 
the  roads  are  good." 

On  receipt  of  this,  McClellan  conferred  with  his  chief  quarter- 
master, who  thought  that  sufficient  supplies  would  be  on  hand 
within  three  days.  Meanwhile,  on  Oct.  10  a  fresh  trouble  arose. 
Stuart  with  1800  cavalry  and  Pelham's  battery  had  been  sent 
by  Lee  upon  a  raid.  Fording  the  Potomac,  some  15  miles  above 
Williamsport,  at  dawn  on  the  10th,  by  dark  Stuart  reached 
Chambersburg,  where  he  burned  a  machine-shop,  many  loaded 
cars,  and  a  supply  depot,  paroled  285  sick  and  wounded  Fed- 
erals, and  gathered  about  500  horses.  Next  morning  he  moved 
to  Emmitsburg,  and  thence  below  the  mouth  of  the  Monocacy, 
where  he  recrossed  the  Potomac,  on  the  forenoon  of  the  12th. 
The  distance  travelled  had  been  126  miles,  of  which  the  last  80 
from  Chambersburg  were  accomplished  without  a  halt. 

An  epidemic  of  foot-and-mouth  disease  was  prevailing  at  this 
time  among  the  enemy's  cavalry,1  and  the  desperate  efforts  to 
intercept  Stuart,  made  with  reduced  forces,  put  much  of  it  out 
of  condition  for  active  service  until  they  could  get  some  rest  and 
several  thousand  fresh  horses.  Pleasanton  had  made  a  march 
of  55  miles  in  24  hours,  part  of  the  distance  across  the  moun- 
tains by  very  bad  roads,  and  Averill's  brigade  had  travelled 
200  miles  in  four  days.  Stuart's  loss  was  but  one  man  wounded, 
and  his  conduct  of  the  expedition  was  excellent.  Yet  the  raid 
risked  a  great  deal  in  proportion  to  the  results  accomplished. 
It  might  easily  have  happened  that  the  whole  command  should 
be  captured.  But  the  incident  contributed  largely  to  McClellan's 
delay,  and  to  the  growing  dissatisfaction  of  the  government  with 
his  conduct.2 

1  The  same  disease,  "sore  tongue  and  soft  hoof,"  was  complained  of  by 
Lee  on  Nov.  7  to  the  Sec.  of  War,  as  affecting  his  cavalry. 

2  This  was  the  second  occasion,  within  four  months,  on  which  Stuart  had 
ridden  entirely  around  McClellan's  army.     Col.  R.  B.  Irwin  tells  of  the  effect 


278  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

Mr.  Lincoln  had  allowed  McClellan  to  decide  whether  his 
advance  should  be  up  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  or  east  of  the 
Blue  Ridge,  but  expressed  a  preference  for  the  latter  route. 

McClellan,  however,  had  decided  to  take  the  Valley  route,  for 
fear  of  Lee's  advancing  into  Md.  and  Pa.  if  it  was  left  un- 
covered. Both  Lincoln  and  Halleck  thought  his  fears  ground- 
less and  his  caution  excessive.  Neither  of  them  believed  the 
Confederate  army  to  be  as  immense  as  McClellan  reported,  and 
both  knew  that  if  the  Federals  needed  supplies  the  Confederates 
needed  them  much  more.  In  Lincoln's  practical  style,  he  often 
made  pertinent  suggestions  to  McClellan  and  would  sometimes 
mingle  with  them  a  touch  of  sarcasm.  He  wrote  that  if  Lee 
"  should  cut  in  between  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  and  Washing- 
ton, McClellan  would  have  nothing  to  do  but  to  attack  him  in 
the  rear."  Soon  after  Stuart's  raid,  he  suggested  that  "  if  the 
enemy  had  more  occupation  south  of  the  river,  his  cavalry  would 
not  be  so  likely  to  make  raids  north  of  it."  And  on  Oct.  25,  he 
telegraphed  McClellan  in  reply  to  a  despatch  about  sore-tongued 
and  fatigued  horses,  "  Will  you  pardon  me  for  -asking  what  the 
horses  of  your  army  have  done,  since  the  battle  of  Antietam,  that 
fatigues  anything?" 

On  Oct.  26,  McClellan  put  his  army  in  motion,  19  days  after 
his  receipt  of  the  President's  order.  By  this  time  he  was  willing 
to  adopt  the  line  of  advance  east  of  the  Blue  Ridge,  as  the  stage 
of  water  in  the  Potomac  River  now  made  all  fords  impracticable. 
The  crossing  was  made  at  Berlin,  about  10  miles  below  Harper's 
Ferry.  Pontoon  bridges  were  laid,  and  the  army  crossed  over 
rather  leisurely,  the  last  of  it,  Franklin's  corps,  on  Nov.  1  and  2. 

We  will  now  return  to  the  Confederates,  who,  since  Sharps- 
burg,  have  been  resting  and  recuperating  between  Winchester 
and  Bunker  Hill. 

of  this  raid  on  the  mind  of  President  Lincoln,  in  the  following  anecdote :  — 
"When  the  President  seemed  in  unusually  high  spirits  and  was  convers- 
ing freely,  some  one  (I  think  De  Kay)  suddenly  asked,  '  Mr.  President,  what 
about  McClellan  ? '  Without  looking  at  his  questioner,  the  President  drew 
a  ring  upon  the  deck  with  a  stick  or  umbrella,  and  said  quietly,  'When  I  was 
a  boy  we  used  to  play  a  game,  three  times  round  and  out.  Stuart  has  been 
around  him  twice ;  if  he  goes  around  him  once  more,  gentlemen,  McClellan 
will  be  out.'" 


FALL  OF   1862 


279 


Our  base  of  supplies  was  now  Staunton,  more  than  100  miles 
distant,  but  over  fairly  good  roads.  Our  trains  were  actively  at 
work,  bringing  ammunition,  food,  and  clothing,  and  gradually 
our  condition  approached  the  normal.  But  the  supply,  even  of 
wagons,  was  limited,  and,  as  late  as  Oct.  20,  55  were  wanted 
for  the  reserve  ordnance  train  of  Longstreet's  corps,  and  41  for 
that  of  Jackson. 

Meanwhile,  as  important  as  reequipment,  a  thorough  reorgani- 
zation took  place,  and  at  last  we  became  an  army  rather 
than  a  collection  of  brigades,  divisions,  and  -batteries.  In  Oct. 
Longstreet  and  Jackson  were  made  lieutenant-generals,  and 
major-generals  and  brigadiers  were  promoted  and  our  1st  and  2d 
army  corps  were  formed,  following  the  example  of  the  Fed- 
erals nearly  a  year  before. 

The  formation  of  our  batteries  into  battalions  was  also  carried 
forward,  but  rather  slowly.  A  large  proportion  of  our  guns  were 
but  6-Pr.  and  12-Pr.  howitzers,  which  the  enemy  had  now  dis- 
carded as  too  light.  There  are  no  returns  showing  our  different 
varieties  of  small-arms,  but  that  we  still  had  men  armed  with 
flintlocks  is  shown  by  the  return  of  13  picked  up  on  the  field 
after  the  battle  of  Fredericksburg. 

The  organization,  when  completed,  stood  as  follows,  the 
strength  being  given  from  the  returns  of  Nov.  20,  1862. 

ORGANIZATION  OF  ARMY  OF  NORTHERN  VA.,  NOV.,  1862 
IST  CORPS,  LONGSTREET'S 


DIVISION 

BRIGADES  AND  ARTILLERY 

PRESENT 
FOR  DUTY 

McLaws's 

Kershaw's,  Barksdale's,  Cobb's,  Semmes's, 
Cabell's  Battalion 
Artillery,  4  Batteries,  18  Guns 

7,898 

Anderson's 

Wilcox's,  Mahone's,  Featherstone's, 
Wright's,  Perry's 
Unorganized  Artillery,  4  Batteries,  18  Guns 

7,639 

Pickett's 

Garnett's,  Kemper's,  Armistead's,  Jenkins's, 
Corse's 
Unorganized  Artillery,  3  Batteries,  14  Guns 

7,567 

Total 


28,104 


280 


MILITARY  MEMOIRS 


IST  CORPS,  LONGSTREET'S  (Continued) 


DIVISION 

BRIGADES  AND  ARTILLERY 

PRESENT 
FOR  DUTY 

Hood's 

Total  carried  forward 
Law's,  Robertson's,  Anderson's,  Ben- 
ning's 
Unorganized  Artillery,  3  Batteries,  14  Guns 

28,104 
7,334 

Walker's 

Ransom's,  Cooke's,  No  Artillery 

3,855 

Reserve    Artil- 
lery 

Alexander's  Battalion.    6  Batteries, 
26  Guns 
Washington  Artillery.    4  Batteries,  9 
Guns 

623 

Total 

5  Divisions,  20  Brigades 
24  Batteries,  99  Guns 

34,916 

2o  CORPS,  JACKSON'S 


Ewell's 

Lawton's,  Early  's,  Trimble's,  Hays's, 
Latimer's  Battalion 
6  Batteries,  26  Guns 

7,716 

D.  H.  Hill's 

Rodes's,  Dole's,  Colquitt's,  Iverson's,  Ram- 
seur's 
H.P.Jones's  Battalion,  5  Batteries,  22  Guns 

6,944 

A.  P.  Hill's 

Field's,  Gregg's,  Thomas's,  Lane's,  Archer's, 
Fender's 
Walker's  Battalion,  7  Batteries,  28  Guns 

11,554 

Taliaferro's 

Paxton's,  J.  R.  Jones's,  Warren's,  Pendle- 
ton's 
Brockenbrough's   Battalion,    5   Batteries, 
22  Guns 

5,478 

Total 

4    Divisions,    18    Brigades,   23    Batteries, 
98  Guns 

31,692 

Stuart's 
Cavalry 

Brigades,  Hampton's,  Lee  F.,Lee,  W.  H.  F., 
Jones's,  W.  E.;  Pelham's  Artillery 
5  Batteries,  22  Guns 

9,146 

Pendleton's 
Reserve 
Artillery 

Brown's  Battalion,  6  Batteries 
Cutt's  Battalion,  3  Batteries 
Nelson's  Battalion,  3  Batteries 
Total  36  Guns 

718 

Aggregate 

38  Brigades  Infantry,  4  Brigades  Cavalry, 
63  Batteries,  255  Guns 

76,472 

FALL  OF  1862  281 

On  Oct.  27  Lee  moved  with  Longstreet's  corps  and 
Pendleton's  reserve  arty,  toward  the  eastern  slope  of  the  Blue 
Ridge.  My  reserve  ordnance  train  moved  on  the  29th  via 
Nineveh,  Front  Royal,  Chester  Gap,  Gaines's  Cross-roads  and 
Sperryville,  and  encamped  at  Culpeper  on  Nov.  4.  Lee,  in 
person,  had  already  arrived  there.  A  few  days  after  I  was  placed 
hi  command  of  the  battalion  of  artillery  which  had  been  com- 
manded by  Col.  S.  D.  Lee,  who  was  now  promoted  brigadier- 
general  and  sent  to  Vicksburg.  My  successor  as  chief  of  ord- 
nance was  Col.  Briscoe  G.  Baldwin,  who  served  with  great  success 
until  the  surrender  at  Appomattox. 

Meanwhile,  an  important  event  was  on  foot.  We  have  seen 
the  lack  of  cordiality  between  McClellan  and  the  President,  and 
the  growth  of  mistrust  of  the  latter's  intention  to  prosecute  the 
active  offensive  campaign  desired.  On  Oct.  27  he  had  telegraphed 
the  President  urging  the  necessity  of  filling  the  old  regiments 
with  drafted  men  "  before  taking  them  into  action  again."  The 
tone  of  his  letters  had  long  been  unsatisfactory,  and  this  expres- 
sion kindled  into  flame  the  growing  suspicion  that  he  was  simply 
preparing  new  excuses  for  delay.  Immediately  on  reading  the 
message  Lincoln  showed  himself  ready  to  meet  the  issue  by 
wiring  back :  — 

Now  I  ask  a  distinct  answer  to  the  question,  "  Is  it  your  purpose  not 
to  go  into  action  again  until  the  men  now  being  drafted  in  the  States  are 
incorporated  into  the  old  regiments?" 

McClellan  read  between  the  lines  the  threat  conveyed,  and 
backed  squarely  down.  He  promptly  explained  that  the 
offensive  despatch  was  the  inadvertence  of  an  aid,  and  promised 
to  "  push  forward  as  rapidly  as  possible  and  endeavor  to  meet 
the  enemy."  Indeed,  the  Confederates  noted,  during  the  next 
week,  the  unwonted  vigor  of  his  advance.  There  were  constant 
sharp  skirmishes,  and  the  enemy  got  possession  of  the  two 
lower  gaps  in  the  Blue  Ridge,  Snicker's  and  Ashby's,  and  held 
the  outlet  of  Manassas  Gap.  McClellan's  headquarters  were 
advanced  to  Rectortown.  His  cavalry  occupied  Warrenton,  and 
it  was  evident  that  he  would  soon  cross  the  Rappahannock. 
Then,  suddenly,  his  activity  ceased,  and  from  Nov.  9  to  the  17th, 
the  Federal  army  laid  quietly  in  its  camps.  His  backdown  had 


282  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

come  too  late.  He  had  been  removed  from  the  command  on 
Nov.  7,  and  Burnside  substituted  in  his  place. 

McClellan's  promises  of  Oct.  27  might  have  satisfied  President 
Lincoln,  but  there  were  strong  influences  now  determined  upon 
a  change,  and  which  wanted  not  only  the  head  of  McClellan,  but 
that  of  Porter.  On  Nov.  5  the  President  wrote  an  order  authoriz- 
ing Halleck,  in  his  own  discretion,  to  relieve  McClellan,  and  to 
place  Burnside  in  command  of  the  army.  Porter  was  also  to 
be  relieved  from  the  command  of  the  5th  corps,  and  to  be 
succeeded  by  Hooker. 

On  the  same  date  these  formal  orders  were  prepared  and 
signed  by  Halleck,  but  they  were  not  promulgated  for  two 
days. 

The  designation  of  Burnside  to  succeed  McClellan  was  a  great 
surprise  to  old  army  circles,  both  in  the  Federal  and  Confederate 
armies ;  and  was,  perhaps,  an  unpleasant  one  to  Burnside  him- 
self. He  was  popular,  but  not  greatly  esteemed  as  a  general. 
He  had  commanded  a  brigade  at  the  first  battle  of  Bull  Run, 
but  had  in  no  way  risen  above,  even  if  he  reached,  the  average 
of  the  brigade  commanders.  He  had  later  had  the  luck  to  com- 
mand the  expedition  to  the  N.C.  Sounds,  where  his  overwhelming 
force  easily  overcame  the  slight  resistance  that  it  met.  This 
gained  him  the  prestige,  in  newspapers  and  political  circles,  of 
successful  independent  command.  As  commander  of  a  corps, 
he  was  one  of  the  four  next  in  line  for  promotion  —  Burnside, 
Hooker,  Sumner,  and  Franklin. 

The  older  officers  dreaded  Hooker's  appointment.  By  many 
he  was  thought  utterly  unfit,  though  a  brave  man  and  a  hard 
fighter.  Moved  by  the  wishes  of  his  friends,  Burnside  was 
brought  to  accept  the  command  rather  than  see  it  go  to  Hooker. 

McClellan  was  not  unprepared  for  the  blow,  and  he  met  it 
gracefully  and  did  all  in  his  power  to  commend  his  successor  to 
the  confidence  of  the  army.  He  had  not,  however,  anticipated 
that  he  was  to  be  relegated  to  private  life,  but  had  supposed 
that  he  would  be  transferred  to  some  command  in  the  West. 
But  no  other  command  was  ever  offered  him.  A  few  days  later 
Burnside  submitted  to  the  President  his  plan  for  the  campaign, 
and  it  was  approved,  though  reluctantly.  McClellan's  plan  had 


FALL  OF  1862 


283 


been  to  interpose  between  Lee's  divided  forces.  Already  he  was 
not  far  from  such  a  position.  From  Longstreet's  corps  to  Jack- 
son's was  over  40  miles  by  the  roads  across  the  mountains,  and 
McClellan's  forces  were  within  20  miles  of  either.  But  Lee 
could  have  delayed  a  march  upon  either,  and,  by  falling  back, 
might  unite  his  two  corps,  behind  the  Robertson  River,  before 
accepting  battle. 

This  had  been  Lee's  plan,  if  the  threat  of  Jackson's  position 
upon  the  Federal  flank  should  fail  to  prevent  their  advance. 

Burnside's  organization  was  as  follows :  — 


GRAND  Divs. 

CORPS 

DIVISIONS 

BRIGADES 

ARTILLERY 

Right  Grand 
Division 

Sumner 

2d  Corps 
Couch 

Hancock 

Howard 
French 

Caldwell,  Meagher, 
Zook 
Sully,  Owen,  Hall, 
Kimball,  Palmer,  An- 
drews 

8  Batteries 

9th  Corps 
Willcox 

Sturgis 
Getty 

Poe,  Christ,  Leasure 
Nagle,  Ferrero 
Hawkins,  Harland 

6  Batteries 

Centre  Grand 
Division 

Hooker 

3d  Corps 
Stoneman 

Birney 

Sickles 
Whipple 

Robinson,  Ward, 
Berry 
Carr,  Hall,  Revere 
Piatt,  Carroll 

9  Batteries 

5th  Corps 
Butterfield 

Griffin 
Sykes 
Humphreys 

Barnes,  Sweitzer, 
Stockton 
Buchanan,  Andrew, 
Warren 
Tyler,  Allabach 

8  Batteries 

Left  Grand 
Division 

Franklin 

1st  Corps 
Reynolds 

Doubleday 

Gibbon 
Meade 

Phelps,Rogers,Gavin, 
Meredith 
Root,  Lyle,  Taylor 
Sinclair,  Magilton, 
Jackson 

11  Batteries 

6th  Corps 
W.F.Smith 

Brooks 
Howe 
Newton 

Torbert,    Cake,    Rus- 
sell 
Pratt,  Whiting,  Vin- 
ton 
Cochrane,        Devens, 
Rowley 

11  Batteries 

6  Corps 

18  Divisions 

51  Brigades 

53  Batteries 

284  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

Burnside  began  his  campaign  with  a  blunder.  He  adopted 
Richmond  as  his  objective,  instead  of  Lee's  army.  The  latter 
was  within  a  day's  march  of  him,  and  its  wings  were  separated 
by  two  days'  march.  Here  was  an  opportunity  for  a  skilful 
commander,  but  Burnside  decided  to  make  Fredericksburg  a 
base,  and  to  move  thence  upon  Richmond.  On  Nov.  15,  he 
turned  his  back  upon  Lee  and  marched  for  Fredericksburg. 
Meanwhile,  he  had  made  some  important  changes  in  his  organiza- 
tion, by  the  formation  of  three  grand  divisions  out  of  his  six 
corps  in  order  to  lessen  the  routine  duties  of  his  office.1 

Besides  the  troops  shown  above,  the  right  grand  division  com- 
prised two  brigades  of  cavalry  and  a  battery,  and  each  of  the 
others,  one  brigade  of  cavalry  and  a  battery.  There  was  also  an 
artillery  reserve  of  12  batteries,  an  engineer  brigade  with  the 
pontoon  train,  and  an  escort  and  a  provost  guard  of  infantry 
and  cavalry. 

On  Dec.  10,  the  return  of  the  army  showed  "present  for 
duty,"  as  follows:  — 

Right  Grand  Division,  Sumner  .  .  .  31,659 

Centre  Grand  Division,  Hooker  .  .  .  40,396 

Left     Grand  Division    Franklin  .  .  46,897    .     .     118,952 
The  Artillery  comprised  374  guns. 

Besides  these  troops  there  were  two  corps,  the  llth,  with 
15,562  present  for  duty,  under  Sigel;  and  the  12th,  with  12,162, 
under  Slocum,  which  Burnside  called  his  reserve  grand  divi- 
sion. These  troops,  under  command  of  Sigel,  were  on  the  march 
to  Fredericksburg,  but  they  did  not  arrive  until  after  the 
battle. 

Besides  these,  there  were  51,970  holding  the  line  of  the  Potomac 
above  Washington,  and  the  fortified  lines  about  the  city  and 
Alexandria,  with  284  guns  of  position,  and  120  field-pieces. 
Thus,  all  together,  there  were  available  for  use  against  Lee  and 
to  protect  the  capital,  198,546  men  and  about  900  guns. 

On  the  same  day,  Dec.  10,  Lee's  return  showed  his  present 
for  duty,  by  divisions,  as  follows :  — 

1  This  organization  was  not  kept  up  by  Burnside's  immediate  successors, 
but  under  Grant  in  1864  something  equivalent  was  developed  in  separate 
armies  and  in  large  corps. 


FALL  OF  1862 


285 


1ST   CORPS,   LONGSTREET 

STRENGTH 

2o  CORPS,  JACKSON 

STRENGTH 

Anderson's  Division 
Hood's  Division 
McLaws's  Division 
Pickett's  Division 
Ransom's  Division 
Reserve  Artillery 

7,639 
7,334 
7,898 
7,567 
3,855 
623 

Ewell's  Division 
A.  P.  Hill's  Division 
D.  H.  Hill's  Division 
Jackson's  Division 
Reserve  Artillery 

7,716 
11,554 
8,944 
5,005 
473 

Total  2d  Corps 

33,692 

Total  1st  Corps 

34,886 

Total  two  Corps 

68,578 

Adding  Pendleton's  reserve  artillery,  718,  Stuart's  cavalry, 
9146,  and  41  general  staff,  we  have  Lee's  aggregate,  78,483,  and 
about  250  guns.  This  was  practically  the  largest  army  which 
Lee  ever  had  in  the  field.  Possibly,  during  the  Seven  Days, 
more  troops  were  near  Richmond,  but,  being  organized  only  in 
divisions,  or  in  independent  brigades  and  batteries,  and  thus 
less  easy  to  handle,  they  constituted  a  much  less  powerful 
army. 

As  before  stated,  on  Nov.  15,  Burnside  commenced  his  move- 
ment upon  Fredericksburg,  Sumner's  grand  division  leading  the 
way.  Already  his  cavalry  had  made  reconnoissances  which  had 
attracted  attention,  and  Lee,  on  the  15th,  had  sent  a  regiment 
of  cavalry,  one  of  infantry,  and  a  battery  to  reenforce  four  com- 
panies of  infantry  and  a  battery  already  at  Fredericksburg. 
Orders  were  also  sent  to  destroy  the  railroad  from  Fredericks- 
burg to  Acquia  Creek.  On  the  17th  it  was  learned  that  gun- 
boats and  transports  had  entered  Acquia  Creek,  on  which 
W.  H.  F.  Lee's  brigade  of  cavalry  was  despatched  in  that  direc- 
tion, and  Stuart  was  ordered  to  force  a  crossing  of  the  Rappa- 
hannock  and  reconnoitre  toward  Warren  ton.  This  was  done  on 
the  18th,  and  the  enemy's  general  movement  was  discovered. 
A  part  of  Longstreet's  corps  was  put  in  motion  on  the  18th,  and 
the  remainder  followed  next  day. 

Sumner's  corps  arrived  at  Falmouth  on  the  17th,  and  an 
artillery  duel  ensued,  across  the  river,  rashly  provoked  by  the 
Confederates,  who  had  orders  to  oppose  any  force  attempting  to 
cross.  It  really  came  near  inducing  the  enemy  to  cross,  though 
under  orders  from  Burnside  not  to  do  so.  For  under  the  superior 


286  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

metal  of  the  Federals,  the  Confederate  gunners  were  driven  from 
their  guns.  There  was  a  ford  in  the  vicinity,  and  the  tempta- 
tion was  strong  to  come  over  for  them,  but  the  existence  of 
orders  prevented  its  being  done. 

For  Burnside  had  feared  that  Lee  would  overwhelm  any  small 
force  which  should  cross  before  he  was  prepared  to  support  it. 
Lincoln  and  Halleck,  indeed,  had  only  consented  to  the  move- 
ment via  Fredericksburg  with  the  understanding  that  the  army 
should  possess  itself  of  the  heights  opposite  the  town  by  crossing 
the  river  above  and  coming  down.  Burnside  had  deliberately 
changed  this  plan,  after  starting  on  the  march.  After  the  battle, 
his  personal  responsibility  for  the  changed  result  was  brought 
home  to  him  unpleasantly. 

Swinton  asserts  that  Burnside  — 

"did  not  favor  operating  against  Richmond  by  the  overland  route,  but 
had  his  mind  turned  toward  a  repetition  of  McClellan's  movement  to  the 
Peninsula ;  and  in  determining  to  march  to  Fredericksburg  he  cherished 
the  hope  of  being  able  to  winter  there  upon  an  easy  base  of  supplies,  and 
in  the  spring  embarking  his  army  for  the  James  River." 

The  three  weeks'  delay  between  his  arrival  and  his  crossing  the 
river  suggests  the  lack  of  definite  plans.  At  first  the  delay  was 
attributed  to  the  non-arrival  of  pontoon  trains.  These  trains 
had  been  ordered  on  Nov.  6  from  Rectortown  to  Washington 
City.  This  order  failed  to  reach  Berlin  until  the  12th. 

Sumner  was  anxious  to  cross,  and  asked  Burnside  if  he  might 
do  so  without  waiting  for  pontoons,  "if  he  could  find  a  ford." 
He  had  found  the  ford  before  he  made  the  request,  but  Burn- 
side's  inclinations  were  adverse  to  a  battle  and  he  could  not  be 
beguiled. 

So  the  small  Confederate  force  held  the  town  until  the  20th, 
when  Longstreet  arrived  with  McLaws's  division,  and  was  followed 
the  next  day  by  the  remainder  of  the  corps. 

On  the  21st  Sumner  sent  a  formal  demand  for  the  surrender 
of  the  town,  basing  it  upon  the  statement  that  his  troops  had 
been  fired  upon  from  under  cover  of  the  houses,  and  that  mills 
and  manufactories  in  the  town  were  furnishing  provisions  and 
clothing  to  the  enemy.  He  demanded  an  answer  by  5  P.M.,  and 
said  that  if  the  surrender  was  not  immediate  at  nine  next 


FALL  OF  1862  287 

morning,  he  would  shell  the  town,  the  intermediate  16  hours 
being  allowed  for  the  removal  of  women  and  children. 

This  note,  only  received  by  the  Mayor  at  4.40  P.M.,  was 
referred  to  Longstreet,  who  authorized  a  reply  to  be  made  that 
the  city  would  not  be  used  for  the  purposes  complained  of,  but 
that  the  Federals  could  only  occupy  the  town  by  force  of  arms. 
Mayor  Slaughter  pointed  out  that  the  civil  authorities  had  not 
been  responsible  for  the  firing  which  had  been  done,  and,  further, 
that  during  the  night  it  would  be  impossible  to  remove  the  non- 
combatants.  During  the  night  Sumner  sent  word  that  in  con- 
sideration of  the  pledges  made,  and,  in  view  of  the  short  time 
remaining  for  the  removal  of  women  and  children,  the  batteries 
would  not  open  as  had  been  proposed. 

But  the  letter  left  it  to  be  inferred  that  the  purpose  to  shell 
was  only  postponed,  and  Lee,  who  had  now  arrived,  advised  the 
citizens  to  vacate  the  town.  This  advice  was  followed  by  the 
greater  part  of  the  population.  It  was  pitiable  to  see  the 
refugees  endeavoring  to  remove  their  possessions  and  encamp- 
ing in  the  woods  and  fields,  for  miles  around,  during  the  un- 
usually cold  weather  which  soon  followed. 

This  incident  is  responsible  for  the  existence  of  most  of  the 
earthworks,  which,  at  the  time  of  the  battle,  contributed  largely 
to  the  repulse  of  the  enemy's  assaults  upon  Marye's  Hill.  Great 
sympathy,  of  course,  was  felt  for  the  citizens,  and  Lee,  immedi- 
ately after  his  arrival,  ordered  batteries  to  be  erected,  from  which 
the  enemy's  positions,  upon  the  hills  commanding  the  town  from 
the  north,  could  be  replied  to  by  our  rifled  guns,  in  case  of  their 
shelling  the  town.  Lee  at  first  had  not  intended  to  give  battle 
at  Fredericksburg,  but  had  proposed  after  delaying  the  enemy 
to  fall  back  behind  the  North  Anna  River,  and  to  deliver  his 
battle  there.  Both  he  and  Jackson  objected  to  the  position  at 
Fredericksburg  that  the  river,  with  the  commanding  positions 
on  the  north  bank,  could  always  afford  a  safe  retreat  to  a  beaten 
enemy,  as  the  Antietam  had  done  at  Sharpsburg.  This  was  un- 
doubtedly true,  as  was  soon  afterward  proved  when  the  battle 
took  place.  At  the  North  Anna  the  enemy,  if  defeated,  might 
be  successfully  pursued  and  some  fruits  of  victory  be  gathered. 

But  the  position  at  Fredericksburg  soon  began  to  show  its 


288  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

good  points,  and  as  the  country  behind  the  Rappahannock  was 
able  to  supply  some  subsistence  which  would  otherwise  be  lost, 
it  was  decided  to  give  battle  at  Fredericksburg,  against  Jackson's 
protest. 

Burnside's  pontoons  arrived  on  Nov.  25.  By  this  time  a  few 
earthworks  showed  upon  the  Confederate  hills,  and  led  him  to 
delay,  and  to  reconnoitre  the  river  for  a  flank  movement.  Above 
Fredericksburg  the  country  was  hilly  and  wooded.  The  river 
was  narrow,  and  there  were  several  fords.  These  features  would 
have  made  a  crossing  easy  to  accomplish  by  a  surprise.  Below 
the  town  the  river  widened,  and  the  country  opened.  Yet  Burn- 
side  adopted  that  flank  for  his  movement,  and  began  his  prepara- 
tions to  cross  at  Skinker's  Neck,  12  miles  below  Fredericksburg, 
where  the  river  was  over  1000  feet  wide. 

Lee  discovered  his  preparations,  and  as  Jackson's  corps  had 
arrived  from  the  Valley  about  Nov.  29,  it  was  moved  to  the 
right,  and  observed  the  river  as  far  as  Port  Royal,  18  miles  below. 
Jackson  had  not  left  Winchester  until  Nov.  22,  five  days  after 
Sumner's  arrival  at  Falmouth.  His  troops  had  marched  150 
miles  in  10  days,  but  Lee  and  Jackson  had  both  presumed  largely 
on  Burnside's  want  of  enterprise  in  allowing,  for  even  a  few  days, 
150  miles  to  separate  the  two  corps.  Lee  had  given  no  express 
orders  to  Jackson,  but  as  late  as  Nov.  19,  had  written  him  to 
remain  in  the  Valley  as  long  as  his  presence  embarrassed  the 
enemy,  but  to  keep  in  view  that  the  two  corps  must  be  united 
in  order  to  give  battle. 

The  Federal  army  was  supplied  with  balloons.  McClellan  had 
used  them  on  the  Peninsula,  but  during  Pope's  campaign,  and 
in  Md.,  they  had  not  been  seen,  although  the  open  character  of 
the  country  would  have  often  exposed  and  embarrassed  the  most 
important  movements  of  the  Confederates,  had  balloonists  been 
on  the  lookout.  Now,  the  balloons  reconnoitring  the  country 
about  Skinker's  Neck,  discovered  Jackson's  camps,  and  Burn- 
side  knew  that  his  designs  were  disclosed.  The  discovery  sug- 
gested an  alternate  piece  of  strategy.  If  he  could  cross  at 
Fredericksburg,  and  rapidly  push  a  force  around  Lee's  right  at 
Hamilton's  Crossing,  he  might  interpose  between  the  forces  about 
Skinker's  Neck  and  those  in  front  of  Fredericksburg.  The  press- 


FALL  OF  1862  289 

ure  upon  him  to  fight  was  great,  and  on  Dec.  10  the  orders 
were  issued  for  a  crossing  that  night.  The  programme  was  as 
follows :  — 

Two  bridges  were  to  be  thrown  across  the  river  at  the  upper 
end  of  the  town,  one  bridge  at  the  lower  end,  and  two  about  a 
mile  below  the  town.  Where  the  bridges  were  in  pairs,  one  was 
for  the  use  of  artillery  and  one  for  infantry.  The  pontoon  trains 
were  to  arrive  opposite  the  chosen  sites  at  3  A.M.,  and  unload  the 
boats  and  material.  By  daylight  this  was  to  be  finished  and  the 
boats  placed  in  the  river.  The  bridges  were  then  to  be  built  in 
from  two  to  three  hours.  In  length  they  would  be  from  400  to 
440  feet.  The  weather  was  unusually  cold,  the  thermometer 
being  24  degrees  above  zero.  The  ice  in  the  river  was  about  an 
inch  thick.  The  bridges  would  be  concealed  from  Confederate 
fire  by  the  town.  On  the  north  bank,  179  Federal  guns  were 
put  in  position  during  the  night,  to  cover  the  crossing,  and  it 
was  believed  that  they  could  instantly  silence  any  musketry  fire 
from  the  opposite  bank. 

There  had  been  ample  time  for  the  construction  of  formidable 
earthworks  and  abattis,  had  Lee  originally  intended  to  receive 
battle  there.  Probably  30  pits  had  been  made,  each  for  a  single 
gun,  but  in  few  places  had  any  protection  for  infantry  been 
provided,  except  upon  the  river  bank  in  front  of  the  town.  This 
portion  of  the  line  was  under  charge  of  McLaws,  who  had  care- 
fully located  every  sharp-shooter  with  reference  to  his  protec- 
tion and  his  communications.  Elsewhere  there  was  little  prepa- 
ration of  any  sort. 

There  was,  however,  one  natural  feature  which  proved  of  great 
value.  The  Confederate  line  occupied  a  range  of  low  hills  nearly 
parallel  to  the  river  and  a  few  hundred  yards  back  from  the 
town.  The  Telegraph  road,  sunken  from  three  to  five  feet 
below  the  surface,  skirted  the  bottom  of  these  hills  for  about 
800  yards,  until  it  reached  the  valley  of  Hazel  Run,  into  which 
it  turned.  This  sunken  road  was  made  part  of  the  line  of  battle 
for  McLaws's  infantry.  It  not  only  formed  a  parapet  invisible 
to  the  enemy  until  its  defenders  rose  to  fire  over  it,  but  it  afforded 
ample  space  for  several  ranks  to  load  and  fire,  and  still  have 
room  behind  them  for  free  communication  along  the  line.  In 


290  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

easy  canister  range,  nine  guns  on  the  hills  above  could  fire  over 
the  heads  of  the  infantry.  This  position  was  known  as  Marye's 
Hill. 

The  crossing  had  been  expected  for  some  days,  and  orders 
given  for  two  signal  guns,  whenever  it  was  attempted.  On  the 
10th  Burnside's  army  was  ordered  to  cook  three  days'  rations, 
and  the  news  was  quickly  conveyed  to  Lee,  being  shouted  across 
the  river  to  one  of  our  pickets.  At  2  A.M.,  the  pickets  reported 
that  pontoon  trains  could  be  heard  on  the  opposite  bank,  and 
at  4.30  A.M.  the  building  of  the  bridges  commenced.  The  signal 
guns  were  fired  about  5  A.M.,  and  the  different  brigades  and 
batteries,  already  alert,  quickly  took  positions  in  the  early  dawn. 
The  day  was  calm  and  clear  except  for  a  peculiar  smoky  haze  or 
dry  fog  which  now  prevailed  in  the  forenoons  for  several  days. 
In  the  early  hours  it  limited  vision  to  a  range  of  scarcely  100 
yards,  but,  as  the  sun  rose  higher,  it  faded  and  disappeared  by 
noon. 

The  sharp-shooters  along  the  river  front  had  reserved  their  fire 
until  after  the  discharge  of  the  signal  guns.  They  then  opened 
upon  the  bridge  builders,  who  could  now  be  dimly  seen,  and 
soon  drove  them  off  the  bridges  with  some  loss.  A  heavy  fire 
of  infantry  and  artillery  was  opened  in  reply,  upon  the  Con- 
federate rifle-pits,  under  which  they  became  silent.  After  a 
half -hour's  fire,  the  bridge  builders  made  a  fresh  attempt;  but 
their  appearance  provoked  fresh  volleys  from  Barksdale,  whose 
brigade  was  holding  the  city,  and  again  the  bridges  were  cleared. 
Several  efforts  of  this  sort  were  made  during  the  morning,  all 
resulting  similarly,  and  the  casualties  in  the  Engineer  brigade, 
which  had  the  work  in  charge,  ran  up  to  near  50. 

At  the  site  selected  for  Franklin's  crossing  about  a  mile  below 
the  city,  there  was  no  opposition,  for  there  was  no  shelter  for 
even  a  Confederate  skirmish-line.  The  bridges  here  were  finished 
by  11  A.M.  Franklin,  however,  was  ordered  not  to  cross  until 
the  resistance  at  the  town  had  been  overcome.  Here,  by  11  A.M., 
the  Engineer  brigade  had  abandoned  the  task  of  building  bridges 
under  fire.  When  this  state  of  affairs  was  reported  to  Burn- 
side,  he  ordered  every  gun  in  range  of  the  city  to  fire  50  rounds 
into  it.  Probably  100  guns  responded,  and  the  spectacle  which 


FALL  OF  1862  291 

was  now  presented  from  the  Confederate  hilltops  was  one  of  the 
most  magnificent  and  impressive  in  the  whole  course  of  the  war. 

The  city,  except  its  steeples,  was  still  veiled  in  the  mist 
which  had  settled  in  the  valleys.  Above  it  and  in  it  incessantly 
showed  the  round  white  clouds  of  bursting  shells,  and  out  of 
its  midst  there  soon  rose  three  or  four  columns  of  dense  black 
smoke  from  houses  set  on  fire  by  the  explosions.  The  atmosphere 
was  so  perfectly  calm  and  still  that  the  smoke  rose  vertically  in 
great  pillars  for  several  hundred  feet  before  spreading  outward 
in  black  sheets.  The  opposite  bank  of  the  river,  for  two  miles 
to  the  right  and  left,  was  crowned  at  frequent  intervals  with 
blazing  batteries,  canopied  in  clouds  of  white  smoke. 

Beyond  these,  the  dark  blue  masses  of  over  100,000  infantry 
in  compact  columns,  and  numberless  parks  of  white-topped 
wagons  and  ambulances  massed  in  orderly  ranks,  all  awaited 
the  completion  of  the  bridges.  The  earth  shook  with  the  thunder 
of  the  guns,  and,  high  above  all,  a  thousand  feet  in  the  air,  hung 
two  immense  balloons.  The  scene  gave  impressive  ideas  of  the 
disciplined  power  of  a  great  army,  and  of  the  vast  resources  of 
the  nation  which  had  sent  it  forth. 

Under  cover  of  this  storm  of  shell,  the  Federal  bridge  builders 
again  ventured  upon  their  bridges  and  tried  to  extend  them, 
but  the  artillery  fire  had  been  at  random  into  the  town, 
and  not  carefully  aimed  at  the  locations  of  the  sharp-shooters. 
Consequently,  these  had  not  been  much  affected,  and  presently 
the  faint  cracks  of  their  rifles  could  be  heard,  between  the  re- 
ports of  the  guns.  The  contrast  in  sound  was  great,  but  the 
rifle  fire  was  so  effective  that,  again,  the  bridges  were  deserted. 
Indeed,  the  promiscuous  fire  of  bombardments  seldom  accom- 
plishes any  result.  Carnot,  in  his  Defence  of  Strong  Places,  says 
that  they  "are  resorted  to  when  effective  means  are  lacking." 
No  citizen  was  reported  injured,  though  many  left  the  town 
only  after  firing  began  in  the  morning,  and  some  remained  during 
the  whole  occupation  by  the  Federals. 

Presently  Gen.  Hunt,  chief  of  artillery,  suggested  an  expedient. 
There  were  10  pontoon  boats  in  the  water  along  the  north  shore. 
On  the  southern  shore  the  sharp-shooters,  a  little  back  from  the 
high  brink  of  the  river,  could  only  see  the  farther  half  of  its 


292  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

width.  Hunt  proposed  that  troops  should  make  a  rush  and  fill 
the  boats.  These  should  then  be  rowed  rapidly  across  to  the 
shelter  of  the  opposite  shore,  where  the  men  could  disembark 
under  cover.  A  lodgment  once  made,  other  troops  could  follow, 
until  a  force  was  accumulated  which  could  capture  the  rifle-pits. 

This  sensible  course,  which  should  have  been  the  one  first 
adopted  in  the  morning,  under  cover  of  the  fog,  was  now  tried. 
Four  regiments,  the  7th  Mich.,  the  19th  and  20th  Mass.,  and  the 
89th  N.  Y.,  volunteered  for  the  crossing.  The  first  boats  suffered 
some  casualties,  but  were  soon  safe  under  shelter  of  the  bank. 
Other  instalments  followed,  and  the  Confederates,  appreciating 
that  their  game  was  up,  and  that  the  bridges  below  the  town 
were  already  available,  began  to  withdraw.  The  pontoniers 
now  returned  to  their  work,  and  the  bridges  were  completed. 
Some  skirmishing  took  place  in  the  streets,  and  a  few  were  cut 
off  and  captured.  But  the  defence  had  practically  gained  the 
entire  day,  for  although  a  division  of  the  6th  corps  crossed  in 
the  afternoon,  it  was  subsequently  recalled,  all  but  one  brigade, 
left  to  guard  the  bridge-heads  during  the  night. 

This  delay  robbed  Burnside's  strategy  of  its  only  merit.  It 
had  been  his  hope  to  find  Lee's  army  somewhat  dispersed,  as 
indeed  it  had  been;  D.  H.  Hill's  and  Early's  divisions  having 
been  at  Skinker's  Neck  and  Port  Royal,  12  to  22  miles  away. 
But  they  were  recalled  on  the  12th  and  reached  the  field  on  the 
morning  of  the  13th  after  hard  marching.  The  casualties  suffered 
by  the  Confederates  engaged  in  this  defence  were  224  killed  and 
wounded  and  105  missing.  Of  the  Federal  losses,  separate  re- 
ports were  made  only  of  the  Engineer  brigade,  engaged  upon  the 
bridge  work.  This  lost  50  killed  and  wounded,  and  Hancock 
reported  the  loss  of  150  in  two  regiments  which  had  supported 
the  Engineers. 

The  night  was  quite  cold,  the  thermometer  falling  to  26  degrees. 
While  this  is  not  extreme  for  this  latitude  and  season,  it  caused 
great  suffering  among  the  troops  from  the  South,  generally  thinly 
clad,  and  for  some,  months  far  from  railroad  transportation. 
Especially  was  this  the  case  on  the  picket-lines  where  fires  were 
forbidden.  Kershaw  reported  it  "a  night  of  such  intense  cold  as 
to  cause  the  death  of  one  man,  and  to  disable  temporarily  others." 


FALL  OF   1862         .  293 

The  whole  of  the  12th  was  occupied  in  crossing  two  grand 
divisions.  Siimner  crossed  the  2d  and  the  9th  corps  by  the 
upper  bridges  and  occupied  the  town.  Franklin  crossed  the 
1st  and  6th  corps  by  the  lower  bridges  and  occupied  the  plain 
as  far  out  as  the  Bowling  Green  road,  a  half  mile  from  the  river, 
and  the  same  distance  in  front  of  the  wooded  range  of  hills  oc- 
cupied by  Jackson's  corps.  Much  has  been  said  of  the  strength 
of  the  Confederate  position  upon  the  hills  overlooking  the  plateau 
of  the  valley,  with  its  sunken  road  in  front  of  Marye's  Hill.  The 
Federal  position  was  even  a  stronger  one,  against  any  attack  by 
the  Confederates.  The  dominating  hills  and  plateaus  of  the 
north  bank,  with  its  concave  bend  at  Falmouth  and  unlimited 
positions  for  artillery,  protected  by  the  wet  ditch,  as  it  were,  of 
the  river  in  front,  practically  constituted  a  fortress,  with  the 
plains  of  the  south  bank  as  its  glacis.  The  Bowling  Green  road, 
along  their  middle,  running  between  high  banks  on  each  side, 
made  a  powerful  advanced  work,  and  the  low  bluffs  near  the 
river  made  a  second  line.  The  Confederate  line,  also  concave  in 
its  general  shape  and  dominating  the  plains  between,  was  strong 
against  assaults  in  front,  but  neither  flank  was  secure  against 
being  turned.  Its  right  especially  was  in  the  air  at  Hamilton's 
Crossing,  and  Burnside  planned  to  attack  this  flank. 

Franklin's  grand  division  had  been  strengthened  for  that  pur- 
pose by  three  divisions  assigned  to  his  support.  One  of  them, 
Burns's,  of  the  9th  corps,  was  already  across  the  Rappahannock 
and  on  the  left  of  Sumner,  separated  from  Franklin's  right 
only  by  Deep  Run,  across  which  bridges  had  been  laid.  The 
other  two  were  Sickles's  and  Birney's  divisions  of  the  3d  corps, 
of  Hooker's  grand  division,  which  was  still  upon  the  north  side, 
but  close  to  the  bridges,  in  readiness  to  cros^s.  With  these  troops, 
Franklin  had  nearly  60,000  men.  During  the  afternoon  of  the 
12th,  Franklin  had  urged  that  these  two  divisions  should  be 
brought  over  during  the  night,  and  that  preparations  should  be 
made  for  an  advance  at  daylight.  Burnside  promised  to  order 
it,  but  the  order  was  not  given  until  the  next  morning. 

He  apparently  lacked  confidence  in  himself  and  shrank  back 
from  his  own  plans  as  the  moment  of  execution  drew  near. 
Franklin  had  been  informed  that  Burnside  would  give  the  final 


294  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

order  which  should  put  his  force  in  motion.  About  7  A.M.  on 
the  13th  an  order  came,  but  it  was  not  at  all  the  order  expected. 
It  made  no  reference  to  the  plans  of  the  day  before,  but  ordered 
Franklin  to  "keep  his  whole  command  in  position  for  a  rapid 
movement  down  the  old  Richmond  road."  Then  he  was  to 
"send  out,  at  once,  a  division,  at  least,  to  seize,  if  possible,  the 
height  near  Capt.  Hamilton's  on  this  side  of  the  Massaponax, 
taking  care  to  keep  it  well  supported  and  its  line  of  retreat  open." 

The  order  went  on  to  tell  Franklin  what  Sumner  was  to  be 
doing  at  the  same  time.  He  was  also  to  send  "  a  division  or  more 
up  the  Plank  road  to  its  intersection  with  the  Telegraph  road, 
where  they  will  divide  with  the  view  of  seizing  the  heights  on 
both  of  these  roads."  Then  the  order  set  forth  what  he  hoped 
to  accomplish.  "Holding  these  two  heights,  he  hopes  will 
compel  the  enemy  to  evacuate  the  whole  ridge  between  them." 
It  is  enough  to  say  that  this  change  from  a  single  attack  with 
full  force  upon  our  right,  to  two  weak  and  isolated  attacks  on 
the  right  and  left,  lost  the  battle.  Being  ordered  to  send  "at 
least  a  division,"  Franklin  designated  the  1st  corps  under 
Reynolds  for  the  attack  upon  the  height  at  Hamilton's  Crossing. 
Meade's  division  was  to  lead,  closely  followed  and  supported  by 
Gibbon;  Doubleday's  was  to  protect  the  left  flank  of  the  ad- 
vance, which  was  threatened  by  Stuart's  artillery.  Franklin 
would  have  also  sent  a  portion  of  the  6th  corps,  but  it  had  been 
placed  in  position  for  the  attack  first  planned,  and  time  would 
have  been  lost  by  a  change. 

The  Confederate  right  flank  was  not  well  prepared  to  stand 
the  coming  shock  in  view  of  the  long  warning  it  had  had.  The 
fact  was  that  Jackson's  troops  had  been  in  observation  of  the 
river  below,  and  had  .only  arrived  upon  the  field  on  the  12th. 
Previously  this  flank  had  been  held  only  by  Hood's  division,  and 
during  its  stay,  little  probability  of  attack  had  been  foreseen. 
Consequently,  Hood  made  but  two  works  of  preparation.  On 
the  edge  of  the  woods,  overlooking  the  railroad,  a  trench  had 
been  dug  long  enough  to  hold  a  brigade  and  a  half ;  and  through 
the  thick  wood  500  yards  in  the  rear,  a  road  had  been  cleared, 
affording  communication  behind  the  general  line  which  occupied 
the  wooded  hills. 


FALL   OF    1862  295 

On  the  12th  A.  P.  Hill  was  placed  in  front,  to  cover  about  a 
mile  and  a  half  of  line  with  his  six  brigades.  On  the  extreme 
right  he  posted  14  guns,  and  supported  them  with  half  of  Brocken- 
brough's  brigade.  No  other  position  for  artillery  offered  along 
the  front  until  the  left  of  the  division  was  reached.  Here  12 
guns  were  advanced  north  of  the  railroad,  and  21  more  were 
placed  upon  a  low,  open  hill,  south  of  the  road  some  200  yards  to 
the  left  and  rear,  supported  by  Fender's  brigade.  The  wooded 
hills  between  these  positions  were  held  by  the  four  remaining 
brigades,  but  no  two  of  them  connected  with  each  other.  On 
the  right,  the  other  half  of  Brockenbrough's  and  Archer's  brigade 
occupied  the  trenches  which  had  been  built  by  Hood.  Archer's 
left  rested  on  a  swampy  portion  of  the  wood  overgrown  with 
underbrush,  and  it  had  carelessly  been  assumed  to  be  impass- 
able. Maj.  Von  Borcke,  a  German  officer  on  Stuart's  staff,  had 
suggested  felling  it,  but  it  was  not  thought  worth  while.  On 
the  far  side  of  this  swamp,  Lane's  brigade  took  up  the  line;  the 
gap  between  it  and  Archer's  being  about  500  yards. 

Beyond  Lane  was  another  considerable  gap  to  his  left  and 
rear,  where  Fender's  brigade  was  supporting  the  12  and  21  guns 
before  referred  to.  Behind  Lane,  about  400  yards,  was  Thomas's 
brigade.  The  remaining  brigade  of  the  division,  Gregg's,  was 
placed  in  the  military  road  opposite  the  swamp  and  gap  between 
Archer  and  Lane. 

If  we  call  this  disposition  of  Hill's  troops  one  of  two  lines,  a 
third  line  was  formed  by  the  divisions  of  Early  and  Taliaferro  — 
Early  on  the  right — a  short  distance  in  rear,  and  a  fourth  one  by 
the  division  of  D.  H.  Hill  in  rear  of  that.  Burnside  was  losing 
one  of  the  advantages  of  his  superior  force  by  concentrating  it 
upon  too  short  a  front.  He  was  hemmed  in  on  the  left  by 
Massaponax  Creek,  and  was  confined  to  a  front  attack.  With 
only  a  mile  and  a  half  to  defend  and  with  about  30,000  infantry 
in  hand,  covered  by  the  woods  from  accurate  artillery  fire, 
Jackson  was  very  strong.  With  this  understanding  of  the  posi- 
tions and  forces  the  result  might  have  been  predicted.  The 
faulty  disposition  of  A.  P.  Hill's  division,  with  two  gaps  in  his 
front  line,  would  surely  allow  to  the  enemy  a  temporary  success. 
But  the  strong  reserves  close  at  hand  were  enough  to  restore  the 


296  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

battle,  and  even  induce  a  counter-stroke.  The  counter-stroke, 
however,  must  be  driven  back  with  loss  when  it  ventures  out 
into  the  plain.  With  this  foregone  result  of  the  game  set 
forth,  we  may  now  briefly  describe  the  moves  by  which  it 
was  played  on  the  left,  before  taking  up  the  independent  bat- 
tle to  be  fought  out  during  the  whole  afternoon  by  the  Federal 
right. 

During  the  night  of  the  12th,  the  ground  was  frozen,  and  the 
movements  of  artillery  could  be  plainly  heard  through  the  fog, 
even  before  dawn  brought  the  music  of  bands  and  commands  of 
officers  all  strangely  muffled  but  clearly  audible  in  the  still  air. 
We  were  now  about  to  measure  our  strength  with  the  largest 
and  best-equipped  army  that  had  ever  stood  upon  a  battle-field 
in  America.  But  our  own  army  was  better  organized  and  stronger 
than  ever  before,  and  now,  finding  itself  concentrated  at  exactly 
the  right  moment,  it  was  as  confident  and  elated  as  if  the  vic- 
tory had  already  been  won. 

About  10  A.M.,  the  gradual  clearing  of  the  mist  began  to  reveal 
the  plain,  and  the  Federal  skirmishers  and  guns  began  to  feel 
for  our  positions.  Our  own  guns  took  little  or  no  part  in  this 
preliminary  firing,  saving  themselves  for  the  approach  of  the 
hostile  infantry.  This  was  not  long  delayed,  Meade's  division 
of  three  brigades  taking  the  lead,  supported  by  Gibbon's  divi- 
sion, a  little  in  rear  on  its  right  flank,  and  Doubleday's  on  its 
left.  Some  delay  ensued  in  their  crossing  the  Bowling  Green 
road,  owing  to  the  hedges  and  ditches  lining  it,  which  had  to  be 
made  passable  for  the  artillery,  and  here  the  Confederates  first 
took  the  aggressive.  From  across  the  Massaponax  "  the  gallant 
Pelham,"  as  he  was  called  by  Lee  in  his  report  to  Richmond  for 
the  day,  opened  an  enfilading  fire  upon  the  Federal  lines  with 
two  guns  which  he  had  advanced  within  easy  range.  Meade 
replied  with  12  guns,  and  one  of  Doubleday's  batteries  assisted. 
Pelham  frequently  changed  his  position,  but  kept  up  his  fire  for 
nearly  an  hour  until  ordered  by  Jackson  to  withdraw,  one  gun 
having  been  disabled. 

The  advance  was  now  resumed  until  within  easy  range,  when 
a  furious  cannonade  was  opened  upon  the  Confederate  line,  and 
maintained  for  nearly  an  hour.  To  this  our  guns  made  little 


FALL  OF  1862  297 

reply,  but  both  the  artillery  and  infantry,  concealed  in  the 
woods,  suffered  a  good  many  casualties. 

It  was  now  about  11.30  A.M.,  and  Meade's  infantry  again 
advanced  and  were  soon  within  800  yards  of  the  Confederate 
batteries.  These  opened  with  the  47  guns  in  position  upon  the 
two  flanks,  and  eight  more  sent  out  from  Pendleton's  reserve 
to  Pelham.  Under  this  fire  the  Federal  advance  was  checked, 
and  portions  of  the  line,  which  received  the  brunt  of  it,  were 
driven  back.  Meanwhile,  fresh  guns  were  added  to  the  Federal 
line.  The  artillery  duel  raged  for  over  an  hour,  when  the  Con- 
federate fire  ceased,  the  enemy's  infantry  being  no  longer  in 
sight,  and  the  Confederate  guns  low  in  ammunition. 

Upon  this  check,  Gibbon's  division  was  sent  to  Meade's  sup- 
port and  formed  in  column  of  brigades  on  Meade's  right  flank. 
Meade  had  two  brigades  in  his  front  line,  and  his  remaining 
brigade  in  a  second  line  in  close  support.  Doubleday's  division 
was  moved  up  nearer  behind  Meade's  left,  and  engaged  with 
Stuart's  skirmishers  and  artillery  across  the  Massaponax. 
Birney's  and  Newton's  divisions  of  the  3d  and  6th  corps  were 
also  sent  forward  to  the  Bowling  Green  road  to  support  the 
attack,  which  Meade,  at  1  P.M.,  was  about  to  renew  with  Gibbon 
on  his  right.  So  the  assault  had  a  front  of  three  brigades,  and 
was  three  lines  deep  behind  the  right  brigade;  two  lines  deep 
behind  the  centre  brigade,  and  only  one  line  deep  on  the 
left. 

The  Confederate  artillery  fire  at  once  reopened,  but  in  weaker 
force  than  before,  owing  to  its  losses  and  expenditures,  and  the 
attacking  forces  were  soon  within  musket  range.  Crashes  of 
infantry  now  swelled  the  roar  to  the  proportions  of  a  great 
battle,  mingling  with  a  similar  tumult  which  had  now  broken 
out  in  front  of  Fredericksburg.  The  battle  was  now  on  in  its 
full  force  at  two  points,  nearly  five  miles  apart.  Franklin's  part 
in  it  was  of  the  shortest  duration,  and  will  be  first  told. 

Gibbon's  division  on  Meade's  right  overlapped  the  left  flank 
of  Lane's  brigade,  and  came  in  front  of  the  33  guns  on  A.  P.  Hill's 
left.  The  12  in  advance  had  to  be  withdrawn  to  escape  capture, 
but  Gibbon's  three  brigades  were  able  to  do  no  more  than  to 
fight  their  way  up  to  the  railroad  with  the  loss  of  1267  men ;  the 


298  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

two  foremost  brigades  being  successively  broken  and  reenforced 
by  the  brigade  following. 

On  Meade's  extreme  left,  his  3d  brigade,  under  Gen.  C.  F. 
Jackson,  found  the  artillery  fire  from  the  14-gun  battery  on 
Hill's  right  so  effective  that  it  abandoned  the  direct  advance, 
and,  inclining  to  the  right,  it  moved  behind  Meade's  other 
brigades  and  took  part  in  their  fight,  which  has  now  to  be  de- 
scribed. 

The  marshy  woods  before  referred  to,  which  filled  the  wide 
gap  between  Archer  and  Lane,  extended  in  a  long  triangle  to 
the  front  across  the  railroad.  The  march  of  Meade's  division 
brought  its  right  brigade  into  this  wood,  where  the  men  found 
themselves  free  from  the  Confederate  artillery  fire.  Not  only 
were  they  hidden  from  view,  but  they  were  too  far  to  the  left  for 
the  guns  on  the  right  flank,  and  too  far  to  the  right  for  the  guns 
on  the  left  flank.  It  was  this  immunity  from  fire  which  brought 
C.  F.  Jackson's  brigade  into  the  woods,  and  thus  formed  Meade's 
division  into  a  column  of  three  brigades.  This  column,  without 
firing  a  shot  or  meeting  a  picket,  made  its  way  entirely  through 
the  woods,  until  it  fell  upon  Archer's  left  flank  and  Lane's  right 
flank,  turning  each,  and  capturing  about  300  prisoners.  Archer's 
men  were  so  taken  by  surprise  that  some  of  his  troops  were 
caught  with  their  arms  stacked.  Two  regiments  were  quickly 
routed,  and  it  was  said  that  they  were  fired  on  as  they  retreated 
by  their  own  comrades,  who  believed  them  to  be  deserting  their 
posts  without  cause. 

But  the  other  regiments  of  Archer's  brigade  held  firmly,  repuls- 
ing the  enemy  by  the  help  of  the  troops  on  their  right.  Lane's 
brigade,  attacked  in  front  by  Gibbon's  division  and  its  right 
flank  turned  by  Meade's  through  the  unoccupied  gap,  was  forced 
back  in  the  woods,  until  Thomas's  brigade  came  to  its  support. 
This  soon  restored  the  line.  Of  Meade's  three  brigades,  the 
leading  one  was  drawn  into  these  separate  fights  upon  each  flank, 
while  the  second  brigade  continued  to  push  forward.  In  this  way 
it  advanced  unseen  and  unmolested  for  500  yards,  when  it  came 
upon  the  brigade  of  Gregg  at  rest  in  the  so-called  military  road. 
Meade  immediately  opened  a  hot  fire.  Gregg  could  not  realize 
that  a  Federal  brigade  could  be  so  far  within  our  lines.  He 


FALL  OF  1862  299 

rushed  in  front  of  Orr's  regiment,  beating  up  the  muskets  of  men 
who  were  firing  and  calling  out  that  they  were  firing  on  friends, 
until  he  fell  mortally  wounded.  This  was  the  culmination  of 
the  Federal  attack,  and  its  collapse  came  quickly. 

Orr's  regiment  was  broken,  but  the  rest  of  the  brigade  stood 
firm,  and  changed  front  to  meet  the  Federal  advance.  The 
latter  were  already  in  confusion  when  Lawton's  brigade  came 
to  reenforce  Gregg,  and  the  enemy  was  driven  back  rapidly. 
Hoke's  brigade  was  also  sent  to  the  assistance  of  Archer,  and 
Early's  brigade  to  support  Lane  and  Thomas.  The  whole  Fed- 
eral advance  was  driven  from  the  woods  and  pursued  out  into 
the  plain.  The  troops  of  Archer,  Lane,  and  Thomas,  or  por- 
tions of  them,  joined  in  the  counter-stroke,  and  the  whole  of 
both  Meade's  and  Gibbon's  divisions  were  involved  and  car- 
ried along  with  the  retreat.  But  there  was  no  adequate  debouch- 
ment from  the  dense  woods  for  rapid  advance,  and  when  the 
Confederates,  disorganized  by  the  pursuit,  met  the  fresh  troops 
of  the  enemy,  the  advance  was  checked,  and,  unpursued,  it  fell 
back  to  the  line  of  the  railroad.  Indeed,  the  whole  advance 
beyond  the  railroad  had  been  unwise.  Its  only  result  would 
surely  be  the  loss  of  the  most  daring  of  the  pursuers.  And  the 
loss  of  such  men  from  a  brigade  is  like  the  loss  of  temper  from 
a  blade.1 

The  Federals  made  no  further  effort  on  their  left  during  the 
day,  and  distant  sharp-shooting,  with  intermittent  artillery,  was 

1  In  illustration,  I  quote  from  the  report  of  Col.  Evans,  commanding 
Lawton's  brigade,  as  follows :  — 

"I  cannot  forbear  to  mention  in  terms  of  unqualified  praise  the  heroism 
of  Capt.  E.  P.  Lawton,  Asst.  Adjt.-Gen.  of  the  brigade,  from  the  beginning  of 
the  advance  until  near  the  close  of  the  fight,  when  he  received  a  dangerous 
wound,  and  was  unavoidably  left  in  the  open  plain  where  he  fell.  Cheering 
on  the  men,  leading  this  regiment,  or  restoring  the  line  of  another,  encourag- 
ing officers,  he  was  everywhere  along  the  whole  line,  the  bravest  among  the 
brave.  Just  as  the  four  regiments  emerged  from  the  neck  of  woods  referred 
to,  his  horse  was  shot  under  him,  and,  in  falling,  so  far  disabled  him  that 
thousands,  less  ardent  or  determined,  would  have  felt  justified  in  leaving 
the  field ;  but  limping  on  he  rejoined  the  line  again  in  their  advance  toward 
the  battery,  but  soon  received  the  wound  with  which  he  fell." 

The  wound  unfortunately  proved  mortal.  Gen.  Burnside,  a  few  days 
later,  generously  returned  the  body  to  the  Confederate  lines,  giving  it  an 
escort  of  honor  from  the  hospital  across  the  river. 


300  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

now  the  only  activity  until  near  sundown,  which  occurred  about 
4.45. 

Burnside,  at  1  P.M.,  had  sent  orders  to  Franklin  to  attack  with 
the  6th  corps  on  the  right  of  Gibbon,  and  at  2  P.M.  had  repeated 
the  order  urgently  and  explicitly.  But  about  this  time  Meade 
and  Gibbon  were  driven  back,  and  pursued,  and  put  so  completely 
out  of  action  that  fresh  divisions  had  to  replace  them.  When 
his  left  had  been  made  secure,  Franklin  thought  it  too  late  to 
organize  a  fresh  attack. 

Jackson  had  noted  within  the  Federal  lines  movements  of 
b  troops  and  artillery  with  which  they  were  preparing  themselves 
to  resist  further  attack.  He  had  misinterpreted  them,  and 
supposed  them  to  be  preparations  for  a  renewed  assault.  His 
appetite  for  battle  had  not  been  satisfied,  and  seeing  the  heavy 
force  at  the  enemy's  disposal,  he  could  not  believe  that  they 
would  be  content  with  an  affair  of  only  two  or  three  divisions. 
He  accordingly  waited  to  receive  the  expected  assault,  and 
finally,  when  it  did  not  materialize,  he  determined  to  take  the 
offensive  himself.  Apparently,  he  did  not  yet  fully  appreciate 
that  the  enemy's  position  was  practically  a  citadel.  But  he 
fortunately  discovered  it  in  time.  While  his  assault  was  being 
prepared,  he  had  indulged  in  some  preliminary  cannonading, 
\which  had  put  the  enemy  fully  on  the  alert.^,Jn  his  official  re- 
port, he  writes :  — 

"In  order  to  guard  against  disaster  the  infantry  was  to  be  preceded  by 
artillery,  and  the  movement  postponed  until  later  in  the  evening,  so 
that,  if  compelled  to  retire,  it  would  be  under  the  cover  of  night.  Owing 
to  unexpected  delays  the  movement  could  not  be  gotten  ready  until  late 
in  the  evening.  The  first  gun  had  hardly  moved  forward  from  the  wood 
100  yards  when  the  enemy's  artillery  reopened,  and  so  completely  swept 
our  front  as  to  satisfy  me  that  the  proposed  movement  should  be  aban- 
doned." 

A.  P.  Hill's  division,  which  bore  the  brunt  of  the  fighting  on 
the  13th,  out  of  11,000,  lost  2122  men.  Early 's,  which  came  to 
his  support,  lost  932  out  of  7500.  The  other  divisions  lost  less 
than  200  each,  principally  from  the  heavy  artillery  fire  which 
the  enemy  threw  into  the  woods.  Meade's  division,  out  of  5000, 
lost  1853,  and  Gibbon  lost  1267.  So  the  casualties  of  the  two 


FALL  OF   1862 


301 


fighting  divisions  on  each  side  were  nearly  balanced;  the  Con- 
federate loss  being  3054  out  of  about  18,500  engaged,  and  the 
Federal,  3120  out  of  about  10,000  engaged. 

We  will  now  take  up  affairs  at  Fredericksburg.  In  his  plans 
on  the  12th,  Burnside  had  not  proposed  a  direct  attack  from  the 
town,  but  on  the  13th,  as  already  told,  had  directed  Sumner  to 
prepare  to  assault  Marye's  Hill  with  at  least  two  divisions,  but 


he  was  not  to  advance  until  Burnside  gave  the  order.  At  first  he 
proposed  to  give  it  only  when  Franklin  had  gotten  possession 
of  the  hill  at  Hamilton's  Crossing;  but  about  10.30,  becoming 
impatient,  he  delayed  no  longer. 

The  selection  of  the  point  of  attack  immediately  opposite  the 
town  was  perhaps  influenced  by  the  shelter  afforded  the  troops 
within  the  town.  But  it  was  a  fatal  mistake.  The  most  ob- 
vious, and  the  proper  attack  for  the  Federal  right,  was  one  turn- 


302  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

ing  the  Confederate  left  along  the  very  edge  of  the  river  above 
Falmouth,  supported  by  artillery  on  the  north  bank  which  could 
enfilade  and  take  in  reverse  the  Confederate  left  flank.  This 
attack  is  indicated  by  the  concave  north  bank  of  the  river,  and 
it  offered  the  easiest  proposition  to  the  Federals  of  the  whole 
topography. 

Sumner's  grand  division  numbered  about  27,000  on  the  field. 
Hooker's  grand  division  had  not  yet  been  brought  across  the 
river,  except  the  two  divisions  supporting  Franklin.  The  other 
four  (Whipple  of  the  3d  corps,  and  Griffin,  Sykes,  and  Humphreys 
of  the  5th)  were  held  near  the  upper  bridges,  and  were  all  brought 
across  during  the  day.  They  numbered  about  26,000.  Burn- 
side's  position  during  the  battle  was  at  the  Phillips  house,  on  a 
commanding  hill  a  mile  north  of  the  river.  Lee  made  his  head- 
quarters on  a  hill,  since  called  Lee's  Hill,  overlooking  Hazel 
Run  and  the  eastern  half  of  the  field  in  front  of  the  town. 
Two  30-Pr.  Parrott  rifles  were  located  in  pits  on  this  hill,  and 
were  used  with  good  effect  upon  the  enemy  advancing  from  the 
lower  part  of  the  town,  until  one  exploded  at  its  39th  round, 
and  the  other  at  its  54th. 

Here  Lee  and  Longstreet  stood  during  most  of  the  fighting, 
and  it  is  told  that,  on  one  of  the  Federal  repulses  from  Marye's 
Hill,  Lee  put  his  hand  upon  Longstreet's  arm  and  said,  "It  is 
well  that  war  is  so  terrible,  or  we  would  grow  too  fond  of  it." 

Sumner's  advance  from  the  town  began  about  noon.  With 
skirmishers  in  front,  French  moved  his  brigades  by  parallel  streets, 
and,  crossing  on  bridges  the  little  canal  (about  20  feet  wide  and 
four  feet  deep)  some  300  yards  from  the  town,  they  formed  suc- 
cessively for  the  attack  in  a  considerable  sheltered  area,  between 
the  canal  and  the  low  bluff  of  a  plateau  which  extended  to  the 
front  some  400  to  500  yards  from  the  sunken  road  at  the  foot 
of  Marye's  Hill. 

The  three  brigades  of  French  formed  in  the  order  —  Kimball, 
Andrews,  Palmer.  In  close  support  came  Hancock  with  Zook, 
Meagher,  and  Caldwell.  Howard's  division  was  also  brought 
out  from  the  town  as  a  further  support.  There  was  no  special 
difficulty  in  coming  from  the  town  and  getting  under  cover  in 
the  sheltered  area  above  described,  although  it  was  done  under 


303 

fire  of  our  artillery.  The  real  trouble  would  lie  in  advancing 
about  400  yards  across  the  plateau  to  the  sunken  road.  There 
was  no  intervening  abattis  or  ditch,  but  there  were  some  small 
houses,  gardens,  and  fences,  affording  some  shelter,  but  break- 
ing the  continuity  of  the  ranks.  These  two  divisions  numbered 
about  9000  men. 

The  front  line  of  the  Confederate  defence  was  held  by  three 
Ga.  regiments  in  the  sunken  Telegraph  road,  the  18th,  24th,  and 
Philip's  legion  of  Cobb's  brigade.  The  24th  N.C.  of  Ransom's 
held  an  infantry  trench,  which  extended  from  the  Telegraph  to 
the  Plank  road. 

On  the  crest  of  the  hill  above  the  road  were  four  12-Pr.  guns, 
two  12-Pr.  howitzers,  and  three  10-Pr.  rifles,  comprising  the  three 
batteries  of  the  New  Orleans  Washington  artillery  under  Col. 
Walton.  On  the  left  of  the  Plank  road  were  four  guns  of  Maurin's 
battery,  in  pits,  and,  at  Stansbury's  house,  Parker's  battery  of 
Alexander's  battalion,  with  four  guns,  found  positions  during  the 
afternoon  to  fire  upon  the  enemy's  right  flank.  His  left  flank 
was  also  partially  exposed  to  the  fire  of  the  two  Parrotts  on  Lee's 
Hill.  The  infantry  in  the  sunken  road  and  ditch  numbered  at 
the  commencement  of  the  action  only  about  2000 ;  but  in  sup- 
port behind  Marye's  Hill  were  about  7000  more,  most  of  whom 
were  brought  into  action  later. 

As  each  of  the  six  brigades  at  short  intervals  was  advanced 
over  the  crest  of  the  plateau,  it  met  the  Confederate  fire.  Kim- 
ball's  brigade  led,  and  no  brigade  during  the  day  advanced 
farther,  and  but  few  as  far.  But  he  was  wounded,  and  his  brigade 
repulsed  with  a  loss  of  520  men  within  20  minutes.  Andrew's 
brigade  followed,  and  was  likewise  driven  back  with  the  loss  of 
342.  Palmer,  who  came  next,  lost  291.  The  whole  loss  of  the 
division  (including  its  artillery  which  fired  from  the  edge  of  the 
town)  was  1160.  About  this  time  Ransom,  seeing  preparations 
for  further  attack,  reenforced  his  line  by  Cooke's  brigade.  The 
27th  N.C.  took  position  in  the  sunken  road,  and  the  15th,  46th, 
and  48th  occupied  the  crest  of  the  hill,  giving  a  second  tier  of 
infantry  fire. 

The  remnants  of  French's  division,  extending  to  right  and 
left,  took  shelter  in  slight  undulations  and  kept  up  fire  both  at 


304  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

the  Confederate  guns  and  infantry.  Hancock's  division  soon 
followed  French's  and  with  a  similar  experience,  but  more  pro- 
longed and  bloody.  His  leading  brigade,  Zook's,  lost  527.  The 
second,  Meagher's,  lost  545,  and  the  third,  Caldwell's,  lost  952. 
The  loss  of  the  division  was  2032.  The  battle  at  this  point  had 
developed  into  a  fearful  example  of  successive  attacks  by  small 
forces;  the  same  vicious  game  which  had  lost  2d  Manassas  and 
Sharpsburg.  But  Burnside  was  now  obstinate,  and  was  order- 
ing in  fresh  troops  upon  each  of  his  two  battle-fields.  The  turn 
of  Howard's  division  came  next.  He  had  been  at  first  directed 
to  attack  upon  his  right  of  the  Plank  road,  and  was  preparing  to 
do  so,  when  Hancock  called  for  supports,  and  Howard  was 
diverted  to  the  same  field.  His  leading  brigade,  Owen's,  did 
not  push  its  assault  so  far  as  to  be  broken  by  the  Confederate  fire, 
but  laid  down  where  it  could  find  a  little  cover.  It  was  able  here 
to  hold  its  position  until  relieved  after  nightfall.  His  losses 
were  258.  Howard's  second  brigade  was  Hall's,  which  was  sent 
upon  its  charge  somewhat  to  the  right  of  the  ground  covered  by 
the  preceding  charges.  He  was  broken,  rallied,  charged  again, 
and  was  again  driven  back,  when  he  also  found  shelter,  halted  his 
command,  and  held  on  until  night,  having  lost  515  men. 

Howard's  third  brigade  was  Sully's,  which  was  kept  in  reserve, 
and  two  regiments  sent  to  reenforce  Owens,  and  one  to  Hall. 
The  losses  in  this  brigade  reached  122.  Howard's  entire  loss 
was  914.  Couch's  whole  corps  had  now  been  practically  wrecked 
with  a  loss  of  4114  men,  in  fighting  eight  separate  battles  with 
his  nine  brigades,  against  a  force  not  half  his  size,  all  within 
four  hours. 

Next  to  the  left  of  Couch's  corps  was  the  9th,  under  Willcox. 
Sturgis's  division  of  two  brigades  was  on  its  right,  occupying  the 
lower  portion  of  the  city.  Next  came  Getty's  division  of  two 
brigades  under  cover  of  the  bluffs  at  the  mouth  of  Hazel  Run. 
Burns's  division  of  three  brigades  on  the  left  connected  with 
Franklin  at  Deep  Run,  and  was  under  his  orders.  During  the 
day  Burns  went  across  Deep  Run  to  Franklin's  support. 

When  French's  division  was  advanced,  Sturgis  was  ordered  to 
support  it  upon  its  left.  He  threw  forward  Dickenson's  battery 
and  Ferrero's  brigade.  The  battery  received  a  heavy  fire  from 


FALL  OF  1862  305 

guns  on  and  near  Lee's  Hill,  and  was  soon  disabled  and  with- 
drawn, Dickenson  being  killed.  Ferrero  advanced  from  the  lower 
part  of  the  city  to  the  left  of  the  ground  over  which  French  and 
Hancock  had  fought.  He  did  not  have  the  canal  to  cross,  as  it 
terminated  near  the  railroad.  He  met  a  severe  fire,  however, 
and  finding  depressions  of  ground  in  which  his  troops  could  get 
cover,  his  brigade  occupied  them  for  the  rest  of  the  day  and  fired 
from  60  to  200  rounds  per  man  at  the  Confederate  lines  and 
batteries. 

Sturgis's  second  brigade,  under  Nagle,  about  an  hour  later, 
was  ordered  to  support  Sturgis's  on  the  left.  After  some  delay 
in  crossing  ravines,  this  brigade  also  found  cover  somewhat  to 
Ferrero's  rear,  which  it  occupied  and  joined  in  the  fire  upon  the 
Confederate  lines  until  dark. 

Ferrero's  casualties  were  491  and  Nagle's  500.  About  3  P.M., 
Ferrero  having  asked  for  reinforcements,  and  Griffin's  division 
having  reported  as  support  to  the  9th  corps,  Barnes's  brigade, 
of  that  division,  was  sent  in  over  the  same  ground  that  Ferrero 
had  traversed.  This  brigade  also  made  a  gallant  advance,  but 
finally  took  cover  with  the  loss  of  500. 

Meanwhile,  Whipple's  division  of  the  3d  corps,  of  two  brigades, 
which  had  been  placed  at  the  upper  end  of  the  town  to  guard 
the  right  flank,  having  no  enemy  close  in  front,  sent  Carroll's 
brigade  to  support  Sturgis.  Griffin  placed  Sweitzer's  brigade 
on  the  right  of  Carroll,  and  sent  forward  the  two  brigades  sup- 
porting them  with  Stockton's  brigade,  the  last  of  his  division. 

This  charge  of  Griffin's  was  the  eleventh  separate  effort  made 
up  to  this  time.  But  the  infantry  fire  met  was  now  being  con- 
stantly increased,  the  Telegraph  road  affording  the  opportunity. 
Cobb  had  been  killed  and  Cooke,  soon  after,  severely  wounded 
early  in  the  affair.  On  the  latter  event,  Kershaw  with  his  bri- 
gade was  ordered  up,  and  about  the  same  time,  Ransom  brought 
up  the  remaining  three  regiments  of  his  brigade.  Some  of  these 
troops  doubled  upon  those  already  in  the  sunken  road,  until 
there  were  six  ranks.  These  were  effectively  handled  by  Ker- 
shaw in  person.  Others  took  the  best  partial  cover  they  could 
find  about  the  top  and  slopes  of  the  hill,  whence  their  fire  con- 
tributed to  that  from  the  sunken  road.  There  the  six  ranks 


306  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

fired  successive  volleys  from  each  rank,  with  only  a  few  seconds' 
intervals.  A  regiment  from  Jenkins's  brigade  was  also  advanced 
down  the  right  bank  of  Hazel  Run,  reenforcing  a  company  of 
sharp-shooters  which  had  been  doing  fine  service  all  day  upon 
the  enemy's  flanks. 

Under  this  increased  fire  Griffin's  charge  differed  but  little  in 
its  results  from  those  immediately  preceding  it.  The  men  ad- 
vanced as  far  as  they  could  find  some  partial  protection,  and  there 
they  laid  down.  Carroll's  brigade  here  lost  118;  Sweitzer's 
222;  and  Stockton's  201.  It  was  now  nearly  four  o'clock  and 
there  came  a  comparative  lull  in  the  conflict.  But  Hooker 
was  under  orders  to  attack  with  his  whole  force,  and  he  had  yet 
intact  Humphreys's  and  Sykes's  divisions  of  the  5th  corps.  Even 
before  Griffin's  charge,  Hooker  had  looked  at  the  field,  and  be- 
come so  convinced  that  the  Confederate  line  could  not  be  carried, 
that  he  had  sent  an  aid  to  Burnside  to  say  that  he  advised 
against  attack.  The  answer  came  that  the  attack  must  be  made. 
Hooker,  however,  considered  it  a  duty  to  his  troops  to  make  a 
fuller  explanation,  and  endeavored  to  dissuade  Burnside  from 
what  he  was  sure  would  be  a  hopeless  effort.  Burnside  still 
insisted  that  the  position  must  be  carried  before  night. 

Hooker,  accordingly,  returned  and  began  to  prepare  for  the 
attack  by  advancing  as  many  batteries  as  could  be  located  on  the 
edge  of  the  town,  and  even  sending  two,  Hazard's  and  Frank's, 
across  the  canal,  where  they  opened  with  a  range  of  less  than  300 
yards. 

While  these  preparations  were  going  on,  the  troops  holding 
the  hollows  and  undulations  in  front,  where  they  had  found  shelter 
when  the  charges  had  been  repulsed,  reported  that  the  Confed- 
erates were  withdrawing  from  their  positions.  This  report  was 
quickly  spread  and  reached  Couch,  who  said  to  Humphreys, 
"Hancock  reports  the  enemy  is  falling  back.  Now  is  the  time 
for  you  to  go  in."  * 

1  This  false  impression  doubtless  arose  from  seeing  the  nine  guns  on  the 
crest  of  Marye's  Hill  limber  up,  and  leave  the  hill.  When  the  lull  in  the 
firing  occurred,  Walton  had  requested  Alexander's  battalion  to  relieve  his 
guns,  which  had  nearly  exhausted  their  ammunition.  Nine  fresh  guns  were 
quickly  moved  up.  Walton's  guns  were  withdrawn  to  give  clear  roads,  and 
the  reliefs  replaced  them  at  a  gallop.  These  movements  were  seen  by  the 
enemy  and  thought  to  be  the  beginning  of  a  retreat. 


FALL  OF  1862  307 

Humphreys's  division  was  composed  of  two  brigades,  Alla- 
bach's and  Tyler's,  and  it  went  into  action  4500  strong.  It 
was  already  under  urgent  orders  to  attack.  Allabach's  brigade 
was  in  front,  and  Tyler's  in  motion  to  get  upon  its  right  flank. 

Now,  without  waiting  for  Tyler,  Humphreys  ordered  Alla- 
bach  to  advance,  and,  throwing  themselves  in  front,  he  and 
Allabach  led  the  charge.  In  about  200  yards  they  reached  the 
continuous  line  now  formed  of  the  fragments  of  the  preceding 
charges,  lying  down  where  they  could  find  cover.  Here,  in  spite 
of  all  their  efforts,  Allabach's  troops  also  laid  down  and  began 
to  fire.  Humphreys  could  now  see  the  Confederate  line,  and 
appreciated  that  it  was  so  covered  that  fire  against  it  was  of  little 
effect.  With  some  difficulty  and  delay  he  succeeded  in  check- 
ing the  fire  of  his  men,  got  them  on  their  feet,  and  again  started 
to  advance.  Up  to  this  point  his  line  had  had  partial  cover,  but 
now  for  150  yards  there  was  none.  They  advanced  for  50  yards 
and  then  broke,  a  part  stopping  with  the  line  of  remnants,  and 
the  remainder  were  rallied  near  the  canal. 

Tyler's  brigade  after  a  little  delay  was  formed  in  a  double  line 
of  battle  on  the  left  of  Allabach's  position.  It  had  first  moved 
to  the  right,  but  there  met  enfilading  fire  of  artillery,  and  it  was 
withdrawn  to  the  left.  Humphreys  joined  it  and  ordered  the 
charge  to  be  made  with  the  bayonet  alone,  and  that  the  men 
should  pass  directly  over  the  line  of  those  lying  down. 

Meanwhile,  as  sundown  approached,  Burnside's  orders  had 
grown  urgent  that  the  position  should  be  carried  before  dark. 
Getty's  division  of  the  9th  corps,  two  brigades,  from  the  left  on 
Hazel  Run,  was  ordered  to  assault,  but  no  steps  were  taken  to 
have  it  simultaneous  with  that  of  Humphreys. 

Had  there  been  time,  Humphreys,  from  his  experience  with 
Allabach,  would  have  preferred  to  first  clear  his  path  of  the  line. 
of  men  lying  down,  already  spoken  of.  Not  only  were  they 
physically  much  in  the  way,  but  even  more  were  they  a  moral 
obstacle.  A  repulsed  line,  which  is  not  ready  to  join  in  a  fresh 
assault,  does  not  at  all  like  a  new  line  to  pass  over  it,  for  it  seems 
a  reflection  upon  their  courage.  They  are  apt  to  do  all  they  can 
to  discourage  and  obstruct  the  newcomers,  and  the  latter  can- 
not fail  to  appreciate  that  an  advance,  leaving  a  large  force 


308  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

behind,  is  very  liable  to  receive  fire  from  the  rear,  intended  to 
go  over  their  heads,  but  likely  to  land  a  good  many  bullets  in 
their  backs.  And,  even  if  this  does  not  happen,  a  false  alarm 
of  "fire  from  the  rear,"  is  almost  sure  to  occur. 

Under  the  conditions  confronting  him,  Humphreys's  charge 
was  utterly  hopeless,  and  should  never  have  been  made.  But 
it  illustrated  a  high  type  of  disciplined  valor,  and,  but  for  the 
men  lying  down,  might  have  crossed  bayonets  with  the  Con- 
federates. The  six  ranks  of  seasoned  veterans  in  the  road, 
however,  could  scarcely  have  been  overcome  by  those  who 
would  arrive. 

With  all  its  officers  in  front,  led  by  Humphreys  and  Tyler,  and 
with  a  loud  hurrah,  which  was  a  signal  to  our  guns  on  the  hill 
to  put  in  rapid  work  from  full  chests  of  canister,  Tyler's  brigade 
now  made  a  rapid  advance  under  what,  in  his  official  report, 
Humphreys  called  "the  heaviest  fire  yet  opened,  which  poured 
upon  it  from  the  moment  it  first  rose  from  the  ravine."  They 
came  in  two  lines,  quite  close  together,  and  without  firing  a  shot. 
A  more  beautiful  charge  is  not  recorded  in  the  annals  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac. 

Its  experiences,  as  told  in  the  official  reports  both  of  Hum- 
phreys and  Tyler,  are  instructive.  Humphreys  writes :  — 

"As  the  brigade  reached  the  masses  of  men  referred  to,  every  effort 
was  made  by  the  latter  to  prevent  our  advance.  They  called  to  our  men 
not  to  go  forward,  and  some  attempted  to  prevent  by  force  their  doing  so. 
The  effect  upon  my  command  was  what  I  apprehended. .  .  .  The  line  was 
somewhat  disordered,  and,  in  part,  was  forced  to  fall  into  a  column, 
but  still  advanced  rapidly.  The  fire  of  the  enemy's  musketry  and  artil- 
lery, furious  as  it  was  before,  now  became  still  hotter.  The  stone  wall 
was  a  sheet  of  flame  that  enveloped  the  head  and  flanks  of  the  column. 
Officers  and  men  were  falling  rapidly,  and  the  head  of  the  column  was  at 
length  brought  to  a  stand  when  close  up  to  the  wall.  Up  to  this  time 
not  a  shot  had  been  fired  by  the  column,  but  now  some  firing  began.  It 
lasted  but  a  minute,  when,  in  spite  of  all  our  efforts,  the  column  turned  and 
began  to  retire  slowly.  I  attempted  to  rally  the  brigade  behind  the  natu- 
ral embankment,  so  often  mentioned,  but  the  united  efforts  of  Gen.  Tyler, 
myself,  our  staffs,  and  the  other  officers  could  not  arrest  the  retiring  mass. 
My  efforts  were  the  less  effective,  since  I  was  again  dismounted,  my  sec- 
ond horse  having  been  killed  under  me.  .  .  .  Our  loss  in  both  brigades 
was  heavy,  exceeding  1000  in  killed  and  wounded,  including  in  the  number 


FALL  OF  1862  309 

officers  of  high  rank.  The  greater  part  of  the  loss  occurred  during  the  brief 
time  they  were  charging  and  retiring,  which  scarcely  occupied  more  than 
10  or  15  minutes  for  each  brigade." 

Tyler's  report  says :  — 

"The  brigade  moved  forward,  hi  as  good  order  as  the  muddy  condition 
of  the  ground  on  the  left  of  my  line  would  admit,  until  we  came  upon  a 
body  of  officers  and  men  lying  flat  upon  the  ground  in  front  of  the  brick 
house,  and  along  the  slight  elevation  on  its  right  and  left.  Upon  our  ap- 
proach the  officers  commanded  halt,  flourishing  their  swords  as  they 
lay,  while  a  number  of  their  men  tried  to  intimidate  our  troops  by  crying 
out  that  we  would  be  slaughtered,  etc.  An  effort  was  made  to  get  them  out 
of  the  way,  but  failed,  and  we  marched  over  them.  When  we  were  within 
a  very  short  distance  of  the  enemy's  line,  a  fire  was  opened  on  our  rear, 
wounding  a  few  of  my  most  valuable  officers,  and,  I  regret  to  say,  killing 
some  of  our  men.  Instantaneously  the  cry  ran  along  our  lines  that  we 
were  being  fired  into  from  the  rear.  The  column  halted,  receiving  at  the 
same  tune  a  terrible  fire  from  the  enemy.  Orders  for  the  moment  were 
forgotten,  and  a  fire  from  our  whole  line  was  immediately  returned.  An- 
other cry  passed  along  the  line,  that  we  were  being  fired  upon  from  the  rear, 
when  our  brave  men,  after  giving  the  enemy  several  volleys,  fell  back." 

Besides  suffering  from  the  infantry  fire  of  their  own  men  in  the 
rear,  the  Federal  column,  or  portions  of  it,  also  believed  that 
the  Federal  artillery  above  Falmouth,  which  kept  up  a  constant 
long-range  fire  with  their  heavy  rifles  upon  the  Confederate 
position,  had  mistaken  localities  and  was  landing  its  projectiles 
in  the  Federal  ranks.  Couch  writes  of  this  charge  of  Hum- 
phreys's  division,  as  follows,  in  the  Century  Magazine:  — 

"The  musketry  fire  was  very  heavy  and  the  artillery  fire  was  simply 
terrible.  I  sent  word  several  times  to  our  artillery  on  the  right  of  Fal- 
mouth that  they  were  firing  into  us  and  were  tearing  our  men  to  pieces. 
I  thought  they  had  made  a  mistake  in  the  range,  but  I  learned  later  that 
the  fire  came  from  the  guns  of  the  enemy  on  their  extreme  left." 

This  fire  came  from  Parker's  battery,  of  my  battalion,  located 
near  the  Stansbury  house.  The  losses  in  Allabach's  brigade  were 
officially  reported  as  562,  and  those  in  Tyler's  as  454. 

The  attacks  by  these  brigades  were  the  twelfth  and  thirteenth 
separate  charges  of  the  day,  and  there  was  still  one  to  follow. 

Getty's  division,  comprising  Hawkins's  and  Harland's  brigades, 
received  orders  to  attack  about  the  same  time  that  Humphreys 
was  arranging  his  attack.  Being  near  the  mouth  of  Hazel  Run, 


310  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

they  had  farther  to  advance  before  reaching  the  field,  and  only 
arrived  upon  it  after  Tyler  was  repulsed.  They  had  not  been 
engaged  during  the  day,  but  had  suffered  some  casualties  from 
premature  explosions  of  Federal  shell  fired  from  the  hills  across 
the  river.  Hawkins's  brigade  led,  advancing  by  right  of  com- 
panies as  far  as  the  railroad,  where  the  brigade  line  was  re- 
formed and  a  fresh  start  taken,  directed  at  the  southern  ex- 
tremity of  Marye's  Hill.  Harland's  brigade  was  to  follow  in 
similar  formation. 

In  view  of  the  lateness  of  the  hour,  this  charge  was  even  more 
hopeless  than  any  of  the  preceding.  Hawkins  had  protested 
against  it  before  starting,  but  the  orders  were  explicit.  By  the 
time  that  the  division  crossed  the  railroad,  it  was  so  dark  that 
distinct  vision  was  limited  to  a  few  hundred  feet.  The  first 
portion  of  the  march  was  unobserved  by  the  Confederates,  and 
the  line  rapidly  advanced  until  it  came  to  marshy  ground, 
through  which  ran  a  ditch  to  Hazel  Run.  Here  they  opened 
fire,  and  their  position  was  defined  to  the  Confederates  by  the  . 
flashes  of  their  muskets,  and  infantry  and  artillery  replied  from 
Marye's  Hill,  from  across  Hazel  Run,  and  from  guns  upon  Lee's 
Hill.  They  crossed  the  ditch,  however,  and  had  advanced 
quite  close  to  the  sunken  road,  when  suddenly  the  infantry  in  it 
opened  fire,  and,  at  the  same  time,  fire  was  opened  upon  them 
from  the  right  and  rear  by  the  line  of  Federals  lying  down,  in 
front  of  whom  their  advance  from  the  left  had  brought  them. 
Hawkins  thus  describes  the  scene :  — 

"When  the  brigade  arrived  at  this  cut  [ditch]  it  received  an  enfilading 
fire  from  the  enemy's  artillery  and  infantry,  but,  notwithstanding,  the 
plateau  on  the  other  side  was  gained,  the  left  of  the  line  advancing  till 
within  about  10  yards  of  a  stone  wall,  behind  which  a  heavy  infantry  force 
of  the  enemy  was  concealed,  which  opened  an  increased  artillery  and  in- 
fantry fire,  and,  in  addition  to  this,  the  brigade  received  the  fire  of  the 
83d  Pa.  Volunteers  and  of  the  20th  Me.  Volunteers  who  were  on 
the  left  of  Gen.  Couch's  line,  which  our  right  had  overlapped.  This 
firing  from  all  quarters,  and  from  all  directions,  I  should  think,  lasted  about 
seven  minutes,  when  I  succeeded  in  stopping  it  and  then  discovered  that 
the  greatest  confusion  existed.  Everybody,  from  the  smallest  drummer 
boy  up,  seemed  to  be  shouting  to  the  full  of  his  capacity.  After  consider- 
able exertion,  comparative  quiet  and  order  were  restored,  and  the  com- 
mand re-formed  along  the  canal  cut  [ditch].  I  then  reported  to  you  for 


FALL  OF   1862  311 

further  orders,  and  you  ordered  the  command  withdrawn,  and  placed  in  its 
former  position  in  the  town." 

Getty  not  only  showed  good  judgment  in  withdrawing  Haw- 
kins's brigade  on  the  first  opportunity,  but  ho  had  done 
even  better  with  Harland's  brigade,  for  he  halted  it  near  the 
railroad,  and  did  not  permit  it  to  participate  in  the  charge. 
Sykes's  division  was  also  held  in  reserve  on  the  edge  of  the  town, 
behind  Humphreys,  and  at  11  P.M.  was  sent  across  the  canal, 
where  it  relieved  the  remnants  of  all  of  the  brigades  which  had 
made  their  advances  from  that  quarter. 

The  Confederate  fire  soon  ceased  when  the  flashes  of  the 
enemy's  guns  no  longer  gave  targets.  The  losses  in  Hawkins's 
brigade  had  been  255,  in  Harland's  they  were  41. 

Among  the  Confederates,  no  one  conceived  that  the  battle  was 
over,  for  less  than  half  our  army  had  been  engaged,  only  four  out 
of  nine  divisions.  It  was  not  thought  possible  that  Burnside 
would  confess  defeat  by  retreating. 

Burnside  himself,  however,  was  far  from  having  given  up  the 
battle,  and,  though  many  prominent  officers  advised  against  it,  he 
determined  to  renew  the  attack  at  dawn.  He  proposed  to  form 
the  whole  9th  corps  into  a  column  of  regiments  and  to  lead  it  in 
person  upon  Marye's  Hill. 

He  came  across  the  river  after  the  fighting  ceased,  gave  the 
necessary  orders,  and  returned  to  the  Phillips  house  about  1  A.M. 
He  found  there  waiting  for  him  Hawkins,  who  had  made  the  last 
charge,  and  who  had  now  come  at  the  request  of  Willcox,  Hum- 
phreys, Meade,  Getty,  and  others  to  protest  against  the  pro- 
posed attack,  and  to  give  information  about  the  situation,  which 
it  was  supposed  that  Burnside  did  not  possess.  A  long  conference 
ensued  in  the  presence  of  Sumner,  Hooker,  and  Franklin,  the 
commanders  of  the  three  grand  divisions.  On  their  unani- 
mous advice,  verbal  orders  were  sent  countermanding  the  pro- 
posed assault.  Before  these  could  be  delivered,  many  preparatory 
movements  were  under  way.  And  while  they  were  in  progress, 
a  courier  bearing  orders  which  disclosed  Burnside's  plan,  becom- 
ing lost  in  the  darkness,  wandered  up  to  our  picket-line.  He  was 
captured,  and  his  orders  were  found  and  taken  to  Longstreet  and 
Lee.  Notice  was  at  once  sent  along  our  lines,  with  instructions 


312  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

to  extend  and  strengthen  OUT  intrenchments,  and  to  make  all 
necessary  preparations  of  ammunition,  water,  and  provisions, 
which  was  vigorously  set  about  with  no  suspicion  that  Burnside 
would  disappoint  us. 

So  on  the  14th,  when,  at  dawn,  the  Confederates  stood  to  arms, 
they  looked  and  listened  in  vain  for  signs  of  the  fresh  assaults 
which  the  captured  order  had  led  them  to  expect.  About  10 
o'clock,  the  morning  fog  began  to  lighten,  and  a  vicious  sharp- 
shooting  sprang  up.  Sykes's  regulars  were  now  in  our  front,  and 
the  guns  from  the  Stafford  hills  kept  up  a  slow  target  practice  at 
our  lines,  to  which  we  made  no  reply. 

The  day  passed  without  serious  hostilities.  During  the  after- 
noon some  of  their  shells  prematurely  exploding,  caused  orders 
to  be  issued  not  to  fire  any  more  at  our  position  about  Marye's 
Hill. 

During  the  night  of  the  14th,  we  received  ammunition  from 
Richmond,  and  Longstreet  authorized  a  moderate  fire  on  the 
15th,  to  suppress  the  sharp-shooting.  During  the  night,  also,  we 
had  located  two  guns  on  our  left  where  they  could  enfilade 
the  sheltered  position,  in  front  of  the  canal,  from  which  the 
Federal  attacks  had  come. 

So,  on  the  15th,  our  position  was  agreeably  improved.  A  few 
shots,  raking  the  depressions  in  which  the  enemy  had  so  far 
found  shelter,  routed  the  picket  reserves.  A  single  shot  into  a 
loopholed  brick  tannery  on  the  Plank  road,  silenced  it,  and  for 
the  rest  of  the  day  nothing  annoyed  us,  and  we  worked  openly  at 
our  defences. 

The  night  of  the  15th  was  dark  and  rainy,  with  high  wind 
from  the  south,  preventing  us  from  hearing  noises  from  the 
enemy's  direction.  During  the  night  Burnside  safely  with- 
drew across  the  river.  Commencing  his  movement  at  7  P.M., 
his  whole  enormous  force  was  across  in  12  hours  of  a  stormy 
night.  It  was  a  great  feat,  and  its  successful  performance,  un- 
molested, under  our  guns,  reflects  badly  upon  the  vigilance  of 
the  Confederates.  It  should  have  been  suspected,  discovered  by 
scouts,  and  vigorously  attacked  with  artillery. 

On  the  morning  of  the  15th,  both  Hooker  on  the  right  and 
Franklin  on  the  left  had  applied  to  Burnside  for  permission  to 


FALL  OF  1862 


313 


send  a  flag  of  truce  and  recover  the  wounded  in  their  respective 
fronts.  It  seems  that  Hooker's  request  was  refused,  for  no  flag 
was  here  shown.  But  on  Franklin's  front  an  informal  arrange- 
ment was  made  by  which  all  picket  firing  ceased,  and  the  Federal 
ambulances  and  burial  parties  were  allowed  to  remove  the  dead 
and  wounded  in  front  of  our  pickets,  and  our  own  men  brought 
forward  and  delivered  those  who  had  fallen  within  our  lines. 
On  the  16th,  when  the  city  was  evacuated,  very  few  of  the 
wounded  who  had  fallen  on  the  13th  in  front  of  the  town 
were  found  alive. 

The  Federal  guns  were,  generally,  still  in  position  on  the  hills 
on  the  north  side,  and  a  few  spiteful  shells  were  thrown  by 
them  in  ;the  $$tly  hours,  but,  before  noon,  the  pickets  of  both 
sides  were  peacefully  reestablished. 

The  whole  action  resolved  itself  into  two  separate  offen- 
sive battles  by  the  Federals,  one  on  their  right  and  one  on  their 
left,  with  some  unimportant  skirmishing  in  the  centre.  The 
forces  present  or  near  at  hand  on  each  field,  and  the  losses,  may 
be  divided  about  as  follows :  — 


FEDERAL 
RIGHT 
ATTACK 

FEDERAL 
CENTRE 
SKIRMISH 

FEDERAL 

LEFT 
ATTACK 

AGGREGATE 

Federal 

Forces 
Losses 

51,623 

7,817 

13,735 
383 

39,337 
4,447 

104,695 
12,647 

Confederate 

Forces 
Losses 

20,043 
1,589 

14,901 
305 

43,569 
3,415 

78,513 
5,309 

Whatever  may  be  said  of  Burnside's  strategy  or  tactics,  he  was 
not  deficient  in  moral  courage.  Although  well  aware  that  most 
of  his  generals  were  in  a  despondent  mood,  he  determined  within 
a  very  few  days  to  make  a  fresh  effort.  He  had  his  cavalry 
reconnoitre  the  river  below  Fredericksburg,  and  then  decided  to 
cross  in  that  direction. 

On  Dec.  26  he  ordered  three  days'  cooked  rations,  and  10 
days'  rations  in  the  wagons,  with  beef  cattle,  forage,  and  ammu- 
nition, all  to  be  prepared  to  move  at  12  hours'  notice.  His  cav- 
alry advance  was  already  in  motion  for  a  raid  within  the  Con- 


314  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

federate  lines,  when  he  received  a  message  from  President  Lincoln 
forbidding  any  movement  without  his  being  previously  informed. 
This  interference  broke  up  his  plan.  Some  of  the  generals  had 
communicated  it  to  the  President  with  adverse  criticisms. 

Not  discouraged,  however,  he  soon  devised  another,  and, 
doubtless,  a  better  one.  He  proposed  to  cross  the  river  at 
Banks  Ford,  only  about  four  miles  above  Fredericksburg,  mak- 
ing at  the  same  time  demonstrations  at  several  points,  both 
above  and  below.  His  losses  at  Fredericksburg  had  been  more 
than  repaired  by  the  arrival  within  reach  of  the  llth  and  12th 
army  corps,  some  30,000  strong,  under  Sigel.  There  had  been 
good  weather  since  the  battle  and  the  roads  were  in  fan1  order. 
He  had  visited  Washington  and  sought  the  approval  of  the 
President  and  War  Department,  but  had  found  them  reluctant 
to  give  it,  being  influenced  by  the  general  distrust  of  Burnside's 
ability  among  the  principal  officers  of  his  army. 

To  bring  the  matter  to  an  issue,  Burnside  tendered  his  resig- 
nation, to  be  accepted  "in  case  it  was  not  deemed  advisable  for 
him  to  cross  the  river."  He  then  returned  and  hurried  his  prepa- 
ration. On  Jan.  20,  he  put  his  army  in  motion.  Positions 
for  184  guns  had  been  selected,  covering  the  approaches  to  the 
points  chosen  for  crossing,  and  roads  had  been  found  and  opened 
as  secretly  as  possible.  But,  nevertheless,  the  Federal  activity 
had  been  noted,  especially  at  Banks  and  United  States  fords, 
and,  on  the  19th,  Lee  sent  a  brigade  to  strengthen  our  pick- 
ets there.  As  the  distances  were  not  great  from  the  Federal 
camps  before  Fredericksburg  to  the  positions  about  Banks 
Ford,  most  of  their  guns  were  able  to  reach  their  positions  by 
the  night  of  the  20th.  About  dark  on  that  day,  a  violent  rain- 
storm set  in,  which  continued  all  that  night  and  the  two  follow- 
ing days.  The  pontoon  trains  in  rear  of  the  guns  had  farther  to 
go,  and  were  unwieldy  to  handle.  Many  troops  and  trains  were 
still  far  from  their  destinations,  and  now  every  road  became  a 
deep  quagmire,  and  even  small  streams  were  impassable  tor- 
rents. Although  desperate  efforts  were  made  all  during  the 
night  to  get  the  pontoons  to  the  river,  when  morning  dawned, 
not  enough  for  a  single  bridge  had  arrived,  and  five  bridges 
were  required. 


FALL  OF  1862  315 

Swinton  writes  of  the  situation,  as  follows :  — 

"  It  would  have  been  judicious  in  Gen.  Burnside  to  have  promptly  aban- 
doned a  situation  that  was  now  hopeless.  But  it  was  a  characteristic 
of  that  general's  mind  (a  characteristic  that  might  be  good  or  bad  accord- 
ing to  the  direction  it  took)  never  to  turn  back  when  he  had  once  put  his 
hand  to  the  plough ;  and  it  had  already,  more  than  once,  been  seen  that 
the  more  hopeless  the  enterprise,  the  greater  his  pertinacity.  The  night's 
ram  had  made  deplorable  havoc  with  the  roads,  but  Herculean  efforts  were 
made  to  bring  pontoons  enough  into  position  to  build  a  bridge  or  two  withal. 
Double  and  triple  teams  of  mules  were  harnessed  to  each  boat,  but  it 
was  in  vain.  Long  stout  ropes  were  then  attached  to  the  teams,  and  a 
hundred  and  fifty  men  put  to  the  task  on  each.  The  effort  was  but  little 
more  successful.  Floundering  through  the  mire  for  a  few  feet,  the  gang  of 
Lilliputians,  with  their  huge  ribbed  Gulliver,  were  forced  to  give  over, 
breathless.  Night  arrived,  but  the  pontoons  could  not  be  gotten  up, 
and  the  enemy's  pickets,  discovering  what  was  going  on,  jocularly  shouted 
their  intention  to  'come  over  to-morrow  and  help  build  the  bridges.' 

"Morning  dawned  upon  another  day  of  rain  and  storm.  The  ground 
had  gone  from  bad  to  worse,  and  now  showed  such  a  spectacle  as  might 
be  presented  by  the  elemental  wrecks  of  another  deluge.  An  indescrib- 
able chaos  of  pontoons,  vehicles,  and  artillery  encumbered  all  the  roads 
—  supply  wagons  upset  by  the  roadside,  guns  stalled  in  the  mud,  ammuni- 
tion trains  mired  by  the  way,  and  hundreds  of  horses  and  mules  buried 
in  the  liquid  muck.  The  army,  in  fact,  was  embargoed.  It  was  no  longer 
a  question  of  how  to  go  forward  —  it  was  a  question  of  how  to  get  back. 
The  three  days'  rations,  brought  on  the  persons  of  the  men,  were  ex- 
hausted, and  the  supply  trains  could  not  be  moved  up.  To  aid  the  return, 
all  the  available  force  was  put  to  work  to  corduroy  the  rotten  roads.  Next 
morning  the  a*my  floundered  and  staggered  back  to  the  old  camps,  and 
so  ended  a  movement  that  will  always  live,  in  the  recollection  of  the  army, 
as  the  'Mud  March,'  and  which  remains  a  striking  exemplification  of  the 
enormous  difficulties  incident  to  winter  campaigning  in  Va." 

Burnside's  plan  had  been  a  good  one,  and  his  army,  with  the 
llth  and  12th  corps,  had  numbered  on  Jan.  20,  152,516  present 
for  duty,  besides  45,239  in  the  defences  of  Washington.  But  for 
the  rain-storm  —  the  "Act  of  God"  —he  certainly  had  reason- 
able ground  to  hope  for  success.  But  he  was  not  disposed  to 
lay  the  whole  blame  upon  the  storm.  He  had  been  greatly  dis- 
satisfied with  Franklin,  and  his  conduct  of  his  command,  at  the 
battle  of  Fredericksburg,  and  he  now  keenly  resented  hostile 
criticisms  which  had  injured  him  in  estimation  of  the  President. 

From  the  scene  of  the  Mud  March  he  went  direct  to  Washing- 


316  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

ton,  with  an  order  in  his  pocket  for  the  President  to.  approve,  or 
else  to  accept,  his  resignation.  He  made  the  issue  boldly,  first 
with  Hooker,  and  next  with  Franklin,  and  his  principal  officers. 
The  proposed  order  dismissed  from  the  army  Hooker,  Brooks, 
and  Newton,  commanding  divisions,  and  Cochrane,  commanding 
a  brigade  in  the  6th  corps ;  and  it  relieved  from  further  duty  with 
the  army,  Franklin,  Smith,  commanding  the  6th  corps,  Sturgis, 
commanding  a  division,  and  Ferrero,  a  brigade  in  it,  and  Taylor, 
Franklin's  Asst.  Adjt.-Gen. 

Lincoln  felt  kindly  to  Burnside  and  respected  him,  but  he  had 
now  more  confidence  in  Hooker,  who  had  won  the  sobriquet  of 
"  Fighting  Joe,"  and  much  general  popularity,  both  in  the  army 
and  in  the  newspapers,  with  his  fine  bearing  and  frank  manners. 
So  Lincoln  met  the  issue  and  suppressed  the  order,  relieved 
Burnside  from  the  command,  and  gave  it  to  Hooker  on  Jan.  25. 
None  of  the  other  proscribed  officers  were  disturbed,  except 
Franklin,  who  was  placed  on  waiting  orders  and  afterward  trans- 
ferred to  La. 


CHAPTER  XV 

CHANCELLORSVILLE 

Winter  Quarters.  Rations  Reduced.  Hays's  Louisiana  Brigade.  Offi- 
cers' Servants.  Hooker's  Reorganization.  Confederate  Organization. 
Hooker's  Plan  of  Attack.  Lee's  Proposed  Aggressive.  Hooker 
Crosses.  Hooker's  Fatal  Mistake.  Lee's  Prompt  Action.  The 
Wilderness.  Hooker  Advances.  Lee's  Advance.  Hooker  Retreats. 
Hooker  Intrenches.  Lee  Reconnoitres.  Lee's  Plan  of  Attack. 
Jackson's  March.  The  Movement  Discovered.  Sickles  Advances. 
Jackson  Deploys.  Jackson  Attacks.  Colquitt's  Blunder.  DowdalPs 
Tavern.  Casualties.  At  Hooker's  Headquarters.  Defensive  Meas- 
ures. Jackson  Pauses.  A  Cannonade.  Wounding  of  Jackson. 
Stuart  in  Command.  Formation  for  Attack.  Sickles's  Midnight 
Attack.  Hooker's  Interior  Line.  Hooker  abandons  Hazel  Grove. 
Stuart  Attacks.  Assaults  Repulsed.  Hazel  Grove  Guns.  Federals 
Withdraw.  Lee  and  Stuart  Meet.  Sedgwick's  Advance.  Wilcox 
on  Taylor's  Hill.  Assaults  Renewed.  Early  falls  Back.  Salem 
Church.  Casualties.  Early's  Division,  Lee  organizes  an  Attack. 
Sedgwick  driven  Across. 

SOON  after  the  battle  of  Fredericksburg,  Lee  placed  his  army 
in  winter  quarters.  Jackson  was  extended  along  the  river,  be- 
low the  town,  as  far  as  Port  Royal,  his  own  headquarters  being 
at  a  hunting  lodge  on  the  lawn  of  a  Mr.  Corbin,  at  Moss  Neck, 
11  miles  below  Fredericksburg.  Longstreet  was  encamped  from 
a  little  above  Fredericksburg  to  Massaponax  Creek.  Lee  estab- 
lished his  headquarters  in  a  camp  a  short  distance  in  rear  of  Ham- 
ilton's Crossing.  Most  of  the  artillery  was  sent  back  to  the 
North  Anna  River  for  convenience  of  supply.  My  own  battalion 
occupied  a  wood  at  Mt.  Carmel  church,  five  miles  north  of  Han- 
over Junction,  the  horses  being  sheltered  in  an  adjoining  pine 
thicket.  On  the  occasion  of  Burnside's  Mud  March,  we  marched 
about  halfway  to  Fredericksburg,  but  were  then  allowed  to 
return.  The  infantry  generally  did  not  leave  their  camps,  as 
there  was  nowhere  any  fighting. 

317 


318  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

Although  so  near  to  Richmond,  the  army  was  inadequately 
clothed,  shod,  and  fed,  in  spite  of  Lee's  earnest  efforts.  As  far 
back  as  April  28,  1862,  the  meat  ration  had  been  reduced  from 
12  to  8  ounces,  and  a  small  extra  allowance  of  flour  (two 
ounces)  was  given.  It  was  claimed  that  but  for  this  reduction, 
the  supply  of  meat  would  not  have  held  out  throughout  the  fall. 
On  Jan.  23,  1863,  a  further  reduction  was  ordered,  by  the  com- 
missary-general, to  four  ounces  of  salt  meat  with  one-fifth  of  a 
pound  of  sugar.  Lee  wrote  of  the  situation  on  March  27 :  — 

"The  men  are  cheerful,  and  I  receive  but  few  complaints,  still  I  do  not 
consider  it  enough  to  maintain  them  in  health  and  vigor,  and  I  fear  they 
will  be  unable  to  endure  the  hardships  of  the  approaching  campaign. 
Symptoms  of  scurvy  are  appearing  among  them,  and,  to  supply  the 
place  of  vegetables,  each  regiment  is  directed  to  send  a  daily  detail  to 
gather  sassafras  buds,  wild  onions,  garlic,  lamb's  quarter,  and  poke  sprouts; 
but  for  so  large  an  army  the  supply  obtained  is  very  small." 

Some  idea  of  the  situation  is  given  in  the  following  extracts 
from  a  letter  of  a  staff-officer  of  Hays's  La.  brigade  to  his  rep- 
resentative in  Congress :  — 

"Among  1500  men  reported  for  duty  there  are  400  totally  without 
covering  of  any  kind  for  their  feet.  These  men,  of  course,  can  render  no 
effective  service,  as  it  is  impossible  for  them  to  keep  up  with  the  column 
in  a  march  over  frozen  ground.  There  are  a  large  number  of  men  who  have 
not  a  single  blanket.  There  are  some  without  a  particle  of  underclothing, 
having  neither  shirts,  drawers,  nor  socks,  while  overcoats,  from  their 
rarity,  are  objects  of  curiosity. 

"  The  5th  regiment  is  unable  to  drill  for  want  of  shoes.  The  8th  regi- 
ment will  soon  be  unfit  for  duty  from  the  same  cause ;  and  indeed,  when 
shoes  are  supplied,  the  men  will  be  unable  to  wear  them  for  a  long  while, 
such  is  the  horrible  condition  of  their  feet  from  long  exposure. 

"This  destitution,  in  the  way  of  clothing,  is  not  compensated  by  close 
shelter  or  abundant  food,  for  the  troops  have  no  tents,  and  are  almost 
totally  unprovided  with  cooking  utensils  for  the  petty  rations  they  re- 
ceive. .  .  . 

"Troops  from  other  States  are  supplied,  indeed,  in  a  great  degree  by 
individual  contributions  from  their  homes,  while  we  of  Louisiana  have 
received  nothing  whatever,  since  the  fall  of  New  Orleans,  with  the  excep- 
tion, I  believe,  of  a  company  of  the  9th  regiment." 

Troops  from  the  more  distant  States  suffered  many  more  pri- 
vations, both  in  food  and  clothing,  than  those  near  home. 


CHANCELLORSVILLE  319 

Some  of  the  State  governments  also  did  much  toward  the  cloth- 
ing of  their  own  troops,  and  private  families,  too,  sent  largely 
both  of  food  and  clothing  to  their  members  in  the  armies. 

Without  such  help,  Confederate  officers  would  often  have  suf- 
fered for  food.  Early  in  the  war,  officers  received  no  rations, 
but  were  allowed  to  purchase  from  the  commissaries,  for  them- 
selves and  servants.  But  as  rations  became  scarce,  the  privi- 
lege of  purchase  was  taken  away,  and  a  ration  was  given  each 
officer.  Nothing,  however,  was  allowed  for  a  servant.  There- 
after, officers  had  to  divide  with  their  servants  and  supply  the 
deficiency  as  best  they  could. 

Personally,  my  mess  received  constant  supplies  of  bacon  and 
peas  from  our  country  homes  in  S.C.  and  Ga.,  and  other  articles 
giving  the  most  nourishment  in  the  least  space. 

Our  scarcities  were  due  entirely  to  insufficient  railroad  trans- 
portation. Before  the  war,  our  roads  had  but  a  light  traffic. 
They  were  now  loaded  with  a  very  heavy  one,  and  as  cars,  en- 
gines, and  rails  wore  out,  they  could  not  be  replaced.  When 
complaint  was  made  to  the  commissary-general  of  insufficient 
supplies,  he  would  answer,  "Stop  running  passenger  trains,  and 
I  can  run  more  freight  trains  and  supply  you." 

The  great  need  of  rations  for  the  coming  summer  led  the  War 
Dept.  to  send  Longstreet  with  two  divisions  for  a  cam- 
paign in  the  vicinity  of  Suffolk.  Its  object  was  to  collect  forage 
and  provisions  from  counties  near  the  Federal  lines.  The  cam- 
paign was  not  initiated  by  Lee,  and  he  thought  that  one  division 
would  have  been  sufficient,  as  the  result  showed.  For  the  little 
fighting  done  was  unnecessary,  being  initiated  by  the  Confeder- 
ates. And,  although  Lee  at  Chancellorsville  repulsed  Hooker's 
attack,  it  was  poor  policy  to  take  the  risk  of  battle  against  enor- 
mous odds,  with  one-fourth  of  his  infantry  absent. 

As  might  have  been  expected,  under  the  difficult  circumstances 
attending  our  transportation  either  by  wagon  or  by  rail,  Pickett's 
and  Hood's  divisions  could  not  be  gotten  back  in  time  for  the 
battle,  and  our  victory  was  the  product  of  lucky  accident  com- 
bined with  sublime  audacity,  desperate  fighting,  and  heavy  losses. 

Hooker  proved  himself  a  good  organizer.  When  placed  in 
command,  the  army  was  much  discouraged  and  desertions  were 


320 


MILITARY  MEMOIRS 


numerous.  Hooker  abolished  the  grand  divisions;  devised  a 
system  of  furloughs  as  a  check  to  desertion ;  improved  the  trans- 
portation and  supply  departments,  and  organized  his  cavalry 
into  a  corps.  In  addition,  he  instituted  the  system  of  badges, 
showing  at  a  glance  the  corps  and  division  to  which  the  wearer 
belonged.  It  was  simply  a  piece  of  flannel,  sewed  on  the  top  of 
the  cap,  whose  shape  designated  the  corps,  and  its  color  the  divi- 
sion. A  circle  indicated  the  1st  corps;  a  trefoil  the  2d;  a  loz- 
enge the  3d ;  a  Maltese  cross  the  5th ;  a  Latin  cross  the  6th ;  a 
crescent  the  llth;  and  a  star  the  12th.  These  shapes  cut  from 
red  flannel  were  worn  by  the  1st  divisions ;  from  white  flannel  by 
the  2d ;  from  blue  flannel  by  the  3d,  and  from  green  flannel  by 
the  4th  divisions,  should  there  be  so  many.  Discipline,  drill,  and 
instruction  were  well  maintained,  supplies  of  all  kinds  abundantly 
furnished.  The  spirit  of  the  men  revived  with  the  consciousness 
of  their  immense  superiority  in  numbers  and  equipment,  and  it 
was  with  good  show  of  reason  that  Hooker  spoke  of  his  army 
when  it  took  the  field,  as  "the  finest  army  on  the  planet."  His 
organization  was  as  follows,  with  the  strength  of  each  corps  pres- 
ent for  "  duty  equipped  "  on  April  30. 


CORPS 

DIVISIONS 

BRIGADES 

ARTILLERY 

1st 
Reynolds 
16,908 

Wadsworth 
Robinson 
Doubleday 

Phelps,  Cutler,  Paul,  Meredith 
Root,  Baxter,  Leonard 
Rowley,  Stone 

Batts. 
10 

Guns 
52 

2d 
Couch 
16,893 

Hancock 
Gibbon 
French 

Caldwell,  Meagher,  Zook,  Brook 
Sully,  Owen,  Hall 
Carroll,  Hays,  MacGregor 

8 

48 

3d 

Sickles 
18,721 

Birney 
Berry 
Whipple 

Graham,  Ward,  Hayman 
Carr,  Revere,  Mott 
Franklin,  Bowman,  Berdan 

9 

54 

5th 
Meade 
15,724 

Griffin 
Sykes 
Humphreys 

Barnes,  McQuade,  Stockton 
Ayres,  Burbank,  O'Rorke 
Tyler,   Allabach 

8 

42 

6th 
Sedgwick 

23,667 

Brooks 
Howe 
Newton 
Burnham 

Brown,  Bartlett,  Russell 
Grant,  Neill 
Shaler,  Brown,  Wheaton 
Burnham 

9 

54 

CHANCELLORSVILLE 


321 


CORPS 

DIVISIONS 

BRIGADES 

ARTILLERY 

llth 
Howard 
12,977 

Devens 
Von  Steinwehr 
Schurz 

Von  Gilsa,  McLean 
Buschbeck,  Barlow 
Schimmelpfennig,  Krzyzanowski 

Batts. 
6 

Guns 
36 

12th 
Slocum 
13,450 

Williams 
Geary 

Knipe,  Ross,  Ruger 
Candy,  Kane,  Greene 

5 

28 

Cavalry 
Stoneman 

11,544 

Pleasonton 
Averell 
Gregg 
Reserve  Brig. 

Davis,  Devin 
Sargent,  Mclntosh 
Kilpatrick,  Wyndham 
Buford 

5 

22 

1,610 

2,217 

Artillery  Reserve 
Provost  Guard 

12 

2 

58 
10 

8  Corps,  23  Divisions,  64  Brigades,  133,711  Men,  74  Batteries,  404  Guns 

The  nearest  Confederate  return  is  for  March  21.  It  is  not  en- 
tirely complete  for  the  artillery  and  cavalry,  but,  estimating  for 
them,  Lee's  organization  and  strength  at  that  date  was  as  follows : 

IST  CORPS,  LONGSTREET'S,  MARCH  31,  1863 


DIVISIONS 

STRENGTH 

BRIGADES 

BATTS. 

GUNS 

Anderson's 
McLaws's 

•  8,232 

8,567 

Wilcox,  Wright,  Mahone,  Posey, 
Perry 
Wofford,  Semmes,  Kershaw, 
Barksdale 

4 
4 

18 
18 

850 

Corps'  Reserve  Artillery 

10 

36 

2  Divisions 

17,649 

9  Brigades 

18 

72 

2D  CORPS,  JACKSON'S 


A.  P.  Hill's 

10,400 

Heth,  Thomas,  Lane,  McGowans, 

Archer,  Fender 

6 

26 

Rodes's 

9,632 

Rodes,  Colquitt,  Ramseur,  Doles, 

Iverson 

4 

18 

Early's 

8,243 

Gordon,  Hoke,  Smith,  Hays 

4 

18 

Colston's 

6,629 

Paxton,  Jones,  Warren,  Nichols 

4 

18 

900 

Corps'  Reserve  Artillery 

9 

83 

4  Divisions 

35,795 

19  Brigades 

27 

118 

600 

General  Reserve  Artillery 

6 

26 

322  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 


CAVALRY 


DIVISIONS 

STRENGTH 

BRIGADES 

BATTS. 

GUNS 

Stuart 

2,400 

Fitzhugh  Lee,  W.  H.  F.  Lee 

3 

12 

2  Corps,  7  Divisions,  30  Brigades,  56,444  Men,  54  Batteries,  228  Guns 

Allowing  for  about  3500  reinforcements  during  the  month  of 
April,  Lee's  whole  force  was  about  60,000,  of  whom  some  57,000 
were  infantry  and  artillery.  Of  these  arms  Hooker  had  about 
122,000. 

Each  commander  planned  to  take  the  initiative.  Hooker 
knew  that  he  had  double  Lee's  infantry,  and  great  superiority 
in  artillery,  and  he  desired  only  to  get  at  Lee  away  from  breast- 
works. On  April  13  he  ordered  Stoneman's  cavalry  upon  a  raid 
to  Lee's  rear,  which  expedition  was  to  be  the  opening  of  his  cam- 
paign. A  rain-storm  on  the  14th,  lasting  36  hours,  halted  the 
movement,  after  its  leading  brigade  had  forded  the  Rappahan- 
nock.  The  brigade  was  recalled,  having  to  swim  horses  across 
the  fast-rising  river,  and  two  weeks  elapsed  before  the  movement 
could  be  renewed.  It  was  intended  that  Stoneman  should  de- 
stroy the  railroads,  which  would  force  Lee  to  retreat.  Stoneman 
should  then  harass  and  delay  him  as  he  fell  back,  pursued  by 
Hooker. 

Lee's  proposed  campaign  was  another  invasion;  this  time  of 
Pa.  He  could  neither  attack  Hooker,  nor  even  threaten  his 
rear  across  the  Rappahannock.  But  he  could  again  sweep 
the  Valley  and  cross  the  Potomac;  and  beyond,  both  Lee 
and  Jackson  imagined  great  possibilities.1  Three  months  later 
the  opportunity  offered,  and  Lee  put  it  to  the  test ;  but  his  great 
lieutenant,  Jackson,  was  no  longer  at  the  head  of  his  2d  corps. 

On  April  29,  Lee  found  himself  anticipated  by  Hooker's 
having,  the  night  before,  laid  pontoon  bridges  across  the  Rappa- 
hannock, below  Deep  Run,  at  the  site  of  Franklin's  crossing  in 

1  Between  Jan.  and  April,  1863,  Jackson  had  his  chief  engineer,  Maj. 
Hotchkiss,  prepare  a  remarkable  map  of  the  country  from  Winchester  to  the 
Susquehanna,  compiled  from  county  maps  of  Md.,  Va.,  and  Pa.  It  was 
on  a  large  scale,  and  noted  farmhouses,  with  names  of  occupants.  It  was  used 
by  Lee  on  the  Gettysburg  campaign,  and  has  been  reproduced  on  smaller  scale 
in  the  O.  R.  Atlas,  Plate  CXVI. 


CHANCELLORSVILLE  323 

Dec.  Hooker  had  commenced  his  movement,  on  the  27th,  by 
going  with  the  5th,  llth,  and  12th  corps  to  cross  the  Rappa- 
hannock  at  Kelly's  Ford,  above  the  mouth  of  the  Rapidan,  27 
miles  from  Fredericksburg.  A  picket,  at  this  point,  was  driven  off, 
a  pontoon  bridge  laid,  and  the  whole  force,  about  42,000  men, 
was  across  the  river  on  the  29th,  when  the  6th  corps,  under  Sedg- 
wick,  was  crossing  in  front  of  Jackson.  Hooker  immediately 
pushed  his  force  by  two  roads  from  Kelly's  to  Germanna  and  Ely's 
fords  of  the  Rapidan  —  about  11  miles  off,  and,  on  arriving,  the 
troops  forded,  although  the  water  was  nearly  shoulder  deep. 
The  fording  was  kept  up  all  night  by  light  of  large  bonfires,  and 
the  next  morning  the  march  to  Chancellorsville,  six  miles  away, 
was  resumed. 

Meanwhile,  two  divisions  of  the  2d  corps  had  moved  up  from 
Fredericksburg  to  United  States  Ford,  where  they  laid  a  pontoon 
bridge  about  noon  on  the  30th.  By  9  P.M.  they  had  crossed  and 
united  with  the  5th,  llth,  and  12th  corps  at  Chancellorsville. 
No  resistance  had  been  encountered  anywhere,  but  that  of  picket 
forces.  Hooker,  in  84  hours,  had  covered  about  45  miles,  cross- 
ing two  rivers,  and  had  established  a  force  of  54,000  infantry  and 
artillery  upon  Lee's  flank  at  Chancellorsville.1  Hooker  was' 
naturally  elated  at  his  success,  and  issued  an  order  to  his  troops, 
congratulating  them,  and  announcing  that  now  — 

"  the  enemy  must  either  ingloriously  fly,  or  come  out  from  behind  his 
defences,  and  give  us  battle  on  our  own  ground,  where  certain  destruction 
awaits  him." 

And,  indeed,  if  a  general  may  ever  be  justified  in  enumerating 
his  poultry  while  the  process  of  incubation  is  incomplete,  this 
might  be  an  occasion.  He  was  on  the  left  flank  and  rear  of  Lee's 
only  strong  position  with  a  force  fully  equal  to  Lee's,  while  an- 
other equal  force  threatened  Lee's  right.  And  somewhere  in 
Lee's  rear  —  between  him  and  Richmond  —  was  Stoneman 
with  10,000  sabres,  opposed  only  by  two  regiments  of  cavalry, 

1  Hooker's  men  carried  eight  days'  rations.  Three  days'  full  rations,  cooked, 
were  in  the  haversacks;  five  days' bread  and  groceries  in  the  knapsacks,  and 
five  days' beef  on  the  hoof.  The  total  weight  carried  by  each  man,  including 
60  rounds  of  ammunition,  was  45  pounds.  But  few  wagons  were  brought 
across  the  Rappahannock.  Most  of  the  reserve  ammunition  was  carried 
by  pack  mules,  coupled  in  pairs  and  driven  in  trains. 


324  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

tearing  up  the  railroads  and  waiting  to  fall  upon  Lee's  flank 
when  he  essayed  the  retreat  which  Hooker  confidently  expected 
to  see.  He  had  said  to  those  about  him  that  evening :  — 

"  The  rebel  army  is  now  the  legitimate  property  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac.  They  may  as  well  pack  up  their  haversacks  and  make  for 
Richmond,  and  I  shall  be  after  them." 

But  Hooker  had  made  one  mistake,  and  it  was  to  cost  him 
dearly.  He  had  sent  off,  with  Stoneman,  his  entire  cavalry  force, 
except  one  brigade.  This  proved  insufficient  to  keep  him  in- 
formed of  the  Confederate  movements,  even  though  their  efforts 
were  supplemented  by  many  signal  officers  with  lookouts  and 
field  telegraphs,  and  by  two  balloons. 

It  was  during  the  morning  of  the  30th,  that  Lee  learned  that 
Hooker  had  divided  his  army,  and  that  one-half  of  it  was  already 
at  Chancellorsville,  while  most  of  the  remainder  was  in  his  front. 
By  all  the  rules  of  war,  one-half  or  the  other  should  be  at  once 
attacked,  and  as  Sedgwick's  was  the  nearest,  and  Lee's  whole 
force  was  already  concentrated,  Jackson  at  first  proposed  to  at- 
tack Sedgwick.  Lee,  however,  thought  the  position  impregnable, 
and  Jackson,  after  careful  reconnoissance,  came  to  the  same 
conclusion.  Orders  were  then  at  once  prepared  to  march  and 
attack  Hooker  before  he  could  move  from  Chancellorsville. 
Early  with  his  division,  Barksdale's  brigade,  Pendleton's  artillery 
reserve,  and  the  Washington  artillery,  in  all  about  10,000  men, 
were  left  to  hold  the  lines  before  Fredericksburg.  These  covered 
about  six  miles,  and  the  force  averaged  about  one  man  to  each 
yard,  and  nine  guns  to  each  mile.  About  midnight  on  the  30th, 
Jackson  marched  from  Hamilton's  Crossing  with  his  three  re- 
maining divisions,  under  A.  P.  Hill,  Rodes,  and  Colston.  He 
was  joined  on  the  road  in  the  morning  by  Lee  with  the  remaining 
brigades  of  McLaws,  and  by  Anderson's  division,  and  Alex- 
ander's battalion  of  artillery. 

Jackson's  three  divisions  numbered  about  25,000,  Anderson's 
division  about  8000,  and  three  brigades  of  McLaws  about  6000. 
Thus,  Lee  had  in  hand  nearly  40,000  men,  with  which  to  attack 
Hooker  at  Chancellorsville,  where  Hooker  now  had  four  corps  — 
the  3d,  5th,  llth,  and  12th  —  and  two  divisions  of  the  2d;  a  total 


CHANCELLORSVILLE  325 

effective  of  about  72,000  infantry  and  artillery,  and  was  intrench- 
ing himself. 

Chancellorsville  was  situated  about  a  mile  within  the  limits 
of  a  tract  called  the  Wilderness.  It  stretched  some  12  or 
14  miles  westward  along  the  Rapidan  and  was  some  8  or  10 
miles  in  breadth. 

The  original  forest  had  been  cut  for  charcoal  many  years  before, 
and  replaced  by  thick  and  tangled  smaller  growth.  A  few  clear- 
ings were  scattered  at  intervals,  and  a  few  small  creeks  drained  it. 
Chancellorsville  was  merely  a  brick  residence  at  an  important 
junction  of  roads,  with  a  considerable  clearing  on  the  west. 
Three  roads  ran  toward  Fredericksburg :  the  old  Turnpike  most 
directly ;  the  Plank  road  to  its  right,  but  uniting  with  the  Turn- 
pike at  Tabernacle  Church — about  halfway;  the  River  road  to 
the  left,  by  a  roundabout  course  passing  near  Banks  Ford  of  the 
Rappahannock. 

Hooker's  line  of  battle  ran  from  Chancellorsville,  about  two 
miles  northeastward  to  the  Rappahannock,  covering  United 
States  Ford.  Westward  it  covered  the  Plank  road  for  about 
three  miles,  ending  in  a  short  offset  northward.  Intrenchment 
was  quickly  done  by  cutting  abattis,  or  an  entanglement,  in 
front,  and  throwing  up  slight  parapets,  or  piling  breastworks 
of  logs.  About  11  A.M.,  however,  Hooker  prepared  to  resume  his 
advance,  and  ordered  the  5th  and  12th  corps  to  move  out  on  the 
three  roads  toward  Fredericksburg  and  establish  a  line  in  the 
open  country  beyond  the  Wilderness.  Griffin's  and  Humphreys's 
divisions  of  the  5th  were  sent  down  the  River  road,  on  the  left, 
Sykes's  division  down  the  Turnpike  hi  the  centre,  and  the  12th 
corps,  under  Slocum,  down  the  Plank  road  on  the  right. 

Meanwhile,  Lee  and  Jackson  disposed  Anderson's  division 
for  an  advance,  covering  both  the  Pike  and  the  Plank  roads. 
Wilcox's  and  Mahone's  brigades,  with  Jordan's  battery  of  Alex- 
ander's battalion,  moved  upon  the  former;  Wright's,  Perry's, 
and  Posey's  brigades,  with  the  remainder  of  Alexander's  battalion, 
on  the  latter.  McLaws's  division  moved  by  the  Pike,  and  Lee, 
with  Jackson's  three  divisions,  followed  the  Plank  road.  Thus 
the  two  armies  were  marching  toward  each  other  on  these  two 
roads,  while  on  the  River  road  two  of  the  Federal  divisions  were 


326  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

marching  toward  Banks  Ford,  which  was  at  this  time  unde- 
fended, although  some  intrenchments  had  been  erected  there. 
The  possession  of  Banks  Ford  by  Hooker  would  shorten  the  dis- 
tance between  Chancellorsville  and  his  left  wing  under  Sedg- 
wick,  by  several  miles. 

The  advancing  forces  first  came  into  collision  on  the  Pike. 
Sharp  fighting  followed,  Semmes's  brigade  coming  up  on  the 
left  of  Mahone  and  bearing  the  brunt  of  it  against  Sykes's 
regulars.  Sykes's  orders  had  been,  however,  only  to  advance 
to  the  first  ridge  beyond  the  forest,  and  he  maintained  his 
position  there,  though  menaced  by  the  extension  of  the  Con- 
federate lines  beyond  his  flank,  until  orders  were  received  from 
Hooker  to  withdraw  to  the  original  position  within  the  forest. 
Similar  orders  were  also  sent  to  Slocum  on  the  Plank  road, 
and  to  Griffin  and  Humphreys  who  had  advanced,  nearly  five 
miles  down  the  River  road,  entirely  unopposed,  and  who  were 
within  sight  of  Banks  Ford  when  the  orders  for  the  counter- 
march reached  them.  Slocum's  corps  had  not  become  seriously 
engaged,  but  its  skirmishers  had  been  driven  in  and  its  right  flank 
threatened  by  Wright's  brigade.  This  advanced  upon  the  line 
of  an  unfinished  railroad,  which,  starting  from  Fredericksburg, 
ran  through  the  Wilderness  generally  a  mile  or  two  south  of  the 
Plank  road. 

Up  to  the  moment  of  the  withdrawal  of  his  troops,  Hooker's 
campaign  had  been  well  planned  and  well  managed,  and  its 
culmination  was  now  at  hand  in  the  open  field — as  he  had  de- 
sired. He  could  scarcely  hope  for  more  propitious  circumstances, 
and,  by  all  the  rules  of  the  game,  a  victory  was  now  within  his 
grasp.  His  lieutenants  received  the  order  to  fall  back  with  sur- 
prise and  regret.  The  advance,  upon  both  the  Plank  road  and 
the  Pike,  had  cleared  the  forest  and  reached  fairly  good  posi- 
tions. An  officer  was  sent  to  Hooker  to  explain  and  request 
permission  to  remain,  but  he  returned  in  a  half-hour,  with 
the  orders  repeated. 

Hooker  has  been  severely  blamed  for  these  orders,  subverting 
all  the  carefully  prepared  plans  only  published  to  the  army  that 
morning.  It  is  interesting  to  learn  the  cause.  Reports  from 
the  balloons  and  signal  officers  had  informed  him  of  the  march 


CHANCELLORSVILLE  327 

of  a  force  toward  Chancellorsville,  estimated  at  two  corps. 
Rumors  had  also  been  brought  by  deserters,  the  night  before, 
that  Hood's  division  had  rejoined  Lee,  coming  from  Suffolk,  but 
Hooker's  information  from  Fortress  Monroe  should  have  shown 
that  to  be  impossible.  There  is  no  sign  of  any  hesitation  upon 
his  part  until  2  P.M.  At  that  hour  he  wired  Butterfield,  his 
chief  of  staff,  at  Falmouth :  — 

"From  character  of  information  have  suspended  attack.  The  enemy 
may  attack  me, — I  will  try  it.  Tell  Sedgwick  to  keep  a  sharp  lookout, 
and  attack  if  he  can  succeed." 

This  despatch  makes  clear  Hooker's  mind.  He  realized  from 
the  rapid  manner  of  Lee's  approach,  and  from  the  sounds  of 
battle  already  heard,  both  on  the  Pike  and  the  Plank  road,  that 
Lee  meant  to  attack.  He  had  confidently  expected  Lee  to  re- 
treat without  a  battle,  and  finding  him,  instead,  so  quick  to  take 
the  aggressive,  he  lost  his  nerve  and  wished  himself  back  on  the 
line  he  had  taken  around  Chancellorsville,  where  he  would  enjoy 
the  great  advantage  of  acting  upon  the  defensive.  He  had  seen 
in  Dec.  the  enormous  advantage  which  even  slight  breastworks 
could  confer,  and  now  he  saw  the  chance  of  having  his  battle  a 
defensive  one  behind  intrenchments.  It  was  surely  the  safest 
game  to  play,  and  Hooker  is  fully  justified  in  electing  to  play  it. 
No  remonstrances  shook  his  confidence  in  the  least.  He  said  to 
Couch,  — 

"It  is  all  right,  Couch,  I  have  got  Lee  just  where  I  want  him.  He 
must  fight  me  on  my  own  ground." 

Orders  were  given  to  intrench,  and  work  was  at  once  begun 
with  abundance  of  men  and  tools,  and  it  was  pushed  during 
most  of  the  night.  Couch  says,  — 

"At  2  A.M.  the  corps  commanders  reported  to  Gen.  Hooker  that 
their  positions  could  be  held;  at  least  so  said  Couch,  Slocum,  and 
Howard." 

Indeed,  no  better  field  fortification  can  be  desired  than  what 
it  was  the  quickest  to  build  in  the  Wilderness.  A  wide  belt  of 
dense  small  growth  could  be  soon  felled  in  front  of  shallow  ditches, 
with  earth  and  log  breastworks.  Any  charging  line  is  brought  to 


328  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

a  halt  by  the  entanglement,  and  held  under  close  fire  of  musketry 
and  canister,  while  the  surrounding  forest  prevents  the  enemy 
from  finding  positions  to  use  his  own  artillery. 

So  the  corps  commanders,  responsible  only  for  the  front  of  their 
own  lines,  might  truly  report  that  their  positions  could  be  held. 
Yet  the  line,  as  a  whole,  may  have  a  weak  feature.  This  was  the 
case  here.  Its  right  flank  "rested  in  the  air,"  and  was  not  even 
covered  by  a  curtain  of  cavalry. 

Hooker,  however,  was  not  entirely  blind  to  this  weakness  of 
his  line.  He  inspected  it  early  next  morning,  May  2,  and  ordered 
changes  and  enjoined  vigilance  which  might  have  saved  him  from 
the  surprise  of  the  afternoon,  had  he  not,  like  Pope  in  his  cam- 
paign of  the  previous  fall,  failed  to  fathom  the  boldness  of  Lee's 
designs  even  after  discovering  the  Confederate  movements. 

Lee  appreciated  that  Hooker's  withdrawal  into  the  Wilderness 
was  not  forced,  but  to  fortify  and  concentrate.  He  could,  there- 
fore, lose  no  time  in  finding  how  and  where  he  might  attack. 
Until  nightfall  the  skirmishes  were  pushed  forward  everywhere, 
in  order  to  locate  the  exact  position  of  the  enemy. 

The  result  is  briefly  given  in  Lee's  report,  as  follows :  — 

"The  enemy  had  assumed  a  position  of  great  natural  strength,  sur- 
rounded on  all  sides  by  a  dense  forest,  filled  with  a  tangled  undergrowth, 
in  the  midst  of  which  breastworks  of  logs  had  been  constructed,  with  trees 
felled  in  front  so  as  to  form  an  almost  impenetrable  abattis.  His  artillery 
swept  the  few  narrow  roads  by  which  his  position  could  be  approached 
from  the  front,  and  commanded  the  adjacent  woods." 

Hooker  had,  indeed,  manoeuvred  Lee  out  of  his  position  with- 
out a  battle.  There  was  now  nothing  left  but  to  attack  the 
greatly  superior  force  in  the  impregnable  position,  or  to  attempt 
a  retreat  already  dangerously  delayed.  But  presently  there  came 
some  more  cheerful  news.  Fitzhugh  Lee,  who  held  the  extreme 
left  of  our  cavalry,  had  also  reconnoitred  the  enemy,  and  had 
discovered  that  his  right  flank  was  in  the  air. 

The  one  chance  left  to  Lee  was  to  pass  undiscovered  entirely 
across  the  enemy's  front  and  turn  his  right  flank.  The  enterprise 
was  of  great  difficulty  and  hazard.  To  try  it  and  fail  meant 
destruction.  For  the  army,  already  divided,  must  now  be  further 
subdivided,  and  the  largest  fraction  placed  in  a  position  whence 


CHANCELLORSVILLE  329 

retreat  would  be  impossible.  Only  a  very  sanguine  man  could 
even  hope  that  15  brigades,  with  over  100  guns,  could  make  a 
march  of  14  miles  around  Hooker's  enormous  army  without  being 
discovered.  The  chance,  too,  must  be  taken  of  aggressive  ac- 
tion by  the  enemy  at  Fredericksburg  or  Banks  Ford,  even  if 
Hooker  himself  did  nothing  during  the  eight  hours  in  which  the 
flanking  force  would  be  out  of  position  in  a  long  defile  through 
the  forest. 

But  no  risks  appalled  the  heart  of  Lee,  either  of  odds,  or  posi- 
tion, or  of  both  combined.  His  supreme  faith  in  his  army  was 
only  equalled  by  the  faith  of  his  army  in  him.  The  decision  to 
attack  was  quickly  made  and  preparations  begun.  Wilcox's 
brigade  was  ordered  to  Banks  Ford  to  hold  the  position.  This 
precaution  was  well  taken,  for  after  midnight  of  the  1st, 
Hooker  ordered  Reynolds's  corps  to  leave  Sedgwick  and  join  the 
army  at  Chancellorsville.  Reynolds  started  at  sunrise  and 
marched  by  Banks  Ford,  where  he  expected  to  find  a  bridge. 
But,  as  has  been  told,  Griffin's  and  Humphreys's  divisions,  after 
being  within  sight  on  the  afternoon  of  the  1st,  had  been  recalled. 
Wilcox,  at  dawn  on  the  2d,  had  occupied  the  trenches.  So  Rey- 
nolds, arriving  after  sunrise  and  seeing  Confederates  in  possession, 
continued  his  march  on  the  north  side,  and  crossed  at  United 
States  Ford. 

Anderson's  four  remaining  brigades,  with  McLaws's  three, 
were  ordered  to  intrench  during  the  night.  Jackson,  with  his 
three  divisions,  his  own  artillery,  and  Alexander's  battalion  of 
Longstreet's  corps,  were  assigned  to  make  the  march  through  the 
Wilderness  and  turn  Hooker's  right. 

Lee  himself  would  remain  with  McLaws's  and  Anderson's 
troops,  and  occupy  the  enemy  while  the  long  march  was  made. 
Cheering  was  forbidden,  and  stringent  measures  taken  to  keep 
the  column  closed.  Fitz-Lee,  with  his  cavalry,  would  precede  the 
infantry  and  cover  the  flank.  Two  hours  after  sunrise,  Lee, 
standing  by  the  roadside,  watched  the  head  of  the  column  march 
by,  and  exchanged  with  Jackson  the  last  few  words  ever  to  pass 
between  them.  Rodes's  division  led  the  column,  Colston's  divi- 
sion followed,  and  A.  P.  Hill's  brought  up  the  rear. 

The  sun  rose  on  May  2  a  few  minutes  after  five,  and  set  at 


330  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

6.50  P.M.  The  moon  was  full  that  night.  The  march  led  by  a 
cross-roads  near  the  Catherine  Furnace,  thence  southward  for 
over  a  mile  and  then  southwestward  for  two  miles  before  turning 
west  and  striking  the  Brock  road  within  another  mile.  At  the 
cross-roads,  the  line  of  march  was  nearest  the  Federal  lines  and 
was  most  exposed.  Here  the  23d  Ga.  regiment  of  Colquitt's 
brigade,  Rodes's  division,  was  left  to  cover  the  rear. 

When  the  line  of  march  reached  the  Brock  road,  it  turned  south- 
ward for  about  a  mile,  and  then,  almost  doubling  back  upon  it- 
self, it  took  a  woods  road  running  a  trifle  west  of  north,  nearly 
parallel  to  the  Brock  road  itself,  and  coming  back  into  it  about 
three  miles  north  of  the  point  at  which  it  was  first  entered.  This 
made  a  route  two  miles  longer  than  would  have  been  made  by 
turning  northward  when  the  Brock  road  was  first  reached.  And 
as  this  part  of  the  road  was  farthest  of  all  from  the  enemy  (over 
three  miles),  and  in  the  densest  woods,  it  would  seem  that  two 
miles  might  have  been  saved,  had  there  been  time  and  opportu- 
nity for  reconnoissance. 

Where  the  Brock  road  crossed  the  Plank  road,  the  column 
halted,  while  Fitz-Lee  took  Jackson  to  the  front  to  a  point  whence 
he  could  see  the  Federal  lines,  with  arms  stacked,  hi  bivouac 
behind  their  intrenchments,  and  utterly  unconscious  of  the 
proximity  of  an  enemy.  Until  that  moment  it  had  been  uncer- 
tain exactly  where  Jackson  would  attack.  But  he  now  saw  that 
by  following  the  Brock  road  about  two  miles  farther  he  would  get 
upon  the  old  turnpike,  beyond  the  enemy's  flank,  and  could  take 
it  in  the  rear.  So  the  march  was  at  once  resumed  to  reach  that 
position.  But  Paxton's  brigade  of  Colston 's  division  was  here 
detached  and  placed  with  the  cavalry,  in  observation  on  the 
Plank  road,  and  did  not  rejoin  its  division  until  near  midnight. 

The  head  of  the  column  made  about  two  and  a  half  miles  an 
hour,  the  rear  about  one  and  a  half,  for  in  spite  of  all  efforts  the 
column  lost  distance.  During  the  day  there  were  three  halts 
for  rest  of  perhaps  twenty  minutes  each.  There  were  no  ve- 
hicles except  the  artillery,  ambulances,  and  ammunition  wagons. 
These,  marching  each  behind  its  division,  made  the  column 
10  miles  in  length,  of  which  the  infantry  occupied  over  six. 
The  head,  marching  at  about  6  A.M.,  reached  the  deploying  point 


CHANCELLORSVILLE  331 

on  the  turnpike  by  4  P.M.    The  distance  had  proven  greater  than 
anticipated,  and  time  was  now  of  priceless  value. 

Meanwhile  the  movement,  though  misunderstood,  had  been 
detected  by  the  enemy.1  About  a  mile  southwest  of  Chancellors- 
ville  was  a  settlement  called  Hazel  Grove,  on  a  cleared  ridge. 
From  this  ridge,  about  8  A.M.,  Birney,  of  Sickles's  corps,  discovered 
a  column  of  infantry,  trains,  and  artillery  passing  his  front.  He 
brought  up  a  battery  and  opened  on  the  train  at  a  range  of  1600 
yards,  throwing  it  into  much  confusion,  and  compelling  it  to  find 
other  routes  around  the  exposed  point.  Jackson  sent  a  battery 
to  reply  and  check  the  enemy  from  advancing.  Sickles  came  to 
Birney's  position  and  observed  Jackson's  column.  His  official 
report  says :  — 

"This  continuous  column  —  infantry,  artillery,  trains,  and  ambulances 
—  was  observed  for  three  hours,  moving  apparently  in  a  southerly  direc- 
tion toward  Orange  C.  H.,  on  the  O.  &  A.  R.  R.  or  Louisa  C.  H.  on  the 
Va.  Cen.  The  movement  indicated  a  retreat  on  Gordonsville,  or  an  attack 
upon  our  right  flank  —  perhaps  both,  for  if  the  attack  failed,  the  retreat 
would  be  continued. 

"I  hastened  to  report  these  movements,  through  staff-officers,  to  the 
general-in-chief,  .  .  .  to  Maj. -Gen.  Howard  and  also  to  Maj. -Gen.  Slocum, 
inviting  their  cooperation  in  case  the  general-in-chief  should  authorize 
me  to  follow  up  the  enemy  and  attack  his  columns.  At  noon  I  received 
orders  to  advance  cautiously  toward  the  road  followed  by  the  enemy,  and 
attack  his  columns." 

Sickles  advanced  Birney's  division,  which  engaged  an  outpost 
on  the  flank  and  captured  a  regiment,  the  23d  Ga.  The  two  rear 
brigades,  under  Thomas  and  Archer,  with  Brown's  battalion  of 
artillery,  were  halted  for  an  hour  in  observation,  but  were  not 
engaged,  and  then  followed  on  after  the  column.  They  were 
only  able  to  overtake  it,  however,  after  night. 

It  was  about  4  P.M.  when  the  head  of  Jackson's  column  began 
its  deployment  on  both  sides  of  the  Plank  road,  beyond  Hooker's 
right,  in  the  tangled  forest;  and  it  was. nearly  6  P.M.  when  eight 

1  Jackson's  celebrated  march  around  Pope  had  also  been  discovered  by 
the  enemy  as  soon  as  it  was  begun,  but  had  also  been  misunderstood  — 
doubtless  for  a  similar  reason.  No  one  could  conceive  that  Lee  would  de- 
liberately plan  so  unwise  a  move  as  this  was  conceived  to  be  —  dividing  his 
army  under  the  enemy's  nose. 


332  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

of  the  12  brigades  now  in  his  column,  had  formed  in  two  lines  of 
battle,  and  one  of  the  remaining  four  in  a  third  line. 

Meanwhile  Sickles,  though  now  unopposed  in  front,  had 
brought  up  Whipple's  division  of  his  own  corps,  and,  having 
asked  for  reinforcements,  had  also  received  Barlow's  brigade 
from  the  right  flank  of  the  llth  corps,  Williams's  division  of  the 
12th  corps,  and  three  regiments  of  cavalry  and  some  horse  artil- 
lery under  Pleasonton.  Posey's  brigade  held  the  left  flank  of 
Lee's  line  of  battle  in  Hooker's  front,  while  Jackson  conducted  the 
flanking  movement.  Posey  had  a  strong  force  of  skirmishers 
in  front,  which  became  hotly  engaged  with  the  left  flank  of  Sickles's 
advance,  when  it  engaged  Jackson's  rear-guard.  While  bringing 
up  their  reinforcements,  the  Federals  made  several  efforts  to 
carry  Posey's  position,  but  were  always  repulsed.  Sickles  then 
planned  to  outflank  and  surround  it,  but  he  had  been  so  slow 
that,  before  he  was  ready  to  act,  Jackson  had  attacked,  and 
Sickles  was  hastily  recalled. 

Otherwise  there  might  have  been  a  strange  spectacle.  Sickles 
might  have  routed  Anderson  at  the  same  time  that  Jackson  was 
routing  Howard.  For  he  was  on  Anderson's  flank  with  over 
20,000  infantry,  a  brigade  of  cavalry,  and  some  horse  artillery. 
He  wandered  off,  however,  to  the  south  and  west,  for  miles, 
where  there  was  no  enemy  before  him. 

Along  the  front  of  Lee's  line  the  six  brigades  present  of  Ander- 
son's and  McLaws's  divisions,  aided  by  their  artillery,  had  spent 
the  day  in  more  or  less  active  skirmishing  and  cannonading  with 
the  enemy.  Where  the  enemy  showed  a  disposition  to  advance, 
the  Confederates  were  well  satisfied  to  lie  quiet  and  repel  them, 
as  on  the  left  in  front  of  Posey.  But  on  the  Confederate  right 
the  Federal  skirmish-line,  under  Col.  Miles,  being  strongly  posted 
and  showing  no  disposition  to  advance,  it  was  wise  to  be  mod- 
erately aggressive  and  keep  the  enemy  in  hopes  of  an  attack. 
Kershaw  and  Semmes  did  this  handsomely  throughout  the  day, 
though  the  threat  of  Sickles's  movements  caused  Lee  to  draw  his 
troops  to  his  left,  and  reduce  his  right  to  less  than  a  full  line. 

About  6  P.M.,  the  sun  being  then  about  one  hour  high,  Jackson 
gave  the  signal  to  Rodes  to  move  forward.  His  brigades  were  in 
the  following  order  from  left  to  right:  Iverson,  O'Neal,  Doles, 


CHANCELLORSVILLE  333 

and  Colquitt,  with  Ramseur's  brigade  100  yards  in  rear  of  Col- 
quitt  on  the  right.  Colston's  three  brigades  formed  in  line  with 
Ramseur,  and  in  the  following  order  from  the  left :  Nichols,  Jones, 
Warren.  About  half  of  each  division  was  on  each  side  of  the 
pike,  and  two  Napoleons  of  Breathed's  horse  artillery  stood 
in  the  pike  ready  to  follow  the  skirmishers.  Two  hundred  yards 
behind  Colston,  A.  P.  Hill  had  deployed  Fender  on  the  left  of  the 
pike.  Lane,  McGowan,  and  Heth  were  coming  in  column 
down  the  pike.  Archer  and  Thomas  were  following,  but  some 
miles  behind.  Jackson  had  made  his  play  so  far  with  fair  success, 
and  he  now  stood  ready  with  over  20,000  men  to  surprise  How- 
ard's 13,000.  He  was  sure  of  an  important  victory,  but  the 
fruits  to  be  reaped  from  it  would  be  limited  for  two  reasons. 

1st.  Two  brigades  were  some  hours  behind,  for  Archer,^ 
without  orders,  had  taken  them  to  protect  the  rear.  2d.  There  ' 
were  now  but  two  hours  of  daylight  left,  and  only  in  daylight  can 
the  fruits  of  victories  be  gathered.  The  question  is  suggested 
whether  or  not  time  had  been  anywhere  lost  unnecessarily.  It 
would  seem  that  12  hours  should  not  be  needed  to  march  14  miles 
and  form  20,000  men  in  line  of  battle.  Briefly,  it  may  be  said, 
that  with  good  broad  roads,  or  with  troops  formed,  ready  to 
march  at  the  word,  and  disciplined  to  take  mud  holes  and  ob- 
structions without  loss  of  distance,  two  hours  could  have  been 
saved.  But  none  of  these  conditions  existed.  Especially  was 
time  lost  in  the  morning  in  getting  the  column  formed. 

Rodes  reports  it  about  8  A.M.  before  the  start  was  made. 
Further  on,  his  report  notes,  "a  delay  was  caused  by  an  endeavor 
on  our  part  to  entrap  some  Federal  cavalry."  There  may  have 
been,  during  the  morning,  lack  of  appreciation  of  the  value,  even 
of  the  minutes,  in  an  enterprise  of  the  character  now  on  foot, 
and  an  inadequate  idea  of  the  distance  to  be  covered. 

Some  time  was  also  lost  in  deploying  Fender's  brigade  in  the 
third  line  just  before  the  charge  was  ordered.  It  would  have 
saved  a  half -hour  of  great  value  to  have  ordered  the  charge  as  soon 
as  the  2d  line  was  formed,  and  allowed  A.  P.  Hill's  division  to 
follow  Rodes  and  Colston  in  column  from  the  first,  as  they 
actually  did  at  last.  For,  after  advancing  some  distance  through 
the  tangled  undergrowth,  Fender's  brigade  was  brought  back  to 


334  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

the  road  and  placed  at  the  head  of  the  column  for  the  rest  of  the 
advance. 

It  was  nearly  6  P.M.  when  the  signal  for  the  advance  was  given 
by  a  bugle,  and  taken  up  and  repeated  for  each  brigade  by  bugles 
to  the  right  and  left  through  the  woods.  But  the  sounds  seem 
to  have  been  smothered  in  the  forest,  for  the  Federal  reports  make 
no  mention  of  them.  Their  first  intimation  of  anything  unusual 
was  given  by  wild  turkeys,  foxes,  and  deer,  startled  by  the  long 
lines  of  infantry  and  driven  through  the  Federal  camps.  Then 
came  shots  from  the  Federal  pickets,  and  then  the  guns  on  the 
turnpike  opened  and  were  soon  followed  by  Confederate  volleys 
and  yells,  impressing  upon  the  enemy  the  fact  that  an  overwhelm- 
ing force  had  surprised  them.  Nevertheless,  a  gallant  effort  at 
resistance  was  made.  The  extreme  right  of  the  Federals  was  held 
by  Von  Gilsa's  brigade  of  four  regiments,  about  1400  strong, 
which  was  formed,  a  half  facing  south  and  half  facing  west. 
They  stood  to  fire  three  volleys,  but  by  that  time  the  Confederate 
lines  were  enveloping  their  flanks,  and  enfilade  and  reverse  fire 
was  being  opened  upon  them.  Only  prompt  flight  could  save  the 
brigade  from  annihilation.  After  the  third  volley  the  brigade 
very  wisely  took  to  its  heels  and  made  its  escape  with  a  loss  of 
264  killed,  wounded,  and  captured.  Two  guns  with  Von  Gilsa 
were  also  captured.  The  next  brigade  to  the  left,  McLean's,  en- 
deavored to  change  front.  But  it  did  not  take  long  for  the  stern 
facts  of  the  situation  to  become  clear  to  every  man  of  the  brigade. 
As  the  canister  fire  of  the  Confederate  guns  was  added  to  the 
enfilade  fire  of  the  Confederate  infantry,  this  brigade  also  dissolved 
into  a  mass  of  fugitives,  and  two  more  guns,  serving  with  them, 
were  captured.  But  that  they  had  fought  well  is  shown  by  their 
losses,  which  were  692  out  of  about  2500.  The  division  com- 
mander and  four  out  of  five  regimental  commanders  were  killed 
or  wounded. 

For  a  while,  now,  the  fight  degenerated  into  a  foot  race. 
Howard's  original  force  of  13,000  had  been  reduced  to  10,000 
by  the  sending  off  of  Barlow's  large  brigade.  Of  the  10,000,  in  a 
half-hour  4000  had  been  routed.  The  Confederates,  recognizing 
the  importance  of  pushing  the  pursuit,  exerted  themselves  to  the 
utmost.  The  lines  broke  into  the  double-quick  wherever  the 


CHANCELLORSVILLE  335 

ground  was  favorable,  stopping  only  to  fire  at  fugitives,  or  when 
completely  out  of  breath.  The  horse  artillery  kept  nearly 
abreast,  and  directed  its  fire  principally  at  the  Federal  batteries 
which  endeavored  to  cover  the  retreat.  Some  of  these  were 
fought  gallantly,  and  some  were  overrun  and  captured.  More 
might  have  been,  and  more  prisoners  taken,  but  for  a  blunder  by 
Colquitt.  His  brigade  was  on  the  right  of  the  front  line,  and  its 
advance  was  least  obstructed  either  by  woods  or  the  enemy. 
It  could  have  moved  most  rapidly,  and  might  have  narrowed 
the  enemy's  avenue  of  escape. 
Jackson's  instructions  had  been  explicit.  Rodes's  report  says : — 

"Each  brigadq  commander  received  positive  instructions  which  were 
well  understood.  The  whole  line  was  to  push  ahead  from  the  beginning, 
keeping  the  road  for  its  guide.  .  .  .  Under  no  circumstances  was  there 
to  be  any  pause  in  the  advance." 

Ramseur's  brigade  was  ordered  to  move  in  rear  of  Colquitt's 
and  to  support  it.  Colquitt,  early  in  the  advance,  halted  to  in- 
vestigate  a  rumor  of  a  body  of  the  enemy  on  his  right  flank,  ^< 
which  proved  to  be  a  small  party  of  cavalry.  He  delayed  so 
that  neither  his  brigade  or  Ramseur's  rejoined  the  line  until  late 
at  night. 

Thus  two  brigades,  by  disregard  of  instructions  and  without 
need,  were  kept  entirely  out  of  action  during  the  whole  afternoon. 
So  it  happened  that  five  of  Jackson's  15  brigades  (Thomas, 
Archer,  Paxton,  Colquitt  and  Hamseur)  were  missing  from  his 
line  of  battle  during  the  whole  afternoon,  and,  as  A.  P.  Hill's 
four  remaining  brigades  were  not  deployed  until  after  dark,  only 
six  brigades  were  in  the  attack  and  pursuit  of  the  llth  corps: 
to  wit,  Rodes,  Doles,  and  Iverson  of  Rodes's  division,  and  Jones,  , 
Warren,  and  Nichols  of  Colston's  division.  ,.  The  great  advantage 
of  the  Confederates  lay  in  their  being  able  to  bring  the  centre 
of  their  line  of  battle  against  the  flank  of  the  enemy's  line.  This 
overwhelmed  the  two  right  brigades  in  a  very  short  while,  as 
we  have  seen,  and  the  line  pushed  rapidly  on,  hoping  to  over- 
whelm the  succeeding  brigades  likewise,  one  at  a  time. 

The  next  division  was  Schurz's  of  two  brigades,  in  line  of  battle 
along  the  Plank  road,  with  two  batteries  which  took  positions  and 
fired  on  the  approaching  Confederates.  Schurz  endeavored  to 


336 


MILITARY  MEMOIRS 


form  at  right  angles  to  their  approach,  but  the  mass  of  fugitives 
with  wagons,  ambulances,  beef  cattle,  etc.,  entirely  overwhelmed 
some  of  his  regiments,  and  only  two  or  three  isolated  ones  were 
able  to  march  in  good  order,  and,  facing  about,  to  fire  from  time 
to  time  at  their  pursuers. 

Next,  at  Dowdall's  tavern,  was  a  line  of  rifle-pits  at  right  angles 
to  the  Plank  road,  and  already  occupied  by  Buschbeck's  brigade 
of  Von  Steinwehr's  division,  the  last  of  Howard's  corps  —  its 
companion  brigade,  Barlow's,  being  away  with  Sickles.  Three 
or  four  batteries  were  here  established  upon  the  line,  and  to  it 
were  rallied  numbers  of  fugitives.  At  last  an  organized  resist- 
ance was  prepared.  When  the  Confederates  approached,  in 
very  scattered  shape,  they  met  a  severe  fire,  and  the  advance  was 
checked.  Had  Colquitt  here  been  on  the  Confederate  right 
with  his  and  Ramseur's  brigades,  an  opportunity  was  offered  for  a 
large  capture.  It  might  have  been  accomplished  by  the  force 
at  hand  with  a  little  delay.  But  they  were  already  flushed  with 
victory  and  would  not  be  denied.  After  a  sharp  fight  of  perhaps 
20  minutes,  Colston's  second  line  merged  into  the  first,  and  the 
two  lines  pushed  forward  everywhere.  The  Federal  artillery 
foresaw  the  end  and  fled,  five  guns  being  too  late  and  captured. 
Buschbeck  followed  in  fairly  good  order,  but  preceded  by  a 
stampede  of  troops  and  trains,  principally  down  the  Plank 
road,  though  a  part  diverged  to  the  left  by  a  road  to  the  White 
House,  called  the  Bullock  road. 

The  casualties  in  Schurz's  division  were  919.  In  Buschbeck's 
brigade  were  483.  The  total  loss  of  Howard's  corps  was :  killed, 


KILLED 

WOUNDED 

MISSING 

TOTAL 

Schimmelpfennig 
Krzyzanowski 
Buschbeck's 

84 
45 
26 

215 

277 
229 

120 

178 
228 

419 
500 
483 

Total 

155 

721 

526 

1402 

217;    wounded,  1221;    missing,  974;    total,  2412;    only  about 
20  per  cent  of  the  corps. 

It  was  a  very  trifling  loss,  compared  with  what  it  might 


CHANCELLORSVILLE  337 

have  been  had  all  of  Jackson's  troops  been  upon  the  field,  and  had 
his  orders  been  strictly  observed. 

The  casualties  of  the  Confederates  are  not  known,  their  re- 
turns consolidating  all  separate  actions  together. 

Much  undeserved  obloquy  was  heaped  upon  the  llth  corps  for 
their  enforced  retreat.  No  troops  could  have  acted  differently. 
All  of  their  fighting  was  of  one  brigade  at  a  time  against  six. 
With  the  capture  of  the  Buschbeck  position,  the  fighting  of  the 
day  practically  ceased.  The  Confederate  troops  were  at  the 
limit  of  exhaustion  and  disorganization.  Daylight  was  fading 
fast,  and  commands  badly  intermingled.  The  pursuit  was  kept 
up,  however,  for  some  distance,  although  the  enemy  was  no 
longer  in  sight.  A  few  hundred  yards  beyond  the  Buschbeck 
position,  the  Plank  road  entered  a  large  body  of  forest,  closing  on 
both  sides  of  the  road  for  nearly  a  mile  before  the  open  Chan- 
cellorsville  plateau  is  reached.  At  the  entrance  of  the  wood  a 
single  Federal  gun,  with  a  small  escort,  was  formed  as  a  rear- 
guard, and  followed  the  retreat  to  Chancellorsville  without  seeing 
any  pursuers. 

A  notable  case  of  acoustic  shadows  occurred  during  this  action. 
Sickles,  some  two  and  a  half  miles  away,  heard  nothing  of  the 
attack  upon  Howard  until  word  was  brought  him,  which  he  at 
first  refused  to  believe.  At  6.30  P.M.,  Hooker  sat  on  the  veranda 
of  the  Chancellorsville  house  in  entire  confidence  that  Lee  was 
retreating  to  Gordonsville  and  that  Sickles  was  "among  his 
trains."  Faint  sounds  of  distant  cannonading  were  at  first 
supposed  to  come  from  Sickles.  Presently,  an  aid  looking  down 
the  road  with  his  glass  suddenly  shouted,  "My  God!  here  they 
come."  All  sprang  to  their  horses  and,  riding  down  the  road,  met, 
in  a  half-mile,  the  fugitive  rabble  of  Howard's  corps,  and  learned 
that  Jackson,  with  half  of  Lee's  army,  had  routed  the  Federal 
flank.  Had  there  been  some  hours  of  daylight,  Hooker's  posi- 
tion would  have  been  critical.  For  Lee  and  Jackson  were  now 
less  than  two  miles  apart,  and  between  them  were  of  infantry 
less  than  two  divisions;  Geary's  of  the  12th  corps  in  front  of 
Lee,  and  two  brigades  of  Berry's  of  the  3d,  near  the  path  of 
Jackson. 

But  darkness  puts  an  embargo  upon  offensive  operations  in  a 


338  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

wooded  country.  Troops  may  be  marched  during  the  night, 
where  there  is  no  opposition,  but  the  experiences  of  this  occasion 
will  illustrate  the  difficulty  of  righting,  even  when  the  moon  is  at 
its  best.  The  night  restored  to  the  Federals  nearly  all  the  ad- 
vantages lost  during  the  day.  Hooker  acted  promptly  and 
judiciously.  Urgent  recalls  were  sent  for  Sickles  and  his  entire 
force.  His  advance  had  gone  two  miles  to  the  front  and  was 
preparing  to  bivouac,  when  orders  overtook  it.  It  did  not 
reach  the  field  until  after  10  P.M. 

The  force  first  available  against  Jackson  was  the  artillery 
of  the  12th  corps,  for  which  a  fine  position  was  offered  along  the 
western  brow  of  the  Chancellorsville  plateau,  south  of  the 
Plank  road.  This  position  was  known  as  Fair  view,  and  it 
now  became  the  key-point  of  the  battle.  In  front  of  it  the 
open  ground  extended  about  600  yards  to  the  edge  of  the  forest. 
A  small  stream,  between  moderate  banks  at  the  foot  of  the 
plateau,  offered  shelter  for  a  strong  line  of  infantry  in  front  of 
the  guns.  Here,  within  an  hour,  was  established  a  powerful 
battery  of  34  guns,  and  during  the  night  all  were  protected  by 
parapets.  The  position  was  essentially  like  the  Confederate 
position  at  Marye's  Hill  before  Fredericksburg,  but  on  a  larger 
scale.  The  forest  in  front  offered  no  single  position  for  a  Con- 
federate gun. 

Only  from  one  point  could  it  be  assailed  by  artillery.  Across 
the  stream  in  front,  about  1000  yards  obliquely  to  the  left,  was 
the  small  settlement  called  Hazel  Grove,  occupying  some  high 
open  fields,  from  which,  as  has  been  told,  Birney  had  that 
morning  discovered  Jackson's  march.  Hazel  Grove  offered  ex- 
cellent positions  for  attacking  the  Fairview  lines,  but  Hazel 
Grove  was  itself  within  the  Federal  lines,  and,  about  sundown,  was 
occupied  by  a  few  cavalry  with  some  artillery  of  the  3d  corps,  and 
some  miscellaneous  trains.1 

1  Two  small  collisions  had  occurred  just  before  the  close  of  the  fighting 
between  some  of  these  troops  and  small  bodies  of  Jackson's  men  still  making 
their  way  forward.  The  8th  Pa.  Cav.  had  been  ordered  to  Howard, 
and  at  the  Plank  road  it  suddenly  met  a  column  of  infantry  in  pursuit  of 
Howard's  fugitives.  The  cavalry  received  a  volley  emptying  about  30 
saddles  and  turning  the  regiment  back.  Meanwhile,  about  200  of  Doles's 
brigade,  under  Col.  Winn  of  the  4th  Ga.,  had  stampeded  the  trains  at  Hazel 


CHANCELLORSVILLE  339 

The  only  Federal  infantry  near  at  hand  when  the  fugitives 
reached  Chancellorsville  were  Carr's  and  Revere's  brigades  of 
Berry's  division  of  the  3d  corps.  These  brigades  were  formed 
in  line  of  battle  in  the  forest  north  of  the  Plank  road,  with  their 
left  resting  on  the  guns  at  Fairview.  Here  they  promptly 
set  to  work  to  intrench  themselves  in  the  forest  across  the 
Plank  road,  and  to  cut  an  abattis  in  front.  They  were  soon 
reenforced  by  Hays's  brigade  of  French's  division  of  the  2d  corps, 
and  later  by  Mott's,  the  remaining  brigade  of  Berry's  division, 
which  had  been  guarding  bridges  at  United  States  Ford. 

Meanwhile,  as  darkness  fell,  the  Confederate  pursuit  died  out 
upon  entering  the  forest  beyond  the  open  lands  about  Dowdall's 
tavern.  The  cessation  was  not  voluntary  on  Jackson's  part,  but 
it  was  necessary  that  Rodes's  and  Colston's  divisions  should 
be  re-formed,  and  that  Hill's  division  should  take  the  lead.  It 
had  followed  the  pursuit,  marching  in  column,  and  was  in 
good  order  and  comparatively  fresh.  The  other  divisions  were 
broken,  mingled,  and  exhausted,  and  several  brigades  were  far 
behind.  During  the  long  pause  in  the  advance,  while  Hill's 
brigades  filed  into  the  woods  to  the  right  and  left,  and  the  dis- 
organized brigades  were  withdrawn  to  re-form,  Jackson  im- 
patiently supervised  and  urged  forward  the  movements.  It  is 
possible  that  he  proposed  to  push  his  attack  down  the  Bullock 
road  which,  a  short  distance  ahead,  diverged  to  the  left,  toward 
the  river,  instead  of  following  the  Plank  road  to  Chancellorsville, 
as  he  had  said  to  Hill:  "Press  them,  Hill!  Press  them!  Cut 
them  off  from  United  States  Ford."  It  would,  however,  have 

Grove,  and  had  been  heavily  cannonaded  by  the  Federal  batteries.  They 
had,  however,  found  shelter  and  suffered  no  loss.  The  affairs  were  insignifi- 
cant, and  are  only  referred  to  here  because  absurd  exaggerations  of  Pleas- 
onton's  Federal  reports  have  been  accepted  by  many  reputable  authors. 
A  Federal  writer,  Col.  A.  C.  Hamlin,  historian  of  the  llth  corps,  has  pub- 
lished the  fullest  and  most  accurate  account  yet  produced  of  the  history  of 
that  evening,  including  the  wounding  of  Stonewall  Jackson,  from  either 
Confederate  or  Federal  sources.  He  made  many  visits  to  the  field  in  com- 
pany with  the  most  prominent  living  actors,  and  has  carefully  compared  the 
official  reports,  both  of  Federal  and  Confederate  officers.  No  future  student 
of  this  battle  can  afford  to  be  ignorant  of  his  story.  —  The  Battle  of  Chancel- 
lorsville. By  A.  C.  Hamlin,  historian,  llth  Army  Corps.  Bangor,  Me. 
Published  by  the  author,  1896. 


340  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

been  an  error  to  make  such  a  diversion,  for  the  attack  would 
have  met  an  overwhelming  force.  Its  only  hope  of  success  was 
to  reunite  with  Lee  at  Chancellorsville  with  the  least  delay. 
Meanwhile,  partaking  of  the  impatience  of  Jackson,  his  chief 
of  artillery,  Col.  Crutchfield,  pushed  some  guns  forward  on  the 
Plank  road,  and  opened  a  random  fire  down  it  toward  Chancel- 
lorsville, now  less  than  a  mile  away. 

It  was  an  unwise  move,  for  it  provoked  a  terrific  response 
from  the  34  guns  now  in  position  upon  Fairview  plateau.  The 
Plank  road  was  now  crowded  with  troops  and  artillery  in  column, 
and  the  woods  near  it  were  full  of  the  reorganizing  brigades. 
Under  such  a  fire,  even  in  the  dim  light  of  the  rising  moon,  great 
confusion  soon  resulted,  and  although  actual  casualities  were  few, 
it  became  necessary  to  discontinue  our  fire  before  order  could  be 
restored  and  the  formation  of  the  line  of  battle  be  resumed. 

Lane's  N.C.  brigade  was  at  the  head  of  Hill's  division.  One 
regiment,  the  33d,  was  deployed  and  sent  some  200  yards  ahead 
as  skirmishers,  and  the  other  four  formed  line  of  battle  with  the 
centre  on  the  Plank  road  in  the  following  order  from  left  to  right : 
28th,  18th,  37th,  7th.  The  Bullock  road  here  diverged  to  the 
left,  toward  United  States  Ford,  but  the  enemy  was  evidently 
close  in  front,  and  Jackson  said  to  Lane,  "Push  right  ahead,  Lane. 
Right  ahead." 

While  the  formation  was  still  in  progress,  Jackson,  followed  by 
several  staff-officers  and  couriers,  rode  slowly  forward  upon  an 
old  road,  called  the  Mountain  road,  which  left  the  Bullock  to  its 
left  near  the  Plank  road,  and  ran  parallel  to  the  latter,  about 
80  yards  distant,  toward  Chancellorsville.1 

Up  this  road  the  party  advanced  for  100  or  200  yards,  but 
not  passing  the  33d  N.C.  skirmish-line.  They  then  halted  and 
listened  for  a  while  to  the  axes  of  the  Federals,  cutting  abattis 
in  the  forest  ahead.  Beyond  the  Plank  road,  the  Federal  troops 
who  had  been  off  with  Sickles  were  .now  returning,  and  were 
slowly  working  their  way  to  reoccupy  some  breastworks  which 

1  Most  accounts  have  stated  that  this  ride  was  along  the  Plank  road,  but 
careful  investigation  by  Col.  Hamlin,  and  the  testimony  of  the  most  compe- 
tent living  witnesses,  make  it  clear  that  this  ride,  and  the  shooting  of  Jackson, 
both  took  place  in  the  Mountain  road,  which  is  now  almost  obliterated  by  the 
forest. 


CHANCELLORSVILLE  341 

had  been  built  the  night  before  in  the  forest  south  of  the  Plank 
road.  Between  their  skirmishers  and  those  of  the  33d  N.C.  on  their 
side  of  the  Plank  road,  there  suddenly  began  some  firing.  The 
fire  spread  rapidly  in  both  directions,  along  the  picket-lines,  and 
was  presently  taken  up  by  Federal  regiments  and  lines  of 
battle  in  the  rear.  Jackson,  at  the  head  of  his  party,  was 
slowly  retracing  his  way  back  to  his  line  of  battle,  when  this 
volley  firing  began.  Maj.  Barry,  on  the  left  of  the  18th  N.C., 
seeing  through  the  trees  by  the  moonlight  a  group  of  horsemen 
moving  toward  his  line,  ordered  his  left  wing  to  fire.  Two  of 
the  party  were  killed,  and  Jackson  received  three  balls;  one  in 
the  right  hand,  one  through  the  left  wrist  and  hand,  and  one 
shattering  the  left  arm  between  shoulder  and  elbow. 

The  reins  were  dropped,  and  the  horse,  turning  from  the  fire, 
ran  into  overhanging  limbs  which  nearly  unhorsed  him;  but, 
recovering  the  rein,  he  guided  into  the  Plank  road  where  Capt. 
Wilbourn  of  his  staff  helped  him  off.  Meanwhile,  the  enemy 
had  advanced  guns  to  their  skirmish-line,  and  presently  began  to 
sweep  the  Plank  road  with  shell  and  canister.  A  litter  was 
brought  and  Jackson  placed  in  it,  but  a  bearer  was  shot,  and 
Jackson  fell  heavily  on  his  wounded  side.  With  great  diffi- 
culty he  was  finally  gotten  to  an  ambulance,  which  already  held 
his  chief  of  artillery,  Col.  Crutchfield,  with  a  shattered  leg. 

During  the  night  Jackson's  left  arm  was  amputated,  and  the 
next  day  he  was  taken  in  an  ambulance  via  Spottsylvania,  to  a 
small  house  called  Chandler's,  near  Guinea  Station.  For  a  few 
days  his  recovery  was  expected,  but  pneumonia  supervened,  and 
he  died  on  May  10.  In  his  last  moments  his  mind  wandered, 
and  he  was  again  upon  the  battle-field  giving  orders  to  his 
troops:  "Order  A.  P.  Hill  to  prepare  for  action.  Pass  the  in- 
fantry to  the  front.  Tell  Maj .  Hawks  -  There  was  a  pause 
for  some  moments,  and  then,  calmly,  the  last  words,  "Let  us 
pass  over  the  river,  and  rest  under  the  shade  of  the  trees." 

Jackson's  fall  left  A.  P.  Hill  in  command,  but  Hill  was  himself 
soon  disabled  by  a  fragment  of  shell,  and  sent  for  Stuart.  Rodes 
ranked  Stuart,  but  the  latter  was  not  only  best  known  to  the 
army,  but  was  of  great  popularity,  and  Rodes  cheerfully  acqui- 
esced. His  whole  career,  until  his  death  at  Winchester,  Sept. 


342  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

19,  '64,  was  brilliant,  and  justifies  the  belief  that  he  would 
have  proven  a  competent  commander,  but,  as  will  be  seen,  Stu- 
art's conduct,  upon  this  occasion,  was  notably  fine.  A  little  before 
dark,  Stuart,  with  Jackson's  consent,  had  taken  his  cavalry  and 
a  regiment  of  infantry  and  started  to  attack  the  camps  and 
trains  of  the  enemy  near  Ely's  Ford.  He  had  reached  their 
vicinity  and  was  forming  for  the  assault,  when  one  of  Jackson's 
staff  brought  the  message  of  recall.  He  ordered  the  command 
to  fire  three  volleys  into  the  nearest  camp  and  then  to  withdraw, 
while  he  rode  rapidly  back — about  five  miles — and  took  com- 
mand between  10  and  11  P.M. 

There  was  but  one  course  to  take  —  to  make  during  the  night 
such  preparation  as  was  possible,  and,  at  dawn,  to  renew  the 
attack  and  endeavor  to  break  through  the  enemy's  line  and 
unite  with  Lee  at  Chancellorsville.  The  wounding  of  Crutch- 
field  had  left  me  the  senior  artillery  officer  present,  and  I  was 
sent  for,  and  directed  to  reconnoitre,  and  to  post  before  dawn  as 
many  guns  as  could  be  used.  I  spent  the  night  in  reconnoissance 
and,  beside  the  Plank  road,  could  find  but  one  outlet  through  the 
forest,  a  cleared  vista  some  200  yards  long  and  25  wide,  through 
a  dense  pine  thicket,  opening  upon  a  cleared  plateau  held  by  the 
enemy.  This  plateau  afterward  proved  to  be  the  Hazel  Grove 
position,  and  I  concentrated  near  it  several  batteries.  In  his 
Life  of  Stuart,  Maj.  McClellan,  his  adjutant,  writes:  — 

"Col.  Alexander's  reconnoissance  convinced  Stuart  that  Hazel  Grove 
was  the  key  to  the  Federal  line,  and  to  this  part  of  the  field  Stuart 
directed  a  large  share  of  his  personal  attention  on  the  morning  of  the  3d." 

One  of  Jackson's  engineers  was  sent  by  a  long  detour  and  found 
Lee  before  daylight  and  explained  to  him  Stuart's  position  and 
plans,  that  he  might,  during  the  action,  extend  his  left  and  seek 
a  connection  with  our  right.  During  the  night,  the  brigades  in 
rear  rejoined,  and  the  three  divisions  were  formed  for  the  attack 
in  the  morning,  with  Hill's  division  in  front,  Colston's  in  a  second 
line,  and  Rodes's  in  a  third. 

Two  brigades  on  Hill's  right  were  placed  obliquely  to  the  rear, 
to  present  a  front  toward  that  flank.  The  positions  of  the  differ- 
ent brigades  are  roughly  shown  thus :  — 


CHANCELLORSVILLE  343 


Thomas  Fender 


Nichols  Paxton 


Iverson  Rodes 


Lane 
Heth  McGowan 

Archer 
Warren        Jones 


Ramseur,    Doles,    Colquitt 


When  Hooker  found  that  the  Confederate  attack  had  come 
to  a  standstill  in  front  of  the  Fairview  line,  with  Sickles  near 
Hazel  Grove  upon  its  right  flank,  he  ordered  Sickles  to  move  for- 
ward by  the  moonlight,  and  attack.  Birney's  division,  in  two 
lines  with  supporting  columns,  about  midnight,  advanced  from 
Hazel  Grove  upon  the  forest  south  of  the  Plank  road  and  in  front 
of  the  Fairview  position.  The  left  wing  of  this  force  grazed  the 
skirmishers  of  McGowan  and  struck  the  right  flank  of  Lane's 
brigade,  of  which  two  and  a  half  regiments  became  sharply 
engaged.  But  the  whole  Federal  advance  glanced  off,  as  it 
were,  and,  changing  its  direction,  it  turned  toward  the  Federal 
line  in  front  of  Fairview,  where  it  approached  the  position  of 
Knipe's  and  Ruger's  brigades  of  Williams's  division  of  the  12th 
corps. 

Hearing  their  noisy  approach,  and  believing  them  to  be  Con- 
federates, the  Fairview  guns  and  infantry  opened  fire  upon  the 
woods,  while  the  approaching  lines  were  still  so  distant  that  they 
were  unable  to  locate  their  assailants,  and  supposed  the  fire  to 
come  from  the  Confederate  line.  And  now  for  a  long  time,  for 
one  or  perhaps  two  hours,  the  Confederates  listened  to  a  suc- 
cession of  furious  combats  in  the  forest  in  their  front,  accom- 
panied by  heavy  shelling  of  the  woods,  volleys  of  musketry,  and 
a  great  deal  of  cheering.  Our  pickets  and  skirmish-lines  were 
forced  sometimes  to  lie  down  or  seek  protection  of  trees  from 
random  bullets,  but  we  had  no  other  part  in  it.  It  extended 
northward  sometimes  even  across  the  Plank  road.  And  the 
official  reports  of  many  Federal  officers  give  glowing  accounts 
of  the  repulse  of  desperate  Confederate  attacks,  and  even  of  the 
capture  of  Confederate  guns.  These  stories  were  founded  on  the 
finding  of  some  Federal  guns,  which  had  been  abandoned  in  one 
of  the  stampedes  of  the  afternoon. 

Col.  Hamlin's  book,  above  referred  to,  says:  — 


344  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

"  Some  of  the  reports  of  this  midnight  encounter  are  missing,  and  their 
publication  will  throw  much  light  on  the  details.  On  the  Federal  side  it 
was  undoubtedly  a  mixed-up  mess,  and  some  of  the  regiments  complain  of 
being  fired  into  from  the  front  and  from  both  flanks.  ...  At  all  events, 
after  reading  the  reports  of  Gen.  Sickles  at  the  time,  and  his  statement  a 
year  afterward  to  Congress  .  .  .  the  brilliant  array  of  gallant  troops  in  the 
moonlight  .  .  .  the  bold  attack  .  .  .  the  quick  return  of  one  of  the  columns 
to  be  stopped  by  the  bayonets  of  the  63d  Pa.  .  .  .  the  advance  of  the  other 
column  deflecting  to  the  right,  until  it  met  Gen.  Slocum  in  person  .  .  . 
certainly  there  is  occasion  for  a  slight  smile  on  the  part  of  the  reader. 
And  this  smile  may  be  lengthened  on  reading  the  story  of  Gen.  De  Tro- 
briand,  who  was  a  participator,  or  the  account  left  by  Col.  Underwood  of 
the  23d  Mass.,  who  returned  from  the  depths  of  the  wilderness  in  time  to 
witness  and  describe  the  ludicrous  scene." 

Hooker  had  little  cause  for  apprehension  after  darkness  had 
come  to  his  relief,  yet  the  shock  to  his  overconfidence  had  been 
so  severe  that  his  only  new  dispositions  were  defensive.  Yet  he 
had  over  60,000  fresh  troops  present,  while  Lee  had  on  the  east 
but  about  16,000  and  on  the  west  about  24,000. 

His  first  care  was  to  order  the  intrenchment  of  an  interior 
line,  upon  which  he  could  fall  back  in  case  Stuart  forced  his  way 
through  to  a  junction  with  Lee.  A  short  line  was  quickly  se- 
lected, of  great  natural  strength,  behind  Hunting  Run  on  the 
west,  and  behind  Mineral  Spring  Run  on  the  east,  with  both 
flanks  resting  on  the  river  and  covering  his  bridges.  This  line 
will  be  more  fully  described  and  referred  to  later.  It  took 
in  the  White  House,  some  three-fourths  of  a  mile  in  the  rear  of 
Chancellorsville,  and  was  probably  the  strongest  field  intrench- 
ment ever  built  in  Va.  Next,  Hooker  sent  orders  to  Sedgwick 
at  9  P.M.,  as  follows :  — 

"  The  major-general,  commanding,  directs  that  you  cross  the  Rappahan- 
nock  at  Fredericksburg  on  receipt  of  this  order,  and  at  once  take  up  your 
line  of  march  on  the  Chancellorsville  road  until  you  connect  with  him,  and 
will  attack  and  destroy  any  force  you  may  fall  in  with  on  your  road. 

"You  will  leave  all  your  trains  behind,  except  pack  trains  of  your  am- 
munition, and  march  to  be  in  the  vicinity  of  the  general  at  daylight.  You 
will  probably  fall  upon  the  rear  of  the  forces  commanded  by  Gen.  Lee,  and 
between  you  and  the  major-general,  commanding,  he  expects  to  use  him  up. 
Send  word  to  Gen.  Gibbon  to  take  possession  of  Fredericksburg.  Be  sure 
not  to  fail," 


CHANCELLORSVILLE  345 

These  orders  were  good,  and  would  have  insured  victory,  had 
they  been  carried  out.  And  Hooker  took  a  further  precaution, 
most  desirable  whenever  important  orders  are  issued.  He 
despatched  a  competent  staff-officer,  Gen.  Warren,  his  chief 
engineer,  to  supervise  their  execution.  Unfortunately  for  him, 
however,  under  the  conditions  it  proved  impossible  to  exe- 
cute the  orders  within  the  time  set,  as  will  be  told  later.  Here 
it  is  only  necessary  to  note  that  Sedgwick  was  never  able  to  get 
near  Chancellors ville. 

Even  as  the  field  stood,  with  or  without  the  arrival  of  Sedg- 
wick, the  battle  was  still  Hooker's,  had  he  fought  where  he  stood. 
But  about  dawn  he  made  the  fatal  mistake  of  recalling  Sickles 
from  the  Hazel  Grove  position,  which  he  was  holding  with  Whip- 
pie's  and  Birney's  divisions,  and  five  batteries.  There  has 
rarely  been  a  more  gratuitous  gift  of  a  battle-field.  Sickles  had 
a  good  position  and  force  enough  to  hold  it,  even  without  re- 
enforcements,  though  ample  reinforcements  were  available. 
The  Federal  line  was  longer  and  overlapped  ours  on  its  right, 
and  our  only  opportunity  to  use  artillery  was  through  the  nar- 
row vista  above  referred  to,  which  was  scarcely  sufficient  for 
four  guns,  and  had  but  a  very  restricted  view. 

Had  Stuart's  attack  been  delayed  a  little  longer,  our  right 
flank  might  have  marched  out  upon  Hazel  Grove  plateau  with- 
out firing  a  shot.  A  Federal  battery,  supported  by  two  regi- 
ments, had  been  designated  as  a  rear-guard,  and  it  alone  occupied 
the  plateau  when  our  advance  was  made,  though  the  rear  of  the 
retiring  column  was  still  near. 

Stuart's  men,  when  the  lines  were  finally  formed,  got  from 
two  to  three  hours'  rest  before  dawn.  About  that  time,  cooked 
rations  were  brought  up.  Before  the  distribution,  however, 
was  finished,  Archer's  and  McGowan's  brigades  were  moved  for- 
ward, from  their  retired  positions  as  the  right  flank,  to  straighten 
the  line.  They  soon  came  upon  a  picket-line  of  the  enemy,  and 
sharp  firing  began.  Stuart,  without  waiting  further,  ordered 
the  whole  line  to  the  attack. 

Archer's  brigade,  about  1400  strong,  in  advancing  through 
the  pine  thickets,  drifted  to  the  right,  and  gradually  opened  a 
gap  between  it  and  McGowan's  brigade,  emerging  from  the 


346  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

forest  alone,  and  in  front  of  the  enemy's  rear-guard.  A  sharp 
action  ensued,  while  Archer  extended  his  right  and  threatened  the 
enemy's  rear,  forcing  the  battery  to  retreat.  He  then  charged 
and  captured  100  prisoners,  and  forced  the  abandonment  of  four 
of  the  guns.  , 

He  attempted  to  push  his  advance  much  farther,  but  was 
checked  by  the  fire  of  the  enemy's  artillery  and  of  the  rear  brigade, 
Graham's,  of  Sickles's  column.  After  two  efforts,  realizing  that 
his  force  was  too  small,  and  leaving  one  of  his  captured  guns,  he 
fell  back  to  Hazel  Grove  ridge,  about  6.30  A.M.  This  was  now 
being  occupied  rapidly  by  our  guns.  Thus,  so  easily  that  we  did 
not  at  once  realize  its  great  value,  we  gained  space  for  our 
batteries,  where  we  soon  found  that  we  could  enfilade  the  enemy's 
adjacent  lines. 

Meanwhile,  the  first  assault  had  been  made  along  the  whole  line 
by  Hill's  division.  The  enemy's  advanced  line  crossed  the  Plank 
road  and  was  held  by  Williams 's  division  of  the  12th  corps, 
Berry's  of  the  3d  corps,  and  Hays's  brigade  of  the  2d  corps.  In 
rear  of  the  front  line  was  a  second  line  near  the  edge  of  the  forest. 
Across  the  small  stream  and  along  the  edge  of  the  elevated  pla- 
teau, their  artillery  had  been  strongly  intrenched  during  the 
night,  making  a  third  line.  The  two  divisions  from  Hazel  Grove, 
with  their  four  batteries,  were  brought  up  in  rear  of  the  forces 
already  holding  the  front  to  the  west.  This  whole  front  from 
north  to  south  was  scarcely  a  mile  and  a  quarter  long.  It  was 
defended  by  about  25,000  men,  and  it  was  being  attacked  by 
about  an  equal  number.  The  Confederates,  however,  had  the 
hot  end  of  .the  affair,  in  having  to  take  the  aggressive  and  ad- 
vance upon  breastworks  protected  by  abattis  and  intrenched 
guns. 

In  his  first  assault,  however,  Hill's  division,  now  commanded 
by  Heth,  after  a  terrific  exchange  of  musketry,  succeeded  in 
driving  the  Federals  from  the  whole  of  their  front  line.  They 
followed  the  retreating  enemy,  and  attacked  the  second  line, 
where  the  resistance  became  more  strenuous.  On  the  extreme 
right,  Archer's  brigade  had  now  fallen  back  to  Hazel  Grove, 
where  it  remained,  supporting  the  guns  now  taking  position  there. 
This  left  McGowan's  flank  uncovered,  and  a  Federal  force  at- 


CHANCELLORSVILLE  347 

tacked  it,  and  drove  it  back  to  the  captured  line.  This  uncov- 
ered Lane's  brigade,  and  it  was  also  forced  to  fall  back.  On  the 
left  of  the  Plank  road,  the  advance  of  Thomas  beyond  the  ene- 
my's first  line  met  both  a  stronger  second  line  and  a  flank  at- 
tack, his  left  being  in  the  air.  After  an  hour's  hard  fighting,  the 
whole  line  was  forced  back  to  the  captured  breastworks,  with 
severe  losses.  It  was  clear  that  extreme  efforts  would  be  needed 
to  drive  the  enemy  from  his  position.  Stuart  ordered  30  addi- 
tional guns  to  Hazel  Grove,  and  brought  forward  both  the 
second  and  third  lines,  putting  in  at  once  his  last  reserves.  It 
would  be  useless  to  follow  in  detail  the  desperate  fighting  which 
now  ensued  and  was  kept  up  for  some  hours.  The  Federal 
guns  on  the  Fairview  heights  were  able  to  fire  over  the  heads  of 
two  lines  of  infantry,  and  other  batteries  aided  from  the  new 
position  in  which  Hooker  had  now  established  the  1st,  2d,  and 
5th  corps.  This  was  so  near  on  our  left  that  Carroll's  and 
McGregor's  brigades  of  the  2d  corps,  with  artillery,  were  sent 
forward  to  attack  our  flank,  and  were  only  repulsed  after  such 
fighting  that  they  lost  367  men.  With  the  aid  of  our  second  and 
third  lines,  fresh  assaults  were  made  on  both  sides  of  the  Plank 
road,  and  now  the  enemy's  second  lines  were  carried.  But  his 
reserves  were  called  upon,  and  again  our  lines  were  driven  back, 
and  countercharges  south  of  the  road  again  penetrated  the  gap 
between  McGowan  and  Archer.  Paxton's  brigade  was  brought 
across  from  the  north  and  restored  the  situation  at  a  critical 
moment,  Paxton,  however,  being  killed.  Some  of  our  brigades 
were  now  nearly  fought  out,  the  three  divisions  being  often 
massed  in  one,  and  the  men  could  only  be  moved  by  much  exam- 
ple on  the  part  of  their  officers.  Stuart  himself  was  conspicuous 
in  this,  and  was  everywhere  encouraging  the  troops  with  his 
magnetic  presence  and  bearing,  and  singing  as  he  rode  along  the 
lines,  "Old  Joe  Hooker,  won't  you  come  out  the  Wilderness." 
There  can  be  no  doubt  that  his  personal  conduct  had  great 
influence  in  sustaining  the  courage  of  the  men  so  that  when,  at 
last,  our  artillery  had  begun  to  shake  the  Federals'  lines,  there 
was  still  the  spirit  to  traverse  the  bloody  ground  for  the  fourth 
time  and  storm  the  Fairview  batteries. 

Guns  had  been  brought  to  Hazel  Grove  from  all  the  battalions 


348  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

on  the  field — Pegram's,  Carter's,  Jones's,  Mclntosh's,  and  Alex- 
ander's. Perhaps  50  guns  in  all  were  employed  here,  but  less 
than  40  at  any  one  time,  as  guns  were  occasionally  relieved,  or  sent 
to  the  rear  to  refill.  Their  field  of  fire  was  extensive,  being  an 
oblique  on  both  the  enemy's  artillery  and  infantry.  Some 
ground  having  been  gained  on  the  Plank  road,  Cols.  Jones  and 
Carter  had  also  been  able  to  establish  10  rifle  guns  there,  which 
enfiladed  the  Plank  road  as  far  as  the  Chancellorsville  house. 

About  nine  o'clock,  the  Federal  artillery  fire  was  perceptibly 
diminished.  Many  of  their  guns  were  running  short  of  ammu- 
nition, and  fresh  ammunition  was  not  supplied.  Sickles  asked 
for  it,  and  for  reinforcements,  but  none  were  sent.  It  would 
seem  that  Hooker  preferred  to  lose  the  Chancellorsville  plateau 
entirely,  and  fall  back  into  his  new  position,  which  was  like  a 
citadel  close  at  hand,  rather  than  risk  fighting  outside  of  it. 

At  Stuart's  last  charge,  the  Federal  lines  yielded  with  but 
moderate  resistance.  The  guns  in  the  Fairview  intrenchments 
abandoned  them,  and  fell  back  to  the  vicinity  of  the  Chancellors- 
ville house. 

The  guns  at  Hazel  Qrove  moved  forward  across  the  valley  and 
occupied  the  deserted  Federal  positions,  here  making  connec- 
tion with  Anderson's  division  which  Lee  was  extending  to  his 
left  to  meet  them.  They  were  soon  joined  by  Jordan's  bat- 
tery of  my  own  battalion,  which  had  been  serving  with 
Anderson. 

The  enemy,  driven  out  of  their  fortified  lines,  attempted  to 
make  a  stand  near  the  Chancellorsville  house,  but  it  was  a  brief 
one.  There  were  no  breastworks  here  to  give  shelter,  and  their 
position  was  now  so  contracted  that  our  guns  from  three  direc- 
tions crossed  their  fire  upon  it.  Hooker,  in  the  porch  of  the 
Chancellorsville  house,  was  put  hors  de  combat  for  two  or  three 
hours  by  a  piece  of  brick  torn  from  a  pillar  by  a  cannon-shot. 
No  one  took  command  in  his  place,  and  for  a  while  the  army 
was  without  a  head.  Meanwhile,  McLaws  and  Anderson  had 
seen  the  enemy  withdrawing  from  their  fronts  and  pressed  for- 
ward at  the  same  time  that  Stuart's  infantry  crowned  the 
plateau  from  the  west.  Some  prisoners  were  cut  off  and  cap- 
tured on  each  flank,  and  a  few  guns  also  fell  into  our  hands,  but, 


CHANCELLORSVILLE  349 

as  a  whole,  the  enemy's  withdrawal  was  orderly  and  well  managed, 
and  with  less  loss  than  might  have  been  expected.  One  sad 
feature  of  the  occasion  was  that  the  woods  on  the  north  of  the 
road  were  set  on  fire  by  shells,  and  the  dry  leaves  spread  the  fire 
rapidly,  although  the  trees  and  undergrowth  did  not  burn. 
Efforts  were  made  to  remove  the  wounded,  but  the  rapid  spread 
of  the  fire  prevented,  and  some  of  the  wounded  of  both  armies 
were  burned. 

About  10  A.M.,  Lee,  advancing  with  McLaws's  division,  met 
Stuart  with  Jackson's  corps  near  the  site  of  the  Chancellorsville 
house,  now  only  a  smoking  ruin,  for  our  shells  had  set  it  on  fire. 
It  was,  doubtless,  a  proud  moment  to  Lee,  as  it  was  to  the  troops 
who  greeted  him  with  enthusiastic  cheering. 

Lee,  by  no  means,  intended  the  battle  to  end  here.  Both  in- 
fantry and  artillery  were  ordered  to  replenish  ammunition  and 
renew  the  assault,  but  there  came  news  from  the  rear,  which 
forced  a  change  of  programme.  Sedgwick's  corps  had  broken 
through  the  flimsy  line  in  front  of  it,  and  was  now  moving  up 
the  Plank  road.  With  all  his  audacity  Lee  could  not  venture 
to  attack  five  corps  intrenched  in  his  front,  while  Sedgwick  came 
up  in  his  rear. 

The  story  of  events  at  Chancellorsville  must  now  pause,  as 
the  action  there  paused,  while  that  is  told  of  Sedgwick's  venture 
against  Lee's  rear. 

Hooker  had  sent  urgent  orders  the  night  before  to  Sedgwick 
to  come  to  his  help,  and  a  staff-officer,  Warren,  to  supervise 
their  execution.  But  Sedgwick,  though  already  on  the  south 
side  of  the  river,  which  Hooker  did  not  seem  to  know,  was  three 
miles  below  Fredericksburg,  near  the  scene  of  Franklin's  cross- 
ing in  Dec.  He  had  been  under  orders  to  advance  toward  Rich- 
mond on  the  Bowling  Green  road,  and  had  disposed  his  troops 
accordingly. 

To  advance  up  the  Plank  road,  it  was  necessary  to  march  to 
Fredericksburg  and  force  the  Confederate  lines  on  Marye's  Hill. 
These  lines  were  held  from  Taylor's  Hill  to  the  Howison  house, 
about  three  miles,  by  only  two  brigades,  Barksdale's  and  Hays's, 
with  a  small  amount  of  artillery.  The  regiments  were  strung 
out  in  single  rank,  the  men  sometimes  yards  apart,  and  with 


350  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

wide  intervals  at  many  places  between  regiments.  On  Marye's 
Hill,  two  regiments,  the  18th  and  21st  Miss.,  with  six  guns  of  the 
Washington  Arty,  and  two  under  Lt.  Brown  of  Alexander's 
Bat.,  were  distributed  from  the  Plank  road  to  Hazel  Creek, 
about  a  half-mile. 

Sedgwick  had  marched  at  midnight  with  a  good  moon,  but 
his  progress  was  slow,  for  the  Confederate  pickets  annoyed  it. 
By  daylight  he  was  in  Fredericksburg,  and  his  batteries  from 
both  banks  of  the  river  and  from  the  edge  of  the  town  opened 
on  the  Confederates.  Sedgwick  had  been  informed  by  Hooker 
that  the  Confederate  force  left  at  Fredericksburg  was  very  small, 
and,  without  delay,  he  sent  forward  four  regiments  from  Whea- 
ton's  and  Shaler's  brigades  to  charge  the  works  in  front  of  Marye's 
Hill.  It  was  sending  a  boy  on  a  man's  errand.  The  Con- 
federate infantry  reserved  its  fire  until  the  enemy  were  within 
40  yards,  when  they  opened  and  quickly  drove  them  back. 
A  second  assault  was  made,  but  with  similar  result.  Sedgwick 
was  now  convinced  that  a  heavy  force  confronted  him,  and  he 
waited  for  Gibbon's  division  of  the  2d  corps.  This  had  just 
crossed  from  Falmouth,  and  it  made  an  effort  upon  the  extreme 
Confederate  left.  It  proved  futile  on  account  of  the  canal  along 
the  front  at  that  part  of  the  field,  which  was  defended  by  three 
regiments  of  Hays's  brigade  of  Early's  division,  hurried  there 
by  Early  on  seeing  the  enemy's  preparations. 

Soon  afterward,  Wilcox's  brigade  came  to  the  scene  from 
Banks  Ford,  where  it  had  been  in  observation  on  the  2d.  At 
dawn  on  the  3d,  Wilcox  noted  that  the  enemy's  pickets  on  the 
north  side  were  wearing  haversacks,  and  correctly  guessed  that 
the  forces  opposite  were  leaving  for  Chancellors ville.  He  was 
preparing  to  march  in  the  same  direction,  when  a  messenger 
brought  word  of  the  advance  of  Gibbon's  division.  There- 
upon leaving  a  picket  of  50  men  and  two  guns  in  observation  at 
Banks  Ford,  Wilcox  marched  to  Taylor's  Hill. 

About  10  A.M.,  Gibbon  having  reported  that  an  attack  on  OUT 
extreme  left  was  impracticable,  and  Howe's  division,  making  no 
progress  east  of  Hazel  Run,  Sedgwick  had  no  recourse  but  to 
renew  his  attack  upon  Marye's  Hill  by  main  force.  He  accordingly 
prepared  a  much  stronger  assault  than  that  of  the  morning. 


CHANCELLORSVILLE  351 

Newton's  division,  supported  by  Burnham's  brigade,  was  to 
attack  Marye's  Hill,  while  Howe's  division  assaulted  Lee's  Hill 
beyond  Hazel  Run. 

This  force  numbered  about  14,000  men,  with  an  abundant 
artillery.  Across  Hazel  Creek  were  seven  guns  of  Cutt's  and 
Cabell's  battalions,  and  the  two  remaining  regiments  of  Barks- 
dale's  brigade  and  one  La.  of  Hays's  brigade. 

About  11  A.M.,  both  Newton  and  Howe  renewed  the  assault. 
Newton  advanced  rapidly  through  the  fire  of  the  few  Con- 
federate guns,  but  recoiled  soon  after  the  infantry  opened, 
although  Barksdale's  line  was  so  thin  that  it  scarcely  averaged 
a  man  to  five  feet  of  parapet.  Some  of  the  Federal  regiments, 
however,  suffered  severely,  and  a  number  of  killed  and  wounded 
were  left  near  the  Confederate  line. 

This,  by  a  strange  piece  of  good  nature  on  the  part  of  one  of 
our  best  officers,  proved  our  undoing.  When  Newton's  line  was 
beaten  back,  the  firing  on  both  sides  nearly  ceased,  and  some 
Federal  officer  sent  forward  a  flag  of  truce.  No  Federal  report 
mentions  this  incident.  The  flag  was  probably  sent  by  only  a 
brigade  commander,  for  the  fighting,  by  Howe's  division,  across 
Hazel  Run,  was  kept  up  without  cessation.  Col.  Griffin  of  the 
18th  Miss,  received  the  flag.  The  officer  bearing  it  asked  to  be 
allowed  to  remove  his  dead  and  wounded  in  Griffin's  front. 
Without  referring  to  his  brigade  commander,  Griffin  granted  the 
request,  and,  still  more  thoughtlessly,  allowed  his  own  men  to 
show  themselves  while  the  wounded  were  being  delivered.  The 
enemy,  to  their  great  surprise,  discovered  what  a  small  force  was 
in  their  front. 

They  lost  little  time  in  taking  advantage  of  the  information. 
The  action  was  reopened,  and  now  a  charge  was  made  with  a 
rush,  and  the  enemy  swarmed  over  our  works.  The  Mississippians 
had  no  chance  to  escape,  but  fought  with  butts  of  guns  and  bayo- 
nets, and  were  mostly  captured,  with  the  loss  of  about  100  killed 
and  wounded.  The  casualties  in  Newton's  division  and  Burn- 
ham's  brigade,  in  the  whole  battle,  were  about  1200,  of  which 
probably  900  fell  in  this  affair.  All  of  the  guns  on  the  hill  were 
captured,  Brown's  section  last  of  all,  firing  until  surrounded. 
Meanwhile,  Howe's  division  had  a  full  mile  to  traverse  before 


352  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

reaching  the  Confederate  lines.  Instead  of  a  charge,  their 
progress  was  a  slow  advance  under  cover  of  heavy  artillery  fire. 
Before  they  reached  the  Confederate  line,  Newton's  division  had 
made  its  second  charge  and  was  in  possession  of  Marye's  Hill. 
Thereupon,  Early,  who  was  in  command,  ordered  the  withdrawal 
of  his  whole  division,  and  the  formation  of  a  new  line  of  battle 
across  the  Telegraph  road,  about  two  miles  in  the  rear.  Here 
he  concentrated  Gordon's,  Hoke's,  and  Smith's  brigades,  with  the 
remnants  of  Barksdale's.  Hays's  brigade  had  been  cut  off  with 
Wilcox,  and  these  two  brigades  were  in  position  to  delay  Sedg- 
wick  in  advancing  upon  the  Plank  road  toward  Chancellorsville. 
But  Hays,  under  orders  from  Early,  crossed  the  Plank  road 
before  Sedgwick  had  made  any  advance.  Wilcox  then  took 
position  with  four  guns  across  the  Plank  road,  and  delayed  the 
enemy's  advance  as  much  as  possible,  while  he  fell  back  slowly  to 
Salem  Church,  where  he  had  been  notified  that  McLaws  would 
meet  him  with  reinforcements.  He  reached  this  point  about  3 
P.M.,  meeting  there  Wofford's,  Semmes's,  Kershaw's,  and  Ma- 
hone's  brigades,  under  McLaws.  The  five  brigades  rapidly 
formed  a  single  line  of  battle  across  the  Plank  road.  Wilcox's 
brigade  held  the  centre,  with  the  14th  and  llth  Ala.  on  the  left 
of  the  Plank  road,  and  the  10th  and  8th  on  the  right.  The 
9th  Ala.  was  in  reserve  a  short  distance  in  rear  of  the  10th. 
Four  guns  were  posted  across  the  Plank  road,  and  a  company 
of  infantry  was  put  in  Salem  Church,  and  one  in  a  schoolhouse  a 
short  distance  in  front.  Kershaw's  brigade  was  on  the  right 
of  Wilcox,  and  Wofford  on  right  of  Kershaw;  Semmes's  brigade 
was  on  Wilcox's  left,  and  Mahone's  brigade  was  on  the  left  of 
Semmes. 

In  front  of  the  line  of  battle  stretched  a  fringe  of  dense  young 
wood,  some  200  yards  wide,  and  beyond  that,  for  perhaps  a  half- 
mile,  were  open  fields,  which  extended  with  a  few  interruptions 
on  each  side  of  the  Plank  road  back  to  Fredericksburg,  about 
four  miles.  Sedgwick  had  been  delayed  over  four  hours  in  trav- 
ersing that  distance. 

About  4.30  P.M.,  Sedgwick  established  a  battery  1000  yards  in 
front  of  Wilcox,  and  opened  fire.  The  Confederate  artillery  was 
nearly  out  of  ammunition,  and  after  a  few  rounds  it  was  with- 


CHANCELLORSVILLE  353 

drawn.  Encouraged  by  this,  the  Federals  now  sent  forward 
Brooks's  divison,  formed  across  the  road  in  two  lines,  with  New- 
ton's division  in  the  same  formation  upon  Brooks's  right. 

Now  ensued  one  of  the  most  brilliant  and  important  of  the 
minor  affairs  of  the  war.  McLaws  had  reached  the  field  and 
assumed  the  command,  but  credit  is  also  due  to  Wilcox,  who  had 
delayed  many  times  his  number  for  several  hours,  and  gained 
time  for  reinforcements  to  arrive. 

The  story  of  the  battle  may  be  told  very  briefly.  North  of  the 
road,  opposite  the  14th  and  llth  Ala.,  was  Torbert's  Jersey  brigade 
under  Brown,  in  a  double  line.  On  the  south,  opposite  the  8th, 
9th,  and  10th  Ala.,  was  Bartlett's  brigade,  one  of  the  best  in  the 
Federal  army,  which  boasted  that  it  had  never  been  repulsed,  and 
had  never  failed  to  hold  any  position  it  was  ordered  to  occupy. 

The  strength  of  the  Confederate  position  consisted  in  the 
thick  undergrowth  which  completely  hid  their  lines,  lying  down 
on  the  crest  of  a  slight  ridge  in  rear  of  the  woods.  These  were 
held  by  skirmishers  during  the  enemy's  approach  across  the 
open.  When  the  artillery  was  withdrawn,  it  left  a  gap  of  about 
50  yards  between  the  llth  Ala.,  on  the  left  of  the  road  and 
the  10th  on  the  right.  Bartlett's  brigade  advanced  gallantly 
through  the  severe  skirmish  fire,  fought  through  the  strip  of 
woods,  drove  the  company  from  the  church,  and  cut  off  the  one 
in  the  schoolhouse.  Pushing  on  and  overlapping  the  left  of  the 
10th  Ala.,  they  enfiladed  it,  broke  its  line,  and  drove  it  back  in 
confusion.  The  8th  Ala.,  under  Lt.-Col.  Herbert,  on  the  right  of 
the  10th,  however,  did  not  break,  but  threw  back  its  three  left 
companies,  and  brought  an  enfilade  fire  on  the  enemy's  further 
advance.  The  9th  Ala.,  being  in  reserve  a  little  in  rear  of  the 
10th,  rose  from  the  ground,  and,  giving  the  enemy  a  volley, 
charged  them  and  drove  them  back. 

Brown's  brigade,  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  road,  had  a  wider 
body  of  woods  to  cross,  and  had  not  advanced  as  far  as  Bartlett. 
But  when  Bartlett  was  driven  back,  Wilcox's  whole  brigade 
joined  in  the  counter-stroke.  Bartlett's  first  line  was  followed  so 
rapidly  that  the  prisoners  in  the  schoolhouse  were  liberated,  and 
the  rush  of  the  fugitives  and  the  quick  pursuit  overwhelmed  the 
second  line,  giving  it  no  chance  to  make  a  stand. 


354  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

Across  the  Plank  road,  Semmes's  two  right  regiments,  the  10th 
and  51st  Ga.,  joined  the  14th  and  llth  Ala.,  and  these  four  regi- 
ments, meeting  the  Jersey  brigade  in  the  woods,  drove  it  back  in 
such  a  direction  that  the  fugitives  from  each  side  of  the  Plank 
road  converged  upon  the  road.  The  Confederates  in  pursuit  said 
that  they  had  never  had  such  crowds  to  fire  upon.  The  pursuit 
was  dangerously  prolonged,  but  fortunately  the  enemy  contented 
himself  by  checking  it,  and  the  Confederates  then  slowly  withdrew. 
Long-range  firing,  however,  was  kept  up  until  night. 

Bartlett's  brigade  reported  a  loss  in  this  attack  of  580  officers 
and  men  out  of  less  than  1500  men.  Brown's  brigade  reported 
a  loss  of  511.  Brooks,  commanding  the  division,  said  in  his  offi- 
cial report :  — 

"In  this  brief  but  sanguinary  conflict  this  division  lost  nearly  1500 
officers  and  men.  Col.  H.  W.  Brown,  commanding  the  Jersey  brigade, 
was  severely  wounded ;  and  Col.  Collet,  1st  N.J.,  Col.  G.  W.  Town,  and 
Lt.-Col.  Hall,  95th  Pa.,  were  killed." 

Wilcox's  brigade  lost  75  killed,  372  wounded,  and  48  missing, 
a  total  of  495.  The  losses  of  Semmes's  brigade  are  included  with 
the  campaign  losses.  One  of  its  regiments,  however,  the  10th 
Ga.,  reports  for  this  day :  21  killed,  102  wounded,  and  5  missing, 
a  total  of  128  out  of  230  present.  In  the  morning  at  Chancellors- 
ville,  this  regiment  had  received  the  surrender  of  the  27th  Conn., 
which  had  been  on  picket  and  was  cut  off  by  the  capture  of 
Chancellors ville.  During  this  charge  it  also  captured  over  100 
prisoners.  While  this  action  was  going  on,  Early  had  formed 
line  of  battle  to  resist  an  advance  of  the  enemy  upon  the  Tele- 
graph road,  and  was  bringing  up  his  extreme  right  from  Hamil- 
ton's Crossing.  It  was  about  night  when  his  whole  division  was 
concentrated. 

The  enemy  was  holding  Gibbon's  entire  division  idle  in  Freder- 
icksburg,  guarding  the  pontoon  bridges  to  Falmouth.  Had 
Gibbon  moved  up  on  Sedgwick's  flank  to  Banks  Ford,  his 
division  would  have  counted  for  something  in  the  next  day's 
affairs.  His  force  was  just  what  Sedgwick  needed  to  enable  him 
to  hold  his  ground. 

Returning  now  to  Chancellorsville,  we  have  to  note  a  move- 
ment which  involved  an  unfortunate  Confederate  delay  on  the 


CHANCELLORSVILLE  355 

next  day  —  a  delay  which  enabled  Sedgwick's  corps  to  escape 
scot-free  from  a  position  which  should  have  cost  him  all  his  ar- 
tillery and  half  his  men.  The  River  road,  from  Chancellorsville 
to  Fredericksburg  via  Banks  Ford,  was  left  unoccupied  when 
Hooker  took  refuge  in  his  fortified  lines  on  the  morning  of  the  3d. 
Anderson,  with  his  three  remaining  brigades,  —  Wright's,  Perry's, 
and  Posey's, — was  sent  at  4  P.M.  to  watch  that  road,  and  threaten 
the  enemy  upon  that  flank.  Two  hours  after  sunrise  on  the  4th, 
Heth  arrived  with  three  brigades  to  relieve  Anderson,  who  was  now 
ordered  to  proceed  to  Salem  Church,  about  six  miles,  and  report 
to  McLaws,  which  he  did  about  noon.  This  sending  Anderson  to 
reenforce  McLaws  might  have  been  done  the  afternoon  before. 
He  would  then  have  been  on  hand  at  the  earliest  hour  for  the 
joint  attack  upon  Sedgwick,  on  the  4th,  which  is  now  to  be  de- 
scribed. 

The  events  of  the  morning  of  the  4th  had  been  as  follows :  No 
communication  had  been  received  by  Sedgwick  from  Hooker, 
and  he  was  still  under  orders  to  come  to  Chancellorsville.  But 
at  an  early  hour,  movements  of  Early's  troops  were  discovered 
in  his  rear,  and,  instead  of  advancing,  Sedgwick  had  deployed 
Howe's  division  perpendicular  to  the  Plank  road  facing  to  his 
rear,  and  stretching  to  the  river  above  Banks  Ford,  where 
pontoon  bridges  had  been  laid  the  afternoon  before.  Sedgwick's 
scouts  had  reported  that  "a  column  of  the  enemy,  15,000 
strong,  coming  from  the  direction  of  Richmond,  had  occupied 
the  heights  of  Fredericksburg,  cutting  him  off  from  the  town." 
He  at  once  abandoned  all  idea  of  taking  the  aggressive,  and  only 
wished  himself  safely  across  the  river.  But  he  did  not  dare  to 
attempt  a  crossing,  except  under  cover  of  night.  His  lines  were 
too  long,  and  were  weak  in  plan,  as  they  faced  in  three  directions, 
— east,  south,  and  west.  But  he  dared  not  venture  a  change,  for 
fear  of  precipitating  an  attack.  When  at  last  he  received  a 
despatch  from  Hooker,  its  noncommittal  advice  was  not  en- 
couraging. It  said :  — 

"Everything  snug  here.  We  contracted  the  lines  a  little  and  repulsed 
the  last  assault  with  ease.  Gen.  Hooker  wishes  them  to  attack  him  to- 
morrow, if  they  will.  He  does  not  desire  you  to  attack  them  again  in 
force,  unless  he  attacks  him  at  the  same  time.  He  says  you  are  too 


356  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

far  away  for  him  to  direct.  Look  well  to  the  safety  of  your  corps,  and  keep 
up  communication  with  Gen.  Benham  at  Banks  Ford  and  Fredericksburg. 
You  can  go  to  either  place  if  you  think  it  best  to  cross.  Banks  Ford  would 
bring  you  in  supporting  distance  of  the  main  body,  and  would  be  better 
than  falling  back  to  Fredericksburg." 

A  little  later  Hooker  sent  another  message,  urging  Sedgwick,  if 
possible,  to  hold  a  position  on  the  south  bank,  to  which  Sedg- 
wick replied :  — 

"The  enemy  threatens  me  strongly  on  two  fronts.  My  position  is  bad 
for  such  attack.  It  was  assumed  for  attack,  not  for  defence.  It  is  not 
improbable  that  the  bridges  at  Banks  Ford  may  be  sacrificed.  Can  you 
help  me  strongly  if  I  am  attacked?" 

No  answer  to  this  inquiry  appears,  and  Sedgwick  stood  on  the 
defensive,  awaiting  nightfall.  Meanwhile,  early  in  the  morning, 
Early's  division,  with  Barksdale's  brigade,  had  moved  down  upon 
Marye's  Hill,  which  they  found  held  by  a  picket  force  only,  and 
easily  occupied.  An  advance  was  attempted  into  Fredericks- 
burg, but  it  was  found  with  barricades  across  the  streets  held  by 
one  of  Gibbon's  brigades,  supported  by  two  other  brigades  and  a 
number  of  guns  on  the  north  bank.  Early  then  sent  to  communi- 
cate with  McLaws  and  endeavor  to  arrange  a  joint  attack  upon 
Sedgwick,  but  received  information  that  Anderson's  division  was 
coming,  and  was  himself  sent  for  to  meet  Lee. 

Before  leaving  Chancellorsville  that  morning,  Lee  had  examined 
Hooker's  lines  with  the  view  of  assaulting  at  once,  but  their 
strength  made  it  imprudent  to  do  so  while  Sedgwick  was  still 
south  of  the  river.  So  he  next  set  out  to  dispose  of  Sedgwick, 
that  he  might  then  concentrate  his  whole  force  to  attack  Hooker. 

Probably  no  man  ever  commanded  an  army  and,  at  the  same 
fc  time,  so  entirely  commanded  himself,  as  Lee.  This  morning  was 
J\  ^almost  the  only  occasion  on  which  I  ever  saw  him  out  of  humor. 
It  was  when  waiting  the  arrival  of  Anderson,  with  his  three 
brigades  from  the  River  road,  after  being  relieved  by  Heth. 
Anderson  was  in  no  way  to  blame  for  the  delay,  but  he  should 
have  been  relieved  the  afternoon  before,  which  would  have 
let  him  move  during  the  night. 

Some  delay  was  inevitable,  as  Sedgwick's  peculiar  rectangular 
formation  was  not  readily  understood.  It  was  about  three 


CHANCELLORSVILLE  357 

miles  in  extent,  and  occupied  high  ground,  with  a  wide,  open  valley 
in  its  front,  forcing  a 'development  of  our  line  of  nearly  six  miles 
to  cover  its  three  fronts.  An  entire  day  would  have  been  none 
too  much  to  devote  to  the  attack,  if  the  fruits  of  victory  were  to 
be  reaped.  Although  Lee  urged  all  possible  speed,  it  was  6  P.M. 
when  the  advance  commenced.  Sunset  was  at  seven.  Dark- 
ness fell  before  the  lines  could  be  gotten  into  close  action.  In 
the  dusk,  two  of  Early's  brigades,  Hoke's  and  Hays's,  fired  into 
each  other  by  mistake,  and  were  thrown  into  confusion.  Both 
had  to  be  withdrawn  and  re-formed.  The  enemy  was,  however, 
forced  back  to  the  vicinity  of  Banks  Ford,  and  had  there  then 
been  daylight  to  bring  up  our  batteries,  there  might  have  been 
large  captures.  Upon  McLaws's  front,  ranges  were  marked  by 
daylight  for  firing  upon  Banks  Ford  and  some  guns  were  kept 
firing  all  night.  But  all  that  was  possible  amounted  only  to 
annoyance.  It  was  again  illustrated  that  afternoon  attacks 
seldom  reap  any  fruits  of  victory. 

It  was  with  great  elation  on  the  morning  of  the  5th,  that  our 
guns  fired  the  last  shots  across  the  Rappahannock  at  Sedg- 
wick's  retreating  columns.  But  orders,  soon  received  from  head- 
quarters, indicated  that  our  commander  was  not  yet  satisfied. 
Early's  division  and  Barksdale's  brigade  were  directed  to  remain 
in  observation  at  Banks  Ford  and  Fredericksburg,  —  which 
had  also  been  evacuated  by  Gibbon's  division  during  the 
previous  night,  —  while  all  the  rest  of  the  army  was  ordered 
to  return  to  the  front  of  Hooker's  lines  near  Chancellorsville, 
which  Lee  intended  to  assault  on  the  morrow  with  his  whole 
force. 

What  was  known  of  the  enemy's  position  gave  assurance  that 
the  task  would  be  the  heaviest  which  we  had  ever  undertaken. 
Hooker  now  had  his  entire  army  concentrated,  and,  allowing 
for  his  losses,  must  have  had  fully  90,000  men  to  defend  about 
five  miles  of  breastworks.  These  he  had  had  48  hours  to  prepare, 
with  all  the  advantages  for  defence  which  the  Wilderness  offered. 
Lee  would  scarcely  be  able  to  bring  into  action  35,000  under  all 
the  disadvantages  imposed  by  the  Wilderness  upon  the  offensive 
and  by  two  streams  which  on  the  southeast  and  northwest  cov- 
ered three-fourths  of  the  enemy's  front.  Behind  these  streams 


358  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

both  flanks  rested  securely  upon  the  river.  The  attack  would 
have  to  be  made  everywhere  squarely  in  front,  and  our  artillery 
would  be  unable  to  render  any  efficient  help.  When,  upon  the  6th, 
we  found  the  lines  deserted  and  the  enemy  gone,  our  engineers 
were  amazed  at  the  strength  and  completeness  of  the  enemy's 
intrenchments.  Impenetrable  abattis  covered  the  entire  front, 
and  the  crest  everywhere  carried  head-logs  under  which  the  men 
could  fire  as  through  loopholes.  In  rear,  separate  structures 
were  provided  for  officers,  with  protected  outlooks,  whence  they 
could  see  and  direct  without  exposure. 

Four  of  Hooker's  corps  had  suffered  casualties  averaging  20 
per  cent,  but  three,  the  1st,  2d,  and  5th,  had  scarcely  been  en- 
gaged. It  must  be  conceded  that  Lee  never  in  his  life  took  a 
more  audacious  resolve  than  when  he  determined  to  assault 
Hooker's  intrenchments.  And  it  is  the  highest  possible  compli- 
ment to  the  army  commanded  by  Lee  to  say  that  there  were 
two  persons  concerned  who  believed  that,  in  spite  of  all  the  odds, 
it  would  have  been  victorious.  These  two  persons  were  Gens. 
Lee  and  Hooker.  For  Hooker  was  already  hurrying  his  prepara- 
tions to  retreat  during  the  coming  night.  Clearly,  this  decision 
was  the  mistake  of  his  life. 

During  the  afternoon  of  the  5th,  there  came  on  one  of  the 
remarkable  storms  which  on  many  occasions  closely  followed 
severe  engagements.  The  rainfall  was  unusually  heavy  and 
continued  long  after  dark,  converting  roads  into  quagmires, 
rivulets  into  torrents,  and  causing  great  discomfort  to  man  and 
beast.  But  its  occurrence  was  advantageous  to  the  Confederates, 
as  it  prevented  their  pressing  upon  the  enemy's  impregnable  line, 
and  it  hurried  the  efforts  of  the  Federals  to  cross  the  river,  as 
rapidly  rising  waters  overflowed  the  approaches  to  their  bridges. 
Before  the  rain,  I  had  found  positions  for  several  guns  close  upon 
the  river-bank,  partly  around  a  bend  below  the  Federal  left, 
giving  an  oblique  fire  upon  some  of  their  batteries.  During  the 
night  we  constructed  pits,  and,  at  early  dawn,  were  putting  the 
guns  in  them,  when  we  were  suddenly  fired  upon  by  guns  square 
upon  our  own  flank  and  across  the  river.  A  lieutenant  had  his 
ankle  smashed,  some  horses  were  killed,  and  some  dismounted 
limber  chests  were  exploded,  before  all  could  be  gotten  under 


CHANCELLORSVILLE  359 

cover  in  the  pits.  From  these  we  could  make  no  reply,  as  they 
faced  Hooker's  lines,  and  we  could  only  lie  close  and  wait  for 
more  daylight.  This  revealed  that  the  enemy  had  abandoned 
his  works  during  the  night  and  recrossed  the  river.  To  retaliate 
I  brought  up  seven  other  guns,  under  cover  of  a  wood,  and  engaged 
the  enemy  for  a  half -hour,  inflicting  "some  loss  in  killed  and 
wounded,"  as  reported  by  Gen.  Hunt,  with  no  further  loss  to 
ourselves,  but  the  wheel  of  a  gun.  Finding  by  then  that  the 
battle  was  over  and  no  enemy  left  on  our  side  of  the  river,  the 
guns  were  gradually  withdrawn  and  camps  were  sought  in 
another  severe  rain-storm,  which  came  up  about  5  P.M.  and  lasted 
far  into  the  night.1 

The  battle  made  by  Stuart  on  the  3d,  has  rarely  been  sur- 
passed, measured  either  by  the  strength  of  the  lines  carried  or 
by  the  causalties  suffered  in  so  brief  a  period.  In  Colston's 
division  four  brigades  lost  eight  brigade  commanders,  three  killed 
and  five  disabled.  Three  out  of  six  of  the  division  staff  fell.  In 
Fender's  brigade  of  Heth's  division,  six  out  of  ten  field-officers 
were  killed  or  wounded.  Our  brigades  rarely  came  to  the  field 
2000  strong,  and  casualties  of  600  to  a  brigade  were  rarely 
reached  even  in  battles  prolonged  over  a  day.  Here  within  six 
hours,  five  of  the  15  brigades  lost  over  600  in  killed  and  wounded 
each :  Lane's  N.C.  brigade  losing  786 ;  Colston's  N.C.  and  Va. 
losing  726;  Fender's  N.C.,  693. 

The  battle  of  Chickamauga  is  generally  called  the  bloodiest  of 
modern  battles.  The  losses  given  by  Livermore  are  22  per  cent 
in  the  Federal  army  and  25  per  cent  in  the  Confederate,  in 
two  days'  fighting.  Jackson's  three  divisions  had  a  paper 
strength  of  26,661,  and  their  losses  were  7158,  about  27  per 
cent.  They  were,  doubtless,  over  30  per  cent  of  the  force 
actually  engaged.  The  losses  in  the  3d  and  12th  Federal  corps, 
which  composed  the  principal  part  of  our  opponents,  were 
less,  as  they  fought  behind  breastworks.  Their  strength 
on  paper  was  32,171.  Their  losses  were  4703,  being  about  15 

1  A  reminiscence  of  that  night  is  the  finding  of  our  camp  in  the  heaviest  of 
the  rain  and  blackest  of  the  darkness  by  a  lost  ambulance  carrying  a  Virgin- 
ian colonel,  whose  leg  had  been  amputated  on  the  field.  He  was  taken  out 
and  fed,  slept  on  the  crowded  floor  of  our  tent,  and  next  morning  was 
started  for  a  hospital  in  fine  spirits  in  spite  of  his  maimed  condition. 


360 


MILITARY  MEMOIRS 


per  cent  of  the  paper  strength  and  probably  18  per  cent  of 
the  actual. 

Had  Gen.  Lee  been  present  on  the  left,  during  the  Sunday 
morning  attack,  and  seen  Stuart's  energy  and  efficiency  in  han- 
dling his  reserves,  inspiring  the  men  by  his  contagious  spirit,  and 
in  the  cooperation  of  artillery,  with  the  infantry,  he  might  have 
rewarded  Stuart  on  the  spot  by  promoting  him  to  the  now 
vacant  command  of  Jackson's  corps.  Ewell,  who  did  succeed 
Jackson,  was  always  loved  and  admired,  but  he  was  not  always 
equal  to  his  opportunities,  as  we  shall  see  at  Gettysburg. 
Stuart's  qualities  were  just  what  were  needed,  for  he  was  young, 
he  was  not  maimed,  and  he  had  boldness,  persistence,  and 
magnetism  in  very  high  degree.  Lee  once  said  that  he  would 
have  won  Gettysburg,  had  he  had  Jackson  with  him.  Who  so 
worthy  to  succeed  Jackson  as  the  man  who  had  successfully 
replaced  him  on  his  last  and  greatest  field  ? 

CONFEDERATE  CASUALTIES 


COMMANDS 

KILLED 

WOUNDED 

MISSING 

TOTAL 

STBEN. 

S.C.    Kershaw's      Brig. 
Miss.  Barksdale's 

12 
43 

90 
208 

2 
341 

104 

592 

Ga.     Semmes's           " 

85 

492 

26 

603 

Ga.    Wofford's 

74 

479 

9 

562 

Cabell's  Battn.  A 

5 

21 

2 

28 

McLaws's  Div. 

219 

1,290 

380 

1,889 

8,800 

Ala.   Wilcox's   Brig. 
Va.     Mahone's     " 

72 
24 

372 
134 

91 
97 

535 
255 

Miss.  Posey's        " 
Ga.    Wright's      " 
Fla.    Perry's 

41 
25 
21 

184 
271 
88 

65 

290 
296 
109 

Anderson's  Div. 

183 

1,049 

215 

1,485 

8,500 

Washington  Arty. 
Alexander's     " 

4 
6 

8 
35 

33 

21 

45 
62 

Hardaway's     " 

1 

12 

13 

Total  Res.    " 

11 

55 

54 

120 

Total  1st  Corps 

413 

2,394 

687 

3,494 

CHANCELL  ORSVILLE 


361 


CONFEDERATE  CASUALTIES   (Continued) 


COMMANDS 

KILLED 

WOUNDBD 

HISSING 

TOTAL 

STRKN. 

Hd.  Qrs.,  2d  Corps 
Hd.  Qrs.,  1st  Div. 
Va.    Heth's         Brig. 
S.C.    McGowan's      '     J 
Ga.    Thomas's         ' 
N.C.  Lane's 
Ala.   Archer's           ' 
N.C.  Fender's 

2 
2 
44 
46 
21 
161 
44 
116 

3 
2 

259 
402 
156 
626 
305 
577 

7 

121 

16 
68 

5 
4 
303 
455 
177 
908 
365 
761 

A.  P.  Hill's  Div. 

436 

2,330 

212 

2,978 

10,400 

Ala.    Rodes's       Brig. 
Ga.    Doles's 
Ga.     Colquitt's       " 
N.C.  Iverson's 
N.C.  Ramseur's      " 

90 
66 
9 
67 
151 

538 
343 
128 
330 
529 

188 
28 
312 
73 
108 

816 
437 
449 
470 

788 

Rodes's  Div. 

383 

1,868 

709 

2,960 

9,600 

Ga.    Gordon's  Brig.  l 
Va.     Smith's         "     l 
N.C.  Hoke's          "     l 
La.     Hays's 
Early's  Rept.  adds 

16 
11 
35 
63 
11 

145 
75 
195 
306 
117 

500 

161 
86 
230 
369 
628 

Early's  Div. 

136 

838 

500 

1,474 

8,200 

Va.     Paxton's  Brig.  1 
11      Garnett's      "     l 
N.C.  Colston's  (Va.) 
La.     Nicholls's  l 

54 
52 
128 
47 

430 
420 
594 
266 

80 

484 
472 
802 
313 

Colston's  Div. 

281 

1,710 

80 

2,071 

6,600 

Artillery,  2d  Corps 

26 

124 

150 

Total  2d  Corps 

1,262 

6,870 

1,501 

9,633 

35,800 

Lee,  F.,  Cav.  Brig. 
Pelham's  Arty. 

4 
4 

7 
6 

8 

11 

18 

Grand  Total 

1,683 

9,277 

2,196 

13,156 

56,444 

1  From    Report   of   Surgeon   Guild,    excluding   slightly    wounded  and 
missing. 


362 


MILITARY  MEMOIRS 
FEDERAL  CASUALTIES 


COMMANDS 

KILLED 

WOUNDED 

MISSING 

TOTAL 

STRENGTH 

Reynolds's    Div. 
Robinson's      " 
Doubleday's    " 

1 

7 
1 

15 
42 
23 

2 
6 
38 

18 
55 

62 

Total  1st  Corps 

9 

80 

46 

135 

16,908 

Hancock's  Div. 
French's       " 

78 
63 

445 
506 

601 
119 

1,124 

688 

Two  Divs.  2d  Corps 

141 

951 

720 

1,812 

16,893 

Birney's     Div. 
Berry's         " 
Whipple's    " 

119 
148 
111 

925 
1,037 
682 

563 
244 

289 

1,607 
1,429 
1,082 

Total  3d  Corps 

378 

2,644 

1,096 

4,118 

18,721 

Griffin's          Div. 
Sykes's 
Humphreys's  " 

17 
27 
25 

108 
167 
197 

13 
91 
55 

138 

285 
277 

Total  5th  Corps 

69 

472 

159 

700 

15,724 

Deven's          Div. 
Steinwehr's       " 
Schurz's 

61 
27 
129 

477 
248 
496 

432 
244 

298 

970 
519 
923 

Total  llth  Corps 

217 

1,221 

974 

2,412 

12,927 

Williams's  Div. 
Geary's 

135 
125 

801 
637 

676 
444 

1,612 
1,206 

Total  12th  Corps 

260 

1,441 

1,121 

2,822 

13,450 

Deven's  Brig.  Cav. 

8 

35 

98 

141 

Total  about  Chancellors- 
ville 

1,081 

6,844 

4,214 

12,140 

Gibbon's  Div.,  2d  Corps 
Brooks's       "     6th    " 
Howe's         "     6th    " 
Newton's      "     6th    " 
Burnham's  "      6th    " 

8 
203 
91 
98 
93 

90 
923 
697 
605 
395 

12 
366 
502 
307 
310 

110 
1,492 
1,290 
1,010 

798 

Total  6th  Corps 

485 

2,620 

1,485 

4,590 

23,667 

Total  about  Fredericksburg 

493 

2,710 

1,497 

4,700 

Grand  Total 

1,574 

9,554 

5,711 

16,804 

CHAPTER  XVI 
GETTYSBURG:  THE  FIRST  DAY 

High  Tide.  Opportunity  Open.  Suggestion  made.  Invasion.  Special 
Feature.  Feature  Impossible.  Reorganization.  Armament.  Lee 
Moves.  Brandy  Station.  Ewell  in  Valley.  Captured  Property. 
Hooker  Moves.  Lincoln  Suggests.  Lee  in  Valley.  Stuart  proposes 
Raid.  Conditional  Consent.  Stuart's  Raid.  Carlisle.  Results  of 
Raid.  Across  the  Potomac.  Hooker  Relieved.  Chambersburg.  Re- 
turn of  Scout.  Orders.  Chance  Encounter.  Hill  to  Gettysburg. 
Meade's  Movement.  Reynolds  to  Gettysburg.  Battle  Opens.  Archer 
Captured.  Rodes  Arrives.  Early  Arrives.  Lee  orders  Pursuit.  Ewell 
stops  Pursuit.  Lee  Confers.  The  Enemy's  Line.  Best  Point  of 
Attack.  Longstreet's  Arrival.  Federal  Arrivals. 

A  PAUSE  of  four  weeks  after  the  battle  of  Chancellorsville  to 
prepare  for  an  aggressive  counter-stroke,  was,  perhaps,  the  period 
of  highest  tide  in  Confederate  hopes  among  all  the  vicissitudes 
of  the  war.  The  campaign  which  ensued,  culminating  at  Gettys- 
burg, is  generally  accepted  as  the  turning-point  of  Confederate 
fortunes.  I  think  it  may  be  held  that  each  summer  campaign 
in  Va.  marked  a  Confederate  crisis.  That  is  to  say,  that  de- 
feat in  any  one  of  them  would  have  been  followed  by  the  col- 
lapse of  its  government,  within  less  than  another  12  months, 
while  a  victory  would  assure  it  only  of  that  much  of  life.  More 
than  that  was  impossible  as  long  as  the  war  spirit  ruled  the 
North,  and  this  was  certainly  the  case  in  1863. 

A  year  later,  however,  there  did  come  a  period  of  very  great 
Federal  discouragement,  due  to  a  succession  of  severe  losses. 
At  the  same  time,  there  occurred  a  crisis  in  the  military  situation, 
which  threatened  an  ignominious  termination  to  Grant's  cam- 
paign, the  greatest  campaign  of  the  war.  This  was  saved  by  a 
brilliant  piece  of  Federal  strategy,  which  is  to  be  told  of  in  due 
course.  In  it  will  be  found  the  real  crisis  —  the  story  of  the 
passing  of  the  last  hope  of  Confederate  success.  It  was  not 

363 


364  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

lost  upon  any  field  of  battle,  either  of  offence  or  of  defence. 
It  was  a  victory  of  strategy  and  not  one  of  arms. 

It  was  now  for  Lee  to  take  the  offensive  —  a  role  appealing 
strongly  to  his  disposition.  The  defensive  was  to  invite  the 
enemy  to  accumulate  his  resources  to  the  point  at  which  their 
very  weight  would  crush  us.  But,  for  a  brief  period,  we  enjoyed 
a  choice  of  the  field  of  action.  It  was  a  fatal  mistake  that  in 
this  choice  we  failed  to  utilize  the  single  advantage  in  the  game 
of  war,  which  the  Confederacy  enjoyed. 

We  occupied  the  "Interior  Lines,"  and  could  reenforce  from 
one  flank  to  the  other,  across  our  country,  more  quickly  than 
the  enemy  could  discover  and  follow  our  movements  by  round- 
about routes.  Only  by  such  transfers  of  her  armies  could  the 
South  ever  hope  to  face  her  adversaries  with  superior,  or  even 
with  equal,  numbers  —  by  demanding  double  duty  of  her  regi- 
ments, fighting  battles  with  them  alternately  in  the  east  and  in 
the  west.  In  Lee  we  had  a  leader  of  phenomenal  ability,  could 
this  policy  have  been  once  adopted  under  his  direction.  Here  in 
May,  1863,  was  presented  a  rare  opportunity  to  inaugurate  what 
might  be  called  an  "Army  on  Wheels"  within  the  Confederate 
lines,  as  distinguished  from  an  Army  of  Invasion  beyond  them. 
The  situation  was  this.  Grant  was  investing  Vicksburg  with 
60,000  men,  and  we  were  threatened  with  the  loss  of  the  Missis- 
sippi River,  and  of  30,000  men  at  Vicksburg  under  Pemberton. 
At  Jackson,  Miss.,  Johnston,  with  scarcely  24,000  men,  was 
looking  on  and  begging  vainly  for  reinforcements. 

At  Murfreesboro,  Term.,  Bragg,  with  about  45,000  Confederates, 
confronted  Rosecrans  with  about  84,000.  Neither  felt  strong 
enough  for  the  aggressive,  and  the  whole  spring  and  summer 
passed  idly.  At  Knoxville  were  about  5000  Confederates  under 
Buckner,  and  there  were  also  scattered  brigades  in  southwest 
Va.  and  eastern  N.C.,  from  which  reinforcements  might  be 
drawn.  In  this  state  of  affairs,  Longstreet,  with  Hood's  and 
Pickett's  divisions,  arrived  in  Petersburg,  under  orders  to  rejoin 
Lee  at  Fredericksburg.  Hooker  had  just  been  driven  across 
the  Rappahannock,  and  his  army  was  soon  to  lose  largely  from 
the  expiration  of  terms  of  service  of  many  regiments. 

Nothing  aggressive  was  probable  from  him  for  many  weeks. 


GETTYSBURG:   THE  FIRST  DAY  365 

Longstreet's  veteran  divisions,  about  13,000  strong,  could  have 
been  placed  on  the  cars  at  Petersburg  and  hurried  out  to  Bragg, 
via  Lynchburg  and  Knoxville.  Johnston's  25,000  from  Jackson, 
and  Buckner's  5000  from  Knoxville,  could  have  met  them.  With 
these  accessions,  and  with  Lee  in  command,  Rosecrans  might 
have  been  defeated,  and  an  advance  made  into  Ky.,  threatening 
Louisville  and  Cincinnati.  If  anything  could  have  caused  Grant's 
recall  from  Vicksburg,  it  would  have  been  this.  Surely  the 
chances  of  success  were  greater,  and  of  disaster  less,  than  those 
involved  in  our  crossing  the  bridgeless  Potomac,  into  the  heart 
of  the  enemy's  country,  where  ammunition  and  supplies  must 
come  by  wagons  from  Staunton,  nearly  200  miles,  over  roads 
exposed  to  raids  of  the  enemy  from  either  the  east  or  the  west. 
In  this  position,  a  drawn  battle,  or  even  a  victory,  would  still 
leave  us  compelled  soon  to  find  our  way  back  across  the 
Potomac. 

Longstreet 1  tells  of  his  having  suggested  to  Secretary  Seddon 
such  a  campaign  against  Rosecrans,  and  he  also  suggested  it  to 
Lee  on  his  arrival  at  Fredericksburg.  Mr.  Seddon  thought  Grant 
could  not  be  drawn  from  Vicksburg  even  by  a  Confederate 
advance  upon  the  Ohio  River.  To  this  Longstreet  answered  that 
Grant  was  a  soldier  and  must  obey  orders  if  popular  alarm  forced 
the  government  to  recall  him.  At  that  time  Davis  was  sanguine 
of  foreign  intervention,  and  the  Emperor  Napoleon  was  per- 
mitting a  French  firm  to  build  some  formidable  ironclads  for  the 
Confederate  navy.  These  might  have  accomplished  some  re- 
sults, had  not  the  issue  of  the  Gettysburg  campaign  induced  the 
Emperor  to  withdraw  his  consent  to  their  delivery. 

Lee  recognized  the  strong  features  of  the  proposed  strategy, 
and  took  a  day  or  two  to  consider  it.  But  he  finally  decided 
upon  an  invasion  of  Pa.  He  was  averse  to  leaving  Va.  him- 
self, and  also  to  any  division  of  his  army.  Both  he  and  Jackson, 
ever  since  the  failure  of  the  Md.  campaign,  had  longed  to  try  it 
once  more,  and  Jackson  had  had  prepared  during  the  winter 
and  spring  the  remarkable  map,  already  mentioned  (p.  322), 
covering  the  whole  scene  of  the  coming  campaign.  In  the  dis- 
cussion with  Longstreet,  it  was  assumed  that  the  strategy  of  the 

1  Manassas  to  Appomattox,  p.  327. 


366  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

campaign  should  be  such  as  would  force  the  enemy  to  attack 
our  army  in  position.  Jackson  had  once  said,  and  it  was  ever 
afterward  an  article  of  our  steadfast  faith  and  confidence,  "We 
sometimes  fail  to  drive  the  enemy  from  position,  but  they 
always  fail  to  drive  us." 

Lee  fully  appreciated  the  over-anxiety  of  the  enemy  for  the 
safety  of  Washington,  and  proposed,  for  this  occasion,  a  special 
feature,  which  he  hoped  would  play  upon  and  exaggerate  these 
fears.  Two  of  Pickett's  five  brigades  had  been  temporarily  left,  — 
Jenkins's  at  Petersburg,  and  Corse's  at  Hanover  Junction.  Lee 
proposed  that  when  his  column  of  invasion  crossed  the  Potomac, 
these  two  brigades,  reenforced  by  whatever  could  be  drawn 
from  lower  Virginia  and  the  Carolinas,  should  form  a  column 
commanded  by  Beauregard,  who  should  come  from  Charleston 
for  the  purpose.  This  column,  with  some  parade  of  its  inten- 
tion, should  advance  from  Culpeper  and  threaten  Washington. 
Hooker's  army  would  have  been  drawn  by  Lee  north  of  the 
Potomac.  The  prestige  of  Beauregard's  name  would  doubtless 
exaggerate  the  numbers  in  his  command,  and  Lee  hoped  that 
the  sudden  danger  might  lead  the  enemy  to  call  troops  from  the 
West,  particularly  if  his  army  could  win  a  battle  north  of  the 
Potomac.  The  weak  feature  was  that  Lee  did  not  have  under 
his  own  control  the  troops  which  he  desired  to  move.  Davis 
had,  indeed,  proposed  to  him  to  control  all  troops  on  the  Atlantic 
slope ;  but  Lee  insisted  even  on  being  relieved  of  the  department 
south  of  the  James,  under  D.  H.  Hill.  He  did  not  take  the  War 
Dept.  into  his  confidence  at  first,  hoping  to  accomplish  his 
purpose  by  gradual  suggestion  and  request.  The  process  was 
too  slow,  and  the  result  was  unfortunate.  Only  on  June  23 
from  Berry ville,  Va.,  did  he  fully  explain  to  the  President  his 
wishes.  On  the  25th,  from  Williamsport,  he  followed  the 
matter  up  with  two  letters,  urging  "the  organization  of  an 
army,  even  in  effigy,  under  Beauregard,  at  Culpeper  C.  H." 
Meanwhile,  some  demonstrations  by  the  enemy  from  the  York 
River  had  excited  apprehensions  at  Richmond,  and  neither 
Corse's  or  Jenkins's  brigades  were  sent  forward,  as  had  been 
planned. 

A  reply  was  despatched  on  June  29,  saying,  — 


GETTYSBURG:   THE  FIRST  DAY  367 

"This  is  the  first  intimation  the  President  has  had  that  such  a  plan 
was  ever  in  contemplation,  and,  taking  all  things  into  consideration,  he 
cannot  see  how  it  can  by  any  possibility  be  carried  into  effect." 

Explaining  the  difficulty  of  protecting  the  railroads  near  Rich- 
mond, the  letter  even  suggested  that  Lee  spare  some  of  his  own 
force  to  better  protect  his  own  communications.  This  caution 
was  not  excessive.  The  messenger  carrying  this  letter  to  Lee 
was  captured  on  July  2,  by  a  raid  upon  our  rear,  and,  its  im- 
portance being  recognized,  it  was  hurried  to  Meade  and  delivered 
to  him  on  the  field  of  Gettysburg  at  4.10  A.M.  on  July  4.  At 
that  hour  there  was  some  uncertainty  in  the  Union  councils  as 
to  their  best  policy.  The  facts  given  in  the  captured  letter  of 
the  difficulties  of  the  Confederates,  and  the  impossibility  of  Lee's 
receiving  any  reinforcements,  doubtless  increased  Meade's  con- 
fidence in  all  his  later  movements.  The  letter  was  considered 
of  such  importance  that  the  officer  who  brought  it,  Capt.  Ulric 
Dahlgren,  was  complimented  and  promoted. 

In  May  our  army  was  reorganized  into  three  corps,  each  com- 
prising three  divisions  of  infantry,  generally  of  four  brigades  each, 
and  five  battalions  of  artillery,  averaging  16  guns  each.  Ewell 
succeeded  Jackson  in  command  of  the  2d  corps,  and  A.  P.  Hill 
took  command  of  the  new  3d  corps.  He  had  been  an  excellent 
division  commander,  and  done  conspicuous  fighting  and  march- 
ing in  the  previous  campaigns.1  It  has  already  been  said  that 
Stuart  would  have  made  a  more  active  and  efficient  corps  com- 
mander than  Ewell. 

1  D.  H.  Hill  also  had  strong  claims  for  promotion.  He  had  done  as  much 
hard  fighting  as  any  other  general,  and  had  also  displayed  great  ability  in 
holding  his  men  to  their  work  by  supervision  and  example.  But  at  this  time 
he  was  not  with  the  army,  and  was  in  command  of  the  important  department 
south  of  the  James.  He  was  a  North  Carolinian,  and  was  very  acceptable 
to  the  State  authorities,  who  objected  if  too  many  North  Carolinians  were 
taken  to  Va.,  leaving  N.C.  exposed  to  Federal  raids.  There  was  an  earnest- 
ness about  D.  H.  Hill's  fighting  which  was  like  Jackson's  at  its  best.  Had 
opportunity  come  to  him,  he  must  have  won  greater  fame.  His  individual- 
ity may  be  briefly  illustrated  by  an  official  indorsement  placed  upon  the 
application  of  a  soldier  to  be  transferred  from  the  infantry  to  the  band. 

"  Respectfully  forwarded,  disapproved.  Shooters  are  more  needed  than 
tooters." 


368  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

Reorganized,  the  army  stood  as  follows :  — 

1ST   CORPS.      LONGSTREET 


DIVISIONS 

STRENGTH 

BRIGADE  COMMANDER 

BATTS. 

GUNS 

McLaws 

Pickett 
Hood 

Arty.  Battns. 

7,311 

5,200 
7,720 

1,000 

Kershaw,  Barksdale,  Semmes, 
Wofford 
Garnett,    Kemper,   Armistead 
Law,  Robertson,   Anderson,  G.  T. 
Benning 
Cabell,   Bearing,  Henry,  Walton, 
Alexander 

21 

84 

Totals 

21,231 

11  Brigades,  5  Battns.  Arty. 

21 

84 

2o  CORPS.     EWELL 


Early 

6,943 

Hays,  Smith,  Hoke,  Gordon 

Johnson 

5,564 

Stuart,  Walker,  Nichols,  Jones 

Rodes 

8,454 

Daniel,  Doles,  Iverson,  Ramseur, 

O'Neal 

Arty.  Battns. 

1,000 

Jones,    Latimer,    Carter,    Brown, 

Nelson 

21 

84 

Totals 

21,961 

13  Brigades,  5  Battns.  Arty. 

21 

84 

3o  CORPS.    A.  P.  HILL 


Anderson 
Heth 

Fender 
Arty.  Battns. 

7,440 
7,500 

6,800 
1,000 

Wilcox,  Wright,   Mahone,   Perry, 
Posey 
Pettigrew,  Brockenbrough,  Archer, 
Davis 
Perrin,  Lane,  Thomas,  Scales 
Lane,  Garnett,  Poague,  Mclntosh, 
Pegram 

20 

80 

Totals 

22,740 

13  Brigades,  5  Battns.  Arty. 

20 

80 

65,932 

3  Corps,  9  Divisions,  37  Brigades, 
15  Battns.  Arty. 

62 

248 

Stuart 
Cavalry 

10,292 

Hampton,       Robertson,       Jones, 
F.  Lee,  Jenkins,  W.  H.  F.  Lee 
Imboden 
1  Battn.  Arty. 

6 

24 

Totals 

10,292 

1  Division,  7  Brigades 

6 

24 

Aggregate 

76,224 

3  Corps,  10  Divisions,  44  Brigades, 
16  Battns.  Arty. 

68 

272 

GETTYSBURG:    THE  FIRST  DAY 


369 


The  figures  given  are  the  returns  of  the  "Officers  and  men 
present  for  duty"  on  May  31.  No  later  return  was  made  before 
the  battle. 

Similarly,  for  the  Federal  army,  the  table  below  gives  the 
"Officers  and  men  present  for  duty"  on  June  30,  the  last  return 
before  the  battle.  To  arrive  at  the  forces  actually  engaged, 
deductions  must  be  made  from  these  figures  in  both  armies  for 
sick,  guards,  and  details.  This  deduction  Livermore  averages 
at  seven  per  cent  for  Infantry  and  Artillery  and  15  per  cent 
for  Cavalry. 

ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC.    PRESENT  FOR  DUTY,  JUNE  30,  '63 


CORPS  STRENGTH 

DIVISIONS 

BRIGADES 

ARTILLERY 

1st  Corps 
Reynolds 
10,355 

Wadsworth 
Robinson 
Rowley 

Meredith,  Cutler 
Paul,  Baxter 
Biddle,  Stone,  Stannard 

Batts. 
5 

Guns 
23 

2d  Corps 
Hancock 
13,056 

Caldwell 
Gibbon 
Hays 

Cross,  Kelley,  Zook,  Brook 
Harrow,  Webb,  Hall 
Carroll,  Smyth,  Willard 

5 

24 

3d  Corps 
Sickles 
12,630 

Birney 
Humphreys 

Graham,  Ward,  De  Trobriand 
Carr,  Brewster,  Burling 

5 

30 

5th  Corps 
Sykes 
12,211 

Barnes 
Ayres 
Crawford 

Tilton,  Sweitzer,  Vincent 
Day,  Burbank,  Weed 
McCandless,  Fisher 

5 

26 

6th  Corps 
Sedgwick 
15,710 

Wright 
Howe 
Newton 

Torbert,  Bartlett,  Russell 
Grant,  Neill 
Shaler,  Eustis,  Wheaton 

8 

48 

llth  Corps 
Howard 
10,576 

Barlow 
Steinwehr 
Schurz 

Von  Gilsa,  Ames 
Coster,  Smith 
Schimmelpfennig,      Krzyzan- 
owski 

5 

26 

12th  Corps 

Slocum 
8,597 

Williams 
Geary 

McDougall,     Lockwood,   Ru- 
ger 
Candy,  Cobham,  Greene 

4 

20 

2,568 

Tyler 

Artillery  Reserve 

21 

110 

370 


MILITARY  MEMOIRS 


CORPS  STRENGTH 

DIVISIONS 

BRIGADES 

ARTILLERY 

2,580 

Engineers,    Provost    Guard's 
Escorts 

100,283 

7  Corps,  19  Divisions,  51  Brigades,  Infan- 
try and  Artillery 

58 

312 

Cavalry  Corps 
Pleasonton 
14,973 

Buford 
Gregg,  D. 
Kilpatrick 

Gamble,  Devin,  Merritt 
Mclntosh,  Huey,  Gregg,  J. 
Farnsworth,  Custer 

9 

50 

115,256 

8  Corps,  22  Divisions,  59  Brigades 

67 

362 

The  Confederate  infantry  by  this  time  were  about  nine-tenths 
armed  with  the  rifled  musket,  muzzle  loading,  mostly  of  calibre 
.58,  but  some  of  calibre  .54.  Their  artillery  was  now,  also,  all 
organized  into  battalions,  usually  of  four-gun  batteries  each. 
Each  corps  had  five  of  these  battalions.  One  of  these  served 
with  each  of  the  three  divisions,  and  the  remaining  two  con- 
stituted a  corps  reserve,  under  command  of  the  senior  artillery 
officer,  who  began  to  be  called,  and  to  act,  as  chief  of  artillery  of 
the  corps. 

The  general  artillery  reserve,  which  had  been  commanded  by 
Pendleton,  was  broken  up,  on  the  organization  of  the  3d  corps, 
and  it  was  never  reestablished.  Pendleton,  however,  was  re- 
tained as  chief  of  artillery.  It  is  worthy  of  note  that  this 
artillery  organization  of  a  few  batteries  with  each  division,  and 
a  reserve  with  each  corps,  but  with  no  general  reserve  for  the 
army,  was  the  first  of  the  kind  ever  adopted  by  any  foreign 
army,  and  that  it  was  subsequently  copied  by  Prussia  and 
Austria  after  1866,  and  by  France  after  1870,  and  later  by 
England.  But,  although  our  reserve  under  Pendleton  had 
never  found  the  opportunity  to  render  much  service,  its  being 
discontinued  was  due  to  our  poverty  of  guns,  not  to  dissatisfac- 
tion with  the  system.  And  the  fine  service  at  Gettysburg  by 
the  Federal  reserve  of  110  guns,  under  Hunt,  would  seem  to 
demonstrate  the  advantage  of  such  an  organization  in  every 
large  army. 

On  Wednesday,  June  3,  Lee  began  the  delicate  operation  of 


GETTYSBURG:   THE  FIRST  DAY  371 

manoeuvring  Hooker  out  of  his  position  behind  the  Rappahan- 
nock  by  a  movement  of  the  1st  and  2d  corps  toward  Culpeper. 
Hood  and  McLaws  marched  on  the  3d,  Rodes  on  the  4th,  and 
Early  and  Johnson  on  the  5th.  Longstreet's  reserve  —  the 
Washington  Artillery  with  eight  guns,  and  my  own  with  26 — 
marched  on  the  3d.  On  the  5th,  the  enemy,  having  discovered 
that  something  was  on  foot,  crossed  a  small  force  over  the  Rap- 
pahannock,  at  the  old  position  near  the  mouth  of  Deep  Run. 
On  this,  Lee  ordered  Swell's  corps  to  halt  and  await  develop- 
ments. But  on  the  6th  he  became  satisfied  that  nothing  serious 
was  intended,  and  Ewell  was  ordered  to  proceed.  In  the  after- 
noon, Lee  himself  left  Fredericksburg  for  Culpeper.  Hill's  corps 
now  stood  alone  in  front  of  Hooker's  entire  army. 

Meanwhile,  Hooker  had  sent  Buford's  and  Gregg's  divisions  of 
cavalry,  supported  by  Russell's  and  Ames's  brigades  of  infantry, 
to  attack  Stuart's  camps  near  the  Rappahannock.  A  severe 
cavalry  battle  resulted  on  the  9th,  near  Brandy  Station.  The 
enemy's  attack  was  a  surprise,  and  the  isolated  Confederate 
brigades,  first  encountered,  were  so  roughly  handled  that  help 
was  called  for  from  the  infantry  and  artillery.  My  own  battalion 
and  an  infantry  force  were  sent  to  the  field,  but  reached  it  too 
late.  The  enemy,  having  obtained  the  information  which  was 
the  object  of  his  expedition,  withdrew  across  the  Rappahannock 
under  cover  of  his  infantry  brigades,  with  loss  of  three  guns  and 
907  men.  Stuart's  loss  was  485. 

On  June  10,  EwelFs  corps  left  Culpeper  for  the  Valley.  Rodes 
moved  to  Berryville,  while  Early  and  Johnson  advanced  upon 
Winchester,  and,  on  the  13th  and  14th,  drove  Milroy's  forces 
into  the  city.  Preparations  were  made  to  storm  the  fortified  line 
at  dawn  on  the  15th,  an  enterprise  which  might  easily  have  been 
disastrous,  had  they  been  well  defended.  But  Milroy  saw  his 
communications  threatened,  and  did  not  wait  for  the  attack. 
About  dawn,  his  retreating  forces  were  struck  in  the  flank  near 
Stephenson's  depot  by  Steuart's  and  the  Stonewall  brigade,  and 
were  routed  with  the  loss  of  about  2400  men  and  23  guns.  Rodes's 
division,  going  by  Berryville,  had  driven  the  enemy  from  that 
point  on  the  13th,  and  on  the  14th  had  captured  Martinsburg 
late  in  the  afternoon,  taking  five  guns  and  many  stores.  Most 


372  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

of  the  enemy  escaped  under  cover  of  darkness,  though  the  pur- 
suit was  pushed  until  late  at  night.  On  the  15th,  starting  at 
10  A.M.,  Rodes  reached  Williamsport  at  dark  and  at  once  crossed 
three  brigades  and  three  batteries  over  the  Potomac.  The 
marches  made  by  Ewell's  whole  corps  in  this  swoop  upon  Mil- 
roy,  and  the  fruits  of  victory  secured,  compare  well  with  the 
work  of  the  same  corps  under  Jackson  13  months  before. 
Early  and  Johnson,  advancing  upon  Winchester,  made  70  miles 
in  three  days.  Rodes  speaks  of  his  march  to  Williamsport  as  — 

"  the  most  trying  march  we  had  yet  had ;  most  trying  because  of  the 
intense  heat,  the  character  of  the  road  (stony  and  dusty)  and  the  increased 
number  of  barefooted  men  in  the  command." 

He  go'es  on  to  say :  — 

"It  was  not  until  this  day  that  the  troops  began  to  exhibit  unmistak- 
able signs  of  exhaustion,  and  that  stragglers  could  be  found  in  the  line 
of  march,  and  even  then  none  but  absolutely  worn-out  men  fell  out  of 
the  line.  The  whole  march  from  Culpeper  to  Williamsport,  which  was  an 
extremely  rapid  one,  was  executed  in  a  manner  highly  creditable  to  the 
officers  and  men  of  the  division.  A  halt  at  Williamsport  was  abso- 
lutely necessary  from  the  condition  of  the  feet  of  the  unshod  men.  Very 
many  of  these  gallant  fellows  were  still  marching  in  ranks  with  feet  bruised, 
bleeding,  and  swollen." 

Of  the  fruits  gathered  by  the  victory,  Lee  reports,— 

"More  than  4000  prisoners,  about  30  pieces  of  artillery,  250  wagons, 
400  horses,  20  ambulances,  and  a  lot  of  ammunition,  etc." 

Besides  these  captures  of  military  material,  large  quantities  of 
cattle,  provisions,  and  supplies  of  all  kinds  useful  to  the  army 
were  now  to  be  collected  in  the  fertile  farming  country,  into 
which  the  army  had  penetrated. 

Stringent  orders  were  issued,  forbidding  the  taking  of  private 
property  except  by  duly  authorized  officers,  giving  formal 
receipts  in  all  cases,  that  the  owners  might  have  no  difficulty 
in  establishing  claims  and  receiving  payment  at  fair  prices. 

On  June  13,  as  Ewell's  corps  approached  Winchester,  Long- 
street  being  at  Culpeper,  and  Hill  still  opposite  Fredericksburg, 
Hooker  put  his  army  in  motion  from  Falmouth  for  Manassas. 
Before  Lee  began  his  movement,  Hooker  had  anticipated  it,  and 


GETTYSBURG:    THE  FIRST  DAY  373 

had  proposed  in  that  event  to  cross  the  Rappahannock  and  inter- 
pose between  Lee's  flanks.  It  was,  doubtless,  his  proper  move, 
and  would  have  forced  Lee  to  recall  Longstreet  and  Ewell  and 
have  broken  up  his  campaign.  But  it  had  been  decided,  soon 
after  the  battle  of  Chancellorsville,  in  a  council  between  Mr. 
Lincoln,  Halleck,  and  Stanton,  that  Hooker  should  never  again 
be  intrusted  with  the  conduct  of  a  battle.  He  could  not  be  at 
once  removed  on  account  of  the  support  of  politicians  who  desired 
to  have  Secretary  Chase  succeed  Mr.  Lincoln  as  President.  This 
party,  with  the  active  aid  of  Chase,  had  placed  Hooker  in  his 
position  by  turning  the  scale  in  his  favor,  when  the  choice  was 
between  Hooker  and  Meade,  as  successor  to  Burnside.  They 
still  supported  Hooker  strongly,  and  a  dead-lock  was  only  averted 
by  Chase's  friends  consenting  to  a  change  of  the  commander  in 
case  Hooker  should  voluntarily  resign. 

The  secret  of  Chase's  interest  lay  in  the  fact  that  Hooker  had 
pledged  himself  not  to  become  a  candidate  for  the  Presidency, 
should  he  win  a  great  victory. 

Meanwhile,  as  he  was  not  to  be  allowed  to  fight,  both  Halleck 
and  Lincoln  refused  his  sensible  proposition  to  cross  the  Rappa- 
hannock, and  Lincoln  wrote  him  the  oft-quoted  advice,  — 

"not  to  be  entangled  on  the  river,  like  an  ox  jumped  half  over  a  fence, 
and  liable  to  be  torn  by  dogs,  front  and  rear,  without  a  fair  chance  to  gore 
one  way  or  kick  another." 

Now  that  Lee's  army  was  stretched  out  over  a  line  more  than 
100  miles  long,  even  Lincoln  saw  that  a  wonderful  opportunity 
was  flaunted  in  the  face  of  the  Federals.  He  now  wrote  to 
Hooker  in  quite  a  different  spirit :  — 

"If  the  head  of  Lee's  army  is  at  Martinsburg,  and  the  tail  of  it  on  the 
Plank  road  between  Fredericksburg  and  Chancellorsville,  the  animal 
must  be  very  slim  somewhere.  Could  you  not  break  him?" 

Hooker  would  have  only  been  too  glad  to  try,  but  Stanton 
and  Halleck  were  on  guard  over  him,  and  practically  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  was  bound  hand  and  foot,  and  Lee  was  free  to 
work  his  own  will,  unmolested,  until  Hooker  should  be  forced  to 
tender  his  resignation. 
Hooker's  movement  toward  Manassas  was  at  once  followed  by 


374  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

Hill's  marching  for  Culpeper  on  the  14th,  and,  on  the  15th, 
Longstreet  marched  from  Culpeper  to  take  position  east  of  the 
Blue  Ridge,  while  Hill  passed  in  his  rear  and  crossed  the  moun- 
tains to  Winchester  via  Front  Royal.  When  Hill  was  safely  in 
the  Valley,  Longstreet  also  entered  through  Ashby's  and  Snicker's 
gaps,  and  about  the  20th  the  two  corps  were  united. 

The  cavalry  had  acted  as  a  screen  in  front  of  Longstreet  during 
this  advance,  and,  in  this  duty,  had  severe  encounters  with  the 
enemy  at  Aldie,  Middleburg,  and  Upperville,  losing  in  them  over 
500  in  killed,  wounded,  and  missing. 

About  June  22,  as  Hill  and  Longstreet  drew  near  the  Potomac, 
ready  to  cross,  Stuart  made  to  Lee  a  very  unwise  proposition, 
which  Lee  more  unwisely  entertained.  It  was  destined  to  have 
an  unfortunate  influence  on  the  campaign.  Stuart  thus  refers 
to  the  matter  in  his  official  report :  — 

"I  submitted  to  the  commanding  general  the  plan  of  leaving  a  brigade 
or  so  in  my  present  front,  passing  through  Hopewell  or  some  other  gap 
in  the  Bull  Run  Mountains,  attain  the  enemy's  rear,  passing  between  his 
main  body  and  Washington,  and  cross  into  Md.,  joining  our  army  north 
of  the  Potomac. 

"The  commanding  general  wrote  authorizing  this  move,  if  I  thought  it 
practicable,  and  also  what  instructions  should  be  given  the  two  brigades 
left  in  front  of  the  enemy.  He  also  notified  me  that  one  column  would 
move  via  Gettysburg,  and  the  other  via  Carlisle,  toward  the  Susquehanna, 
and  directed  me,  after  crossing,  to  proceed  with  all  despatch  to  join  the 
right  (Early)  of  the  army  in  Pa." 

In  view  of  the  issues  at  stake,  and  of  the  fact  that  already  he 
had  been  deprived  of  two  promised  brigades  (Corse's  and  Jen- 
kins's), it  was  unwise  even  to  contemplate  sending  three  brigades 
of  cavalry  upon  such  distant  service.  When  one  compares  the 
small  beneficial  results  of  raids,  even  when  successful,  with  the 
risks  here  involved,  it  is  hard  to  understand  how  Lee  could  have 
given  his  consent. 

Hooker's  Chancellorsville  campaign  had  been  lost  by  the 
absence  of  his  cavalry,  and  Lee's  Gettysburg  campaign  was 
similarly  compromised.  Lee,  however,  acquiesced,  only  attach- 
ing the  condition  that  Longstreet  could  spare  the  cavalry  from 
his  front,  and  approved  the  adventure.  Longstreet,  thus  sud- 


GETTYSBURG:   THE  FIRST  DAY  375 

denly  called  on  to  decide  the  question,  seems  not  to  have  appre- 
ciated its  importance,  for  he  decided  it  on  the  imaginary  ground 
that  "the  passage  of  the  Potomac  by  our  rear  would,  in  a  measure, 
disclose  our  plans." 

Accordingly,  about  midnight  of  June  24,  Stuart,  with  Hamp- 
ton's, W.  H.  F.  Lee's,  and  Fitz-Lee's  brigades,  six  guns,  and 
some  ambulances,  marched  from  Salem,  for  the  Potomac  River. 
Making  a  circuit  by  Brentsville,  Wolf  Run  shoals,  Fairfax 
C.  H.,  and  Dranesville,  he  crossed  the  Potomac  at  Rowser's 
Ford  at  midnight  of  the  27th,  about  80  miles  by  the  route 
travelled.  The  ford  was  barely  passable.  The  water  came  on 
the  saddles  of  the  horses  and  entirely  submerged  the  artillery 
carriages.  These  were  emptied  and  the  ammunition  carried 
across  by  hand.  Here  the  Chesapeake  and  Ohio  Canal  was  cut. 
Next  morning  at  Rockville,  a  train  of  wagons  eight  miles  long 
was  captured,  and  400  prisoners  were  taken  and  paroled.  In 
saving  a  large  number  of  wagons,  instead  of  burning  them,  and 
in  delaying  12  hours  to  parole  his  prisoners,  instead  of  bringing 
along  the  officers  and  letting  the  men  go,  Stuart  committed  fatal 
blunders.  The  Federal  authorities  refused  to  recognize  the  paroles 
(though  they  were  given  at  the  earnest  solicitation  of  the  cap- 
tured officers),  and  all  the  paroled  were  at  once  returned  to  duty. 
The  delay  caused  to  subsequent  marches  by  the  long  wagon- train, 
and  the  embarrassment  of  protecting  it,  was  responsible  for  the 
loss  of  time  which  made,  on  the  whole,  a  sad  failure  of  the  ex- 
pedition. On  the  29th,  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  R.R.  was  crossed 
and  torn  up  at  Hood's  Mills.  At  Westminster  about  5  P.M.,  a 
squadron  of  Federal  cavalry  was  routed,  and  the  head  of  the 
column  bivouacked  that  night  midway  between  Westminster  and 
Littletown.  Had  it  here  followed  the  direct  road,  via  Littletown 
to  Gettysburg,  only  about  16  miles  away,  it  could  have  occupied 
Gettysburg  before  11  A.M.  on  the  30th,  where  it  would  have 
found  itself  in  good  position  in  front  of  Lee's  army,  then  con- 
centrating at  Cashtown.  It  might,  however,  have  had  a  severe 
fight  with  Buf  ord's  two  brigades  of  cavalry,  which  arrived  in  the 
afternoon,  just  in  time  to  anticipate  Pettigrew's  brigade  of 
Heth's  division,  which  had  been  directed  to  visit  Gettysburg  in 
quest  of  shoes. 


376  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

This  incident  will  be  referred  to  again.  It  is  mentioned  here 
only  to  show  how  near  Stuart's  expedition  came  to  a  happy  issue 
on  June  30.  Had  it  done  so,  Lee's  army  would  have  occupied 
some  strong  position  between  Cashtown  and  Gettysburg,  and 
the  onus  of  attack  would  have  been  upon  the  Federals,  as  had 
been  the  plan  of  the  campaign. 

But  his  orders  led  Stuart  toward  the  Susquehanna,  so  he  pro- 
ceeded north  to  Hanover,  which  was  reached  at  10  A.M.  on  the 
30th.  Here  he  had  a  sharp  skirmish  with  Kilpatrick's  cavalry. 
Hampered  by  his  125  captured  wagons,  he  turned  squarely  to  the 
right,  and,  making  a  detour  by  Jefferson,  he  reached  Dover  on 
the  morning  of  July  1,  crossing  during  the  night  the  road  on 
which  Early 's  division  had  marched  on  the  30th  from  York  to 
Heidlersburg.  Here  he  learned  that  Early  had  gone  toward 
Shippensburg.  Stuart  was  practically  lost,  and  had  to  guess  in 
which  direction  he  should  go  to  find  Lee's  army.  Lee  was  now 
beginning  the  battle  of  Gettysburg,  25  miles  off  to  the  south- 
west. Stuart's  report  says:  — 

"  After  as  little  rest  as  was  compatible  with  the  exhausted  condition 
of  the  command,  I  pushed  on  for  Carlisle  [25  miles  to  the  northwest! , 
where  I  hoped  to  find  a  portion  of  our  army." 

He  arrived  before  Carlisle  in  the  afternoon.  His  rations  were 
now  entirely  exhausted.  He  desired  to  levy  a  contribution,  but 
learned  that  a  considerable  force  of  militia  was  ambushed  in 
the  town,  "with  a  view  to  entrap  him  on  his  entrance."  He 
invested  the  town,  threw  in  some  shells,  and  burned  the  United 
States  Cavalry  barracks.  "The  whereabouts  of  our  army,"  he 
says,  "was  still  a  mystery,  but  during  the  night  I  received  a 
despatch  from  Lee  that  the  army  was  at  Gettysburg  [about  30 
miles  south]  and  had  been  engaged  this  day."  The  investment 
was  abandoned,  and  the  column  headed  for  Gettysburg,  where 
it  arrived  that  afternoon  "just  in  time  to  thwart  a  movement  of 
the  enemy's  cavalry  upon  our  rear."  .  .  . 

The  expedition  had  occupied  eight  days,  and  had  traversed  in 
that  time  about  250  miles.  Meanwhile,  Lee  had  been  exceed- 
ingly impatient.  When  Stuart,  at  last,  reported  in  person,  late 
in  the  afternoon  of  the  2d,  although  Lee  said  only, "  Well,  General, 


GETTYSBURG:   THE  FIRST  DAY  377 

you  are  here  at  last,"  his  manner  implied  rebuke,  and  it  was  so 
understood  by  Stuart. 

He,  however,  is  scarcely  to  be  blamed  for  suggesting  the  raid. 
Had  he  wasted  no  time  paroling  prisoners  and  saving  wagons, 
his  raid  might  have  been  successful,  as  raids  go,  for  his  whole 
casualties  were  but  89  killed,  wounded,  and  missing.  But  the 
venture  was  a  strategic  mistake,  for  it  resulted  in  the  battle's 
being  one  of  chance  collision,  with  the  Confederates  taking  the 
offensive,  whereas  the  plan  of  the  campaign  had  been  to  fight  a 
defensive  battle. 

Hill  crossed  the  Potomac  at  Shepherdstown  on  June  23,  and 
Longstreet  began  crossing  at  Williamsport  on  the  24th.  Hooker 
was  not  far  behind,  for  he  crossed  at  Edward's  Ferry  on  the  25th 
and  26th,  and  moved  to  the  vicinity  of  Frederick.  Here  he 
threatened  Lee's  rear  through  the  South  Mountain  passes,  if  he 
moved  north,  and,  at  the  same  time,  covered  Washington. 
Hooker  had,  meanwhile,  been  placed  in  command  of  the  troops 
at  Washington  (some  26,000  men),  and  at  Harper's  Ferry,  where 
there  were  about  11,000.  It  was  a  wise  order,  but  under  the 
policy  of  not  allowing  Hooker  to  fight,  it  was  but  a  sham,  as  he 
soon  discovered.  He  attempted  to  draw  15,000  men  from  the 
Washington  lines,  as  his  whole  army  was  now  in  front  of  the 
city,  but  Halleck  refused  to  allow  it.  He  then  proposed  to 
throw  a  strong  force  across  the  mountains  upon  Lee's  rear,  and, 
for  this  purpose,  he  ordered  the  11,000  under  French  at  Harper's 
Ferry  to  unite  with  the  12th  corps,  which  was  to  lead  the  move- 
ment. Again  Halleck  interposed.  He  refused  the  troops  on 
the  absurd  ground  that  "Maryland  Heights  have  always  been 
regarded  as  an  important  point  to  be  held  by  us,  and  much  labor 
and  expense  has  been  incurred  in  fortifying  them." 

Hooker  appealed  in  vain  to  Stanton  and  Lincoln,  pointing  out 
the  folly  of  holding  so  large  a  force  idle.  Then  Hooker  realized 
that  he  had  lost  the  support  of  the  government,  and  tendered 
his  resignation  June  27.  It  was  just  what  Stanton  and  Halleck 
had  been  seeking,  and  was  no  sooner  received  than  accepted, 
and  prompt  measures  adopted  to  relieve  him,  lest  the  armies 
should  come  into  collision  with  Hooker  still  in  command. 

Meade  succeeded  Hooker.     He  was  an  excellent  fighter,  but 


378  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

too  lacking  in  audacity  for  a  good  commanding  general.  He 
was  also  of  cross  and  quarrelsome  disposition,  and  unpopular 
with  his  leading  officers. 

Duplicate  orders,  relieving  Hooker  and  installing  Meade,  were 
sent  that  afternoon  by  Hardie,  Stanton's  chief  of  staff.  He 
delivered  the  order  to  Meade  about  midnight,  while  Hooker  was 
still  in  ignorance  how  his  proffered  resignation  was  being  re- 
ceived. Meade  protested,  and  begged  to  be  excused  hi  favor  of 
Reynolds,  who  was  the  favorite  of  the  army.  But  he  was  com- 
pelled to  accompany  Hardie  on  a  ride  to  Hooker's  quarters,  some 
miles  away,  to  deliver  the  order  superseding  him.  Hooker  had 
hoped  for  a  different  outcome.  He  acquiesced  gracefully,  but 
the  scene  was  a  painful  one. 

Meanwhile,  Lee,  with  Longstreet  and  Hill,  had  reached  Cham- 
bersburg  and  bivouacked  in  its  neighborhood  from  June  27  to  the 
29th.  The  Federal  army  had  now  been  across  the  Potomac  for 
three  days,  but  Lee  was  not  yet  informed,  and  he  now  became 
anxious  to  hear  from  his  cavalry.  An  additional  large  brigade 
coming  from  W.  Va.,  under  Imboden,  should  have  joined  him 
here,  but  it  had  not  yet  arrived.  It  had  been  delayed  in  its  ap- 
proach by  destroying  the  Chesapeake  and  Ohio  Canal  about 
Hancock.  A  very  essential  part,  also,  of  Stuart's  proposed 
programme  had  not  been  carried  out. 

This  was  that  two  of  his  five  brigades  should  cross  into  Md. 
with  Lee  and  continue  on  his  right  flank,  to  screen  it  and  observe 
the  enemy.  Longstreet  had  specially  directed  Stuart  to  let 
Hampton's  brigade  be  one  of  these,  with  Hampton  hi  command 
of  both.  This  was  not  convenient,  and  Stuart  had  left  Robert- 
son's and  Jones's  brigades,  with  Robertson  in  command.  Also, 
he  had  failed  to  make  Robertson  understand  what  was  expected 
of  him.  The  result  was  that  Robertson  and  his  two  brigades  re- 
mained in  Va.  until  brought  over  by  Lee's  order  on  July  2.1 

To  gam  information,  Stuart  had  designed  to  have  two  efficient 
scouts  operating  within  the  enemy's  line,  but  accident  had 

1  This  failure  to  carry  out  Lee's  orders  indicates  a  staff  insufficient  to 
keep  him  in  touch  with  what  was  taking  place.  A  notable  feature  of  the 
coming  battle  will  be  found  in  the  number  of  important  events  which 
seemed  to  happen  without  any  control  for  the  Commander-in-Chief. 


GETTYSBURG:   THE  FIRST  DAY  379 

prevented  in  both  cases.  Mosby,  one  of  them,  had  failed  to 
reach  Stuart,  at  his  crossing  of  the  Potomac,  owing  to  an  enforced 
change  of  Stuart's  line  of  march.  Stringfellow,  the  other,  had 
been  captured.  Lee,  therefore,  on  June  28,  still  believed  that 
Hooker's  army  had  not  yet  crossed  the  Potomac,  and,  to  hurry 
Hooker  up,  he  issued  orders  for  an  advance,  the  next  day,  of  all 
his  forces  upon  Harrisburg. 

But  there  was  still  one  scout,  Harrison,  within  the  Federal 
lines.  Longstreet  had  despatched  him  from  Culpeper,  three 
weeks  before,  to  go  into  Washington  and  remain  until  he  had 
important  information  to  communicate. 

With  good  judgment  and  good  fortune  he  appeared  about  mid- 
night on  the  28th,  with  the  news  that  Hooker  had  crossed  the 
Potomac,  and  had  been  superseded  by  Meade.  He  was  also 
able  to  give  the  approximate  locations  of  five  of  Meade's  seven 
corps,  three  being  near  Frederick  and  two  near  the  base  of  South 
Mountain. 

This  news  caused  an  immediate  change  in  Lee's  plans.  He 
was  specially  anxious  to  hold  Meade  east  of  the  Blue  Ridge,  and 
not  have  him  come  into  the  Valley  behind  us  —  the  movement 
which  Hooker  had  brought  on  his  own  resignation  by  seeking  to 
make.  To  forestall  this,  Lee's  plan  had  long  been  formed  to 
concentrate  his  own  army  somewhere  between  Cashtown  and 
Gettysburg,  in  a  strong  position  where  it  would  threaten  at  once 
Washington,  Baltimore,  and  Philadelphia.  The  enemy,  he  hoped, 
would  then  be  forced  to  attack  him.  His  report  states  that,  — 

"the  march  toward   Gettysburg  was  conducted  more  slowly  than    it 
would  have  been  had  the  movements  of  the  Federal  army  been  known." 

Accordingly,  on  the  29th,  orders  were  sent,  countermanding 
those  of  the  day  before  and  directing  movements  which  would 
concentrate  the  three  corps  at  Cashtown,  eight  miles  west  of 
Gettysburg.  There  was  no  urgency  about  the  orders,  which 
indicates  that  Lee  had  not  yet  selected  any  particular  site  for 
his  coming  battle.  Meade,  however,  very  soon  after  taking  com- 
mand on  the  28th,  had  selected  a  position,  Parr's  Ridge,  behind 
Pipe  Creek,  on  the  divide  between  the  waters  of  the  Potomac 
and  Chesapeake  Bay.  Here  he,  too,  hoped  to  fight  on  the 


380  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

defensive.  It  would  have  been  safe  play,  but  not  so  brilliant  as 
what  Hooker  had  proposed,  or  as  what  Lee  himself  had  used 
with  Pope  in  Aug.,  1862. 

On  June  29,  Hill  moved  Heth's  division  from  Fayetteville  to 
Cashtown,  about  10  miles.  Heth  heard  that  shoes  could  be 
purchased  in  Gettysburg,  and,  with  Hill's  permission,  authorized 
Pettigrew's  brigade  to  go  there  next  day  and  get  them.  On  the 
30th,  Fender's  division  followed  Heth's  from  Fayetteville  to 
Cashtown,  and  was  followed  by  Longstreet  with  Hood  and 
McLawsfrom  Chambersburg  as  far  as  Greenwood,  about  11  miles. 
Here  they  bivouacked  about  2  P.M.  Lee  accompanied  this  march, 
and  also  bivouacked  at  Greenwood.  Pickett's  division  was  left 
at  Chambersburg  to  guard  the  rear  until  Imboden's  cavalry 
should  arrive,  and  Law's  brigade  was  detached  from  Hood's 
division  and  sent  to  New  Guilford  C.  H.,  a  few  miles  south 
of  Fayetteville,  until  Robertson's  cavalry  should  relieve  it.  On 
the  30th,  Ewell's  corps,  having  received  the  orders  from  Lee, 
also  marched  toward  Cashtown,  the  place  of  rendezvous. 

Meanwhile,  Pettigrew,  on  approaching  Gettysburg,  found 
Buford's  cavalry  just  occupying  it,  upon  which  he  withdrew 
about  five  miles  and  bivouacked. 

Previously,  everything  had  moved  favorably  for  the  Con- 
federates' strategy.  Now,  Stuart  was  still  unheard  from,  Robert- 
son and  Imboden  were  still  behind,  and  four  brigades  of  infantry 
were  detained  waiting  for  them.  Lee  knew  approximately  the 
enemy's  position,  however,  and  his  own  three  corps  were  con- 
verging by  easy  marches  upon  Cashtown,  near  which  village  he 
proposed  to  select  his  ground  and  await  an  attack. 

Meade's  army  was  equally  near  Pipe  Creek,  where  he  hoped  to 
be  able  to  play  the  same  game.  But  a  chance  collision  suddenly 
precipitated  a  battle,  unforeseen  and  undesired  by  either  party. 

Hill's  report  describes  how  it  began :  — 

"  On  arriving  at  Cashtown,  Heth,  who  had  sent  forward  Pettigrew's 
brigade  to  Gettysburg,  reported  that  Pettigrew  had  encountered  the  enemy 
at  Gettysburg  (principally  cavalry),  but  in  what  force  he  could  not  deter- 
mine. A  courier  was  then  despatched  with  this  information  for  the 
general  commanding,  and  with  orders  to  start  Anderson  early.  Also  to 
Ewell  informing  him,  and  that  I  intended  to  advance  the  next  morning, 
and  discover  what  was  in  my  front." 


O 


PQ 

CO 


H 


W 


o>  H 
•*    t. 

~    ® 


O     =3 

k1  S 

(R    O 


»1 


O    M. 


E  -2 

IS 


CQ     i3! 

S  O 


S  JB 
II 


GETTYSBURG:    THE  FIRST  DAY  381 

Thus  Hill's  movement  to  Gettysburg  was  made  of  his  own 
motion,  and  with  knowledge  that  he  would  find  the  enemy's 
cavalry  in  possession.  Ewell  was  informed  of  it.  Lee's  orders 
were  to  avoid  bringing  on  an  action. 

Like  Stuart's  raid,  Hill's  venture  is  another  illustration  of  an 
important  event  allowed  to  happen  without  supervision.  Lee's 
first  intimation  of  danger  of  collision  was  his  hearing  Hill's  guns 
at  Gettysburg.  He  was  much  disturbed  by  it,  not  wishing  to 
fight  without  the  presence  of  his  cavalry  to  gather  fruit  in  case  of 
victory. 

On  July  1,  of  his  nine  divisions,  Pickett's  was  in  bivouac  at 
Chambersburg.  The  other  eight,  except  Law's  brigade,  were  all 
in  motion  toward  Gettysburg,  Ewell  having  at  an  early  hour 
ordered  Rodes  and  Early  to  diverge  to  that -point  from  the  roads 
they  were  pursuing,  toward  Cash  town.  Unfortunately,  six  of 
the  divisions,  and  the  trains  and  the  reserve  artillery  of  all  three 
corps,  were  concentrated  upon  the  turnpike  from  Fayetteville 
to  Gettysburg.  Anderson's  division,  followed  by  the  3d  corps 
trains,  had  started  soon  after  daylight  from  Fayetteville.  Here 
they  had  halted,  but  Lee,  passing,  had  ordered  them  on  to 
Gettysburg,  following  Heth  and  Fender,  who  had  marched  from 
Cashtown  at  5  A.M.,  and  become  engaged  at  Gettysburg  about  10. 

Soon  after  Anderson  had  passed  Greenwood,  Hood  and 
McLaws  were  starting  to  follow,  when  they  encountered  John- 
son's division  of  the  2d  corps  cutting  in  from  the  left,  with  the 
trains  and  reserve  artillery  of  that  corps.  Lee,  who  was  riding 
with  Longstreet  at  the  head  of  his  infantry,  directed  that  he 
should  halt  until  these  had  all  passed.  This  column  occupied 
about  14  miles  of  road,  and  it  delayed  Longstreet's  infantry  until 
4  P.M.  In  the  morning,  Longstreet's  orders  had  been  only  to  go 
as  far  as  Cashtown,  but  later  orders  were  sent  for  all  troops  to 
come  to  Gettysburg. 

It  was  now  the  fourth  day  since  Meade  had  relieved  Hooker. 
Harper's  Ferry  had  been  evacuated.  Of  its  11,000  troops,  7000 
under  French  were  brought  to  Frederick,  and  4000  escorted  to 
Washington  the  artillery  and  stores  of  the  post. 

Meade  knew  that  Swell's  corps  was  between  York  and  Car- 
lisle, and,  on  the  29th,  put  his  whole  army  in  motion  in  that 


382  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

direction,  encamping  that  night  on  a  line  extending  from 
Emmitsburg  to  Westminster.  On  the  30th,  his  advanced  corps 
moved  forward  within  a  few  miles  of  Gettysburg  on  his  left,  to 
Littletown  in  the  centre,  and  toward  Manchester  on  his  right. 

He  now  found  that  Lee  was  withdrawing  and  concentrating 
near  Cash  town.  He  wrongly  ascribed  this  to  his  own  advance 
from  Frederick,  and  published  orders  on  the  30th,  saying:  — 

"The  General  believes  he  has  relieved  Harrisburg  and  Philadelphia, 
and  now  desires  to  look  to  his  own  army,  and  assume  position  for  offensive 
or  defensive,  as  occasion  requires,  or  rest  to  the  troops.  It  is  not  his  de- 
sire to  wear  the  troops  out  by  excessive  fatigue  and  marches,  and  thus 
unfit  them  for  the  work  they  will  be  called  upon  to  perform." 

In  fact,  Lee  did  not  know  that  Meade  had  moved  at  all,  and 
his  own  movement  eastward  was  really  inspired  by  apprehension 
for  his  own  communications,  aroused  by  Hooker's  action  before 
he  had  been  superseded. 

Although  Meade  had  selected  his  proposed  line  of  battle 
behind  Pipe  Creek,  and  now  announced  his  intention  to  rest  his 
troops,  he  still,  on  the  1st,  ordered  a  further  advance  of  each  of 
his  seven  corps,  as  follows:  The  5th  corps  was  ordered  to 
Hanover;  the  6th  corps  to  Manchester;  the  12th  corps  to  Two 
Taverns;  the  3d  corps  to  Emmitsburg,  and  the  1st  and  llth 
corps  to  Gettysburg. 

These  advances  were  not  intended  to  bring  on  a  battle,  but  to 
cover  the  position  selected,  allowing  space  in  front  to  delay  the 
enemy's  approach  and  give  time  for  preparation.  The  instruc- 
tions to  Reynolds,  who  was  in  command  on  the  left,  were  not 
to  bring  on  a  general  engagement. 

But,  though  both  Meade  and  Lee  had  cautioned  their  lieutenants 
to  this  effect,  it  was  precipitated  by  Hill's  initiative  and  Reynolds's 
willing  concurrence.  In  the  first  collision  of  the  day,  Reynolds's 
leading  division,  by  good  handling,  got  decidedly  the  best  of 
the  affair,  giving  the  Federals  quite  a  taste  of  victory.  Lee  had 
been  very  uneasy  as  the  roar  of  the  distant  battle  increased,  but 
when,  later,  the  arrival  of  Ewell  had  turned  the  scale,  and  he, 
reaching  the  field,  saw  the  Federals  routed  and  prisoners  taken 
by  the  thousand,  it  became  simply  impossible  for  him  to  hold 


GETTYSBURG:   THE  FIRST  DAY  383 

back  his  hand.  And  not  only  impossible,  but  then  unwise,  for 
a  great  opportunity  was  undoubtedly  before  him.  He  ordered 
it  seized  "if  possible,"  and  for  the  rest  of  the  afternoon  rested  in 
the  belief  that  efforts  were  being  made,  being  misled  by  Swell's 
not  informing  him  that  the  pursuit  had  been  abandoned  before 
his  orders  to  push  it  were  given. 

The  course  of  the  battle  had  been  as  follows :  About  10  A.M., 
the  advance  of  Heth's  division  became  engaged  with  Buford's 
cavalry,  between  one  and  two  miles  in  front  of  Gettysburg. 
Buford,  with  his  horse  artillery,  sought  to  detain  the  enemy  until 
Reynolds's  corps  (seven  brigades),  which  he  knew  was  ap- 
proaching, could  come  to  his  assistance.  By  11  o'clock,  how- 
ever, he  was  forced  to  withdraw  to  the  left,  where  he  took 
position,  and  during  the  rest  of  the  day  protected  the  left  flank 
of  the  Federals.  As  Buford  withdrew,  Wadsworth's  two  brigades 
became  engaged  with  Davis  and  Archer. 

Davis,  on  the  left,  overlapped  Cutler  on  the  Federal  right  and, 
of  course,  soon  drove  back  his  right  wing  along  with  Hall's 
battery,  all  of  which  were  withdrawn  without  severe  loss.  But, 
on  the  Confederate  right,  Archer's  brigade  was  overlapped  by 
Meredith's,  which  struck  it  on  the  flank  and  captured  Archer 
and  several  hundred  prisoners.  This  blow  to  Archer  relieved 
Cutler's  brigade,  which,  changing  front  to  its  left,  was  able  to 
cut  off  and  capture  two  regiments  of  Davis's  brigade  which  had 
advanced  in  pursuit  of  Cutler's  right,  and  taken  position  in  the 
cut  of  an  unfinished  railroad  north  of  the  Chambersburg  Pike. 

Almost  at  the  moment  of  his  victory,  however,  Reynolds  was 
killed.  He  was  an  excellent  soldier  and  was  well  known  to  have 
been  the  choice  of  the  army  to  replace  Hooker. 

Meanwhile,  Cutler  was  now  reenforced  by  Rowley's  division 
of  the  same  corps,  which  extended  its  line  farther  to  the  right. 
Robinson's  division  also  approached  and  was  held  in  reserve 
near  by.  Later,  as  the  engagement  grew  more  severe,  it  was 
also  put  into  the  battle. 

Meanwhile,  Hill  had  formed  Fender's  division  in  line  of  battle 
in  rear  of  Heth,  but  it  was  held  in  reserve  for  some  time,  as 
Heth  about  noon  received  a  reenforcement  by  the  arrival  of 
Rodes's  division,  on  his  left  flank,  coming  in  from  Middle  town. 


384  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

About  the  same  time,  also,  the  head  of  the  llth  corps,  under 
Howard,  arrived  at  Gettysburg,  and  Howard  succeeded  Reynolds 
in  command  of  the  field.  He  halted  Steinwehr's  division,  two 
brigades,  on  Cemetery  Hill,  as  a  reserve,  and  advanced  Schurz 
and  Barlow  to  the  front.  With  these  he  formed  line  to  cover 
the  approaches  from  the  north  as  far  east  as  Rock  Creek.  This 
disposition  was  bad.  The  force  was  small  for  so  long  a  line, 
and  its  right  flank  was  in  the  air  near  the  Heidlersburg  road,  by 
which  Early  was  now  drawing  near. 

For  a  while,  however,  the  Federal  forces  were  superior  in  num- 
bers at  the  actual  points  of  contact,  where  only  Rodes's  and 
Heth's  divisions  were  yet  engaged.  And,  whether  from  discipline 
or  from  the  inspiration  of  home,  the  fighting  done  by  the  Federal 
brigades  was  of  the  best  type.  At  this  period  some  Confederate 
brigades  were  seriously  crippled.  Heth's  division,  which  had 
already  suffered  severely  in  Archer's  and  Davis's  brigades,  now 
lost  heavily  in  Pettigrew's  by  a  musketry  combat  at  very  close 
quarters.  It  won  the  affair,  but  the  brigade  was  scarcely  a  half 
brigade  for  the  rest  of  the  battle. 

Iverson's  brigade  was  exposed  to  a  severe  flank  fire  and  lost 
three  regiments.  In  his  report,  Iverson  says :  — 

"When  I  saw  a  white  handkerchief  raised,  and  my  line  of  battle  still 
lying  down  in  position,  I  characterized  the  surrender  as  disgraceful.  But 
when  I  found  afterward  that  500  of  my  men  were  left  lying  dead  and 
wounded  on  a  line  as  straight  as  a  dress  parade,  I  exonerated  the  sur- 
vivors and  claim  for  the  brigade  that  they  nobly  fought  and  died  with- 
out a  man  running  to  the  rear." 

It  is  needless  to  detail  the  fighting  when  Early's  division 
advanced  upon  the  right  of  the  llth  corps;  and  when  Fender 
reenforced  Heth  against  the  1st  corps.  The  enemy  was  forced 
back,  and  an  advance  of  the  Confederate  line  swept  forward 
into  the  city.  About  5000  prisoners  were  captured,  and  fugitives 
could  be  seen  in  disorganized  masses  passing  over  the  hills  in  the 
rear. 

It  was  now  about  three  o'clock.1 

1  The  time  and  the  condition  of  affairs  are  given  in  Hancock's  report,  as 
follows:  "At  3  P.M.  I  arrived  at  Gettysburg  and  assumed  the  command. 
At  this  time  the  1st  and  the  llth  corps  were  retiring  through  the  town,  closely 


GETTYSBURG:    THE  FIRST  DAY  385 

Sunset  was  about  7.30,  twilight  was  long,  and  the  moon  was 
full.  There  was  daylight  enough,  and  force  enough  at  hand,  to 
follow  the  pursuit  and  at  least  to  carry  Cemetery  Hill,  from  which 
one  of  the  two  reserve  brigades,  Coster's,  had  been  withdrawn. 

Soon  after  two  o'clock,  Lee  had  arrived  on  Seminary  Ridge, 
and  seen  the  defeat  of  the  enemy  and  their  retreat  over  Cemetery 
Hill.  His  first  impulse  was  to  have  the  pursuit  pushed  and  he 
sent  his  Adjt.-Col.  W.  H.  Taylor,  to  instruct  Ewell  accordingly. 
Unfortunately,  he  took  no  steps  to  see  that  the  order  was  obeyed. 

Taylor  gives  the  following  account :  — 

"  Gen.  Lee  witnessed  the  flight  of  the  Federals  through  Gettysburg  and 
up  the  hills  beyond.  He  then  directed  me  to  go  to  Gen.  Ewell,  and  to  say 
to  him  that  from  the  position  which  he  occupied,  he  could  see  the  enemy 
retreating  over  those  hills  without  organization  and  in  great  confusion, 
that  it  was  only  necessary  to  press  '  those  people '  in  order  to  secure  posses- 
sion of  the  heights,  and  that,  if  possible,  he  wished  him  to  do  this. 

"  In  obedience  to  these  instructions  I  proceeded  immediately  to  Gen. 
Ewell,  and  delivered  the  order  of  Gen.  Lee,  and  after  receiving  from  him 
some  message  for  the  commanding  general  in  regard  to  the  prisoners 
captured,  returned  to  the  latter  and  reported  that  his  order  had  been  de- 
livered. Gen.  Ewell  did  not  express  any  objection  or  indicate  the  existence 
of  any  impediment  to  the  execution  of  the  orders  conveyed  to  him,  but 
left  the  impression  upon  my  mind  that  they  would  be  executed.  ...  " i 

After  reading  this  circumstantial  statement,  it  is  hard  to  un- 
derstand Ewell's  conduct.  Not  only  did  he  fail  to  renew  the 
pursuit  which  he  had  previously  stopped,  but,  by  apparent 

pursued  by  the  enemy.  The  cavalry  of  Buford  was  occupying  a  firm  position 
on  the  plain  to  the  left  of  Gettysburg,  covering  the  rear  of  the  retreating  corps. 
The  3d  corps  had  not  yet  arrived  from  Emmitsburg.  Orders  were  at  once 
given  to  establish  a  line  of  battle  on  Cemetery  Hill  with  skirmishers  oc- 
cupying that  part  of  the  town  immediately  in  our  front.  The  position  just 
on  the  southern  edge,  overlooking  the  town  and  commanding  the  Emmits- 
burg and  Taneytown  roads  and  the  Baltimore  Turnpike,  was  already  par- 
tially occupied  on  my  arrival  by  direction  of  Gen.  Howard.  Some  difficulty 
was  experienced  in  forming  the  troops  of  the  llth  corps,  but  by  vigorous 
efforts  a  sufficiently  formidable  line  was  established  to  deter  the  enemy 
from  any  serious  assault  on  the  position." 

It  will  presently  appear  that  the  enemy  was  not  deterred  by  the  Federal 
line,  but  was  halted  by  Ewell  without  orders,  and  was  deliberately  kept 
halted  even  after  orders  to  attack  "if  possible"  had  arrived,  and  remained 
halted  all  the  rest  of  the  afternoon. 

1  Four  Years  with  Lee,  p.  95. 


386  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

acquiescence  and  sending  messages  about  prisoners  captured,  he 
seems  to  have  intentionally  misled  Lee  into  the  belief  that  his 
orders  were  being  obeyed,  while  the  rare  opportunity  slipped 
rapidly  away.  There  could  not  be  a  more  striking  illustration, 
either  of  the  danger  of  giving  any  important  orders  in  any  con- 
ditional form,  or  of  failing  to  follow  up  all  such  orders  with  some 
supervision.  When  the  firing  gradually  died  out  instead  of 
being  renewed,  Lee  took  no  action. 

Meanwhile,  Johnson's  division,  closely  followed  by  Anderson's, 
had  reached  the  field,  and  was  ordered  by  Ewell  to  pass  the  town 
and  occupy  Gulp's  Hill,  a  half-mile  to  the  east.  Ewell's  report 
says :  — 

"Before  Johnson  could  get  up,  the  enemy  was  reported  moving  to  out- 
flank our  extreme  left,  and  I  could  see  what  seemed  to  be  his  skirmishers 
in  that  direction." 

The  skirmishers  turned  out  to  be  our  own  men.  Before  this 
was  discovered,  it  was  sunset,  and  the  hill  about  that  time  was 
occupied  by  Wadsworth's  Federal  division.  Ewell,  however, 
was  not  informed  of  this,  and  was  again  about  to  despatch 
Johnson  on  his  errand  when  orders  arrived  from  Lee  to  draw 
his  corps  to  the  right.  He  rode  to  see  Lee  and  persuaded  him 
to  let  the  expedition  be  made.  It  was  a  most  unfortunate  deci- 
sion, as  will  presently  appear,  for  it  fatally  extended  Lee's  left 
flank.  About  midnight,  Johnson's  division  was  moved  around 
the  base  of  Gulp's  Hill  and  a  reconnoitring  party  ascended,  but 
found  the  enemy  in  possession.  No  one  ordered  the  division  to 
be  carried  back  to  the  right,  where  it  could  have  been  of  much 
service  in  subsequent  operations,  and  where  Lee  had  intended 
it  to  be.  It  was  far  too  weak  to  attack  the  strong  position  of 
the  enemy  on  Gulp's  Hill,  and  its  communication  with  the  rest 
of  the  army  was  long,  roundabout,  and  exposed  to  the  enemy's 
view.  But  the  division  was  allowed  to  remain  until  the  end  of  the 
battle,  and,  as  long  as  it  remained  absent,  the  task  before  the 
remainder  of  the  army  was  beyond  its  strength. 

During  the  afternoon,  Longstreet  had  joined  Lee  on  Seminary 
Ridge  overlooking  the  town,  and  had  noted  the  position  being 
taken  by  the  enemy.  He  had  said  to  Lee :  "  We  could  not  call 


GETTYSBURG:  THE  FIRST  DAY  387 

the  enemy  to  a  position  better  suited  to  our  plans.  We  have 
only  to  file  around  his  left  and  secure  good  ground  between 
him  and  his  capital." 

To  his  surprise,  Lee  had  answered,  "If  he  is  there  to-morrow, 
I  shall  attack  him." 

Longstreet  replied,  "  If  he  is  there  to-morrow,  it  will  be  be- 
cause he  wants  you  to  attack  him." 

Later  in  the  afternoon  Lee  rode  forward  to  arrange  a  renewal 
of  the  attack  upon  Cemetery  Hill  from  the  town  at  daylight 
next  morning.  He  held  a  long  conference  with  Ewell,  Early,  and 
Rodes,  who  urged,  instead,  that  Longstreet  should  attack  the 
enemy's  left  flank.  No  one  of  those  present  had  more  than  a 
very  vague  idea  of  the  character  and  features  of  the  enemy's 
line,  and  it  is  therefore  not  surprising  that  this  advice,  though 
very  plausible  in  view  of  the  success  of  former  flank  movements, 
was  here  the  worst  possible. 

The  enemy's  line,  though  taken  hurriedly  upon  the  natural 
ridges  overlooking  the  open  country,  which  nearly  surrounded  it, 
was  unique  both  in  character  and  strength.  In  plan  it  nearly 
resembled  a  fish-hook,  with  its  convexity  toward  us,  forcing  upon 
our  line  a  similar  shape  with  the  concavity  toward  them.  Their 
lines  were  the  ulterior  and  shorter,  being  scarcely  three  miles  in 
length,  giving  ability  to  reenforce  at  any  point  by  short  cuts 
across  the  interior  area.  Our  exterior  lines  were  about  five  miles 
in  length,  and  to  move  from  point  to  point  required  long,  round- 
about marches,  often  exposed  to  the  enemy's  view.  Their  force 
would  allow  25,000  infantry  and  100  guns  for  each  mile  of  line. 
Ours  would  allow  but  13,000  infantry  and  50  guns  per  mile. 
Their  flanks  were  at  once  unassailable  and  unturnable.  Their 
left,  which  was  the  top  of  the  fish-hook  shank,  rested  on  Big 
and  Little  Round  Top  mountains;  and  their  right,  which  was 
the  "point"  of  the  "fish-hook,"  was  on  Gulp's  Hill  over  Rock 
Creek.  Both  flanks  presented  precipitous  and  rocky  fronts, 
screened  from  artillery  fire  by  forest  growth,  and  the  convexity 
of  the  line  was  such  that  the  two  flanks  approached  and  each  was 
able  to  reenforce  the  other.  The  shank  of  the  fish-hook  ran 
north,  nearly  straight,  for  about  two  miles  from  Little  Round 
Top  to  Cemetery  Hill,  where  the  bend  began.  The  bend  was 


388  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

not  uniform  and  regular,  but  presented  a  sharp  salient  at  the 
north,  and  on  the  east  a  deep  reentrant  around  which  the  line 
swept  to  reach  Gulp's  Hill,  and  pass  around  it  nearly  in  an  S. 

This  salient  upon  Cemetery  Hill  offered  the  only  hopeful  point 
of  attack  upon  the  enemy's  entire  line,  as  will  more  fully  appear  in 
the  accounts  of  the  different  efforts  made  at  various  places  during 
the  battle.  It  would  be  too  much  to  say  that  an  attack  here 
on  the  morning  of  July  2  would  have  succeeded.  But  it  is  not  at 
all  too  much  to  say  that  no  other  attack  was  possible  at  that 
time  which  would  have  had  near  as  good  chance  of  success,  yet  it 
was  deliberately  discarded,  and  Lee's  conference  closed  with  the 
understanding  among  all  those  present  that  Longstreet  should 
attack  in  the  morning  upon  the  enemy's  left.  It  was  this  which 
gave  rise  to  the  mistaken  charges  made  after  Lee's  death  that 
Longstreet  had  disobeyed  orders  in  not  attacking  early  on  the  2d. 

No  orders  whatever  were  given  Longstreet  that  night.  Before 
sunset,  he  had  ridden  back  from  his  interview  with  Lee  to  meet 
his  troops,  who,  about  4  P.M.,  marched  from  near  Greenwood  with 
orders  to  come  to  Gettysburg,  17  miles.  About  midnight  they 
bivouacked  four  miles  from  the  field.  Marching  again  at  dawn 
on  the  2d,  they  arrived  near  the  field  between  6  and  8  A.M.  His 
reserve  artillery  (the  Washington  artillery  and  Alexander's  bat- 
talion), which  was  ordered  to  follow  the  infantry  from  Green- 
wood at  midnight,  was  much  detained  upon  the  road  by  passing 
trains,  and  did  not  reach  the  field  until  9  A.M. 

Law's  brigade  of  Hood's  division,  recalled  from  New  Guilford 
C.  H.,  did  not  rejoin  its  division  until  noon  on  the  2d,  having 
marched  at  3  A.M.,  and  covered  by  that  time  about  20  miles. 
Pickett's  division  was  also  upon  the  road,  having  marched 
from  Chambersburg  at  2  A.M.  It  made  22  miles  and  encamped 
within  three  miles  of  Gettysburg  at  4  P.M.,  reporting  its  presence 
to  Lee. 

The  most  important  occurrence  of  the  evening  had  been 
Meade's  wise  decision  to  abandon  his  plan  of  offering  battle  be- 
hind Pipe  Creek,  and  to  concentrate  upon  the  position  at  Gettys- 
burg, which  Hancock  had  recommended.  He  was  most  anxious 
to  fight  upon  the  defensive,  and  he  knew  that  Lee,  having  a 
taste  of  victory,  was  not  one  to  recoil  from  further  offensive 


GETTYSBURG:    THE  FIRST  DAY  389 

efforts.  So,  although  reports  during  the  afternoon  had  been 
discouraging,  the  march  of  all  the  corps  had  been  hastened  to 
find  the  defensive  battle-field ;  and  their  arrivals  upon  it  had  been 
about  as  follows :  — 

Geary's  division  of  the  12th  corps  had  arrived  about  6  P.M.  and 
was  placed  on  the  left  of  the  Federal  line  by  Hancock.  Wil- 
liams's  division  of  the  same  corps  bivouacked  near  Rock  Creek 
Bridge  that  night. 

The  advance  of  the  3d  corps  came  upon  the  field  about  sunset. 
During  the  night,  or  early  in  the  morning,  the  entire  corps  ar- 
rived. 

The  2d  corps,  having  come  from  Taneytown,  also  reached  the 
field  soon  after  nightfall,  and  was  all  at  hand  in  the  morning. 

The  5th  corps,  marching  from  Hanover  at  7  P.M.,  arrived  on 
the  field,  14  miles,  at  8  A.M.  on  the  2d. 

The  6th  corps,  from  the  Union  right  at  Manchester,  arrived 
about  2  P.M.,  after  a  march  of  about  32  miles  in  17  hours. 

At  8  A.M.  of  the  2d,  therefore,  practically  the  whole  of  both 
armies  was  upon  the  field  except  Pickett's  division  and  Law's 
brigade  of  the  Confederates,  and  the  6th  corps  of  the  Federals. 


CHAPTER  XVII 
GETTYSBURG:  SECOND  DAY 

The  Situation.  Lee  decides  to  Attack.  The  Attack  to  be  on  our  Right. 
Longstreet's  Flank  March.  Sickles's  Advance.  Meade  foresees  Sickles's 
Defeat.  Progressive  Type  of  Battle.  Hood  proposes  Flank  Move- 
ment. Formation  and  Opening.  Hood's  Front  Line.  Fight  on  Little 
Round  Top.  Hood's  Second  Line.  McLaws  badly  Needed.  Kershaw 
and  Semmes.  Artillery  Fighting.  Barksdale  and  Wofford.  An- 
derson's Division.  Wilcox's  Brigade.  Wilcox  asks  Help.  Why  No 
Help  was  Given.  Lang's  Brigade.  Wright's  Brigade.  Wright  carries 
the  Stone  Wall.  Wright's  Retreat.  Reinforcements  for  Sickles. 
Ayres's  Division.  Confederate  Situation.  The  Artillery  Engaged. 
Ten  More  Brigades  in  Sight.  Crawford's  Advance.  Ewell's  Co- 
operation. The  Afternoon  Cannonade.  Johnson's  Assault.  Early's 
Attack.  Federal  Account.  Rodes's  Failure  to  Advance.  Rodes's 
New  Position.  Rodes's  Summary,  Second  Day. 

LONGSTREET,  riding  ahead  of  his  approaching  troops,  met  Lee 
upon  Seminary  Ridge  about  dawn  on  July  2.  Daylight  dis- 
closed the  enemy  in  his  position  overlooking  the  town,  and  it 
was  apparent  that  he  was  intrenched  and  was  offering  us  the 
privilege  of  taking  the  offensive.  Lee  was  far  from  disposed 
to  decline  the  offer.  Col.  Long,  of  his  staff,  reports  that  he 
advised  Lee  during  the  night,  — 

"At  present  only  two  or  three  corps  of  the  enemy  are  up,  and  it  seems 
best  to  attack  before  they  are  greatly  strengthened." 

But,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  43  of  the  51  Federal  brigades  of  in- 
fantry were  upon  the  ground  at  8  A.M.  and  occupying  the  strong 
position  already  described.  Four  of  Lee's  37  infantry  brigades 
were  absent ;  four  more  (Johnson's  division),  were  out  of  position 
east  of  Gulp's  Hill,  and  the  lack  of  cavalry  required  the  use  of 
part  of  his  remaining  infantry  upon  each  flank  to  protect  from 
surprise.  When,  at  nine  o'clock,  the  arrival  of  Longstreet's 
reserve  artillery  was  reported,  it  must  be  admitted  that  there 
was  little  to  be  hoped  for  from  any  immediate  attack  then 
possible. 

390 


GETTYSBURG:  SECOND  DAY  391 

Lee  however  had  decided  to  make  one.  He  had  said  to  Hood 
soon  after  the  latter's  arrival :  "The  enemy  is  here.  If  we  don't 
whip  him  he  will  whip  us."  He  had  sent  staff-officers  to  each 
flank  and  was  awaiting  their  reports.  Longstreet's  only  sug- 
gestion had  been  a  turning  movement,  and  taking  a  position 
threatening  the  enemy's  rear.  Lee  seems  to  have  doubted  that 
this  would  force  the  enemy  to  attack.  He  feared  being  manoeu- 
vred out  of  position,  and  perhaps  forced  back  across  the  Poto- 
mac without  any  opportunity  of  fighting.  It  was  a  reasonable 
fear,  now  that  the  Federal  army  had  drawn  near,  and  could 
much  restrict  his  foraging  for  supplies.  This  was  a  risk  insepa- 
rable from  campaigns  of  invasion,  and  it  evidently  seemed  a 
much  greater  one  now,  than  when  the  campaign  was  being 
decided  upon.  Not  fully  appreciating  the  strength  of  the 
enemy's  position,  and  misled  by  the  hope  that  a  large  fraction 
of  the  Federal  army  was  out  of  reach,  Lee  had  determined  to 
strike,  and  only  hesitated  as  to  the  best  point  to  attack.  About 
nine  o'clock,  he  rode  to  the  left  and  conferred  again  with  Ewell 
and  Early,  who  again  discouraged  attack  in  their  own  front,  and 
urged  that  it  be  by  Longstreet  on  the  right.  About  10  he 
returned,  and  presently  received  the  report  from  Long  and 
Pendleton  who  had  reconnoitred  on  the  right. 

About  11  A.M.,  his  orders  were  issued.  Anderson's  division 
of  Hill's  corps  was  directed  to  extend  Hill's  line  upon  Seminary 
Ridge  to  the  right,  while  Longstreet  with  Hood's  and  McLaws's 
divisions  should  make  a  flank  march  to  the  right  and  pass  beyond 
the  enemy's  flank,  which  seemed  to  extend  along  the  Emmits- 
burg  road.  Forming  then  at  right  angles  to  this  road,  the  at- 
tack was  to  sweep  down  the  enemy's  line  from  their  left,  being 
taken  up  successively  by  the  brigades  of  Anderson's  division  as 
they  were  reached.  Swell's  corps,  holding  the  extreme  left,  was 
to  attack  the  enemy's  right  on  hearing  Longstreet's  guns.  Long- 
street  was  directed,  in  his  march,  to  avoid  exposing  it  to  the  view 
of  a  Federal  signal  station  on  Little  Round  Top  Mountain. 

Meanwhile,  on  the  arrival  of  Longstreet's  reserve  artillery 
in  the  vicinity  of  the  field,  I  had  been  placed  in  charge  of  all  the 
artillery  of  his  corps,  and  directed  to  reconnoitre  the  enemy's 
left  and  to  move  some  of  the  battalions  to  that  part  of  the  field. 


392  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

This  had  been  done  by  noon,  when  three  battalions,  —  my  own, 
Cabell's  and  Henry's — were  located  in  the  valley  of  Willoughby 
Run  awaiting  the  arrival  of  the  infantry.  Riding  back  presently 
to  learn  the  cause  of  their  non-arrival,  the  head  of  the  infantry 
column  was  found  halted,  where  its  road  became  exposed  to  the 
Federal  view,  while  messages  were  sent  to  Longstreet,  and  the 
guide  sought  a  new  route.  The  exposed  point  had  been  easily 
avoided  by  our  artillery,  by  turning  out  through  a  meadow, 
but  after  some  delay  there  came  orders  to  the  infantry  to  counter- 
march and  take  a  road  via  "  Black  Horse  Tavern."  This  in- 
cident delayed  the  opening  of  the  battle  nearly  two  hours.  It  is 
notable,  both  as  illustrating  the  contingencies  attending  move- 
ments over  unfamiliar  ground,  and  also  the  annoyance  which 
may  be  caused  an  enemy  by  the  use  of  balloons  to  overlook  his 
territory.  It  hardly  seems  probable,  however,  that  in  this 
instance  the  delay  influenced  the  result  of  the  battle.  The  same 
may  be  said,  too,  of  a  preliminary  delay  in  Longstreet's  begin- 
ning his  march  to  the  left  after  Lee's  order  at  11  A.M.  Long- 
street's  official  report  says, — 

"Fearing  that  my  force  was  too  weak  to  venture  to  make  an  attack, 
I  delayed  until  Gen.  Law's  brigade  joined  its  division." 

The  history  of  the  battle  seems  to  justify  this  delay  (Longstreet 
calls  it  30  minutes),  as  without  Law's  brigade  our  first  attack 
must  have  been  dangerously  weak. 

Meanwhile,  an  important  change  had  occurred  in  the  enemy's 
position.  Until  noon,  their  main  line  had  run  nearly  due  south 
from  Cemetery  Hill  to  Little  Round  Top,  while  a  strong  skir- 
mish-line only  was  held  upon  the  Emmitsburg  Pike,  for  about  a 
mile  from  Cemetery  Hill,  to  a  cross-road  at  the  Peach  Orchard. 
About  noon,  the  movements  of  the  Confederates  toward  the  Fed- 
eral left  were  noted,  and  Sickles,  whose  corps  held  that  flank,  sent 
forward  from  the  Peach  Orchard  a  small  reconnoitring  force.  It 
encountered  Wilcox's  brigade,  and  was  driven  back  with  severe 
loss,  but  not  before  it  had  discovered  the  approach  of  Long- 
street's  column.  This  being  reported  to  Sickles,  he  unwisely 
ordered  an  advance  of  his  whole  corps  to  hold  the  ground  about 
the  Peach  Orchard.  He  probably  had  in  mind  the  advantage 


GETTYSBURG:  SECOND  DAY  393 

given  the  Confederates  at  Chancellorsville  in  allowing  them  the 
occupation  of  the  Hazel  Grove  plateau.  But  it  was,  nevertheless, 
bad  tactics.  It  exchanged  strong  ground  for  weak,  and  gave  the 
Confederates  an  opportunity  not  otherwise  possible.  They 
would  be  quite  sure  to  crush  the  isolated  3d  corps.  If  their 
attack  was  properly  organized  and  conducted,  it  might  become 
possible  to  rush  and  carry  the  Federal  main  line  in  the  pursuit 
of  the  fugitives. 

Meade,  however,  having  seen  Hooker's  movement,  at  once 
visited  the  ground,  and,  after  conferring  with  Sickles,  ordered 
his  return  to  his  original  position.  Before  the  movement  could 
be  begun,  however,  Longstreet's  guns  had  opened,  and  it  was 
unwise  to  attempt  a  withdrawal  under  fire.  Meade  saw  the 
danger,  and  with  military  foresight  prepared  to  meet  it  with 
every  available  man.  There  was  not  during  the  war  a  finer 
example  of  efficient  command  than  that  displayed  by  Meade  on 
this  occasion.  He  immediately  began  to  bring  to  the  scene 
reinforcements,  both  of  infantry  and  artillery,  from  every 
corps  and  from  every  part  of  his  line.  As  will  be  seen  in  the 
account  of  the  fighting,  he  had  engaged,  or  in  hand  on  the  field, 
fully  40,000  men  by  the  time  that  Longstreet's  assault  was  re- 
pulsed. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  must  be  said  that  the  management  of  the 
battle  on  the  Confederate  side  during  this  afternoon  was  conspicu- 
ously bad.  The  fighting  was  superb.  But  there  appears  to  have 
been  little  supervision,  and  there  was  entire  failure  everywhere 
to  conform  to  the  original  plan  of  the  battle,  as  it  had  been  in- 
dicated by  Lee.  Offensive  battles  are  always  more  difficult  of 
control  than  defensive,  and  there  were  two  special  difficulties  on 
this  occasion.  First,  was  the  great  extent  of  the  Confederate 
lines,  about  five  miles  —  and  their  awkward  shape,  making  inter- 
communication slow  and  difficult.  Second,  was  the  type  or  char- 
acter of  the  attack  ordered ;  which  may  be  called  the  echelon,  or 
progressive  type,  as  distinguished  from  the  simultaneous.  The 
latter  should  be  the  type  for  any  battle  in  the  afternoon.  Battles 
begun  by  one  command  and  to  be  taken  up  successively  by  others, 
are  always  much  prolonged.  We  had  used  this  method  on  four 
occasions, — at  Seven  Pines,  Gaines  Mill,  Frazier's  Farm  or 


394  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

Glendale,  and  Malvern  Hill,  —  and  always  with  poor  success. 
Our  effort  this  afternoon  will  be  seen  to  be  a  monumental  failure. 
General  instructions  were  given  to  each  corps  commander,  but 
much  was  left  to  their  discretion  in  carrying  them  out.  More  than 
one  fell  short  in  performance. 

It  was  about  3  P.M.  when  Hood's  division,  in  the  advance,  crossed 
the  Emmitsburg  road  about  1000  yards  south  of  the  Peach 
Orchard.  The  enemy's  artillery  had  opened  upon  us  as  soon 
as  our  approach  was  discovered,  and  we  presently  replied. 
Hood's  division  crossed  the  road  and  formed  in  two  lines,  Rob- 
ertson and  Law  in  front,  with  Law  on  the  right;  Anderson  and 
Benning  200  yards  in  rear,  with  Benning  on  the  right. 

While  this  formation  was  taking  place,  scouts  reported  that  Big 
Round  Top  Mountain  was  unoccupied  and  that  an  open  farm 
road  around  it  led  to  unguarded  supply  trains  and  hospitals. 
Hood  and  Law  earnestly  urged  upon  Longstreet  that  instead 
of  making  the  direct  attack,  he  should  pass  around  the  3d  corps, 
seize  Big  Round  Top,  and  fall  upon  the  trains.  Longstreet 
replied  that  Lee  had  ordered  the  direct  attack,  and  it  must  be 
made  without  delay. 

It  is  not  likely  that  the  movement  proposed  by  Hood  would 
have  accomplished  much.  Already  our  line  was  dangerously 
extended,  and  to  have  pushed  one  or  two  divisions  past  the  3d 
corps  and  around  the  mountain  would  have  invited  their  de- 
struction. Had  our  army  been  more  united  and  able  to  follow 
up  the  move  in  force,  it  might  have  proved  a  successful  one.  Not 
by  assaulting  the  enemy  in  his  chosen  position  where  his  whole 
army  stood,  as  it  were,  in  a  circle  back  to  back,  but  by  threaten- 
ing his  communications  while  covering  our  own.  It  might  easily 
have  resulted  in  our  being  able  to  secure  a  position  which  would 
force  the  enemy  to  take  the  aggressive.  Had  Johnson's  division 
been  brought  back  from  its  isolated  position,  and  had  Lee  been 
present  to  hear  the  report  brought  by  Hood's  scouts,  the  whole 
subsequent  history  of  the  battle  might  have  been  changed. 

Meanwhile,  McLaws's  division  had  been  formed,  west  of  and 
parallel  to  the  Emmitsburg  road,  with  Kershaw  on  the  right 
supported  by  Semmes,  and  Barksdale  on  the  left  supported  by 
Wofford.  In  front  of  Kershaw,  Cabell's  battalion  of  artillery 


GETTYSBURG:  SECOND  DAY  395 

was  engaged  with  18  guns;  and  in  front  of  Barksdale  were  18 
of  my  own  battalion.  Ten  guns,  also  of  Henry's  battalion,  were 
engaged  across  the  Emmitsburg  road.  The  remaining  8  guns 
of  my  own  battalion  were  held  close  by,  to  follow  the  infantry 
promptly  in  any  advance,  and  the  Washington  artillery  with 
10  guns,  by  Longstreet's  order,  were  held  in  reserve  in  rear.  ' 

Thus,  about  3.45  P.M.,  36  guns  were  in  action  against  the  Peach 
Orchard,  and  the  enemy's  adjacent  lines  and  10  guns  against  the 
enemy's  left.  The  ranges  were  generally  between  500  and  700 
yards.  After  this  cannonade  had  continued  for  perhaps  30 
minutes,  Hood  received  the  order  to  advance. 

Following  the  initiative  prescribed  by  Lee,  Longstreet,  Hood, 
and  McLaws  all  made  progressive  attacks.  Hood  at  first  ad- 
vanced only  his  front  line.  McLaws  was  about  to  advance  upon 
Hood's  left  very  soon  after,  when  Longstreet  halted  him.  He 
was  held  back  for  about  an  hour,  during  which  Hood's  second  line 
was  sent  in,  and  both  lines  suffered  severely.  Then  McLaws 
advanced  both  lines  of  his  right  wing,  Kershaw  and  Semmes; 
and,  after  a  further  interval  of  at  least  20  minutes  (long  enough 
to  cause  severe  loss  to  Kershaw 's  exposed  left),  Barksdale  and 
Wofford  followed.  There  were  thus  four  partial  attacks  of  two 
brigades  each,  requiring  at  least  an  hour  and  a  half  to  be  gotten 
into  action;  where  one  advance  by  the  eight  brigades  would 
have  won  a  quicker  victory  with  far  less  loss. 

When  Hood's  first  line  commenced  the  advance,  Law,  on  the 
right,  overlapped  the  Federal  left.  On  the  left  Robertson  was 
greatly  overlapped  by  the  Federal  line.  Law,  obliquing  still 
farther  to  his  right,  hoping  to  turn  the  Federal  flank,  a  gap 
opened  between  Robertson  and  himself.  The  4th  and  5th  Tex., 
on  Robertson's  right,  trying  to  dress  upon  Law,  were  drawn 
entirely  away  from  Robertson,  and  attached  themselves  to  Law's 
brigade.  This  brigade  became  divided,  in  the  rough  ground  it 
traversed,  into  two  bodies.  The  two  regiments  on  the  right,  the 
15th  and  47th  Ala.  with  a  few  of  the  4th  and  5th  Tex.,  swung 
still  farther  to  the  right,  meeting  no  enemy,  and,  crossing  Plum 
Run,  they  ascended  the  side  of  Big  Round  Top.  Then,  wheeling 
to  the  left,  they  crossed  the  depression  between  Big  and  Little 
Round  Top  and  finally  found  the  enemy  in  position  on  the 


396  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

top  of  the  latter.  Quite  a  sharp  action  ensued,  which  may  be 
described  here,  out  of  its  order  in  time,  as  it  was  entirely  isolated. 

Three  companies  of  the  47th  Ala.  were  detached  and  left  on 
picket  at  the  foot  of  the  mountain.  The  remaining  force  was  but 
about  500  men  under  the  command  of  Col.  Gates  of  the  15th  Ala. 
The  mountain  had  been  partially  occupied  in  the  morning  by  the 
3d  corps,  but  was  vacated  when  they  moved  to  the  front.  About 
4  P.M.,  Gen.  Warren,  seeing  the  deployment  of  our  lines,  had 
brought  up  Vincent's  brigade  of  Barnes's  division  of  the  5th 
corps.  Swinton  has  written  that  a  foot-race  occurred  for  the 
commanding  position,  and  that  a  desperate  hand-to-hand  fight 
with  bayonets  and  clubbed  muskets  took  place  for  a  half-hour 
between  "Hood's  Texans"  and  Vincent's  men. 

None  of  the  official  reports  on  either  side  are  consistent  with 
this  story.  There  was  some  sharp  fighting  and  Vincent  was 
killed,  but  Oates's  small  and  isolated  force  was  soon  outflanked 
and  compelled  to  retreat  to  the  foot  of  the  mountain.  It  was 
not  pursued,  and,  at  the  foot,  it  built  breastworks  of  rocks  which 
it  held  all  night  and  part  of  the  next  day.  The  total  casualties 
reported  for  the  battle  by  the  15th  Ala.  were:  17  killed,  54 
wounded,  and  90  missing,  total  161.  Maj.  Campbell  of  the  47th 
reported  "about  one- third  of  his  whole  number  of  men  were 
killed  and  wounded."  The  losses  of  Vincent's  brigade  for  the 
battle  were  352. 

Hood's  front  line  had,  meanwhile,  been  reduced,  by  Oates's 
divergence  to  Big  Round  Top,  to  less  than  seven  regiments  in 
two  isolated  bodies.  Law,  on  the  right,  had  the  4th,  44th,  and 
48th  Ala.,  and  parts  of  the  4th  and  5th  Tex.  Robertson,  on  the 
left,  had  only  the  1st  Tex.  and  3d  Ark.  His  left  flank,  too,  was 
in  the  air,  and  was  much  overlapped  by  the  Federal  line.  It 
could  make  no  progress,  but  maintained  a  position  under  very 
severe  fire  of  artillery  and  infantry,  which,  within  the  first  half- 
hour,  severely  wounded  Hood.  Law  succeeded  to  the  command 
of  the  division. 

His  part  of  the  brigade  had  made  more  progress,  but  already 
reinforcements  sent  by  Meade  were  reaching  the  enemy  and 
Law's  advance  was  checked.  He  ordered  in  the  second  line, 
using  Benning's  brigade  to  reenforce  his  own,  and  Anderson  to 


GETTYSBURG:  SECOND  DAY  397 

extend  Robertson  on  his  left.    Law  thus  describes  the  advance 
of  his  reenforced  line  in  an  article  in  Battles  and  Leaders: — 

"The  ground  was  rough  and  difficult,  broken  by  rocks  and  boulders, 
which  rendered  an  orderly  advance  impossible.  Sometimes  the  Federals 
would  hold  one  side  of  the  huge  boulders  on  the  slopes  until  the  Confed- 
erates occupied  the  other.  In  some  cases  my  men,  with  reckless  daring, 
mounted  to  the  top  of  the  large  rocks  in  order  to  get  a  better  view  and  to 
deliver  their  fire  with  greater  effect.  .  .  . 

"In  less  than  an  hour  from  the  time  we  advanced  to  the  attack,  the 
hill  by  Devil's  Den,  opposite  our  centre,  was  taken  with  three  pieces  of 
the  artillery  that  had  occupied  it.  The  remaining  piece  was  run  down 
the  opposite  slope  by  the  gunners,  and  escaped  capture." 

During  all  this  time,  however,  McLaws's  division  was  stand- 
ing idle,  though  Barksdale  was  begging  to  be  allowed  to  charge, 
and  McLaws  was  awaiting  Longstreet's  order.  Even  when 
prolonged  by  Anderson's  Georgians,  the  Texans'  line  was  still 
so  overlapped  by  the  Federals  that  it  could  not  advance.  Law, 
placing  his  two  brigades  on  the  defensive  on  the  captured  hill, 
now  came  to  the  left  and  made  a  strong  appeal  to  Kershaw  for 
help.  This  was  referred  to  McLaws  and  probably  to  Longs treet, 
for  now  the  order  was  given  for  the  advance  of  Kershaw  sup- 
ported by  Semmes.  But,  by  some  unaccountable  lack  of  appre- 
ciation of  the  situation,  Barksdale,  Wofford,  and  all  the  brigades 
of  Anderson's  division  are  still  left  idle  spectators  of  the  combat, 
while  Hood's  division  is  wearing  itself  out  against  superior 
numbers  in  strong  position.  Lee  seems  not  to  have  been  near. 
This  was  unfortunate,  for  his  whole  field  of  battle  had  been 
waiting  all  day  and  was  still  waiting  for  Longstreet's  battle  to 
be  developed;  and  here  it  was  being  begun,  in  the  progressive 
manner  which  had  been  ordered,  but  with  unwise  deliberation. 
Longstreet,  of  course,  is  responsible,  but  every  commanding 
officer  takes  great  risks  when  he  leaves  such  important  move- 
ments without  supervision.  It  was  especially  unfortunate  in 
this  case,  because  advancing  Kershaw  without  advancing  Barks- 
dale  would  expose  Kershaw  to  enfilade  by  the  troops  whom  Barks- 
dale  would  easily  drive  off.  Few  battle-fields  can  furnish  ex- 
amples of  worse  tactics. 

Kershaw  was  put  in  motion  by  a  signal.  Cabell's  guns,  in  his 
front,  were  ordered  to  pause  in  their  firing,  and  then  to  fire  three 


398  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

guns  in  rapid  succession.  At  the  signal  the  men  leaped  the  wall 
in  their  front  and  were  promptly  aligned  by  their  company 
officers.  Kershaw  writes,  in  Battles  and  Leaders :  - 

"The  brigade  moved  off  at  the  word  with  great  steadiness  and  precision, 
followed  by  Semmes  with  equal  promptness.  Longstreet  accompanied 
me  in  this  advance  on  foot  as  far  as  the  Emmitsburg  road.  All  the  field 
and  staff  officers  were  dismounted  on  account  of  the  many  obstacles  in 
the  way. 

"When  we  were  about  the  Emmitsburg  road  I  heard  Barksdale's 
drums  beat  the  assembly  and  knew  then  that  I  should  have  no  immediate 
support  on  my  left  about  to  be  squarely  presented  to  the  heavy  force  of 
infantry  and  artillery  at  and  in  rear  of  the  Peach  Orchard." 

As  such  a  position  would  be  speedily  ruinous,  Kershaw  directed 
the  three  regiments  on  his  left  to  wheel  to  the  left  and  to  charge 
the  batteries  in  rear  of  the  Orchard,  while  with  the  right  wing  he 
continued  the  movement  to  the  aid  of  Hood's  division.  Thus 
this  brigade  was  also  separated  into  two  parts.  Kershaw  moved 
with  the  right  wing,  and  presently,  finding  his  right  regiment, 
the  7th  S.C.,  beginning  to  overlap  one  on  its  left,  he  halted  his 
line  and  ordered  the  7th  to  move  by  the  right  flank.  By  some 
misunderstanding  the  order  was  shouted  to  the  left,  and  was 
overheard  by  the  left  wing,  who  supposed  it  was  an  order  for 
themselves  to  move  by  the  right  flank. 

Kershaw's  narrative  continues :  — 

"After  passing  the  building  at  Rose's,  the  charge  of  the  left  wing  was 
no  longer  visible  from  my  position,  but  the  movement  was  reported  to 
have  been  magnificently  conducted  until  the  cannoneers  had  left  their 
guns  and  the  caissons  were  moving  off,  when  the  order  was  given  by  some 
unauthorized  person  to  'move  by  the  right  flank,'  and  was  immediately 
obeyed  by  the  men.  The  Federals  returned  to  their  guns  and  opened  on 
these  doomed  regiments  a  raking  fire  of  grape  and  canister  at  short  dis- 
tance which  proved  most  disastrous,  and  for  a  time  destroyed  their  use- 
fulness. Hundreds  of  the  bravest  and  best  men  of  Carolina  fell  victims 
of  this  fatal  blunder." 

Meanwhile  our  own  artillery  fire  had  been  kept  up  without 
intermission  for  what  seemed  more  than  two  hours,  though  I 
know  of  no  one  who  timed  it.  The  range  was  very  close,  and  the 
ground  we  occupied  gave  little  shelter  except  at  few  points  for 
the  limbers  and  caissons.  Our  losses  both  of  men  and  horses 


GETTYSBURG:  SECOND  DAY  399 

were  the  severest  the  batteries  ever  suffered  in  so  short  a  time 
during  the  war.  Moody's  battery  had  four  24-Pr.  howitzers  and 
two  12-Pr.  guns  on  a  rocky  slope,  and  the  labor  of  running  the 
guns  up  after  each  recoil  presently  became  so  exhausting  that, 
with  Barksdale's  permission,  eight  volunteers  from  a  Miss,  regi- 
ment were  gotten  to  help  the  cannoneers.  Two  of  this  de- 
tachment were  killed  and  three  severely  wounded.  Fickling's 
battery  of  four  12-Pr.  howitzers  had  two  of  them  dismounted, 
and  forty  cannoneers  killed  or  wounded. 

At  last  the  10  guns  of  Jordan  and  Woolfolk  which  had  been 
held  in  reserve  were  sent  for,  but  just  as  they  arrived  Barksdale's 
brigade  made  its  advance,  and  was  soon  followed  by  Wofford's, 
which  Longs treet  also  accompanied  in  person.  While  the  in- 
fantry was  passing,  my  four  batteries,  which  had  been  engaged 
in  the  cannonade,  were  gotten  ready,  and  the  whole  six  followed 
the  charge  of  the  infantry,  and  came  into  action  in  and  about 
the  Peach  Orchard.1 

Barksdale's  brigade  advanced  directly  upon  the  Peach  Or- 
chard. Wofford's  inclined  somewhat  to  the  right  and  went  to 
the  assistance  of  Kershaw  and  Semmes,  striking  the  flank  of  the 
Federals  opposing  them.  The  enemy  was  driven  back  with 
severe  loss  and  followed  across  the  Wheat  Field  and  on  to  the 
slopes  of  Little  Round  Top.  Barksdale  had  made  an  equal  ad- 
vance upon  our  left.  But  by  this  time  the  reinforcements 
which  Meade  was  hurrying  from  every  part  of  the  Federal  line 
began  to  swarm  around  our  mixed-up  brigades.  Barksdale  was 
killed,  Semmes  mortally  wounded,  and  our  lines  were  slowly 
forced  back.  Another  partial  attack  had  spent  its  energy  upon 
a  task  impossible  for  so  small  a  force. 

Under  the  orders,  Anderson's  division  was  to  take  up  the 
attack  next  after  McLaws,  so  that  the  delay  in  starting  Barksdale 
delayed  also  Wilcox's  brigade  on  his  left.  Wilcox's  report  states 
that  "  the  cannonading  continued  until  6.20  P.M.  when  McLaws's 

1  As  we  advanced  we  saw  a  number  of  prisoners  being  sent  to  the  rear, 
passing  a  rail  fence  across  our  path.  Maj.  Bearing,  commanding  the  battal- 
ion attached  to  Pickett's  division  was  with  us,  and  he  shouted  an  order  to 
the  prisoners  to  "move  those  rails."  Never  was  an  order  executed  with 
more  alacrity.  Every  prisoner  seemed  to  seize  a  rail,  and  the  fence  dis- 
appeared as  if  by  magic. 


400  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

troops  advanced  to  the  attack."  There  was  again  much  delay, 
due  to  the  fact  that  Wilcox  had  not  been  previously  located  at 
the  position  from  which  his  charge  should  be  made.  This  re- 
quired a  flank  movement  to  the  left  of  400  or  500  yards  over 
ground  obstructed  by  stone  and  plank  fences.  The  8th  Ala. 
was  even  hurried  into  the  charge  in  column  of  fours.  Proper 
preparation  of  the  line  during  the  long  delay  might  have  saved 
much  time  and  permitted  Wilcox's  brigade  to  cover  Barksdale's 
exposed  left. 

Wilcox  made  a  brilliant  charge,  and  was  soon  followed  in 
echelon  on  the  left  by  Perry's  brigade  under  Lang,  and  Lang 
was  similarly  followed  by  Wright's  brigade.  These  two  charges 
followed  with  the  least  delay  of  any  during  the  affair.  But  each 
brigade  was  formed  in  a  single  line  and  without  support,  each 
advanced  with  its  left  flank  in  the  air,  intervals  of  time  and 
space  intervened  even  between  these  attacks,  and  each  was 
finally  and  separately  repulsed  with  severe  loss.  The  two  re- 
maining brigades  of  the  division,  Posey's  and  Mahone's,  were 
withheld  from  the  assault.  I  will  describe  briefly  the  action  of 
each  brigade. 

Wilcox  first  encountered  skirmishers  in  front  of  the  Emmits- 
burg  pike  with  a  line  of  infantry  and  batteries  along  the  pike. 
These  fell  back  before  his  musketry  fire,  leaving  in  the  road  two 
guns  whose  horses  had  been  killed.  Beyond  the  pike  the  ground 
sloped  gradually  some  600  yards  to  a  ravine  fringed  with  small 
trees  in  rocky  ground.  Beyond  the  ground  rose  rapidly  some  200 
yards  to  a  ridge,  crowned  with  numerous  batteries  and  held  by  the 
enemy  in  force.  Wilcox's  report  gives  his  strength  as  about  1200, 
and  thus  describes  his  advance :  — 

"  When  my  command  crossed  the  pike  and  began  to  descend  the  slope 
they  were  exposed  to  an  artillery  fire  from  numerous  pieces  both  from  the 
front  and  from  either  flank.  Before  reaching  the  ravine  at  the  foot  of 
the  slope  two  lines  of  infantry  were  met  and  broken,  and  driven  pell-mell 
across  the  ravine.  A  second  battery  of  six  pieces  here  fell  into  our  hands. 
From  the  batteries  on  the  ridge  above  referred  to,  grape  and  canister  were 
poured  into  our  ranks.  This  stronghold  of  the  enemy,  together  with  his 
batteries,  were  almost  won  when  still  another  line  of  infantry  descended  the 
slope  in  our  front,  at  a  double  quick,  to  the  support  of  their  fleeing  com- 
rades, and  for  the  defence  of  the  batteries. 


GETTYSBURG:  SECOND  DAY  401 

"Seeing  this  contest  so  unequal  I  despatched  my  adjutant-general  to 
the  division  commander  to  ask  that  support  be  sent  to  my  men,  but  no 
support  came.  Three  several  times  did  this  last  of  the  enemy's  lines  at- 
tempt to  drive  my  men  back  and  were  as  often  repulsed.  This  struggle 
at  the  foot  of  the  hill  on  which  were  the  enemy's  batteries,  though  so  un- 
equal, was  continued  for  some  30  minutes.  With  a  second  supporting  line 
the  heights  could  have  been  carried.  Without  support  on  either  my  right 
or  my  left  my  men  were  withdrawn  to  prevent  their  entire  destruction  or 
capture.  The  enemy  did  not  pursue,  but  my  men  retired  under  a  heavy 
artillery  fire,  and  returned  to  their  original  position  in  the  line,  and  biv- 
ouacked for  the  night,  pickets  being  left  on  the  pike.  ...  In  the  engage- 
ment of  this  day  I  regret  to  report  a  loss  of  577  men  killed,  wounded,  and 
missing." 

Soon  after  this  battle  a  newspaper  correspondent,  "  P.  W.  A.," 
described  Wilcox's  charge  and  his  sending  in  vain  to  Anderson  for 
reinforcements,  and  stated  that  Anderson  had  Posey's  and 
Mahone's  brigades  idle,  and  that  the  battle  was  lost  for  lack  of 
their  support.  Anderson  replied,  admitting  the  facts,  but  stating 
that  he  was  under  orders  from  Hill  to  hold  two  brigades  in  reserve, 
and  that  when  Wilcox's  call  for  help  was  received  he  was  unable 
to  find  Hill  and  refer  the  matter  to  him. 

Next  on  Wilcox's  left  was  our  lone  Fla.  brigade,  Perry's,  now 
under  Lang.  It  had  but  three  small  regiments,  and  mustered 
about  700  bayonets.  Lang  reports  as  follows :  — 

"At  6  P.M.,  Wilcox  having  begun  to  advance  I  moved  forward,  being 
met  at  the  crest  of  the  first  hill  with  a  murderous  fire  of  grape,  canister, 
and  musketry.  Moving  forward  at  the  double  quick,  the  enemy  fell 
back  beyond  their  artillery,  where  they  were  attempting  to  rally,  when  we 
reached  the  crest  of  the  second  hill.  Seeing  this  the  men  opened  a  galling 
fire  upon  them,  thickly  strewing  the  ground  with  their  killed  and  wounded. 
This  threw  them  into  confusion  when  we  charged  them  with  a  yell,  and 
they  broke  and  fled  into  the  woods  and  breastworks  beyond,  leaving  four 
or  five  pieces  of  cannon  in  my  front,  carrying  off,  however,  most  of  the 
horses  and  limbers. 

"  Following  them  rapidly  I  arrived  behind  a  small  eminence  at  the  foot 
of  the  heights,  where,  the  brigade  having  become  much  scattered,  I  halted 
for  the  purpose  of  re-forming,  and  allowing  the  men  to  catch  their  breath 
before  the  final  assault  upon  the  heights. 

"  While  re-forming,  an  aid  from  the  right  informed  me  that  a  heavy  force 
had  advanced  upon  Wilcox's  brigade  and  was  forcing  it  back.  At  the 
same  time  a  heavy  fire  of  musketry  was  poured  upon  my  brigade  from  the 
woods  50  yards  in  front,  which  was  gallantly  met  and  handsomely  replied 


402  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

to  by  my  men.  A  few  moments  later  another  messenger  from  the  right 
informed  me  that  Wilcox  had  fallen  back  and  the  enemy  was  then  some 
distance  in  rear  of  my  right  flank.  Going  to  the  right  I  discovered  that  the 
enemy  had  passed  me  more  than  100  yards  and  were  attempting  to  sur- 
round me.  I  immediately  ordered  my  men  back  to  the  road  some  300 
yards  to  the  rear.  Arriving  there  I  found  there  was  no  cover  under  which 
to  rally  and  continued  to  fall  back,  rallying  and  re-forming  upon  the  line 
from  which  we  started.  ...  In  this  charge  the  brigade  lost  about  300 
killed,  wounded,  and  missing." 

Next  came  Wright's  Ga.  brigade  about  1800  strong.  Wright, 
in  his  report,  describes  the  ground  over  which  his  advance  was 
to  be  made,  the  distance  to  be  traversed  under  fire  increasing 
toward  the  left. 

"I  was  compelled  to  pass  for  more  than  a  mile  across  an  open  plain, 
intersected  by  numerous  post  and  rail  fences,  and  swept  by  the  enemy's 
artillery,  posted  along  the  Emmitsburg  road,  and  upon  the  crest  of  the 
heights  a  little  south  of  Cemetery  Hill." 

He  noted  that  Posey's  brigade  upon  his  left  was  not  advancing, 
and  fearing  that  with  his  left  flank  in  the  air  he  would  be  involved 
in  serious  difficulty,  he  sent  an  aid  to  Anderson  with  a  message 
on  the  subject.  Anderson  ordered  Posey  to  send  forward  two 
regiments  as  skirmishers.  Later  Posey  speaks  of  supporting 
his  skirmishers  with  his  remaining  regiments ;  but  as  his  casual- 
ties in  the  whole  campaign  were  but  12  killed  and  71  wounded, 
evidently  his  brigade  was  not  seriously  engaged,  and  the  whole 
attack  was  allowed  to  terminate  with  that  of  Wright.  Neither 
Hill  nor  Anderson  give  any  explanation.  Hill  had  still  unen- 
gaged and  close  at  hand  Mahone's  brigade  and  Heth's  division  in 
reserve. 

Wright's  report  is  of  special  interest  as  his  advance  was  over 
the  same  ground  covered  the  next  day  by  the  charge  of  Pickett's 
division.  His  report  thus  describes  it  after  he  had  carried  the 
enemy's  advanced  line,  capturing  several  guns,  crossed  the 
pike,  and  approached  the  stone  wall  marking  Pickett's  farthest 
advance  in  his  charge  on  the  3d. 

"  We  were  now  within  less  than  100  yards  of  the  crest  of  the  heights, 
which  were  lined  with  artillery,  supported  by  a  strong  body  of  infantry 
under  protection  of  a  stone  fence.  My  men,  by  a  well-directed  fire,  soon 
drove  the  cannoneers  from  their  guns,  and  leaping  over  the  fence  charged 


GETTYSBURG:  SECOND  DAY  403 

up  to  the  top  of  the  crest,  and  drove  the  enemy's  infantry  into  a  rocky 
gorge  on  the  eastern  slope  of  the  heights,  and  some  80  or  100  yards  in  rear 
of  the  enemy's  batteries. 

"We  were  now  complete  masters  of  the  field,  having  gained  the  key, 
as  it  were,  of  the  enemy's  whole  line.  Unfortunately,  just  as  we  had 
carried  the  enemy's  last  and  strongest  position,  it  was  discovered  that  the 
brigade  upon  our  right  had  not  only  not  advanced  across  the  turnpike, 
but  had  actually  given  way  and  was  rapidly  falling  back  to  the  rear, 
while  on  our  left  we  were  entirely  unprotected,  the  brigade  ordered  to  our 
support  having  failed  to  advance.  .  .  . 

"We  were  now  in  a  critical  condition.  The  enemy's  converging  lines 
were  rapidly  closing  upon  our  rear ;  a  few  moments  more  and  we  would 
be  completely  surrounded ;  still  no  support  could  be  seen  coming  to  our 
assistance,  and  with  painful  hearts  we  abandoned  our  captured  guns,  faced 
about,  and  prepared  to  cut  our  way  through  the  closing  lines  in  our  rear. 
This  was  effected  in  tolerable  order,  but  with  immense  loss.  The  enemy 
rushed  to  his  abandoned  guns  as  soon  as  we  began  to  retire  and  poured 
a  severe  fire  of  grape  and  canister  into  our  thinned  ranks  as  we  retired 
slowly  down  the  slope  into  the  valley  below.  I  continued  to  fall  back  until 
I  reached  a  slight  depression  a  few  hundred  yards  in  advance  of  our  skir- 
mish line  of  the  morning,  when  I  halted,  re-formed  my  brigade,  and 
awaited  the  further  pursuit  of  the  enemy.  .  .  . 

"In  this  charge  my  loss  was  very  severe,  amounting  to  688  in  killed, 
wounded,  and  missing,  including  many  valuable  officers.  I  have  not  the 
slightest  doubt  that  I  should  have  been  able  to  have  maintained  my  posi- 
tion on  the  heights  and  secured  the  captured  artillery  if  there  had  been 
a  protecting  force  on  my  left,  or  if  the  brigade  on  my  right  had  not  been 
forced  to  retire.  We  captured  over  20  pieces  of  artillery,  all  of  which  we 
were  compelled  to  abandon." 

Is  there  anywhere  a  sadder  story  of  the  war  than  thjs  ?  In  all 
the  reports  of  all  the  battles  of  the  war  there  is  no  one  more  elo- 
quent of  fine  conduct,  but  of  poor  handling  of  splendid  troops. 
And  presently  we  shall  see  in  sharp  contrast,  in  the  Federal 
army,  during  this  same  afternoon,  perhaps  the  best  example 
which  the  war  produced  of  active  supervision  and  efficient 
handling  of  a  large  force  on  the  defensive. 

This  action  of  Wright's  ended  Longstreet's  battle  of  the 
afternoon.  Three  of  Anderson's  five  brigades  had  attacked  in 
progressive  order  and  in  single  lines.  They  had  been  defeated 
and  driven  back,  one  at  a  time,  in  the  order  of  their  advance.  No 
better  demonstration  could  be  asked  of  the  evils  of  progressive 
attacks.  The  three  brigades  could  just  as  easily  have  attacked 


404  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

simultaneously  with  McLaws,  and  several  other  brigades  of 
Hill's  corps  could  have  supported  and  advanced  with  them.  The 
temporary  success  of  each  brigade  in  a  single  and  isolated  line 
puts  it  beyond  doubt  that  such  an  attack  would  have  had  better 
result. 

It  has  been  told  that  Meade,  being  on  the  left  with  Sickles  at 
the  time  of  Longstreet's  attack,  had  at  once  begun  to  bring 
up  reinforcements.  It  is  interesting  to  note  the  number  thus 
brought  forward  before  the  fighting  ceased  at  dark. 

The  first  help  sent  Sickles,  when  his  six  brigades  were  attacked 
by  Longstreet's  eight,  was  Barnes's  division  of  the  5th  corps, 
three  brigades,  —  Tilton's,  Sweitzer's,  and  Vincent's.  Vincent 
fought  Gates  on  Little  Round  Top  and  repulsed  him,  Vincent, 
however,  being  killed.  Tilton  and  Sweitzer  attacked  Law  and 
Anderson,  but  were  themselves  soon  driven  back. 

The  losses  of  this  division  were :  Vincent's,  352;  Tilton's,  125; 
Sweitzer's,  427;  total,  904.  As  Barnes  retreated,  CaldwelTs 
division  of  the  2d  corps  came  up,  with  four  brigades  under  Cross, 
Kelley,  Zook,  and  Brook.  The  battle  seesawed,  but  Caldwell 
was  driven  back  with  the  loss  of  half  his  division.  Cross  and 
Zook  were  killed  and  Brook  wounded.  The  brigade  losses  were : 
Cross,  330;  Kelley,  198;  Brook,  389;  Zook,  358;  total,  1275. 

While  Caldwell  was  in  the  stress  of  action,  Sykes  advanced 
Ayres's  division  of  three  brigades,  sending  Weed  to  the  left  to  the 
aid  pf  Vincent ;  and  the  two  brigades  of  regulars,  under  Day  and 
Burbank,  to  the  left  of  Caldwell's  division.  Here  their  right 
was  exposed  by  the  retreat  of  Caldwell,  and  they  were  com- 
pelled to  cut  their  way  back  to  the  main  Federal  line  upon  the 
crest  of  the  ridge,  closely  pursued  and  severely  punished  by  the 
Confederates.  Weed,  supporting  Vincent  at  a  critical  juncture, 
had  been  himself  killed.  Between  Weed  and  Vincent,  however, 
Oates's  force  had  been  driven  to  the  base  of  the  mountain,  where 
it  remained  unpursued.  Day  and  Burbank,  when  driven  back, 
formed  upon  Weed's  left  upon  the  crest.  Weed's  losses  were  200 ; 
Day's,  382;  Burbank's,  447;  total,  1029. 

Most  of  this  fighting  was  taking  place  about  midway  between 
Little  Round  Top,  which  was  the  left  flank  of  the  Federal  line, 
and  the  Peach  Orchard  on  the  Emmitsburg  road.  In  the  dis- 


GETTYSBURG:  SECOND  DAY  405 

puted  arena  was  a  wheat  field  nearly  surrounded  by  woods  on  the 
west  of  Plum  Run,  here  running  south  through  marshy  ground. 
The  tide  of  battle  rolled  back  and  forth  across  this  field  several 
times,  and  when  Ayres's  regulars  were  driven  back  and  pur- 
sued, Sykes  ordered  forward  his  last  division,  Crawford's,  called 
the  Pa.  Reserves,  two  brigades  under  McCandless  and  Fisher. 
Crawford  formed  in  two  lines,  the  second  massed  on  the  first,  and 
his  report  thus  describes  the  scene  as  he  approached  it :  — 

"  Our  troops  in  front,  after  a  determined  resistance,  unable  to  withstand 
the  force  of  the  enemy,  fell  back,  and  some  finally  gave  way.  The  plain 
to  my  front  was  covered  with  fugitives  from  all  divisions,  who  rushed 
through  my  lines  and  along  the  road  to  the  rear.  Fragments  of  regiments 
came  in  disorder,  and  without  their  arms,  and  for  a  moment  all  seemed 
lost.  The  enemy's  skirmishers  had  reached  the  foot  of  the  rocky  ridge 
(Little  Round  Top)  and  his  columns  were  following  rapidly." 

One  is  tempted  to  pause  for  a  moment  to  contemplate  the 
really  hopeless  situation  of  the  Confederate  battle.  Already 
Sickles's  six  brigades  had  been  reenforced  by  10  brigades  which 
had  been  defeated  one,  two,  or  three  at  a  time,  with  losses  to  the 
reinforcements  alone  of  3108  men  and  five  generals.  The 
eight  Confederate  brigades  had  themselves  suffered  terribly  and 
lost  four  generals.  All  had  marched  fully  20  miles  within  24 
hours,  and  the  attack,  much  of  it  through  woods  and  over 
rugged  ground,  had  mingled  commands  and  broken  ranks.  In- 
fantry can  never  deliver  their  normal  amount  of  fire  except  in 
regular  ranks,  shoulder  to  shoulder.  When  ranks  are  broken 
the  men  interfere  with  and  mask  each  other.  To  say  nothing  of 
probable  need  of  ammunition  at  this  stage  of  the  action,  one 
must  recognize  that  now,  as  the  llth  and  12th  brigades  of  the 
Federal  reinforcements  approach,  the  Confederate  need  of  at 
least  a  fresh  division  is  great.  There  are  not  only  no  reenforce- 
ments  on  the  way,  but  none  within  two  miles. 

Both  Hill  and  Ewell  have  orders  to  cooperate  with  Long- 
street's  battle,  but  they  are  limiting  their  cooperation  to  in- 
effective cannonading  of  the  enemy's  intrenchments  in  their 
front,  while  the  enemy  is  stripping  these  of  infantry  and  march- 
ing fresh  divisions  to  concentrate  upon  Hood  and  McLaws,  and 
the  three  brigades  of  Wilcox,  Perry,  and  Wright,  which  had  sup- 


406  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

ported  them.  But  when  these  had  carried  the  lines  in  their 
front  (Carr's,  Brewster's,  and  Burling's  brigades  of  the  3d  corps), 
Hancock  had  brought  up  Harrow's  and  Hall's  brigades  of  Gib- 
bon's division;  and  Willard's  of  Hays's  division.  One  at  a 
time,  the  three  Confederate  brigades  were  driven  back  with 
losses,  already  stated,  amounting  to  1565  men.  The  six  Federal 
brigades  had  lost  as  follows:  Harrow's,  768;  Hall's,  377;  Wil- 
lard's, 714,  Willard  being  killed;  Carr's,  790;  Brewster's,  778; 
Burling's,  513;  total,  3940.1 

It  would  be  tedious  to  attempt  to  follow  the  artillery  ree'n- 
forcements  which  came  to  the  aid  of  Sickles's  corps,  but  Hunt, 
Chief  of  Artillery,  in  his  report,  mentions  11  batteries  with  60 
guns  being  engaged  from  his  general  reserve.  In  addition  to 
these  the  2d,  3d,  and  5th  corps  had  80  guns  engaged.  Against 
these  140  guns,  Longstreet  had  but  62  guns  on  the  field,  and 
Anderson's  division  but  seven.  The  artillery  on  both  sides  suf- 
fered severely  in  men  and  horses.  A  number  of  Federal  bat- 
teries were  captured,  and  held  temporarily,  but  only  two 
or  three  guns  could  be  brought  off  the  field.  Hunt's  report 
says : — 

"The  batteries  were  exposed  to  heavy  front  and  enfilading  fires  and 
suffered  terribly,  but  as  rapidly  as  any  were  disabled  they  were  retired 
and  replaced  by  others." 

Besides  the  reinforcements  of  12  brigades  already  mentioned 
(including  Crawford's  Pa.  reserves),  Meade  had  followed  them 
with  Robinson's  and  Doubleday's  divisions  of  the  1st  corps, 
five  brigades  (taken  from  the  lines  in  front  of  Hill's  corps),  and 
with  Williams's  division,  three  brigades  of  the  12th  corps.  Two 
more  brigades,  Candy's  and  Cobham's,  of  Geary's  division  of  the 
12th  corps,  w«re  also  withdrawn  from  the  intrenchments  upon 
Gulp's  Hill,  and  ordered  to  the  left,  but  they  missed  their  road 
and  did  not  reach  the  scene  of  action  in  time.  These  with- 
drawals left  of  the  12th  corps  but  a  single  brigade,  Greene's, 
holding  the  intrenchments  upon  Gulp's  Hill  in  front  of  John- 
son's division  of  Swell's  corps,  who  had  been  all  day  under 

1  The  Federal  losses  stated  are  from  the  official  returns  which  include  the 
losses  of  all  three  days,  but  most  of  the  brigades  mentioned  suffered  the 
greater  part  of  their  losses  during  the  afternoon  of  the  2d. 


GETTYSBURG:  SECOND   DAY  407 

orders  to  attack  at  the  sound  of  Longstreet's  guns.  What  they 
did  will  be  told  presently. 

All  of  these  reenforcements  did  not  become  engaged.  A  part 
of  Stannard's  brigade  recaptured  six  of  the  Federal  guns,  which 
the  Confederates  had  overrun  but  could  not  remove.  Part  of 
Lockwood's  brigade  of  the  12th  corps,  who  were  raw  troops,  were 
led  into  action  by  Meade  in  person,  and  also  retook  a  captured 
battery.  Most  of  these  reenforcements  came  into  view  upon  the 
crest,  from  the  lower  slopes  of  which  Crawford's  division  now 
advanced  in  a  counter-stroke  to  the  Confederate  charge  which  had 
routed  and  pursued  Ayres's  division.  The  mere  sight  of  the  long 
lines  and  solid  blue  masses  which  appeared  to  the  Confederates 
as  they  cleared  the  woods  and  scanned  the  opposite  slopes,  was 
calculated  to  paralyze  the  advance.  Ten  fresh  brigades  were 
in  position  before  them,  besides  the  remnants  of  the  13  brigades 
which  had  been  driven  back.  About  75  guns  were  in  action  sup- 
porting this  huge  force.  To  this  day  there  survive  stories  show- 
ing how  the  Confederates  were  impressed  by  this  tremendous 
display.  One,  still  told  by  guides  at  Gettysburg,  is  that  a  cry 
was  heard  in  the  Confederate  ranks,  "Have  we  got  all  creation 
to  whip?"  And  another  of  the  time  was  that  the  Federal 
commander  was  heard  to  give  his  orders:  "  Attention,  Universe! 
Nations  into  line!  By  Kingdom!  —  Right  wheel." 

Fortunately  for  the  Confederates,  the  Federal  counter-stroke 
was  confined  to  a  very  moderate  advance  by  Crawford's  division. 
Our  disorganized  lines  made  a  show  of  resistance,  but  it  only 
led  to  the  loss  of  perhaps  200  prisoners  from  Anderson's  brigade, 
which  unwisely  prolonged  its  fire.  The  enemy,  however,  only 
advanced  to  the  eastern  edge  of  the  Wheat  Field,  and  the  Con- 
federates retreated  no  farther  than  the  western  edge.  From 
those  positions  the  firing  was  kept  up  until  darkness  brought 
a  welcome  end.  For  in  our  worn-out  condition  and  isolated 
position  we  were  in  a  very  dangerous  situation.  Had  Meade 
now  ordered  an  advance  he  would  have  found  Longstreet's  left 
flank  in  the  air,  and  the  whole  line  of  McLaws's  and  Hood's 
divisions  much  exhausted  and  but  poorly  supplied  with  ammu- 
nition. The  ground  on  the  left  was  open  and  the  moon  was 
full.  There  was  certainly  a  great  opportunity  offered  the 


408  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

Federal  commander,  with  his  large  force  of  fresh  troops  in  hand 
near  the  field,  and  only  needing  the  word  to  go. 

It  is  now  time  to  see  how  Lee's  orders  were  being  interpreted 
and  carried  out  upon  the  left.  The  official  reports  are  a  painful 
record  of  insufficient  comprehension  of  orders  and  inefficient 
attempts  at  execution,  by  officers  each  able  to  shift  the  blame 
of  failure  upon  other  shoulders  than  his  own.  Between  the 
lines  the  apparent  absence  of  supervision  excites  constant  won- 
der. But  everywhere  that  the  troops  fought  their  conduct  was 
admirable. 

Ewell,  as  before  told,  was  ordered  to  attack  with  Johnson's 
division  when  he  heard  the  sound  of  Longstreet's  guns.  Ewell 
says  that  later  his  instructions  were  modified  into  "making  a 
diversion,"  but  Lee's  report  does  not  recognize  such  modifica- 
tion. Ewell  interpreted  his  orders  as  calling  only  for  a  cannon- 
ade. It  must  be  admitted  that  any  serious  attack  by  Johnson 
would  have  been  suicidal.  The  enemy's  lines  were  of  exceptional 
strength,  which  is  noted  in  the  Federal  reports.  Ruger,  for 
instance,  thus  describes  the  position  of  his  division. 

"Breastworks  were  immediately  constructed  of  logs,  rocks,  and  earth 
along  the  whole  line,  and  at  the  gap  in  the  line  caused  by  the  swale,  so 
as  to  give  cross  fire  in  front  of  gap.  In  rear  of  breastworks  of  1st  brigade, 
about  75  yards  and  nearly  parallel  therewith,  was  a  stone  wall,  behind  which 
the  second  line  of  the  brigade  was  placed.  In  front  of  the  line  of  the  3d 
brigade  Rock  Creek  was  from  four  to  six  feet  deep,  with  muddy  bottom, 
caused  by  a  dam  near  the  turnpike.  The  whole  position  was  covered 
with  rocks.  ..." 

Added  to  these  difficulties  was  the  fact  that  there  was  but  a 
single  position  where  the  Confederates  could  plant  guns  to  fire 
upon  this  line,  and  that  an  inferior  one,  giving  little  shelter  and 
exposed  to  an  enfilade  fire.  It  was  so  contracted  that  with 
difficulty  14  guns  were  crowded  upon  it,  within  about  1000 
yards  of  the  enemy.  It  might  have  been  foreseen  that  this 
battery,  exposed  to  the  fire  of  double  its  number  of  guns,  would 
soon  be  put  out  of  action.  That  was  what  happened :  its  com- 
mander, an  especially  gallant  "Boy  Major,"  Latimer  (under  21 
years),  being  killed.  Besides  these  guns  Ewell's  diversion  em- 
braced six  rifles,  in  rear  of  Latimer  at  a  range  of  2000  yards; 


GETTYSBURG:  SECOND  DAY  409 

and  12  more,  on  Seminary  Ridge  to  the  left  of  Hill's  artillery  at 
a  range  much  over  a  mile.  Hill's  artillery  comprised  55  guns  on 
Seminary  Ridge.  So  the  whole  assistance  given  to  Longstreet's 
attack  between  4  P.M.  and  darkness  by  the  other  two  corps  was 
confined  to  an  artillery  duel  by  32  guns  of  Ewell  and  55  of  Hill, 
mostly  at  extreme  ranges.  But  the  value  of  this  duel  as  as- 
sistance to  Longstreet  was  absolutely  nothing,  for  it  did  not 
prevent  the  enemy  from  withdrawing  troops  from  every  corps 
in  his  line  to  repel  our  assault. 

This  cannonading  was  maintained  for  about  two  hours,  after 
which  it  gradually  diminished  until  dark.  Meanwhile,  about 
six  o'clock,  Ewell  had  sent  orders  to  each  of  his  division 
commanders  to  attack  the  enemy's  lines  in  his  front.  This 
involved  for  Johnson  an  attack  upon  Gulp's  Hill.  The  divi- 
sion had  not  been  pushed  close  to  the  hill  in  preparation  for  an 
assault,  although  one  had  been  contemplated  all  day.  It  now 
had  a  full  mile  to  advance  and  Rock  Creek  had  to  be  crossed. 
This  could  only  be  done  at  few  places  and  involved  much  delay. 
Only  three  of  Johnson's  four  brigades  moved  to  the  attack.  His 
official  report  says :  — 

"I  then  advanced  my  infantry  to  the  assault  of  the  enemy's  strong 
position  —  a  rugged  and  rocky  mountain,  heavily  timbered  and  difficult 
of  ascent;  a  natural  fortification  rendered  more  formidable  by  deep  in- 
trenchments  and  thick  abattis  —  Jones's  brigade  in  advance,  followed  by 
Nichols's  and  Steuart's.  Gen.  Walker  was  directed  to  follow,  but  report- 
ing to  me  that  the  enemy  were  advancing  upon  him,  from  their  right,  he 
was  ordered  to  repulse  them  as  soon  as  possible.  .  .  .  Gen.  Walker  did 
not  arrive  in  time  to  participate  in  the  assault  that  night. 

"  By  the  time  my  other  brigades  had  crossed  Rock  Creek  and  reached 
the  base  of  the  mountain,  it  was  dark.  His  skirmishers  were  driven  in, 
and  the  attack  made  with  great  vigor  and  spirit.  It  was  as  successful 
as  could  have  been  expected  under  the  circumstances.  Steuart's  bri- 
gade, on  the  left,  carried  a  line  of  breastworks  which  ran  perpendicular 
to  the  enemy's  main  line,  captured  a  number  of  prisoners  and  a  stand  of 
colors,  and  the  whole  line  advanced  to  within  short  range  and  kept  up  a 
heavy  fire  until  late  in  the  night." 

As  has  been  told,  the  whole  of  the  12th  corps  had  been  with- 
drawn from  the  lines  except  Greene's  brigade.  This  brigade 
was  being  extended  when  its  advance  was  met  by  Steuart,  who 


410  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

got  possession  only  of  empty  trenches.  Johnson's  other  brigades 
found  the  trenches  in  front  of  their  approach  held  by  Greene's 
thin  line,  but  in  the  darkness  of  the  woods,  the  steep  and  rocky 
ground,  and  the  abattis  and  obstructions  in  front,  Johnson's  line 
was  halted  at  irregular  distances,  and  the  attack  resolved  it- 
self into  a  random  and  ineffective  musketry  fire.  Nothing 
more  was  possible.  And  even  had  they  found  more  trenches 
vacant  and  occupied  them,  Meade  could  at  will  concentrate  am- 
ple force  to  drive  them  out.  The  more  one  studies  the  situation, 
the  more  strange  it  seems  that  Lee  abandoned  his  first  purpose 
to  withdraw  Johnson  from  his  false  position. 

Early's  attack  is  next  to  be  described.  It,  too,  was  isolated, 
inadequate,  and  unsupported.  It  necessarily  failed.  Both 
attacks  were  in  progress  at  the  same  time,  but  Longstreet's, 
which  they  were  intended  to  support,  had  already  ceased.  Like 
Johnson's  division,  Early  was  also  short  of  one  brigade,  Smith's 
having  been  sent  to  guard  the  rear  from  the  direction  of  York. 
Gordon  also  was  not  engaged,  as  Early  soon  realized  that  the 
attack  was  an  isolated  one  and  would  be  quickly  repulsed. 

Early's  report  gives  the  following  details :  — 

" .  .  .As  soon  as  Johnson  became  warmly  engaged,  which  was  a  little 
before  dusk,  I  ordered  Hays  and  Avery  to  advance  and  carry  the  works 
on  the  height  in  front.  These  troops  advanced  in  gallant  style  to  the 
attack,  passing  over  the  ridge  in  front  of  them  under  a  heavy  artillery  fire, 
and  then  crossing  a  hollow  between  that  and  Cemetery  Hill  and  moving 
up  this  hill  in  the  face  of  at  least  two  lines  of  infantry  posted  behind  stone 
and  plank  fences;  but  these  they  drove  back,  and  passing  over  all  ob- 
stacles they  reached  the  crest  of  the  hill  and  entered  the  enemy's  breast- 
works crowning  it,  getting  possession  of  one  or  two  batteries. 

"But  no  attack  was  made  on  the  immediate  right,  as  was  expected, 
and  not  meeting  with  support  from  that  quarter,  these  brigades  could 
not  hold  the  position  they  had  attained,  because  a  very  heavy  force  of 
the  enemy  was  turned  against  them  from  that  part  of  the  line  which  the 
divisions  on  the  right  were  to  have  attacked,  and  these  brigades  had, 
therefore,  to  fall  back,  which  they  did  with  comparatively  slight  loss, 
considering  the  nature  of  the  ground  over  which  they  had  to  pass,  and 
the  immense  odds  opposed  to  them,  and  Hays's  brigade  brought  off  four 
stands  of  captured  colors.  Gen.  Rodes  did  not  advance  for  reasons  given 
in  his  report." 

The  maps  show  that  Hays's  brigade  on  the  right  had  only 


GETTYSBURG:  SECOND  DAY  411 

about  500  yards  to  advance  over  ground  exposed  to  the  enemy's 
fire.  Avery's  brigade  on  the  left  had  a  somewhat  greater  distance. 

Hays  reports  his  casualties  in  this  affair  as  181.  Avery  was 
killed.  The  casualties  of  his  brigade  for  the  three  days  were 
345,  of  which  at  least  two-thirds  were  suffered  in  this  charge. 

Howard's  report  gives  the  story  from  the  Federal  side :  — 

"The  attack  was  so  sudden  and  violent  that  the  infantry  in  front  of 
Ames  was  giving  way.  In  fact,  at  one  moment  the  enemy  had  gotten 
within  the  batteries.  A  request  for  assistance  had  already  gone  to  head- 
quarters, so  that  promptly  a  brigade  of  the  2d  corps  under  Col.  Carroll 
moved  to  Ames's  right,  deployed,  and  went  into  position  just  in  time  to 
check  the  enemy's  advance.  At  Wiedrich's  battery,  Gen.  Ames,  by  ex- 
traordinary exertions,  arrested  a  panic,  and  the  men  with  sponge  staffs 
and  bayonets  forced  the  enemy  back.  At  this  time  he  received  support 
from  Gen.  Schurz.  Effective  assistance  was  also  rendered  at  this  time 
by  a  portion  of  Gen.  Steinwehr's  command  at  points  where  the  enemy  was 
breaking  through.  This  furious  onset  was  met  and  withstood  at  every 

point,  and  lasted  less  than  an  hour." 

» 

It  only  remains  to  show  why  Rodes  failed  to  cooperate  with 
Early  and  Johnson  as  Ewell  had  ordered.  The  fault  was  with 
Ewell  himself.  We  have  already  seen  that  he  had  allowed 
Johnson's  division  to  remain  all  day  so  far  from  the  position 
which  he  was  to  attack  that,  when  ordered  to  advance,  darkness 
fell  upon  him  before  he  could  reach  it.  Similarly  Ewell  had 
allowed  both  of  his  other  divisions  to  locate  themselves  far  out 
of  reach  of  the  places  where  they  were  likely  to  be  needed.  Of 
his  own  motion,  however,  Early  had  advanced  half  of  his  divi- 
sion at  dawn  to  the  Federal  skirmish  line,  and  these  two  brigades 
were  ready  to  advance  when  ordered. 

Rodes  had  remained  about  the  northwestern  edge  of  the 
town,  near  where  the  righting  of  the  first  day  had  ended,  and 
was  still  there  when  the  orders  came  to  attack.  He  was  already 
preparing  to  advance,  having  seen  both  infantry  and  artillery 
withdrawn  by  the  enemy  from  his  front  to  resist  Longstreet's 
pressure  upon  their  left.  But  his  location  was  so  unfortunate 
that,  in  spite  of  this  warning,  both  Johnson's  and  Early's  at- 
tacks were  begun  and  finished  before  Rodes  had  reached  the 
enemy's  skirmish  line. 

Finding  then  his  opportunity  gone  he  wisely  desisted.     But 


412  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

as  Lee  and  his  staff  during  the  morning  had  visited  Ewell's  lines, 
it  is  strange  that  such  faulty  locations  escaped  notice  and  cor- 
rection. Rodes's  report  not  only  shows  the  badness  of  his 
original  position,  but  tells  of  an  excellent  one  for  the  attack, 
which  so  far  had  entirely  escaped  the  recognition  of  any  Confed- 
erate reconnoitring  officer.  His  report  says :  — 

"  Having  to  draw  my  troops  out  of  town  by  the  flank,  change  the  direc- 
tion of  the  line  of  battle,  and  then  to  traverse  a  distance  of  1200  to  1400 
yards,  while  Gen.  Early  had  to  move  only  half  that  distance  without 
change  of  front,  the  result  was  that  before  I  drove  the  enemy's  skirmishers 
in,  Gen.  Early  had  attacked  and  been  compelled  to  withdraw.  .  .  .  But 
instead  of  falling  back  to  the  original  line,  I  caused  the  front  line  to  assume 
a  strong  position  in  the  plain  to  the  right  of  the  town  along  the  hollow  of 
an  old  road-bed.  This  position  was  much  nearer  the  enemy,  was  clear 
of  the  town,  and  was  one  from  which  I  could  readily  attack  without  con- 
fusion." 

Rodes's  description  of  his  new  position  is  of  special  interest. 
Taken  in  connection  with  his  statement  of  the  distance  to  be 
traversed  by  Early's  charge,  it  shows  the  existence  of  far  more 
favorable  ground  for  an  attack  upon  Cemetery  Hill  than  is  to 
be  found  elsewhere  upon  the  Federal  line  of  battle  from  Gulp's 
Hill  to  Little  Round  Top.  It  was  open  to  our  occupation  from 
the  afternoon  of  the  first  day,  when  Ewell  stopped  the  pursuit, 
and  it  must  ever  remain  a  grave  reflection  upon  the  Confederate 
conduct  of  the  battle  that  the  weakest  part  of  the  Federal  posi- 
tion was  the  only  portion  which  was  not  attacked.  It  will  be 
more  fully  described  in  the  account  of  the  action  on  the  3d. 

Thus  ended  the  second  day,  and  one  is  tempted  to  say  that 
thus  ended  the  battle  of  Gettysburg.  For  of  the  third  day  it 
must  be  said,  as  was  said  of  the  charge  of  the  Six  Hundred  at 
Balaklava,  "Magnificent,  but  not  War!" 

The  first  day  had  been  won  by  17  Confederate  brigades  of 
infantry  attacking  13  Federal.  The  victory  was  fruitless  be- 
cause Ewell  stopped  the  pursuit  in  full  tide. 

On  the  second  day,  Longstreet,  with  11  brigades,  in  seven 
piecemeal  attacks,  drives  back  six  Federal  brigades,  which, 
being  gradually  reenforced  by  18  fresh  brigades,  check  the 
Confederate  advance,  and  recover  part  of  the  lost  ground,  before 


GETTYSBURG:  SECOND  DAY  413 

night  ends  the  conflict.  Cooperative  attacks  by  Ewell  and  Hill, 
ordered  by  Lee,  fail  to  be  effective  because  both  Ewell  and  Hill 
had  failed  to  have  their  divisions  in  proper  positions  for  the 
charge  long  before  the  moment  arrived,  although  each  had  had 
ample  time. 


CHAPTER  XVIII 
GETTYSBURG:  THIRD  DAY 

The  Plan  of  the  Day.  Johnson  Reenforced.  Johnson's  Battle.  Lee 
joins  Longstreet.  A  Discussion.  The  Decision.  The  Neglected  Op- 
portunity. Posting  the  Guns.  Artillery  of  Other  Corps.  Infantry 
Formation.  Hill's  Cannonade.  The  Nine  Howitzers.  Note  from  Long- 
street.  Talk  with  Wright.  Cannonade  Opens.  Pickett  called  for. 
Pickett  and  Longstreet.  Pickett  Appears.  The  Repulse.  Lee  on  the 
Field.  The  Afternoon.  Nelson's  Enfilade.  Advances  from  Peach 
Orchard. 

IN  his  official  report  Lee  writes :  — 

"The  result  of  the  (second)  day's  operations  induced  the  belief  that 
with  proper  concert  of  action,  and  with  the  increased  support  that  the 
positions  gained  on  the  right  would  enable  the  artillery  to  render  the 
columns,  we  should  ultimately  succeed,  and  it  was  accordingly  determined 
to  continue  the  attack.  The  general  plan  was  unchanged.  Longstreet, 
reenforced  by  Pickett's  three  brigades,  was  to  attack  the  next  morning, 
and  Ewell  was  ordered  to  assault  the  enemy's  right  at  the  same  time.  The 
latter  during  the  night  reenforced  Johnson  with  two  brigades  from  Rodes's 
and  one  from  Early's  division." 

This  statement  shows  that  the  strongest  features  of  the  enemy's 
position  were  not  yet  apprehended.  These  were  the  ability  of 
the  enemy  to  concentrate  their  whole  force  upon  any  point 
attacked;  and  the  impregnable  character  of  the  two  Federal 
flanks.  The  two  brigades  sent  from  Rodes  to  reenforce  Johnson 
were  taken  from  the  new  position  discovered  by  him  early  in  the 
evening  and  already  referred  to,  not  only  as  the  most  favorable, 
but  as  practically  the  only  position  from  which  the  Federal  line 
could  have  been  attacked  with  any  hope  of  success.  The  bri- 
gade sent  from  Early  was  sent  from  a  force  which  could  have 
effectively  cooperated  with  an  attack  by  Rodes.  The  effect  of 
sending  the  three  brigades  was  to  emasculate  the  centre  of  our 
line  and  to  concentrate  seven  brigades  where  they  were  utterly 

414 


GETTYSBURG:  THIRD  DAY  415 

useless.  Before  proceeding,  however,  we  may  best  here  give 
briefly  the  outcome  of  Johnson's  battle. 

He  had  been  ordered  by  Ewell  to  attack  at  daylight,  under 
the  impression  that  Longstreet  would  attack  at  the  same  hour. 
In  fact,  however,  Longstreet  received  no  orders  during  the 
night,  and  the  troops  required  for  his  attack  could  not  be  gotten 
into  their  positions  before  noon.  Johnson,  however,  was  himself 
attacked  by  the  enemy  at  daylight  at  a  point  where  he  was  still 
holding  the  trenches  he  had  found  abandoned  the  night  before. 
He  repulsed  the  Federal  assault  and  attempted  to  follow  the 
fugitives,  but  was  repulsed.  Heavy  firing  was  kept  up  from 
behind  rocks,  trees,  and  parapets  until  near  noon.  Rumors  of 
movements  of  the  enemy  upon  his  left,  which  afterward  proved 
to  be  false,  then  led  him  to  withdraw  to  the  base  of  the  hill 
where  he  remained  unmolested  until  night,  when  he  was  at  last 
recalled  to  the  west  of  the  town.  His  losses  were  about  1873, 
showing  that  the  fighting  was  severe. 

Lee's  headquarters  were  beyond  the  Chambersburg  pike,  about 
four  miles  by  road  from  the  scene  of  battle  on  our  right.  During 
the  night  the  Washington  artillery  was  brought  up  and  disposed 
with  the  rest  of  Longstreet's  guns  about  the  Peach  Orchard,  with 
the  intention  of  resuming  the  battle  in  the  morning.  During 
the  night  Longstreet  had  sent  scouts  in  search  of  a  way  by 
which  he  might  turn  the  enemy's  left  and  believed  he  had 
found  one  with  some  promise  of  success.  Soon  after  sunrise, 
while  Longstreet  awaited  the  arrival  of  Pickett's  division  with 
Dearing's  battalion  of  artillery,  intending  then  to  extend  his 
right,  Lee  joined  him  and  proposed  an  assault  upon  the  enemy's 
left  centre  by  Longstreet's  three  divisions. 

Longstreet  demurred,  and,  as  had  occurred  on  the  day  before, 
some  time  was  spent  in  discussion  and  examination.  Although 
the  opposing  lines  were  in  full  view  and  easy  range  of  each  other, 
neither  seemed  anxious  to  begin  an  action.  The  enemy's  guns 
were  generally  behind  breastworks  on  the  high  hills  and  ridges 
with  ample  covering  in  rear  for  their  horses  and  caissons.  Ours, 
posted  before  daylight,  stood  exposed  on  gently  rolling  ground 
about  the  Peach  Orchard  and  vicinity.  The  enemy  fired  occa- 
sional shots,  but  not  enough  to  force  us  to  reply,  and  we  were 


416  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

but  too  glad  to  be  able  to  reserve  our  ammunition  for  more 
important  work. 

Longstreet  pointed  out  to  Lee  the  enemy's  position  on  the 
Round  Tops  and  the  danger  of  withdrawing  Hood  and  McLaws 
from  our  right  flank,  which  would  be  necessary  if  they  were  to 
take  part  in  the  attack  upon  the  enemy's  left  centre.  Lee  recog- 
nized the  necessity  and  substituted  six  brigades  from  Hill's 
corps.  His  report  says :  — 

"Longstreet  was  delayed  by  a  force  occupying  the  high  rocky  hills 
on  the  enemy's  extreme  left,  from  which  his  troops  could  be  attacked 
in  reverse  as  they  advanced.  His  operations  had  been  embarrassed  the 
day  previous  from  the  same  cause  and  he  now  deemed  it  necessary  to  de- 
fend his  flank  and  rear  by  the  divisions  of  Hood  and  McLaws.  He  was, 
therefore,  reenforced  by  Heth's  division  and  two  of  Fender's  brigades  to 
the  command  of  which  Trimble  was  assigned."1 

Longstreet  further  objected  that  the  enemy's  artillery  on  the 
"high  rocky  hills"  would  enfilade  the  lines  assaulting  the  left 
centre.  Col.  Long,  of  Lee's  staff,  in  his  Memoirs  of  Lee,  writes :  — 

"This  objection  was  answered  by  Col.  Long  who  said  that  the  guns 
on  Round  Top  could  be  suppressed  by  our  batteries.  This  point  being 
settled,  the  attack  was  ordered  and  Longstreet  was  directed  to  carry  it 
out." 

Longstreet,  in  his  Manassas  to  Appomattox,  describing  the 
same  conversation,  gives  further  detail  as  follows :  — 

"  I  asked  the  strength  of  the  column.  He  (Lee)  stated,  15,000.  Opin- 
ion was  then  expressed  that  the  15,000  men  who  could  make  successful 
assault  over  that  field  had  never  been  arrayed  for  battle  ;  but  he  was 
impatient  of  listening  and  tired  of  talking,  and  nothing  was  left  but  to 
proceed." 

It  seems  remarkable  that  the  assumption  of  Col.  Long  so  easily 
passed  unchallenged  that  Confederate  guns  in  open  and  inferior 
positions  could  "suppress"  Federal  artillery  fortified  upon  com- 
manding ridges.  Our  artillery  equipment  was  usually  admitted 
to  be  inferior  to  the  enemy's  in  numbers,  calibres  and  quality  of 
ammunition.  Moreover,  here,  the  point  selected .  and  the 
method  of  the  attack  would  certainly  have  been  chosen  for  us 
by  the  enemy  had  they  had  the  choice.  Comparatively  the 

1  Fender  had  been  mortally  wounded  in  the  artillery  duel  of  Hill's  corps 
during  the  afternoon  of  the  2d. 


GETTYSBURG:  THIRD  DAY  417 

weakest  portion  of  their  line  was  Cemetery  Hill,  and  the  point 
of  greatest  interest  in  connection  with  this  battle  is  the  story  of 
our  entire  failure  to  recognize  this  fact.  The  narrative  may 
therefore  pause  while  this  neglected  opportunity  is  pointed  out. 

There  was  one  single  advantage  conferred  by  our  exterior 
lines,  and  but  one,  in  exchange  for  many  disadvantages.  They 
gave  us  the  opportunity  to  select  positions  for  our  guns  which 
could  enfilade  the  opposing  lines  of  the  enemy.  Enfilading  fire 
is  so  effective  that  no  troops  can  submit  to  it  long.  Illustrations 
of  this  fact  were  not  wanting  in  the  events  of  this  day.  What 
has  been  called  the  shank  of  the  Federal  fish-hook,  extending 
south  from  the  bend  at  Cemetery  Hill  toward  Little  Round  Top, 
was  subject  to  enfilade  fire  from  the  town  and  its  flanks  and 
suburbs.  That  liability  should  have  caused  special  examination 
by  our  staff  and  artillery  officers,  to  discover  other  conditions 
which  might  favor  an  assault.  There  were  and  are  others  still 
easily  recognizable  on  the  ground.  The  salient  angle  is  acute 
and  weak,  and  within  about  500  yards  of  its  west  face  is  the 
sheltered  position  occupied  by  Rodes  the  night  of  July  2d, 
which  has  already  been  mentioned. 

From  nowhere  else  was  there  so  short  and  unobstructed  an 
approach  to  the  Federal  line,  and  one  so  free  from  flank  fire. 
On  the  northeast,  at  but  little  greater  distance,  was  the  position 
whence  Early's  two  brigades  the  evening  before  had  success- 
fully carried  the  east  face  of  the  same  salient.  Within  the  edge 
of  the  town  between  these  two  positions  was  abundant  oppor- 
tunity to  accumulate  troops  and  to  establish  guns  at  close 
ranges. 

As  long  as  Gettysburg  stands  and  the  contour  of  its  hills  re- 
mains unchanged,  students  of  the  battle-field  must  decide  that 
Lee's  most  promising  attack  from  first  to  last  was  upon  Cemetery 
Hill,  by  concentrated  artillery  fire  from  the  north  and  assaults 
from  the  nearest  sheltered  ground  between  the  west  and  north- 
east. 

That  this  was  not  realized  at  the  time  is  doubtless  partly  due 
to  the  scarcity  of  trained  staff  and  reconnoitring  officers,  and 
partly  to  the  fact  that  Ewell  had  discontinued  and  withdrawn 
the  pursuit  on  the  afternoon  of  the  1st,  when  it  was  about  to 


418  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

undertake  this  position.  Hence  the  enemy's  pickets  were  not 
driven  closely  into  their  lines,  and  the  vicinity  was  not  carefully 
examined.  Not  a  single  gun  was  established  within  a  thousand 
yards,  nor  was  a  position  selected  which  enfiladed  the  lines  in 
question. 

Quite  by  accident,  during  the  cannonade  preceding  Pickett's 
charge,  Nelson's  battalion  of  Ewell's  corps  fired  a  few  rounds 
from  a  position  which  did  enfilade  with  great  effect  part  of  the 
llth  corps  upon  Cemetery  Hill,  but  the  fire  ceased  on  being  sharply 
replied  to.  Briefly  the  one  weak  spot  of  the  enemy's  line  and 
the  one  advantage  possessed  by  ours  were  never  apprehended. 

In  addition  to  the  six  .brigades  of  Hill's  corps  assigned  to 
Longstreet  for  his  column  of  assault,  one  more,  Wilcox  of 
Anderson's  division,  was  later  added,  making  ten  brigades  in  all, 
of  which  only  three  were  Longstreet's  and  seven  were  Hill's.  I 
was  directed  by  Longstreet  to  post  all  of  his  artillery  for  a  pre- 
liminary cannonade,  and  then  to  take  a  position  whence  I  could 
best  observe  the  effect  of  our  fire,  and  determine  the  proper 
moment  to  give  the  signal  to  Pickett  to  advance.  The  signal  for 
the  opening  of  the  cannonade  would  be  given  by  Longstreet  him- 
self after  the  infantry  brigades  were  all  in  position. 

A  clump  of  trees  in  the  enemy's  line  was  pointed  out  to  me 
as  the  proposed  point  of  our  attack,  which  I  was  incorrectly 
told  was  the  cemetery  of  the  town,  and  about  9  A.M.  I  began  to 
revise  our  line  and  post  it  for  the  cannonade.  The  enemy  very 
strangely  interfered  with  only  an  occasional  cannon-shot,  to 
none  of  which  did  we  now  reply,  for  it  was  easily  in  their  power 
to  drive  us  to  cover  or  to  exhaust  our  ammunition  before  our 
infantry  column  could  be  formed.  I  can  only  account  for  their 
allowing  our  visible  preparations  to  be  completed  by  supposing 
that  they  appreciated  in  what  a  trap  we  would  find  ourselves. 
Of  Longstreet's  83  guns,  8  were  left  on  our  extreme  right  to 
cover  our  flank,  and  the  remaining  75  were  posted  in  an  irregular 
line  about  1300  yards  long,  beginning  in  the  Peach  Orchard  and 
ending  near  the  northeast  corner  of  the  Spangler  wood. 

While  so  engaged,  Gen.  Pendleton  offered  me  the  use  of  nine 
12-Pr.  howitzers  of  Hill's  corps,  saying  that  that  corps  could 
not  use  guns  of  such  short  range.  I  gladly  accepted  and  went  to 


GETTYSBURG:  THIRD  DAY  419 

receive  the  guns  under  command  of  Maj.  Richardson.  I  placed 
them  under  cover  close  in  rear  of  the  forming  column  with 
orders  to  remain  until  sent  for,  intending  to  take  them  with  the 
column  when  it  advanced. 

A  few  hundred  yards  to  left  and  rear  of  my  line  began  the 
artillery  of  the  3d  corps  under  Col.  Walker.  It  comprised.  60 
guns,  extending  on  Seminary  Ridge  as  far  as  the  Hagerstown 
road,  and  two  Whitworth  rifles  located  nearly  a  mile  farther 
north  on  the  same  ridge.  In  this  interval  were  located  20  rifle 
guns  of  the  2d  corps  under  Col.  Carter.  Four  more  rifles  of  the 
same  corps  under  Capt.  Graham  were  located  about  one  and  a 
half  miles  northeast  of  Cemetery  Hill.  These  24  guns  of  the  2d 
corps  were  ordered  to  fire  only  solid  shot  as  their  fuses  were  un- 
reliable. 

There  remained  unemployed  of  the  2d  corps  25  rifles  and  16 
Napoleons,  and  of  the  3d  corps,  fifteen  12-Pr.  howitzers.  It  is 
notable  that  of  the  84  guns  of  the  2d  and  3d  corps  to  be  engaged, 
80  were  in  the  same  line  parallel  to  the  position  of  the  enemy  and 
56  guns  stood  idle.  It  was  a  phenomenal  oversight  not  to  place 
these  guns,  and  many  beside,  in  and  near  the  town  to  enfilade 
the  "shank  of  the  fish-hook"  and  cross  fire  with  the  guns  from 
the  west. 

The  Federal  gun's  in  position  on  their  lines  at  the  commence- 
ment of  the  cannonade  were  166,  and  during  it  10  batteries 
were  brought  up  from  their  reserves,  raising  the  number  engaged 
to  220  against  172  used  upon  our  side  during  the  same  time. 

The  formation  of  our  infantry  lines  consumed  a  long  time,  and 
the  formation  used  was  not  one  suited  for  such  a  heavy  task. 
Six  brigades,  say  10,000  men,  were  in  the  first  line.  Three  bri- 
gades only  were  in  the  second  line— very  much  shorter  on  the  left. 
It  followed  about  200  yards  in  rear  of  the  first.  The  remaining 
brigade,  Wilcox's,  posted  in  rear  of  the  right  of  the  column, 
was  not  put  in  motion  with  the  column,  and  being  ordered  for- 
ward 20  minutes  or  more  later,  was  much  too  late  to  be  of  any 
assistance  whatever.  Both  flanks  of  the  assaulting  column  were 
in  the  air  and  the  left  without  any  support  in  the  rear.  It  was 
sure  to  crumble  away  rapidly  under  fire.  The  arrangement  may 
be  represented  thus :  — 


420  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

Brockeribrough,  Davis,  McGowan,  Archer,  Garnett,  Kemper, 
Lane,  Scales,  Armistead, 

Wilcox. 

No  formation,  however,  could  have  been  successful  and  the  light 
one  doubtless  suffered  fewer  casualties  than  one  more  compact 
and  deeper  would  have  had. 

A  little  before  noon  there  sprung  up  upon  our  left  a  violent 
cannonade  which  was  prolonged  for  fully  a  half-hour,  and  has 
often  been  supposed  to  be  a  part  of  that  ordered  to  precede 
Pickett's  charge.  It  began  between  skirmishers  in  front  of 
Hill's  corps  over  the  occupation  of  a  house.  Hill's  artillery  first 
took  part  in  it,  it  was  said,  by  his  order.  It  was  most  unwise, 
as  it  consumed  uselessly  a  large  amount  of  his  ammunition,  the 
lack  of  which  was  much  felt  in  the  subsequent  fighting.  Not  a 
single  gun  of  our  corps  fired  a  shot,  nor  did  the  enemy  in  our  front. 

When  the  firing  died  out,  entire  quiet  settled  upon  the 
field,  extending  even  to  the  skirmishers  in  front,  and  also 
to  the  enemy's  rear;  whence  behind  their  lines  opposing 
us  we  had  heard  all  the  morning  the  noise  of  Johnson's 
combats. 

My  75  guns  had  all  been  carefully  located  and  made  ready  for 
an  hour,  while  the  infantry  brigades  were  still  not  yet  in  their 
proper  positions,  and  I  was  waiting  for  the  signal  to  come  from 
Longstreet,  when  it  occurred  to  me  to  send  for  the  nine  howitzers 
under  Richardson,  that  they  might  lead  in  the  advance  for  a 
few  hundred  yards  before  coming  into  action.  Only  after  the 
cannonade  had  opened  did  I  learn  that  the  guns  had  been  re- 
moved and  could  not  be  found.  It  afterward"  appeared  that 
Pendleton  had  withdrawn  four  of  the  guns,  and  that  Richardson 
with  the  other  five,  finding  himself  in  the  line  of  the  Federal  fire 
during  Hill's  cannonade,  had  moved  off  to  find  cover.  I  made 
no  complaint,  believing  that  had  these  guns  gone  forward  with 
the  infantry  they  must  have  been  left  upon  the  field  and  per- 
haps have  attracted  a  counter-stroke  after  the  repulse  of  Pickett's 
charge. 

Meanwhile,  some  half-hour  or  more  before  the  cannonade  be- 
gan, I  was  startled  by  the  receipt  of  a  note  from  Longstreet  as 
follows :  — • 


GETTYSBURG:  THIRD  DAY  421 

"  Colonel :  If  the  artillery  fire  does  not  have  the  effect  to  drive  off 
the  enemy  or  greatly  demoralize  him,  so  as  to  make  our  effort  pretty 
certain,  I  would  prefer  that  you  should  not  advise  Pickett  to  make  the 
charge.  I  shall  rely  a  great  deal  upon  your  judgment  to  determine  the 
matter  and  shall  expect  you  to  let  Gen.  Pickett  know  when  the  moment 
offers." 

Until  that  moment,  though  I  fully  recognized  the  strength  of 
the  enemy's  position,  I  had  not  doubted  that  we  would  carry  it, 
in  my  confidence  that  Lee  was  ordering  it.  But  here  was  a 
proposition  that  /  should  decide  the  question.  Overwhelming 
reasons  against  the  assault  at  once  seemed  to  stare  me  in  the 
face.  Gen.  Wright  of  Anderson's  division  was  standing  with 
me.  I  showed  him  the  letter  and  expressed  my  views.  He 
advised  me  to  write  them  to  Longs treet,  which  I  did  as  follows : — 

"General:  I  will  only  be  able  to  judge  of  the  effect  of  our  fire  on  the 
enemy  by  his  return  fire,  as  his  infantry  is  little  exposed  to  view  and  the 
smoke  will  obscure  the  field.  If,  as  I  infer  from  your  note,  there  is  any 
alternative  to  this  attack,  it  should  be  carefully  considered  before  opening 
our  fire,  for  it  will  take  all  the  artillery  ammunition  we  have  left  to  test 
this  one,  and  if  result  is  unfavorable  we  will  have  none  left  for  another 
effort.  And  even  if  this  is  entirely  successful,  it  can  only  be  so  at  a  very 
bloody  cost." 

To  this  note,  Longstreet  soon  replied  as  follows :  — 

"  Colonel :  The  intention  is  to  advance  the  infantry  if  the  artillery  has 
the  desired  effect  of  driving  the  enemy's  off,  or  having  other  effect  such 
as  to  warrant  us  in  making  the  attack.  When  that  moment  arrives  ad- 
vise Gen.  Pickett  and  of  course  advance  such  artillery  as  you  can  use  hi 
aiding  the  attack." 

Evidently  the  cannonade  was  to  be  allowed  to  begin.  Then 
the  responsibility  would  be  upon  me  to  decide  whether  or  not 
Pickett  should  charge.  If  not,  we  must  return  to  Va.  to  re- 
plenish ammunition,  and  the  campaign  would  be  a  failure.  I 
knew  that  our  guns  could  not  drive  off  the  enemy,  but  I  had  a 
vague  hope  that  with  Swell's  and  Hill's  cooperation  something 
might  happen,  though  I  knew  little  either  of  their  positions, 
their  opportunities,  or  their  orders. 

I  asked  Wright :  "What  do  you  think  of  it?  Is  it  as  hard  to 
get  there  as  it  looks?"  He  answered:  "The  trouble  is  not  in 


422  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

going  there.  I  went  there  with  my  brigade  yesterday.  There 
is  a  place  where  you  can  get  breath  and  re-form.  The  trouble 
is  to  stay  there  after  you  get  there,  for  the  whole  Yankee 
army  is  there  in  a  bunch." 

I  failed  to  fully  appreciate  all  that  this  might  mean.  The  ques- 
tion seemed  merely  one  of  support,  which  was  peculiarly  the  prov- 
ince of  Gen.  Lee.  I  had  seen  several  of  Hill's  brigades  forming 
to  support  Pickett,  and  had  heard  a  rumor  that  Lee  had  spoken 
of  a  united  attack  by  the  whole  army.  I  determined  to  see 
Pickett  and  get  an  idea  of  his  feelings.  I  did  so,  and  finding 
him  both  cheerful  and  sanguine,  I  felt  that  if  the  artillery  fire 
opened,  Pickett  must  make  the  charge;  but  that  Longstreet 
should  know  my  views,  so  I  wrote  him  as  follows :  — 

"General:  When  our  fire  is  at  its  best,  I  will  advise  Gen.  Pickett  to 
advance." 

It  must  have  been  with  bitter  disappointment  that  Long- 
street  saw  the  failure  of  his  hope  to  avert  a  useless  slaughter,  for 
he  was  fully  convinced  of  its  hopelessness.  Yet  even  he  could 
have  scarcely  realized,  until  the  event  showed,  how  entirely  un- 
prepared were  Hill  and  Ewell  to  render  aid  to  his  assault  and  to 
take  prompt  advantage  of  even  temporary  success.  None  of 
their  guns  had  been  posted  with  a  view  to  cooperative  fire,  nor 
to  follow  the  charge,  and  much  of  their  ammunition  had  been 
prematurely  wasted.  And  although  Pickett's  assault,  when 
made,  actually  carried  the  enemy's  guns,  nowhere  was  there  the 
slightest  preparation  to  come  to  his  assistance.  The  burden  of 
the  whole  task  fell  upon  the  10  brigades  employed.  The  other 
27  brigades  and  56  fresh  guns  were  but  widely  scattered  spec- 
tators. 

It  was  just  1  P.M.  by  my  watch  when  the  signal  guns  were 
fired  and  the  cannonade  opened.  The  enemy  replied  rather 
slowly  at  first,  though  soon  with  increasing  rapidity.  Having 
determined  that  Pickett  should  charge,  I  felt  impatient  to  launch 
him  as  soon  as  I  could  see  that  our  fire  was  accomplishing  any- 
thing. I  guessed  that  a  half-hour  would  elapse  between  my 
sending  him  the  order  and  his  column  reaching  close  quarters. 
I  dared  not  presume  on  using  more  ammunition  than  one  hour's 


GETTYSBURG:  THIRD  DAY  423 

firing  would  consume,  for  we  were  far  from  supplies  and  had 
already  fought  for  two  days.  So  I  determined  to  send  Pickett 
the  order  at  the  very  first  favorable  sign  and  not  later  than 
after  30  minutes'  firing. 

At  ,the  end  of  20  minutes  no  favorable  development  had 
occurred.  More  guns  had  been  added  to  the  Federal  line  than 
at  the  beginning,  and  its  whole  length,  about  two  miles,  was 
blazing  like  a  volcano.  It  seemed  madness  to  order  a  column 
in  the  middle  of  a  hot  July  day  to  undertake  an  advance  of  three- 
fourths  of  a  mile  over  open  ground  against  the  centre  of  that  line. 

But  something  had  to  be  done.  I  wrote  the  following  note 
and  despatched  it  to  Pickett  at  1.25:  — 

"  General :  If  you  are  to  advance  at  all,  you  must  come  at  once  or  we 
will  not  be  able  to  support  you  as  we  ought.  But  the  enemy's  fire  has  not 
slackened  materially  and  there  are  still  18  guns  firing  from  the  cemetery." 

I  had  hardly  sent  this  note  when  there  was  a  decided  falling 
off  in  the  enemy's  fire,  and  as  I  watched  I  saw  other  guns  limbered 
up  and  withdrawn.  We  frequently  withdrew  from  fighting 
Federal  guns  in  order  to  save  our  ammunition  for  their  infantry. 
The  enemy  had  never  heretofore  practised  such  economy.  After 
waiting  a  few  minutes  and  seeing  that  no  fresh  guns  replaced 
those  withdrawn,  I  felt  sure  that  the  enemy  was  feeling  the 
punishment,  and  at  1.40  I  sent  a  note  to  Pickett  as  follows:  — 

"For  God's  sake  come  quick.  The  18  guns  have  gone.  Come  quick 
or  my  ammunition  will  not  let  me  support  you  properly." 

This  was  followed  by  two  verbal  messages  to  the  same  effect 
by  an  officer  and  sergeant  from  the  nearest  guns.  The  18  guns 
had  occupied  the  point  at  which  our  charge  was  to  be  directed. 
I  had  been  incorrectly  told  it  was  the  cemetery.  Soon  only  a 
few  scattered  Federal  guns  were  in  action,  and  still  Pickett's  line 
had  not  come  forward,  though  scarcely  300  yards  behind  my 
guns. 

I  afterward  learned  what  had  followed  the  sending  of  my  first 
note.  It  reached  Pickett  in  Longstreet's  presence.  He  read  it 
and  handed  it  to  Longstreet.  Longstreet  read  and  stood  silent. 
Pickett  said,  "General,  shall  I  advance?"  Longstreet  knew 
that  it  must  be  done,  but  was  unwilling  to  speak  the  words.  He 


424  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

turned  in  his  saddle  and  looked  away.  Pickett  saluted  and  said, 
"I  am  going  to  move  forward,  sir,"  and  galloped  off. 

Longstreet,  leaving  his  staff,  rode  out  alone  and  joined  me  on 
the  left  flank  of  the  guns.  It  was  doubtless  1.50  or  later,  but  I 
did  not  look  at  my  watch  again.  I  had  grown  very  impatient 
to  see  Pickett,  fearing  ammunition  would  run  short,  when 
Longstreet  joined  me.  I  explained  the  situation.  He  spoke 
sharply,  —  "Go  and  stop  Pickett  where  he  is  and  replenish 
your  ammunition."  I  answered :  "  We  can't  do  that,  sir.  The 
train  has  but  little.  It  would  take  an  hour  to  distribute  it,  and 
meanwhile  the  enemy  would  improve  the  time." 

Longstreet  seemed  to  stand  irresolute  (we  were  both  dis- 
mounted) and  then  spoke  slowly  and  with  great  emotion :  "  I  do 
not  want  to  make  this  charge.  I  do  not  see  how  it  can  succeed. 
I  would  not  make  it  now  but  that  Gen.  Lee  has  ordered  it  and 
is  expecting  it." 

I  felt  that  he  was  inviting  a  word  of  acquiescence  on  my  part 
and  that  if  given  he  would  again  order,  "Stop  Pickett  where 
he  is."  But  I  was  too  conscious  of  my  own  youth  and  inex- 
perience to  express  any  opinion  not  directly  asked.  So  I  re- 
mained silent  while  Longstreet  fought  his  battle  out  alone  and 
obeyed  his  orders. 

The  suspense  was  brief  and  was  ended  by  the  emergence  from 
the  wood  behind  us  of  Garnett  riding  in  front  of  his  brigade.  I 
had  served  on  the  Plains  with  him  and  Armistead  in  1858,  and 
I  now  met  him  for  the  first  time  since  Longstreet's  Suffolk  cam- 
paign. He  saluted  and  I  mounted  and  rode  with  him  while  his 
brigade  swept  through  our  guns.  Then  I  rode  down  the  line 
of  guns,  asking  what  each  gun  had  left.  Many  had  canister 
only.  These  and  all  having  but  few  shell  were  ordered  to  stand 
fast.  Those  with  a  moderate  amount  of  suitable  ammunition 
were  ordered  to  limber  up  and  advance. 

During  the  cannonade  the  reserve  ordnance  train  had  been 
moved  from  the  position  first  occupied,  and  caissons  sent  to  it 
had  not  returned.  Only  about  one  gun  in  four  could  be  ordered 
forward  from  the  centre,  but  from  the  right  Maj.  Haskell  took 
five  from  Garden's  and  Flanner's  batteries,  and  Maj.  Eshleman, 
of  the  Washington  artillery,  sent  four  somewhat  to  Haskell's  left. 


GETTYSBURG:  THIRD  DAY  425 

Returning  to  the  centre  I  joined  the  few  guns  advancing  from 
the  batteries  there,  and  moved  forward  to  a  swell  of  ground  just 
west  of  the  Emmitsburg  road,  whence  we  opened  upon  troops 
advancing  to  attack  the  right  flank  of  Pickett's  division. 
Eshleman  and  Haskell  to  the  left  front  of  the  Peach  Orchard 
soon  also  opened  fire.  The  charging  brigades  were  now  close  in 
front  of  the  Federal  lines  and  the  musketry  was  heavy. 

As  we  watched,  we  saw  them  close  in  upon  the  enemy  in  smoke 
and  dust,  and  we  ceased  firing  and  waited  the  result.  It  was 
soon  manifest  in  a  gradual  diminution  of  the  fire  and  in  a 
stream  of  fugitives  coming  to  the  rear  pursued  by  some  fire  but 
not  as  much,  it  seemed  to  me,  as  might  have  been  expected. 

After  perhaps  20  minutes,  during  which  the  firing  had  about 
ceased,  to  my  surprise  there  came  forward  from  the  rear  Wilcox's 
fine  Ala.  brigade,  which  had  been  with  us  at  Chancellorsville,  and, 
just  60  days  before,  had  won  the  affair  at  Salem  Church.  It  had 
been  sent  to  reenforce  Pickett,  but  was  not  in  the  column.  Now, 
when  all  was  over,  the  single  brigade  was  moving  forward  alone, 
and  there  was  no  one  there  with  authority  to  halt  it.  They  were 
about  1200  strong  and  on  their  left  were  about  250,  the  remnant 
of  Perry's  Fla.  brigade.  It  was  at  once  both  absurd  and  tragic. 

They  advanced  several  hundred  yards  beyond  our  guns,  under 
a  sharp  fire.  Then  they  halted  and  opened  fire  from  some 
undergrowth  and  brushwood  along  a  small  ravine.  Federal 
infantry  soon  moved  out  to  attack  their  left,  when  Perry  fell 
back  past  our  guns ;  Wilcox  moved  by  his  right  flank  and  making 
a  circuit  regained  our  lines  at  the  Peach  Orchard.  His  loss  in 
this  charge  was  204  killed  and  wounded.  Perry's  loss  was  about 
proportional,  with  some  prisoners  in  addition. 

While  Wilcox's  brigade  was  making  its  charge,  Gen.  Lee  rode 
up  and  joined  me.  He  was  entirely  alone,  which  could  scarcely 
have  happened  except  by  design  on  his  part.  We  were  not 
firing,  but  holding  position  to  prevent  pursuit  by  the  enemy.  I 
have  no  doubt  that  Lee  was  apprehensive  of  this,  and  had  come 
to  the  front  to  help  rally  the  fugitives  if  that  happened.  He 
remained  with  us  perhaps  an  hour  and  spoke  to  nearly  every 
man  who  passed,  using  expressions  such  as :  "  Don't  be  dis- 
couraged." "It  was  my  fault  this  time."  "Form  your  ranks 


426  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

again  when  you  get  under  cover."  "  All  good  men  must  hold 
together  now." 

I  had  with  me  as  an  aid,  Lt.  Colston,  ordnance  officer  of  my 
battalion.  At  one  time  loud  cheering  was  heard  in  the  Federal 
lines  and  Lee  asked  Colston  to  ride  to  the  front  and  find  out 
the  cause.  Colston's  horse  was  unused  to  the  spur  and,  balking, 
Colston  had  a  stick  handed  him  and  used  it.  Lee  said :  "  Oh, 
don't  do  that.  I  once  had  a  foolish  horse  and  I  found  gentle 
measures  so  much  the  best."  Colston  presently  reported 
that  the  Federals  were  cheering  an  officer  riding  along  their 
line.  Lee  remarked  that  he  had  thought  it  possible  that  John- 
son's division  in  the  Federal  rear  might  have  gained  some 
success.  Evidently  he  was  not  yet  informed  that  Johnson, 
about  noon,  had  withdrawn  to  a  defensive  position.  Kemper 
was  brought  by  on  a  litter.  Lee  rode  up  and  said,  "General,  I 
hope  you  are  not  badly  hurt."  Kemper  replied,  "Yes,  General, 
I'm  afraid  they  have  got  me  this  time."  Lee  pressed  his  hand, 
saying:  "I  trust  not!  I  trust  not."  Col.  Fremantle,  of  her 
Majesty's  Coldstream  Guards,  had  also  joined  the  party.  We  sat 
on  horseback  on  the  slope  behind  the  guns  where  we  could  see 
over  the  crest,  but  the  group  of  horses  was  not  visible  to  the 
enemy. 

When  all  the  fugitives  had  passed  and  there  was  still  no  sign 
of  counter-stroke,  Lee  rode  off.  I  continued  to  hold  my  line  of 
guns  with  few  changes  until  after  dark.  There  were  some 
advances  by  Federal  skirmish  lines,  which  we  kept  in  check 
with  our  guns,  sometimes  having  to  use  canister  sharply.  But 
the  Federal  guns  did  not  interfere,  for  which  we  were  duly 
grateful. 

During  the  afternoon  I  quietly  withdrew  guns,  one  at  a  time, 
sending  them  to  be  refitted,  and  by  10  o'clock  our  whole  line 
had  been  retired  about  to  the  position  from  which  the  attack 
began  on  the  2d. 

Now  that  we  have  reached  the  turning-point  of  our  campaign, 
we  may  revert  to  some  incidents  of  note  in  the  progress  of  the 
battle. 

In  speaking  of  our  neglect  to  enfilade  the  Federal  lines,  it 
was  stated  that  quite  by  accident  a  few  rounds  were  fired  during 


GETTYSBURG:  THIRD  DAY  427 

the  cannonade  which  happened  to  enfilade  a  part  of  Cemetery 
Hill.  In  the  Philadelphia  Weekly  Times  of  May  31,  1877,  Col. 
Osborne,  Chief  of  Artillery,  llth  corps,  describes  the  cannonade, 
in  which  he  commanded  "a  little  over  60  guns,"  and  mentions 
this  incident  as  follows :  — 

"The  fire  from  our  west  front  had  progressed  15  to  20  minutes  when 
several  guns  opened  on  us  from  the  ridge  beyond  East  Cemetery  Hill. 
The  line  of  fire  from  these  last  batteries,  and  the  line  of  fire  from  the  bat- 
teries on  our  west  front,  were  such  as  to  leave  the  town  between  the  two 
lines  of  fire.  These  last  guns  opened  directly  on  the  right  flank  of  my  line 
of  batteries.  The  gunners  got  our  range  at  almost  the  first  shot. 

"  Passing  low  over  Wainwright's  guns  they  caught  us  square  in  flank 
and  with  the  elevation  perfect.  It  was  admirable  shooting.  They  raked 
the  whole  line  of  batteries,  killed  and  wounded  the  men  and  horses,  and 
blew  up  the  caissons  rapidly.  I  saw  one  shell  go  through  six  horses  stand- 
ing broadside. 

"To  meet  this  new  fire  I  drew  from  the  batteries  facing  west  the  20-lb. 
Parrott  battery  of  Capt.  Taft,  and  wheeling  it  half  round  to  the  right 
brought  it  to  bear  on  them.  I  also  drew  from  the  reserve  one  battery 
and  placed  it  in  position  on  Taft's  right.  .  .  . 

"  Fortunately  for  us  these  batteries,  placed  in  the  new  line,  at  once  se- 
cured the  exact  range  of  their  immediate  adversaries.  In  a  few  minutes 
the  enemy's  fire  almost  ceased,  and  when  it  again  opened,  and  while  the 
fire  was  progressing,  it  was  irregular  and  wild.  They  did  not  again  get 
our  range  as  they  had  it  before  we  replied." 

Gen.  Howard  in  the  Atlantic  Monthly,  July,  1876,  writing  of  this 
occasion,  says,  "One  regiment  of  Steinwehr's  was  fearfully  cut 
to  pieces  with  a  shell."  It  doubtless  received  an  enfilading  shot 
from  the  firing  here  described. 

The  official  reports  enable  us  to  identify  this  firing  as  done  at 
a  range  of  2500  yards  by  three  rifled  guns  of  Milledge's  battery 
of  Nelson's  battalion  of  Swell's  reserve  artillery.  Nelson  had 
three  batteries  carrying  13  guns,  and  the  48  rounds  fired  by 
Milledge  were  the  only  shots  fired  by  the  battalion  during  the 
campaign.  It  was  not,  however,  Nelson's  fault,  but  his  superior's. 
His  report  says :  — 

"About  12  M.  I  was  ordered  to  draw  the  attention  of  the  enemy's  bat- 
teries from  our  infantry,  in  connection  with  Capt.  Graham,  commanding 
Rockbridge  artillery,  and  fired  about  20  or  25  rounds  from  a  point  to  the 
left  and  somewhat  in  advance  of  Capt.  Graham's  position.  On  Friday 
night  I  encamped  about  one-half  mile  in  rear  of  my  position  on  that  day." 


428  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

The  Ordnance  report  of  the  2d  corps  identifies  the  guns  and 
gives  the  rounds  fired  as  48. 

Mention  has  been  made  of  the  five  guns  advanced  by  Maj. 
Haskell  from  the  Peach  Orchard,  and  the  four  from  the  Wash- 
ington artillery  a  little  to  their  left.  These  guns  moved  so  far 
outside  of  Pickett's  charge  that  they  were  able  to  fire  obliquely 
upon  the  Federals  opposing  it.  Haskell  on  the  extreme  right 
was  even  able  to  enfilade  portions  of  the  Federal  reinforcements 
The  fighting  here  was  almost  hand  to  hand.  The  following 
account  is  given  by  Col.  Rice  of  the  19th  Mass. :  *  — 

"The  men  in  gray  were  doing  all  that  was  possible  to  keep  off  the  mixed 
bodies  of  men,  who  were  moving  upon  them  swiftly  and  without  hesita- 
tion, keeping  up  so  close  and  continuous  a  fire  that  at  last  its  effects  be- 
came terrible.  .  .  .  The  grove  was  fairly  jammed  with  Pickett's  men, 
in  all  positions,  lying  and  kneeling.  Back  from  the  edge  were  many  stand- 
ing and  firing  over  those  in  front.  By  the  side  of  several  who  were  firing, 
lying  down  or  kneeling,  were  others  with  their  hands  up  in  token  of 
surrender.  In  particular  I  noticed  two  men,  not  a  musket  length  away, 
one  aiming  so  that  I  could  look  into  his  musket  barrel ;  the  other,  lying 
on  his  back,  coolly  ramming  home  a  cartridge.  A  little  farther  on  was  one 
on  his  knees  waving  something  white  in  both  hands.  Every  foot  of 
ground  was  occupied  by  men  engaged  in  mortal  combat  who  were  in  every 
possible  position  which  can  be  taken  while  under  arms  or  lying  wounded 
or  dead. 

"A  Confederate  battery  near  the  Peach  Orchard  commenced  firing. 
A  cannon-shot  tore  a  horrible  passage  through  the  dense  crowd  of  men 
in  blue,  who  were  gathering  outside  the  trees.  Instantly  another  shot 
followed  and  fairly  cut  a  road  through  the  mass.  ..." 

The  official  report  of  Col.  Abbott  of  the  20th  Mass,  thus 
describes  the  same  scene:  — 

"The  enemy  poured  in  a  severe  musketry  fire,  and  at  the  clump  of 
trees  they  burst  also  several  shells,  so  that  our  loss  was  very  heavy,  more 
than  half  the  enlisted  men  of  the  regiment  being  killed  or  disabled,  while 
there  remained  but  three  out  of  13  officers.  .  .  ." 

The  enfilading  shots  described  by  Col.  Rice  doubtless  came 
irom  the  batteries  under  command  of  Maj.  Haskell.  No  official 
report  was  made,  but  I  quote  from  a  personal  letter  of  Maj. 
Haskell  some  years  later :  — 

1  B.  &  L.  387- 


GETTYSBURG:  THIRD  DAY  429 

"Just  before  Pickett's  division  charged,  you  rode  up  and  after  inquir- 
ing what  ammunition  I  had,  you  ordered  me  to  move  forward  with  five 
guns,  part  of  which  were  taken  from  each  battery.  We  advanced  about 
300  to  500  yards  when  I  saw  a  large  mass  of  infantry  to  our  left  front  be- 
ginning to  deploy,  apparently  to  strike  the  right  flank  of  Pickett's  division. 
I  at  once  opened  fire  on  this  infantry,  which  almost  immediately  scattered 
or  withdrew,  unmasking  a  large  number  of  guns.  Gen.  Hunt  told  me 
after  the  war  there  were  over  20.  In  a  very  few  minutes  these  guns  had 
disabled  several  of  mine,  killing  and  wounding  quite  a  number  of  men  and 
horses.  Our  ammunition  being  exhausted,  I  ordered  such  guns  as  could  be 
moved  to  withdraw,  ordering  Garden  and  Planner  to  return  as  quickly 
as  possible  with  litters  for  the  wounded,  and  teams  and  limbers  for  the 
disabled  guns.  This  they  did,  getting  everything  out." 

The  four  guns  under  Capt.  Miller  and  Lt.  Battle  fared  nearly 
as  badly.  Maj.  Eshleman,  seeing  that  they  were  being  rapidly 
cut  up,  withdrew  them ;  but  two  of  the  guns,  three  of  the  teams, 
a  Lt.,  and  several  men  were  put  hors  de  combat  in  the  movement. 

But  one  official  report  from  Pickett's  division  has  been  pub- 
lished, that  of  Garnett's  brigade,  by  Maj.  C.  S.  Peyton,  19th  Va., 
who  was  the  only  field  officer  of  the  division  not  killed  or  wounded. 
Pickett  wrote  a  report  which  reflected  unjustly  upon  the  bri- 
gades of  Hill's  corps,  among  which  the  break  first  occurred. 
Lee  returned  the  report,  asking  Pickett  to  modify  it,  which 
Pickett  delayed  and  finally  neglected  to  do.  I  quote  from 
Peyton's  report,  dated  July  9,  as  follows :  — 

"  Notwithstanding  the  long  and  severe  marches  made  by  the  troops  of 
this  brigade,  they  reached  the  field  about  9  A.M.  in  high  spirits  and  in  good 
condition.  At  about  12  M.  we  were  ordered  to  take  position  behind  the 
crest  of  the  hill,  on  which  the  artillery  under  Col.  Alexander  was  planted, 
where  we  lay  during  the  most  terrific  cannonading,  which  opened  at  1.30 
P.M.,  and  was  kept  up  without  intermission  for  one  hour. 

"During  the  shelling  we  lost  about  20  killed  and  wounded.  Among 
the  killed  was  Lt.-Col.  Ellis  of  the  19th  Va.  .  .  .  At  2.30  P.M.  the  artil- 
lery fire  having  to  some  extent  abated,  the  order  to  advance  was  given, 
first  by  Gen.  Pickett  in  person,  and  repeated  by  Gen.  Garnett  with  prompt- 
ness, apparent  cheerfulness,  and  alacrity.  The  brigade  moved  forward 
at  quick  time.  The  ground  was  open,  but  little  broken,  and  from  800  to 
1000  yards  from  the  crest  whence  we  started  to  the  enemy's  line.  The  bri- 
gade moved  in  good  order,  keeping  up  its  line  almost  perfectly,  notwith- 
standing it  had  to  climb  three  high  post  and  rail  fences,  behind  the  last 
of  which  the  enemy's  skirmishers  were  first  met,  and  immediately  driven 


430  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

in.  Moving  on,  we  soon  met  the  advanced  line  of  the  enemy,  lying 
concealed  in  the  grass  on  the  slope  about  100  yards  in  front  of  his  second 
line,  which  consisted  of  a  stone  wall,  about  breast  high,  running  nearly 
parallel  to  and  about  30  paces  from  the  crest  of  the  hill  which  was  lined 
with  their  artillery. 

"The  first  line  referred  to  above,  after  offering  some  resistance,  was 
completely  routed,  and  driven  in  confusion  back  to  the  stone  wall.  Here 
we  captured  some  prisoners,  which  were  ordered  to  the  rear  without  a 
guard.  Having  routed  the  enemy  here,  Gen.  Garnett  ordered  the  brigade 
forward,  which  it  promptly  obeyed,  loading  and  firing  as  it  advanced. 

"  Up  to  this  time  we  had  suffered  but  little  from  the  enemy's  batteries, 
which  apparently  had  been  much  crippled  previous  to  our  advance,  with 
the  exception  of  one  posted  on  the  mountain,  about  one  mile  to  our  right, 
which  enfiladed  nearly  our  entire  line  with  fearful  effect,  sometimes  as 
many  as  10  men  being  killed  and  wounded  by  the  bursting  of  a  single 
shell.  From  the  point  it  had  first  routed  the  enemy,  the  brigade  moved 
rapidly  toward  the  stone  wall,  under  a  galling  fire  both  from  artillery  and 
infantry,  the  artillery  using  grape  and  canister.  We  were  now  within 
about  75  paces  of  the  wall,  unsupported  on  the  right  and  left.  Gen. 
Kemper  being  some  50  or  60  yards  behind  and  to  the  right,  and  Gen.  Armi- 
stead  coming  up  in, our  rear. 

"  Gen.  Kemper 's  line  was  discovered  to  be  lapping  on  ours,  when,  deem- 
ing it  advisable  to  have  the  line  extended  on  the  right,  to  prevent  being 
flanked,  a  staff  officer  rode  back  to  the  general  to  request  him  to  incline 
to  the  right.  Gen.  Kemper  not  being  present  (perhaps  wounded  at 
the  time),  Capt.  Fry  of  his  staff  immediately  began  his  exertions  to  carry 
out  the  request,  but  in  consequence  of  the  eagerness  of  the  men  in  pressing 
forward,  it  was  impossible  to  have  the  order  carried  out. 

"Our  line,  much  shattered,  still  kept  up  the  advance  until  within 
about  20  paces  of  the  wall,  when,  for  a  moment,  it  recoiled  under  the 
terrific  fire  that  poured  into  our  ranks  both  from  their  batteries  and 
from  their  sheltered  infantry.  At  this  moment  Gen.  Kemper  came  up  on 
the  right  and  Gen.  Armistead  in  rear,  when  the  three  lines,  joining  in  con- 
cert, rushed  forward  with  unyielding  determination  and  an  apparent  spirit 
of  laudable  rivalry  to  plant  the  Southern  banner  on  the  walls  of  the  enemy. 
His  strongest  and  last  lines  were  instantly  gained ;  the  Confederate  battle 
flag  waved  over  his  defences,  and  the  fighting  over  the  wall  became 
hand  to  hand  and  of  the  most  desperate  character;  but,  more  than  half 
having  already  fallen,  our  line  was  found  too  weak  to  rout  the  enemy. 

"We  hoped  for  a  support  on  the  left  (which  had  started  simultaneously 
with  ourselves),  but  hoped  in  vain.  Yet  a  small  remnant  remained  in 
desperate  struggle,  receiving  a  fire  in  front,  on  the  right  and  on  the  left, 
many  even  climbing  over  the  wall,  and  fighting  the  enemy  in  his  own 
trenches  until  entirely  surrounded;  and  those  who  were  not  killed  or 
wounded  were  captured,  with  the  exception  of  about  300  who  came  off 


GETTYSBURG:  THIRD  DAY  431 

slowly,  but  greatly  scattered,  the  identity  of  every  regiment  being  en- 
tirely lost,  and  every  regimental  commander  killed  or  wounded. 

"The  brigade  went  into  action  with  1287  men  and  about  140  officers, 
as  shown  by  the  report  of  the  previous  evening,  and  sustained  a  loss,  as  the 
list  of  casualties  will  show,  of  941  killed,  wounded,  and  missing,  and  it  is 
feared,  from  all  the  information  received,  that  the  majority  (those  reported 
missing)  are  either  killed  or  wounded.  .  .  . 

"There  was  scarcely  an  officer  or  man  in  the  command  whose  attention 
was  not  attracted  by  the  cool  and  handsome  bearing  of  Gen.  Garnett, 
who,  totally  devoid  of  excitement  or  rashness,  rode  immediately  in  rear 
of  his  advancing  line,  endeavoring  by  his  personal  efforts,  and  by  the  aid 
of  his  staff,  to  keep  his  line  well  closed  and  dressed.  He  was  shot  from 
his  horse  while  near  the  centre  of  the  brigade,  within  about  25  paces  of  the 
stone  wall.  .  .  . 

"The  conduct  of  Capt.  M.  P.  Spessard  of  the  28th  Va.  was  particu- 
larly conspicuous.  His  son  fell  mortally  wounded  at  his  side ;  he  stopped 
but  for  a  moment  to  look  on  his  dying  son,  gave  him  his  canteen  of  water, 
and  pressed  on,  with  his  company,  to  the  wall,  which  he  climbed,  and 
fought  the  enemy  with  his  sword  in  their  own  trenches  until  his  sword  was 
wrested  from  his  hands  by  two  Yankees;  he  finally  made  his  escape  in 
safety." 

All  accounts  of  the  charge  agree  that  its  failure  began  when 
the  advance  had  covered  about  half  the  distance  to  the  Federal 
line.  At  that  point  the  left  flank  of  Pettigrew  began  to  crumble 
away  and  the  crumbling  extended  along  the  line  to  the  right  as 
they  continued  to  advance  until  two-thirds  of  the  line  was  gone, 
before  the  remainder,  beginning  at  Fry's  brigade,  was  finally 
absorbed  in  the  collision  with  the  enemy.  That  result  was  in- 
evitable. Under  the  conditions  it  should  have  been  foreseen. 

The  Federal  line  on  our  left  overlapped  our  line  by  nearly  a 
half-mile.  It  was  crowded  with  guns,  and  their  oblique  fire  upon 
the  unsupported  left  could  be  endured  but  for  a  short  period, 
particularly,  as  several  fences  crossed  their  line  of  advance, 
causing  constant  disturbance  of  their  ranks.  The  artillery  of 
the  3d  corps,  firing  from  Seminary  Ridge,  which  had  been  vainly 
expected  to  silence  this  portion  of  the  enemy's  line,  was  now 
itself  practically  silent,  on  account  of  its  imprudent  expenditure 
in  the  duel  about  11  A.M.  Lee's  report  says :  — 

"Our  artillery,  having  nearly  exhausted  their  ammunition  in  the 
protracted  cannonade  that  preceded  the  advance  of  the  infantry,  were 
unable  to  reply  or  render  the  necessary  support  to  the  attacking  party. 


432  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

Owing  to  this  fact,  which  was  unknown  to  me  when  the  assault  took  place, 
the  enemy  was  enabled  to  throw  a  strong  force  of  infantry  against  our 
left,  already  wavering  under  a  concentrated  fire  of  artillery  from  the  ridge 
in  front  and  from  Cemetery  Hill  on  the  left.  It  finally  gave  way,  and  the 
right,  after  penetrating  the  enemy's  lines,  entering  his  advanced  works 
and  capturing  some  of  his  artillery,  was  attacked  simultaneously  in  front 
and  on  both  flanks,  and  driven  back  with  heavy  loss." 

Evidently  the  reliance  for  the  support  of  our  left  flank  had 
been  the  fire  of  the  82  guns  from  Seminary  Ridge.  It  was  as 
oversanguine  as  that  expressed  by  Col.  Long  in  the  morning 
conference  on  the  right,  and  it  failed  to  note  that  the  enemy 
might  hold  guns  in  reserve.  This  was  done  on  the  present  occa- 
sion. Hunt,  the  Federal  chief  of  artillery,  had  withdrawn  many 
guns  to  await  the  charge  which  he  knew  was  coming. 

The  crumbling  away  of  Pettigrew's  left  precipitated  the 
advance  of  Wilcox.  Pickett,  who  was  riding  with  his  staff  in 
rear  of  his  division,  saw  that  the  brigades  on  the  left  were  break- 
ing and  sent  two  aides  to  endeavor  to  rally  them,  which  they 
were  unable  to  do.  A  third  was  sent  at  the  same  moment  to 
Longstreet  to  say  that  the  position  in  front  would  be  taken,  but 
that  reinforcements  would  be  required  to  hold  it.  Longstreet, 
in  reply,  directed  Pickett  to  order  up  Wilcox,  and  Pickett  sent 
three  messengers  in  succession  to  be  sure  that  the  order  was 
promptly  acted  upon.  As  the  fugitives  from  Pettigrew's  divi- 
sion came  back,  Wright's  brigade  of  Anderson's  division  was 
moved  forward  a  few  hundred  yards  to  cover  their  retreat. 
Later,  after  Wilcox  had  fallen  back,  by  Lee's  order,  Wright  was 
moved  across  to  the  rear  in  support  of  Wilcox,  in  case  the  enemy 
should  make  an  advance,  which  at  times  seemed  probable  during 
the  entire  afternoon. 

It  must  be  ever  held  a  colossal  mistake  that  Meade  did  not 
organize  a  counter-stroke  as  soon  as  he  discovered  that  the  Con- 
federate attack  had  been  repulsed.  He  lost  here  an  opportunity 
as  great  as  McClellan  lost  at  Sharpsburg.  Our  ammunition  was 
.so  low,  and  our  diminished  forces  were,  at  the  moment,  so  widely 
dispersed  along  our  unwisely  extended  line,  that  an  advance 
by  a  single  fresh  corps,  the  6th,  for  instance,  could  have  cut  us 
in  two.  Meade  might  at  least  have  felt  that  he  had  nothing  to 
lose  and  everything  to  gain  by  making  the  effort. 


GETTYSBURG:  THIRD  DAY  433 

Longstreet  felt  that  the  lines  held  by  Hood  and  McLaws  were 
unwisely  advanced  for  the  changed  conditions,  and,  during  the 
afternoon,  he  quietly  withdrew  these  divisions  to  the  rear  of  the 
Emmitsburg  road.  During  the  process  of  the  withdrawal, 
the  enemy  advanced  McCandless's  brigade  of  the  5th  corps 
into  the  neutral  ground  between  the  lines,  where  it  accidentally 
encountered  the  15th  Ga.  of  Benning's  brigade.  This  by  mis- 
take had  been  marched  to  the  front,  when  it  was  intended  to  be 
moved  to  the  rear.  The  regiment,  though  only  numbering  about 
250,  took  a  position  and  opened  fire,  expecting  reinforcements. 
It  was  quickly  outflanked  and  only  with  difficulty  and  by  severe 
fighting  did  it  extricate  itself,  losing  101  men. 

During  the  morning  there  were  cavalry  affairs  upon  each  of 
our  flanks.  Upon  our  left,  Stuart  advanced,  and  a  severe  combat 
ensued  with  Gregg's  division  and  Ouster's  brigade.  The  result 
was  a  draw,  each  side  claiming  what  it  held  at  the  close  as  a 
victory.  Upon  our  right,  Kilpatrick  reports  that  at  8  A.M.  he 
received  orders,  — 

"to  move  to  the  left  of  the  Federal  line  and  attack  the  enemy's  right 
and  rear  with  his  whole  command  [Ouster's  and  Farnsworth's  brigades], 
and  the  regular  brigade  [Merritt'sl." 

By  some  mistake,  surely  a  fortunate  one  for  the  Confederates, 
Ouster's  brigade  had  already  been  sent  to  Gregg's  division,  on 
the  other  flank.  Our  right  was  at  first  merely  picketed  by  100 
cavalry  on  the  extreme  flank,  while,  nearer  the  position  of  our 
infantry,  was  a  strong  line  of  skirmishers  with  Bachman's  and 
Reilly's  batteries  in  support. 

Had  Kilpatrick  come  with  three  brigades  upon  our  right  flank, 
he  could  not  have  failed  to  discover  an  immense  opportunity 
open  to  him.  Behind  the  mask  of  our  videttes  were  wide  fields 
stretching  along  the  valleys  of  Willoughby  Run  and  Marsh 
Creek  for  miles  to  the  north  and  west,  containing  all  our  trains 
practically  unguarded.  The  bulk  of  our  cavalry  was  engaging 
Gregg's  division  about  two  miles  east  of  Gettysburg.  Once 
through  our  skirmish  line,  Kilpatrick  would  have  had  great  scope 
before  any  adequate  force  could  be  brought  against  him.  As  it 
was,  we  had  a  narrow  escape.  Merritt's  dismounted  men  had 


434  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

found  the  flank  of  our  videttes,  and  were  driving  them  rapidly 
to  the  rear,  when  Anderson's  brigade  was  brought  to  the  rescue, 
and  Merritt  was  driven  back. 

Meanwhile,  Kilpatrick  had  ordered  Farnsworth  to  charge 
through  our  long  line  of  infantry  pickets  extending  from  the 
Emmitsburg  road  to  the  right  flank  of  our  infantry  line  on  the 
lower  slope  of  Big  Round  Top.  Farnsworth  at  first  remonstrated, 
but  then  made  the  charge  gallantly,  with  about  300  men  of  the 
1st  W.  Va.  and  the  1st  Vt.  They  rode  through  the  Texan  skir- 
mish line,  but  found  themselves  surrounded  with  no  escape  but 
to  make  a  circuit  and  return,  broken  into  squads  by  the  fire  of 
infantry  and  artillery,  and  by  the  natural  obstacles  of  the 
ground.  Farnsworth  fell  with  five  mortal  wounds.  The  total 
killed  and  wounded  in  the  charge  were  65. 1 

The  report  of  the  Federal  chief  of  artillery  gives  interesting 
details.  The  supply  of  ammunition  carried  with  that  army  was 
270  rounds  per  gun.  The  Confederate  army  carried  for  the 
campaign  about  150  rounds  per  gun. 

Hunt  reports  an  expenditure  in  action  of  32,781  rounds,  an 
average  of  106  per  gun  for  310  guns,  excluding  the  cavalry. 
Swell's  corps  reports  5851  rounds  expended,  and  Hill's  corps 
7112  rounds.  No  report  was  made  of  Longstreet's  ammunition, 
but  his  83  guns  were  all  engaged,  while  Ewell  and  Hill  each 
engaged  only  65.  Ewell  averaged  about  90  rounds  per  gun 
engaged,  and  Hill  about  110,  Longstreet's  83  guns  doubtless 
averaged  as  much  as  Hill's,  which  would  make  about  9000  for 
the  battle.  This  gives  an  aggregate  for  the  army  of  about 
22,000,  or  103  rounds  per  gun  for  213  guns  engaged,  excluding 
cavalry.  The  killed  and  wounded  (not  including  the  missing) 
in  the  Federal  reserve  artillery,  108  guns  all  engaged,  num- 
bered 230,  an  average  per  gun  of  2.1.  In  Longstreet's  corps 
the  total  was  271,  for  83  guns,  an  average  per  gun  of  2.6.  In 

1  Confederate  eye-witnesses  declared  that  Farnsworth,  having  fallen 
mortally  wounded,  was  summoned  to  surrender,  but  refused  and  shot  himself. 
His  shoulder-straps  and  papers  were  brought  into  our  lines  and  the  story  told 
by  reliable  witnesses  during  the  afternoon.  Federal  accounts,  however, 
claim  that  the  wounded  officer  who  shot  himself  was  not  Farnsworth  but 
a  Capt.  Cushman  who  was  left  for  dead  on  the  field,  but  recovered  and  was 
killed  in  a  later  battle. 


GETTYSBURG:  THIRD  DAY  435 

Swell's  the  total  was  132,  and  average  per  gun  engaged  2.  In  Hill's 
the  total  was  128  and  average  per  gun  engaged  2.  The  destruc- 
tion of  artillery  horses  was  very  great,  but  figures  are  given  only 
for  Hill's  corps.  This  reported  190  killed  in  action,  80  captured, 
187  abandoned  on  the  road,  and  200  condemned  as  broken  down ; 
a  total  of  627  lost  in  the  campaign,  with  77  guns.  Serving  the 
26  guns  of  Alexander's  battalion,  138  men  and  116  horses,  or 
over  5  men  and  4  horses  per  gun,  were  killed  or  wounded.  The 
greater  part  of  this  loss  was  from  artillery  fire,  and  its  severity 
shows  that  the  ground  occupied  was  unfavorable  and  afforded 
little  shelter. 

An  anxious  inventory  of  the  ammunition  left  on  hand  was  made 
during  that  afternoon,  and  much  relief  was  felt  that  "enough 
for  one  day's  fight"  was  found. 

During  the  afternoon  of  the  3d,  Lee  determined  upon  immedi- 
ate retreat  to  Va.  Such  an  end  to  our  invasion  had,  indeed,  been 
inevitable  from  its  beginning,  but  the  difficulties  were  now  greatly 
increased.  Fortunately,  Meade  was  not  in  aggressive  mood,  and 
Lee  decided  to  give  his  trains  one  day's  start  of  his  troops. 
Many  Federal  writers  have  sought  to  excuse  Meade's  failures  to 
improve  the  opportunities  offered  him,  one  after  the  other,  on 
the  3d,  4th,  and  5th,  and  llth,  12th,  and  13th  of  July.  It  is 
needless  to  balance  pros  and  cons.  An  axiom  of  the  game  of 
war  is  to  attack  whenever  a  large  stake  may  be  won  by  success, 
and  but  small  loss  incurred  by  repulse.  Then  the  game  is 
worth  the  candle,  and  the  game  must  be  played.  It  is  the  hard- 
est of  all  games  to  a  general  new  to  the  responsibility  of  chief 
command. 

Under  cover  of  the  night,  Lee  took  a  defensive  line  upon  Semi- 
nary Ridge  with  its  right  flank  retired  to  Willoughby  Run.  Here 
he  stood  all  day  of  the  4th,  apparently  inviting  attack,  but  for- 
tunate in  remaining  unmolested. 

Imboden's  cavalry  had  joined  him  on  the  3d,  2100  strong,  with 
a  six-gun  battery.  During  the  night  of  the  3d,  Imboden  had 
been  directed  to  organize  most  of  our  vehicles  into  a  single 
train,  and  to  conduct  it  without  a  halt  to  Williamsport.  Here 
it  would  stop  only  to  feed,  and  would  then  ford  the  Potomac  and 
move  without  a  halt  to  Winchester.  Imboden's  force,  with  a 


436  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

few  more  guns,  would  guard  the  front  and  flanks  of  the  column, 
which  would  be  about  17  miles  long.  A  brigade  of  Stuart's 
cavalry,  with  a  battery,  would  guard  the  rear.  Lee's  medical 
director  was  charged  to  see  that  all  the  wounded  who  could  bear 
the  journey  were  carried  in  the  empty  wagons  and  ambulances. 

What  this  journey  was  to  mean  to  the  wounded,  none  seem  to 
have  imagined  before  starting,  or  they  would  have  greatly  pre- 
ferred to  become  prisoners.  Every  vehicle  appeared  to  be 
loaded  to  its  capacity. 

It  was  about  4  P.M.  on  the  4th  before  the  head  of  the  train  was 
put  in  motion  from  Cashtown.  Meanwhile,  what  would  have 
seemed  a  visitation  of  the  wrath  of  God  had  come  upon  us,  had 
we  not  preferred  the  theory  which  has  been  previously  referred 
to,  that  storms  may  be  generated  by  heavy  firings.  Now  there 
came  suddenly,  out  of  the  clear  sky  of  the  day  before,  one  of 
the  heaviest  rainfalls  I  have  ever  seen.  Probably  four  inches 
of  water  fell  within  12  hours,  and  it  was  sure  to  make  the  Poto- 
mac unfordable  for  a  week.  Imboden,  in  Battles  and  Leaders, 
gives  the  following  description :  — 

"  Shortly  after  noon  on  the  4th,  the  very  windows  of  heaven  seemed 
to  have  opened.  The  rain  fell  in  blinding  sheets,  the  meadows  were  soon 
overflowed,  and  fences  gave  way  before  the  raging  streams.  During  the 
storm,  wagons,  ambulances,  and  artillery  carriages  by  hundreds  —  nay,  by 
thousands  —  were  assembling  in  the  fields  along  the  road  from  Gettys- 
burg to  Cashtown  in  one  confused  and  apparently  inextricable  mass. 
As  the  afternoon  wore  on,  there  was  no  abatement  of  the  storm.  Can- 
vas was  no  protection  against  its  fury,  and  the  wounded  men,  lying  upon 
the  naked  boards  of  the  wagon-bodies  were  drenched,  horses  and  mules 
were  blinded  and  maddened  by  the  wind  and  water,  and  became  almost 
unmanageable." 

My  personal  recollections  of  the  occasion  are  vivid.  About 
5  P.M.,  my  somewhat  battered  battalion  drew  into  a  meadow 
adjoining  the  Fair  field  Pike  with  orders  to  watch  the  passing 
column  of  troops  and  take  its  place  in  the  column  immediately 
behind  the  3d  corps,  when  it  passed.  This  might  be,  we  were 
told,  in  an  hour  or  two.  TJiere  was  good  grass  in  the  meadow 
and  the  horses  needed  food,  but  the  need  to  move  promptly 
when  the  time  came  prevented  unhitching.  By  good  fortune, 
four  of  us  got  possession  of  an  old  door,  upon  which  we  could  sit, 


GETTYSBURG:  THIRD  DAY  437 

laying  it  flat  on  a  knoll  some  50  yards  from  the  road.  On  that 
door  we  sat  or  lay  in  the  rain  all  night,  every  half-hour  taking 
turns  in  walking  out  to  the  road  to  see  what  command  was 
passing.  At  daylight  the  rain  ceased  to  fall,  but  the  sky  re- 
mained threatening.  About  6  A.M.,  we  took  our  place  in  the 
column,  and  marched  19  hours  until  1  A.M.  that  night.  Then  we 
bivouacked  until  four  near  Monterey  Springs  on  the  Blue  Ridge. 
We  then  marched  again  for  14  hours,  and  bivouacked  about  6  P.M. 
two  or  three  miles  beyond  Hagerstown.  Swell's  corps,  moving 
behind  ours,  did  not  leave  the  vicinity  of  Gettysburg  until  about 
noon  on  the  5th. 

The  wagon-train  under  Imboden  moved  on  roads  to  our  right, 
via  Greenwood  to  Williamsport.  It  made  better  speed  than  our 
column  of  infantry  and  artillery,  but  at  a  cost  of  human  suffering 
which  it  is  terrible  to  contemplate.  Some  of  the  wounded  were 
taken  from  the  wagons  dead  at  Williamsport,  and  many  who  were 
expected  to  recover  died  from  the  effects  of  the  journey.  Among 
these,  it  was  said,  were  Gens.  Fender  and  Semmes,  neither  of 
whom  had  been  thought  mortally  wounded. 

Imboden  gives  a  harrowing  account  of  the  movement  of  the 
train,  as  follows :  — 

"After  dark  I  set  out  from  Cashtown  to  gain  the  head  of  the  column 
during  the  night.  My  orders  had  been  peremptory  that  there  should 
be  no  halt  for  any  cause  whatever.  If  an  accident  should  happen  to  any 
vehicle,  it  was  immediately  to  be  put  out  of  the  road  and  abandoned. 
The  column  moved  rapidly,  considering  the  rough  roads  and  the  darkness, 
and  from  almost  every  wagon  issued  heart-rending  wails  of  agony.  For 
four  hours  I  hurried  forward  on  my  way  to  the  front,  and  in  all  that  time 
I  was  never  out  of  hearing  of  the  groans  and  cries  of  the  wounded  and 
dying.  Scarcely  one  in  a  hundred  had  received  adequate  surgical  aid, 
owing  to  the  demands  on  the  hard-working  surgeons  from  still  worse  cases 
which  had  to  be  left  behind.  Many  of  the  wounded  in  the  wagons  had 
been  without  food  for  36  hours.  Their  torn  and  bloody  clothing,  matted 
and  hardened,  was  rasping  the  tender,  inflamed,  and  still  oozing  wounds. 
Very  few  of  the  wagons  had  even  a  layer  of  straw  in  them  and  all  were 
without  springs.  The  road  was  rough  and  rocky  from  the  heavy  washings 
of  the  preceding  day.  The  jolting  was  enough  to  have  killed  strong  men 
if  long  exposed  to  it." 

"From  nearly  every  wagon  as  the  teams  trotted  on,  urged  by  whip 
and  shout,  came  such  cries  and  shrieks  as  these :  — 

'"Oh  God!    Why  can't  I  die!' 


438  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

" '  My  God  !     Will  no  one  have  mercy  and  kill  me ! ' 

"'Stop!  Oh!  for  God's  sake  stop  just  for  one  minute;  take  me  out 
and  leave  me  to  die  by  the  roadside.' 

" '  I  am  dying !  I  am  dying !  My  poor  wife,  my  dear  children !  What 
will  become  of  you  ? '  .  .  . 

"  No  help  could  be  rendered  to  any  of  the  sufferers.  No  heed  could  be 
given  to  any  of  their  appeals.  Mercy  and  duty  to  the  many  forbade 
the  loss  of  a  moment  in  the  vain  effort  then  and  there  to  comply  with  the 
prayers  of  the  few.  On !  On !  We  must  move  on.  The  storm  con- 
tinued, and  the  darkness  was  appalling.  There  was  no  time  to  fill  even  a 
canteen  of  water  for  a  dying  man,  for,  except  the  drivers  and  the  guards, 
all  were  wounded  and  utterly  helpless  in  that  vast  procession  of  misery." 

When  daylight  came,  the  head  of  the  column  had  reached  Green- 
castle,  having  traversed  about  30  miles,  and  it  still  had  15  to  go 
to  reach  Williamsport.  Here  began  a  succession  of  small  at- 
tacks of  the  long  train  by  citizens,  and  small  detachments  of 
Federal  cavalry,  scouting  in  the  country.  At  one  point  some 
citizens  cut  the  spokes  of  a  dozen  wagons,  but  a  guard  sent  back, 
arrested  and  took  them  off  as  prisoners  of  war.  At  another 
point  about  a  hundred  wagons  were  captured.  The  head  of  the 
column  reached  Williamsport  in  the  afternoon  and  during  the 
night  the  balance  came  up.  Here  it  met  two  regiments  of  John- 
son's division,  returning  from  Staunton,  where  they  had  escorted 
the  prisoners  taken  at  Winchester  on  the  advance. 

Imboden  required  every  family  in  the  town  to  cook  provisions 
for  the  wounded,  under  pain  of  having  its  kitchen  occupied.  The 
river  was  in  flood  and  impassable  except  by  two  small  ferry-boats. 
Next  morning  he  learned  of  the  approach  of  five  Federal  brigades 
of  cavalry  —  about  7000  men,  with  18  guns.  The  flanks  of  the 
city  fortunately  rested  upon  creeks,  leaving  only  the  north  front 
to  be  defended.  He  armed  about  800  teamsters  and  convales- 
cents, and  with  the  two  regiments  of  infantry  and  his  dismounted 
cavalry  he  marched  about  so  as  to  create  the  impression  of  a 
large  force.  He  put  in  the  line  all  of  his  guns  and  brought  over 
some  ammunition  in  the  ferry-boats.  A  sharp  fight  ensued, 
the  teamsters  acquitting  themselves  handsomely.  The  enemy 
was  driven  back  and  held  off  until  the  approach  of  Stuart's 
cavalry  in  the  afternoon  caused  the  Federal  cavalry  to  with- 
draw. 


GETTYSBURG:  THIRD  DAY  439 

As  a  precaution  against  such  freshets,  Lee  had  maintained  a 
pontoon  bridge  at  Falling  Waters.  But  it  was  weakly  guarded, 
and  on  June  5,  a  small  raiding  party,  sent  by  French  from 
Frederick,  had  broken  it,  and  destroyed  some  of  its  boats, 
fortunately  not  all.  The  retreat  of  the  army  was,  therefore, 
brought  to  a  standstill  just  when  48  hours  more  would  have 
placed  it  beyond  pursuit.  We  were  already  nearly  out  of 
provisions,  and  now  the  army  was  about  to  be  penned  upon 
the  river  bank,  and  subjected  to  an  attack  at  his  leisure  by 
Meade. 

All  diligence  was  used  to  relieve  the  situation.  The  ferry- 
boats were  in  use  by  day  and  by  night  carrying  over,  first,  our 
wounded,  and  next  5000  Federal  prisoners  brought  from 
Gettysburg.  These  were  safely  escorted  on  to  Staunton 
by  Imboden  with  a  single  regiment  of  infantry.  Warehouses 
upon  the  canal  were  torn  down,  and  from  the  timber  new 
pontoon  boats  were  being  built  to  repair  the  bridge  at  Falling 
Waters. 

Meanwhile,  the  engineers  selected  and  fortified  a  line  of  bat- 
tle upon  which  we  would  make  a  last  stand.  A  fairly  good 
line  was  found  with  its  right  flank  on  the  Potomac  near 
Downsville,  passing  by  St.  James  College  and  resting  its  left 
on  the  Conococheague.  Longstreet's  corps  held  its  right  flank, 
Hill  the  centre,  and  Ewell  the  left.  On  the  10th,  Meade 
was  approaching  rapidly,  driving  in  our  advanced  guards. 
An  unfortunate  affair  occurred  at  Funks  town,  where  Ander- 
son's Ga.  brigade,  called  upon  to  assist  our  cavalry,  was 
so  badly  directed  by  them  that  a  Federal  battery  enfiladed 
the  line,  and  a  battery  of  our  own  horse  artillery  by 
mistake  also  fired  into  it.  The  brigade  suffered  126  cas- 
ualties. 

On  the  llth,  the  army  was  ordered  into  position  upon  the 
selected  line,  Lee  in  person  overlooking  the  placing  of  Long- 
street's  corps.  I  never  before,  and  never  afterward,  saw  him 
as  I  thought  visibly  anxious  over  an  approaching  action; 
but  I  did  upon  this  occasion.  No  one  can  say  what  might 
have  been  the  result  of  a  Federal  attack,  for,  although  our 
supply  of  ammunition  was  low,  we  were  on  the  defensive,  and 


440  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

the  temper  of  the  troops  was  excellent  for  a  desperate  resist- 
ance. 

Meade's  report  indicates  easy  acquiescence  in  our  retreat  from 
Gettysburg.  While  the  6th  corps  followed  us  to  the  vicinity  of 
Fairfield  on  the  5th,  picking  up  stragglers,  the  rest  of  the  army 
remained  on  the  battle-field  for  two  days,  "employed  in  succor- 
ing the  wounded  and  burying  the  dead." 

A  third  day  was  lost  "halting  a  day  at  Middletown  to  procure 
necessary  supplies  and  to  bring  up  the  trains."  Under  ordi- 
nary circumstances  Lee  might  now  have  been  across  the  Poto- 
mac, but  there  were  further  rains  on  the  7th  and  8th,  and  Lee's 
escape  was  exceedingly  narrow. 

On  the  13th,  both  his  bridge  and  the  ford  near  Williamsport 
were  passable,  and  orders  were  issued  to  make  the  crossing  during 
that  night.  The  river  had  fallen  to  a  stage  barely  permitting 
infantry  to  ford,  but  about  dark  it  again  began  to  rise.  Ewell's 
corps  was  ordered  to  cross  by  the  ford.  Longstreet,  followed 
by  Hill,  was  to  cross  by  the  pontoon  bridge.  Caissons  were  or- 
dered to  start  from  the  lines  at  5  P.M.,  the  infantry  and  artillery 
at  dark. 

Meade  might  have  attacked  on  the  12th  but  contented  himself 
with  reconnoissance.  As  a  result  of  the  reconnoissance  of  the 
12th,  he  assembled  his  corps  commanders  and  proposed  a  dem- 
onstration in  force  on  the  13th  by  the  whole  army,  to  be  con- 
verted into  an  attack  if  any  opening  was  found. 

The  opinion  of  a  majority  of  his  leading  officers  was  so  adverse 
to  the  proposition  that  Meade  allowed  himself  to  be  persuaded, 
thus  giving  Lee  the  last  day  needed.  Later  in  the  day  he  re- 
pented and  issued  orders  for  a  general  advance  on  the  14th.  It 
was  made  just  a  day  too  late.  Lee  had  left  only  two  guns  stalled 
in  the  mud,  and  a  few  hundred  stragglers  broken  down  by  the 
night  march,  short  in  distance,  but  rarely  equalled  for  its 
discomfort  and  fatigue. 

Another  rain-storm  had  set  in  before  dusk,  and  it  kept  up  nearly 
all  night.  It  was  the  dark  period  of  the  moon  and  the  blackness 
of  the  night  was  phenomenal.  The  route  to  the  bridge  was 
over  small  farm  roads,  rough,  narrow,  and  hilly.  Already 
from  the  incessant  rams  they  were  in  bad  condition,  and  now, 


GETTYSBURG:  THIRD  DAY  441 

under  the  long  procession  of  heavy  wheels,  churning  in  the  mud, 
they  became  canals  of  slush  in  which  many  vehicles  were  hope- 
lessly stalled. 

My  command,  between  sunset  and  sunrise,  was  only  able  to 
cover  about  three  miles  —  seldom  moving  more  than  a  few  yards 
at  a  time.  Large  bonfires  on  the  banks  were  kept  up  to  light 
the  entrance  upon  the  bridge,  but  in  spite  of  them  a  wagon 
loaded  with  wounded  ran  off  into  the  river.  After  daylight 
the  weather  cleared  and  better  progress  was  made,  the  last  of 
Hill's  corps  crossing  about  1  P.M.  During  the  morning  it  was 
followed  by  the  enemy  who  skirmished  with  our  rear-guard  and 
picked  up  stragglers. 

In  one  of  these  skirmishes,  a  small  body  of  Federal  cavalry  was 
allowed  to  approach  within  200  yards  of  Heth's  division  under 
Pettigrew,  who  supposed  them  to  be  our  own  cavalry  bringing 
up  the  rear.  These,  however,  had  passed  without  giving 
notice  that  they  were  the  last.  A  Maj.  Weber,  of  the  6th  Mich. 
Cav.,  seeing  but  a  small  portion  of  the  Confederate  line, 
charged  it  with  about  40  men.  Weber  was  killed  and  nine- 
tenths  of  his  command  shot  down,  but  one  of  a  few  pistol-shots 
which  they  fired  gave  a  mortal  wound  to  Gen.  Pettigrew.  He 
had  been  wounded  in  the  hand  on  the  3d,  and  was  unable  to 
manage  his  horse,  which  reared  and  fell  with  him.  In  the  act 
of  rising,  the  fatal  shot  struck  him. 

Ewell's  corps  reached  Williamsport  by  the  Hagerstown  turn- 
pike and  commenced  fording  the  river  by  midnight.  The  ar- 
tillery with  an  escort  of  one  brigade  was  sent  to  cross  the 
pontoon  bridge.  Rodes's  report  describes  the  fording  of  the 
Potomac,  as  follows :  — 

"My  division  waded  the  river  just  above  the  aqueduct  over  the 
mouth  of  the  Conococheague ;  the  operation  was  a  perilous  one.  It  was 
very  dark,  raining,  and  excessively  muddy.  The  men  had  to  wade  through 
the  aqueduct,  down  the  steep  bank  of  soft  and  slippery  mud,  in  which  num- 
bers lost  their  shoes  and  down  in  which  many  fell.  The  water  was  cold, 
deep,  and  rising,  the  lights  on  either  side  of  the  river  were  dim,  just  afford- 
ing enough  light  to  mark  the  places  of  entrance  and  exit.  The  cartridge 
boxes  of  the  men  had  to  be  placed  around  their  necks ;  some  small  men 
had  to  be  carried  over  by  their  comrades;  the  water  was  up  to  the 
armpits  of  a  full-sized  man. 


442  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

"All  the  circumstances  attending  this  crossing  combined  to  make  it  an 
affair,  not  only  involving  great  hardship,  but  one  of  great  danger  to  the 
men  and  company  officers;  but  be  it  said  to  the  honor  of  these  brave 
fellows,  they  encountered  it  not  only  promptly  but  actually  with  cheers 
and  laughter. 

"We  crossed  without  loss  except  of  some  25,000  or  30,000  rounds  of 
ammunition  unavoidably  wetted  and  spoiled.  After  crossing,  I  marched 
a  short  distance  beyond  Falling  Waters  and  then  bivouacked ;  and  there 
ended  the  Pa.  campaign." 

It  is  not  necessary  to  follow  the  march  of  the  army  from  the 
Potomac  via  Front  Royal  and  Culpeper  to  the  line  of  the  Rapi- 
dan,  which  it  finally  occupied.  It  is  notable  that  Lee  had  not 
proposed  to  entirely  withdraw  from  an  aggressive  attitude  when 
he  crossed  the  Potomac.  His  report  states  that  he  intended 
to  cross  the  Blue  Ridge  into  Loudon  Co.,  where  he  might  op- 
pose Meade's  crossing  into  Va.,  but  that  the  Shenandoah  was 
found  to  be  impassable.  While  waiting  for  it  to  subside,  the 
enemy  crossed  below  and  seized  the  passes  he  had  designed  to  use. 

Not  only  this,  but  Meade  also  moved  along  the  eastern  slope, 
threatening  to  cut  Lee  off  from  Gordonsville  and  the  railroad. 
Longstreet  was  pushed  ahead  and  barely  succeeded  in  crossing 
the  Shenandoah  in  time  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  occupying 
Manassas  and  Chester  gaps,  through  which  Longstreet  moved 
to  Culpeper  by  July  24.  Hill's  corps  soon  followed,  and  Ewell, 
moving  farther  up  the  valley,  crossed  at  Thornton's  Gap.  All 
were  finally  united  behind  the  Rapidan  on  Aug.  4,  while  the 
cavalry,  under  Stuart,  held  Culpeper,  and  the  enemy  held  the 
line  of  the  Rappahannock. 

The  following  tables  of  casualties  furnish  the  best  compara- 
tive indications  of  the  amount  of  fighting  which  fell  to  the  lot 
of  different  organizations.  It  is  notable  that  six  Confederate 
brigades  were  not  severely  engaged,  and  the  6th  Federal  corps 
was  scarcely  engaged  at 'all.  The  totals  given  are  from  the 
official  returns  of  both  armies,  but  the  Confederate  returns  are 
known  to  be  very  incomplete.  The  best  estimate  of  actual 
Confederate  losses  has  been  made  by  Livermore  in  Numbers  and 
Losses  in  the  Civil  War.  It  is  about  50  per  cent  greater  for  the 
killed  and  wounded,  and  is  attached  hereto. 


GETTYSBURG:  THIRD  DAY  443 

CONFEDERATE  CASUALTIES.    GETTYSBURG.    APPROXIMATE 

BY  BRIGADES 


COMMANDS 

KILLED 

WOUNDED 

MISSING 

TOTAL 

Kershaw 
Semmes 
Barksdale 
Wofford 
Cabell's  Arty. 

115 
55 
105 
30 

8 

483 
284 
550 
192 
29 

32 
91 
92 
112 

630 
430 
747 
334 
37 

McLaws's  Div. 

313 

1538 

327 

2,178 

Garnett 
Annistead 
Kemper 
Dealing's  Arty. 

78 
88 
58 
8 

324 
460 
356 
17 

539 
643 
317 

941 
1,191 
731 
25 

Pickett's  Div. 

232 

1,157 

1,499 

2,888 

Law 
Anderson,  G.  T. 
Robertson 
Benning 
Henry's  Arty. 

74 
105 
84 
76 
4 

276 
512 
393 
299 
23 

146 
54 
120 
122 

496 
671 
597 
497 

27 

Hood's  Div. 

343 

1,504 

442 

2,289 

Alexander's  Arty. 
Washington  Arty. 

19 
3 

114 

26 

6 
16 

139 

45 

Reserve  Arty. 

22 

140 

22 

184 

Aggregate  1st  Corps 

910 

4,339 

2,290 

7,539 

Hays 
Hoke 
Smith 
Gordon 
Jones's  Arty. 

36 
35 
12 
71 
2 

201 
216 
113 
270 
6 

76 
94 
17 
39 

313 
345 

142 
380 
8 

Early's  Div. 

156 

806 

226 

1,188 

Steuart 
Nichols 
Stonewall 
Jones 
Latimer's  Arty. 

83 
43 
35 
58 
10 

409 
309 
208 
302 
40 

190 
36 
87 
61 

682 
388 
330 
421 
50 

Johnson's  Div. 

229 

1,269 

375 

1,873 

444 


MILITARY  MEMOIRS 


CONFEDERATE  CASUALTIES.    GETTYSBURG.    APPROXIMATE 

BY  BRIGADES 


COMMANDS 

KILLED 

WOUNDED 

MISSING 

TOTAL 

Daniel 

165 

635 

116 

916 

Iverson 

130 

328 

308 

820 

Doles 

24 

124 

31 

179 

Ramseur 

23 

122 

32 

177 

O'Neal 

73 

430 

193 

696 

Carter's  Arty. 

6 

35 

24 

65 

Rodes's  Div. 

421 

1,728 

704 

2,853 

Brown's  Arty. 
Nelson's  Arty. 

3 

19 

22 

Reserve  Arty. 

3 

19 

22 

2d  Corps 

809 

3,823 

1,305 

5,937 

Wilcox 

51 

469 

257 

777 

Mahone 

8 

55 

39 

102 

Wright 
Perry 
Posey 
Lane's  Arty. 

40 
33 
12 
3 

295 
217 
71 
21 

333 
205 

6 

668 
455 
83 
30 

Anderson's  Div. 

147 

1,128 

840 

2,115 

Pettigrew 
Brockenbrough 
Archer 

190 
25 
16 

915 
123 
144 

517 

1,105 

148 
677 

Davis 

180 

717 

897 

Garnett's  Arty. 

5 

17 

22 

Heth's  Div. 

411 

1,905 

534 

2,850 

Perrin 

100 

477 

577 

Lane 

41 

348 

389 

Thomas 

16 

136 

152 

Scales 

102 

323 

110 

535 

Poague's  Arty. 

2 

24 

6 

32 

Pender's  Div. 

262 

1,312 

116 

1,690 

Mclntosh's  Arty. 
Pegram's  Arty. 

7 
10 

25 
37 

1 

32 

48 

Reserve  Arty. 

17 

62 

1 

6,735 

3d  Corps 

837 

4,407 

1,491 

6,735 

GETTYSBURG:  THIRD  DAY  445 

CONFEDERATE  CASUALTIES.     GETTYSBURG.    APPROXIMATE 

BY  BRIGADES 


COMMANDS 

KILLED 

WOUNDED 

MISSING 

TOTAL 

Hampton 
Lee,  F. 
Lee,  W.  H.  F. 
Jones 

17 
5 
2 
12 

58 
16 
26 
40 

16 
29 
13 
6 

91 
50 
41 

58 

Jenkins's  Arty. 

Total  Cavalry 

36 

140 

64 

240 

Aggregate 

2,592 

12,709 

5,150 

20,451 

Livermore's  Estimate 

3,903 

18,735 

5,425 

28,063 

FEDERAL  CASUALTIES.    GETTYSBURG 
BY  DIVISIONS 


COMMANDS 

KILLED 

WOUNDED 

MISSING 

TOTAL 

Wadsworth 
Robinson 
Rowley 
Wainwright's  Arty. 

299 
91 
265 
9 

1,229 
616 
1,296 
86 

627 
983 
541 
11 

2,155 
1,690 
2,103 
106 

1st  Corps 

666 

3,131 

2,162 

6,059 

Caldwell 
Gibbon 
Hays 
Hazard's  Arty. 

187 
344 
238 
27 

880 
1,212 
987 
119 

208 
101 
66 
3 

1,275 
1,647 
1,291 
149 

2d  Corps 

797 

3,194 

378 

4,369 

Birney 
Humphreys 
Randolph's  Arty. 

271 
314 

8 

1,384 
1,562 

81 

356 
216 
17 

2,011 
2,092 
106 

3d  Corps 

593 

3,029 

589 

4,211 

Barnes 
Ayres 
Crawford 
Martin 

167 
164 
26 

8 

594 
802 
181 
33 

142 
63 
3 
2 

904 
1,029 
210 
43 

5th  Corps 

365 

1,611 

211 

2,187 

446  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

FEDERAL  CASUALTIES.    GETTYSBURG 
BY  DIVISIONS 


COMMANDS 

KILLED 

WOUNDED 

MISSING 

TOTAL 

Wright 
Howe 
Newton 
Tompkins's  Arty. 

1 
2 
20 
4 

17 

12 
148 

8 

2 

28 

18 
16 

196 
12 

6th  Corps 

27 

185 

30 

242 

Barlow 
Steinwehr 
Schurz 
Osborn's  Arty. 

122 
107 
133 

7 

677 
507 
684 
53 

507 
332 
659 
9 

1,306 
946 
1,476 
69 

llth  Corps 

369 

1,922 

1,510 

3,801 

Williams 
Geary 
Muhlenberg's  Arty. 

96 
108 

406 
397 
9 

31 
35 

533 
540 
9 

12th  Corps 

214 

812 

66 

1,082 

Arty.  Reserve 
Gen.  Hd.  Qrs. 
Cavalry 

43 
91 

187 
4 
354 

12 
407 

242 

4 
852 

Aggregate 

3,155 

14,529 

5,365 

23,049 

CHAPTER  XIX 

BATTLE  OF  CHICKAMAUGA 

Position  of  the  Confederacy  after  Gettysburg  and  Vicksburg.  Reenforce- 
ments  of  Bragg.  The  Armies  before  the  Battle  of  Chickamauga.  The 
Order  of  Battle.  Engagement  of  the  19th.  Battle  of  the  20th.  Rose- 
crans's  Order  to  Wood.  Longstreet's  Advance.  The  Casualties. 
Thomas  at  Chattanooga.  The  Battle  of  Wauhatchie.  Bragg's  Posi- 
tition.  Battle  of  Chattanooga  or  Missionary  Ridge.  Positions  of  the 
Armies.  The  Attack  on  the  Ridge.  Bragg's  Retreat.  The  Knoxville 
Campaign.  Longstreet's  Expedition.  Fort  Sanders  and  its  Garrison. 
Storming  the  Fort.  The  Retreat.  Casualties  of  the  Campaign. 

HAVING  rested  at  Culpeper  from  July  24  to  31,  and  then 
crossed  the  Rapidan  to  Orange  C.  H.,  where  we  could  receive 
supplies  by  rail,  Lee's  army  now  recuperated  rapidly  from  its 
exhaustion  by  the  campaign  of  Gettysburg.  There  remained 
nearly  five  months  of  open  weather  before  winter.  The  pros- 
pects of  the  Confederacy  had  been  sadly  altered  by  our  failures 
at  Gettysburg  and  Vicksburg.  Grant  would  now  be  able  to 
bring  against  us  in  Ga.  Rosecrans  reenforced  by  the  army  which 
had  taken  Vicksburg.  To  remain  idle  was  to  give  the  enemy 
time  to  do  this.  Once  more  the  necessity  was  upon  us  to  devise 
some  offensive  which  might  bring  on  a  battle  with  approximately 
equal  chances.  Lee,  accordingly,  urged  forward  the  building  up 
of  his  own  army  with  the  design  of  an  early  aggressive  movement 
against  Meade.  It  must  be  admitted  that  the  opportunity  for 
such  was  slight.  The  enemy's  fortified  lines  about  Alexandria 
were  too  near;  as  was  proven  later,  when  in  Nov.  an  advance 
was  actually  attempted. 

But  the  Confederacy  still  held  unimpaired  the  advantage  of  the 
"Interior  Lines,"  already  spoken  of  as  open  to  them  in  May, 
and  then  urged  by  Longstreet  both  upon  Secretary  Seddon  and 
Lee.  These  still  offered  the  sole  opportunity  ever  presented  the 
South  for  a  great  strategic  victory.  Already,  however,  move- 

447 


448  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

ments  of  the  enemy  were  on  foot  which,  in  a  few  weeks,  would 
enable  them  to  close  the  shorter  route  from  Richmond  to  Chat- 
tanooga via  Knoxville,  and  leave  us  only  the  much  longer  and 
less  favorable  line  via  Weldon,  Wilmington,  and  Augusta.  Un- 
fortunately, no  one  but  Longstreet  seems  to  have  appreciated 
this,  and  he  was  very  slow  in  again  taking  up  the  matter  and 
urging  it. 

It  resulted  that  the  movement,  when  attempted,  was  too  late 
to  utilize  the  short  Knoxville  line  and  that  only  five  small 
brigades  of  infantry  were  transferred  to  the  west  in  time  to  take 
any  part  in  the  hard-fought  battle  of  Chickamauga.  This  was 
consequently  but  another  bloody  and  fruitless  victory  to  be 
followed  by  a  terrible  defeat  in  a  few  weeks  when  the  enemy's 
reinforcements  had  joined.  It  is  first  to  tell  of  the  dilatory 
consideration  and  slow  acceptance  of  the  proposed  strategy, 
which  should  have  been  decided  upon  even  before  Lee's  army 
was  again  south  of  the  Potomac,  and  every  subsequent  move- 
ment planned  to  facilitate  it. 

It  was  not  until  about  Aug.  15,  two  weeks  after  the  army 
was  safe  behind  the  Rapidan,  that  Longstreet  again  called  the 
attention  of  Sec'y  Seddon  to  the  tremendous  threatenings  of  the 
situation,  and  pointed  out  the  one  hope  of  escape  which  he  could 
suggest.  There  seems  to  have  been  no  reply.  A  few  days  later, 
in  conversation  with  Lee,  Longstreet  again  expressed  his  views. 
Lee  was  unwilling  to  consider  going  west  in  person,  but  approved 
the  sending  of  Longstreet,  and  even  spoke  of  his  being  given  in- 
dependent command  there,  if  the  War  Department  could  be 
brought  to  approve. 

About  Aug.  23,  Lee  was  called  to  Richmond,  and  was 
detained  there  by  President  Davis  for  nearly  two  weeks.  During 
this  time,  consent  was  given  that  Longstreet  should  go  to  reen- 
force  Bragg  against  Rosecrans,  but  with  only  Hood's  and  Mc- 
Laws's  divisions,  nine  brigades,  and  my  battalion  of  26  guns. 
It  was  proposed  to  send  this  force  from  Louisa  C.  H.  by 
rail  to  Chattanooga,  via  Bristol  and  Knoxville,  a  distance  of 
but  540  miles,  and  it  was  hoped  that  the  movement  could  be 
made  within  four  days. 

There  was  too  little  appreciation  of  the  importance  of  time  in 


BATTLE  OF  CHICKAMAUGA  449 

the  enterprise  proposed,  and  it  was  not  until  Sept.  9  that  the 
first  train  came  to  Louisa  C.  H.  to  begin  the  transportation. 

On  that  day  2000  Confederates  under  Gen.  Frazier,  who  had 
been  unwisely  held  at  Cumberland  Gap  and  allowed  to  be  sur- 
rounded by  a  superior  force,  surrendered  without  a  fight.  Al- 
ready Burnside  had  occupied  Knoxville,  leaving  us  only  the 
long  line  via  Petersburg,  Wilmington,  Augusta,  and  Atlanta, 
about  925  miles,  with  imperfect  connections  through  some  cities 
and  some  changes  of  gauge.  The  infantry  was  given  precedence, 
and  my  battalion  was  marched  to  Petersburg,  where  it  took 
trains  about  4  P.M.,  Thursday,  Sept.  17.  At  2  A.M.,  Sunday,  the 
20th,  we  reached  Wilmington,  225  miles  in  58  hours.  Here  we 
changed  cars  and  ferried  the  river,  leaving  at  2  P.M.  The  battle 
of  Chickamauga  was  being  fought  upon  the  19th  and  20th,  only 
five  of  our  nine  brigades  having  arrived  in  time  to  participate. 
We  reached  Kingsville,  S.C.,  192  miles  in  28  hours,  changed  .trains 
hi  six  hours,  and  got  to  Augusta,  140  miles,  at  2  P.M.  on  Tues- 
day, the  22d.  Leaving  Augusta  at  7  P.M.,  we  reached  Atlanta,  171 
miles,  at  2  P.M.,  Wednesday.  Leaving  at  4  A.M.,  Thursday,  we 
were  carried  115  miles  and  landed  at  Ringgold  Station,  12  miles 
from  the  battle-field,  at  2  A.M.  on  Friday,  Sept.  25.  Our  jour- 
ney by  rail  had  been  843  miles  and  had  consumed  seven  days  and 
10  hours,  or  178  hours.  It  could  scarcely  be  considered  rapid 
transit,  yet  under  the  circumstances  it  was  really  a  very  creditable 
feat  for  our  railroad  service  under  the  attendant  circumstances. 
We  found  ourselves  restricted  to  the  use  of  one  long  roundabout 
line  of  single-track  road  of  light  construction,  much  of  it  of  the 
"stringer  track"  of  those  days,  a  16-pound  rail  on  'stringers, 
with  very  moderate  equipment  and  of  different  gauges,  for  the 
entire  service  at  the  time  of  a  great  battle  of  the  principal  armies 
of  the  Confederacy.  The  task  would  have  taxed  a  double-tracked 
road  with  modern  equipment. 

Its  efficient  performance  was  simply  impossible,  and  the  in- 
complete success  we  were  able  to  obtain  by  getting  five  brigades 
of  Longstreet's  infantry  upon  the  field,  without  any  of  his  ar- 
tillery, shows  the  soundness  of  our  strategy,  and  is  an  earnest  of 
what  might  have  been  accomplished,  had  a  campaign  upon  our 
short  interior  lines  been  inaugurated  in  May,  under  Lee  in 


450 


MILITARY  MEMOIRS 


person,  instead  of  the  unfortunate  invasion  of  Pa.  Indeed,  it 
must  be  said  of  the  battle  itself,  that  the  force  upon  the  field  was 
ample  to  have  reaped  the  full  fruits  of  victory,  had  its  manage- 
ment been  judicious.  The  story  of  the  details,  presently  to  be 
told,  is  but  another  story  of  excellent  fighting  made  vain  by  in- 
efficient handling  of  an  army  hastily  brought  together,  poorly 
organized,  and  badly  commanded. 

It  will  be  seen  that  the  battle  was  opened  by  two  divisions 
attacking  the  whole  army  of  the  enemy  in  a  fortified  position,  the 
attack  being  made  in  a  single  line  without  supports  at  hand. 
They  are  defeated  and  put  out  of  action  for  the  day.  Two  more 
divisions  try  and  fare  little  better.  A  fifth,  in  reserve,  sends 
in  one  brigade  without  result;  four  are  not  engaged.  The 
morning  is  gone  and  the  battle  of  the  Right  Wing  is  over.  That 
of  the  Left  Wing  has  scarcely  begun.  It  advances,  finds  by  acci- 
dent a  gap  in  the  enemy's  line,  and  drives  off  three  divisions  of  the 
enemy.  The  left  wing  fights  the  rest  of  the  enemy's  army 
(three-fourths  of  it)  until  near  dark,  when  both  wings  unite  and 
drive  the  enemy  off  the  field ;  darkness  covering  his  retreat.  It 
is  the  old  familiar  story  of  piecemeal  attacks. 

On  the  arrival  of  Longstreet,  Bragg's  army  would  comprise  five 
corps  and  a  reserve  division,  organized  as  shown  below.  No 
exact  returns  of  the  total  "present  for  duty"  exist,  but  instead 
are  given  Livermore's  estimates  of  the  "Effective  Strength."  l 

ARMY  OF  TENN.,  GEN.  BRAGG,  SEPT.  19-20,  1863 


CORPS 

DIVISIONS 

BRIGADES 

BATTERIES 

Polk 

Cheatham 
Hindman 

Jackson,  Smith,  Maney,  Wright, 
Strahl 
Anderson,  Deas,  Manigault 

5 
3 

Hill,  D.  H. 

Cleburne 
Breckenridge 

Wood,  Polk,  Deshler 
Helm,  Adams,  Stovall 

3 

4 

Walker 

Gist 
Liddell 

Colquitt,  Ector,  Wilson 
Govan,  Walthall 

2 

2 

Buckner 

Stewart 
Preston 

Bate,  Brown,  Clayton 
Gracie,  Trigg,  Kelly 

4 
3 

1  Livermore's  Numbers  and  Losses  in  Civil  War,  p.  105. 


BATTLE  OF  CHICKAMAUGA  451 

ARMY  OF  TENN.,   GEN.  BRAGG,   SEPT.  19-20,   1863 


CORPS 

DIVISIONS 

BRIGADES 

BATTERIES 

Res.  Div. 

Johnson 

Gregg,  McNair,  Fulton 

2 

Longstreet 

McLaws 
Hood 

Kershaw,    Humphreys,    Wofford,1 
Bryan  l 
Law,    Robertson,    Benning,    Jen- 
kins,1 Anderson  1 

Res.  Arty. 

Batteries 

Williams,  4;  Robertson,  5;    Alex- 
ander, 6  l 

9 

Total  Inf.  and  Arty.,  33  Brigades,  174  Guns.     Effective  total  52,066 


Wheeler 
Cavalry 

Wharton 
Martin 

O'Rews,  Harrison 
Morgan,  Russell 

1 
1 

Forrest 
Cavalry 

Armstrong 
Pegram 

Wheeler,  Dibbfell 
Davidson,  Scott 

2 
2 

Total  Cavalry,  8  Brigades,  24  Guns.     Effective  total,  14,260 


Unlike  the  armies  in  Va.,  which  had  never  considered  them- 
selves defeated,  our  Western  army  had  never  gained  a  decided 
victory.  Naturally,  therefore,  Lee  enjoyed  both  the  affection 
and  confidence  of  his  men,  while  there  was  an  absence  of  much 
sentiment  toward  Bragg.  It  did  not,  however,  at  all  affect  the 
quality  of  the  fighting,  as  shown  by  the  casualties  suffered  at 
Chickamauga,  which  were  25  per  cent  by  the  Confederates  in 
killed  and  wounded,  exclusive  of  the  missing. 

Neither  in  armament,  equipment,  or  organization  was  the 
Western  army  in  even  nearly  as  good  shape  as  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia.  About  one- third  of  the  infantry  was  still 
p.rmed  only  with  the  smooth-bore  musket,  calibre  .69.  Only 
a  few  batteries  of  the  artillery  were  formed  into  battalions,  and 
their  ammunition  was  all  of  inferior  quality. 

Much  has  been  said  in  the  accounts  of  prior  battles  of  the  in- 
sufficient and  unskilled  staff  service  in  the  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia,  even  after  many  active  campaigns.  The  Western 
armies  generally  had  had  far  less  opportunities  to  learn  from 
1  Names  in  italics  arrived  too  late  for  the  battle. 


452 


MILITARY  MEMOIRS 


experience,  and  fewer  resigned  ex-army  officers  from  the  old  U.  S. 
Army  among  them,  to  organize  and  train  their  raw  material. 
Several  of  Bragg's  divisions  had  been  recently  brought  together 
and  were  strangers  to  each  other.  Nearly  all  were  unfamiliar 
with  the  country  in  which  they  found  themselves,  which  was 
unusually  wooded  and  hilly.  Bragg,  himself,  was  lacking  in 
quick  appreciation  of  features  of  topography. 

The  organization  of  the  Federal  army,  with  its  strength  present 
for  duty  before  the  battle,  is  given  below,  and  also  Livermore's 
estimate  of  the  "Effective  Strength." 

ARMY  OF  THE  CUMBERLAND,  GEN.  ROSECRANS,  SEPT.  19-20,  '63 


COUPS 

DIVISIONS 

BRIGADES 

BATTERIES 

14th 
Thomas 
Pres.  22,758 

Baird 
Negley 
Brannon 
Reynolds 

Scribner,  Starkweather,  King 
Beatty,  Stanley,  Sirwell 
Connell,  Croxton,  Van  Derveer 
Wilder,  King,  Turchin 

3 
3 
3 
3 

20th 
McCook 
Pres.  13,372 

Davis 
Johnson 
Sheridan 

Post,  Carlin,  Heg 
Willich,  Dodge,  Baldwin 
Lytle,  Laiboldt,  Bradley 

3 
3 
3 

21st 
Crittenden 
Pres.  14,190 

Wood 
Palmer 
Van  Cleve 

Buell,  Wagner,  Harker 
Cruft,  Hazen,  Grose 
Beatty,  Dick,  Barnes 

3 
4 
3 

Reserve 
Granger 
Pres.  5,489 

Steedman 

Whitaker,  Mitchell,  McCook 

3 

Total  Inf.  and  Art.,  33  Brigades,  204  Guns,  Pres.  53,919.  Effective  50,144 


Cavalry 
Mitchell 

McCook 
Crook 

Campbell,  Ray, 
Minty,  Long 

Watkins 

1 
1 

Total  Cavalry,  5  Brigades,  30  Guns,  Pres.  9,504.    Effective  8,078. 


Comparing  the  two  armies,  we  see  that  while  Bragg's  "Effec- 
tive total"  (66,326)  is  largely  greater  than  Rosecrans  (58,222),  it 
is  due  to  Bragg's  excess  in  cavalry  (6182),  which  arm  had  little 
opportunity  in  the  battle  upon  either  side.  Of  infantry  and  ar- 
tillery, Rosecrans  had  an  excess  of  1853  men  and  30  guns,  besides 


BATTLE  OF  CHICKAMAUGA  453 

the  superiority  of  his  small-arms  and  rifled  artillery  over  the  in- 
ferior equipment  of  the  Confederates.  It  is  well  recognized  that 
the  defensive  role  is  the  least  hazardous,  and,  on  this  campaign, 
Rosecrans,  although  on  the  strategic  offensive,  gladly  seized  the 
tactical  defensive  when  Bragg  incautiously  gave  him  the  privi- 
lege. 

Bragg's  daily  experience  in  the  handling  of  his  army  should 
have  warned  him  that  it  was  not  a  military  machine  which 
could  be  relied  upon  to  execute  orders  strictly,  or  to  be  alert 
to  seize  passing  opportunities,  and  it  is  safe  to  say  that  its  power 
for  offence  was  scarcely  50  per  cent  of  what  the  same  force  would 
have  developed  upon  the  defensive. 

The  position  at  Chattanooga  held  by  Bragg  at  the  beginning  of 
the  campaign  was  entirely  untenable,  as  Rosecrans's  line  of 
approach,  along  the  Nashville  and  Chattanooga  R.R.,  reaching 
the  Tennessee  River  at  Stevenson,  threatened  Bragg's  commu- 
nications for  40  miles  south,  and  he  was  forced  to  fall  back  without 
a  battle  and  take  position  where  he  might  guard  his  communica- 
tions. He  withdrew  from  Chattanooga  on  Sept.  8,  and,  moving 
south  about  22  miles,  disposed  his  forces  in  the  vicinity  of  Lafay- 
ette and  held  the  gaps  in  Pigeon  Mountain,  a  spur  of  the  great 
plateau  of  Lookout  Mountain,  running  northeast,  with  Mc- 
Lemore's  Cove  between  the  two.  Rosecrans  was  misled  by 
Bragg's  easy  abandonment  of  Chattanooga  into  the  belief  that 
his  retreat  would  be  continued  at  least  as  far  as  Dalton,  and 
perhaps  to  Rome.  So,  with  little  delay  or  caution,  the  Federal 
troops  were  pushed  forward  in  rapid  pursuit. 

As  the  country  was  semi-mountainous,  well  wooded,  and  but 
sparsely  settled,  neither  commander  proved  able  to  keep  him- 
self fully  informed  of  his  adversary's  movements.  Each  lost, 
therefore,  possible  opportunities  of  attacking  isolated  portions 
of  his  adversary  with  a  superior  force. 

The  most  important  of  these  was  lost  by  Bragg,  who,  on  Sept. 
10  and  11,  might  have  crushed,  in  McLemore's  Cove,  parts  of 
Thomas's  and  McCook's  corps.  Orders  were  issued  for  at- 
tacks, but  there  was  no  supervision  of  the  necessary  preparatory 
movements,  and  various  obstacles  intervened,  until  the  enemy 
discovered  his  danger  and  made  his  escape.  Bragg,  in  his  offi- 


454  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

cial  report,  placed  the  principal  blame  for  this  failure  upon 
Gen.  Hindman,  and  preferred  charges  against  him,  which,  upon 
further  investigation,  he  subsequently  withdrew.  There  can 
be  no  doubt  that  upon  this  occasion  an  opportunity  was  lost  to 
the  Confederates  which  might  have  won  the  campaign.  But 
the  loss  was  due  entirely  to  the  misfortune  of  inadequate  or- 
ganization, and  lack  of  the  trained  staff,  which  alone  can  make  an 
efficient  army  of  any  assemblage  of  troops.  Of  course,  rumors 
of  the  sending  of  Longstreet  with  two  divisions  to  reenforce 
Bragg,  were  sure  to,  and  did,  reach  the  enemy  by  many  channels 
and  from  many  sources.  Even  from  the  lines  along  the  Rapidan, 
there  were  deserters  and  negro  servants  who  were  well  informed 
about  all  considerable  movements.  At  Richmond  and  Peters- 
burg, at  Wilmington,  Charleston,  and  Atlanta,  the  enemy,  doubt- 
less, maintained  spies,  and  the  coming  of  the  reinforcements  from 
Lee  was  no  secret  among  Bragg's  brigades,  even  long  before 
their  arrival.  One  would  suppose,  too,  that  the  wisdom  of  such 
strategy  would  be  so  apparent  that  it  would  be  easily  guessed,  on 
hearing  that  any  movement  was  on  foot.  It  is,  therefore,  worthy 
of  note  that  the  Federal  War  Department,  where  reports  and 
rumors  from  all  sources  were  brought  together  and  studied,  even 
as  late  as  Sept.  11,  was  inclined  to  believe  that  Bragg  was  re- 
enforcing  Lee.  It  was  not  convinced  to  the  contrary  until  Sept. 
15.  Before  that,  Rosecrans  had  discovered  the  proximity  of 
Bragg's  army  and  had  hastened  to  concentrate  his  scattered  di- 
visions, some  of  which,  mistaking  the  roads,  made  marches  of 
50  miles.  The  concentration  took  place  in  the  valley  of  Chicka- 
mauga  Creek,  about  12  miles  south  of  Chattanooga  on  the  western 
slope  of  Missionary  Ridge. 

Bragg,  meanwhile,  realizing  something  of  his  opportunities, 
made  more  than  one  effort  to  strike  in  detail  some  of  the  nearest 
Federal  divisions,  but  was  unable  to  succeed.  It  was  only  on  the 
night  of  the  17th  that  he  finally  issued  an  order  for  an  advance 
in  force  upon  the  next  day.  Having  waited  so  long,  he  had  best 
have  waited  longer.  Already  he  had  given  Rosecrans  just  the 
time  needed  to  concentrate  his  entire  army.  Even  a  day 
sooner  might  have  caught  portions  of  it  out  of  position  and 
much  exposed,  but  when  the  action  opened  on  the  19th,  not  only 


BATTLE  OF  CHICKAMAUGA  455 

was  the  whole  Federal  army  in  hand,  but  most  of  it  had  fairly 
well  intrenched  itself. 

There  was  now  no  reason  to  hasten  an  attack,  and  there  were 
two  reasons  for  delay.  First,  by  taking  a  threatening  position, 
and  using  his  superior  force  of  cavalry  upon  Rosecrans's  rear,  he 
might  have  forced  the  Federals  to  attack ;  and  Bragg's  army,  as 
has  been  said,  was  twice  as  powerful  for  defence  as  for  offence. 
Second,  he  was  now  receiving  reinforcements,  averaging  nearly 
a  brigade  a  day.  On  the  19th,  only  Hood  with  three  of  Long- 
street's  veteran  brigades  had  reached  the  field.  Longstreet,  in 
person  with  two  more,  arrived  in  time  to  take  part  on  the  20th. 
McLaws  with  four  more  brigades  of  infantry  and  26  guns  of  the 
reserve  artillery  were  close  behind,  and  were  enough  to  have 
turned  the  evenly  balanced  scale  in  the  battle. 

On  Sept.  15,  Rosecrans's  army  was  west  of  the  Chickamauga, 
and  had  its  right  extended  south  beyond  the  left  of  Bragg's  army. 
Bragg's  right,  at  the  same  time,  east  of  the  Chickamauga  ex- 
tended north  beyond  Rosecrans's  left.  Either  army,  changing 
front  to  its  left,  might  thus  have  turned  the  other's  flank  with 
great  advantage,  but  neither  was  quite  prepared  to  act  promptly. 
Rosecrans,  however,  on  the  17th,  appreciated  his  own  danger 
and  began  to  extend  his  left  and  to  draw  down  his  right,  prac- 
tically moving  his  whole  army  to  the  left.  This  movement  was 
continued  during  the  night  of  the  18th  and  on  the  morning  of  the 
19th.  Before  Bragg  was  prepared  to  open  his  attack,  Rosecrans's 
left  had  occupied  the  strong  ground  chosen  for  it  to  rest  upon,  on 
Kelley's  farm,  about  nine  miles  south  of  Chattanooga.  From  this 
point,  the  line  extended  to  the  Chickamauga  at  Lee  and  Gordon's 
Mill,  about  four  miles,  with  the  divisions  in  the  following  order 
from  left  to  right :  — 

Brannon,  Baird,  Reynolds,  Palmer,  Van  Cleve,  Wood,  with 
Negley's  division  in  reserve,  and  the  three  divisions  of  McCook's 
corps  —  Davis,  Johnson,  and  Sheridan  —  massed  near  Crawfish 
Spring,  near  by  on  the  right.  At  Rossville,  six  miles  from  Chatta- 
nooga and  about  three  north  of  Kelley's  farm,  was  Granger's 
reserve  corps,  of  three  brigades,  holding  the  very  important  gap 
at  that  point  in  Missionary  Ridge. 

Bragg's  order  of  battle  was  of  the  progressive  or  echelon  type, 


456  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

and  prescribed  that  the  attack  should  be  begun  by  his  right 
column  under  Hood,  which  should  cross  at  Reed's  Bridge,  and, 
turning  to  the  left  oblique,  should  sweep  up  the  Chickamauga 
and  be  reenforced  as  it  proceeded  by  Walker's  and  Buckner's 
corps,  crossing  by  Alexander's  Bridge  and  Tedford's  Ford. 
Meanwhile  Polk,  at  Lee  and  Gordon's  Mill,  should  press  the  enemy, 
bearing  to  the  right  where  resistance  was  met,  until  a  crossing 
was  made  at  or  between  the  mill  and  Dalton's  or  Tedford's  Ford. 
Hill's  corps  would  watch  the  left  flank  and  cross  and  attack  the 
enemy's  right  if  he  attempted  to  reenforce  his  centre.  The 
cavalry  would  protect  the  flanks,  Wheeler  on  the  left  and  For- 
rest on  the  right.  Cooking  was  ordered  to  be  done  at  the  trains, 
and  cooked  rations  forwarded  to  the  troops. 

This  order  seems  simple,  well  conceived,  and  apparently  as 
well  adapted  to  surrounding  conditions  as  it  could  have  been 
made,  but  its  execution,  as  will  be  seen,  departed  widely  from 
the  course  prescribed. 

The  right  column  under  Hood,  charged  with  the  opening  of  the 
battle,  was  composed  of  three  brigades  of  Hood's  and  three  of 
Bushrod  Johnson's.  In  reaching  their  assigned  positions,  there 
was  much  delay  to  all  of  the  columns,  due  to  the  bad  and  narrow 
roads  through  the  forest,  and,  in  addition,  Hood's  column  was 
opposed  by  the  enemy's  cavalry,  and  had  a  preliminary  skirmish 
at  Pea  Vine  Church.  At  Reed's  Bridge,  and  also  at  Alexander's, 
it  was  necessary  to  force  the  crossing,  and  both  bridges  were  so 
injured  by  the  enemy  that  fords  somewhere  in  the  vicinity  had 
to  be  used  to  cross  the  stream.  These  delays  consumed  the  whole 
of  the  18th,  and,  at  nightfall,  Hood's  six  brigades  and  Walker's 
five  bivouacked  on  the  west  side  of  the  Chickamauga  about  a  mile 
and  a  half  in  front  of  the  Rossville  and  Lafayette  road,  upon 
which  Rosecrans  began  to  arrive  and  take  position  before  day- 
light on  the  19th.  Buckner's  corps,  at  Tedford's  Ford,  having 
been  directed  to  delay  until  Hood  and  Walker  were  across,  had, 
after  a  slight  skirmish,  gotten  possession  of  both  banks  of  the 
river  at  Tedford's,  and  also  at  Dalton's,  a  half-mile  to  the  left. 
Folk's  corps  and  Hill's  occupied  the  day  in  moving  from  the  vicin- 
ity of  Lafayette  to  their  prescribed  positions  opposite  the  enemy's 
right.  At  dawn  on  the  19th,  the  division  of  Buckner  began  cross- 


BATTLE  OF  CHICKAMAUGA  457 

ing  at  Tedford's  and  Dalton's,  but,  before  they  were  ready  to 
attack,  the  initiative  was  seized  by  the  Federals,  under  the  im- 
pression that  only  a  single  Confederate  brigade  was  in  front  of 
them.  Croxton's  brigade,  supported  by  the  other  two  brigades 
of  Brannan's  division,  was  ordered  to  advance.  This  brought 
on  the  battle,  which  was  waged  all  day  with  severe  losses  on  each 
side,  but  with  material  success  on  neither.  The  entire  Federal 
army  was  engaged,  except  two  brigades.  Of  the  Confederates, 
the  brigades  of  Anderson,  Deas,  Manigault,  Helm,  Adams,  Sto- 
vall,  Gracie,  Trigg,  Kelley,  Kershaw,  and  Humphreys  were  not 
engaged.  The  righting  was  desultory  and  without  concert  of 
action.  From  7  A.M.  until  noon,  there  was  a  gap  of  about  two 
miles  between  the  14th  and  21st  Federal  corps,  which,  had  the 
Confederates  discovered  it,  might  have  given  them  the  victory. 

The  fighting  was  kept  up  until  dark.  Longstreet  arrived  on  the 
field  at  11  P.M.,  having  arrived  at  Catoosa  Station  about  four,  and 
ridden  without  a  guide,  narrowly  missing  riding  into  the  enemy. 
The  battle  was  ordered  to  be  renewed  at  daylight,  but  under  a 
different  organization.  The  army  was  now  divided  into  two 
wings,  the  right  under  Polk,  and  the  left  under  Longstreet.  To 
Folk's  wing  was  assigned  Cheatham's  division  of  his  corps,  and 
the  corps  of  Hill  and  Walker,  with  the  cavalry  under  Forrest  on 
the  right.  To  Longstreet,  Bragg  gave  the  division  of  Hindman 
of  Folk's  corps,  Johnson's  division,  Buckner's  corps,  and  the  five 
brigades  of  Hood's  and  McLaws's  divisions,  with  the  cavalry 
under  Wheeler  on  the  left.  This  organization  was  adopted, 
because  the  troops  were  already  approximately  in  the  positions 
assigned,  but  it  involved  further  subdivision  of  the  command 
without  any  increase  of  staff,  and  led  to  an  unfortunate  delay 
of  some  hours  in  opening  the  battle. 

This  was  to  be  begun  by  Hill's  corps  at  daylight.  Sunrise 
was  at  5.45.  The  orders  were  given  by  Bragg  to  Polk  about 
midnight,  but  never  reached  Hill  until  7.30  in  the  morning.  The 
locations  of  the  different  commanders  were  not  known  to  each 
other.  When  the  orders  to  attack  arrived,  there  were  essential 
preparations  still  to  be  made,  as  the  troops  were  not  in  position, 
and  two  hours  were  consumed  in  getting  them  even  approxi- 
mately so.  These  hours  were  very  precious  to  the  enemy.  All 


458  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

during  the  night,  the  noise  of  his  axes  had  been  heard  felling  trees 
and  building  breastworks  of  logs,  and  this  work  was  kept  up 
until  the  Federal  right,  under  Thomas,  occupied  a  veritable 
citadel,  from  which  assaults  by  infantry  alone  could  scarcely 
dislodge  him. 

His  divisions  were  in  the  following  order  from  left  to  right: 
Baird  of  the  14th  corps,  Johnson  of  the  20th,  Palmer  of  the  21st, 
Reynolds  of  the  14th.  These  divisions  occupied  the  breastworks 
above  described,  which  ran  north  and  south  and  were  terminated 
at  each  end  by  wings  extending  well  to  the  rear.  Next  on  the 
right  was  Brannan's  division  of  the  14th,  and  then  Negley's,  of 
the  same.  Then  came  Sheridan  and  Davis  of  the  20th,  and  then 
Wood  and  Van  Cleve  of  the  21st  in  reserve. 

At  9.30  A.M.,  Breckenridge  moved  to  the  attack  and  was  soon 
followed  by  Cleburne.  These  two  divisions  were  unfortunately 
placed  in  a  single  line  and  without  any  supports  in  the  rear.  They 
advanced  in  the  following  order  from  right  to  left:  Adams, 
Stovall,  Helm,  Polk,  Wood,  Deshler.  The  two  right  brigades  of 
Adams  and  Stovall  were  found  to  entirely  overlap  the  enemy's 
line,  and  they  pushed  on  slowly,  and  gradually  swung  to  the  left 
and  came  into  collision  with  the  retired  portion  of  the  enemy's 
line.  Meanwhile,  the  centre  of  Helm's  brigade  had  struck  the 
enemy's  fortified  line,  and,  after  a  severe  fight  in  which  Helm  was 
killed,  it  was  repulsed.  The  brigades  of  Adams  and  Stovall 
were  now  entirely  isolated,  but  maintained  their  aggressive  until 
Adams  was  himself  wounded  and  captured,  when  they  were  with- 
drawn, and  the  three  brigades  cut  no  further  figure  in  the  battle 
until  late  in  the  afternoon.  Had  Cleburne's  division  been  behind 
this  division  in  support,  or  even  had  their  advance  been  simul- 
taneous, there  might  have  been  a  different  story  to  tell. 

Its  three  brigades  —  Polk,  Wood,  and  Deshler  —  were  also  in 
single  line  and  advanced  a  little  after  the  repulse  of  Helm. 
Polk  and  the  right  flank  of  Wood's  met  the  same  fire  which  had 
repulsed  Helm.  Wood  and  Deshler  advanced  farther  before 
they  received  it,  but  they  were  all  driven  back  with  heavy  losses, 
which  included  Deshler  himself.  The  contest  was  kept  up  for 
a  long  time,  and  was  reenforced  by  the  five  brigades  of  Walker's 
division,  who  were  brought  up  from  the  rear  and  put  in  at 


BATTLE  OF  CHICKAMAUGA  459 

various  points  without  making  any  serious  impression.  These 
brigades  constituted  the  whole  command  of  Polk  in  charge  of  the 
left  wing,  except  the  division  of  Cheatham  which  contained  five 
brigades.  Why  neither  Bragg  or  Polk  put  them  in  until  after 
6  P.M.  is  not  explained.  One  would  imagine  that  they  would 
have  been  called  upon  before  giving  up  the  whole  plan  of  the 
battle,  which  was  now  done.  Originally,  it  had  been  designed  to 
break  the  left  flank  of  the  enemy  and  then  sweep  him  to  the 
right.  Now  the  effort  will  be  to  break  the  right  flank  and  sweep 
to  the  left.  And  in  this  the  right  wing  of  the  army  will  take  no 
more  part  than  the  left  wing  has  taken  in  the  battle  of  the 
morning,  and  Cheatham's  division  will  practically  take  none  at 
all. 

About  11  A.M.,  Bragg,  finding  the  attack  on  the  enemy's  left 
making  no  progress,  sent  a  staff-officer  down  the  lines  with 
orders  to  every  division  commander  to  move  upon  the  enemy 
immediately.  The  order  was  first  delivered  to  Stewart's  division 
of  Buckner's  corps.  This  formed  two  lines  deep  and  two  bri- 
gades front,  with  the  aid  of  Wood's  brigade  of  Cleburne's  divi- 
sion on  its  right.  The  four  brigades,  Brown  and  Wood  fol- 
lowed by  Clayton  and  Bate,  advanced  together.  The  enemy  were 
driven  by  this  charge  some  200  yards  and  lost  a  battery  of  guns, 
but  here  the  impulse  was  gone  and  the  advance  stopped.  Mean- 
while, Longstreet  had  appealed  to  Bragg  for  permission  to  attack 
with  his  entire  wing,  and,  consent  being  given,  had  formed 
Johnson's  division  with  Fulton  and  McNair  in  front,  with  Gregg 
in  the  second  line,  and  with  Hood's  division  in  a  third  line. 
Hindman's  division  formed  on  the  left,  and  about  11.30  a  general 
advance  was  essayed.  Preston's  division  was  in  reserve  on  the 
extreme  left. 

It  is  now  time  to  look  in  the  Federal  ranks  and  see  what  was 
taking  place  there.  Akhough  the  attack  was  only  made  at  9.30, 
and  by  only  12  brigades,  and  was  resisted  by  Thomas  with  12 
brigades  in  fortified  lines,  yet,  at  10.10  A.M.,  we  find  Garfield, 
Rosecrans's  adjutant,  writing  to  McCook  to  be  prepared  to  sup- 
port the  left  flank,  "at  all  hazards  even  if  the  right  is  drawn 
wholly  to  the  present  left."  At  10.30  he  called  for  help,  and 
Sheridan's  division  was  ordered  to  him.  At  10.45,  upon  a  fur- 


460  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

ther  call,  Van  Cleve's  division  was  also  ordered  to  support  him 
"with  all  despatch."  Negley's  division  had  withdrawn  from  its 
position  in  line  to  support  Baird,  and  had  been  replaced  by  Wood's 
division,  making  the  order  of  the  divisions:  Baird,  Johnson, 
Palmer,  Reynolds,  Brannan,  Wood,  Davis,  Sheridan.  About  this 
time  another  message  from  Thomas  reached  Rosecrans  that  he 
was  heavily  pressed,  and  the  aide  who  brought  it  informed  Rose- 
crans that  "Brannan  was  out  of  line  and  Reynolds's  right 
was  exposed."  On  this  Rosecrans  dictated  a  message  to 
Wood:  — 

"The  general  commanding  directs  that  you  close  up  on  Reynolds  as 
fast  as  possible  and  support  him." 

This  order  changed  the  issue  of  the  battle.  Reynolds's  divi- 
sion was  slightly  echeloned  with  Brannan's,  but  no  one  other 
than  Reynolds  considered  it  worthy  of  note.  When  Wood 
obeyed  his  order  and  reached  the  ground,  Brannan  was  found  to 
already  occupy  it,  and  Thomas  sent  Wood  on  to  the  support 
of  Baird.  Reynolds  had  blundered  in  his  complaint,  and 
Rosecrans  had  blundered  in  acting  on  it  without  reference  to 
Thomas. 

On  receipt  of  the  order,  Wood,  leaving  his  skirmishers  in  front, 
started  his  division  at  a  double-quick  to  the  left,  passing  in  rear 
of  Brannan's  division  to  reach  the  right  of  Reynolds.  He  had 
advanced  but  little  more  than  a  brigade  length  when  Johnson's 
Confederate  division,  supported  by  Hood  and  Hindman,  burst 
through  the  forest  hi  front  and  fell  upon  the  movement.  Had 
this  movement  of  Wood's  division  been  foreseen  by  the  Con- 
federates and  prepared  for,  it  could  not  have  happened  more 
opportunely  for  them.  Longstreet  has  been  given  great  credit 
for  it,  which,  however,  he  never  claimed. .  It  was  entirely  acci- 
dental and  unforeseen,  but  in  a  very  brief  period  it  threw  the 
entire  left  flank  of  the  enemy  in  a  panic. 

Longstreet's  advance  cut  off  the  rear  of  Buell's  brigade  of 
Wood's  division,  and  two  brigades  of  Sheridan's  advancing  to 
fill  the  gap  being  opened  behind  Wood.  These  brigades  did 
not  make  enough  resistance  to  check  the  Confederates,  whose 
triple  lines  could  be  seen  advancing  and  who  now  followed  the 


BATTLE  OF  CHICKAMAUGA  461 

fugitives.  Hindman's  brigades,  diverging  to  the  left,  routed  the 
division  of  Davis  and  captured  27  guns  and  over  1000  prisoners. 
Rosecrans,  McCook,  and  Crittenden  were  all  caught  and  in- 
volved in  the  confusion  of  a  retreat  which  soon  became  a  panic.  ' 
It  was  not,  however,  pursued  and  might  have  halted  and  been 
re-formed  within  a  mile  of  the  field  without  seeing  the  enemy. 
The  retreat,  however,  was  continued  to  Chattanooga.  A 
severe  check  was  sustained  by  Manigault,  who  attacked  Wilder's 
brigade.  This  brigade  had  two  regiments  armed  with  Spencer 
repeating  rifles,  and  the  29th  111.  serving  with  it  on  this  occasion, 
carried  the  same  arm.  They  occupied  a  very  favorable  position 
on  a  steep  ridge  and  their  fire  at  close  quarters  was  very  severe 
and  drove  back  the  first  advance.  Then,  finding  themselves 
isolated,  they  presently  withdrew  from  the  field. 

About  this  time,  Longstreet  was  sent  for  by  Bragg,  who  was 
some  distance  in  rear  of  Longstreet's  present  position.  The 
change  in  the  order  of  battle  was  explained  to  Bragg  and  the 
route  of  two  divisions  of  the  enemy,  and  he  was  requested  to 
draw  the  forces  from  the  right  wing  to  unite  with  the  left,  and 
move  behind  Thomas,  where  a  gap  of  great  extent  had  been 
opened,  and  drive  him  out  of  his  fortified  position.  Bragg, 
however,  was  discouraged,  and  said  "there  was  no  fight  left 
in  the  right  wing."  Cheatham's  division  had  not  been  engaged. 

Longstreet's  account  of  the  interview  states:  — 

"  He  [Bragg]  did  not  wait,  nor  did  he  express  approval  or  disapproval 
of  the  operations  of  the  left  wing,  but  rode  for  his  headquarters  at  Reed's 
bridge.  There  was  nothing  for  the  left  wing  to  do  but  to  work  along  as 
best  it  could." 

A  pause  in  the  fighting  now  ensued,  which  the  Federals  em- 
ployed in  forming  a  new  line  for  their  centre  and  right  with  the 
troops  remaining  on  the  field,  —  Baird,  Johnson,  Palmer,  and 
Reynolds,  —  whose  positions  had  not  been  changed,  and  Bran- 
nan,  with  fragments  of  Wood,  Negley,  and  Van  Cleve.  With 
these  troops  a  short  and  very  strong  line  was  formed  scarcely 
a  mile  in  extent  from  right  to  left,  and  occupying  favorable 
ground  in  the  forest  which  gave  it  protection  from  artillery 
fire.  In  plan  the  right  wing  of  this  line  covered  two  reentrant 


462  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

angles  located  on  commanding  ridges,  from  which  they  were 
able  to  deliver  a  plunging  fire  by  volley,  the  ranks  alternating 
with  little  exposure.  During  the  afternoon  they  were  reenforced 
by  two  brigades  of  Granger's  division  coming  up  from  Rossville. 
Practically  about  two-thirds  of  the  army,  say  30,000  men  under 
Thomas,  here  held  together  in  a  strong  position  and  stood  prac- 
tically back  to  back,  while  he  repelled  a  series  of  desperate 
charges  by  the  brigades  of  Anderson,  Deas  and  Manigault, 
Gracie,  Trigg  and  Kelley,  Gregg,  McNair  and  Fulton;  and  the 
five  brigades  of  Longstreet,  Kershaw,  Humphreys,  Law,  Robert- 
son and  Benning,  about  25,000.  Not  more  than  half  of  these 
brigades  were  engaged  at  any  one  time.  The  bayonet  was  some- 
times used,  and  men  were  killed  with  clubbed  muskets.  This 
was  kept  up  from  2  to  6  P.M.,  during  which  time  the  infantry  fire 
was  incessant  and  tremendous.  About  5  P.M.  Longstreet  suc- 
ceeded in  getting  11  guns  under  Williams  into  position, 
whence  their  fire  could  take  in  flank  and  rear  the  positions  of 
Thomas's  four  left  divisions;  but  the  distance  was  about  900 
yards,  and  the  effect  was  not  immediate. 

About  6  P.M.  the  Confederates  on  the  right  flank,  who  had 
lain  quiet  since  noon,  recovering  from  their  severe  punishment 
in  the  morning,  prepared  to  make  a  general  advance.  About 
the  same  time,  Thomas  had  taken  warning  from  the  artillery  fire 
now  coming  in  on  his  flank  and  rear  and  made  preparations  to 
withdraw  his  command.  He  had  also  received  orders  from 
Rosecrans  to  withdraw  to  Rossville,  but  had  delayed  to  execute 
them  until  the  last  moment.  It  had  now  come,  and  had  he 
delayed  longer  his  losses  would  have  been  great.  As  it  was, 
they  were  comparatively  light.  At  some  points  there  were 
severe  struggles  and  at  others  there  was  little  resistance,  but 
everywhere  his  lines  were  occupied  and  the  triumphant  Con- 
federates celebrated  their  victory  with  such  cheering  as  is  said 
never  to  have  been  heard  before. 

The  table  of  casualties  shows  the  heaviest  percentages  of  the 
war.  Deducting  the  missing,  many  of  whom  were  prisoners,  and 
also  the  losses  of  the  cavalry,  which  were  light,  the  killed  and 
wounded  among  the  infantry  and  artillery  were  14,871  out  of 
47,520,  or  over  31  per  cent  among  the  Confederates. 


BATTLE  OF  CHICKAMAUGA  463 

CASUALTIES  ARMY  OF  TENN.,  CHICKAMAUGA,  SEPT.  19-20, 1863 


CORPS  AND 
DIVISION 

BRIGADE 

KILLED 

WOUNDED 

MISSING 

TOTAL 

STRENGTH 

Polk 
Cheatham 

Jackson 
Smith 
Maney 
Wright 
Strahl 

55 
40 
54 
44 
19 

430 
260 
315 
400 
203 

5 

7 
15 
43 

28 

490 
307 
384 
483 
250 

1,405 
1,200 
1,177 
1,252 
1,149 

Total 

212 

1,608 

99 

1,919 

6,183 

Polk 
Hindman 

Anderson 
Deas 
Manigault 

80 
123 
66 

454 

578 
426 

24 
28 
47 

558 
729 
539 

1,865 
1,942 
1,914 

Total 

269 

1,458 

99 

1,826 

5,621 

Hill 
Cleburne 

Wood 
Polk 
Deshler 

96 
52 
56 

680 
493 
366 

2 

2 
2 

778 
547 
424 

Not  giv. 

a 

1,783 

Total 

204 

1,539 

6 

1,749 

5,115 

Hill 
Breckenridge 

Helm 
Adams 
Stovall 

63 
66 
37 

408 
269 
232 

35 

84 
46 

506 
429 
305 

1,485 
1,314 
970 

Total 

166 

909 

165 

1,240 

3,769 

Walker 
Gist 

Colquitt 
Ector 
Wilson 

49 
59 
99 

251 
239 
426 

36 
138 
80 

336 
436 
605 

Not  giv. 
« 

u 

Total 

207 

916 

254 

1,377 

5,000 

Walker 
Lid'dell 

Govan 
Walthall 

73 
61 

502 
531 

283 
196 

858 
788 

Not  giv. 
it 

Total 

134 

1,033 

479 

1,646 

3,175 

Buckner 
Stewart 

Bate 
Brown 
Clayton 

63 
50 
86 

530 

427 
518 

11 

4 
15 

604 
481 
619 

1,316 
1,412 
1,446 

Total 

199 

1,475 

30 

1,704 

4,174 

Buckner 
Preston 

Gracie 
Trigg 
Kelly 

90 
46 
66 

576 
231 
241 

2 
4 
3 

668 
281 
310 

2,128 
1,536 
1,136 

Total 

202 

1,048 

9 

1,259 

4,800 

464 


MILITARY  MEMOIRS 


CASUALTIES  ARMY  OF  TENN.,  CHICKAMAUGA,  SEPT.  19-20, 1863 


CORPS  AND 
DIVISION 

BRIGADE 

KILLED 

WOUNDED 

MISSING 

TOTAL 

STRENGTH 

Johnson's 
Reserve 
i 

Gregg 
McNair 
Fulton 

113 
67 

28 

447 
320 
271 

17 

54 
74 

577 
441 
373 

1,436 
1,291 
956 

Total 

208 

1,038 

145 

1,391 

3,683 

Longstreet 
Hood 

Law 

Robertson 
Benning 
Kershaw 
Humphreys 

61 

78 
46 
68 
20 

329 
457 
436 
419 
132 

35 
6 
1 

390 
570 

488 
488 
152 

Not  giv. 

« 

ii 

« 
« 

Total 

273 

1,773 

4 

2,088 

6,000 

Total  Folk's  Corps 
Total  Hill's  Corps 
Total  Walker's  Corps 
Total  Buckner's  Corps 
Total  Johnson's  Div. 
Total  Longstreet  's  Corps 

481 
370 
341 
401 
208 
273 

3,066 
2,448 
1,949 
2,523 
1,038 
1,773 

198 
171 
733 
39 

145 
42 

3,745 
2,989 
3,023 
2,963 
1,391 
2,088 

11,804 
8,884 
8,175 
8,974 
3,683 
6,000 

Total  Inf.  and  Arty. 

2,074 

12,797 

1,328 

16,199 

47,520 

Total  Cavalry 

250 

14,260 

CASUALTIES  ARMY  OF  THE  CUMBERLAND,  CHICKAMAUGA, 
SEPT.  19-20,  1863 


CORPS 

DIVISION 

KILLED 

WOUNDED 

MISSING 

TOTAL 

STRENGTH 

14th 
Corps 
Thomas 

1st 
2d 
3d 
4th 

181 
66 
325 
93 

794 
430 
1,652 

685 

1,202 
295 
214 
176 

2,177 
791 
2,191 
954 

Total 

14th  Corps 

665 

3,561 

1,888 

6,114 

22,758 

20th 
Corps 
McCook 

1st 
2d 
3d 

124 
148 
151 

720 
940 
939 

405 
554 
276 

1,349 
1,642 
1,366 

Total 

20th  Corps 

423 

2,699 

1,235 

4,357 

13,372 

21st 
Corps 
Crittenden 

1st 
2d 
3d 

132 
134 
56 

744 
1,031 
604 

194 
203 
302 

1,070 
1,368 
962 

Total 

21st  Corps 

322 

2,382 

699 

3,403 

14,190 

Reserve 

Granger 

215 

976 

631 

1,822 

5,479 

Total  Inf.  and  Arty. 

1,625 

9,618 

4,453 

15,696 

55,799 

Total  Cavalry 

32 

136 

300 

468 

9,842 

BATTLE  OF  CHICKAMAUGA  465 

Among  the  Federal  infantry  and  artillery  the  killed  and 
wounded  were  11,243  out  of  55,799,  or  an  average  of  about  21 
per  cent.  No  returns  are  given  of  the  Confederate  losses  in  the 
cavalry,  but  they  were  very  light  in  the  Federal  cavalry,  only 
32  killed  and  136  wounded,  and  there  is  no  reason  to  suppose 
them  any  heavier  among  the  Confederates.  Apparently  the 
forest  paralyzed  the  cavalry  of  both  armies. 

Very  many  of  the  reports  of  the  Confederate  brigadiers  state 
the  number  of  men  engaged,  and  these  statements,  excluding 
cooking  details,  ambulance  men,  and  stragglers,  are  more  exact 
than  the  official  returns,  and  are  used  in  estimating  the  per- 
centages of  killed  and  wounded.  In  Gist's  and  Hood's  divisions 
only  no  figures  are  given,  and  here  estimates  have  been  made  in 
round  numbers. 

There  is  much  discrepancy  in  the  reports  of  tne  two  com- 
manders as  to  the  guns,  small  arms,  and  prisoners  taken.  Bragg 
reports  51  guns  and  15,000  stand  of  small-arms.  Rosecrans 
admits  but  36  guns  and  8450  small-arms,  which  is  more  probably 
correct.  The  Confederates  were  in  the  habit  of  exchanging  their 
inferior  guns  and  small-arms  on  the  field  for  the  better  ones  of 
the  enemy,  leaving  the  old  in  their  places.  Some  of  these  found 
on  the  field  were  by  mistake  assumed  to  be  captured.  A  list  of 
the  51  reported  captured  is  given  in  the  reports  with  the  manu- 
facturers' marks,  and  of  these  15  appear  as  of  Confederate  make. 
Of  prisoners,  Bragg  reports  8000,  while  Rosecrans  admits  but 
4750.  No  accurate  returns  were  made  of  the  prisoners  captured. 
The  numbers  were  largely  guesswork,  the  same  prisoners  being 
often  claimed  by  more  than  one  command.  There  is  no  reason 
to  doubt  the  accuracy  of  Rosecrans's  report.  It  gives,  also,  some 
interesting  statistics  of  the  ammunition  expended  which  was 
but  7325  rounds  of  artillery  and  2,650,000  of  infantry.  The 
wooded  character  of  the  field  is  shown  in  the  comparatively  small 
amount  of  artillery  ammunition  which  is  said  to  have  been 
"12,625  less  than  was  expended  at  Stone  River,"  and  is  less 
than  one-fourth  of  the  Federal  expenditure  at  Gettysburg. 

On  the  morning  of  the  21st  the  army  under  Thomas  was  in 
position  on  Missionary  Ridge,  about  Rossville,  five  miles  in  rear 
of  the  field  of  the  day  before.  Here  it  took  position  and  awaited 


466  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

attack  all  day,  but  none  was  made.  Longstreet  reports  that  he 
advised  crossing  the  Tennessee  River  and  moving  upon  Rose- 
crans's  communications,  and  that  Bragg  approved  and  ordered 
Folk's  wing  to  take  the  lead,  while  his  wing  cared  for  the  wounded 
and  policed  the  field.  The  army,  however,  was  in  such  confu- 
sion and  need  of  ammunition  that  it  was  dark  before  the  rear 
of  Folk's  corps  was  stretched  out  upon  the  road,  and  Longstreet's 
march  was  postponed  until  the  22d.  During  the  night  Thomas 
withdrew  into  the  city,  which  was  already  partially  fortified,  and 
was  now  easily  made  impregnable. 

Bragg  followed  on  the  22d  and  took  position  in  front  of  him, 
Longstreet's  scheme  of  moving  across  the  Tennessee  River  on 
Rosecrans's  communications  he  deemed  impracticable  and 
dropped  it.  The  town  was  not  invested  closely,  but  position  was 
taken  on  Missionary  Ridge  and  Lookout  Mountain,  about  three 
miles  out,  with  the  intention  of  compelling  the  evacuation  of  Chat- 
tanooga by  cutting  it  off  from  its  base  of  supplies  at  Stevenson,  Ala. 

The  shortest  and  best  road  came  via  Jasper,  crossed  the  river 
at  Kelley's  Ferry,  and,  recrossing  at  Brown's  Ferry,  found  itself 
directly  opposite  Chattanooga  on  the  north  side  of  the  river,  about 
40  miles  from  Stevenson.  But  this  road  could  not  be  used. 
Below  Kelley's  Ferry  it  skirted  the  river  and  was  commanded  by 
small-arms  from  the  south  side.  This  compelled  the  enemy  to 
cross  Walden's  Ridge  to  get  by,  adding  many  miles  to  their 
journey  over  exceedingly  rough  country. 

The  importance  of  holding  strongly  the  country  between  the 
two  ferries,  Kelley's  and  Browns's,  seems  never  to  have  been 
appreciated  by  either  Bragg  or  Longstreet,  who  had  charge  of 
the  left  wing  of  the  army.  The  duty  was  confided  to  a  single 
small  brigade,  Law's,  of  Hood's  division,  which  was  sent  around 
the  toe  of  Lookout  Mountain  for  the  purpose.  A  full  division 
at  least  should  have  guarded  so  important  a  point,  and  one  so 
exposed.1 

1  It  was  about  this  time  that  Gen.  W.  F.  Smith,  known  in  the  U.  S. 
Army  as  "  Baldy  "  Smith,  was  assigned  to  the  Federal  army,  as  chief  engineer. 
He  devised  and  superintended  the  execution,  not  only  of  the  skilful  strategic 
moves  by  which  the  blockade  of  Chattanooga  was  broken,  but  those  by 
which  Grant  on  Nov.  25  so  easily,  and  with  such  little  loss,  routed  Bragg  at 
Chattanooga. 


BATTLE  OF  CHICKAMAUGA  467 

The  opportunity  to  blockade  the  wagon  traffic  was  not  at 
once  understood  by  the  Confederates,  and  it  was  Oct.  11 
before  it  was  fully  enforced.  After  that  date  wagons  were  often 
eight  days  in  bringing  a  load  from  Stevenson,  and  reduced  rations 
were  issued  to  the  Federals.  Wheeler's  cavalry  in  a  raid  had 
destroyed  most  of  the  transportation  of  the  14th  corps,  but  was 
itself  nearly  destroyed  by  the  opportunity  of  plundering  the 
wagons.  Couriers  reported  that  "from  Bridgeport  to  the  foot 
of  the  mountains  the  mud  is  up  to  the  horses'  bellies."  On  the 
6th  Rosecrans  reported  "the  possession  of  the  river  is  a  sine 
qua  non  to  the  holding  of  Chattanooga."  Reconnoissances  and 
preparations  were  made,  and  on  the  night  of  the  27th  a  flotilla 
of  pontoons,  carrying  about  1500  men  under  Hazen,  was 
floated  down  and  landed  at  Brown's  Ferry.  On  the  north 
side  a  force  was  marched  by  land  to  meet  them,  and  a  pontoon 
bridge  was  built.  By  morning  a  brigade  with  artillery  was  es- 
tablished and  fortifying  itself  in  a  strong  position  on  the  southern 
bank.  Before  Bragg  could  concentrate  enough  to  attack  them, 
Hooker  appeared,  coming  from  Bridgeport,  with  the  llth  and 
12th  corps  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  These  had  been  hurried 
out  to  reenforce  Rosecrans,  when  the  Federals  realized^  that 
Longstreet  had  reenforced  Bragg. 

This,  of  course,  put  an  end  to  the  contemplated  attack,  but, 
with  very  questionable  judgment,  Bragg  ordered  a  night  attack 
upon  a  portion  of  Geary's  division  of  the  12th  corps  (about  1500 
strong  with  four  guns),  which  had  encamped  at  a  point  called 
Wauhatchie.  This  was  about  three  miles  from  Brown's  Ferry, 
where  Hooker,  with  the  remainder  of  his  force,  had  united  with 
the  force  under  Hazen. 

THE   BATTLE   OF  WAUHATCHIE 

Night  attacks  are  specially  valuable  against  troops  who  have 
been  defeated  and  are  retreating.  They  are  of  little  value  un- 
der any  other  circumstances.  The  war,  too,  had  now  reached  a 
stage  where  men  had  become  impossible  to  replace  in  the  Con- 
federate ranks.  Nothing  could  be  more  injudicious  than  to 
sacrifice  them,  even  for  a  success,  which  would  have  no  effect 
upon  the  campaign. 


468 


MILITARY  MEMOIRS 


BATTLE  OF  CHICKAMAUGA  469 

That  was  the  case  in  this  instance.  Near  at  hand,  the  Federals 
had  double  or  treble  the  force  of  the  Confederates,  and  the  camp 
to  be  attacked  was  two  miles  within  the  Federal  lines.  The 
attack  must  be  made,  the  fruit  of  it  be  gathered,  and  withdrawal 
accomplished  before  the  light  of  dawn;  for  with  the  dawn,  or 
even  before  it,  an  overwhelming  force  of  the  enemy  would  cut 
off  the  withdrawal. 

The  only  troops  available  for  the  attack  were  four  brigades  of 
Hood's  division,  under  Jenkins,  which  had  been  brought  around 
the  high  toe  of  Lookout  Mountain.  This  road  was  exposed  to 
batteries  on  the  north  side  of  the  river  and  could  only  be  used  at 
night.  Three  of  the  brigades,  Law,  Benning,  and  Robertson,  had 
suffered  severely,  both  at  Gettysburg  and  Chickamauga,  and 
scarcely  averaged  700  men  each.  These  brigades  were  ordered 
to  cross  Lookout  Creek,  and  seize  the  road  between  Hooker's 
camp  near  Brown's  Ferry  and  the  camp  of  Geary  to  be  at- 
tacked. The  remaining  brigade  was  Jenkins's  own,  now  under 
Bratton,  and  was  about  1800  strong. 

Law,  with  two  regiments,  had  opposed  Hazen's  landing  on  the 
27th,  and  skirmished  on  the  28th  with  the  advance  of  the  llth 
and  12th  corps  under  Hooker,  but  had  now  withdrawn  across 
Lookout  Creek.  From  the  mountains  above,  a  fine  view  was 
afforded  of  the  valley  with  Hooker's  camp  at  the  north  end,  and 
Geary's  three  miles  behind  it.  Jenkins  had  been  summoned  be- 
fore sundown  to  view  it  and  get  some  idea  of  the  topography. 
He  returned  after  dark  and  joinipg  Law  discussed  the  enterprise, 
which  Law  strongly  advised  against.  The  orders,  however, 
were  peremptory  and  there  was  no  superior  at  hand  to  appeal  to. 
The  moon  was  about  full,  and  soon  after  dark  Law  moved  with 
his  brigade  across  the  bridge  and,  after  some  time  spent  in 
exploration,  took  position  on  a  ridge  nearly  parallel  to  the  road 
between  Brown's  Ferry  and  Wauhatchie,  and  some  50  to  150 
yards  distant.  It  was  about  two  miles  below  the  camp  of 
Geary's  division,  and  less  than  a  mile  above  the  encampments  of 
the  llth  and  12th  corps.  The  Texas  brigade  reporting  to  Law, 
he  placed  two  of  its  regiments  on  his  left  and  one  on  his  right, 
and  sent  the  4th  regiment  to  hold  the  bridge  in  his  rear.  Ben- 
ning's  brigade  was  sent  to  ambush  the  road  farther  ahead. 


470  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

This  effort  to  hold  the  road  against  efforts  to  reenforce  Geary 
might  have  been  much  more  effective  had  Law  thrown  his  bri- 
gades boldly  across  the  road,  with  perhaps  two  brigades  in  his 
front  line  supported  by  the  third  in  a  second  line.  He  prob- 
ably failed  to  adopt  this  policy  only  because  he  was  too  con- 
scious of  his  weakness.  His  retreat  was  more  assured  and  easier 
from  the  position  which  he  took.  And,  in  view  of  the  risks  at- 
tendant on  the  venture,  and  the  small  chances  of  success,  it 
may  have  been  the  more  prudent  course. 

In  the  placing  of  Law's  command  there  had  been  a  few  picket 
shots  about  10  o'clock,  which  had  caused  Geary's  command  to 
be  put  under  arms  and  to  be  unusually  alert.  Soon  after  mid- 
night their  own  picket  challenged  and  was  shot  down,  upon  which 
the  camp  was  alarmed,  all  lights  extinguished,  and  the  troops 
formed  in  line.  The  weather  was  somewhat  cloudy,  making  the 
moonlight  fitful.  Jenkins  endeavored  to  restrain  his  men  from 
firing  as  they  deployed  before  the  camp,  but  it  was  in  vain,  and 
gradually  the  regiments  extending  on  each  side  overlapped  the 
Federal  line  and  awaited  an  attack  on  the  Federal  rear  by  Lt.- 
Col.  T.  M.  Logan,  with  a  force  of  sharp-shooters,  who  had  passed 
around  to  the  rear.  Their  attack  was  to  be  a  signal  for  a  general 
charge.  About  an  hour  had  now  elapsed. 

It  was  just  at  this  juncture  that  Jenkins  gave  orders  to  with- 
draw. Law  had  notified  him  that  the  enemy  had  passed  his 
position,  which  was  a  mistake.  The  road  had  been  open  all  the 
while,  but  no  troops  had  passed.  On  the  opening  of  the  attack 
upon  Geary  there  had  been  a  general  alarm  in  all  the  camps 
below,  and  several  brigades  had  been  ordered  to  go  to  his  relief. 
The  first  brigade  passing  Law's  ambush  received  volleys  which,  in 
the  darkness,  did  little  harm  but  threw  their  lines  into  confusion. 
Forming  then  parallel  to  the  road,  the  Federals  charged  Law's 
position,  but  were  at  first  repulsed.  Re-forming,  and  extending 
their  lines,  Steinwehr's  division  made  a  second  attempt,  but 
Smith's  brigade,  which  struck  Law's  front,  was  again  repulsed 
with  heavy  loss.  The  men,  however,  did  not  on  this  occasion 
fall  back  to  the  foot  of  the  hill,  but  rallied  in  the  darkness  of  the 
woods,  near  at  hand,  until  a  part  of  the  136th  N.Y.,  which  had 
overlapped  Law's  front,  ha'd  appeared  in  his  rear.  The  attack 


BATTLE  OF  CHICKAMAUGA  471 

being  then  renewed  was  successful  all  along  the  line,  and  Law  fell 
back  toward  the  bridge,  not  being  pursued.  Robertson,  who 
had  had  eight  casualties,  and  Benning,  who  had  had  none,  also 
withdrew,  as  the  retreat  of  Law  compelled. 

Meantime,  in  the  confusion  of  the  night  a  column  of  two 
Federal  brigades,  ordered  to  go  direct  to  Geary's  help,  had  halted 
without  orders,  and  was  overlooked  for  nearly  two  hours.  Owing 
to  this  oversight,  and  the  non-pursuit  of  Law,  both  he  and  Jenkins 
were  able  to  cross  the  bridge  before  daylight. 

No  artillery  was  used  by  the  Confederates,  but  Knaps's  bat- 
tery of  four  guns,  with  Geary,  was  severely  engaged  at  close 
quarters,  expending  224  rounds  and  losing  3  killed  and  19 
wounded. 

Geary's  total  casualties  were :  — 

34  killed,  174  wounded,  8  missing:  total  216. 

These  all  occurred  in  Greene's  and  Cobham's  brigades  about 
1600  strong.  The  Federal  casualties  in  the  brigades  opposing 
Law  were :  — 

45  killed,  150  wounded,  7  missing :  total  204. 

These  occurred  principally  in  Tyndale's  and  Orland  Smith's 
brigades.  The  aggregate  was  420.  The  Confederate  casualties 
reported  are  as  follows :  — 

Law :  3  killed,  19  wounded,  30  missing :  total  52. 
Jenkins:  31  killed,  286  wounded,  39  missing:  total  356.     Aggregate 
408. 

The  character  of  the  attack  by  Jenkins's  brigade,  and  of  the 
defence  by  Greene's  and  Cobham's,  aided  by  the  battery,  had 
been  excellent.  The  casualties  were  heavy,  and  included  many 
officers  distinguished  among  their  comrades  for  conduct,  Noth- 
ing less  could  have  been  expected,  and  nothing  materially  more 
could  be  hoped  for,  and  such  considerations  should  have  for- 
bidden this  adventure.  The  guarding  of  the  rear  by  Law 
proved  a  success,  though  due  to  a  Federal  mistake,  not  to  his 
disposition.  Only  about  half  his  force  was  engaged.  It  re- 
pulsed two  attacks,  but  was  swept  away  by  the  third.  The 
enemy,  however,  made  no  advance  and  a  free  road,  left  open  until 
after  daylight,  provided  an  escape  for  all  four  brigades  from  one 


472  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

of  the  most  foolhardy  adventures  of  the  war.  A  Court  of  In- 
quiry in  the  llth  corps  was  held,  which  found  that  Krzyzan- 
owski's  brigade  had  halted  without  authority  and  against  the 
orders  of  the  division  commander,  when  under  orders  to  go  to 
Geary's  assistance. 

These  operations  left  Rosecrans  with  free  communications  by 
the  shortest  and  best  roads,  and  at  liberty  to  receive  all  the 
reinforcements  coming  to  him.  Besides  the  llth  and  12th  corps, 
under  Hooker,  already  near  at  hand,  it  was  known  that  Grant 
was  bringing  up  a  large  force  under  Sherman  from  Memphis, 
and  it  was  clear  that  within  30  days  a  force  would  be  concentrated 
against  us  sufficient  to  overwhelm  us.  Rosecrans  had  now  con- 
verted Chattanooga  into  a  citadel,  impregnable  to  assault  by 
storm,  within  which  he  could  confidently  await  the  accumula- 
tion of  whatever  force  was  needed. 

The  burden  of  the  attack  was  upon  us.  We  must  promptly 
take  the  aggressive,  and  meet  and  defeat,  either  Grant  and  Sher- 
man approaching  from  the  west,  or  Burnside,  near  at  hand  and 
threatening  on  the  east,  and  be  able  then  to  reconcentrate  our 
army  against  the  other  adversaries.  President  Davis  had 
recently  paid  a  visit  to  the  army,  which,  it  was  known,  was  dis- 
satisfied with  Bragg  as  a  commander,  but  after  some  investi- 
gation had  decided  to  sustain  him.  Bragg,  accordingly,  had 
the  decision  of  the  question  what  should  be  done. 

On  Nov.  3  he  issued  orders  for  Longstreet's  corps,  with  Wheel- 
er's cavalry,  to  attack  Burnside's  corps  at  Knoxville,  which 
was  to  be  assailed  at  the  same  time  by  a  force  of  perhaps  4000 
men  under  Ransom,  coming  from  southwest  Virginia.  With 
the  remainder  of  his  army,  Bragg  proposed  to  hold  his  present 
lines,  in  front  of  Chattanooga,  during  the  absence  of  Long- 
street's  division.  As  these  lines  occupied  a  concave  front  of 
fully  eight  miles  against  an  enemy  concentrated  within  four, 
they  were  necessarily  weak  and  unable  to  quickly  reenforce 
threatened  points.  Longstreet  pointed  out  their  disadvantages 
and  urged  a  withdrawal  of  the  remainder  of  the  army  to  a  strong 
defensive  position  behind  the  Chickamauga  River,  and  that 
his  own  force  for  the  attack  of  Burnside  at  Knoxville  should  be 
increased  to  20,000  men,  to  insure  quick  and  easy  work,  and 


BATTLE  OF  CHICKAMAUGA  473 

save  any  dependence  upon  the  hypothetical  force  from  south- 
west Virginia.  Bragg,  however,  overruled  all  suggestions,  and 
Longstreet  was  put  in  motion  on  Nov.  4  for  Knoxville,  with 
Wheeler's  two  divisions  (four  brigades)  of  cavalry. 

The  result  was  what  might  have  been  expected,  and  we  may 
anticipate  and  record  it,  briefly,  before  following  Longstreet  in 
his  adventure  against  Knoxville. 

THE   BATTLE   OF   CHATTANOOGA   OR   MISSIONARY   RIDGE 

On  Oct.  22  Grant  had  reached  Chattanooga  and  superseded 
Rosecrans.  By  Nov.  20  he  had  concentrated  at  Chattanooga 
about  65,000  infantry  and  artillery  present  for  duty,  and  pro- 
vided siege  artillery  for  the  forts  about  Chattanooga.  Bragg, 
meanwhile,  had  further  reduced  his  force  by  sending  Bushrod 
Johnson  with  two  brigades,  2500  men,  to  Knoxville,  who  joined 
Longstreet  just  too  late  to  be  of  any  service.  This  had  reduced 
his  force  to  about  40,000  infantry  present  for  duty,  greatly 
handicapped  by  their  position  in  the  long  concave  exterior  line. 
On  Nov.  22  Grant  took  the  aggressive  and  set  on  foot  attacks 
upon  Bragg's  extreme  right  and  left  flanks.  On  the  morning  of 
the  24th  Hooker  turned  the  extreme  left  flank  at  Wauhatchie, 
in  the  valley  of  Lookout  Creek,  by  climbing  the  slope  of  Lookout 
Mountain  to  the  foot  of  the  palisade.  This  palisade  is  a  precipice 
dividing  the  top  of  the  mountain  from  the  slopes  forming  its 
toe.  These  were  held  by  one  brigade  of  Bragg's  infantry  who 
were  advanced  some  distance  down  the  slope.  Advancing  along 
the  foot  of  the  precipice  he  took  the  Confederate  positions  on  the 
toe  of  the  mountain  in  reverse.  They  were  also  exposed  to 
artillery  fire  from  the  front  across  the  river  and  were  thus  surely 
driven  out,  about  as  fast  as  Hooker's  men  could  pick  their  way 
along  the  steep  slopes  at  the  foot  of  the  precipice,  which  bounded 
the  mountain  on  the  west. 

Ten  miles  away  on  the  right  flank,  Chickamauga  Creek  emptied 
into  the  Tennessee  by  two  mouths,  and,  in  the  eastern  mouth  of 
the  creek,  Grant  had  concealed  a  number  of  pontoons,  and  behind 
the  hills  north  of  the  river  was  Sherman  with  over  three  divi- 
sions. On  the  morning  of  Nov.  24  a  bridge  was  built  across  the 


474  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

Tennessee  and  12,000  men  were  brought  across  and  made  a  lodg- 
ment on  the  east  end  of  Missionary  Ridge,  before  Bragg  was  aware 
of  it. 

At  sunrise,  on  the  25th,  both  Hooker  and  Sherman  were  ordered 
to  attack.  When  Hooker  advanced  it  was  discovered  that 
during  the  night  of  the  24th,  the  Confederate  forces  had  aban- 
doned Lookout  Mountain  and  withdrawn  all  of  their  men  across 
Chattanooga  Creek,  burning  the  bridge.  Hooker  followed  in 
pursuit  with  three  divisions,  Osterhaus's,  Cruft's,  and  Geary's, 
about  10,000  men.  About  four  hours  were  lost  in  rebuilding 
the  bridge.  Beyond  it,  only  a  feeble  resistance  was  developed 
near  Rossville  on  the  western  extremity  of  Missionary  Ridge  by 
two  regiments  of  Stewart's  division.  Stevenson's  division,  which 
had  held  Lookout  Mountain,  had  been  transferred  during  the 
night  to  the  extreme  right  to  oppose  Sherman.  Hooker  placed 
Osterhaus  on  the  right  of  the  ridge,  Cruft  on  the  ridge  (which 
being  narrow  he  occupied  with  three  lines),  and  Geary  on  the  left 
or  front  of  the  ridge.  In  this  formation  he  advanced  almost 
unopposed  and  with  slight  loss  until  he  connected  about  sundown 
with  Johnson's  division  of  the  14th  corps,  which  had  formed  a 
part  of  Thomas's  attack  upon  the  centre  in  the  afternoon,  as 
will  presently  be  described. 

Sherman  had  had  the  entire  day  of  the  24th  practically  un- 
molested to  establish  himself  on  the  northern  extremity  of 
Missionary  Ridge,  and  reinforcements  from  Chattanooga  had 
reached  him  in  the  afternoon.  Soon  after  sunrise  on  the  25th 
he  moved  to  the  attack.  A  wide  depression  in  the  ridge  sepa- 
rated the  portion  of  it  which  he  occupied  from  that  held  by 
Bragg.  Here,  during  the  afternoon  and  night,  Hardee  had  in- 
trenched Cleburne's  division  and  prepared  to  make  a  desperate 
stand.  Sherman's  men,  fresh  from  Vicksburg,  attacked  with 
great  vigor,  and  being  repulsed,  renewed  the  attack  several 
times  with  no  better  success.  Sherman,  in  his  report,  denies 
that  they  were  repulsed,  but  says :  — 

"Not  so.  The  real  attacking  columns  of  Gen.  Corse,  Col.  Loomis,  and 
Gen.  Smith  were  not  repulsed.  They  engaged  in  a  close  struggle  all  day, 
persistently,  stubbornly,  and  well." 

This  is  one  way  of  stating  it.     Their  charges  were  all  driven 


BATTLE  OF  CHICKAMAUGA  475 

back,  with  losses  more  or  less  severe,  to  the  nearest  places  afford- 
ing cover.  From  these  they  kept  up  musketry  fire,  with  little 
loss  or  execution,  all  the  rest  of  the  day.  Some  reinforcements 
sent  on  the  flanks  did  similarly,  and  before  three  o'clock  in  the 
afternoon  Sherman's  whole  force  had  been  fought  to  a  standstill, 
and  Cleburne  held  his  position  intact  and  with  very  little  fight- 
ing the  rest  of  the  day. 

But  Grant's  third  attack,  the  one  upon  the  centre,  was  yet  to 
be  made.  It  was  to  be  upon  Missionary  Ridge  and  the  topog- 
raphy requires  some  description.  The  ridge  is  here  an  average 
of  some  200  feet  high,  with  steep  slopes,  averaging  on  each  side 
fully  500  yards  wide.  Many  ravines  and  swales  intersect  the 
surface,  which  had  been  wooded  but  was  now  recently  cleared, 
leaving  many  stumps.  When  the  position  was  first  occupied,  a 
line  of  breastworks  had  been  built  at  the  foot  of  the  slopes, 
between  one  and  a  half  and  two  miles  from  the  Federal  lines. 
Later  some  unfinished  breastworks  were  erected  halfway  up  the 
hill. 

The  Confederate  engineers  now  seemed  at  a  loss  to  decide 
exactly  where  to  make  their  final  stand,  and  only  at  the  last  did 
they  decide  to  make  it  at  the  proper  place,  at  the  top  of  the  hill. 
But  with  it  they  made  the  fatal  mistake  of  dividing  their  forces, 
already  too  small,  and  putting  one-half  in  their  skirmish  line,  at 
the  bottom  of  the  hill,  and  the  other  half  at  the  top.  Very  few 
of  the  Confederate  reports  of  this  battle  have  been  preserved, 
but  many  interesting  details  are  given  in  papers,  left  by  Gen. 
Manigault  of  S.C.,  who  commanded  a  brigade  in  Hindman's 
division.  The  construction  of  the  works  was  only  begun  on  the 
23d,  with  a  very  insufficient  supply  of  tools.  The  ground  was 
hard  and  rocky,  and  when  the  assault  was  made  on  the  25th, 
the  trenches  were  but  half  completed,  and  only  afforded  pro- 
tection to  the  lower  part  of  the  body.  The  Confederate  engineer 
who  laid  it  out  had  orders  to  locate  the  line  upon  the  highest 
ground,  and  blindly  obeyed.  At  many  places  this  left  numerous 
approaches,  up  ravines  and  swales,  entirely  covered  from  the 
fire  of  the  breastworks.  Manigault  persuaded  the  engineer,  who 
complained  of  having  too  much  to  do,  to  allow  him  to  lay  out 
his  own  line,  and  at  such  places  he  located  the  line  below  the 


476  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

crest  so  as  to  sweep  the  whole  approach.  Brigades  to  the  right 
and  left  did  not  do  this,  and  there  were  many  places  where  an 
assaulting  column  could  approach  within  a  short  distance  with- 
out receiving  any  fire. 

The  fatal  mistake  of  dividing  the  force  seems  to  have  been 
decided  on  during  the  night  of  the  24th,  for  it  was  not  done  until 
the  morning  of  the  25th.  One-half  of  each  brigade  was  then  sent 
to  the  line  at  the  foot  of  the  hill,  and  the  remainder  to  the  line 
at  the  top.  This  disposition  of  forces  was  made  in  all  the  troops 
on  the  ridge,  and  the  number  available  gave,  in  each  position, 
only  a  single  rank,  with  the  men  about  one  pace  apart.  Private 
instructions  were  given  the  superior  officers,  if  attacked  by  more 
than  a  single  line  of  battle,  to  await  the  enemy's  approach  within 
200  yards,  then  to  deliver  their  fire,  and  retire  to  the  works 
above.  This  was  an  injudicious  order,  as  will  be  seen — im- 
practicable of  successful  execution  after  the  enemy  had  gotten 
that  near  in  such  large  force. 

About  noon  the  enemy  began  to  form  in  masses  in  front  of  our 
centre,  about  two  miles  away.  About  two  o'clock  these  masses 
deployed  and  formed  two  lines  of  battle,  with  a  front  of  at  least 
two  and  a  half  miles.  After  completing  their  arrangements  these 
moved  within  a  mile  of  our  lower,  works  and  halted.  Behind 
these  two  lines  a  reserve  force,  apparently  equal  in  number  to 
one  of  them,  was  disposed  at  intervals  in  close  columns  of  regi- 
ments, and  followed  them  some  300  yards  in  rear.  The  whole 
array  was  preceded  by  a  powerful  line  of  skirmishers  deployed 
at  half  distances.  One  could  not  but  be  struck  with  the  order 
and  regularity  of  the  movements  and  the  ease  with  which  the 
Federals  preserved  their  lines.  The  sight  was  a  grand  and  im- 
pressive one,  the  like  of  which  had  never  been  seen  before  by 
any  one  who  witnessed  it. 

Manigault  writes :  — 

"  I  felt  no  fear  for  the  result,  even  though  the  arrangements  to  repel  the 
attack  were  not  such  as  I  liked,  neither  did  I  know  at  the  time  that  a  col- 
umn of  the  enemy  was  at  that  moment  on  our  left  flank  and  rear,  or  that 
our  army  numbered  so  few  men.  I  think,  however,  that  I  noticed  some 
nervousness  among  my  men  as  they  beheld  this  grand  military  spectacle, 
and  I  heard  remarks  which  showed  that  some  uneasiness  existed,  and  that 
they  magnified  the  host  in  their  view  to  at  least  double  their  number." 


BATTLE  OF  CHICKAMAUGA  477 

The  reference  made  to  the  "column  of  the  enemy  at  that 
moment  on  our  left  flank  and  rear"  is  to  the  three  divisions  under 
Hooker,  advancing  from  Rossville  on  both  sides  of  Missionary 
Ridge.  They  were  due  to  reach  the  field  about  sundown. 

For  some  time  after  the  last  halt  of  the  enemy  there  was  an 
ominous  silence  over  the  whole  field,  except  for  an  occasional 
distant  cannon-shot.  Sherman's  battle,  from  one  to  two  miles 
to  the  right,  had  been  fought  out.  Hooker  was  marching  cau- 
tiously unopposed,  and,  by  a  sort  of  tacit  understanding,  even 
the  skirmishers  in  front  paused  in  contemplation  of  the  coming 
storm. 

The  attack  on  the  Confederate  centre  was  assigned  to  Thomas, 
who  had  been  in  readiness  all  the  morning,  but  was  still  delayed 
by  Grant,  who  hesitated  to  order  it  until  either  Sherman  had 
turned  our  right  flank  or  Hooker  had  turned  our  left.  Hooker 
was  delayed  and  does  not  seem  to  have  been  heard  from.  Sher- 
man had  been  fought  to  a  standstill ;  but  thinking  that  he  saw 
reinforcements  moving  from  the  Confederate  centre  against 
Sherman,  Grant  directed  Thomas  to  give  the  signal.  It  was  a 
dozen  guns,  fired  by  the  enemy,  and  was  followed  by  the  open- 
ing of  their  whole  line,  and  soon  after  by  our  own  guns  from 
Missionary  Ridge  directed  at  the  dark  masses  of  their  troops. 
The  effect  of  a  plunging  fire,  however,  from  our  high  elevation,  was 
distinctly  less  than  it  would  have  been  upon  a  plain,  and  when 
the  enemy's  lines  were  set  in  motion,  which  soon  followed,  it 
was  apparent,  at  a  glance,  that  our  artillery  was  utterly  inade- 
quate to  the  task  of  stopping  the  great  force  before  us. 

Meanwhile  one-half  of  the  whole  Confederate  force  was  under 
secret  orders  to  retreat  when  the  enemy  arrived  within  200  yards, 
and  the  enemy's  generals  were  themselves  under  orders  from 
Grant  not  to  advance  beyond  our  skirmish  line.  Manigault  thus 
describes  what  took  place :  — 

"When  the  enemy  had  arrived  within  about  200  yards  our  men  gave 
their  volley,  and  a  well-directed  and  fatal  one  it  proved,  but  then  followed 
a  scene  of  confusion  rarely  witnessed,  and  only  equalled  at  a  later  hour  on 
that  day.  The  order  had  been  issued  to  retire,  but  many  did  not  hear  it, 
owing  to  the  reports  of  their  own  pieces  and  the  deafening  roar  of  artillery. 
Others  supposed  their  comrades  flying  and  refused  to  do  likewise.  Some 


478  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

feared  to  retire  up  the  hill,  exposed  to  a  heavy  fire  in  their  rear,  feeling 
certain,  as  their  movements  must  be  slow,  that  they  would  be  killed  or 
wounded  before  reaching  their  friends  above.  All  order  was  lost,  and  each 
striving  to  save  himself  took  the  shortest  direction  for  the  summit.  The 
enemy  seeing  the  confusion  and  retreat  moved  up  their  first  line  at  a 
double  quick  and  came  over  the  breastworks,  but  I  could  see  some  of 
our  brave  fellows  firing  into  the  enemy's  faces  and  at  last  falling  over- 
powered. .  .  . 

"The  troops  from  below  at  last  reached  the  works  exhausted  and 
breathless,  the  greater  portion  so  demoralized  that  they  rushed  to  the  rear 
to  place  the  ridge  itself  between  them  and  the  enemy.  It  required  the  ut- 
most efforts  of  myself  and  other  officers  to  prevent  this,  which  we  finally 
succeeded  in  doing.  Many  fell,  broken  down  from  over-exertion,  and 
became  deathly  sick  or  fainted.  I  noticed  some  instances  of  slight  hem- 
orrhage, and  it  was  fifteen  minutes  before  the  nervous  systems  of  those 
men  were  so  restored  as  to  be  able  to  draw  a  trigger  with  steadiness." 

In  the  meantime,  Grant  had  observed  the  battle  from  his 
commanding  position  in  the  rear.  As  above  said,  he  thought  he 
had  seen  Bragg  detaching  troops  from  his  centre,  opposite 
Thomas,  and  sending  them  to  reenforce  the  right  opposite 
Sherman,  and  many  Federal  reports,  ever  since,  have  fallen  into 
the  same  error.  But  all  are  wrong.  Sherman  had  been  fought 
to  a  standstill,  and  Cleburne  had  no  need  for  reinforcements. 
Also,  Thomas's  preparations  could  be  seen  too  plainly.  So  the 
elaborate  strategy,  which  had  sent  Sherman  to  turn  Bragg's 
right,  came  to  naught  at  the  fighting  point.  Grant  had  seen, 
with  much  satisfaction,  the  Confederate  lower  line  of  intrench- 
ments  in  the  possession  of  his  forces.  But,  as  he  looked,  he  was 
surprised  to  see,  at  a  number  of  points,  that  his  men  had  not 
halted  as  he  had  ordered,  but  were  beginning  to  climb  the  slope 
and  advance  against  the  fortified  line  at  the  crest.  He  asked 
angrily:  "Who  ordered  those  men  up  the  hill?"  and,  when  all 
present  disclaimed  it,  said:  "Some  one  will  suffer  for  it,  if  it 
turns  out  badly."  But  the  men  themselves,  having  reached  the 
designated  position,  were  able  to  take  a  more  practical  view  of 
it  than  the  general  himself  at  a  distance. 

It  would  be  impossible  for  the  troops  to  remain  in  the  new 
position  under  the  fire  of  the  Confederate  line  at  the  top  of  the 
hill.  There  was  nothing  to  do  but  to  follow  the  fugitives  and 
endeavor  to  mingle  with  them.  As  the  pursuers  advanced,  they 


BATTLE  OF  CHICKAMAUGA  479 

soon  appreciated  the  fact  that  the  ravines  and  swales  afforded 
more  or  less  protection  from  fire,  and  the  whole  line  soon  divided 
and  concentrated  itself  on  about  six  separate  lines  of  advance. 
Not  one  of  these  was  on  the  front  held  by  Manigault's  brigade. 
Every  attempted  advance  here  had  been  met  with  fire,  before 
which  it  either  fell  back  to  cover,  or  disappeared  to  the  right  or 
left.  Next  on  the  left  was  Patton  Anderson's  brigade  of  Missis- 
sippians,  and  next  on  the  right  was  Deas's  brigade  of  Alabamians. 
A  large  number  of  Federals  soon  found  shelter  behind  some  over- 
hanging rocks  in  Deas's  front  within  20  yards  of  his  line  of  battle. 
Manigault  turned  a  gun  upon  them  and  they  were  driven  from 
view,  but  beyond  a  turn  of  the  rock,  they  got  a  lodgment  in 
large  numbers,  so  that  the  division  commander  called  for  and 
took  Manigault's  largest  regiment  to  reenforce  Deas. 

Meanwhile  an  officer  from  the  left  reported  that  the  enemy 
had  broken  the  Miss,  brigade,  and,  going  to  the  left  to  get  a 
view,  Manigault  saw  the  Federals  in  possession  of  the  Miss, 
battery  and  the  brigade  retreating  in  disorder.  The  Federals 
soon  turned  the  captured  guns  upon  his  line,  enfilading  a  portion 
of  it,  and  about  the  same  time  the  Alabamians  on  the  right  also 
gave  way.  His  own  men  on  the  flanks  were  still  fighting  well, 
but  the  centre,  the  part  being  enfiladed,  even  now  wavering, 
would  soon  melt  away. 

A  ridge  some  500  yards  to  the  rear  offered  favorable  ground 
for  a  rally,  and,  seeing  that  all  was  lost  and  to  check  the  fugitives 
impossible,  he  commanded  a  retreat,  directing  the  officers  to 
rally  the  men  upon  that  ridge.  A  rapid  run-for-it  was  success- 
fully made,  with  some  loss  under  a  heavy  fire,  but  about  two- 
thirds  of  what  was  left  of  the  brigade  were  rallied  on  the  ridge, 
and  were  soon  joined  by  the  remnants  of  the  Ala.  and  Miss, 
brigades.  Manigault  saved  two  of  his  guns,  but  two  were  cap- 
tured. The  enemy  seemed  contented  with  his  success  and  did 
not  pursue,  and  the  firing  ceased  all  along  the  line  except  at 
the  extreme  right,  where  Cleburne  and  the  troops  opposing 
Sherman  still  held  their  ground  until  withdrawn  after  dark. 

Considering  how  utterly  the  centre  of  his  line  was  routed, 
Bragg  made  a  surprisingly  good  retreat,  the  enemy  not  pursuing 
vigorously.  Bragg  crossed  the  Chickamauga  that  night,  de- 


480  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

stroying  the  bridges  behind  him.  On  the  26th,  he  retreated  to 
Ringgold,  where  on  the  27th  he  repulsed  a  pursuing  force  which 
then  retired.  The  army  then  withdrew  to  Dalton,  where,  five 
days  later,  Bragg,  at  his  own  request,  was  relieved  of  the  com- 
mand. He  lost  his  campaign  primarily  when  he  allowed  Rose- 
crans  to  reopen  the  short  line  of  his  communications.  Sending 
Longstreet  to  Knoxville  while  holding  such  advanced  lines  can- 
not be  excused  or  palliated.  It  was  a  monumental  failure  to 
appreciate  the  glaring  weakness  of  his  position.  His  men  never 
really  fought  except  against  Sherman  on  his  extreme  right,  and 
there  they  were  victorious  and  retreated  unmolested  after  night. 
He  was  simply  marched  out  from  his  position  on  Lookout,  and 
he  would  have  been  also  marched  off  of  Missionary  Ridge  by 
Hooker,  had  not  Grant  grown  impatient.  The  unwise  division 
of  his  forces  had  put  it  in  Grant's  power  to  defeat  him  by  march- 
ing with  at  least  50  per  cent  less  than  the  usual  fighting. 

Bragg's  casualties  were  but  361  killed  and  2160  wounded, 
about  the  average  of  a  single  corps  or  one-sixth  of  those  at 
Chickamauga.  But  he  lost  40  guns.  Grant's  losses  were  also 
but  small,  on  Lookout  Mountain  and  on  Missionary  Ridge. 
They  were  heaviest  where  Sherman  attacked  Cleburne's  and 
Breckenridge's  divisions,  but  even  there  where  the  fighting  was 
prolonged  most  of  the  day,  there  were  no  such  casualties  as  there 
had  been  at  Chickamauga. 

Grant's  total  was  753  killed,  4722  wounded,  349  missing. 
Total  5824. 

Livermore  estimates  the  forces  engaged  on  each  side  as  fol- 
lows :  — 

Effective  Federal  infantry  and  artillery, 56,359. 

Effective  Confederate  infantry  and  artillery,  ....     40,929. 

THE   KNOXVILLE   CAMPAIGN 

On  Nov.  3,  as  has  been  told,  Longstreet  was  ordered  to 
march  against  Burnside  in  E.  Tenn.,  with  McLaws's  and  Hood's 
divisions  of  infantry,  Alexander's  and  Leyden's  battalions  of 
artillery  (of  23  and  12  guns)  and  five  brigades  of  cavalry  under 
Wheeler  with  12  guns.  This  force  numbered  about  15,000,  of 
which  about  5000  were  cavalry  and  10,000  infantry  and  artillery. 


BATTLE  OF  CHICKAMAUGA  481 

Cooperation  was  promised  from  southwest  Va.  by  a  force 
of  about  4000  under  Ransom,  but  it  was  too  late  in  starting, 
and  its  infantry  and  artillery  only  reached  Longstreet  on  his 
retreat  northward  after  the  siege  of  Knoxville. 

It  was  designed  to  move  Longstreet  by  rail  from  Chattanooga 
to  Sweetwater,  Tenn.,  within  40  miles  of  Knoxville.  This,  it  was 
hoped,  could  be  easily  done  by  the  7th  or  8th.  The  artillery  and 
McLaws's  division  were  marched  to  Tyner's  Station  on  Nov.  4,  and 
Hood's  division  to  the  tunnel  through  Missionary  Ridge  on  the 
night  of  the  5th.  Trains,  however,  could  only  be  furnished  to 
carry  them  to  Sweetwater  by  the  12th,  and  it  was  the  night  of  the 
14th  before  a  pontoon  bridge  could  be  thrown  across  the  river 
at  Huff's  Ferry  near  London,  and  the  advance  upon  Knoxville, 
29  miles  off,  actively  undertaken.  The  men  and  guns  of  my 
own  battalion  were  carried  on  a  train  of  flat  cars  on  the  10th, 
the  train  taking  over  12  hours  to  make  the  60  miles.  The 
cannoneers  were  required  to  pump  water  for  the  engine  and  to 
cut  up  fence  rails  for  fuel  along  the  route,  and  the  horses  were 
driven  by  the  roads. 

The  forces  of  Burnside  at  Knoxville  consisted  of  four  small 
divisions,  two  of  the  9th  corps,  and  two  of  the  23d,  about  12,000 
infantry  and  artillery  and  8500  cavalry.  The  cavalry,  during 
the  coming  siege,  for  the  most  part  held  the  south  side  of  the 
river,  where  they  erected  strong  works  on  the  commanding  hills 
and  were  little  molested,  as  our  own  cavalry  was  generally  kept 
on  the  north  bank  on  our  left  flank.  Burnside  was  ordered  not 
to  oppose  Longstreet's  advance,  but  to  retreat  before  him  and 
draw  him  on,  as  far  as  possible  from  Chattanooga.  On  Sunday, 
Nov.  15,  Longstreet  crossed  and  advanced  as  far  as  Lenoirs; 
Burnside  falling  back,  skirmishing.  On  the  16th,  an  effort  was 
made  to  bring  him  to  battle  at  Campbell's  Station,  but  only  a 
skirmish  resulted,  in  which  the  Federal  loss  was  31  killed,  211 
wounded,  and  76  missing,  and  the  Confederates  22  killed,  152 
wounded.  Burnside  withdrew  into  Knoxville  that  night  and 
Longstreet  followed  and  drew  up  before  it  on  Nov.  17.  On 
the  18th,  the  outposts  were  driven  in  and  close  reconnoissances 
made,  in  which  the  Federal  Gen.  Sanders  was  killed.  He  had 
been  recently  promoted,  was  an  officer  of  much  promise,  and  a 


MILITARY  MEMOIRS 


BATTLE  OF  CHICKAMAUGA  483 

relative  of  President  Davis.  The  reconnoissances  developed  the 
enemy  holding  a  very  strong  defensive  line  with  but  a  single 
weak  point.  This  was  the  northwest  salient  angle  where  their 
north  and  south  line,  running  perpendicular  to  the  river  below 
the  town,  made  a  right  angle  and  turning  to  the  east  ran  parallel 
with  the  river  to  the  northeast  of  the  town.  There  it  rested, 
behind  an  extensive  inundation  of  First  Creek,  upon  a  strong 
enclosed  work  on  Temperance  Hill,  mounting  12  guns,  with 
outlying  works  upon  Mabry's  and  Flint  Hills. 

These  had  been  built,  with  several  other  works,  during  the 
prior  Confederate  occupation,  and  one,  enclosing  three  sides  of  a 
rectangle  about  125  by  95  feet  with  bastion  fronts,  the  rear  being 
open,  had  been  nearly  completed  at  the  northwest  salient  angle 
above  referred  to.  This  was  now  called  Fort  Sanders,  after  the 
general  killed  on  the  18th,  and  every  exertion  was  used  to  com- 
plete and  strengthen  it,  all  able-bodied  inhabitants  of  the  town 
being  impressed,  both  white  and  black,  to  aid  in  labor  upon  the 
fortifications.  The  Confederate  engineer  who  laid  out  this  work 
had  injudiciously  turned  the  salient  angle  of  its  northwest  bastion 
directly  toward  the  valley  of  Third  Creek,  just  at  the  point  where 
this  valley  allowed  an  approach,  within  120  yards,  completely 
covered  from  the  fire  of  the  fort.  A  convex  crest  of  the  valley 
curved  from  this  point  to  the  east  and  south,  and  sheltered  a 
large  territory,  affording  space  for  many  brigades  to  be  held 
completely  under  cover,  within  distances  of  from  150  to  400 
yards  of  the  enemy's  intrenchments.  These  conditions  made  it 
the  most  favorable  point  for  attack,  and,  indeed,  the  only  one 
at  all  favorable  north  of  the  river. 

A  third  of  the  enemy's  northern  front  was  protected  by  in- 
undations of  First  and  Second  creeks,  across  which  his  guns  had 
open  sweep  for  a  mile.  To  make  a  large  circuit,  and  turn  it, 
would  be  to  abandon  our  communications  with  our  base  of  sup- 
plies. An  attack  upon  either  of  his  short  flanks  running  back 
to  the  river  would  be  enfiladed  from  the  south  bank.  Two 
strong  enclosed  works,  Fort  Comstock  and  Battery  Wiltsie, 
covered  the  only  approach  between  the  inundations. 

The  theory  of  Longstreet's  expedition  was  that  he  should  take 
a  much  superior  force  and  make  short  work  of  it.  In  fact,  we 


484  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

had  an  inferior  force  of  infantry  and  artillery,  until  after  the 
arrival  of  Johnson's  and  Gracie's  brigades,  which  will  be  referred 
to  presently.  The  cavalry  on  neither  side  took  any  part  in  the 
siege  operations.  We  had  now  to  take  the  offensive  which  made 
the  task  harder,  but  yet  we  seem  to  have  stood  a  fair  chance  to 
carry  Fort  Sanders  had  we  made  an  attack  with  all  our  force 
soon  after  our  arrival.  But  every  day  of  delay  added  to  the 
strength  of  the  enemy's  breastworks,  and  in  a  very  few  days  he 
had  an  ulterior  line  which  might  have  successfully  resisted,  even 
had  Fort  Sanders  been  captured.  It  is  now  to  tell  how  the  10 
days  were  consumed  which  were  allowed  to  intervene  before  the 
attack.  By  that  time  a  second  line  had  been  constructed  which 
might  or  might  not  have  survived  the  loss  of  the  first. 

The  20th  saw  our  own  line  finished  with  batteries  erected  to 
repel  any  offensive  movements  of  the  enemy,  and,  incidentally, 
enfilade  some  of  the  lines  of  Fort  Sanders,  which  was  already 
recognized  as  the  most  feasible  point  of  attack.  Had  the 
advantage  of  an  early  attack  been  fully  realized,  it  might  have 
been  organized  and  delivered  on  the  21st,  or  at  latest  by  the  22d. 
But  on  that  day  one  of  our  staff-officers,  who  had  crossed  the 
Holston  River  on  our  right  flank  and  reconnoitred  the  country, 
had  found  it  possible  to  locate  a  battery  upon  a  high  hill  close 
to  the  river,  giving  an  advantageous  line  of  fire  upon  Fort 
Sanders  at  a  distance  of  2400  yards. 

Longstreet  directed  this  to  be  done,  and  the  attack  postponed 
for  it.  A  flat  boat  and  some  wire  were  procured,  a  ferry  fixed 
up,  Law's  and  Robertson's  brigades  of  infantry  and  Parker's 
rifle  battery  was  crossed,  and,  by  working  all  night  of  the  24th, 
it  was  possible  by  noon  of  the  25th  to  report  as  ready  to  open 
an  enfilade  fire  on  Fort  Sanders.  But  the  loss  of  this  time  and 
the  transfer  of  this  infantry  and  artillery  to  the  south  side  of 
the  river  were  both  ill-advised.  Our  rifle  ammunition  was 
defective  in  quality,  our  supply  of  it  was  quite  limited,  and  the 
range  was  too  great  for  effective  work  under  such  conditions. 

Longstreet  felt  too  the  need  of  the  two  brigades  sent  across 
the  river,  and,  hearing  of  the  coming  of  Bushrod  Johnson's  and 
Gracie's  brigades,  he  decided  to  await  their  arrival  expected 
the  night  of  the  26th.  They  brought  an  effective  force  of  about 


BATTLE  OF  CHICKAMAUGA  485 

2600  men,  but  they  did  not  actually  arrive  until  the  night  of 
the  28th,  and  were  not  able  to  render  any  service. 

That  night  Longstreet  was  joined  by  Gen.  Leadbetter,  Bragg's 
Chief  Engineer,  who  had  been  at  Knoxville  during  the  Con- 
federate occupation,  and  being  the  oldest  military  engineer  in  the 
Confederate  service,  was  supposed  to  be  the  most  efficient.  He 
was  a  graduate  of  West  Point  of  1836,  the  class  ahead  of  Bragg's. 
Coming  to  Longstreet,  as  he  did,  with  the  prestige  of  being  on 
the  staff  of  the  commanding-general,  and  especially  charged  with 
the  decision  of  all  questions  of  military  engineering,  it  is  perhaps 
not  strange  that  Longstreet  was  quick  to  adopt  his  suggestions, 
and  these,  it  will  be  seen,  robbed  him  of  most  of  his  few  remain- 
ing chances  of  victory. 

On  Thursday,  the  26th,  the  attack  having  already  been  post- 
poned to  await  the  arrival  of  Johnson's  brigades,  Leadbetter  and 
Longstreet  rode  on  a  reconnoissance  around  the  enemy's  entire 
position.  Leadbetter  pronounced  Fort  Sanders  to  be  assailable, 
but  expressed  a  preference  for  an  attack  upon  Mabry's  Hill. 
This  was  the  enemy's  extreme  right  flank,  and  was  undoubtedly 
the  strongest  portion  of  his  whole  line,  besides  being  the  farthest 
removed  and  the  most  inaccessible.  In  fact  our  own  pickets 
had  been  advanced  but  little  beyond  Second  Creek,  and  Lead- 
better's  opinion  was  based  upon  very  imperfect  and  distant 
views. 

It  was  therefore  determined  to  drive  in  the  enemy's  pickets, 
and  make  a  better  reconnoissance  on  Friday,  the  27th.  Mean- 
while, so  certain  was  Leadbetter  of  the  advantage  of  a  change 
in  the  point  of  attack,  that  Parker's  battery  was  ordered  to  be 
withdrawn  from  the  south  side  of  the  Holston  on  Thursday  night. 
On  Friday  the  cavalry  was  called  on  to  drive  in  the  enemy's 
pickets,  and  Longstreet  and  Leadbetter,  accompanied  by  the 
leading  generals,  made  a  thorough  reconnoissance  of  our  left 
flank.  The  attack  upon  Mabry's  Hill  was  unanimously  pro- 
nounced impossible,  Leadbetter  himself  concurring.  On  the  way 
back  the  party  stopped  opposite  Fort  Sanders,  and  while  watch- 
ing it  with  glasses,  saw  a  man  cross  the  ditch  in  front  of  the 
northwest  salient,  showing  the  depth  of  it  at  that  point  as  less 
than  five  feet.  This  encouraged  a  hope  that  the  ditch  of  the 


486  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

fort  would  not  be  found  a  formidable  obstacle,  and  as  there  was 
now  no  alternative,  and  Leadbetter  was  urgent  against  further 
delay,  the  attack  was  ordered  at  noon  on  the  28th,  this  time 
being  necessary  to  return  Parker's  battery  to  its  enfilading  posi- 
tion on  the  south  side,  whence  Leadbetter  had  had  it  withdrawn 
the  night  before. 

At  noon  the  next  day  all  was  ready,  but  the  day  was  rainy,  and 
very  unfavorable  for  artillery  practice,  so  Longstreet  again  decided 
to  postpone  the  attack  until  the  next  morning,  the  29th. 

Some  howitzers  had  been  raised  upon  skids,  so  as  to  permit 
fire  with  small  charges  at  high  elevations,  as  mortars,  in  order 
to  probe  behind  the  parapets  of  the  fort.  It  had  been  ordered 
that  the  opening  of  these  mortars  should  be  the  signal  for  the 
advance  of  a  large  number  of  skirmishers,  who  should  occupy 
the  enemy's  rifle  pits  within  120  to  250  yards  of  the  fort,  envelop- 
ing completely  its  north  and  west  fronts  and  keeping  down  the 
fire,  either  from  its  embrasures  or  parapets.  After  some  practice 
by  the  mortars  and  the  sharpshooters,  the  mortars  would  sus- 
pend, and  allow  the  rifled  guns  and  others  to  fire  to  get  their 
ranges.  When  all  had  gotten  ranges,  a  rapid  fire  by  both  guns 
and  mortars,  34  in  all,  would  begin,  concentrated  upon  the  fort 
as  long  as  seemed  necessary.  Its  cessation  would  be  the  signal 
for  the  advance  of  the  storming  force  of  two  brigades,  in  columns 
of  regiments,  supported  by  adjacent  brigades  upon  the  flanks. 
If  the  passage  of  the  ditch  was  found  difficult,  the  pioneers  with 
spade  and  picks  were  expected  to  rapidly  cut  small  steps  in  the 
slopes  which  would  enable  the  men  to  swarm  over.  The  sharp- 
shooters and  the  storming  column  itself  could  be  relied  upon  to 
keep  down  the  fire  of  the  fort  on  the  men  in  the  ditches  while 
this  was  being  done. 

The  garrison  of  the  fort,  as  afterward  shown,  did  not  exceed 
220,  including  the  artillery,  and  could  be  overpowered  as  quickly 
as  they  could  be  reached.  It  is  now  to  show  how  all  prepara- 
tions were  thrown  away  and  all  advantages  sacrificed  for  the 
illusive  merits  of  a  night  attack,  decided  upon  by  Longstreet 
after  dark  on  the  28th.  Leadbetter  was  spending  the  night 
with  him,  but  whether  he  suggested  or  acquiesced  was  never  dis*- 
closed. 


BATTLE  OF  CHICKAMAUGA  487 

About  9  P.M.  that  night  I  received  notice  that  the  plan  of 
attack  would  be  changed  and  that  neither  the  rifles  across  the 
river,  the  howitzers  rigged  as  mortars,  nor  any  other  of  the  34 
guns  arranged  to  fire  on  the  fort  would  be  used,  except  to  fire  a 
signal.  Several  days  had  been  spent  in  preparation  for  a 
cannonade,  with  all  our  guns  concentrated  on  the  small  area 
enclosed  by  the  fort,  and  now  it  was  all  to  be  given  up  as  well 
as  all  to  be  hoped  for  from  the  fire  by  daylight  of  a  half  mile  of 
sharpshooters  within  from  120  to  250  yards.  The  fort  had  no 
embrasure  on  its  west  front  and  its  fire  would  have  to  be  over 
the  parapets  and  much  exposed. 

The  advance  was  intended  to  be  a  surprise,  and  the  signal 
guns  were  ordered  to  be  fired  just  before  dawn,  that  the  approach 
of  the  column  might  not  be  visible.  There  was  little  time  for 
consultation  for  it  was  ordered  that  at  moon  rise,  about  10  P.M., 
the  enemy's  picket  line  should  be  taken  and  occupied  by  our 
sharpshooters,  and  the  troops  should  be  under  arms. 

Soon  after  10  P.M.,  there  was  a  general  advance  by  our  picket 
lines  on  both  sides  of  Fort  Sanders,  and  after  some  two  hours  of 
sharp  fighting,  50  or  60  prisoners  had  been  taken,  the  enemy's 
pit  occupied,  and  they  did  not  have  out  a  picket  20  yards  from 
the  fort.  Lt.  Benjamin,  commanding,  feeling  sure  that  the 
attack  would  be  at  daylight,  required  every  man  to  sleep  at  his 
post,  and  one  in  every  four  to  keep  awake  as  a  sentry.  During 
the  night  an  occasional  gun  was  fired  with  canister  or  shell  at 
random  from  the  fort.  Federal  accounts  state  that  our  own 
artillery  was  also  fired  during  the  night,  but  this  is  a  mistake. 
Our  own  troops  were  being  moved  and  would  have  been  en- 
dangered by  such  a  fire. 

At  the  earliest  sign  of  light  in  eastern  sky,  three  successive 
guns  fired  from  different  batteries  gave  the  signal  to  the  sharp- 
shooters to  open  fire  and  for  the  storming  columns  to  advance. 
Their  shells  were  visible  like  meteors  in  the  air  and  they  ex- 
ploded high  above  the  fort.  For  a  few  minutes  about  a  dozen 
guns  poured  a  hot  fire  on  the  fort  and  into  the  angle  of  the  lines 
behind  it.  This  was  intended  only  to  encourage  the  storming 
columns,  and  was  discontinued  in  a  few  minutes.  At  once  the 
sharpshooters  opened  their  fire  upon  the  parapet,  and  orders  were 


488  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

given  the  storming  columns  to  move.  It  had  been  intended  that 
these  should  be  formed  close  behind  the  sharpshooters,  within 
150  to  200  yards  of  the  fort,  but  in  the  darkness  this  had  not 
been  done.  The  columns  each  had  several  hundred  yards  to  go 
and  Johnson's  and  Grade's  brigades,  ordered  up  in  support, 
had  from  800  to  1000. 

The  storming  column  was  composed  of  Wofford's  Ga.  brigade, 
four  regiments,  under  Col.  Ruff  on  the  left,  and  of  two  regi- 
ments of  Humphreys's  Miss.,  and  three  of  Bryan's  Ga.  brigade  on 
the  right.  Anderson's  Ga.  brigade  was  ordered  to  support  the 
storming  column  on  the  left  by  an  attack  on  the  lines  beyond 
the  fort  on  that  side.  As  the  two  columns  advanced  on  con- 
verging lines,  they  presently  ran  into  an  entanglement  of  tele- 
graph wires  stretched  between  stumps  which  threw  down  the 
leading  files  and  caused  a  little  delay.  But  these  were  soon  torn 
away  and  with  very  little  loss.  Two  or  three  shots  each  were 
fired  from  a  barbette  gun  in  the  salient,  and  from  an  embrasure 
in  the  northeast  bastion,  but  with  the  arrival  of  the  men  at  the 
ditch  the  artillery  fire  was  silenced.  The  two  columns  were  soon 
found  to  have  converged  in  the  darkness  too  much,  and  being 
already  deep  columns,  one  of  four  lines  and  one  of  five,  they 
simply  coalesced  in  the  darkness  into  a  mass  whose  officers  could 
no  longer  separate  or  distinguish  their  own  men.  To  this  mass 
was  presently  added  Anderson's  brigade,  ordered  to  carry  the 
breastworks  east  of  the  fort.  Through  some  mistake,  some 
minutes  later,  they  came  in  from  the  left,  in  two  lines,  where 
already  nine  lines  were  crowding  each  other.  The  ditch  was 
found  to  be  from  four  to  eight  feet  deep,  and  about  twelve  feet  in 
width,  without  any  berm  at  the  top  of  the  counterscarp,  and 
with  steep  sides  rendered  slippery  by  freezing  weather  and  the 
rain  of  the  previous  day.  Yet  many  officers  and  men  were  able 
to  cross  the  ditch  and  scale  the  parapet,  but  not  in  such  num- 
bers as  to  overcome  the  150  infantry  defending  the  fort  with 
fine  tenacity.  A  few  shells  were  lighted  by  Lt.  Benjamin  and 
thrown  by  hand  into  the  ditch  as  hand  grenades,  and  axes  and 
billets  of  wood  were  thrown  over  the  parapets.  Lt.  Gumming, 
Adj.  of  the  16th  Ga.,  made  his  way  through  an  embrasure  with 
a  dozen  men,  but  the  party  was  captured  inside.  Col.  Thomas 


BATTLE  OF  CHICKAMAUGA  489 

of  the  same  regiment  was  killed  in  the  ditch  as  was  also  Col. 
McElroy  of  the  13th  Miss.  Lt.-Col.  Fizer  of  the  17th  lost  his 
arm  on  the  parapet  and  Col.  Ruff,  commanding  Wofford's  bri- 
gade, was  killed  on  the  counterscarp. 

Meanwhile  fully  20  minutes  elapsed  and  daylight  began  to 
make  things  dimly  visible.  Nearly  200  men  had  gotten  into 
the  ditch  and  not  finding  it  easy  to  advance,  now  preferred  to 
surrender.  The  fire  from  the  fort  had  ceased  except  an  occa- 
sional musket  fired  over  the  parapet  exposing  only  a  hand 
of  the  man  holding  it.  But  at  a  point  500  yards  to  the  south  of 
the  fort,  an  offset  200  yards  long,  running  nearly  west  from  the 
Federal  breastworks,  gave  a  fair  enfilade  fire  upon  the  crowd 
of  men  along  the  counterscarp  of  the  west  front  of  the  fort,  and 
from  this  point  the  increasing  daylight  was  bringing  a  fire  which 
rapidly  multiplied  the  casualties. 

Longstreet,  about  this  time,  was  advancing  with  the  brigades 
of  Johnson  and  Gracie,  with  those  of  Jenkins  and  Benning  upon 
the  left,  when  he  received  an  exaggerated  report  of  the  wire  en- 
tanglement which  had  been  first  encountered.  Without  a  second 
thought  Longstreet  ordered  the  recall.  Johnson  begged  to  be 
allowed  to  go  on,  as  also  did  Jenkins,  but  Longstreet,  giving  full 
faith  to  the  report,  forbade. 

It  is  certain  that  after  a  little  delay  the  attack  would  have 
been  renewed,  being  preceded  by  a  cannonade,  and  with  a 
storming  column  provided  with  tools  to  cut  steps  in  the  scarp 
and  parapet.  But  within  a  half-hour  a  staff  officer  of  Ransom's 
arrived  with  a  telegram  from  President  Davis,  by  way  of  Bristol, 
Va.,  telling  of  Bragg's  defeat  on  Missionary  Ridge  on  the  25th, 
and  ordering  Longstreet  to  march  to  join  Bragg  at  Dal  ton. 
Vague  rumors  of  this  had  reached  Longstreet  the  night  before, 
but  had  not  been  credited,  and  had  rather  confirmed  his  inten- 
tion to  attack. 

Very  soon  after  this  Burnside  sent  out  a  flag  and  offered  us  a 
truce  to  remove  our  dead  and  wounded,  which  Longstreet  ac- 
cepted,—  all  thought  of  renewal  of  the  attack  being  abandoned. 
The  truce  was  later  extended  until  dark,  Longstreet  at  first  pro- 
posing to  retreat  southward  at  night  to  join  Bragg,  but  during 
the  day  messages  arrived  from  that  direction,  and  we  learned 


490  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

of  the  approach  of  a  force  under  Sherman  to  relieve  Burnside, 
and  that  our  road  to  Dalton  was  closed. 

The  roads  through  upper  Ga.  were  deemed  impracticable  for 
an  army  and  destitute  of  supplies,  so  it  was  determined  to  re- 
treat toward  southwest  Va.  But,  in  order  to  relieve  the 
pressure  upon  Bragg  as  far  as  we  could,  Longstreet  determined 
to  maintain  a  threatening  position  before  Knoxville  until  the 
approaching  Federal  reinforcements  were  within  a  day's  march. 
This  was  done  and  on  the  night  of  Dec.  4,  in  a  severe  rain- 
storm, the  retreat  began.  During  the  night  and  next  morning 
we  made  18  miles  and  encamped  at  Blain's  Cross  Roads, 
where  we  met  Ransom's  artillery  and  infantry  coming  to 
help  us  in  the  attack  upon  Knoxville,  but  nearly  three  weeks  late. 

Having  retreated  nearly  to  Rogersville,  65  miles,  by  the  9th, 
on  the  14th  we  returned  to  Bean  Station  to  attack  a  force  under 
Parke  which  had  followed  us  from  Knoxville.  Sending  two 
brigades  of  cavalry  on  the  flanks  to  cut  off  the  enemy's  retreat, 
Longstreet  advanced  his  whole  force  directly  on  Bean  Station. 
The  enemy's  skirmishers  were  met  about  three  miles  in  front 
with  artillery,  but  were  driven  in  by  Gracie's  brigade.  Gracie 
was  wounded  in  the  skirmish.  The  Federal  line  was  formed  just 
in  rear  of  the  town,  with  a  large  hotel  building  on  the  edge  of 
the  town  strongly  held  by  sharpshooters,  firing  from  loopholes 
in  the  second  and  third  stories.  Parker's  battery  was  advanced 
within  350  yards  of  the  hotel,  which  was  soon  charged  by  Gracie's 
brigade  and  taken  possession  of.  Meanwhile  Kershaw's  brigade 
had  turned  the  left  flank  of  the  enemy's  line  and  four  more  bat- 
teries had  been  advanced  to  close  ranges,  when  it  was  found  that 
the  enemy  was  withdrawing  in  the  dusk  which  was  now  rapidly 
obscuring  the  field.  The  day  was  a  short  one  and  cloudy,  the 
infantry  had  marched  16  miles  over  bad  roads,  and  Longstreet 
feared  that  in  the  darkness  his  troops  might  fire  into  each  other. 
The  enemy  were  mainly  cavalry,  under  Shackelford,  and  pursuit 
at  night  by  our  infantry  would  be  bootless.  So  the  artillery 
held  its  fire  and  the  infantry  went  into  bivouac.  The  affair 
had  been  bloody  for  its  duration  and  our  side  had  the  worst  of  it. 

The  casualties  in  Gracie's  brigade  .        .        .        .        162 
In  Johnson's  they  were 60 


BATTLE  OF  CHICKAMAUGA 


491 


And  in  other  commands  they  were 
The  Federals  report  in  13  regiments  total 


68 


290 
115 


It  is  needless  to  give  further  details  of  the  retreat.  The  cam- 
paign had  been  one  of  much  hardship.  Some  facts  may  be 
given  showing  how  poorly  we  were  provided,  even  with  prime 
necessities,  though  we  were  in  our  own  country.  We  were  so 
deficient  in  horseshoes  that  on  the  advance  to  Knoxville  we 
stripped  the  shoes  and  saved  the  nails  from  all  dead  horses, 
killing  for  the  purpose  all  wounded  and  broken-down  animals, 
both  our  own  and  those  left  behind  by  the  enemy.  During  the 
siege,  the  river  brought  down  a  number  of  dead  animals  thrown 
in  within  the  town.  We  watched  for  these,  took  them  out,  and 
stripped  their  feet  of  shoes  and  nails.  Our  men  were  nearly  as 
badly  off  for  foot  gear  as  our  animals.  I  have  seen  bloody  stains 
left  on  frozen  ground  where  our  infantry  had  passed.  In  the 
artillery  we  took  the  shoes  from  the  feet  of  the  drivers  to  give 
to  the  cannoneers  who  had  to  march.  Our  rations  were  also 
frequently  not  even  the  reduced  rations  now  issued  to  the  whole 
army.  Corn,  unground,  was  often  the  only  ration. 

Longstreet's  retreat  was  now  continued  without  serious  engage- 
ment to  Morristown  and  later  to  Greenville,  where  he  wintered, 
and  rejoined  Lee  at  Gordonsville,  Va.,  in  the  spring. 

The  following  table  gives  the  Confederate  casualties  of  the 
campaign.  Those  of  the  unfortunate  assault  on  Fort  Sanders, 
badly  begun,  suspended  by  mistake,  and  never  concluded,  are 
shown  separately  below. 

RETURN  OF  CASUALTIES,  LONGSTREET'S  CORPS, 
NOV.   14  TO   DEC.   4,   1863 


a 

e 

a 

o 

DIVISION 

BRIGADE 

1 

* 
p 

B 

• 

3 

DATE 

d 

o 

g 

M 

? 

i 

H 

Hood's 

Jenkins 

22 

109 

5 

136 

Nov.  4  to  Dec.  5 

Benning 

1 

5 

6 

Nov.  4  to  Dec.  5 

Robertson 

9 

18 

6 

33 

Nov.  4  to  Dec.  5 

Law 

15 

69 

8 

92 

Nov.  4  to  Dec.  5 

Anderson 

3 

57 

60 

Nov.  17  and  18 

Anderson 

33 

129 

25 

187 

Nov.  29 

Total  Hood's  Division 

83 

387 

44 

514 

492 


MILITARY  MEMOIRS 


a 

a 

o 

DIVISION 

BRIGADE 

H 

a 

1 

R 

g 

DATS 

a 

o 

I 

H 

a 

X 

O 

H 

McLaws's 

Wofford 

48 

121 

81 

250 

Nov.  4  to  Dec.  5 

u 

Bryan 

27 

121 

64 

212 

Nov.  4  to  Dec.  5 

it 

Humphreys 

18 

18 

Nov.  4  to  Dec.  5 

it 

Humphreys 

21 

87 

56 

164 

Nov.  29 

" 

Kershaw 

19 

116 

3 

138 

Nov.  17  and  18 

Total  McLaws's  Division 

115 

463 

204 

782 

Aggregate 

198 

850 

248 

1296 

Loss  in  the  assault  on  Fort  Sanders,  Nov.  29 :  killed,  129;  wounded,  458; 
missing,  226;   total,  813,  included  in  the  above. 


RETURN  OF  CASUALTIES,  BURNSIDE'S  COMMAND, 
NOV.  14  TO   DEC.  4,  1863 


DIVISION 

BRIGADE 

KILLED 

WOUNDED 

MISSING 

d 

H 

O 

H 

9th  Corps 
1st  Div. 

Morrison 
Christ 
Humphreys 
Artillery 

5 
15 
18 

19 
25 

102 
2 

6 
24 
46 

30 
64 
166 
2 

Total 

38 

148 

76 

262 

9th  Corps 
2d  Div. 

Sigfried 
Schall 
Artillery 

5 
4 

27 
7 
1 

32 
3 

64 
14 
1 

Total 

9 

35 

35 

79 

Total  9th  Corps 

47 

183 

111 

341 

23d  Corps 
2d  Div. 
23d  Corps 
3d  Div. 
23d  Corps 
3d  Div. 

Chapin 
Hascall 
Cameron 

2 
9 

13 
15 

97 

6 

7 
2 

19 
24 
108 

Total  23d  Corps 

11 

125 

15 

151 

Cavalry.     Total  4  Brigs. 

34 

85 

80 

199 

Aggregate 

92 

383 

206 

681 

CHAPTER  XX 
BATTLE  OF  THE  WILDERNESS 

Review.    Lee's  Force.    Situation.     Longstreet's  Position.     Longstreet's 
March.    Swell's  Advance.    Ewell's  Fight. 

LEE  honored  our  return  to  his  command  with  a  review.    It     j 
was  the  only  one  ever  held,  after  the  one  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley, 
in  Oct.,  1862.     He  was  not  given  to  parades  merely  for  show. 
Now,  doubtless,  he  felt  and  reciprocated  the  stirrings  of  affection  in 
the  hearts  of  his  men,  inseparable  from  our  return  from  bloody     { 
Chickamauga,  upon  the  eve  of  what  all  felt  must  be  the  struggle 
to  a  finish,  and  no  one  who  was  present  can  ever  forget  the 
occasion. 

It  took  place  in  a  cleared  valley  with  broad  pastures,  in  which    \ 
our  two  divisions  of  infantry,  with  my  old  battalion  of  artillery,    ; 
could  be  deployed,  not  far  from  Mechanicsburg,  where  we  were 
encamped  some  six  or  eight  miles  south  of  Gordonsville. 

It  is  now  over  40  years,  but  in  imagination  I  can  see  to-day 
the  large  square  gate-posts,  without  gate  or  fence,  for  troops 
had  been  everywhere  in  that  vicinity,  marking  where  a  country 
road  led  out  of  a  tall  oak  wood  upon  an  open  knoll  in  front  of 
the  centre  of  our  long  double  lines.     And  as  the  well-remembered      v 
figure  of  Lee  upon  Traveller,  at  the  head  of  his  staff,  rides  be- 
tween the  posts  and  comes  out  upon  the  ground,  the  bugle  sounds 
a  signal,  the  guns  thunder  out  a  salute,  Lee  reins  up  Traveller 
and  bares  his  good  gray  head  and  looks  at  us,  and  we  give  the     , 
"rebel  yell"  and  shout  and  cry  and  wave  our  flags  and  look  at     . 
him  once  more. 

For  a  wave  of  sentiment  —  something  like  what  came  a  year 
later  at  Appomattox  when  he  rode  back  from  his  meeting  with 
Grant  —  seemed  to  sweep  over  the  field.  All  felt  the  bond 
which  held  them  together.  There  was  no  speaking,  but  the 
effect  was  as  of  a  military  sacrament. 

493 


494 


MILITARY  MEMOIRS 


Dr.  Boggs,  a  S.C.  chaplain  riding  with  the  staff,  said  to  Col. 
Venable,  Lee's  aid,  "Does  not  it  make  the  General  proud  to  see 
how  these  men  love  him  ?  "  Venable  answered,  "  Not  proud.  It 
awes  him."  He  rode  along  our  lines  close  enough  to  look  into 
our  faces  and  then  we  marched  in  review  and  went  back  to  our 
camps. 

ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC,  MAY  4,  1864 
2o  CORPS.     HANCOCK 


DIVISIONS 

BRIGADES 

ARTILLERY 

Barlow 
Gibbon 
Birney 
Mott 

Miles 
Webb 
Ward 
McAllester 

Smyth 
Owen 
Hayes 
Brewster 

Frank 
Carroll 

Brooke 

Tidball 
10  Batts. 
60  Guns 

5TH  CORPS.     WARREN 


Griffin 

Ayres 

Sweitzer 

Bartlett 

Wainwright 

Robinson 

Leonard 

Baxter 

Dennison 

9  Batts. 

Crawford 

McCandless 

Fisher 

54  Guns 

Wadsworth 

Cutler 

Rice 

Stone 

6TH  CORPS.    SEDGWICK,  WRIGHT 


Wright 
Getty 
Ricketts 

Brown 
Wheaton 
Morris 

Russell 
Grant 
Seymour 

Upton 
Neill 

Shaler 
Eustis 

Tompkins 
9  Batts. 
54  Guns 

QTH  CORPS.    BURNSIDE,  PARKE 

Stevenson 
Potter 
Willcox 
Ferrero 

Carruth 
Bliss 
Hartranft 
Sigfried 

Leasure 
Griffin 
Christ 
Thomas 

Edwards 
14  Batts. 
84  Guns 

RESERVE  ARTILLERY.    HUNT 

26  Batts. 
106  Guns 

CAVALRY.    SHERIDAN 

Torbert 
Gregg,D.M. 
Wilson 

Custer 
Davies 
Bryan 

Devin 
Gregg,  J.  I. 
Chapman 

Res.Brig. 
Merritt 

BATTLE  OF  THE  WILDERNESS  495 

ARMY  OF  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA,  MAY,  1864 

1ST   CORPS.      LONGSTRKET,   ANDERSON 


DIVISIONS 

BRIGADES 

ARTILLERY 

Kershaw 
Field 

Henagan 
Jenkins 

Wofford 
Anderson 

Humphreys 
Law 
Benning 

Bryan 
Gregg 

Alexander 
54  Guns 

2D  CORPS.    EWELL,  EARLY 


Early 
Johnson 
Rodes 

Hays 
Walker,  Jr. 
Daniel 

Pegram 

Steuart 
Ramseur 

Gordon 
Jones 
Doles 

Johnston 
Stafford 
Battle 

Long 
70  Guns 

3o  CORPS.    HILL 


Anderson, 

Perrin 

Mahone 

Harris 

Wright 

Walker,  L. 

R.  H. 

Perry 

Heth 

Davis 

Kirkland 

Cooke 

Walker,  H.  A. 

80  Guns 

Archer 

Wilcox 

Lane 

McGowan 

Scales 

Thomas 

CAVALRY.    STUART,  HAMPTON 


Hampton 
Lee,  F. 
Lee,  W.  H.  F. 

Young 
Lomax 
Chambliss 

Rosser 
Wickham 
Gordon 

Butler 

Chew 
20  Guns 

Our  narrative  may  pause  for  a  bird's-eye  view  of  the  situation. 
In  all  previous  campaigns  there  had  been  "intermission  for 
refreshment"  between  our  battles,  in  which  the  armies  would 
replenish  and  recruit  before  initiating  new  strategy  leading  up 
to  a  new  collision  —  usually  under  a  new  Federal  leader.  Now 
from  May  5,  when  battle  was  joined  in  the  Wilderness  until 
April  9,  1865,  when  Lee  surrendered  at  Appomattox,  there 
was  scarcely  a  day  when  the  armies  were  not  under  each  other's 
fire. 

Grant  decided  beforehand  not  to  exchange  prisoners.  This 
added  much  to  the  suffering  to  be  endured  on  both  sides.  It  may 
be  condoned  as  tending  to  shorten  the  war,  but  the  way  in  which 
it  was  done  savored  more  of  the  "sharp  trick"  than  of  Grant's 
usual  dignity  and  frankness  of  character.  We  had,  perhaps  un- 


496  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

wisely,  "outlawed"  Butler,  and  Grant's  trick  consisted  in 
making  him  "Commissioner  for  exchange  of  prisoners"  in  hopes 
that  we  would  decline  to  hold  communication  with  him.  When 
we  swallowed  our  pride  and  offered  exchanges,  pretences  were 
found  to  still  refuse. 

The  campaign  against  us  was  practically  to  be  one  of  exter- 
mination, and  it  was  to  be  conducted  by  four  separate  armies 
and  as  much  of  the  navy  as  could  be  used  hi  the  James 
River. 

First.  Grant  had  four  corps  —  the  2d,  5th,  6th,  and  9th  —  and 
a  large  force  of  cavalry.  His  returns  show  102,869  present  for 
duty  with  242  guns.  Besides,  there  was  a  siege-train  being  pre- 
pared of  106  guns  and  mortars,  among  which  were  six  100-Pr. 
rifles.  This  train  came  into  service  in  May  and  June.  The 
cavalry  were  all  armed  with  Spencer  carbines,  the  first  magazine 
guns  ever  used  by  the  army.  They  fully  doubled  the  efficiency 
of  the  cavalry  against  ours  with  only  muzzle-loaders.  Wilder's 
mounted  infantry  had  had  them  at  Chickamauga,  and  their  value 
on  that  occasion  has  been  told.  Brigades  of  them  soon  began 
to  appear  among  the  Federal  infantry,  as  will  appear  hereafter. 
It  was  useless  to  capture  these  guns,  as  we  could  not  supply  the 
brass  cartridges  required. 

Second.  In  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  Sigel  was  preparing  a 
force  of  about  15,000  men  with  40  guns,  which  was  to  move  upon 
Staunton. 

Third.  From  W.  Va.,  Crook  also  was  to  move  upon  Staunton 
with  about  9000  men  and  24  guns.  When  Crook  and  Sigel  had 
united,  they  were  to  move  upon  Lynchburg  and  thence  upon 
Richmond. 

Fourth.  Butler,  at  Fortress  Monroe,  was  organizing  the  Army 
of  the  James,  to  move  upon  Richmond  by  its  south  bank.  It 
would  be  escorted  by  four  monitors,  a  fleet  of  gunboats,  and  a 
large  collection  of  ferry-boats  and  river  craft  of  every  descrip- 
tion. These  would  facilitate  all  movements  by  water.  His 
force  comprised  the  10th  and  18th  corps  and  Kautz's  cavalry, 
30,000  men  with  79  guns,  of  which  about  5000  were  cavalry. 
Besides  these  four  armies,  there  were,  near  Washington,  about 
40,000  troops  which  were  used  for  ree'nf  or  cements  during  the 


BATTLE  OF  THE  WILDERNESS  497 

next  two  months,  besides  a  constant  stream  of  recruits  from  all 
over  the  North,  stimulated  by  bounties  now  being  paid  of  a 
thousand  dollars  per  man,  and,  early  in  July,  Grant  also  brought 
around  from  New  Orleans  the  19th  corps,  about  12,000  men. 

There  were  no  returns  of  Longstreet's  corps  after  his  return 
from  E.  Tenn.,  but  he  gives  as  a  "liberal  estimate,"  10,000  men. 
The  return  of  the  rest  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  on  April 
20,  was  as  follows :  — 

Ewell's  Corps 17,079 

Hill's  Corps 22,199 

Artillery 4,854 

Cavalry 8,497 

Miscellaneous 1,355      .      53,984 

Adding  10,000  for  Longstreet,  Lee's  total  force  was  about 
64,000,  and  he  had  about  274  guns.  Against  the  armies  of  Sigel 
and  Crook,  Breckenridge  was  able  to  muster  in  the  Valley  and 
in  the  S.  W.  Va.,  about  9000  men  and  24  guns. 

To  meet  Butler,  Beauregard  brought  to  Petersburg,  from 
various  points  in  the  South,  troops  which  he  organized  into  four 
divisions,  comprising  about  22,000  infantry,  2000  cavalry,  and 
about  50  guns.  These  included  Pickett's  division  of  Longstreet's 
corps,  say  5000  men,  which  rejoined  Longstreet  about  June  1, 
and  Johnson's  brigade  of  Early's  division,  which  was  returned 
to  the  division  on  May  6. 

To  recapitulate,  the  forces  under  Grant's  command  were  about 
156,000  men  and  those  under  Lee's  were  about  95,000. 

Grant  had  been  urged  by  some  of  his  advisers  to  transfer  his 
ar'my  to  the  James,  and  to  make  his  advance  upon  Richmond 
by  that  line,  by  which  he  could  approach  within  20  miles  with- 
out the  loss  of  a  man.  But  he  wisely  held  that  his  objective  was 
Lee's  army,  and  that  it  could  most  easily  be  reached  in  a  half 
day's  march  from  his  camps  at  Culpeper. 

A  word  about  our  position,  where  Longstreet's  corps  was  to 
await  Grant's  opening  the  campaign.  It  was  at  Mechanicsburg, 
about  six  miles  south  of  Gordonsville.  Lee  was  fully  aware  that 
Grant's  first  move  would  be  an  attempt  to  turn  his  right  flank, 
which  would  bring  him  through  the  Wilderness,  and  had  decided 


498  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

to  attack  him  en  route.  Swell's  corps,  from  its  camps  in  winter 
quarters,  could  reach  Grant's  probable  route  by  a  march  of  18 
miles.  Hill's  corps  was  farther  to  the  left  and  would  have  about 
28  miles  to  go.  Longstreet's,  from  Mechanicsburg,  would  have  a 
somewhat  later  start  and  30  miles  in  an  air  line,  which  proved 
to  be  42  by  the  country  roads,  used  to  avoid  interference  with 
Hill's  route. 

The  first  day  would  offer  us  the  best  chances,  as  Grant  would 
have  no  breastworks  and  could  use  little  artillery  in  the  Wilder- 
ness. What  proved  a  drawn  battle,  begun  by  three  divisions, 
reenforced  by  two  after  six  hours,  and  by  three  more  after  18 
hours,  might  have  had  a  different  result  if  begun  by  five  and 
reenforced  by  two  after  six  hours,  and  only  one  left  (Anderson's) 
to  come  in  after  18  hours.  This  might  have  been  the  history,  if 
Longstreet's  corps  had  been  located  a  few  miles  north  of  Louisa 
C.  H.,  instead  of  at  Mechanicsburg. 

Maj.-Gen.  Field  had  now  been  assigned  to  the  command  of 
Hood's  division  and  Kershaw  had  been  promoted  to  the  com- 
mand of  McLaws's.  I  had  been  made  Chief  of  Artillery  of  the 
corps,  and  the  two  battalions,  Cabell's  and  Henry's  (now 
Haskell's),  which  had  been  left  in  Va.  when  we  went  to  Chicka- 
mauga,  rejoined  us.  Col.  Frank  Huger  succeeded  to  the  com- 
mand of  my  old  battalion. 

It  was  near  midday  on  May  4,  when  the  news  came  that 
Grant  was  crossing  the  Rapidan  at  Ely's  and  Germanna  fords, 
with  orders  from  Lee  to  march  to  Todd's  Tavern  on  the  Brock 
road,  the  road  by  which  Jackson  on  May  2,  1863,  had  turned 
Hooker's  position.  At  4  P.M.,  we  were  on  the  way,  with  orders 
to  march  all  night,  only  stopping  to  feed  and  water.  We  kept 
it  up  until  near  sundown  the  next  day,  when  the  two  divisions 
went  into  bivouac  near  Craig's  meeting-house,  on  the  Carthapin 
road,  having  travelled  about  36  miles.  We  were  ordered  to 
cook,  eat,  and  rest  until  1  A.M.,  and  then  start  for  Todd's  Tavern. 
Before  starting,  orders  came  from  Lee  to  come  across  to  the 
Plank  road  at  Parker's  store,  about  six  miles.  There  was  a  good 
moon,  about  11  days  old.  At  a  fork  in  the  road,  our  leading 
division  took  the  wrong  road  and  lost  about  its  length  in  dis- 
tance, while  the  other  lost  none.  It  resulted  that  at  Parker's 


BATTLE  OF  THE  WILDERNESS  499 

store,  where  we  took  the  broad,  straight  Plank  road,  the  heads 
of  the  two  sets  of  fours  came  together,  and  the  two  columns, 
eight  abreast,  filled  the  road. 

The  story  may  now  pause,  to  tell  what  had  already  taken  place. 
Grant's  effort  was  to  pass  our  flank  and  get  between  us  and  Rich- 
mond. He  had  started  after  thorough  preparation  at  midnight 
on  the  3d,  and  in  18  hours  had  put  most  of  his  force  with  its 
artillery  and  fighting  trains  across  the  river,  using  five  pontoon 
bridges.  He  had  made  about  12  miles,  and  might  have  made  a 
few  miles  more,  but  preferred  to  encamp  on  the  night  of  the  4th 
in  close  order  and  wait  for  the  9th  corps,  which,  with  the  great 
bulk  of  the  ordnance  and  subsistence  trains,  was  still  behind. 
This  had  been  the  most  critical  day,  and,  to  Grant's  relief,  it  closed 
without  Lee's  having  made  an  appearance.  The  swiftness  of  a 
concentration  is  only  that  of  its  most  distant  part,  and  Ewell  had 
been  ordered  to  march  slowly  down  the  Turnpike,  and  let  Hill, 
coming  down  the  Plank  road,  get  abreast  of  him,  and  both  were 
directed  not  to  bring  on  a  general  engagement  until  Longstreet's 
arrival. 

So  Ewell  encamped  the  night  of  the  4th  at  Locust  Grove, 
five  miles  from  Wilderness  Tavern,  the  centre  of  Grant's  line. 
Hill's  advanced  division,  Heth,  encamped  at  Mine  Run,  about 
13  miles  from  his  battle-field  of  the  next  day. 

On  the  5th,  Grant  moved  early,  intending  to  take  a  fine  from 
Locust  Grove  to  Parker's  store.  But  at  7  A.M.,  the  5th  corps 
met  Swell's  corps  within  two  miles  of  Wilderness  Tavern.  Ewell 
had  his  whole  corps  with  him,  about  17,000  men.  Grant,  guess- 
ing that  the  rest  of  our  army  was  not  up,  thought  to  whip  it  in 
detail  and  concentrated  upon  it  the  whole  of  the  5th  corps,  about 
24,000,  and  over  half  of  the  6th,  say  12,000. 

It  did,  indeed,  seem  that  Ewell  had  ventured  rashly  and  had 
put  his  head  in  the  lion's  mouth,  for  the  ground  around  Lacy's, 
where  Grant  made  his  headquarters,  a  half-mile  southwest  from 
Wilderness  Tavern,  was  open,  affording  opportunity  for  artillery 
and  free  communication  for  movement  of  troops,  and  Ewell  had 
no  intrenchments  and  was  strung  out  upon  the  road.  It  is  not 
surprising  that  as  Grant's  different  divisions  deployed,  and 
attacked  from  different  directions,  in  the  early  part  of  the  fight- 


500  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

ing,  some  of  the  Confederate  brigades  were  thrown  into  temporary 
confusion. 

But  by  eleven  o'clock,  Ewell  was  all  up  and  had  taken  a  line 
in  the  forest  which  he  was  able  to  maintain  all  day  and  until 
darkness  ended  the  fighting.  He  had  even  captured  two  24-Pr. 
howitzers  in  a  counter-charge,  and,  during  the  night,  he  managed 
to  intrench  himself.  Gens.  J.  M.  Jones  and  Stafford  had  both 
been  killed  and  Pegram  severely  wounded. 

Hill,  on  the  5th,  had  met  the  enemy's  cavalry  at  Parker's 
store,  and,  driving  them  before  him,  had  pushed  down  the  Plank 
road.  Meanwhile,  when  Grant  had  discovered  Ewell  in  his 
front  and  attacked  with  the  5th,  and  part  of  the  6th,  corps,  he 
had  halted  the  2d  corps  on  the  Brock  road,  on  which  it  had 
been  marching,  and  had  ordered  the  remainder  of  the  6th  to 
advance  up  the  Plank  road  that  they  might  come  upon  the 
flank  of  Ewell.  As  the  latter  already  had  enough  to  occupy 
him,  it  was  well  that  Hill,  about  noon,  encountered  the  skir- 
mishers of  the  6th.  Having  orders  not  to  bring  on  an  action 
until  the  arrival  of  Longstreet,  and  having  only  Heth's  division 
present,  Hill  halted  and  formed  line  of  battle,  but  did  not 
attack. 

Grant,  however,  was  promptly  notified  of  Heth's  arrival,  and, 
knowing  that  Longstreet,  having  to  come  from  beyond  Gordons- 
ville,  could  not  arrive  that  day,  he  redoubled  his  efforts  to  destroy 
both  Hill  and  Ewell  before  night.  So  Hancock  with  the  whole 
of  the  2d  corps,  28,000,  and  the  smaller  half  of  the  6th,  say 
10,000  men,  was  ordered  to  attack  Hill's  two  divisions,  Heth 
and  Wilcox,  of  about  7000  each. 

Hancock,  though  ordered  to  lose  no  time,  delayed  for  an  hour 
or  two  in  order  to  complete  some  intrenchments  already  started 
along  the  Brock  road,  so  as  to  have  something  to  fall  back  upon 
in  case  of  disaster.  This  delay  was  of  great  value  to  Hill,  enabling 
him  to  partially  select  and  prepare  his  ground.  This  day, 
May  5,  was  Grant's  day,  full  of  golden  opportunities.  May  4 
would  have  been  Lee's  day,  had  he  prearranged  his  camps  so  as 
to  enable  him  to  concentrate  his  army  more  promptly  where 
he  knew  that  Grant  would  cross.  The  6th,  after  Longstreet's 
arrival,  would  belong  to  the  chapter  of  accidents.  Grant  seems 


BATTLE  OF  THE  WILDERNESS  501 

to  have  himself  appreciated  this,  and  to  have  continually  urged 
his  battle  faster  than  his  army  could  make  the  speed. 

Hill's  line  of  battle  was  square  across  the  Plank  road,  with 
one  brigade  on  the  left  and  three  on  the  right.  On  the  left,  the 
line  ran  through  a  clearing  now  grown  up  in  broom-grass  and 
small  pines,  and  containing  a  house  known  as  the  Widow  Tabb's./  / 
Some  artillery,  under  Poague,  was  stationed  here,  and  Lee  ana  • 
Hill  made  the  clearing  their  headquarters.  Wilcox's  division/, 
soon  arriving,  was  posted  on  Hill's  left  flank,  extending  back 
obliquely  in  the  direction  of  Swell's  battle,  but  with  a  gap  of  at 
least  a  mile  between.  At  last,  at  4.15  P.M.,  the  sun  setting  at 
seven,  Hancock,  having  built  strong  breastworks  for  his  whole  line 
along  the  Brock  road,  joined  Getty's  division  of  the  6th  corps, 
already  skirmishing  for  an  hour  with  Hill,  and  put  the  whole 
weight  of  his  corps  into  an  attack  upon  Heth.  Hill  soon  found 
that  Wilcox's  line  was  not  assailed,  and  that  it  was  necessary  to 
bring  it  to  the  support  of  Heth.  At  first  Wilcox  passed  to  the 
front  and  made  some  charges,  but  finally  fell  back,  and  the  two 
divisions  were  practically  merged  into  one  line,  which  fought 
lying  down. 

There  was  never  more  desperate  fighting  than  now  ensued, 
and  continued  until  about  8  P.M.,  when  darkness  terminated  the 
battle.  Fortunately  for  Hill,  the  dense  forest  prevented  his 
men  from  realizing  the  enormous  odds  against  him,  or,  like 
Bragg's  men  on  Missionary  Ridge,  they  might  have  become 
demoralized  by  the  sight.  Night  did  not  terminate  the  fight- 
ing any  sooner  than  Hill  wished.  His  ammunition  was  low,  his 
lines  disarranged,  often  disconnected,  and  some  even  facing  in 
different  directions.  Besides  the  danger  impending  from  Han- 
cock on  his  front  and  right,  a  greater  one  threatened  Hill  on  his 
left. 

Warren,  while  fighting  Ewell,  had  seen  Wilcox  in  his  temporary 
location  and  had  seen  his  withdrawal  to  go  to  Heth's  aid.  He 
sent  Wadsworth's  division  and  Baxter's  brigade,  about  8000  men, 
to  move  in  that  direction  and  attack  Hill's  flank.  Darkness 
overtook  Wadsworth  at  Hill's  skirmish  line  and  he  halted  and 
bivouacked,  ready  to  attack  in  the  morning. 

During  the  night,  Grant  had  been  joined  by  Burnside's  9th 


502  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

corps,  24,000  strong,  comprised  in  four  divisions,  one  of  which 
was  of  negroes.  This  was  left  to  guard  the  trains.  Two  of  the 
white  divisions,  Potter  and  Willcox,  supported  by  the  3d,  Steven- 
son's, were  sent  to  penetrate  the  gap  between  Hill  and  Ewell, 
now  over  a  mile  in  extent. 

Long  before  day,  Hill  could  hear  the  enemy  forming  in  the 
woods  near  at  hand.  Nothing  was  done  in  the  way  of  prepara- 
tion or  of  intrenchment  during  the  night,  as  the  men  expected 
to  be  relieved  by  Longstreet's  two  divisions  in  the  morning. 
Meanwhile,  Grant  had  been  misled  into  a  serious  blunder  by  false 
information,  curiously  like  what  had  been  imposed  upon  Hooker 
in  the  Chancellorsville  campaign.  By  the  stories  of  prisoners  he 
was  led  to  believe,  just  as  Hooker  had  been,  that  Pickett's  divi- 
sion had  arrived,  and  he  ordered  Hancock  to  withdraw  Barlow's 
division  from  the  force  about  to  attack  Heth,  and  post  it  on  his 
left,  on  the  Brock  road,  in  anticipation  of  Pickett's  expected 
appearance.  There  happened  to  be  near  that  point  the  grading 
of  an  unfinished  railroad,  designed  to  run  from  Fredericksburg 
to  Orange  C.  H.,  and  here  passing  through  the  Wilderness  a 
little  south  of  it,  and  nearly  parallel  to  the  Plank  road.  It 
offered  a  great  opportunity  to  turn  the  flank  of  either  of  the 
lines  about  to  be  engaged  near  that  road.  Fortunately  for  us, 
Barlow  did  not  utilize  it,  but  left  the  opportunity  to  Longstreet. 

Punctually  at  5  A.M.  on  the  6th,  Warren  and  Sedgwick  attacked 
Ewell  and  Hancock,  with  Wadsworth  and  Getty,  attacked  Hill. 
A  short  story  can  be  made  of  the  attack  upon  Ewell.  He  had 
strengthened  his  lines  during  the  night  and  gotten  in  more  of 
his  artillery.  The  attacks  upon  him  were  fierce  and  bloody,  but 
were  all  repulsed.  For  six  hours  they  were  renewed  frequently, 
but  by  11  A.M.  the  fight  was  all  out  of  the  assailants,  and  for  the 
rest  of  the  day  they  were  satisfied  to  lie  behind  their  breast- 
works and  keep  up  a  more  or  less  noisy,  but  harmless,  fire  upon 
the  Confederates  in  theirs.  Late  in  the  afternoon,  however,  an 
attack  was  made  upon  an  exposed  flank  of  the  6th  corps  by 
Gordon,  of  Early's  division,  which  will  be  described  later.  But, 
of  all  the  chapter  of  accidents  affecting  the  Confederate  fortunes; 
scarcely  one  was  more  unfortunate  for  them  than  what  was  then 
disclosed.  The  opportunity  for  this  attack,  which  might  have 


BATTLE  OF  THE  WILDERNESS  503 

been  fatal  to  Grant's  campaign,  had  lain  open  all  day,  unin- 
vestigated  by  Ewell  and  Early,  although  both  were  notified  of  it, 
and  begged  to  verify  it. 

Hancock's  attack  upon  Hill  opened  with  every  promise  of 
success.  Birney's,  Mott's,  and  Getty's  divisions  advanced  simul- 
taneously upon  Heth  and  Wilcox,  who  made  a  strong  resistance 
until  Wadsworth's  division  and  Baxter's  brigade  struck  them 
upon  the  left  flank,  and  Hancock's  left  overlapped  and  turned 
their  right.  .With  both  flanks  broken,  they  were  rapidly  rollecT 
up  toward  the  centre,  and  the  men,  appreciating  that  their  posi-  | 
tion  was  no  longer  tenable,  fell  back  from  both  flanks  into  the 
Plank  road,  and  came  pouring  down  the  road  past  the  open 
field  near  the  Tabb  house,  where  Lee  stood  among  the  small 
and  scattered  pines.  Seeing  McGowan  pass,  Lee  rode  up  and 
said :  "  My  God !  Gen.  McGowan,  is  this  splendid  brigade  of 
yours  running  like  a  flock  of  geese?"  McGowan  answered: 
"  General,  the  men  are  not  whipped.  They  only  want  a  place 
to  form,  and  they  will  fight  as  well  as  ever  they  did."  / 

Meanwhile,  as  already  told,  Longstreet's  double  column  had 
turned  into  the  Plank  road,  at  Parker's  store,  about  five  o'clock 
with  about  three  miles  to  go.  Longstreet  and  staff  rode  at  the 
head  of  the  column,  which  filled  the  whole  road.  As  we  drew 
near  the  Tabb  house,  we  met  what  seemed  to  be  an  orderly  body 
of  troops  marching  in  the  opposite  direction,  who  parted,  taking 
the  woods  on  each  side  and  giving  us  the  road.  Presently  an 
excited  staff-officer  appeared,  trying  to  stop  them,  who,  being 
asked  why,  answered,  —  "They  are  running,  d — n  them."  Soon 
bullets  began  to  whistle  down  the  road,  and  Longstreet  ordered 
the  leading  brigades  forward  into  line  on  each  side.  Gregg,  Ben- 
ning,  and  Law,  under  Field,  took  the  left.  Kennedy,  Humphreys, 
and  Bryan,  under  Kershaw,  took  the  right.  Some  of  the  bullets 
were  coming  across  the  road  from  the  right,  their  direction  show- 
ing that  the  enemy  was  about  to  pass  around  our  flank. 

Poague's  guns  opened  fire,  and  Lee,  seeing  the  Texas  brigade 
passing,  rode  to  place  himself  at  its  head.     The  men,  recognizing    \ 
him  and  his  intention,  shouted,  "Go  back!    Lee  to  the  rear," 
and  a  Texan  Major  caught  his  horse  by  the  bridle  and  stopped 
him.    He  was  assured  that  the  men  did  not  need  any  leading, 


504  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

and  would  soon  restore  the  battle.  Some  one,  about  that  time, 
pointed  out  Longs treet,  and  Lee  was  taken  to  him. 

The  Federals  had  now  advanced  over  a  mile  through  the 
tangled  forest  and  were  necessarily  in  much  disorder.  Both 
sides  were  fighting  without  intrenchments,  and  the  Federals 
were  everywhere  being  pushed  slowly  back  with  severe  loss. 
Gregg  and  Benning,  on  the  left,  bore  the  brunt  of  the  action. 
Both  were  small  brigades  and  their  casualties  were  heavy. 
Benning  was  severely  wounded.  The  losses  of  the  brigades  can- 
not be  given.  But  few  reports  were  made  after  the  commence- 
ment of  this  campaign,  and  there  are  only  a  small  number  of 
these  which  state  the  casualties. 

The  news  of  Longstreet's  presence  was  soon  conveyed  to 
Meade  and  Grant,  and  reinforcements  were  sent  Hancock,  while 
Sedgwick  and  Warren  were  ordered  to  press  their  attacks. 
Getty  was  wounded  and  his  division  was  withdrawn.  Steven- 
son's division,  the  reserve  of  the  9th  corps,  was  ordered  to  the 
left,  and  Barlow,  on  the  extreme  left,  was  directed  to  attack  Hill's 
right.  Barlow,  however,  only  sent  one  brigade,  Frank's,  having 
been  misled  by  the  approach  from  his  left  of  a  body  of  Federal 
convalescents  who  were  at  first  taken  for  Pickett's  division.  He 
also  attributed  to  Pickett  some  very  rapid  fire  heard  on  the  left, 
where  Sheridan,  with  his  Spencer  carbines,  had  attacked  Stuart, 
by  Grant's  orders,  but  had  been  repulsed.  Willcox's  and  Potter's 
divisions  of  Burnside's  corps,  sent  to  penetrate  the  gap  between 
Hill  and  Ewell,  were  urged  forward,  and  a  staff-officer  sent  to 
guide  them,  but  they  did  not  come  into  action  until  two  o'clock, 
before  which  time  the  ground  had  been  occupied  by  Heth  and 
Wilcox,  who  were  able  to  repel  their  assault  when  it  was  made. 
With  the  aid  of  these  reinforcements,  the  Confederate  advance 
was  brought  to  a  standstill  and  the  firing  gradually  ceased. 
Engineer  troops  were  brought  up,  and  the  Federals  began  im- 
proving and  extending  their  lines. 

Meanwhile,  about  8  A.M.,  Anderson's  division  of  Hill's  corps 
had  arrived  on  the  field,  and  also  Lee's  Chief  Engineer,  Gen. 
M.  L.  Smith.  He  had  been  sent  to  search  for  an  opportunity  to 
turn  the  enemy's  left.  Of  course,  he  soon  found  the  unfinished 
railroad,  and  about  10  A.M.,  he  reported  it  to  Longstreet.  Four 


BATTLE  OF  THE  WILDERNESS  505 

brigades  were  promptly  formed  for  a  flank  attack  to  be  con- 
ducted by  Col.  Sorrel,  Longstreet's  Adj. -Gen.  They  were 
G.  B.  Anderson  of  Field's  division,  Wofford  of  Kershaw's, 
Mahone  of  Anderson's  (R.  H.),  and  Davis  of  Heth's.  This  attack 
was  to  be  at  once  followed  by  a  general  advance  of  all  Long- 
street's  force,  which  included  Jenkins's  large  brigade  and  four 
others  of  Anderson's  division,  which  had  not  yet  fired  a  shot. 

Sorrel  moved  the  four  brigades  by  the  flank  to  the  unfinished 
railroad,  where  they  faced  to  the  left,  and,  about  11  A.M.,  they 
advanced  upon  the  Federal  line,  striking  it  in  flank  and  rear. 
The  success  of  the  movement  was  complete.  Brigade  after 
brigade  was  routed  and  rolled  up.  Hancock,  noted  for  his 
power  and  influence  with  his  men  on  such  occasions,  endeavored 
in  vain  to  stay  the  panic,  but  was  unable  to  do  so,  and,  con- 
sulting with  Birney,  he  decided  to  abandon  all  in  front  and 
endeavor  to  reestablish  his  line  upon  the  Brock  road.  Here  he 
had,  the  day  before,  sacrificed  valuable  time  to  intrench  a  line 
which  might  now  serve  him  as  a  refuge.  The  panic  had  extended 
even  across  the  Plank  road  where  Wadsworth  had  been  killed 
and  Baxter  wounded,  when  their  troops  were  routed. 

This  was  Longstreet's  great  opportunity.  Nearly  the  whole 
of  Grant's  army  had  been  first  fought  to  a  standstill,  and  now 
four  brigades,  with  little  loss  by  a  lucky  movement,  had  utterly 
routed  about  two  full  corps  in  the  Wilderness,  where  it  was 
almost  impossible  to  rally  broken  troops.  Longstreet,  with  five 
more  fresh  brigades,  was  close  at  hand,  fully  prepared  to  join 
the  victorious  four  and  to  be  aided  by  the  brigades  which  had 
relieved  Heth  and  Wilcox  in  the  morning  in  a  supreme  effort 
to  follow  up  the  fugitives,  and  to  drive  them  into  the  Rapidan. 
When  Smith  had  directed  Sorrel's  column  on  its  turning  expedi- 
tion, he  had  been  given  a  small  party  and  directed  to  find  a  way 
across  the  Brock  road  which  would  turn  Hancock's  extreme 
left.  He  had  now  returned  and  reported  one  found.  He  was 
asked  to  conduct  the  flanking  brigades  and  handle  them  as  the 
ranking  officer.  He  was  a  fine  tactician,  a  skilful  engineer,  and 
had  been  noted  for  gallantry  in  the  defence  of  Vicksburg,  where 
he  had  been  chief  engineer.  He  was  a  native  of  N.Y.  and  a 
graduate  of  West  Point  of  the  class  of  1838.  /  fry  z.. 


j 


506  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

When  Sorrel's  flanking  brigades  reached  the  Plank  road,  some 
crossing  in  the  attack  and  pursuit  of  Wadsworth,  and  some  in 
line,  a  little  ways  in  the  woods  on  the  right,  whence  they  fired 
on  the  fugitives  down  the  road,  he  rode  back  to  where  Longstreet, 
Smith,  Field,  Kershaw,  and  others  stood  at  the  head  of  Jenkins's 
brigade,  in  column  in  the  road,  ready  to  be  launched  in  the  pur- 
suit. He  made  his  report,  which  was  of  an  ideal  success,  as  had 
already  been  made  known  by  the  progress  of  the  musketry.  It 
may  be  imagined  how  rapidly  the  news  was  spread  down  the 
ranks  and  with  what  alacrity  was  heard  the  order  to  advance. 

Meanwhile,  the  12th  Va.,  of  Mahone's  brigade,  had  crossed 
the  Plank  road  in  the  pursuit  of  Wadsworth  and  gotten  ahead 
of  the  other  regiments,  detained  by  a  fire  in  the  woods  across 
their  path.  It  was  now  returning  to  find  its  brigade,  which 
was  in  line  near  the  road,  and  had,  only  a  short  while  before, 
been  firing  at  Wadsworth  fugitives.  The  12th,  on  the  left  of 
the  road,  was  mistaken  in  the  woods  for  an  advance  of  the 
enemy,  and  fire  was  opened  on  it  by  the  other  regiments,  just  as 
the  head  of  the  column  was  about  to  pass,  and  it  rode  into  the 
fire.  Oenkins  had  just  before  ridden  close  to  Longstreet  to  offer 
congratulations,  and  had  said :  "  I  feel  happy.  I  had  felt 
despair  of  our  cause  for  some  months,  but  am  relieved.  I  feel 
assured  we  will  put  the  enemy  back  across  the  Rapidan  before 
night." 

Jenkins  and  Longstreet  were  both  struck,  the  former  mortally, 
dying  within  two  hours;  the  latter  in  the  throat,  passing  out 
behind  the  right  shouldery  Capt.  Doby,  and  Bowen,  an  orderly 
of  Kershaw's  staff,  were  killed.  Jenkins's  brigade  levelled  to 
return  the  fire,  but  Kershaw  shouted  "F-r-i-e-n-d-s,"  and  arms 
were  recovered,  and  the  men  lay  down  without  firing  a  shot. 
The  12th  Va.  had  also  lain  down. 

Longstreet  at  once  summoned  Field,  the  senior  officer  present, 
to  take  the  command  and  to  press  the  pursuit,  one  column  the 
direct  attack,  the  other  to  turn  the  position  along  the  Brock 
road.  Before  Field,  however,  had  taken  command,  Gen.  R.  H. 
Anderson,  his  senior,  arrived,  and  Lee  soon  after  came  up. 

Longstreet  writes  that  the  plans,  orders,  and  opportunity  were 
explained  to  Lee,  but  the  woods  concealed  everything  except 


BATTLE  OF  THE  WILDERNESS  507 

the  troops  along  the  road,  and  Lee  did  not  care  to  handle  broken 
lines,  and  ordered  a  formation  for  parallel  battle. 

This  consumed  so  much  time  that  it  was  4.15  P.M.  when  the 
attack  was  renewed  by  Field's  and  Anderson's  divisions,  ex- 
cepting Law's  and  Perry's  brigades.  Gen.  Humphreys,  in 
his  account  of  this  campaign,  says  of  this  attack,  "  Could 
it  have  been  made  early  in  the  day  and  followed  up,  it  would 
have  had  important  consequences."  Earlier  in  the  day,  it  might 
have  been  made  by  three  divisions,  and  would  have  found  the 
enemy  already  retreating.  Now  he  had  had  four  hours  to  re- 
form in  intrenchments  and  strengthen  them.  Grant  had  him- 
self given  orders  to  renew  his  attack  upon  us  at  6  P.M.  Our 
attack  at  4.15  so  reduced  the  Federal  ammunition,  and  their 
ordnance  wagons  were  so  far  in  the  rear,  that  the  attack  was  given 
up.  As  it  was,  Jenkins's  brigade,  under  Bratton,  after  a  half- 
hour's  attack,  drove  off  Ward's  brigade  and  a  portion  of  Mott's 
division,  and  planted  their  colors  upon  the  intrenchments.  But 
there  were  no  reinforcements  and  the  enemy  had  a  second 
fortified  line  full  of  troops,  so  Bratton  was  at  last  forced  to  with- 
draw with  severe  loss.  His  attack,  and  his  final  repulse  by 
Carroll,  were  both  highly  complimented  by  Hancock.  Under  all 
the  circumstances,  the  renewal  of  the  attack  at  the  late  hour, 
and  without  Kershaw's  division,  was  unwise.  It  was  certain  to 
cost  many  lives,  the  chances  of  success  were  not  good,  and, 
even  had  they  been,  the  lateness  of  the  hour  would  have  interfered 
with  gathering  the  fruit  of  victory. 

The  fire  in  the  woods,  which  had  started  during  Mahone's 
attack,  had  continued  to  burn,  and  some  of  the  wounded  perished 
in  it.  It  had  reached  Hancock's  log  breastworks,  and  a  part  of 
them  were  on  fire  at  the  time  of  our  afternoon  assault,  with 
which  it  materially  interfered. 

It  only  remains  to  cotnplete  the  record  of  the  day's 
misfortunes  with  a  brief  account  of  Gordon's  attack  upon  the 
right  of  the  6th  corps,  commenced  a  little  before  sundown, 
although  the  existence  of  the  opportunity  for  it,  as  already  men- 
tioned, had  been  discovered  by  scouts  and  reported  to  Gordon 
by  9  A.M.  Gordon  had  verified  it  by  personal  observation  and 
reported  it  to  his  division  commander,  Early,  and  urged  an 


508  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

attack.  Early  had  adopted  a  theory  that  Grant  would  have 
Burnside's  9th  corps  in  support  of  the  right  of  the  6th.  In  vain 
Gordon  answered  that  observation  showed  it  was  not  there,  and 
in  vain  he  appealed  to  Ewell,  the  corps  commander,  to  verify  it. 
Early's  personality  dominated  Swell's  to  such  an  extent  that 
Ewell  not  only  sustained  him  in  his  theory,  but  would  neither 
go  and  see  or  refer  the  important  question  to  Lee.  And  so  the 
matter  remained  during  all  the  hours  and  all  the  vicissitudes  of 
the  day,  until  about  5.30  P.M.,  when  Lee,  who  had  been  occupied 
until  then  on  the  right,  and  wondered  at  the  strange  silence  on 
his  left,  rode  up  and  asked,  "Cannot  something  be  done  on  this 
flank  to  relieve  the  pressure  on  our  right?" 

Ewell,  Early,  and  Gordon  all  happened  to  be  present.  Gordon's 
proposal  was  mentioned,  and  Early  vigorously  combated  it.  Lee 
listened  in  grim  silence  to  his  reasons  for  non-action,  and  answered 
only  with  direct  orders  to  Gordon  to  proceed  immediately  to 
make  the  attack,  taking  one  other  brigade,  Johnson's,  to  sup- 
port his  attack. 

Strange  to  say,  the  situation  had  not  changed.  The  attack 
took  place  just  as  the  sun  sank  in  the  west.  It  was  as  im- 
mediately and  brilliantly  successful  as  Longstreet's  flank  attack 
with  four  brigades  at  eleven  o'clock  had  been ;  but  now  darkness 
intervened  to  save  Grant's  army  as  effectually  as  had  the  bullet 
which  disabled  Longstreet.  Two  brigades,  Seymour's  and  Shaler's, 
were  completely  routed,  the  brigadiers  and  several  hundred  men 
being  captured.  Gordon's  casualties  were  very  small  and  a 
large  proportion  of  them  were  from  a  cross-fire  of  our  own  men 
upon  the  flanking  party,  as  it  swept  down  the  Federal  line  in 
front  of  the  Confederate  line  of  battle  in  the  twilight.  Darkness, 
of  course,  soon  put  an  end  to  the  possibility  of  fighting,  and  the 
Federals,  during  the  night,  fell  back  and  occupied  an  entirely 
new  line  in  the  rear.  Early,  during  the  war,  never  admitted 
.that  the  9th  corps  was  not  on  the  right  and  rear  of  the  6th,  but 
the  publication  of  the  official  records  shows  that  it  was  em- 
ployed entirely  in  other  parts  of  the  field. 

There  are  no  Confederate  returns  for  112,  out  of  183,  regiments. 

The  Federal  casualties  for  the  two  days  were :  — 

Killed,  2246;  wounded,  12,037;  missing,  3383;  total,  18,366. 


BATTLE  OF  THE  WILDERNESS         509 

Livermore  estimates  that  in  proportion  to  the  numbers  engaged, 
the  Confederate  losses  could  not  have  been  any  less  than  the 
Federal,  which,  estimating  only  the  killed  and  wounded,  were 
14,283  or  127  per  1000  men  engaged.  The  numbers  engaged, 
Livermore  estimates  as :  — 

Federals        '   .     *  .        •        •        •        •        •      -.»••       •        101,895 
Confederate .        .          61,025 

and  the  corresponding  Confederate  loss  would  be  7750.    The 
Confederates  had :  killed,  Gens.  J.  M.  Jones  and  L.  A.  Stafford, 
and  wounded,  Longstreet,  Pegram,  Benning,  and  Perry.    The 
Federals  had,  wounded,  Gens.  Carroll  and  Baxter. 
Gen.  Humphreys  writes  of  this  battle :  — 

"I  have  gone  into  more  detail  because  it  may  serve  to  show  what  diffi- 
culties were  encountered  by  the  forces  engaged  in  it,  owing  to  the  character 
of  the  field  on  which  it  took  place.  ...  So  far  as  I  know,  no  great  battle 
ever  took  place  before  on  such  ground.  But  little  of  the  combatants 
could  be  seen,  and  its  progress  was  known  to  the  senses  chiefly  by  the 
rising  and  falling  sounds  of  a  vast  musketry  fire  that  continually  swept 
along  the  lines  of  battle  many  miles  in  length,  sounds  which  at  times 
approached  the  sublime." 

SPOTTSYLVANIA 

My  command  had  not  been  engaged  in  the  Wilderness.  When 
the  battle  began,  on  the  6th,  I  was  ordered  to  halt  all  the  artillery 
at  Parker's  store,  and  it  remained  there  until  in  the  afternoon 
of  the  7th,  when  it  was  started  for  Spottsylvania  C.  H. 
When  Grant  made  no  attack  on  the  morning  of  the  7th,  and, 
in  the  afternoon,  his  trains  were  seen  moving  toward  our  right, 
Lee  correctly  guessed  that  his  design  was  to  turn  our  right.  Late 
in  the  afternoon,  Lee  ordered  Anderson,  who  had  succeeded 
Longstreet  in  command  of  the  1st  corps,  to  march  at  night  for 
Spottsylvania.  It  was  to  be  a  foot-race  to  see  who  could  first 
occupy  the  ground,  and  the  advantages  seemed  to  be  with 
Grant,  who  had  ordered  Meade  to  start  his  trains  at  3  P.M.,  so  as 
to  clear  the  roads,  and  to  establish  one  corps  at  the  court-house, 
one  at  the  cross-roads  known  as  the  Blockhouse,  and  one  at 
Todd's  Tavern.  The  troops  were  to  march  at  8.30  P.M.,  and 
they  had  about  12  miles  to  go.  It  was  in  the  dark  of  the  moon. 


510  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

We  had  about  15  miles  to  go,  and,  on  arrival,  only  two  divi- 
sions to  oppose  to  the  three  corps.  Fitz-Lee's  cavalry,  however, 
was  on  the  road  in  front  of  Spottsylvania,  and  Hampton's  de- 
fended Corbin's  Bridge  on  the  Catharpin  road,  by  which  the 
enemy  might  have  interfered  with  our  march.  Our  cavalry  had 
cut  down  trees  to  blockade  the  roads,  and  they  defended  their 
blockades  so  well  that  the  enemy's  cavalry  could  not  force  them 
in  the  night,  but  had  to  wait  for  daylight. 

The  enemy  enjoyed  a  great  advantage  in  having  the  initiative. 
Lee  could  not  know  until  after  daylight  in  the  morning  whether 
Grant's  entire  army  had  left  his  front  or  not.  In  any  event,  our 
two  divisions  could  have  no  reinforcements  during  the  greater 
part  of  the  day.  Thanks  to  the  good  work  of  Hampton's  divi- 
sion at  Corbin's  Bridge,  we  passed  that  danger  point  safely. 
Our  artillery,  from  Parker's  store,  came  by  the  Shady  Grove  road, 
and  about  daylight  we  joined  the  two  divisions  of  infantry  near 
the  Po  River,  where  the  column  halted  for  an  hour  to  rest  and 
eat  breakfast,  expecting  this  to  be  a  busy  day.  For  already  we 
could  hear  the  beginning  of  some  fighting  two  miles  to  our  left, 
indicating  that  the  Federal  columns  were  finding  our  cavalry  in 
their  way. 

The  Federals,  however,  were  sure  that  they  had  won  the  race. 
Mr.  Dana,  Asst.  Sec.  of  War,  who  was  with  Grant  at  the  time, 
wrote  of  it  afterward,  as  follows :  — 

"  I  remember  distinctly  the  sensation  in  the  ranks  when  the  rumor  first 
went  around  that  our  position  was  south  of  Lee's.  It  was  the  morning  of 
May  8.  The  night  before,  the  army  had  made  a  forced  march  on  Spott- 
sylvania C.  H.  There  was  no  indication  the  next  morning  that  Lee 
had  moved  in  any  direction.  As  the  army  began  to  realize  that  we  were 
moving  south,  and,  at  that  moment  were  probably  much  nearer  Rich- 
mond than  was  our  enemy,  the  spirits  of  both  officers  and  men  rose  to  the 
highest  pitch  of  animation.  On  every  hand  I  heard  the  cry  '  On  to  Rich- 
mond.'" 

Our  little  halt  for  breakfast,  greatly  needed  by  both  men  and 
animals  after  the  night  march,  about  exhausted  all  the  margin 
by  which  we  had  won  the  race.  About  7  A.M.,  we  reached  a 
cross-road,  where  stood  the  peculiar  looking  house,  called  the 
Blockhouse,  built  of  squared  logs.  Here  we  met  pressing 


BATTLE  OF  THE  WILDERNESS         511 

appeals  for  help  from  two  directions.  From  Spottsylvania 
C.  H.,  one  and  a  half  miles  in  front,  Rosser's  brigade  reported 
itself  as  being  driven  by  Wilson's  division  of  cavalry,  coming 
from  the  direction  of  Fredericksburg.  From  the  road  to  the 
left,  which  crossed  the  Brock  road  on  the  Spindler  farm  one 
mile  away,  Fitz-Lee  reported  himself  as  heavily  pressed  by 
Warren's  corps  of  infantry,  and  the  increasing  musketry  fire 
told  that  the  situation  was  fast  growing  critical.  The  two  lead- 
ing brigades,  Kennedy  and  Humphreys  of  Kershaw's  division, 
were  at  once  filed  to  the  left  and  hurried  to  the  relief  of  Fitz- 
Lee's  cavalry.  The  other  brigades  of  the  same  division,  Wofford 
and  Bryan,  went  on  ahead  to  the  aid  of  Rosser.  Haskell's 
battalion  of  artillery  went  with  Kershaw  and  Humphreys.  Fitz- 
Lee  was  defending  some  slight  rail  breastworks  on  the  edge  of  a 
dense  pine  thicket,  overlooking  a  large  open  area,  and  the  in- 
fantry quickly  relieved  the  men  with  carbines  behind  the  rails. 
The  latter,  unobserved,  were  withdrawn  to  the  rear  through  the 
thicket,  mounted  and  taken  by  Lee  to  the  aid  of  Rosser. 

Kennedy  and  Humphreys  had  hardly  gotten  into  position 
when  they  were  charged  by  the  three  brigades  of  Robinson's 
division  of  the  5th  corps.  Each  brigade  was  formed  in  column 
of  regiments,  four  lines  deep.  Two  brigades  formed  the  first 
line,  and  the  third  brigade  the  second  line.  Warren  had  told 
them,  the  prisoners  afterward  stated,  that  there  was  only 
cavalry  behind  the  rail  breastworks,  who  had  no  bayonets,  and 
could  not  stand  close  quarters.  They  actually  did  charge  home 
to  the  rails,  and  a  bayonet  fight  took  place  across  them;  but 
though  superior  in  numbers,  the  Federals  were  repulsed,  leaving 
the  ground  strewn  with  dead  and  wounded,  Robinson  being 
among  the  latter.  Haskell's  guns  took  part  in  the  repulse  and 
did  fine  service,  losing  a  captain,  Potts,  killed. 

Field's  division  now  came  up  to  Kershaw's  support  and 
extended  his  line  to  the  left.  Huger's  battalion  took  position 
in  the  edge  of  the  pine  thicket  where  the  cavalry  had  stood, 
and  Cabell's  battalion  was  held  in  reserve.  Wilson's  cavalry, 
having  held  Spottsylvania  C.  H.  for  two  hours,  was  withdrawn 
by  Sheridan,  as  Rosser,  reenforced  by  Fitz-Lee,  was  moving  upon 
him.  Wofford  and  Bryan  now  rejoined  Field. 


512  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

Meanwhile,  after  the  repulse  of  Robinson's  division,  Griffin's 
division  made  two  assaults.  The  first  met  about  the  same  fate 
as  Robinson.  The  second  did  not  come  so  far,  but  secured  posi- 
tions to  our  right,  where  they  could  find  cover  from  300  to  400 
yards  away,  and  began  to  intrench.  Crawford's  division  next 
came  up  to  Griffin's  left  and  extended  his  intrenchment,  only 
exchanging  rather  distant  fire  with  ours.  Wadsworth's,  the  last 
division,  now  under  Cutler,  next  made  an  attack  upon  our  left, 
driving  in  our  pickets  and  establishing  a  line  prolonging  Griffin's 
to  his  right.  It  was  now  about  midday,  and  Warren's  corps  had 
been  fought  to  a  standstill. 

About  this  time,  Meade  ordered  Sedgwick  to  reenforce  Warren 
with  his  whole  corps  and  join  him  in  an  attack  upon  our  two 
divisions,  which  was  to  be  "immediate  and  vigorous."  It  was 
scarcely  done  as  ordered,  for  it  was  not  made  until  five  o'clock ; 
it  was  but  a  partial  attack,  and  it  was  nowhere  successful.  The 
time  required  to  form  troops  for  an  attack  can  seldom  be  exactly 
fixed,  and  here  it  was  said  that  the  ground  was  new  to  every 
one  and  the  troops  were  tired  with  an  all-night  march. 

The  attack  was  made,  however,  by  so  large  a  force,  that  it 
overlapped  our  line  on  its  right,  which  might  have  proved  a  very 
serious  matter.  As  luck  would  have  it,  however,  Crawford's 
division,  the  overlapping  part  which  entered  the  woods  beyond 
our  extreme  right  about  dusk,  ran  into  Rodes's  division  of 
Swell's  corps,  just  arriving  on  the  field,  after  an  all-day  march 
from  the  Wilderness,  nearly  exhausted  by  the  heat,  dust,  and 
the  smoke  of  the  fires  still  burning  there.  Rodes  promptly 
drove  Crawford  back  to  his  place  in  the  Federal  line,  and  then 
forming  his  division  on  the  right  of  Kershaw,  he  proceeded  to 
intrench.  Johnson's  division  formed  on  his  right  and  Early's 
division,  now  under  Gordon,  in  reserve.  The  fighting  along  the 
lines  lasted  until  dark.  During  it,  nearly  every  gun  in  our  corps 
had  been  engaged,  and  was  now  assigned  to  some  position, 
either  on  the  line  or  behind,  where  it  could  fire  over.  Now  at 
night,  all  were  intrenching  themselves,  and  we  made  our  bivouac 
near  the  Blockhouse. 

Hill's  corps,  now  under  Early,  Hill  being  sick,  had  remained 
all  day  of  the  8th  guarding  the  movement  of  our  trains  from 


BATTLE  OF  THE  WILDERNESS  513 

the  Wilderness.  On  the  9th,  it  followed  the  other  corps  to 
Spottsylvania  and  took  position  on  Swell's  right,  except  Mahone's 
division  (formerly  Anderson's),  which  was  formed  on  the  left  of 
Field,  overlooking  the  Po.  The  day  was  taken  as  a  much-needed 
day  of  rest  by  the  Federals,  in  which  we  cheerfully  acquiesced. 
The  sharpshooting,  however,  was  active  upon  both  sides.  One 
of  our  sharpshooters  killed  Gen.  Sedgwick  at  a  range  of  about 
700  yards  from  the  pine  thicket  on  the  Brock  road.  He  was  suc- 
ceeded by  Wright  in  the  command  of  the  6th  corps. 

The  day  was  largely  devoted  to  improving  our  breastworks, 
an  art  in  which  we  were  much  behind  our  adversaries.  Our 
equipment  with  intrenching  tools  was  always  far  below  our  re- 
quirements, and  in  emergencies  the  men  habitually  loosened  the 
ground  with  bayonets,  and  scooped  it  up  with  tin  cups.  The  line 
was  laid  out  generally  by  those  who  built  it.  The  Federals  had 
a  large  force,  perhaps  2500  men,  of  engineer  troops  and  heavy 
artillery  regiments,  habitually  employed  in  building  and  im- 
proving their  intrenchments  under  the  direction  of  engineer 
officers.  They  were  more  valuable  than  an  equal  number  of 
regular  troops,  and  should  be  a  part  of  the  equipment  of  every 
army. 

Sheridan,  on  the  8th,  had  been  ordered  to  concentrate  his 
cavalry,  move  against  Stuart,  and  then  upon  our  communica- 
tions, and  when  his  supplies  were  exhausted,  to  proceed  to  the 
James  River,  renew  his  supplies,  and  return  to  the  army. 

Burnside's  corps  arrived  on  the  9th  by  the  Fredericksburg 
road  and  began  intrenching  opposite  Hill,  whose  lines  covered 
the  court-house  on  our  right.  He  had  encountered  some  dis- 
mounted cavalry  whom  he  mistook  for  a  brigade  of  Longstreet's 
infantry,  and  so  reported  it  to  Grant.  This  misled  Grant  into 
the  belief  that  Lee  was  moving  in  the  direction  of  Fredericks- 
burg,  and  he  ordered  Hancock  immediately  to  cross  the  Po, 
move  down  it  and  recross  by  the  Shady  Grove  road,  thus  turn- 
ing our  left  flank.  Hancock  at  once  put  three  divisions  to  cross 
simultaneously  at  three  different  points.  The  farthest  up-stream 
met  a  stubborn  resistance  from  dismounted  cavalry,  but  it  was 
presently  driven  off  by  those  who  had  crossed  below,  where  the 
second  effort  had  met  little  resistance,  and  the  third  none. 


514  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

Pontoon  bridges  were  immediately  thrown  at  all  three  places, 
and  the  troops  were  pushed  down-stream,  hoping  to  secure  the 
Shady  Grove  road  bridge.  Darkness,  however,  soon  forced  a 
halt,  but  some  of  the  men  reached  the  river  and  found  it  not 
fordable.  At  early  dawn,  Hancock  reconnoitred,  but  found 
Mahone's  brigade  on  the  opposite  bank  too  strongly  posted  to 
be  attacked.  Further  reconnoissances  were  being  made,  when, 
about  10  A.M.,  Hancock  was  ordered  to  send  two  divisions  of  his 
three  back  across  the  Po  to  take  part  in  an  assault  ordered  in 
the  afternoon  at  five.  Gibbon  and  Birney  were  accordingly  with- 
drawn, leaving  Barlow's  division  alone  on  the  south  side. 

Meanwhile,  when  Hancock  crossed  the  Po  on  the  afternoon  of 
the  9th,  Lee  had  ordered  Heth's  division  from  his  extreme  right 
to  the  extreme  left,  with  orders  to  cross  below  our  lines,  and, 
coming  up,  to  strike  Hancock's  three  divisions  on  the  flank. 
Heth  had  crossed  the  Po,  some  distance  below  our  left  flank,  on 
the  morning  of  the  10th,  and  turned  to  the  right,  hunting  for 
Hancock's  flank.  It  was  fortunate  for  him  that  he  had  made 
so  wide  a  circuit  that  he  did  not  find  it  until  after  Hancock, 
with  his  two  divisions,  had  been  withdrawn  to  the  north  side, 
for  Barlow's  four  brigades  alone  largely  outnumbered  him  with 
only  three,  and  Barlow  could  have  been  quickly  reenforced. 
Heth  would  otherwise  have  lost  much  of  his  division,  as  its 
retreat  across  the  Po  would  have  been  difficult. 

As  it  was,  Heth  made  two  spirited  charges  upon  two  of  Barlow's 
brigades  drawn  up  behind  the  crest  of  a  ridge,  with  the  others 
supporting  in  the  rear.  Both  charges  were  repulsed  with  severe 
loss,  but  meanwhile,  a  fire  breaking  out  in  the  woods  in  rear, 
Meade  ordered  Barlow  withdrawn.  This  was  done  with  the 
loss  of  one  gun,  wedged  between  trees  by  the  horses,  who  were 
stampeded  by  the  fire.  In  withdrawing,  Barlow  suffered  severely 
from  the  artillery  across  the  Po,  which  swept  the  plain  over 
which  he  reached  the  bridge.  Some  of  the  wounded  perished  in 
the  fire.  Gen.  H.  H.  Walker  of  Heth's  division  was  severely 
wounded.  It  had  been  a  mistake  to  send  Hancock  across  the* 
Po  at  such  a  late  hour  in  the  afternoon.  Night  intervened  be- 
fore he  could  accomplish  anything,  and  it  disclosed  his  plan. 
Next  day  he  abandoned  it  before  discovering  that  Heth  was 


BATTLE  OF  THE  WILDERNESS  515 

in  his  power.  At  night  Heth  was  returned  to  the  right 
flank. 

Heavy  shelling  of  the  1st  corps  lines  had  been  kept  up  all 
the  morning,  and  in  the  afternoon  three  assaults  were  made  at 
different  points.  One  against  Field's  division  had  been  ordered 
at  5  P.M.,  but  at  3.30  Warren  thought  the  opportunity  for  attack 
so  favorable  that  he  made  it  without  further  delay.  In  full  uni- 
form, he  attacked  the  lines  held  by  Field's  division  with  Cutler's 
and  Crawford's  divisions  and  Webb's  and  Carroll's  brigades, 
approaching  through  dense  thickets  which  hid  him  from  view 
until  at  quite  close  quarters.  But  our  guns  had  been  placed  to 
flank  these  thickets  and  riddled  them  with  canister  as  the  enemy 
passed  through.  They  emerged  in  bad  order  and  unable  to  form 
under  close  musketry,  and  were  repulsed  with  severe  losses, 
among  them  Gen.  Rice,  mortally  wounded.  A  few  only  suc- 
ceeded in  gaining  our  works,  where  their  covered  approach  had 
been  closest,  but  they  were  killed  or  captured. 

Not  satisfied  with  this  effort,  Hancock  tried  a  second  assault 
at  7  P.M.,  with  Birney's  and  Gibbon's  divisions,  supported  by 
part  of  the  5th  corps,  but  it  was  also  repulsed  with  severe  loss 
to  the  enemy  and  with  very  trifling  loss  to  us.  Glancing  back 
over  the  sequence  of  events,  it  appears  that  Burnside's  mistaking 
dismounted  cavalry  for  Longstreet's  infantry  on  the  9th,  was  a 
most  fortunate  one  for  Lee.  For  it  led  to  Grant's  prematurely 
sending  Hancock  across  the  Po  and  then  withdrawing  him.  Had 
he  continued  on  that  flank  and  perhaps  been  reenforced  by 
Warren,  it  is  hard  to  see  how  he  could  have  failed  to  defeat 
Heth  and  completely  turn  Lee's  flank,  and  get  upon  his  com- 
munications which  now  ran  to  Louisa  C.  H. 

While  these  affairs  were  going  on  upon  our  left,  a  carefully 
planned  and  partially  successful  effort  was  being  made  near 
our  centre.  In  the  hasty  extension  of  our  line  to  the  eastward 
in  the  afternoon  of  the  8th,  Ewell,  to  keep  on  high  ground,  had 
changed  direction  and  gone  a  mile  north;  then,  making  a  right- 
angled  salient,  had  returned  within  three-fourths  of  a  mile  of  the 
point  of  departure  before  resuming  his  eastward  course.  There 
resulted  a  great  sailent  a  mile  long,  reaching  out  toward  the  enemy 
and  ending  in  the  point  afterward  known  as  the  "Bloody 


516  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

Angle."  It  was  a  piece  of  bad  engineering  and  certain  to  invite 
an  attack  as  soon  as  the  enemy  understood  it. 

This  it  required  a  few  days  for  them  to  do,  for  our  sharp- 
shooters prevented  any  close  reconnoissance.  Meanwhile,  how- 
ever, our  men  found  that  the  sides  of  the  sailent  angle  were  en- 
filaded by  the  musketry  fire  of  the  enemy's  sharpshooters  coming 
over  the  parapets,  and,  for  protection,  traverses  were  erected 
every  few  yards  along  them.  On  the  10th,  all  the  features 
of  this  salient  had  not  been  understood,  but  on  its  western 
face  the  enemy  had  found  a  place  where  a  large  force  could 
approach  within  200  yards  of  our  intrenchments,  entirely  un- 
observed, and  would  have  but  that  distance  under  fire  to  enter 
them.  It  was  here  that  the  carefully  planned  effort  was  made 
at  5  P.M. 

The  assault  was  made  under  Col.  Upton  commanding  a  bri- 
gade in  Russell's  division  of  the  6th  corps.  He  was  a  graduate 
of  West  Point  of  the  class  of  '61,  and  had  already  shown  him- 
self distinguished  as  a  tactician  and  a  leader  of  troops.  His 
command  included  three  brigades,  comprising  12  regiments  which 
were  formed  in  four  lines.  No  commands  were  given  while 
moving  into  position.  All  had  bayonets  fixed  and  guns  loaded, 
but  only  the  front  line  had  them  capped.  On  reaching  our 
works,  the  1st  line  would  divide,  half  going  to  the  right  and  half 
to  the  left,  to  sweep  in  each  direction.  The  2d  line  would  halt 
at  the  works  and  open  fire  to  the  front.  The  3d  would  lie 
down  behind  the  2d,  and  the  4th  would  lie  down  at  the  edge  of 
the  wood,  whence  they  charged,  and  awaited  the  result.  In  the 
charge,  all  officers  would  constantly  repeat  the  shout  "forward," 
and  the  men  would  rush  forward  with  eyes  on  the  ground  they 
were  traversing. 

The  attack  fell  upon  Doles's  Ga.  brigade  of  Rodes's  division, 
and  Upton  thus  describes  how  the  charge  was  met :  — 

"  Here  occurred  a  deadly  hand-to-hand  conflict.  The  enemy  sitting  in 
their  pits  with  pieces  upright,  loaded,  and  with  bayonets  fixed  ready  to  im- 
pale the  first  who  should  leap  over,  absolutely  refused  to  yield  the  ground. 
The  first  of  our  men  who  tried  to  surmount  the  works  fell  pierced  through 
the  head  by  musket  balls.  Others,  seeing  the  fate  of  their  comrades,  held 
their  pieces  at  arm's-length  and  fired  downward,  while  others,  poising  their 


BATTLE  OF  THE  WILDERNESS  517 

pieces  vertically,  hurled  them  down  upon  their  enemy,  pinning  them  to  the 
ground.  .  .  .  Numbers  prevailed  and  like  a  resistless  wave  the  column 
poured  over  the  works,  quickly  putting  hors  de  combat  those  who  resisted, 
and  sending  to  the  rear  those  who  surrendered." 

Mott's  division  was  to  have  supported  Upton  on  the  left,  but 
it  did  not  appear.  It  seems  that  this  division  was  formed  for 
the  attack  where  our  batteries  had  a  view  of  it,  and  that  when 
it  attempted  to  advance,  at  the  signal  for  the  charge,  it  found 
itself  the  target  of  a  severe  artillery  fire,  under  which  the  bri- 
gades broke  and  fell  back  to  the  foot  of  the  hill.  Meanwhile,  the 
Confederate  brigades  on  the  right  and  left  had  promptly  attacked 
Upton  upon  both  flanks,  and  Battle's  brigade,  brought  up  from 
the  rear,  attacked  him  in  front.  He  brought  up  his  fourth  line 
in  vain  in  a  hard  fight,  and  was  finally  driven  back  with  loss, 
which  he  states  as  "about  1000  in  killed,  wounded,  and  pris- 
oners," probably  about  20  per  cent  of  his  command.  Swell's 
official  report  of  the  affair,  dated  Richmond,  March  20,  1865, 
says :  — 

"The  enemy  was  driven  from  our  works,  leaving  100  dead  within  them 
and  a  large  number  in  front.  Our  loss,  as  near  as  I  can  tell,  was  650,  of 
whom  350  were  prisoners." 

The  total  losses  of  the  Federals  for  the  day  were  estimated  at 
4100,  and  included  Gen.  Stevenson  of  Burnside's  corps  killed  by 
a  sharpshooter. 

Grant  believed  that  the  failure  of  Mott's  division  to  advance 
had  caused  Upton's  defeat  upon  the  10th,  and  on  the  llth  he 
planned  a  much  more  powerful  attack  to  be  made  by  the  whole 
of  the  2d  and  the  9th  corps.  In  preparation  for  this,  the  corps 
commanders  were  ordered  to  ascertain  the  least  force  which  could 
hold  their  lines,  and  leave  the  remainder  available  for  service 
elsewhere.  They  were  also  directed  to  press  their  skirmishers 
forward  so  as  to  allow  close  reconnoissance  of  our  works.  Later, 
he  determined  upon  the  salient  already  described,  and  afterward 
known  as  the  "Bloody  Angle,"  as  the  point  of  attack.  On  our 
lines  the  day  was  one  of  bitter  sharpshooting  and  angry  artillery 
practice.  Meanwhile,  all  movements  of  the  enemy  were  carefully 
watched  for  indications  of  his  plans,  and  one  was  reported  from 


518  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

which  Lee  derived  the  impression  that  he  was  preparing  to  make 
a  flank  march  to  our  left. 

Hancock  had  sent  Miles  to  reconnoitre  across  the  Po  in  the 
direction  of  Todd's  Tavern.  Only  two  regiments  were  sent,  and 
they  returned  in  the  evening,  but  our  report  had  exaggerated  the 
numbers  and  undue  importance  was  attached  to  the  incident. 
Early  had  also  reported  indications  of  movements  to  the  left. 
Lee  believed  that  Grant  was  preparing  for  another  flank  march 
to  be  attempted  during  the  night,  and  orders  were  sent  to  each 
chief  of  artillery  to  withdraw  at  sundown  all  of  his  guns  which 
were  in  lines  close  to  the  enemy,  so  that  if  it  became  neces- 
sary to  move  during  the  night,  the  withdrawal  of  the  guns 
would  not  be  heard.  Mahone's  division  was  still  upon  Field's 
left,  and  Lee  also  ordered  it,  with  two  brigades  of  Wilcox, 
to  make  a  night  march  and  occupy  Shady  Grove  before  day- 
light. 

During  the  night,  it  was  discovered  that  the  movement  to 
the  left  had  been  unimportant  (it  was  supposed  to  have  been 
a  feint,  but  it  was  not)  so  that  Mahone  was  recalled,  and 
now  he,  with  Wilcox's  two  brigades,  were  returned  to  Hill's 
corps.  The  order  to  the  chiefs  of  artillery,  however,  was 
not  recalled,  and  consequently  22  guns  of  Page's  and  Cut- 
shaw's  battalions  were,  about  sundown,  withdrawn  from  the 
position  about  to  be  attacked.  It  was  a  fatal  mistake,  as 
will  presently  appear. 

On  the  line  of  Longstreet's  corps,  I  had  ventured  to  accom- 
plish the  intent  of  the  order  without  literal  compliance  with  its 
terms.  I  had  visited  every  battery  and  had  its  ammunition 
chests  mounted  (they  were  usually  dismounted,  and  the 
chests  placed  under  cover  in  the  pits)  and  the  carriages  so  placed 
and  the  roads  so  prepared  that  we  could  withdraw  easily 
and  without  noise.  Our  guns  all  remained  in  position  on  the 
lines. 

It  was  in  the  dark  of  the  moon,  and  heavy  rain  was  falling  as 
the  Federals  began  to  move  soon  after  nightfall.  It  was  after 
midnight  when  they  reached  the  ground  where  they  were  to 
form.  Hancock's  formation  is  interesting,  but  it  failed  from  an 
over-concentration  of  force. 


BATTLE  OF  THE  WILDERNESS  519 

HANCOCK'S  FORMATION  FOR  CHARGE,  MAY  12,  1864 
BARLOW'S  Div. 

BROOKS'S   BRIG.  MILES's   BRIG.  BlRNEY's   DlV. 

t  t  t 


SMYTH'S  BRIG.  BROWN'S  BRIG.  MOTT'S  Div. 


GIBBON'S  Div. 
t 


Did  not  follow  until  advance  struck  the  works. 

At  Gettysburg,  our  formation  for  Pickett's  charge  (which  was 
too  light)  was  in  two  lines  supported  at  a  little  distance  by  a 
part  of  a  third.  Upton's  charge,  on  the  10th,  was  in  four  lines, 
and  was  at  first  successful,  but  was  finally  repulsed.  Hancock 
seemed  anxious  to  make  sure,  and  formed  Barlow's  division 
in  two  lines  of  two  brigades  each,  "closed  in  mass."  This  gave 
a  column  at  least  10  ranks  (or  20  men)  deep.  Barlow  had  open 
ground  to  advance  over.  On  his  right,  Birney  had  a  marsh  and 
then  a  thick  wood  of  low  pines,  until  quite  near  the  enemy.  He 
was  in  two  lines  followed  by  Mott  in  one.  In  rear  of  all  stood 
Gibbon's  division  deployed.  All  officers  were  dismounted,  and 
the  division  and  brigade  commanders  and  their  staffs  marched 
in  the  centre  between  the  lines.  The  intervals  between  the 
ranks  in  Barlow's  division  were  all  so  small  that,  soon  after  the 
advance  began,  the  intervals  were  lost  and  the  division  became 
a  solid  mass. 

Grant  had  ordered  the  charge  at  4  A.M.,  but,  owing  to  fog, 
Hancock  delayed  until  4.35.  As  it  began  to  grow  light,  the  order 
was  given  to  charge.  The  men  moved  at  first  quietly  and  slowly, 
but  about  the  time  when  the  Confederate  pickets  fired,  they 
broke  into  a  run  and  there  was  some  cheering.  The  distance  to 


520  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

our  works  was  about  1200  yards.  The  Confederates  had  heard 
the  noise  of  the  column  being  formed,  and  urgent  calls  had  been 
sent  for  the  return  of  the  22  guns  which  had  garnished  our  para- 
pets the  day  before,  but  had  been  withdrawn  about  sundown,  as 
already  told.  They  were  now  coming  back  through  the  woods 
in  two  long  lines  under  Page  and  Cutshaw.  The  two  leading 
guns  were  in  time  to  unlimber,  and,  between  them,  fired  three 
rounds  into  the  Federal  masses  before  they  were  surrounded. 
All  the  column,  except  the  two  rear  guns,  was  captured.  Had 
they  been  in  their  places,  it  is  quite  certain  that  the  charge  would 
not  have  been  successful.  Nowhere  else,  in  the  whole  history 
of  the  war,  was  such  a  target,  so  large,  so  dense,  so  vulnerable, 
ever  presented  to  so  large  a  force  of  artillery.  Ranks  had 
already  been  lost  in  the  crowd  and  officers  could  neither  show 
example  or  exercise  authority.  A  few  discharges  would  have 
made  of  it  a  mob  which  could  not  have  been  rallied.  There  was 
a  thick  abattis  of  felled  trees  in  front  and  "chevaux  de  frieze" 
which,  Barlow  says,  "would  have  been  very  difficult  to  get  through 
under  a  cool  fire."  For  the  mob,  which  his  division  would  have 
soon  formed,  there  would  have  been  no  escape  but  flight,  with 
phenomenal  loss  for  the  time  exposed  to  fire.  As  it  was,  our 
infantry  had  time  to  fire  only  two  or  three  hurried  rounds,  when 
the  enemy  were  upon  them.  Perhaps  one- third  escaped,  but 
about  two- thirds  were  captured,  among  them  being  Ma j. -Gen. 
Johnston  and  Brig.-Gen.  Steuart.  Of  the  22  guns,  18  were  cap- 
tured at  once.  Two  more  were  abandoned  between  the  lines, 
where  our  men  were  able  to  use  them  against  the  enemy  during 
the  day,  but  the  enemy  got  them  during  the  night. 

Thus,  the  first  Federal  operation  of  the  day  was  a  great  success, 
so  far  as  guns  and  prisoners  were  concerned;  but  the  tactics 
used  were  so  faulty  that  they  practically  so  embarrassed  all  the 
future  operations,  as  to  prevent  any  further  fruit  from  the  vic- 
tory, although  the  -whole  force  of  the  army  was  brought  to  bear. 
The  enemy,  in  possession  of  the  salient  and  the  captured  guns, 
pursued  the  fugitives  and  turned  some  of  the  captured  guns  upon 
them.  But  the  fugitives,  falling  back,  soon  met  reinforcements 
coming  from  the  brigades  of  Johnston  and  Gordon  on  the  right, 
and  from  Daniel  and  Ramseur  on  the  left,  who  attacked  them 


BATTLE  OF  THE  WILDERNESS  521 

with  great  spirit.  The  pursuers  were  utterly  disorganized,  as,  in- 
deed, was  almost  the  whole  of  Hancock's  corps,  and  there  was 
scarcely  room  within  the  salient  to  organize  and  re-form  the  lines. 

Efforts  were  being  made  by  Barlow  when  the  well-organized 
Confederate  brigades  began  to  push  back  the  disorganized  pur- 
suers and  recover  some  of  the  ground  which  had  been  lost.  It 
was  reported  to  Grant  that  Hancock  was  being  checked  and 
eight  brigades  of  the  6th  corps  were  ordered  to  reenforce  him. 
They  charged  in  with  cheers  and  were  added  to  the  troops  al- 
ready much  too  crowded  in  the  confined  space.  This  was  about 
8  A.M. 

Meanwhile,  Burnside  had  been  ordered  at  5  A.M.  to  assault 
A.  P.  Hill's  lines  on  our  right.  He  had  sent  Potter's  division 
against  Lane's,  our  extreme  brigade  on  that  flank.  Potter  car- 
ried the  line  and  captured  two  guns.  Lane  re-formed  his  brigade 
in  some  old  breastworks,  which  enfiladed  those  Potter  had  taken, 
drove  him  out,  and  recaptured  the  guns.  Wilcox  sent  two  bri- 
gades to  Lane's  help,  but  they  were  not  needed  and  were  sent 
back. 

About  8  A.M.,  Burnside  was  ordered  to  move  to  his  left  and 
connect  with  Hancock's  line,  which  he  did  by  9.15.  Willcox's 
division  of  the  9th  was  now  ordered  to  attack  Heth's  line,  at  a 
favorable  point  where  a  pine  thicket  allowed  a  close  approach 
under  cover.  While  his  attack  was  in  progress,  he  was  struck 
on  his  left  flank  by  Lane's  and  Weisiger's  brigades  of  Hill's  corps, 
who  had  been  sent  out  by  Early  to  endeavor  to  relieve  the  press- 
ure at  the  salient.  Lane  claimed  to  have  captured  a  battery, 
but  was  unable  to  take  it  off.  Willcox  was  helped  by  Crittenden's 
division,  and  skirmishing  and  heavy  artillery  firing  was  kept  up 
all  day  without  material  result. 

To  return  now  to  the  Angle  where  eight  brigades  of  the  6th 
corps  had  arrived  about  8  A.M.  The  determined  counter  attacks 
of  Ewell's  brigades  had  cleared  the  space  within  the  breastworks 
and  compelled  the  enemy  to  confine  themselves  to  the  outside 
slopes  of  the  parapet  or  the  interior  of  a  few  enclosures  along  its 
inside  slopes  made  by  joining  the  ends  of  the  traverses,  which 
were  only  10  or  12  feet  apart,  and  built  up  of  logs.  Every  avail- 
able foot  of  cover  was  occupied,  and  outside  of  the  parapets  the 


522  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

men  stood  from  20  to  40  deep.  Those  in  rear  would  pass  guns 
to  some  in  front,  who  would  fire  almost  as  rapidly  as  if  they  had 
breech-loaders.  Fortunately,  much  of  the  fire  was  without  aim 
or  nothing  could  have  lived  before  it.  The  entire  forest  in  its 
front  was  killed,  logs  were  whipped  into  basket  stuff.  An  oak 
tree,  22  inches  in  diameter,  whose  trunk  is  still  preserved  in 
Washington,  was  cut  down  entirely  by  musketry  fire,  disabling 
several  men  in  the  1st  S.C.  regiment,  by  its  fall.  Ammunition 
was  supplied  liberally  from  the  rear  and  many  men  fired  over 
300  rounds.  The  bodies  of  the  wounded  and  slain  of  both  sides 
who  had  fallen  in  the  earlier  attacks  were  shot  to  pieces  and 
mangled  beyond  any  recognition. 

In  the  meantime,  Lee  had  brought  up  three  brigades  of  Hill's 
corps  (Perrin's,  and  Harris's  of  Mahone's  division  and  McGowan 
of  Wilcox's),  and  Grant  added  two  brigades  of  Ricketts's  division 
and  three  of  Cutler's  to  the  19  brigades  already  engaged.  He 
also  brought  up  artillery  on  the  two  flanks  outside  the  salient 
to  rake  the  prolongations  of  the  parapet  held  by  the  Federals. 
In  their  reserve  artillery  were  eight  24-Pr.  Cochorn  mortars,  and 
these,  too,  were  brought  and  effectively  used  to  drop  shells 
behind  the  Confederate  parapets.  Across  the  throat  of  the 
Angle,  our  line  was  covered  from  view  by  the  wood.  Lee's  only 
opportunity  for  attack  was  along  the  west  parapet,  where  the 
traverses  were  close  together,  as  already  told.  Here  the  Confed- 
erates never  relaxed  their  efforts  and  succeeded  in  getting  pos- 
session of  nearly  all  of  them  up  to  the  salient.  Many  were  shot 
and  stabbed  through  the  crevices  of  the  logs.  Perrin  was  killed 
and  McGowan  severely  wounded.  In  his  report,  the  latter  writes 
as  follows:  — 

"In  getting  into  this  trench,  we  had  to  pass  through  a  terrific  fire.  .  .  . 
We  found  in  the  trenches  Gen.  Harris,  and  what  remained  of  his  gallant 
brigade,  and  they  (Mississippians  and  Carolinians),  mingled  together,  made 
one  of  the  most  gallant  and  stubborn  defences  recorded  in  history.  These 
two  brigades  remained  there,  holding  our  line  without  reinforcements, 
without  food,  water,  or  rest,  under  a  storm  of  balls,  which  did  not  intermit 
one  instant  of  time,  for  18  hours.  The  trenches  on  the  right  of  the  Bloody 
Angle  ran  with  blood  and  had  to  be  cleared  of  the  dead  bodies  more  than 
once.  .  .  .  The  loss  in  my  brigade  was  very  heavy,  being  in  the  aggre- 
gate 451.  .  .  .  Our  men  lay  on  one  side  of  the  breastwork  and  the 


BATTLE  OF  THE  WILDERNESS  523 

enemy  on  the  other,  and  in  many  cases  men  were  pulled  over.    It  is  be- 
lieved we  captured  as  many  prisoners  as  we  lost." 

We  pass  now  to  the  left,  to  Longstreet's  front  opposite  War- 
ren. At  dawn,  Warren  had  opened  all  his  guns  and  pressed  for- 
ward his  skirmishers,  hoping  soon  to  see  us  sending  forces  to 
our  right,  to  meet  Hancock's  victorious  advance.  But  Han- 
cock had  overdone  his  effort,  as  has  been  seen,  and  his  advance 
had  been  brief.  Our  guns  were  all  behind  their  parapets  and 
firing  slowly  in  reply  to  the  enemy.  Warren  saw  no  encourage- 
ment to  attempt  an  attack,  so  he  waited.  At  9.15,  Grant  ordered 
him  "to  attack  at  once,  at  all  hazards  and  with  his  whole  force 
if  necessary."  At  10  A.M.,  we  saw  Warren's  men  advance  over 
the  open  ground  where  they  had  first  assaulted  us  on  the  8th. 
By  common  consent,  infantry  and  artillery  reserved  their  fire 
until  his  line  was  within  100  yards.  Then  both  opened,  and  the 
line  was  quickly  driven  back  with  heavy  loss  to  them,  and  but 
little  to  ourselves.  They  fell  back  to  their  right  out  of  our  sight 
in  a  hollow.  We  followed  their  disappearance  with  a  random 
fire  of  artillery  down  the  hollow,  which  Bratton's  skirmishers 
reported  enfiladed  them  and  caused  much  loss.  But,  being  ran- 
dom fire,  it  was  presently  discontinued  to  save  ammunition. 
Soon  there  broke  out  in  the  hollow  a  furious  fusillade  for  which  we 
could  find  no  explanation,  unless  they  were  firing  on  each  other 
by  mistake.  This  seemed  unlikely  when  it  was  kept  up  for  over 
two  hours,  a  great  roar  of  musketry.  Bratton,  in  his  report, 
says :  — 

"  It  seemed  a  heavy  battle  and  we  had  nothing  to  do  with  it.  Skir- 
mishers from  the  1st  and  5th  (S.C.)  regiments  were  ordered  up  to  the  crest 
to  discover  what  it  meant. 

"They  found  them  lying  behind  the  crest,  firing  at  what  did  not  clearly 
appear,  but  they  (the  skirmishers) ,  with  great  gallantry,  charged  them  with 
a  yell,  routed,  and  put  the  whole  mass  to  flight  most  precipitate  and  head- 
long, capturing  some  40  prisoners.  In  their  haste  and  panic  a  multitude 
of  them  ran  across  an  open  space  and  gave  our  battery  and  my  line  of 
battle  on  the  right  a  shot  at  them,  the  skirmishers,  too.  We  kept  up  a 
most  effective  fire  on  them,  and  that  field  also  was  thickly  dotted  with 
their  dead  and  wounded." 

I  can  find  no  mention  of  this  episode  in  any  Federal  report 


524  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

beyond  statements  in  the  itineraries  of  Griffin's  and  Cutler's 
divisions  that  they  were  engaged,  Griffin  three  and  Cutler  four 
hours,  on  the  morning  of  the  12th.  Can  it  be  that  two  Federal 
divisions  fought  each  other  for  nearly  that  time  and  that  every 
reference  to  it  in  the  official  reports  has  been  carefully  sup- 
pressed? It  seems  so.  Warren's  account  of  the  attack  gives 
suspiciously  few  details,  not  even  noting  the  divisions  engaged. 
Here  is  the  whole  of  it :  — 

"  I  also  again  assailed  the  enemy's  intrenchments,  suffering  heavy  loss 
but  failing  to  get  in.  The  enemy's  direct  and  flank  fire  was  too  destructive. 
Lost  very  heavily." 

It  hardly  seems  likely  that  so  much  loss  could  have  been  in- 
curred from  their  very  brief  exposure  to  our  fire.  Longstreet's 
official  diary  describes  the  action  only  as  two  violent  assaults 
between  nine  and  ten,  on  a  part  of  Field's  line.  Gen.  B.  G. 
Humphreys's  book  throws  no  light  on  the  subject  beyond  the 
following  footnote:  — 

"I  was  overlooking  the  right  of  the  army  and  gave  the  order  for  the 
assaults  there  to  cease  as  soon  as  I  was  satisfied  they  could  not  succeed ; 
and  directed  the  transfer  of  the  troops  to  the  centre  for  the  attack  there." 

What,  then,  prolonged  the  engagements  of  Griffin  and  Cutler 
between  three  and  four  hours,  of  which  no  one  gives  any  details  ? 

Immediately  after  this  failure  of  Warren  to  break  our  line,  his 
whole  force  was  transferred  to  the  Angle,  except  Crawford's 
division  of  two  brigades,  and  Kitching's  and  Denison's  brigades. 
This  added  8  brigades  to  the  24  already  massed  there,  and 
artillery  was  also  brought  to  bear  from  every  spot,  near  and  far, 
which  offered  a  location.  It  had  been  intended  to  use  Warren's 
corps  in  a  fresh  attack  upon  the  Angle,  but  after  some  prepa- 
ration itwas  wisely  abandoned.  Lee  had  brought  up  Humphreys's 
brigade  from  Kershaw's,  and  Bratton's  from  Field's  division.  We 
had  also  contributed  Cabell's  Art'y  Batt'n  to  strengthen  the  force 
holding  the  line  across  the  gorge,  and  it  was  practically  impreg- 
nable. As  night  approached,  several  Federal  brigades  were  des- 
ignated to  keep  up  the  fire  upon  our  lines  all  night.  It  was 
faithfully  done,  at  least  until  1  A.M.,  about  which  time,  under 
cover  of  the  darkness,  we  withdrew  to  the  gorge  line,  leaving  to 


BATTLE  OF  THE  WILDERNESS  525 

the  enemy  the  intrenchments  which  had  been  so  well  defended 
all  day.  It  had  been  necessary  in  the  morning  to  retake  them 
from  Hancock's  first  assault,  and  to  hold  them  until  Lee  could 
close  the  gorge.  Afterward,  he  could  not  withdraw  the  force 
with  which  he  had  done  it  until  nightfall,  though  there  was 
no  longer  any  value  in  the  lines  they  held. 

The  military  lesson  to  be  learned  from  the  failure  of  Hancock's 
assault  (for  it  was  a  failure  to  get  only  20  guns  and  perhaps 
4000  prisoners  for  such  a  gigantic  effort)  is,  that  there  is  a  maxi- 
mum limit  to  the  force  which  can  be  advantageously  used  in  any 
locality,  and  a  superfluity  may  paralyze  all  efforts.  Here  there 
was  a  great  superfluity. 

The  Federal  losses  for  the  12th  are  given  by  Humphreys  as :  — 

Killed  and  wounded 6,020 

Missing 800  6,820 

The  Federal  Gens.  Wright,  Webb,  and  Carroll  were  wounded. 
The  Confederate  losses,  Humphreys  estimates  as  between  4000 
and  5000  killed  and  wounded  and  4000  prisoners.  We  had :  Gens. 
Daniel  and  Perrin  killed ;  James  A.  Walker,  R.  D.  Johnston,  Mc- 
Gowan,  and  Ramseur  severely  wounded;  Edward  Johnson  and 
George  A.  Steuart  captured.  One  feature  of  the  occasion  which 
added  to  the  hardship  and  suffering  on  both  sides  was  the  rain 
which  fell  almost  incessantly  for  two  nights  and  a  day.  Mr.  Dana 
gives  the  following  account  of  a  visit  to  the  Angle  on  the  13th :  — 

"All  around  us  the  underbrush  and  trees  had  been  riddled  and  burnt. 
The  ground  was  thick  with  dead  and  wounded  men,  among  whom  the 
relief  corps  was  at  work.  The  earth,  which  was  soft  from  the  heavy  rains 
we  had  been  having  both  before  and  during  the  battle,  had  been  trampled 
by  the  fighting  thousands  of  men  until  it  was  soft  like  hasty  pudding. 
As  we  stood  there  looking  silently  down  at  it,  of  a  sudden  the  leg  of  a  man 
was  lifted  up  from  the  pool  and  the  mud  dripped  off  his  boot.  It  was  so 
unexpected,  so  horrible,  that  for  a  moment  we  were  stunned.  Then  we 
pulled  ourselves  together  and  called  to  some  soldiers  near  by  to  rescue 
the  owner  of  the  leg.  They  pulled  him  out  with  but  little  trouble  and  dis- 
covered that  he  was  not  dead,  only  wounded.  He  was  taken  to  the  hos- 
pital where  he  will  get  well,  I  believe." 

As  might  have  been  expected,  May  13  was  comparatively  a 
day  of  rest.  The  only  record  in  my  note-book  is  of  the  Federal 


526  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

wounded  in  front  of  our  lines,  who  had  been  left  on  the  ground 
since  the  8th.  Some  were  still  alive,  and  we  had  noticed  one  who 
had  occasionally  raised  himself  to  nearly  a  sitting  posture.  To- 
day he  was  trying  to  knock  himself  in  the  head  with  the  butt  of 
his  musket,  making  several  feeble  efforts.  Grant  only  con- 
sented to  ask  a  flag  of  truce  for  the  wounded  some  days  after 
Cold  Harbor  on  June  3.  On  more  than  one  occasion,  the  wounded 
Federals  had  been  burnt  by  fires  in  the  woods. 

On  the  14th,  we  found  the  enemy  gone  from  our  front,  but  none 
of  the  wounded  were  now  found  alive.  The  man  who  had  tried 
the  day  before  to  kill  himself  was  found  to  belong  to  the  Maryland 
brigade.  He  had  been  partially  stripped  and  was  most  elaborately 
tattooed.  At  night,  Field's  division  was  transferred  from  our 
left  flank  to  the  extreme  right,  where  we  found  Warren's  corps 
already  in  front  of  us,  having  been  transferred  the  night  before. 

We  did  not  know  it  at  the  time,  but  it  afterward  appeared  that 
Grant  had  designed  another  great  battle  for  us  this  morning. 
Only  the  fearful  roads,  due  to  the  recent  rains,  and  the  exhaus- 
tion of  his  men  had  forced  him  to  abandon  the  effort.  On  the 
llth,  he  had  sent  his  famous  despatch  that  he  would  "fight  it 
out  on  this  line  if  it  takes  all  the  summer." 

On  the  night  of  the  13th,  the  moon  was  young,  the  night  foggy, 
rainy,  and  intensely  dark.  The  5th  and  6th  corps  were  ordered 
to  march  by  farm  roads,  passing  in  rear  of  the  2d  and  9th,  cross 
the  Ny,  move  through  fields  to  the  Fredericksburg  road,  on  it 
recross  the  Ny,  form  on  Burnside's  left,  and  attack  our  right 
flank  at  4  A.M.  on  the  14th.  The  2d  corps  and  the  9th  were  to 
be  ready,  and,  when  ordered,  to  join  in  the  attack  upon  our 
whole  line.  Though  every  precaution  had  been  taken  to  mark 
the  way  with  bonfires  and  men  posted  along  the  route,  Warren 
only  arrived  on  time  with  about  4000  men.  The  rain  had  put 
out  the  fires  and  the  men  had  lost  their  way  and  floundered  in 
the  mud,  until  they  were  so  broken  and  scattered  that  they  could 
not  be  gotten  into  condition  for  operations  that  day,  and  the 
proposed  attack  was  abandoned.  We  had  doubtless  had  a 
narrow  escape  from  serious  trouble.  With  ordinary  weather  the 
distance  was  not  great,  and  both  the  5th  and  6th  corps  could 
have  surprised  our  flank  at  dawn  in  the  morning.  Our  in- 


BATTLE  OF  THE  WILDERNESS  527 

trenchments  on  that  flank  did  not  then  extend  much  beyond  the 
court-house. 

At  10  o'clock  at  night  of  the  14th  came  orders  for  our  head- 
quarters and  Kershaw's  division  to  follow  Field  to  the  right  flank. 
There  we  extended  our  line  to  the  right,  covering  Snell's  Bridge 
over  the  Po.  The  enemy  occupied  himself  with  building  defensive 
lines  which  did  not  follow  ours  toward  the  Po,  but  turned  east- 
ward and  bent  back  toward  the  northeast,  designed  to  be  held  by 
a  reduced  force,  while  he  concentrated  for  another  effort  to  break 
our  line  in  the  gorge  of  the  salient,  where  he  had  been  checked  on 
the  12th.  It  had  been  suggested  to  Grant  by  Wright  and  Hum- 
phreys that,  after  the  lapse  of  a  few  days,  his  movement  to  the 
left  and  concentration  there  would  have  caused  Lee  to  weaken 
his  left,  and  afford  a  favorable  opportunity  to  surprise  our 
Bloody  Angle  position  again. 

By  the  17th,  his  works  were  strong  enough  to  be  held  by  War- 
ren with  the  5th  corps,  and  the  2d  and  6th  were  ordered  to  pass 
around  the  9th  during  the  night,  and  the  three  corps  to  attack 
in  conjunction  at  dawn,  while  Warren's  corps  cooperated  with 
the  artillery  from  the  Federal  left.  The  attack  seemed  to  promise 
well.  Three  corps  of  infantry  were  to  make  it,  and  the  artillery 
of  four  were  to  support  it.  It  would  fall  wholly  on  Swell's  corps, 
reduced  by  capture  of  Johnson's  division  on  the  12th ;  its  artil- 
lery only  supplemented  by  a  few  guns  of  Hill's  corps.  It  proved, 
however,  an  utter  failure.  The  infantry  was  so  slow  in  finding  its 
way  through  the  woods,  behind  which  the  line  lay,  that  it  was 
nearly  8  A.M.  when  it  found  itself  in  sight  of  our  line  through  an 
opening  in  the  woods.  Twenty-nine  guns  opened  upon  it.  Gib- 
bon's and  Barlow's  division,  which  had  been  in  the  assaulting 
column  on  the  12th,  again  led  the  assault  in  lines  of  brigades,  a 
much  more  effective  formation  than  the  column  closed  in  mass, 
which  presented  itself  on  the  12th.  They  advanced  over  the  same 
ground  they  had  then  traversed,  and  it  is  reported  that  the  stench, 
which  arose  from  the  unburied  dead,  "was  so  sickening  and 
terrible  that  many  of  the  officers  and  men  were  made  deathly  sick 
from  it."  But  our  guns,  which  had  been  absent  before,  were 
now  in  position.  Already,  before  they  emerged  from  the  wood, 
they  were  much  shaken,  and  some  of  the  brigades  were  driven 


528  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

back  entirely  by  the  artillery  fire,  our  guns  giving  little  attention 
to  their  artillery  but  confining  their  fire  to  the  infantry.  Only 
a  few  of  these  approached  our  abattis.  None  penetrated  it,  and 
the  first  attack  was  never  renewed.  About  10  A.M.,  Meade  or- 
dered the  attack  discontinued,  and  the  troops  withdrawn.  Few 
of  our  infantry  were  engaged  and  none  of  them  heavily  for  any 
length  of  time,  the  whole  affair  being  decided  by  the  artillery 
of  the  2d  and  3d  corps.  McParlin,  Medical  Director,  reports  of 
this  affair :  — 

"Five  hundred  and  fifty-two  wounded  were  the  result,  and  the  char- 
acter of  the  wounds  were  unusually  severe,  a  large  proportion  being  caused 
by  shell  and  canister." 

Our  own  loss  was  very  trifling. 

Grant,  on  the  19th,  was  preparing  to  move  Hancock  at  night 
on  the  road  to  Richmond  and  had  issued  the  order  about  noon. 
In  the  afternoon,  he  was  interrupted  in  his  preparations  by  the 
appearance  of  Ewell  with  his  corps,  about  6000  men,  in  his  rear. 
Lee  had  suspected  that  Grant  was  beginning  a  flanking  move- 
ment, and  had  directed  Ewell  to  demonstrate  against  him  to 
find  out.  Ewell  obtained  leave,  instead,  to  move  around  his 
right,  hoping  to  accomplish  the  result  with  less  loss,  as  Grant's 
position  in  our  front  was  strongly  intrenched.  By  a  circuitous 
route  and  roads  impassable  for  artillery,  he  took  his  infantry 
far  around  the  enemy  and  crossed  the  Ny  in  their  rear,  near  the 
camp  of  Tyler's  large  division  and  Kitching's  larger  brigade. 
Here  Ewell  occupied  a  very  critical  position.  He  was  so  slow  in 
realizing  this  and  beginning  his  retreat  that  Ramseur,  fearing 
that  further  delay  would  cause  disaster,  charged  the  enemy. 
Having  driven  them  a  short  distance,  he  retreated,  and,  taking  a 
position  in  rear  with  Pegram,  the  two  were  able  to  delay  the 
enemy  until  darkness  covered  a  withdrawal.  Hancock  and 
Warren  both  hurried  reinforcements  to  Tyler,  and  Ewell  made 
a  lucky  escape.  His  loss  in  this  venture  was  severe  for  the  time 
engaged,  being  about  900  killed,  wounded,  and  missing,  or  15 
per  cent  of  his  whole  force.  It  would  have  cost  less  and  have 
risked  much  less  to  have  made  a  demonstration  in  front.  The 
Federal  loss  was  estimated  at  1100. 

The  two  battles  of  the  Wilderness  and  Spottsylvania  may  be 


BATTLE  OF  THE  WILDERNESS  529 

considered  as  parts  of  the  one  great  battle  of  "Grant  and  Lee," 
begun  in  the  Wilderness  on  May  5,  1864,  and  terminated  only  at 
Appomattox  on  April  9, 1865.  During  all  this  time  the  two  armies 
were  locked  as  if  in  a  mortal  embrace.  Only  by  night  could  they 
shift  positions.  Firing  by  day  was  almost  incessant.  The  con- 
sumption of  men  was  far  in  excess  of  anything  ever  known  before. 
The  killed  and  wounded  of  the  Federals  in  the  Wilderness  and 
Spottsylvania  had  been  28,202,  and  with  4,225  missing,  the  total 
loss  had  been  33,110. 

The  Confederate  losses  can  never  be  accurately  known  for  any 
of  the  battles,  from  now  until  the  close  of  the  war,  as  few  reports 
could  be  made  in  such  active  campaigns.  Livermore's  estimates 
give  17,250  for  the  same  battles,  the  missing  not  included. 

THE  NORTH  ANNA  AND  COLD  HARBOR 

After  the  signal  failure  on  the  18th  of  his  second  venture  at 
the  Bloody  Angle,  Grant  seems  to  have  exhausted  the  pos- 
sibilities on  the  Spottsylvania  lines,  and  for  his  next  effort  he 
decided  to  lay  a  snare  for  Lee.  It  was  thought  that  if  Hancock's 
corps  was  sent  off  about  20  miles  on  the  line  of  the  Fredericks- 
burg  R.R.,  that  Lee  would  be  tempted  to  attack  it  and  endeavor 
to  crush  it  while  isolated.  Grant,  having  every  preparation 
made  for  a  rapid  march,  might  follow  and  attack  Lee  before  he 
could  intrench  himself.  Hancock,  accordingly,  marched  at  night- 
fall on  the  20th,  and,  by  midday  of  the  21st,  Barlow  had  crossed 
the  Mattapony  and  began  to  intrench  at  Milford  Station,  the 
rest  of  the  2d  corps  following.  Next  morning,  the  5th  corps 
marched  about  10  A.M.,  and  the  6th  and  9th  followed  later  in  the 
day.  \ 

Lee  never  knew  of  the  trap  set  for  him.    When  he  was  in-  I 
formed  of  Hancock's  appearance  at  Milford  by  signal  stations  | 
and  cavalry  detachments,  he  supposed  it  to  be  an  effort  to  pass  \ 
him  on  the  flank.     Little  time  was  wasted.     Wilcox  drove  in  the 
6th  corps  skirmishers  in  an  effort  to  find  out  what  was  going  on, 
and  Ewell  was  moved  at  once  across  the  Po,  on  the  right,  and 
about   noon   was   started    to    Hanover   Junction.     Longstreet 
followed  him  at  night,  and  Hill  moved  at  the  same  time  by  a 


530  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

parallel  road.  Longstreet  marched  all  night  and  until  about 
noon  on  the  22d,  when  we  bivouacked  on  the  south  side  of  the 
North  Anna  about  30  miles  from  the  camps  we  had  left,  and 
within  a  mile  of  the  Junction.  Hill,  -who  had  now  returned  to 
duty,  crossed  the  North  Anna  about  10  miles  above  us  on  the  22d, 
and  moved  down  next  morning. 

The  lure  set  for  Lee  had  failed  of  its  object.  To  make  the 
effort,  Hancock  had  been  sent  by  a  route  about  nine  miles  longer 
than  the  most  direct  from  Grant's  left  to  Hanover  Junction, 
which  was  only  25  miles,  and  three  miles  shorter  than  Lee's 
shortest.  Having  the  additional  advantage  of  the  initiative,  it 
was  doubtless  an  error  on  Grant's  part  to  undertake  it.  On  the 
22d,  it  was  learned  that  all  three  of  Lee's  corps  had  passed  the 
night  before,  and  the  Federal  corps  were  now  all  directed  to  follow. 

At  Hanover  Junction,  Lee  received  his  first  reinforcements, 
about  9000  men.  On  May  15,  Breckenridge  had  severely  de- 
feated Sigel  at  New  Market,  in  the  Valley,  and  driven  him  south 
of  Cedar  Creek,  allowing  Lee  to  bring  down  Breckenridge  with 
two  brigades  of  infantry,  about  2500  men.  Beauregard,  on  May 
16,  had  also  defeated  Butler  at  Drury's  Bluff,  allowing  Lee  to 
send  for  Pickett's  division,  about  5000  men.  Hoke's  brigade, 
about  1200  strong,  was  also  brought  from  Petersburg  and  as- 
signed to  Early's  division.  Gordon  was  promoted  and  assigned 
to  the  remnant  of  Johnson's  division,  to  which  also  his  own 
brigade  under  Evans  was  now  transferred  from  Early. 

We  had  taken  position  behind  the  North  Anna,  but  had  not 
yet  selected  a  line  of  battle  or  started  any  intrenchments,  when 
early  in  the  afternoon,  the  enemy  appeared  north  of  the  river, 
and  opened  fire  with  artillery  upon  two  slight  bridge-head  works 
at  the  north  ends  of  the  railroad  bridge  and  the  Telegraph  road 
bridge,  which  had  been  constructed  to  repel  raiders  a  year  before. 
We  brought  up  guns  and  replied,  but  ravines  on  the  north  side 
allowed  covered  approaches  to  both  bridge-heads,  and  both 
were  captured  with  some  prisoners.  We  held,  however,  the 
south  end  of  the  railroad  bridge,  until  after  dark,  and  burned  it. 

Hancock's  corps  had  approached  along  the  railroad  and  the 
Telegraph  road.  Burnside's  corps,  next  on  his  right,  was  di- 
rected on  the  Ox  Ford,  a  crossing  about  two  miles  above  the 


BATTLE  OF  THE  WILDERNESS  531 

railroad.  The  5th  corps  came  to  the  river  at  Jericho  Mills,  four 
miles  above  the  railroad,  and,  finding  no  enemy  opposing,  a 
pontoon  bridge  was  laid  and  the  whole  corps  was  crossed  by 
4.30  P.M.  Meanwhile,  at  Ox  Ford,  Burnside  had  found  the 
south  bank  held  in  such  force  that  it  was  not  deemed  prudent 
to  attack.  The  6th  corps  was  held  in  reserve  on  the  north  bank. 

Finding  himself  at  Jericho  Mills  in  the  vicinity  of  Hill's  corps. 
Warren  had  formed  line  of  battle  in  very  favorable  position, 
He  was  able  to  cover  his  front  with  the  edge  of  a  wood  concealing 
his  actual  line.  His  left  rested  on  the  river,  which  made  a  large 
concave  bend  in  his  rear  and  again  drew  near  his  right,  with  open 
ground  upon  that  flank  commanded  by  the  artillery.  But  the 
rare  opportunity  of  an  isolated  corps  unintrenched  was  here 
offered,  and  Hill  hastened  to  attack  it. 

About  6  P.M.,  he  fell  upon  Griffin  in  the  centre,  and  Cutler  on  the 
right,  who  had  not  fully  formed  their  lines.  Cutler  was  broken 
and  pursued,  but  the  artillery  on  that  flank  was  able  to  save  the 
situation  and  Hill  was  finally  repulsed.  The  casualties  were 
about  equal,  perhaps  1500  on  each  side. 

During  the  night,  Lee  had  selected  and  intrenched  an  excellent 
line,  in  fact,  it  was  too  good,  for  it  defeated  its  object,  as  the 
enemy  never  dared  to  attack.  It  rested  on  the  river  from  a  half- 
mile  above  the  bridge  to  the  Ox  Ford,  and  thence,  leaving  the 
North  Anna,  it  ran  across  the  narrow  peninsula  one  and  a  half 
miles  to  Little  River,  where  its  left  rested.  Returning  to  the 
centre,  on  the  North  Anna  above  the  bridge,  the  line  ran  south- 
east across  a  large  bend  of  the  river  and  rested  on  its  right  three 
miles  below,  near  the  site  of  Morris's  Bridge.  In  front  of  us,  the 
enemy  formed  with  the  5th  and  6th  corps  before  our  left  flank, 
and  with  the  2d  and  part  of  the  9th  before  our  right  flank.  Their 
two  wings,  both  south  of  the  river,  were  unable  to  communicate 
without  crossing  the  river  twice.  This  peculiar  situation  could 
not  fail  to  suggest  unusual  opportunities  to  each  commander. 

Burnside  was  first  ordered  to  attack  and  carry  Ox  Ford,  which 
would  at  once  unite  their  wings  and  divide  ours.  But  Burnside 
pronounced  the  task  impossible,  and  did  not  attempt  it.  Han- 
cock on  his  left,  and  Warren  on  his  right,  each  advanced  skir- 
mishers and  felt  our  lines,  but  both  reported  against  any  attack. 


532  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

Lee,  at  this  time,  happened  to  be  very  much  indisposed  and  con- 
fined to  his  tent.  But  he  was  exceedingly  anxious,  with  the  re- 
enforcements  which  he  had  received,  to  improve  the  slightest 
opportunity  to  give  Grant  a  severe  blow.  This  seemed  a  rare 
occasion  where  he  might  fall  upon  Hancock's  and  Potter's 
division  of  the  9th  before  they  could  be  assisted  by  the  other 
corps.  He  said  to  his  staff:  "We  must  strike  them.  We  must 
never  let  them  pass  us  again." 

But  it  happened  that  the  country  occupied  by  the  Federal 
lines  upon  both  flanks,  and  especially  on  their  left,  was  flat  and 
open,  allowing  full  use  of  their  artillery,  and  their  intrenchments 
were  very  strong.  Probably  it  was  wisely  held  by  our  subor- 
dinates that  no  successful  attack  could  be  made,  and  at  night 
on  May  26,  Grant  removed  the  temptation,  ere  Lee  had  recov- 
ered from  his  illness,  by  moving  for  the  Pamunkey. 

On  May  24,  Sheridan  had  rejoined  from  his  expedition  to  the 
James,  on  which  he  had  done  some  damage  to  the  two  railroads, 
entering  Richmond  from  the  north,  and  burned  some  rolling 
stock  and  stores,  but  had  made  no  impression  on  the  campaign. 
I  think  it  quite  probable,  however,  that  had  Sheridan's  cavalry 
been  with  the  army,  Grant  would  not  have  tried  his  vain  strata- 
gem of  placing  Hancock  as  a  lure  at  Milford,  but,  with  his  aid, 
have  endeavored  to  anticipate  us  at  Hanover  Junction.  So  I 
think  this  raid  should  be  classed  as  a  blunder,  like  Pleasonton's 
at  Chancellors ville  and  Stuart's  at  Gettysburg.  Our  most  serious 
loss  in  connection  with  it  had  been  the  death  of  our  brilliant 
cavalry  leader,  Maj.-Gen.  J.  E.  B.  Stuart,  who  was  killed  at 
Yellow  Tavern,  near  Richmond,  on  May  11.  As  before  said,  I 
have  always  believed  that  Lee  should  have  made  him  the  suc- 
cessor of  Stonewall  Jackson  when  the  latter  was  killed  at  Chan- 
cellor sville. 

Grant's  total  casualties  in  the  North  Anna  lines,  May  23  to 
27,  are  given  as :  — 

Killed  22,  wounded  1460,  missing  290,  total  1973. 

The  Confederate  losses  were  probably  about  the  same. 
On  the  26th,  Grant,  at  noon,  started  Sheridan  and  the  pontoon 
trains  to  cross  the  Pamunkey  River  at  Hanover  Town.     After 


BATTLE  OF  THE  WILDERNESS 


533 


dark  the  infantry  moved,  and  by  next  morning  his  whole  army 
had  vanished,  except  cavalry  pickets  at  the  sites  where  the 
bridges  had  stood.  The  movement  of  the  enemy  was  not  dis- 
covered until  the  morning  of  the  27th.  The  rough  sketch  map 
represents  the  essentials  of  the  position. 

The  army  was  put  in  motion  without  delay,  crossing  the 
South  Anna  on  the  railroad  bridges  and,  after  a  march  of  15  miles, 
we  encamped  that  night  near  Half  Sink.  The  next  morning,  we 


moved  about  13  miles  and  found  ourselves  near  the  Totopotomoy, 
with  Grant  just  arriving  on  the  opposite  side.  Sheridan's  cav- 
alry was  in  his  front,  and  under  orders  to  make  a  demonstration 
toward  Richmond.  Hampton,  with  his  own  and  Fitz-Lee's 
divisions,  and  Butler's  brigade  of  cavalry,  recently  arrived 
from  S.C.,  were  attacked  by  Gregg's  and  Torbert's  divisions, 
with  Merritt's  reserve  brigade  at  Haw's  Shop.  The  battle 
was  fiercely  contested  all  day,  but  the  enemy  had  the  great  ad- 


534  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

vantage  of  the  Spencer  magazine  carbine,  and,  late  in  the  after- 
noon, they  drove  Hampton  back. 

Swell's  health  at  this  time  required  him  to  surrender  the  com- 
mand of  his  corps  permanently  to  Early,  who  was  succeeded  by 
Ramseur,  promoted. 

On  Sunday,  the  29th,  Grant  ordered  the  6th,  2d,  and  5th 
corps,  in  that  order  from  his  right  to  left,  to  reconnoitre  in  their 
fronts  and  locate  our  lines,  the  9th  corps  being  held  in  reserve. 
The  6th  corps  found  only  the  cavalry  on  our  left  flank.  The 
other  two  found  our  pickets  on  the  Totopotomoy,  and,  at  an 
average  distance  of  a  thousand  yards  behind,  our  line  was 
rapidly  intrenching.  Some  sharp  skirmishing  occurred  during 
the  next  three  days,  the  enemy  crossing  the  Totopotomoy  and 
intrenching  opposite  to  us. 

In  many  of  the  Federal  accounts,  it  is  assumed  that  Lee's 
attitude  at  this  period  was  strictly  the  defensive.  Perhaps 
it  should  have  been,  but  all  who  were  near  him  recognized 
that  never  in  the  war  was  he  so  ready  to  attack  upon  the 
slightest  opportunity.  An  instance  occurred  on  May  30,  of 
which  I  was  a  spectator.  A  half-mile  in  front  of  our  line  we  could 
see  Bethesda  Church,  an  important  junction  point,  well  within 
the  enemy's  territory,  and  sure  to  be  included  within  his  lines, 
rapidly  being  extended  to  his  left.  Down  a  long,  straight  road, 
we  had  seen  their  cavalry  all  the  morning,  and,  about  noon,  a 
brigade  of  infantry  appeared.  Immediately,  Lee  ordered  Early 
to  send  a  brigade  to  attack  it.  Early  selected  Pegram's  brigade, 
commanded  by  Gen.  Edward  Willis,  a  brilliant  young  officer, 
just  promoted  from  the  12th  Ga.,  who  had  been  a  cadet  at  West 
tPoint  at  the  beginning  of  the  war.  He  had  been  a  personal 
friend  and  I  saw  his  brigade  start  on  its  errand  with  apprehen- 
sion of  disaster,  for  it  was  evident  that  a  hornets'  nest  would  be 
stirred  up.  The  Federal  brigade  was  quickly  routed  and  pur- 
sued, but  the  pursuers  soon  encountered  a  division  with  its 
artillery  and  were  repulsed  with  severe  loss.  It  had  "made  a 
resolute  attack,"  as  stated  by  Humphreys,  and  lost  Willis  and 
two  of  his  colonels,  killed. 

Meanwhile,  Butler  having  been  defeated,  and,  as  said  by 
Grant,  "bottled"  at  Bermuda  Hundreds,  Grant  decided  to  draw 


BATTLE  OF  THE  WILDERNESS  535 

from  him  two  divisions  of  the  10th  and  one  of  the  18th  corps, 
under  command  of  W.  H.  Smith,  with  which  to  give  Lee  a  surprise. 
The  orders  had  been  given  on  May  22,  the  troops  to  be  brought 
by  water  down  the  James  and  up  the  York.  On  May  30,  the 
transports  bearing  them  began  to  arrive  at  the  White  House,  and 
to  disembark  about  16,000  infantry,  whose  coming  was  not 
known  to  Lee.  But  he,  having  the  reenf  or  cements  which  joined 
him  at  Hanover  Junction,  about  9000,  and  receiving  now  Hoke's 
division,  which  had  come  over  from  Drury's  Bluff,  about  6000, 
and  being  disappointed  at  Grant's  failure  to  attack  his  lines 
on  the  Totopotomoy,  had  himself  planned  a  grand  stroke  for 
June  1. 

The  cavalry  of  the  two  armies  had  been  heavily  engaged  for 
two  days  near  Cold  Harbor,  and  Hoke's  division  was  in  that 
neighborhood.  Lee  proposed  to  extend  Longs treet's  corps  to 
join  it,  and,  attacking  early,  to  sweep  to  his  left  behind  Grant's 
lines,  taking  them  in  flank,  while  Hill  and  Ewell  pressed  them 
in  front.  He  did  not  even^yet  suspect  the  presence  of  Smith's 
troops,  and  it  was  with  high  hopes  of  a  great  victory  on  the  1st 
that  Longstreet's  corps,  under  Anderson,  with  all  its  artillery, 
marched  to  the  vicinity  of  Cold  Harbor,  during  the  night  of 
May  31. 

Grant  had,  meanwhile,  determined  to  send  two  corps  to  seize 
Cold  Harbor  on  the  1st.  Torbert,  the  evening  before,  with  his 
dismounted  troopers  and  magazine  carbines,  had  repulsed  a 
severe  attack  by  Fitz-Lee,  but,  anticipating  attack  by  Hoke's 
infantry  in  the  morning,  he  had  begun  to  withdraw  during  the 
night.  He  received  orders,  however,  to  hold  the  position  at  all 
hazards,  on  which  he  returned,  and  devoted  the  night  to  in- 
trenching his  position.  The  6th  corps,  from  the  extreme  Fed- 
eral right,  was  put  in  motion  that  night  for  Cold  Harbor,  having 
about  15  miles  to  go.  Smith,  with  10,000  men  and  16  guns, 
already  on  the  march  from  White  House  to  join  Grant,  had 
also  been  ordered  during  the  night  to  Cold  Harbor.  A  mistake 
in  the  order  took  him  first  to  New  Castle  Ferry  on  the  Pamunkey, 
and  it  was  only  at  4  P.M.  of  the  1st  that  he  joined  at  Cold  Harbor 
the  6th  corps,  the  head  of  which  had  reached  the  ground  about 
10  A.M.  after  a  fatiguing  all-night  march.  It  is  plain,  then, 


536  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

that  here  a  rare  opportunity  had  been  offered  the  Confed- 
erates. 

With  Hoke's  large  division  on  its  right  flank,  Longstreet's 
corps  should  have  been  able  to  quickly  clear  the  way  of  three 
brigades  of  cavalry.  It  would  have  had  then  the  opportunity 
to  meet  the  6th  corps  scattered  along  the  road  for  many  miles 
and  in  an  exhausted  condition.  Unfortunately,  Hoke's  brigade 
had  not  been  put  under  Anderson's  command,  so  neither  felt 
full  responsibility.  It  only  formed  in  line,  but  did  not  attack 
the  cavalry  breastworks,  reporting  them  as  too  strong.  Kershaw 
made  an  attack  about  6  A.M.,  but  only  put  into  it  two  brigades. 
The  enemy,  with  their  magazine  carbines  behind  intrenchments, 
repulsed  two  assaults  with  severe  loss,  and  then  the  turning  en- 
terprise was  abandoned.  Lee  was  not  upon  the  ground  in  the 
early  hours  of  the  day,  and  Longstreet  was  absent,  wounded. 
No  effort  worthy  the  name  was  used  to  carry  out  Lee's  plan  of 
attack,  nor  were  the  favorable  conditions  appreciated,  although 
they  might  have  been,  as  only  cavalry  was  found  in  our  front. 
Hoke's  division  should  have  been  used  to  turn  their  flank  and 
get  among  their  dismounts. 

While  Kershaw  made  his  attack,  the  remainder  of  the  long 
column  halted  in  the  road,  expecting  the  march  to  be  presently 
resumed.  But  when  the  delay  was  prolonged,  and  a  few  ran- 
dom bullets  from  the  front  began  to  reach  the  line,  without  any 
general  instructions,  the  men  here  and  there  began  to  dig  dirt 
with  their  bayonets  and  pile  it  with  their  tin  cups  to  get  a  little 
cover.  Others  followed  suit,  and  gradually  the  whole  column 
was  at  work  intrenching  the  line  along  which  they  had  halted. 
Gradually  it  became  known  that  the  enemy  were  accumulating 
in  our  front,  and  then,  as  the  country  was  generally  flat,  orders 
were  given  to  close  up  the  column  and  adopt  its  line  as  the  line 
of  battle,  distributing  our  guns  upon  it  at  suitable  points.  Our 
intrenchments  were  scarcely  more  than  a  good  beginning,  a  line 
of  knee-deep  trench  with  the  earth  thrown  in  front.  It  was  en- 
tirely without  abattis  or  obstruction  in  front,  except  at  a  point 
on  our  picket  line  where  a  small  entanglement  had  been  left  by 
our  cavalry.  Meanwhile,  Grant,  under  the  mistaken  idea  that 
Lee  was  afraid  to  fight  in  the  open,  was  urging  an  early  attack 


BATTLE  OF  THE  WILDERNESS  537 

before  Lee  had  time  to  fortify.  But  it  was  1  P.M.  before  the 
whole  of  the  6th  corps  was  up,  and  it  was  6  P.M.  before  Smith's 
command  was  in  position. 

In  the  6th  corps,  each  brigade  was  formed  in  column  of  regi- 
ments, with  the  brigade  on  the  extreme  left  refused.  The  18th 
corps  was  formed  in  columns  of  brigades,  with  the  extreme  right 
refused.  So  the  columns  of  the  18th  were  three  ranks  deep,  and 
those  of  the  6th  averaged  four.  The  Confederate  formation  was 
but  a  single  rank  behind  their  breastwork,  which,  as  has  been 
described,  was  the  work  of  but  a  few  hours,  almost  without  in- 
trenching tools.  There  was  also  in  it  a  gap  of  something  over 
50  yards,  where  a  wooded  and  tangled  ravine  and  small  stream 
separated  Hoke's  and  Kershaw's  divisions. 

A  rough  sketch  will  illustrate :  — 

18TH  CORPS  GTH  CORPS 

MARTINDALE      BROOKS      DEVENS  RICKETTS      RUSSELL      GETTY 

V/  


G 


FIELD'S  DIV.  PICKETT'S  DIV.       KERSHAW'S  DIV. 


HOKE'S  DIV. 


The  distance  between  the  lines  was  about  1400  yards,  and  our 
pickets  were  about  300  yards  in  our  front.  About  6  P.M.,  we  had 
ceased  to  expect  an  attack  that  evening,  when  a  sudden  increase 
of  fire  on  the  picket  line  and  the  opening  of  artillery  stopped 
our  digging  and  called  all  to  arms.  Soon  a  perfect  tornado  of 
fire  broke  out  hi  front  of  Hoke  and  Kershaw,  and  extended,  but 
not  heavily,  to  Pickett's  front.  It  soon  appeared  that  at  all 
points  but  one  the  enemy's  advance  had  been  checked  by  our 
fire,  without  its  reaching  our  line  of  battle.  This  was  at  the 
50-yard  gap  which  had  been  carelessly  left  between  Hoke  and 


538  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

Kershaw.  Here  a  body  of  wood,  fronting  on  our  line  for  about 
200  yards,  extended  quite  a  distance  toward  the  enemy,  allowing 
their  approach  free  from  observation,  until  they  had  actually 
passed  through  the  gap  and  were  in  our  rear.  This  they  did  in 
such  numbers  that  they  were  able  to  turn  to  the  right  and  left 
and  possess  themselves  of  a  small  portion  on  each  flank,  capturing 
a  few  hundred  prisoners. 

As  there  were  no  reserves,  Hunton's  brigade  from  Pickett's 
division,  and  Gregg's  from  Field's,  were  hurried  to  the  spot  and 
checked  the  enemy,  recovered  the  portion  taken  from  Hoke, 
and  connected  the  broken  ends  by  a  horseshoe  some  200  yards 
in  length.  At  all  other  points  the  enemy  stopped  at  what  was 
practically  our  picket  line  and  intrenched  themselves.  Dark- 
ness put  an  end  to  the  fighting.  The  Federal  loss  was  about 
2650.  The  Confederate  was  evidently  less,  as  the  enemy  only 
came  to  close  quarters  near  the  gap  in  the  line. 

Grant  felt  encouraged  by  his  partial  success,  and,  believing 
that  he  had  inserted  the  small  end  of  a  wedge,  prepared  to 
drive  it  home.  Lee  was  practically  fighting  with  a  river  at  his 
back.  It  was  only  the  Chickahominy,  but  could  his  army  be 
routed,  Grant  could  surely  inflict  severe  losses  upon  it  before 
Lee  could  retreat  over  the  few  available  roads.  The  2d  corps,  on 
Grant's  right,  was  ordered  during  the  night  to  march  around 
9th  and  5th  and  reenforce  the  6th,  which  was  ordered  to 
the  attack  at  dawn.  But  it  was  the  dark  of  the  moon,  and  the 
night  march  proved  slow  and  exhausting;  the  18th  corps  was 
also  short  of  ammunition,  so  the  attack  was  postponed,  at  first 
until  5  P.M.  The  5th  corps,  on  June  2,  was  ordered  to  draw  in 
its  right  flank,  and  extend  its  left  past  the  front  of  Field's  and 
Pickett's,  to  unite  with  Smith ;  and  the  9th  corps  was  ordered  to 
be  massed  in  rear  of  the  5th  and  to  support  it  in  the  general 
attack.  This  was  now  again  postponed  until  4.30  A.M.,  on  the 
3d,  to  allow  a  full  night's  rest  and  ample  preparation. 

Lee,  meanwhile,  was  no  less  busy.  When  he  found  in  the 
morning  that  the  2d  corps  had  gone  from  his  front,  he  had  no 
doubt  of  its  destination,  and  marching  Breckenridge's,  Wilcox's, 
and  Mahone's  divisions  past  our  rear,  he  extended  Hoke's  line 
to  the  Chickahominy.  He  also  sent  Fitz-Lee's  division  of 


BATTLE  OF  THE  WILDERNESS  539 

cavalry  across  the  river  to  observe  and  picket  the  south  side. 
Early,  he  directed  to  cross  the  lines  which  had  been  deserted  by 
the  2d  corps  and  to  sweep  down  to  the  right  on  the  flank  of  the 
5th.  This  movement  captured  the  skirmish  line  of  the  9th  corps 
which  had  marched  off  not  long  before,  and  some  of  that  of  the 
5th  which  was  being  shifted  to  its  left,  but  by  that  time  Warren 
had  changed  front  to  oppose  it  and  received  assistance  from  the 
9th  corps,  and  Early's  advance  was  checked.  The  fighting  lasted 
until  night,  and  Gen.  Doles  of  Rodes's  division,  a  very  valuable 
officer,  was  killed.  Had  Early  had  enough  men  to  give  his  move- 
ment force,  it  might  have  had  important  results. 

On  our  front  the  sharpshooting  and  artillery  practice  were  in- 
cessant. In  fact,  as  a  diversion  in  favor  of  Early,  I  was  ordered 
to  be  aggressive  with  the  artillery,  and  on  Field's  line  Huger's 
battalion  was  put  out  in  front  of  the  works  to  get  enfilading  fires. 
In  front  of  Pickett  and  Kershaw,  the  enemy's  intrenchments 
were  within  good  range,  and  their  accuracy  of  fire  was  such  as 
to  disable  gun  carriages  through  the  embrasures  by  cutting  their 
spokes.  A  Napoleon  gun  of  Cabell's  was  placed  in  a  pit  at  the 
end  of  Kershaw's  line  (where  it  was  broken  the  night  before), 
ammunition  for  it  being  passed  up  by  hand  along  the  line  for 
several  hundred  yards.  The  country  was  so  flat  that  at  few 
points  could  the  line  be  safely  approached  from  the  rear. 

A  better  horseshoe  connection  around  the  gap  between  Ker- 
shaw and  Hoke  was  built  to  replace  the  temporary  one  of  the 
night  before;  and  our  intrenchments  everywhere  got  all  the 
work  we  were  able  to  put  upon  them,  but  were  still  quite  im- 
perfect. 

Grant  received  to-day  a  reenforcement  of  3000  infantry  and 
2000  cavalry  under  Gen.  Cesnola,  from  Port  Royal.  They  were 
sent  to  join  Wilson's  cavalry  upon  our  left,  and  were  ordered  to 
join  in  the  attack  upon  Early  next  morning  in  flank  and  rear, 
while  Warren  and  Burnside  attacked  in  front. 

No  long  description  of  this  carefully  planned  battle  is  neces- 
sary. Of  course,  it  came  off  punctually  to  the  minute.  For 
among  Grant's  great  and  rare  qualities  was  his  ability  to  make 
his  battles  keep  their  schedule  times.  One  may  almost  say  also, 
"Of  course,  we  repulsed  him  everywhere."  For  it  was  still 


540  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

true,  as  Stonewall  Jackson  had  said  of  the  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia,  "We  sometimes  fail  to  drive  the  enemy  from  positions. 
They  always  fail  to  drive  us."  In  that  respect  our  army  sin- 
gularly resembled  the  famous  "One-Horse  Shay."  We  held 
together  wonderfully  until  all  our  parts,  worn  out  together, 
failed  together  at  Appomattox.  Naturally,  as  the  attack  had 
been  on  the  largest  possible  scale,  the  repulse  was  unusually 
severe  and  bloody ;  and  the  roar  of  the  battle,  while  it  lasted, 
probably  exceeded  even  that  of  the  combats  in  the  Wilderness, 
which  Humphreys  described  as  often  approaching  the  sub- 
lime. It  broke  forth,  mingled  with  vast  cheering,  in  the  still- 
ness of  early  dawn,  but  it  was  no  surprise.  For  over  an  hour  the 
men  in  the  trenches  had  been  alert  at  hearing  in  front  muffled 
commands  and  smothered  movements.  The  Napoleon  of  Ca- 
bell's  in  the  pit  at  the  end  of  Kershaw's  broken  line,  which  had 
been  supplied  with  ammunition  the  day  before  by  passing  it 
from  hand  to  hand  along  the  line,  was  to  be  withdrawn  to  the 
angle  where  the  new  horseshoe  joined  our  old  line,  and  the 
trench  in  front  of  its  new  position  was  abandoned.  The  nec- 
essary work  was  only  finished  at  the  approach  of  dawn,  and,  in 
whispers,  the  gunners  and  infantry  supports  rolled  it  back  by 
hand,  leaving  the  trench  empty  behind  them.  It  was  safely 
located  at  the  embrasure  prepared  for  it,  enfilading  the  deserted 
trench,  and  double-shotted  with  canister,  but  a  few  minutes  before 
the  cheering  enemy,  who  here  had  not  100  yards  to  advance 
through  thin  woods,  swarmed  over  the  parapet  to  find  the 
trench  deserted,  into  which  they  leaped,  and  to  receive  the  double 
canister  and  the  musketry  and  artillery  of  the  new  line  as  they 
paused  wondering  at  our  disappearance. 

The  sound  of  the  battle  reached  Richmond,  and  men  came  out 
on  the  streets  to  listen  to  it.  Some  houses  were  prepared  for 
an  unusual  influx  of  wounded,  but  few  came.  Richmond 
listened  calmly,  for  it  had  confidence  in  the  One-Horse  Shay. 

The  brunt  of  the  action  lasted  about  an  hour,  though  at  isolated 
places  attacks  were  renewed,  or  more  or  less  distant  fire  was 
kept  up  until  after  noon.  As  a  general  thing,  the  assaults  were 
checked  at  about  50  yards  from  our  lines,  but  at  two  or  three 
points  leading  officers  were  killed  on  or  very  near  our  parapets. 


BATTLE  OF  THE  WILDERNESS  541 

At  one  point  only  was  our  parapet  carried.  There  a  hurried  lo- 
cation in  front  of  Barlow's  division  permitted  him  to  approach, 
under  complete  shelter  from  fire  of  our  line  of  battle,  within  75 
yards.  Here  a  rush  captured  three  guns  and  some  few  hundred 
prisoners,  but  Finnegan's  brigade  soon  recaptured  the  guns 
and  drove  out  the  enemy. 

Grant  had  authorized  Meade,  about  7  A.M.,  to  discontinue  all 
assaults  which  seemed  unpromising,  but  Meade  continued  to 
urge  renewed  efforts  until  1.30  P.M.  Each  of  the  principal  corps 
complained  repeatedly  of  cross-fires  of  artillery  which  swept 
through  the  ranks  "from  the  right  of  Smith  to  the  left  of  Han- 
cock," as  reported  by  Humphreys.  Again  he  states,  — 

"  The  assault  of  the  2d  corps  could  not  be  renewed  unless  the  enemy's 
enfilading  artillery  fire  could  be  silenced." 

Of  the  6th  corps  he  writes :  — 

"  During  all  this  time,  besides  the  direct  fire,  there  was  an  enfilade 
artillery  fire  that  swept  through  the  ranks  from  the  right  to  the  left." 

And  of  the  18th  corps :  — 

"The  fire  from  the  right  came  from  a  part  of  the  enemy's  works  against 
which  no  part  of  our  attack  was  directed,  and  Gen.  Smith  was  unable  to 
keep  it  down  with  his  artillery." 

The  artillery  so  complained  of  was  mostly  Huger's  battalion 
of  24  guns,  which  held  the  line  between  Pickett's  and  Field's 
divisions  and  was,  some  of  it,  used  in  front  of  the  breastworks. 

Swinton  narrates  that  some  hours  after  the  failure  of  the  first 
assault,  Meade  sent  instructions  to  each  corps  commander  to 
renew  the  attack  without  reference  to  the  troops  on  his  right  or 
left ;  that  the  order  descended  through  the  wonted  channels,  but 
was  not  obeyed  —  "the  immobile  lines  pronounced  a  verdict 
against  further  slaughter." 

As  so  told,  an  entirely  erroneous  impression  is  here  created.  No 
such  silent  defiance  of  orders  occurred,  or  anything  like  it.  But 
there  were,  doubtless,  in  the  situation  described  above,  occasions 
when  there  was  delay  in  obedience  until  artillery  could  be  sent 
to  suppress  the  hostile  guns.  This  might  be  distorted  in  the 
telling  and  so  originate  such  stories. 

At  dusk,  heavy  firing  of  musketry  and  artillery  broke  out  at 


542  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

two  or  three  points,  and  presently  died  away.  Each  side  believed 
it  had  been  attacked  and  had  repulsed  an  assault.  The  actual 
fact  was  that  each  was  putting  out  pickets  for  the  night  and  had 
drawn  the  other's  fire  in  false  alarm.  I  have  not  mentioned 
them  before,  but,  throughout  the  campaign,  whenever  the  lines 
were  close  together,  there  was  likely  to  be  heavy  firing  of  mus- 
ketry and  artillery  breaking  out  in  the  night,  which  was  after- 
ward reported  to  be  a  night  attack  repulsed.  Every  one  of 
them  upon  both  sides  was  but  a  false  alarm.  The  only  actual 
night  attack  of  the  war  of  which  I  know  was  the  battle  of  Wau- 
hatchie  near  Chattanooga,  Oct.  28,  '63. 

The  Federal  casualties  are  given  for  June  1-3  as  9948.  As  the 
losses  on  the  1st  were  approximately  estimated  at  2650,  those 
on  the  3d  were  approximately  7300.  The  loss  of  officers  killed  and 
wounded  was  particularly  heavy.  The  total  casualties  of  the 
campaign  since  crossing  the  Pamunkey  were  14,129. 

The  Confederate  losses  on  the  3d  were  never  reported,  but  are 
known  to  have  been  small.  The  Confederate  Medical  and  Sur- 
gical History  of  the  War  gives  1200  wounded  and  500  missing 
from  June  1  to  12.  This,  Humphreys  estimates,  represents  about 
1500  killed  and  wounded,  which  may  be  taken  as  a  maximum. 
Besides  the  general  officers  already  mentioned  as  having  been 
killed  and  wounded  during  the  campaign,  there  were  also  wounded 
Gen.  Kirkland  of  Heth's  division  and  Lane  of  Wilcox's.  Also,  on 
the  3d  of  June,  were  wounded  Law  of  Field's  division  and  Finne- 
gan  of  Mahone's. 

There  now  ensued  on  Grant's  part  several  days  of  indecision, 
while  he  debated  what  to  do  next.  Meanwhile,  to  keep  up 
appearances,  regular  approaches  were  suggested  in  the  orders, 
and,  at  one  point  in  our  front,  they  broke  ground  at  night  a 
short  distance  in  front  of  their  line  of  battle  and  attempted  the 
construction  of  a  battery.  Having  no  Coehorn  mortars,  we  im- 
provised mortar  fire  with  howitzers,  and  the  battery  was  never 
completed.  But,  during  this  whole  interval,  a  terrible  fire  of 
sharpshooters  was  maintained  upon  both  sides,  which  made  life 
in  our  cramped  and  insufficient  trenches  almost  unsupportable. 
Scarcely  anywhere  in  them  could  one  stand  erect  without  being 
exposed  to  a  sharpshooter.  Head  logs  and  loopholes  built  up 


BATTLE  OF  THE  WILDERNESS  543 

of  sandbags  on  the  parapets,  gave  accuracy  to  the  fire.  By 
watching,  all  the  low  points  on  the  enemy's  line,  where  men 
would  be  exposed  in  moving  about,  soon  became  known.  The 
sharp  shooters  would  then  lie  with  guns  already  aimed,  ready  to 
draw  the  trigger  at  the  slightest  glimpse. 

To  shield  themselves  from  the  midsummer  sun,  our  men  were 
accustomed  to  invert  their  muskets,  sticking  the  bayonets  in  the 
ground,  and  letting  the  hammers  of  four  guns  pinch  the  four 
corners  of  a  blanket,  under  which  the  four  men  might  crowd  and 
get  some  shelter  from  the  direct  midday  blaze.  To  visit  the 
guns  scattered  all  along  the  lines,  one  must  crouch  under  the 
blankets  and  step  over  the  men,  who,  in  the  summer  of  1864, 
were  far  from  being  free  of  insect  pests.  Points  where  one 
could  get  out  to  the  rear  were  fully  a  half-mile  apart,  and  be- 
tween brigades  and  regiments  there  would  often  be  a  gap  of  a 
few  feet  or  a  few  yards  which  the  enemy's  sharpshooters  were 
usually  watching  with  their  fingers  on  the  triggers. 

In  the  Federal  lines  their  intrenchments  were  deeper  and 
broader,  and  with  abundant  zigzag  approaches  from  the  rear. 
Their  force  was  ample  to  permit  frequent  reliefs,  while  we  had 
none.  Yet  they  suffered  proportionately.  Gibbon's  single 
division  reported  280  officers  and  men  killed  and  wounded  by 
sharpshooters  between  the  3d  of  June  and  the  12th. 

Humphreys  thus  describes  the  conditions  in  the  Federal 
army,  which  had  both  men  and  supplies  in  profusion :  — 

"The  labor  in  making  the  approaches  and  strengthening  the  intrench- 
ments was  hard.  The  men  in  the  advance  part  of  the  lines,  which  were 
some  miles  in  length,  had  to  lie  close  in  narrow  trenches ;  with  no  water, 
except  a  little  to  drink,  and  that  of  the  worst  kind,  being  from  surface 
drainage ;  they  were  exposed  to  great  heat  during  the  day ;  they  had  but 
little  sleep ;  their  cooking  was  of  the  rudest  character.  For  over  a  month 
the  army  had  had  no  vegetables.  .  .  .  Dead  mules  and  horses  and  offal 
were  scattered  all  over  the  country,  and  between  the  lines  were  dead  bodies 
of  both  parties  lying  unburied  in  a  burning  sun.  The  country  was  low 
and  marshy  in  character.  The  exhausting  effect  of  all  this  began  to  show 
itself,  and  sickness  of  malarial  character  increased  largely.  Every  effort 
was  made  to  correct  this.  Large  quantities  of  vegetables  were  brought 
up  to  the  army,  and  a  more  stringent  police  enforced." 

Meanwhile,  Lee  made  two  efforts  to  take  the  offensive  against 


544  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

Grant's  right  flank  and  rear.  On  the  6th,  he  sent  Early  on  the 
north  of  Matadequin  Creek,  and  on  the  7th  he  made  an  attempt 
south  of  the  same.  In  each  case  swamps  were  found  interven- 
ing, which  prevented  anything  being  accomplished. 

A  few  days  after  the  battle,  while  Grant  was  still  in  his  state 
of  indecision  and  the  make  believe  of  siege  operations  was  going 
on,  Halleck  suggested  to  him  the  investment  of  Richmond  on 
the  north  bank  of  the  James.  It  was  seriously  considered,  as 
offering  greater  security  to  Washington,  but  finally  rejected. 

On  June  5,  Hunter,  in  the  Valley,  who  had  succeeded  Milroy, 
defeated  Jones,  who  had  succeeded  Breckenridge.  As  soon  as 
Lee  learned  of  this,  he  ordered  Breckenridge  to  return  and  take 
with  him  the  troops  he  had  brought  to  Lee  at  Hanover  Junction. 
On  June  12,  he  took  the  bold  move  of  detaching  Early's  whole 
corps  and  sending  it  to  the  Valley,  by  way  of  Charlottesville.  It 
was  ordered  to  attack  Hunter  in  rear,  and,  having  disposed  of 
him  and  united  with  Breckenridge,  to  move  down  the  Valley, 
cross  the  Potomac,  and  threaten  Washington.  It  is  probable  that 
in  deciding  upon  this  line  of  strategy,  Lee  was  influenced  by  hopes 
that  strong  demonstrations  against  Washington  might  recall 
Grant's  army  for  its  protection,  as  had  so  often  happened  before. 
If  so,  however,  the  hope  now  proved  vain.  Grant's  force  proved 
ample  to  detach  enough  to  protect  Washington  and  still  prosecute 
his  campaign  before  Petersburg.  If  Early  could  be  spared,  it 
might  have  been  wiser  to  have  sent  him  to  Johnston's  army  in  Ga. 


CHAPTER  XXI 


THE  MOVEMENT  AGAINST  PETERSBURG 

The  Crisis  of  the  War.  High  Price  of  Gold.  Difficulty  of  recruiting  in 
the  North.  Grant  crosses  the  James  and  moves  on  Petersburg.  Han- 
cock's Corps  Delayed.  Movements  of  Lee.  Beauregard's  Defence. 
Fighting  of  June  16  and  18.  Success  of  Grant's  Strategy. 

IT  is  now  time  to  describe  Grant's  movement  against  Peters- 
burg which,  I  think,  more  than  any  battle  or  other  incident,  con- 
stituted what  may  be  called  the  Crisis  of  the  War.  Possibly  the 
South  never  had  any  real  chance  of  success  from  the  first,  and 
the  actual  crisis  was  past  when  she  fired  the  first  gun.  But, 
though  the  North  was  immensely  her  superior  in  all  the  resources 
of  war,  the  South  was  able  to  win  many  hard-fought  bat- 
tles, and  her  armies  to  cherish  the  hope,  as  year  after  year 
elapsed,  that  the  desperation  of  her  resistance  might  exact  such 
a  price  in  blood  and  treasure  as  would  exhaust  the  enthusiasm 
of  her  adversary.  Certainly,  at  no  other  period  was  there  such 
depression  among  the  people  at  home,  in  the  army,  in  the  field, 
or  among  the  officials  of  the  government  in  Washington.  The 
expenses  of  the  war  were  nearly  $4,000,000  a  day.  Gold  was 
at  a  high  premium  and  advancing  rapidly.  It  went  from  168 
in  May  to  285  in  July. 

The  following  table  shows  the  fluctuations  for  each  month  of 
1864:  — 


MONTH 

DAY 

HIGHEST 

DAY 

LOWEST 

Jan. 

19 

1591 

6 

1511 

Feb. 

16 

161 

27 

157| 

March 

26 

169f 

1 

159 

April 

26 

186| 

4 

166i 

May 

27 

190 

10 

168 

June 

30 

250 

8 

193 

July 

11 

285 

1 

222 

Aug. 

5 

261f 

30 

23li 

Sept. 

2 

254£ 

30 

191 

Oct. 

31 

227f 

3 

189 

Nov. 

8 

260 

18 

210 

Dec. 

7 

243 

18 

212f 

645 


546  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

Enlisting  had  almost  ceased,  although  stimulated  by  enor- 
mous bounties.  A  thousand  dollars  per  man  was  the  ordinary 
price,  and  single  regiments  would  sometimes  take  from  their 
counties  1000  men,  and  draw  a  million  dollars  in  bounties  the 
day  of  their  muster.  There  was  growing  bitterness  in  political 
circles  in  view  of  the  approaching  presidential  election.  The 
terrible  lists  of  casualties  in  battle  were  daily  bringing  mourn- 
ing and  distress  to  every  hamlet  in  the  country. 

Swinton  (p.  494)  writes  of  this  period  as  follows :  — 

"War  is  sustained  quite  as  much  by  the  moral  energy  of  a  people  as 
by  its  material  resources ;  and  the  former  must  be  active  to  bring  out  and 
make  available  the  latter.  .  .  .  For  armies  are  things  visible  and  formal, 
circumscribed  by  time  and  space,  but  the  soul  of  war  is  a  power  unseen, 
bound  up  with  the  interests,  convictions,  passions  of  men.  Now  so  gloomy 
was  the  outlook  after  the  action  on  the  Chickahominy,  and  to  such  a  de- 
gree, by  consequence,  had  the  public  mind  become  relaxed,  that  there  was 
at  this  time  great  danger  of  a  collapse  of  the  war.1 

"Had  not  success  come  elsewhere  to  brighten  the  horizon,  it  would  have 
been  difficult  to  have  raised  new  forces  to  recruit  the  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
which,  shaken  in  its  structure,  its  valor  quenched  in  blood,  and  thousands 
of  its  ablest  officers  killed  and  wounded,  was  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  no 
more." 

It  was  under  these  circumstances  that  Grant  made  his  first 
move  after  the  week  of  indecision  which  followed  the  battle  of 
Cold  Harbor.  The  most  natural  movement,  and  the  one  which 
Lee  expected,  was  that  he  would  merely  cross  the  Chickahominy 
and  take  position  on  the  north  bank  of  the  James  at  Malvern 
Hill,  adjoining  Butler  on  the  south  bank  at  Bermuda  Hundreds. 
This  would  unite  the  two  armies  at  the  nearest  point  to  Rich- 
mond, and  they  would  have  the  aid  of  the  monitors  on  the  river 
in  a  direct  advance.  But  Grant  determined  to  cross  the  James 
at  Wilcox's  Landing,  10  miles  below  City  Point,  and  entirely 
out  of  Lee's  observation,  and  to  move  thence  directly  upon 
Petersburg  with  his  whole  army.  He  would  thus  pass  in  rear 
of  Butler  and  attack  the  extreme  right  flank  of  the  Confederate 
line,  which,  it  was  certain,  would  now  be  held  by  only  a  small 

1  The  archives  of  the  State  Department,  when  one  day  made  public, 
will  show  how  deeply  the  government  was  affected  by  the  want  of  military 
success  and  to  what  resolutions  the  Executive  had  in  consequence  come. 


THE  MOVEMENT  AGAINST  PETERSBURG  547 

force.  It  involved  the  performance  of  a  feat  in  transportation 
which  had  never  been  equalled,  and  might  well  be  considered 
impossible,  without  days  of  delay. 

It  was  all  accomplished,  as  will  be  seen,  without  mishap,  and 
in  such  an  incredibly  short  time  that  Lee  refused  for  three  days 
to  believe  it.  During  these  three  days,  June  15,  16,  and  17, 
Grant's  whole  army  was  arriving  at  and  attacking  Petersburg, 
which  was  defended  at  first  only  by  Beauregard  with  about 
2500  men.  Lee,  with  Longstreet's  and  Hill's  corps,  for  the  same 
three  days,  lay  idle  in  the  woods  on  the  north  side,  only  replacing 
some  of  Beauregard's  troops  taken  to  Petersburg  from  in  front 
of  Butler. 

But  for  this,  Longstreet's  corps  might  have  manned  the  in- 
trenchments  of  Petersburg,  when  Grant's  troops  first  appeared 
before  them,  and  it  is  not  too  much  to  claim  that  his  defeat 
would  have  been  not  less  bloody  and  disastrous  than  was  the 
one  at  Cold  Harbor.  For,  while  the  intrenchments  at  Cold 
Harbor  were  the  poorest  and  slightest  in  which  we  ever  fought, 
the  Petersburg  lines  had  been  built  a  year  before,  and  were  of 
the  best  character,  with  some  guns  of  position  mounted  and  all 
the  forest  in  front  cleared  away  to  give  range  to  the  artillery. 

This,  then,  was  really  the  nearest  approach  to  "a  crisis"  which 
occurred  during  the  war,  as  will  more  fully  appear  as  we  follow 
the  details.  Instead  of  "success  elsewhere,"  Grant  here  escaped 
a  second  defeat  more  bloody  and  more  overwhelming  than  any 
preceding.  Thus  the  last,  and  perhaps  the  best,  chances  of  Con- 
federate success  were  not  lost  in  the  repulse  at  Gettysburg,  nor 
in  any  combat  of  arms.  They  were  lost  during  three  days  of 
lying  in  camp,  believing  that  Grant  was  hemmed  in  by  the  broad 
part  of  the  James  below  City  Point,  and  had  nowhere  to  go 
but  to  come  and  attack  us.  The  entire  credit  for  the  strategy 
belongs,  I  believe,  to  Grant,  though  possibly  it  may  be  shared 
by  Meade's  chief  of  staff,  Humphreys,  whose  modest  narrative 
makes  no  reference  to  the  subject. 

On  Saturday,  June  11,  the  5th  corps  was  moved  down  the 
Chickahominy,  about  10  miles  to  the  vicinity  of  Bottom's  Bridge. 
The  next  night  it  crossed  on  two  pontoon  bridges,  and,  inclining 
to  the  right,  it  took  position  east  of  Riddle's  Shop,  where  it 


548  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

intrenched  to  cover  the  passage  of  the  other  corps.  All  of  the 
other  corps  moved  at  the  same  time.  The  2d  corps  crossed  at 
the  same  bridge  and  marched  to  Wilcox  Landing  on  the  James. 
The  6th  and  9th  corps  crossed  the  Chickahominy  at  Jones's 
Bridge  and  marched  to  the  same  place ;  the  18th  corps,  under 
Smith,  was  sent  back  to  the  White  House,  where  it  took  trans- 
ports for  City  Point,  and  was  landed  there  the  night  of  the  14th. 
Here  it  was  joined  by  Kautz's  cavalry,  about  2400  strong,  and 
by  Hink's  colored  division,  3700,  making  in  all  about  16,000  men, 
who  were  ordered  to  march  at  dawn  on  the  15th  for  Petersburg, 
about  eight  miles,  which  they  were  to  attack.  Here  we  may 
leave  them  for  a  while. 

Hancock's  2d  corps  reached  Wilcox's  Landing  at  6  P.M.  on 
Monday,  the  13th,  after  an  all-night  march  of  about  30  miles. 
The  5th  corps,  under  Warren,  held  its  position  covering  the 
passage  of  other  corps  until  night  of  the  13th,  when  it  followed 
Hancock  and  reached  Wilcox's  Landing  the  next  noon.  The 
cavalry  and  infantry  had  had  some  sharp  skirmishing,  and  re- 
ported their  casualties  as  300  killed  and  wounded.  The  6th  and 
9th  corps,  whose  marches  had  been  from  5  to  10  miles  longer 
than  Hancock's,  arrived  in  the  afternoon  of  the  14th. 

During  the  14th,  the  transports,  which  had  brought  the  18th 
corps  around  from  the  White  House  to  City  Point,  were  em- 
ployed in  ferrying  Hancock  across  the  James.  By  the  morning 
of  the  15th,  his  whole  corps  was  across,  with  most  of  its  artillery, 
and  at  10.30  A.M.,  it  set  out  for  Petersburg,  following  Smith  who 
had  gone  from  City  Point  for  the  same  destination  about  sunrise. 
Hancock  had  about  20,000  men,  and  about  16  miles  to  go.  All 
the  complicated  movements  involved  in  this  manoeuvre,  and  in 
the  capture  of  Petersburg  at  which  it  was  aimed,  had  been  as 
usual  well  thought  out,  and  covered  in  the  orders  and  instruc- 
tions to  the  different  commanders,  with  a  single  exception. 

This  exception  was  very  serious  in  its  results,  as  it  postponed 
the  capture  of  Petersburg  for  over  nine  months.  It  had  its  rise 
in  the  division  of  command  and  responsibility  between  the  co- 
operating armies.  This,  in  its  turn,  had  arisen  from  the  political 
necessity  of  placing  Butler  in  command  of  the  Army  of  the 
James.  Smith's  corps  was  a  part  of  that  army,  and  Grant, 


THE  MOVEMENT  AGAINST  PETERSBURG  549 

feeling  that  secrecy  was  essential  to  success,  visited  Butler  on 
the  14th,  and  at  his  quarters  prepared  the  orders  for  Smith's 
advance  and  attack  on  Petersburg  the  next  day.  When  he 
returned  to  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  he  failed  to  notify  Meade 
of  the  hour  of  Smith's  march,  and  other  details,  and  Meade,  of 
course,  did  not  inform  Hancock.  It  resulted  that  Hancock  was 
not  ordered  to  march  until  10.30  A.M.,  when  he  might  just  as 
easily  have  marched  at  sunrise,  and  he  was  directed  by  a  route 
an  hour  or  two  longer  than  one  he  might  have  used.  Finally, 
he  came  upon  the  field  at  Petersburg  after  dark,  when  he  might 
have  arrived  in  time  to  unite  in  Smith's  assault. 

Meanwhile,  the  5th,  6th,  and  9th  corps  on  the  banks  of  the 
James,  awaited  the  construction  of  the  greatest  bridge  which 
the  world  has  seen  since  the  days  of  Xerxes.  At  the  point 
selected,  the  river  was  2100  feet  wide,  90  feet  deep,  and  had  a 
rise  and  fall  of  tide  of  4  feet,  giving  very  strong  currents.  A 
draw  was  necessary  for  the  passage  of  vessels.  The  approaches 
having  been  prepared  on  each  side,  construction  was  begun  at 
4  P.M.,  on  the  14th,  by  Maj.  Duane,  simultaneously  at  both  ends. 
In  eight  hours  the  bridge  was  finished,  and  the  artillery  and 
trains  of  the  9th,  5th,  and  6th  corps  began  to  cross  in  the  order 
named,  that  being  the  order  in  which  the  corps  would  follow. 
For  48  hours,  without  cessation,  the  column  poured  across,  and 
at  midnight  on  the  16th  Grant's  entire  army  was  south  of  the 
James. 

Let  us  now  turn  to  Lee.  On  the  morning  of  the  13th,  finding 
the  enemy  gone,  he  at  once  put  his  army  in  motion,  crossed  the 
Chickahominy,  and  that  afternoon  took  position  between  White 
Oak  Swamp  and  Malvern  Hill.  Hoke's  division  went  on  to 
Drury's  Bluff.  His  cavalry  came  in  contact  with  Wilson's 
cavalry,  and  also  with  Warren's  infantry,  which  had  intrenched 
itself  on  the  Long  Bridge  road  not  far  in  front  of  his  position. 
Some  sharp  skirmishing  took  place,  as  shown  by  Warren's  report 
of  300  casualties.  The  presence  of  Warren  was  taken  as  assurance 
that  Grant's  army  was  about  to  advance  on  the  north  side  of  the 
James,  and  Warren's  withdrawal  at  dark,  discovered  the  next 
day,  was  supposed  to  mean  only  a  drawing  nearer  to  Butler's 
position,  where  the  narrowness  of  the  river  would  permit  the  easy 


550  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

establishment  of  pontoon  bridges.  On  the  14th,  a  staff-officer 
of  Beauregard's  came  over  from  Petersburg  to  lay  before  Lee 
the  defenceless  position  of  that  city,  and  to  beg  for  reenforce- 
ments.  Lee  consented  that  Beauregard  should  take  Hoke's 
division,  which  had  already  gone  to  Drury's  Bluff,  but  would 
not  consent  to  weaken  Longstreet  or  Hill,  who  were  near  Riddle's 
Shop.  Hoke  was  accordingly  started  for  Petersburg  early  on 
the  15th,  with  18  miles  to  go.  His  leading  brigade,  Hagood's, 
was  picked  up  by  railroad  trains  and  reached  Petersburg  about 
sunset,  the  rest  of  the  division  arriving  about  9  P.M.  Until  Hoke 
came,  the  whole  force  at  Petersburg  consisted  of  Wise's  brigade 
of  infantry  "not  more  than  1200  strong,"  two  small  regiments 
"of  cavalry  under  Bearing."  "Some  light  artillery  with  22 
pieces  .  .  .  besides  a  few  men  manning  three  or  four  heavy 
guns  in  position."  l 

Besides  these,  there  were  some  old  men  and  boys,  called  Local 
Reserves,  who  on  June  9  under  Col.  F.  H.  Archer,  a  veteran  of 
Mexico,  and  Gen.  R.  E.  Colston,  disabled  at  Chancellorsville,  had 
acted  with  great  gallantry  in  repelling  a  raid  by  Kautz's  cavalry. 
The  total  gross  of  all  arms  is  given  as  2738. 

After  Beauregard's  staff-officer  had  left  him,  Lee  gave  orders 
to  our  corps  to  march  the  next  morning,  the  15th,  to  Drury's 
Bluff.  About  sunrise,  we  broke  camps  and  took  the  road,  but 
there  was  a  demonstration  of  the  enemy's  cavalry  about  Malvern 
Hill  and  we  were  halted  to  learn  what  it  meant.  About  mid- 
day, the  report  came  that  the  enemy  had  fallen  back,  but  our 
march  was  not  resumed,  and  we  later  returned  to  our  bivouacs. 

On  the  16th,  the  1st  corps  headquarters,  with  Pickett's  and 
Field's  divisions,  were  hurried  across  the  pontoon  bridge  at 
Drury's  Bluff  and  down  to  the  Bermuda  Hundreds  lines,  which 
had  been  held  by  Bushrod  Johnson's  division,  but  had  been 
abandoned  the  night  of  the  15th  when  Beauregard  had  with- 
drawn it  for  the  defence  of  Petersburg.  Kershaw's  division 
followed  us  only  as  far  as  Drury's  Bluff,  and  was  halted  there. 
We  reached  the  ground  in  time  to  drive  off  one  of  Butler's  bri- 
gades which  had  come  out  to  the  railroad  and  begun  to  tear  it 
up.  We  drove  this  brigade  back  very  nearly  into  their  original 

1  Roman's  Beauregard,  II.,  229. 


THE  MOVEMENT  AGAINST  PETERSBURG  551 

lines,  and,  on  the  next  afternoon,  the  17th,  a  charge  of  Pickett's 
division  entirely  regained  our  lines  which  had  been  abandoned 
by  Bushrod  Johnson. 

During  these  three  days,  the  15th,  16th,  and  17th,  Beauregard, 
while  defending  Petersburg,  with  great  skill  and  tenacity,  had 
repeatedly  reported  to  Lee  the  arrival  of  Grant's  army  at  Peters- 
burg, and  begged  for  reinforcements.  Lee's  replies  were  as 
follows :  — 

"June  16,  10.30  A.M.  I  do  not  know  the  position  of  Grant's  army  and 
cannot  strip  the  north  bank  of  troops." 

"June  17,  12  M.  Until  I  can  get  more  definite  information  of  Grant's 
movements,  I  do  not  think  it  prudent  to  draw  more  troops  to  this  side  of 
the  river." 

On  this  day,  Grant's  entire  force  being  now  on  the  field,  his 
attacks  were  urged  with  increasing  vigor,  and  at  6.40  P.M. 
Beauregard  telegraphed  Lee  as  follows:  — 

"The  increasing  number  of  the  enemy  in  my  front,  and  inadequacy 
of  my  force  to  defend  the  already  too  much  extended  lines,  will  compel 
me  to  fall  back  within  a  shorter  one,  which  I  will  attempt  to-night.  This 

1  shall  hold  as  long  as  practicable,  but,  without  reinforcements,  I  may  have 
to  evacuate  the  city  very  shortly.     In  that  event  I  shall  retire  in  the 
direction  of  Drury's  Bluff,  defending  the  crossing  of  Appomattox  River 
and  Swift  Creek." 

After  the  receipt  of  this  despatch,  Kershaw's  division  was 
ordered  to  proceed  during  the  night  to  Bermuda  Hundreds,  and 
a  little  later  the  order  was  extended  to  continue  the  march  to 
Petersburg.  The  fighting  on  Beauregard's  lines  lasted  until 
nearly  midnight.  But  when  it  was  over,  and  the  transfer  of  his 
troops  to  their  new  line  was  fairly  under  way,  he  began  to  take 
more  radical  measures  to  convince  Lee  of  the  situation.  He 
sent  three  of  his  staff,  one  after  the  other,  within  two  hours,  with 
details  about  the  prisoners  captured  from  different  corps  of  the 
Federal  army,  with  the  stories  told  by  each  of  their  marches 
since  leaving  Cold  Harbor  on  the  12th.  The  first  messenger 
was  Beauregard's  aide,  Col.  Chisolm,  who  interviewed  Lee,  lying 
on  the  ground  in  his  tent  near  Drury's  Bluff,  between  1  and 

2  A.M.  on  the  18th.     Lee  seemed  very  placid  and  heard  many 
messages,  but  still  said  he  thought  Beauregard  was  mistaken  in 


552  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

supposing  that  any  large  part  of  Grant's  army  had  crossed  the 
river.  He  said  also  that  Kershaw's  division  was  already  under 
orders  to  Petersburg,  and  he  promised  to  come  over  in  the 
morning. 

Chisolm  was  soon  followed  by  Col.  Alfred  Roman,  but  he  had 
to  leave  his  messages,  as  Lee's  staff  would  not  disturb  him 
again.  About  3  A.M.,  Maj.  Giles  B.  Cooke  arrived  and  insisted 
upon  an  interview.  He  brought  further  statements  by  prisoners 
which,  laid  before  Lee,  thoroughly  satisfied  him  that  Grant's 
army  had  now  been  across  the  James  for  over  48  hours.  The 
following  telegrams,  which  were  immediately  sent,  will  indicate 
his  change  of  view. 

"June  18,  3.30  A.M.  Superintendent  R.  &  P.  R.R.  Can  trains  run  to 
Petersburg?  If  so,  send  all  cars  available  to  Rice's  Turnout.  If  they 
cannot  run  through,  can  any  be  sent  from  Petersburg  to  the  point  where 
the  road  is  broken?  It  is  important  to  get  troops  to  Petersburg  without 
delay." 

"To  Gen.  Early,  Lynchburg. 

"Grant  is  in  front  of  Petersburg.  Will  be  opposed  there.  Strike  as 
quick  as  you  can.  If  circumstances  authorize,  carry  out  the  original  plan 
or  move  upon  Petersburg  without  delay." 

At  the  same  time,  orders  were  sent  Anderson  for  Field's  divi- 
sion and  the  corps  headquarters  and  artillery  to  follow  Kershaw's 
division  into  Petersburg.  Kershaw  arrived  there  about  7.30 
A.M.  ;  the  rest  of  us  about  nine. 

We  must  now  return  to  Smith's  column,  which  we  saw  start 
to  Petersburg,  about  16,000  strong,  at  daylight  on  the  15th, 
with  about  eight  miles  to  go,  2500  of  the  command  being 
cavalry,  3700  of  them  colored  troops.  Beauregard  awaits  them 
in  the  lines  of  Petersburg  which  encircle  the  city,  about  two  miles 
out,  from  the  river  above  to  the  river  below,  a  development  of 
about  10  miles.  The  intrenchments  had  no  abattis  or  obstruc- 
tions in  front  and  consisted  only  of  a  small  outside  ditch  and  a 
parapet,  with  platforms  and  embrasures  for  guns  at  suitable 
intervals.  As  Beauregard  expected  Hoke's  division  about  dark, 
every  moment  of  delay  was  valuable.  To  prolong  it,  he  used 
the  old  device  of  sending  forward  a  regiment  of  cavalry  and  a 
battery.  These  delayed  the  approach  for  about  three  hours, 


THE  MOVEMENT  AGAINST  PETERSBURG  553 

at  the  expense  of  a  gun  captured.  The  march  was  then  resumed, 
and  about  9  A.M.  the  head  of  the  column  came  to  the  zone  of 
felled  forest  in  front  of  the  intrenchments.  Beauregard,  for- 
tunately, had  a  good  supply  of  guns  and  ammunition  which  he 
used  freely  in  preventing  the  enemy  from  establishing  his  batteries 
or  moving  his  troops  within  sight,  and  it  was  1.30  P.M.  when  the 
column  was  deployed.  Smith  had  still  to  make  his  reconnoissance, 
and  this  occupied  him  until  5  P.M.  But  it  had  been  efficiently 
made,  for  he  learned  that  our  infantry  was  stretched  out  in  a 
very  thin  line,  and  it  led  him  to  decide  that  his  charge  should 
be  made,  not  with  a  column,  but  with  clouds  of  skirmishers. 
Another  hour  was  taken  to  form  the  troops,  and  at  6  P.M.  all 
would  have  been  ready,  but  it  was  now  found  that  the  chief 
of  artillery  had  sent  all  the  horses  to  water,  and  it  required  an 
hour  to  get  them  back.  Tall  oaks  from  little  acorns  grow! 
By  such  small  and  accidental  happenings  does  fate  decide 
battles !  Petersburg  was  lost  and  won  by  that  hour. 

At  7  P.M.,  the  guns  returned  and  opened  a  severe  fire,  to  which 
the  Confederate  guns  did  not  reply,  reserving  their  fire  for  the 
columns  which  they  expected  to  see.  These  never  appeared, 
but  instead,  the  cloud  of  skirmishers  overran  the  works  and 
captured  the  guns  still  loaded  with  double  canister  and  defended 
by  only  a  skirmish  line  of  infantry.  Hink's  colored  division, 
which  made  the  charge,  lost  507  killed  and  wounded  from  the 
fire  of  the  skirmishers.  It  captured  four  guns  and  250  prisoners. 
Lines  of  battle  followed,  and  by  9  P.M.  occupied  about  one  and  a 
half  miles  of  intrenchment,  from  Redan  No.  7  to  No.  11,  inclusive 
(counting  from  the  river  below),  getting  possession  of  16  guns. 
Hancock's  corps  had  arrived  on  the  ground  during  the  action, 
and,  when  it  was  over,  at  Smith's  request  it  relieved  his  troops. 
Smith  had  been  informed  of  the  approach  of  reinforcements  to 
both  sides,  and  he  thought  it  wiser  to  hold  what  he  had,  than 
to  venture  more  and  risk  disaster.  Kautz's  cavalry  had  been 
kept  beyond  the  intrenchments  all  day  by  Bearing's  cavalry 
and  a  few  guns,  which  fired  from  the  redans  in  the  vicinity  of 
No.  28.  About  6  P.M.,  hearing  no  sounds  of  battle  from  Smith, 
Kautz  withdrew,  with  a  loss  of  43  men,  and  went  into  bivouac. 

After  the  fighting  began,  Beauregard  had  recognized  that  he 


554  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

would  need  every  available  man  to  defend  the  city,  and  he 
ordered  Johnson  to  leave  only  Grade's  brigade  in  his  lines,  and 
to  come  to  Petersburg  with  the  rest  of  his  division.  Johnson 
brought  about  3500  men,  which,  with  Hoke,  gave  Beauregard 
in  the  morning  an  effective  force  of  about  14,000  infantry. 
During  the  night  he  built  a  temporary  line,  throwing  out  the 
captured  portion,  while  his  efficient  chief  engineer,  Col.  D.  B. 
Harris,  laid  out  and  commenced  a  better  located  permanent  line 
at  an  average  distance  of  a  half-mile  in  the  rear. 

On  the  16th,  Hancock  was  in  command,  and  the  9th  corps 
arrived  on  the  field,  giving  him  about  48,000  effectives.  He 
devoted  the  day  to  attacks  upon  each  flank  of  the  broken  line 
and  succeeded  in  capturing  one  redan,  No.  4,  on  Beauregard's 
left,  and  three,  Nos.  12,  13,  and  14,  on  his  right. 

On  the  17th,  the  fighting  began  at  3  A.M.  and  was  continued 
until  11  P.M.  The  attack  at  three  was  conducted  by  Potter's  divi- 
sion of  the  9th  corps,  and  was  a  complete  surprise.  Extraordinary 
precautions  had  been  adopted  to  make  it  so.  No  shot  was  fired. 
Canteens  had  been  packed  in  knapsacks,  and  all  orders  were 
transmitted  in  whispers.  The  Confederates  were  so  exhausted, 
by  their  incessant  fighting  by  day  and  working  by  night,  that 
they  were  sound  asleep,  with  arms  in  their  hands,  and  double 
canister  in  their  guns.  Only  a  single  gunner  was  waked  in  time 
to  pull  a  single  lanyard  before  the  enemy  swept  over  and  got 
possession  of  Redan  No.  16,  with  4  guns  and  600  prisoners. 
Nowhere  else  during  the  long  day  were  they  able  to  make  any 
headway. 

The  5th  corps  had  now  arrived  and  one  division  of  the  6th. 
About  dark  in  the  afternoon,  Redan  No.  3,  on  the  left,  had  been 
taken  and  held  temporarily  by  Ledlie's  division  of  the  9th  corps. 
Gracie's  brigade,  which  had  just  come  in  from  Bermuda  Hun- 
dreds, was  put  to  charge  them,  and  drove  them  out,  capturing 
over  1000  prisoners.  After  the  fighting  ceased,  Col.  Harris 
superintended  the  withdrawal  of  the  troops  from  the  temporary 
line  to  the  new  location  which  had  been  prepared  in  the  last  48 
hours. 

At  4  A.M.  on  the  18th,  a  general  advance  was  made  by  the  2d, 
5th,  and  9th  cprps,  the  6th  and  18th  supporting  in  reserve.  The 


THE  MOVEMENT  AGAINST  PETERSBURG  555 

ground  in  front  of  the  points  which  had  been  assaulted  was 
thickly  strewn  with  the  Federal  dead,  and  the  slight  trenches, 
from  which  they  had  fought  so  long  and  desperately,  were  filled 
with  the  slain  there  had  been  no  opportunity  to  bury  or  remove. 
A  few  deserters  or  prisoners  were  picked  up,  and  from  them 
Meade  learned  that  Beauregard's  whole  force  had  been  but  two 
divisions  and  Wise's  brigade,  now  reduced  by  heavy  losses,  but 
trying  to  occupy  a  hastily  constructed  line  a  half-mile,  more  or 
less,  in  the  rear.  This  information  was  conveyed  to  all  the 
corps  commanders,  who  were  ordered  to  press  forward  vigorously 
and  overwhelm  our  lines  in  their  unfinished  condition. 

No  army  could  ask  a  more  favorable  chance  to  destroy  its 
antagonist  than  was  here  presented.  Their  whole  army  was  at 
hand,  and  the  reenforcement  of  Longstreet's  corps,  even  now 
coming  to  Beauregard,  was  not  over  12,000  men  and  was  still 
about  three  to  five  hours  away.  The  little  which  was  accom- 
plished during  the  whole  day  is  striking  evidence  of  the  condi- 
tion to  which  the  Federal  army  had  now  been  reduced. 

At  first,  much  time  was  lost  in  driving  in  our  pickets,  and  in 
efforts  to  arrange  for  simultaneous  assaults  by  the  different  corps. 
Meade  himself  at  last  fixed  upon  twelve  o'clock,  and  ordered  each 
corps  at  that  hour  to  assault  with  a  strong  column.  By  that 
time  Kershaw's  division  had  relieved  Johnson's,  taking  its  place 
in  the  trenches.  Hoke,  Wise,  and  none  of  the  artillery  could  be 
relieved  until  after  dark,  without  unwise  exposure  of  the  troops. 
Field's  division  took  position  in  the  trenches  on  Kershaw's  left, 
but  it  did  not  become  engaged. 

Humphreys  states  that  about  midday  the  2d  corps  made  two 
assaults,  "both  repulsed  with  severe  loss."  Later  Meade  again 
ordered  — 

"assaults  by  all  the  corps  with  their  whole  force,  and  at  all  hazards, 
and  as  soon  as  possible.  All  the  corps  assaulted  late  in  the  afternoon, 
and  at  hours  not  widely  apart:  Birney  with  all  his  disposable  force; 
Nott  from  the  Hare  house  .  .  .  supported  by  one  of  Gibbon's  brigades; 
Barlow  on  Mott's  left,  —  but  were  repulsed  with  considerable  loss.  Burn- 
side  found  the  task  of  driving  the  enemy  [it  was  but  a  picket  force]  out 
of  the  railroad  cut  a  formidable  one,  and,  assaulting,  established  his  corps 
within  a  hundred  yards  of  the  enemy's  main  line.  .  .  .  Warren's  assault 
was  well  made,  some  of  Griffin's  men  being  killed  within  20  feet  of  the 


556  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

enemy's  works,  but  it  was  no  more  successful  than  the  others.  His 
losses  were  very  severe.  .  .  .  On  the  right,  Martindale  advanced  and  gained 
some  rifle-pits,  but  did  not  assault  the  main  line." 

On  the  Confederate  side,  the  day  was  not  considered  a  day  of 
battle,  but  only  of  demonstrations  and  reconnoissance.  None 
of  our  reinforcements  were  engaged,  the  only  fighting  done 
having  been  by  Hoke's  division  and  Wise's  brigade,  who,  under 
Beauregard,  had  already  borne  the  whole  brunt  of  the  four  days 
and  three  nights.  The  official  diary  of  Longstreet's  corps  says 
of  the  day :  — 

"We  arrive  in  Petersburg  and  Kershaw  relieves  Bushrod  Johnson's 
division,  Field  taking  position  on  Kershaw's  right.  A  feeble  attack  is 
made  in  the  afternoon  on  Elliott's  brigade." 

No  official  report  is  given  of  any  brigade  except  Hagood's, 
which  describes  only  skirmishing,  and  one  attempted  charge  on 
our  extreme  left,  "which  never  got  closer  than  250  yards." 

It  was  necessary  to  wait  until  night  before  Beauregard's 
artillery  could  receive  its  plaudit  of  "Well  done!  good  and 
faithful  servants,"  and  be  relieved  by  the  fresh  battalions  of 
Longstreet's  corps.  Of  all  the  moonlight  nights  I  can  remember, 
I  recall  that  Saturday  night  as,  perhaps,  the  most  brilliant  and 
beautiful.  The  weather  was  exceedingly  dry,  the  air  perfectly 
calm,  with  an  exhilarating  electrical  quality  in  it.  The  dust 
rose  with  every  movement  and  hung  in  the  air.  The  whole 
landscape  was  bathed  and  saturated  in  silver,  and  sounds  were 
unusually  distinct  and  seemed  to  be  alive  and  to  travel  every- 
where. It  was  not  a  night  for  sleep  in  the  trenches.  There  was 
a  great  deal  to  be  done  at  all  points,  to  strengthen  and  improve 
them,  and  every  man  was  personally  interested  in  working  at 
his  immediate  location. 

In  spite  of  all  pains,  the  drawing  out  of  old  guns  and  approach 
of  new  was  attended  with  sounds  which  wandered  far  and  with 
luminous  clouds  of  dust  gradually  rising  in  the  air.  Then  the 
enemy  would  know  we  were  moving  and  there  would  come 
crashes  of  musketry  at  random  and  volleys  of  artillery  from  their 
lines.  Then  our  infantry  would  imagine  themselves  attacked, 
and  would  respond  in  like  fashion,  and  the  fire  would  run  along 
the  parapet  to  right  and  left,  and  gradually  subside  for  a  while, 


THE  MOVEMENT  AGAINST  PETERSBURG  557 

to  break  out  presently  somewhere  else.  I  was  accompanied  by 
Lt.-Col.  Branch,  a  Col.  of  artillery  of  Beauregard's  army,  a  very 
competent  and  gallant  officer,  unfortunately  killed  in  1869  by 
the  falling  of  a  bridge  near  Richmond. 

Grant  did  not  renew  his  assaults  on  the  19th,  but  expressed 
himself  satisfied  that  all  had  been  done  which  was  possible,  and 
he  now  directed  that  the  troops  should  be  put  under  cover  and 
have  some  rest. 

Humphreys  writes :  — 

"The  positions  gained  by  the  several  corps  close  against  the  enemy  were 
intrenched,  and  the  two  opposing  lines  in  this  part  of  the  ground  remained 
substantially  the  same  in  position  to  the  close  of  the  war." 

In  brief  review,  it  must  be  said  that  Grant  successfully  de- 
ceived Lee  as  to  his  whereabouts  for  at  least  three  days,  and 
thus,  at  the  most  critical  period  of  the  war,  saved  himself  from 
a  second  defeat,  more  bloody,  more  signal,  and  more  undeniable 
than  Cold  Harbor.  For,  if  Beauregard  alone,  with  only  14,000 
men,  was  able  to  stop  Grant's  whole  army  even  after  being 
driven  by  surprise  into  temporary  works,  what  would  Lee  and 
Beauregard  together  have  done  from  the  strong  original  lines  of 
Petersburg  ?  Grant,  personally,  was  at  that  period  not  abstemi- 
ous, and  that  his  troops  knew  of  it  [perhaps  sometimes  exag- 
gerating facts  in  speaking  of  it]  was  known,  even  to  the  Con- 
federates, from  the  stories  of  prisoners  captured  at  Cold  Harbor. 
Such  a  defeat  in  case  of  any  disaster,  with  such  rumors  afloat, 
would  have  cast  a  baleful  back-light  over  the  campaign,  even  to 
Spottsylvania  and  the  Wilderness.  He  was  now  able  to  base  a 
quasi  claim  to  victory  in  establishing  himself  within  the  lines  of 
Petersburg.  But  all  the  odium  of  repeated  defeats  would  have 
been  heaped  upon  his  campaign,  had  it  terminated  with  a  final 
and  bloody  repulse. 

All  this  had  been  changed  by  his  well-planned  and  successfully 
conducted  strategy.  The  position  which  he  had  secured  was  full 
of  great  possibilities,  as  yet  not  fully  comprehended.  But,  al- 
ready, the  character  of  the  operations  contemplated,  removed  all 
risk  of  serious  future  catastrophe.  However  bold  we  might  be, 
however  desperately  we  might  fight,  we  were  sure  in  the  end  to 


558  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

be  worn  out.  It  was  only  a  question  of  a  few  months,  more  or 
less.  We  were  unable  to  see  it  at  once.  But  there  soon  began 
to  spring  up  a  chain  of  permanent  works,  the  first  of  which  were 
built  upon  our  original  lines  captured  by  the  skirmishers  the 
first  afternoon,  and  these  works,  impregnable  to  assault,  finally 
decided  our  fate,  when,  on  the  next  March  25,  we  put  them  to  the 
test. 

Of  this  period  following  the  battles  of  Cold  Harbor  and  Peters- 
burg, the  future  historian  may  find  something  to  say.  By  all 
the  rules  of  statecraft,  the  time  had  now  arrived  to  open  nego- 
tiations for  peace.  There  would  no  longer  be  any  hope  of  final 
success,  but  there  would  still  be  much  of  blood,  of  treasure,  and 
of  political  rights,  which  might  be  saved  or  lost.  The  time  never 
came  again  when  as  favorable  terms  could  have  been  made  as 
now.  For  it  was  the  hour  of  the  lowest  tide  in  Federal  hopes. 
It  remains  a  fact,  however,  that  for  many  months,  even  until 
the  very  capture  of  Richmond,  both  the  Confederate  army  and 
the  people  would  have  been  very  loth  to  recognize  that  our  cause 
was  hopeless.  Lee's  influence,  had  he  advised  it,  could  have 
secured  acquiescence  in  surrender,  but  nothing  else  would.  His 
confidence  in  his  army,  doubtless,  for  some  months  delayed  his 
realization  of  the  approaching  end.  Even  when  he  foresaw  it, 
his  duty  to  his  government  as  a  soldier  was  paramount,  and 
controlled  his  course  to  the  very  last. 

And  there  is  this  to  be  said.  In  every  war  there  are  two 
issues  contended  for.  First,  is  the  political  principle  involved; 
which  with  us  was  the  right  of  secession.  The  second  is 
prestige  or  character  as  a  people.  Conceding  our  cause,  did  we 
defend  it  worthily,  history  and  posterity  being  the  judges  ? 

We  lost  the  first  issue ;  and  the  more  utterly  it  was  lost,  the 
better  it  has  proved  to  be  —  for  ourselves,  even  more  than  for 
our  adversaries.  Without  detracting  from  their  merit,  but  dis- 
playing and  even  enhancing  it,  we  have  gained  the  second  by  a 
courage  and  constancy  which  could  only  be  fully  developed  and 
exhibited  under  the  extreme  tests  endured,  and  by  the  high 
types  of  men  who  became  our  leaders.  Is  not  that  end  worthy 
of  the  extreme  price  paid  for  it,  even  to  the  last  drop  of  blood 
shed  at  Appomattox?  I  am  sure  that  to  the  army,  any  end 


THE  MOVEMENT  AGAINST  PETERSBURG  559 

but  the  last  ditch  would  have  seemed  a  breach  of  faith  with  the 
dead  we  had  left  upon  every  battle-field. 

The  Federal  casualties  for  Petersburg  and  for  the  campaign 
are  given  as  follows :  — 

June  13  to  18:  killed  1,298,  wounded  7,474,  missing  1,814,  total  10,586. 
May  5  to  June  18 :  killed  8,412,  wounded  44,629,  missing  9,609,  total  62,750. 

No  returns  exist  for  Beauregard's  losses,  but  they  have  been 
estimated  at:  killed,  500,  wounded  2200,  missing  2000,  total 
4700.  The  losses  among  the  general  officers  were  severe  on 
both  sides,  being  of  Confederates :  killed  8,  wounded  15,  captured 
2,  total  25,  and  of  Federals :  killed  6,  wounded  8,  captured  2, 
total  16. 


CHAPTER  XXII 
THE  MINE 

The  Petersburg  Trenches.  Wilson  and  Kautz's  Cavalry  Raid.  Their 
Rout  on  the  29th.  Early 's  Demonstration  toward  Washington.  The 
Mine  at  the  Elliott  Salient.  Extent  of  the  Tunnel  and  Galleries.  Its 
Ventilation.  Countermines.  Plans  for  a  Federal  Charge  to  follow 
the  Explosion.  Movements  of  Hancock.  The  Explosion  on  the  30th. 
The  Crater.  Failure  of  the  Federal  Assault. 

OUR  first  days  in  the  Petersburg  trenches  were  exceedingly 
busy  ones.  From  June  19  to  24,  a  daily  entry  in  my  note-book 
was  "severe  sharpshooting  and  artillery  practice  without  inter- 
mission day  or  night."  Our  whole  time  was  spent  in  improving 
our  lines  and  getting  our  batteries  protected  and  with  good 
communications.  Never  until  in  this  campaign  had  the  enemy 
used  mortar  fire  in  the  field,  but  now  Abbot's  reserve  artillery 
regiment  of  1700  men  brought  into  use  60  mortars  ranging  from 
24-Pr.  Coehorns  to  10-inch  Sea-coast,  which  caused  us  great 
annoyance,  as  we  had  to  keep  our  trenches  fully  manned  and 
had  no  protection  against  the  dropping  shells.  Fortunately,  I 
had  ordered  some  mortars  constructed  in  Richmond  about  two 
weeks  before,  and  they  began  to  arrive  on  June  24,  and  were  at 
once  brought  into  use.  They  were  only  12-pounders,  but  were 
light  and  convenient,  and  at  close  ranges  enabled  us  to  hold  our 
own,  with  less  loss  than  might  have  been  expected.  The  can- 
noneers in  the  batteries,  and  the  infantry  in  the  lines  who  were 
exposed  to  this  mortar  fire,  managed  to  build  little  bomb-proofs, 
and  a  labyrinth  of  deep  and  narrow  trenches  in  rear  of  the  lines. 
Abbott's  siege-train  also  included  six  100-pounder,  and  forty 
30-Pr.  rifles,  besides  their  regular  field-artillery.  Many  of  the 
heavy  calibres  were  mounted  on  the  permanent  forts,  erected  in 
the  outer  line  already  referred  to. 

These  constituted  a  sort  of  intrenched  citadel,  consisting  of 

560 


THE  MINE  561 

isolated  forts  connected  by  infantry  parapets  with  ditches  and 
abattis,  and  impregnable  to  any  assault.  Here  a  small  fraction 
of  the  army  could  securely  hold  its  line  for  days,  and  continue 
to  threaten  Petersburg,  leaving  the  rest  free  to  extend  lines  on 
the  south  or  to  threaten  Richmond  on  the  north.  Meanwhile, 
in  front,  their  offensive  system  of  trenches  and  redans  was  pushed 
as  close  as  possible  to  ours,  and  we  were  constantly  menaced 
with  assault,  should  we  weaken  our  garrison. 

One  point  in  our  front,  called  Elliott's  Salient,  was  recognized 
as  particularly  weak.  The  edge  of  the  deep  valley  of  Poor 
Creek,  approximately  parallel  to  our  general  line  of  works,  here 
approached  within  133  yards  of  the  salient,  which  was  held  by 
Pegram's  battery,  Elliott's  brigade  occupying  the  adjacent  lines. 
Along  the  near  edge  of  the  valley,  the  enemy  built  strong  rifle- 
pits,  with  elaborate  head-logs  and  loopholes,  from  which  a  con- 
stant fire  was  kept  up  upon  our  works.  In  the  valley  behind 
was  ample  room  for  an  unlimited  force,  which  could  be  collected 
and  massed  without  our  knowledge,  and  would  have  but  133 
yards  to  advance  under  fire  to  reach  our  works.  We  soon 
managed  to  place  obstructions  in  front  of  the  parapet  at  this 
point  and  watched  closely,  confidently  expecting  that  the  enemy 
would  here  begin  soon  to  make  zigzag  approaches  as  in  a  siege. 

On  June  22,  Grant  sent  Wilson's  and  Kautz's  divisions 
of  cavalry  upon  a  raid  against  the  Lynchburg  and  Danville 
railroads.  On  the  same  day,  the  2d  and  6th  corps  were  stretched 
out  to  the  left  with  the  intent  of  reaching  the  Weldon  R.R., 
and  perhaps  even  to  the  road  to  Lynchburg. 

Lee,  advised  of  this  movement,  sent  A.  P.  Hill  with  Wilcox's 
and  Mahone's  division,  supported  by  Johnson's,  to  meet  it.  With 
Wilcox's  division,  he  obstructed  the  advance  of  the  6th  corps 
so  effectively  that  it  failed  to  reach  even  the  Weldon  road,  by 
at  least  a  mile.  With  Mahone's  and  Johnson's  divisions,  he 
passed  through  a  gap  carelessly  left  between  the  2d  corps,  which 
was  swinging  around  to  its  left,  and  the  6th,  which  was  advanc- 
ing, and  struck  Barlow's  division  of  the  2d  in  the  rear.  Barlow's 
and  Gibbon's  divisions  were  both  badly  defeated,  losing  four 
guns  (which  were  turned  upon  the  fugitives),  several  colors  and 
about  1700  prisoners.  Mott's  division  was  also  routed  but  re- 


562  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

treated  so  precipitately  as  to  lose  few  prisoners.  Hill  returned 
at  night  to  his  intrenchments,  and  the  next  morning  the  2d  corps 
reoccupied  the  lines  from  which  it  had  been  driven  and  the  6th 
corps  formed  on  its  left  obliquely  toward  the  Weldon  road. 

Wilson  and  Kautz  were  followed  in  their  raid  by  W.  H.  F.  Lee's 
division  of  cavalry  which,  however,  was  unable  to  prevent  the 
tearing  up  of  the  Lynchburg  R.R.  from  near  Petersburg  to 
Burkeville,  and  of  the  Danville  road  from  Burkeville  south  to 
the  Staunton  River.  Here  the  bridge  was  defended  by  local 
militia  who  were  intrenched  with  artillery.  The  river  was  un- 
fordable,  and  Lee,  attacking  in  the  rear,  the  Federals  decided  to 
rejoin  Grant  at  Petersburg  by  a  circuit  to  the  east. 

Unfortunately  for  them,  Hampton's  and  Fitz-Lee's  divisions 
had  just  returned  from  the  pursuit  of  Sheridan's  cavalry  to 
Trevillian's  Station,  where  they  had  had  a  drawn  battle  on 
June  11  and  12.  These  divisions,  aided  by  W.  H.  F.  Lee's, 
which  had  continued  in  the  pursuit,  and  by  two  brigades  of 
infantry  under  Mahone,  fell  upon  Wilson  and  Kautz  on  the  29th 
at  Ream's  Station  and  routed  them  with  the  loss  of  1500  killed, 
wounded,  and  captured,  and  all  of  their  artillery  (12  guns)  and 
their  wagon-train.  They  finally  made  their  escape  across  the 
Blackwater,  burning  the  bridge  behind  them,  and  thus  cutting 
off  pursuit  by  Hampton  and  Lee.  They  reached  the  James  at 
Light  House  Point  on  July  2. 

They  had  been  absent  10  days,  had  marched  over  300  miles, 
and  torn  up  60  miles  of  railroad.  The  tracks,  however,  were  soon 
repaired  and  traffic  restored  by  all  the  lines.  By  the  Weldon 
road,  however,  it  soon  became  necessary  to  halt  the  trains  short 
of  Petersburg,  and  to  wagon  by  a  roundabout  road  into  the  town. 

Between  July  6  and  9,  Grant  had  found  it  necessary  to  send 
the  three  divisions  of  the  6th  corps  to  Washington  to  oppose 
Early  and  Breckenridge.  These,  whom  we  saw  sent  by  Lee, 
from  Cold  Harbor,  to  check  Hunter's  advance  upon  Lynchburg, 
had  reached  Lynchburg  before  him.  Hunter  feared  either  to 
attack,  or  to  retreat  by  the  way  he  had  come.  After  a  pause 
of  two  days  he  started,  on  June  19,  through  W.Va.  via  the 
Great  Kanawha,  the  Ohio  River,  and  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio 
R.R.  to  Harper's  Ferry.  This  left  the  valley  open.  Early  at 


THE  MINE  563 

once  moved  down  it  to  demonstrate  against  Washington.  The 
only  force  available  to  oppose  him  was  Wallace's  command  from 
Baltimore,  with  Ricketts's  division  of  the  6th  corps,  which  was 
the  first  to  arrive.  Early  had  crossed  the  Potomac  at  Shepherds- 
town  and  moved  through  the  passes  of  South  Mountain.  On 
July  9,  he  attacked  and  defeated  Wallace  on  the  Monocacy. 
The  next  day  he  moved  upon  Washington,  Wallace  being 
driven  toward  Baltimore. 

Never  before,  probably,  had  Washington  been  as  bare  of  troops 
as  when  Early  arrived  before  it  on  the  afternoon  of  July  11. 
But  there  were  regular  garrisons  of  infantry  and  artillery  at 
many  of  the  permanent  forts, — District  of  Columbia  volunteers, 
regiments  of  Veteran  Reserves,  many  miscellaneous  detach- 
ments at  the  camp  of  instruction,  and  about  2000  organized  em- 
ployees of  the  quartermaster's  department,  — in  all  over  20,000 
men.  These  troops  alone,  without  aid,  could  have  defended  the 
city  indefinitely  and  forced  Early  to  undertake  a  siege.  That 
night,  there  arrived  the  two  remaining  divisions  of  the  6th  corps, 
and  6000  men  of  the  19th  corps,  under  Emory,  from  New  Orleans. 

In  the  afternoon,  Early  had  reconnoitred,  and,  in  consultation 
with  his  officers,  had  ordered  an  assault  in  the  morning.  It  is 
scarcely  credible  that  he  would  have  made  more  than  a  demon- 
stration, for  any  real  attack  would  have  been  but  a  bloody 
farce.  In  the  night  he  heard  of  the  arrival  of  the  troops  and 
in  the  morning  could  see  them.  He  did  not  attack  and  that 
night  he  withdrew,  marching  to  Leesburg,  where  he  recrossed 
the  Potomac.  Grant  had  intended,  on  Early 's  repulse,  not 
only  to  bring  back  the  6th  corps  to  Petersburg,  but  also  to  bring 
down  the  19th.  Had  he  now  carried  out  those  intentions,  it  is 
likely  that  Lee  would  have  brought  down  Early.  It  was  Lee's 
policy,  however,  to  fight  for  time  and  delay  matters  by  division, 
rather  than  to  hasten  them  by  concentration.  So  he  left  Early 
in  the  Valley,  where  his  presence  would  be  a  constant  menace 
and  would  neutralize  more  troops  than  his  equivalent  elsewhere. 

On  June  30, 1  became  convinced  that  the  enemy  were  prepar- 
ing to  mine  our  position  at  the  Elliott  Salient.  At  that  point, 
incessant  fire  was  kept  up  by  their  sharpshooters,  while  a  few 
hundred  yards  to  the  right  and  left  the  fire  had  been  gradually 


564  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

allowed  to  diminish  and  men  might  show  themselves  without 
being  fired  at.  That  indicated  that  some  operation  was  going 
on,  and  for  several  days  I  had  expected  to  see  zigzag  approaches 
started  on  the  surface  of  the  ground.  When  several  days  had 
passed  and  nothing  appeared,  I  became  satisfied  that  their 
activity  was  underground.  On  my  way  home,  I  was  that  day 
wounded  by  a  sharpshooter  and  received  a  furlough  of  six  weeks 
to  visit  my  home  in  Ga.  On  my  way  to  the  cars  next  day,  I 
was  driven  by  Lee's  headquarters,  where  I  reported  my  belief 
about  the  mine.  There  happened  to  be  present  Mr.  Lawley,  the 
English  correspondent  of  the  London  Times,  who  was  much 
interested  and  asked  how  far  it  would  be  necessary  to  tunnel 
to  get  under  our  works.  I  answered  about  500  feet.  He  stated 
that  the  longest  military  tunnel  or  gallery  which  had  ever  been 
run  was  at  the  siege  of  Delhi,  and  that  it  did  not  exceed  400  feet. 
That  it  was  found  impossible  to  ventilate  for  any  greater  dis- 
tance. I  replied  that  in  the  Federal  army  were  many  Pa. 
coal  miners  who  could  be  relied  on  to  ventilate  mines  any  dis- 
tance that  might  be  necessary,  and  it  would  not  do  to  rely 
upon  military  precedents.  It  proved  that  my  suspicion  was 
correct. 

It  was  June  30  when  I  guessed  it.  The  gallery  had  been 
commenced  on  June  27.  It  was  undertaken,  in  opposition  to 
the  advice  of  all  the  military  engineers  at  Federal  headquarters, 
by  Lt.-Col.  Pleasants  of  the  48th  Pa.  regiment,  a  coal  miner, 
who  saw  the  opportunity  which  the  situation  offered.  A  gallery 
was  successfully  extended  511  feet,  with  two  branch  galleries  at 
the  end,  to  the  right  and  left,  each  37  feet  long.  These  branch 
galleries  were  charged  with  gunpowder  in  eight  parcels  of  1000 
pounds  each,  connected  by  open  troughs  of  powder  to  be  fired 
by  safety  fuses  coming  through  the  tamping  and  along  the 
gallery.  . 

His  method  of  ventilation  was  very  simple.  When  the  tunnel 
had  penetrated  the  hill  far  enough  to  need  it,  a  close  partition 
was  built  across  it  near  the  entrance  with  a  close  fitting  door. 
Through  the  partition  on  the  side  of  this  door  was  passed  the 
open  end  of  a  long  square  box,  or  closed  trough,  which  was 
built  along  on  the  floor  of  the  tunnel,  conveying  the  fresh  out- 


THE  MINE  565 

side  air  to  the  far  end  of  the  tunnel,  where  the  men  extending  it 
were  at  work. 

To  create  a  draft  through  this  air-box,  a  fireplace  was  excavated 
in  the  side  of  the  tunnel,  within  the  partition,  and  a  chimney 
was  pierced  through  the  hill  above  it.  A  small  fire  in  this 
chimney  place,  and  the  outside  air  would  pass  through  the  air- 
box  to  the  far  end  of  the  tunnel,  whence  it  would  return  and 
escape  up  the  chimney,  taking  with  it  the  foul  air  of  the  tunnel. 
This  tunnel  was  finished  July  17,  the  galleries  on  the  23d,  and 
the  mine  was  charged  and  tamped  on  the  28th. 

Lee,  on  receipt  of  my  message  on  July  1,  ordered  our  engineers 
to  start  countermines  at  the  Elliott  Salient.  Two  shafts  were 
sunk  about  10  feet  and  listening  galleries  were  run  out  from 
each.  Unfortunately,  the  shafts  were  located  on  the  right  and 
left  flanks  of  the  battery,  and  the  enemy's  gallery  passed  at  a 
depth  of  20  feet  under  the  apex,  and  was  so  silently  built  that 
our  miners  never  knew  of  their  proximity.  Had  they  detected  it, 
they  would  have  hastened  to  explode  what  is  called  a  camonflet, 
an  undercharged  or  "smothered  mine,"  which  does  not  disturb 
the  surface,  but  caves  in  adjacent  galleries. 

By  July  10,  our  miners  had  done  enough  work,  had  it  been 
done  at  the  apex  of  the  salient,  to  have  heard  the  enemy,  who 
would  have  been  directly  beneath  them.  Work  was  not  only 
kept  up,  however,  on  the  flanks,  but  at  two  other  positions 
farther  to  the  left,  known  as  Colquitt's  and  Gracie's  salients, 
countermines  were  also  begun;  at  Colquitt's  on  the  10th  and 
at  Gracie's  on  the  19th.  All  four  of  our  mines  were  constantly 
pushed  until  the  30th,  when  the  explosion  occurred,  the  total 
length  of  our  galleries  being  then  about  375  feet.  Of  the  two 
galleries  on  each  side  of  the  mine,  one,  which  was  unoccupied, 
was  destroyed  by  the  explosion.  In  the  other,  the  miners  were 
at  work,  but,  though  much  shaken  up,  the  galleries  were  not 
crushed  and  the  miners  climbed  out  and  escaped. 

Meanwhile,  in  spite  of  predictions  of  failure,  the  mine  had 
been  constructed,  and  though  we  were  known  to  suspect  it,  and 
our  countermining  operations  could  be  heard,  it  was  now  deter- 
mined to  delay  the  explosion  until  preparations  could  be  made 
to  have  it  followed  by  a  grand  charge,  supported  by  the  con- 


566  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

centration  of  a  great  force,  both  of  infantry  and  artillery.  That 
it  might  be  the  more  effective,  Grant  determined  to  combine 
strategy  with  main  force,  and  first  endeavor  to  draw  a  large  part 
of  our  infantry  to  the  north  side  of  the  James.  At  suitable 
points,  he  had  already  built  signal-towers  overlooking  our  lines, 
and  some  of  our  most  important  roads ;  and  now  the  artillery 
officers  were  directed  to  prepare  specially  to  concentrate  fire 
upon  every  gun  in  our  lines  which  could  be  used  for  the  defence 
of  Elliott's  Salient.  In  obedience  to  these  instructions,  Hum- 
phreys reports,  "heavy  guns  and  mortars,  81  in  all,  and  about 
the  same  number  of  field-guns,"  were  prepared  with  abundant 
ammunition. 

At  Deep  Bottom,  Butler  maintained  two  pontoon  bridges 
across  the  James,  with  part  of  the  10th  corps  on  the  north  side, 
under  cover  of  his  gunboats  and  ironclads.  Of  course,  we  had 
to  maintain  a  moderate  force  in  observation,  which,  under  Gen. 
Connor,  was  located  near  Bailey's  Creek.  Grant  could  cross 
both  the  Appomattox  and  the  James  and  go  from  his  lines  around 
Petersburg  to  Deep  Bottom  by  a  march  of  12  miles,  all  of  it 
entirely  concealed  from  our  view.  Lee  could  only  send  troops 
to  meet  him  by  a  march  of  20  miles. 

On  the  afternoon  of  July  26,  Hancock  with  about  20,000 
infantry  and  Sheridan  with  two  divisions,  about  6000  cavalry, 
were  started  to  Deep  Bottom.  It  was  expected  that  this  force, 
aided  by  the  10th  corps,  would  surprise  the  Confederate  bri- 
gade (Conner's),  and  would  then  make  a  dash  toward  Richmond. 
Sheridan  was  directed  also  to  endeavor  to  cut  the  railroads  north 
of  Richmond.  During  the  night,  this  force  crossed  the  river, 
and,  at  dawn  on  the  27th,  moved  upon  our  lines  and  captured 
four  20-Pr.  Parrotts  in  an  advanced  position. 

It  happened  that  Lee  had  noted  activity  of  the  enemy  in  that 
quarter.  Wilcox's  division  was  already  at  Drury's  Bluff,  and, 
on  the  24th,  it  and  Kershaw's  division  were  sent  to  reenforce 
Conner.  This  force  made  such  a  show  that  Hancock,  finding  it 
there  before  him,  did  not  deem  it  wise  to  assault  their  line.  On 
their  left,  Kershaw  even  advanced  against  Sheridan's  cavalry 
and  forced  it  to  retreat.  It  took  a  position  behind  a  ridge, 
where  it  dismounted  a  considerable  force  armed  with  the  Spencer 


THE  MINE  567 

magazine  carbines.  Kershaw  unwisely  attempted  a  charge  and 
was  quickly  repulsed,  losing  250  prisoners  and  two  colors. 

On  hearing  of  Hancock's  crossing  on  the  morning  of  the  27th, 
and  that  prisoners  had  been  captured  from  the  2d,  10th,  and  18th 
corps,  Lee  immediately  sent  over  W.  H.  F.  Lee's  division  of 
cavalry  and  Heth's  infantry  of  Hill's  corps.  Later  in  the  day, 
he  arranged  to  have  Field's  division  of  infantry  withdrawn  from 
his  trenches  at  dark,  to  follow  during  the  night,  and  Fitz-Lee's 
cavalry  the  next  morning.  President  Davis  was  also  advised, 
and  on  the  29th  the  Local  Defence  troops  in  Richmond  were 
called  out  to  the  defence  of  the  Richmond  lines.  These  troops 
were  never  called  out  except  in  the  gravest  emergencies,  which 
indicates  the  importance  Lee  attached  to  the  demonstration. 

But  it  was  only  a  demonstration  designed  to  be  abandoned,  if 
it  failed  to  make  a  surprise  of  our  lines  at  Deep  Bottom  on  the 
27th.  As  this  became  fully  apparent  on  the  28th,  orders  were 
issued  from  Deep  Bottom  to  prepare  the  mine  for  explosion  on 
the  morning  of  the  30th.  Orders  were  also  given  for  the  2d  corps 
with  a  division  of  the  18th  corps  and  one  of  the  10th  to  return 
and  take  part  in  the  assault.  Sheridan's  cavalry  was  also  to 
return,  and  passing  in  rear  of  the  army  to  take  position  on  its 
left  to  threaten  our  extreme  right  and  prevent  our  reenforcing 
the  vicinity  of  the  mine.  The  explosion  might  have  been 
arranged  for  the  afternoon  of  the  29th,  but  the  morning  of  the 
30th  was  chosen,  as  it  permitted  the  placing  of  more  heavy  guns 
and  mortars  for  the  bombardment,  which  would  follow  the 
explosion,  as  well  as  preliminary  arrangements,  such  as  massing 
the  troops,  removing  parapets  and  abattis  to  make  passages  for 
the  assaulting  columns,  and  the  posting  of  pioneers  to  remove 
our  abattis  and  open  passages  for  artillery  through  our  lines. 
Depots  of  intrenching  tools,  with  sandbags,  gabions,  fascines, 
etc.,  were  established,  that  lodgments  might  be  more  quickly 
made,  though  the  pioneers  of  all  regiments  were  already  well 
supplied  with  tools.  Engineer  officers  were  designated  to  accom- 
pany all  columns,  and  even  pontoon  trains  were  at  hand  to 
bridge  the  Appomattox  in  pursuit  of  fugitives.  Finally,  Meade 
personally  impressed  on  every  corps  commander  the  importance 
of  celerity  of  movement.  Briefly,  no  possible  precaution  was 


568  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

omitted  to  be  carefully  ordered,  and  the  success  of  the  Deep 
Bottom  expedition,  in  drawing  Lee's  forces  to  that  locality,  had 
exceeded  all  expectations. 

On  the  morning  of  the  30th,  Lee  had  left  to  hold  the  10  miles 
of  lines  about  Petersburg  but  three  divisions  (Hoke's,  Johnson's, 
and  Mahone's),  about  18,000  men,  most  of  the  rest  of  his  army 
being  20  miles  away.  Hoke  and  Johnson  held  from  the  Appo- 
mattox  on  the  left  to  a  little  beyond  the  mine.  Mahone  held  all 
beyond,  one  brigade  being  four  miles  to  the  right.  The  2d,  5th, 
9th,  and  parts  of  the  10th  and  18th,  with  two  divisions  of  Sheridan's 
cavalry,  16  divisions  in  all,  near  60,000  men,  were  concentrated 
to  follow  up  the  surprise  to  be  given  by  the  explosion  under 
Johnson's  division.  That  it  should  be  the  more  complete,  for 
two  days  no  heavy  guns  or  mortars  had  been  fired,  that  the 
Confederates  might  believe  that  the  Federals  were  preparing  to 
retreat. 

Everything  now  seemed  to  be  working  exactly  as  Grant  would 
have  it,  and  it  is  difficult  to  entirely  explain  how  the  attack  came 
to  fail  so  utterly.  Several  causes  cooperated  which  will  be 
presently  referred  to,  but  among  them  was  the  same  cause 
which,  on  May  12,  nullified  the  Federal  surprise  at  the  Bloody 
Angle  at  Spottsylvania.  Too  many  troops  had  been  brought 
together,  and  they  were  in  each  other's  way.  On  a  smaller 
scale,  in  the  assault  of  Fort  Sanders  at  Knoxville,  three  Confeder- 
ate brigades  got  mingled  in  the  assault,  which  at  once  lost  its 
vigor,  though  it  did  not  retreat  until  after  receiving  severe  punish- 
ment. The  brigadier  in  command,  on  this  occasion,  ascribed  his 
failure  to  the  presence  of  the  two  other  brigades  who  should  have 
been  upon  his  flanks. 

The  assault  was  to  be  led  by  Ledlie's  division  of  the  9th  corps, 
a  selection  made  by  lot,  and  a  very  unfortunate  one,  as  Ledlie 
and  Ferrero,  who  commanded  the  colored  division,  which  was  to 
follow  Ledlie,  both  took  shelter  in  a  bomb-proof,  where  they  re- 
mained during  the  entire  action.  The  mine  was  ordered  to  be 
fired  at  3.30  A.M.,  but  the  fuses  had  been  spliced  and  when  first 
fired,  failed  at  the  splice.  After  an  hour,  an  officer  and  sergeant 
entered  the  tunnel  and  relighted  the  fuse.  The  explosion  occurred 
at  4.40.  As  the  sun  rose  about  4.50,  the  delay  had  been  advan- 


THE  MINE  569 

tageous,  as  it  gave  daylight  for  the  movements  of  the  troops  and 
for  the  artillery  fire. 

The  explosion  made  a  crater  150  feet  long,  97  feet  wide,  and 
30  feet  deep,  the  contents  being  hurled  so  high  in  the  air  that 
the  foremost  ranks  of  the  assaulting  columns,  150  yards  away, 
shrank  back  in  disorder  in  fear  of  the  falling  earth.  The  bulk 
of  the  earth,  however,  fell  immediately  around  the  crater,  mingled 
with  the  debris  of  2  guns,  22  cannoneers,  and  perhaps  250  in- 
fantry (nine  companies  of  the  19th  and  22d  S.C.,  which  had 
been  carried  up  in  the  air).  Quite  a  number  of  these  who  fell 
safely  were  dug  out  and  rescued  alive  by  the  assaulting  column. 
Some,  not  yet  aroused,  were  lost,  covered  up  in  the  bomb- 
proofs  of  the  adjacent  trenches  by  the  falling  earth.  This 
formed  a  high  embankment,  as  it  were,  all  around  the  crater, 
with  one  enormous  clod,  the  size  of  a  small  cabin,  perched  about 
the  middle  of  the  inside  rim,  which  remained  a  landmark  for 
weeks.  A  high  interior  line,  called  a  trench  cavalier,  had  been 
built  across  the  gorge  of  the  salient  enclosing  a  triangular  space, 
and  the  left  centre  of  this  space  about  coincided  with  the  centre 
of  the  explosion.  The  parapets  were  partially  destroyed  and 
largely  buried  by  the  falling  earth. 

Into  this  crater  the  leading  division  literally  swarmed,  until 
it  was  packed  about  as  full  as  it  could  hold,  and  what  could  not 
get  in  there,  crowded  into  the  adjacent  trenches,  which  the 
falling  earth  had  caused  to  be  vacated  for  a  short  distance  on 
each  flank.  But,  considering  the  surprise,  the  novelty  of  the 
occasion  and  the  terrific  cannonade  by  150  guns  and  mortars 
which  was  opened  immediately,  the  coolness  and  self-possession 
of  the  entire  brigade  was  remarkable,  and  to.it  is  to  be  attributed 
the  success  of  the  defence.  This  was  conducted  principally  by 
Col.  McMaster  of  the  17th  S.C.,  Gen.  Elliott  having  been  soon 
severely  wounded.  The  effect  of  the  artillery  cannonade  was 
more  a  moral  effect  than  a  physical  one,  for  the  smoke  so  obscured 
the  view  that  the  fire  was  largely  at  random,  at  least  for  one  or 
two  hours,  during  which  it  was  in  fullest  force.  The  effort  was  at 
once  made  to  collect  a  small  force  in  the  trenches  upon  each 
flank,  and  one  in  an  intrenchment  occupying  a  slight  depression 
which  ran  parallel  to  our  line  of  battle  some  250  yards  in  rear 


570  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

of  it,  the  effort  being  to  confine  the  enemy  to  the  crater  and  the 
lines  immediately  adjoining.  The  multiplicity  of  the  deep  and 
narrow  trenches,  and  the  bomb-proofs  in  the  rear  of  our  lines, 
doubtless  contributed  to  our  success  in  doing  this  on  the  flanks, 
but  there  was  also  decided  lack  of  vigor  and  enterprise  on  the 
part  of  the  enemy,  which  permitted  us  to  form  barricades,  which 
were  successfully  defended  to  the  last. 

Meanwhile  the  reinforcements  to  the  storming  column,  in- 
stead of  spreading  to  the  flanks,  massed  outside  of  our  lines  in 
rear  of  the  storming  column,  which  had  made  no  further  advance, 
but  had  filled  the  crater  and  all  the  captured  lines.  Several 
efforts  were  made  to  advance  from  time  to  time,  but  the  first 
were  feeble,  and  could  be  checked  by  the  remnants  of  the  bri- 
gade under  McMaster,  until  two  regiments  of  Wise's  brigade 
and  two  of  Ransom's  were  brought  up  from  the  left.  With  their 
aid,  the  situation  was  made  safe  and  held  until  about  10  A.M., 
when  Mahone  arrived  at  the  head  of  three  brigades  of  his  corps, 
drawn  from  the  lines  on  our  right.  A  regiment  of  Hoke's  from 
the  left  also  came  up  later. 

In  the  meantime,  a  few  of  our  guns  had  found  themselves  able 
to  fire  with  great  effect  upon  the  enemy  massed  in  front  of  our 
lines.  The  left  gun  in  the  next  salient  to  the  right,  occupied  by 
Davidson's  battery,  was  in  an  embrasure  which  flanked  the 
Pegram  Salient,  but  was  not  open  to  any  gun  on  the  enemy's 
line.  This  gun  did  fearful  execution,  being  scarcely  400  yards 
distant.  It  was  fired  by  Maj.  Gibbes  commanding  the  battalion, 
for  perhaps  40  rounds,  until  he  was  badly  wounded,  after 
which  it  was  served  by  Col.  Huger  and  Haskell,  Winthrop,  and 
Mason  of  my  staff,  and  later  by  some  of  Wise's  infantry.  A  hot 
fire  was  turned  upon  it,  but  it  was  well  protected  and  could 
never  be  kept  silent  when  the  enemy  showed  himself. 

Five  hundred  yards  to  the  left  was  a  four-gun  battery  under 
Capt.  Wright  of  Coit's  battalion,  in  a  depression  behind  our  line, 
and  masked  from  the  enemy  by  some  trees.  But  it  had  a 
flanking  fire  on  the  left  of  Pegram's  Salient  and  across  all  the 
approaches  and  a  number  of  infantry  of  Wise's  brigade  could 
also  add  their  fire.  Wright's  fire  was  rapid,  incessant,  and 
accurate,  causing  great  loss.  The  Federal  artillery  made  vain 


THE  MINE  571 

efforts  to  locate  him  with  their  mortar  shells  which  tore  up  the 
ground  all  around,  but  could  never  hit  him  or  silence  him. 

Besides  these,  a  half-dozen  or  more  of  Coehorn  mortars,  under 
Col.  Haskell,  from  two  or  three  different  ravines  in  the  rear,  threw 
shell  aimed  at  the  crater.  And,  finally,  600  yards  directly  in  rear 
of  the  mine  was  the  sunken  Jerusalem  Plank  road,  in  which  I 
had  placed  Haskell's  battalion  of  16  guns  about  the  20th  of 
June,  and  he  had  been  kept  there  ever  since,  without  showing  a 
gun  or  throwing  up  any  earth  which  would  disclose  his  position. 
He  had  suffered  some  loss  from  random  bullets  coming  over 
the  parapets  at  the  salient  500  yards  in  front,  but  it  was  borne 
rather  than  disclose  the  location. 

This  morning,  on  one  occasion,  a  charge  was  attempted  by 
the  colored  division,  part  of  which  was  brought  out  of  the  crater 
and  started  toward  the  Plank  road.  Then  Haskell's  guns  showed 
themselves  and  opened  fire.  The  charge  was  quickly  driven  back 
with  severe  loss  among  its  white  officers.  A  single  private,  with 
his  musket  at  a  support  arms,  made  the  charge,  running  all  the 
way  to  the  guns  and  jumping  into  the  sunken  road  between 
them,  where  he  was  felled  with  a  rammer  staff.  Meanwhile,  our 
guns  across  the  Appomattox  on  the  Federal  right,  and  from 
our  left  near  the  river,  had  kept  up  a  reply  to  the  Federal  can-, 
nonade  to  prevent  their  concentration  opposite  the  mine.  Lee 
and  Beauregard  had  early  come  to  the  field,  which  they  surveyed 
from  the  windows  of  the  Gee  house,  where  Johnson  made  head- 
quarters, on  the  Jerusalem  Plank  road,  near  Haskell's  guns. 
Hill  had  gone  to  bring  up  his  troops. 

On  the  arrival  of  Mahone,  he  at  once  prepared  to  attack,  and 
had  formed  Weiseger's  brigade,  when  a  renewed  attempt  to 
advance  was  made  from  the  enemy's  lines  on  our  left  of  the 
crater.  He  at  once  met  this  by  a  counter-charge  of  Weiseger's 
with  a  portion  of  Elliott's  which  drove  the  enemy  back  and  which 
caused  the  retreat  from  the  rear  of  their  lines  of  many  who  had 
been  sheltered  within  them.  These  suffered  severely  by  our  fire 
from  the  flanks  as  they  crossed  the  open  spaces  behind,  under 
fire  from  the  guns  upon  both  flanks  and  infantry  as  well. 

This  retreat  under  such  severe  fire  was  seen  in  the  Federal 
lines,  just  in  time  to  put  a  stop  to  an  attack  upon  our  right 


572 


MILITARY  MEMOIRS 


flank,  about  to  be  made  by  Ayres's  division  of  Warren's  corps, 
which  had  been  ordered  to  capture  the  "  one-gun  battery  "  on 
our  right,  as  they  called  the  one  at  which  Gibbes  had  been 
wounded.1 

There  was  very  little  infantry  supporting  this  gun,  or  able  to 
reach  it,  without  exposure.  Ayres's  attack  would  probably  have 
been  successful.  He  was  about  to  go  forward,  when  Meade 
directed  all  offensive  operations  to  cease.  Wright's  brigade 
arriving  about  half-past  eleven,  Mahone  made  a  second  attack, 
which  was  repulsed  with  the  aid  of  the  Federal  artillery  bearing 
upon  the  ground. 

Between  1  and  2  P.M.,  Sanders's  brigade  having  arrived,  and 
also  the  61st  N.C.  from  Hoke,  a  combined  movement  upon  both 
flanks  of  the  crater  was  organized.  Mahone  attacked  on  the 
left,  with  Sanders's  brigade,  the  61st  N.C.  and  the  17th  S.C.  ; 
Johnson  attacked  on  the  right  with  the  23d  S.C.  and  the  re- 
maining five  companies  of  the  22d,  all  that  could  be  promptly 
collected  on  that  flank. 

This  attack  was  easily  successful.  Mahone  has  stated  that 
the  number  of  prisoners  taken  in  the  crater  was  1101,  including 
two  brigade  commanders,  Bartlett  and  Marshall. 

The  tabular  statement  -of  the  Medical  Department  gives  the 
Federal  casualties  of  the  day  as:  killed,  419;  wounded,  1679; 
missing,  1910 ;  total,  4008.  Elliott's  brigade  reported  the  loss 
by  the  explosion  as :  — 


TOTAL 

AGO. 

In  18th  S.C.  4  companies 
In  22d  S.C.  5  companies 
In  Pegram's  battery  out  of  30 
present 

86 
170 

22 

278 

About  300  were 
blown  up,  but  a 
small  percentage 
escaped  alive. 

Including  these,  Johnson  reports  the  casualties  in  his  division 
(Elliott,  Wise,  Ransom,  Gracie),  as  follows :  — 

Killed,  165;  wounded,  415;  missing,  359;  total,  938. 

1  Humphreys  calls  this  a  two-gun  battery.     There  were  two  embrasures 
and  two  guns,  but  only  one  used.     The  other  did  not  bear  where  desired. 


THE  MINE  573 

There  are  no  returns  for  Mahone's  and  Hoke's  divisions. 
Hoke's  division  was  composed  of  Corse's,  Clingman's,  Fulton's, 
Hagood's,  and  Colquitt's  brigades,  and  Mahone's  had  only  three 
brigades  on  the  field, — Weiseger's,  Wright's,  and  Sanders's.  Of 
these  eight  brigades,  only  Weiseger's  had  serious  losses,  but  there 
are  no  reports  except  for  Colquitt's,  who,  like  the  rest  of  Hoke's 
division,  held  a  portion  of  the  line  not  attacked.  His  casualties 
were  4  killed  and  27  wounded.  The  total  Confederate  loss  is 
given  in  the  Tabular  Statement  of  the  Medical  Department. as: 
400  killed,  600  wounded,  and  200  missing,  which  is  perhaps 
between  200  and  300  too  small. 

The  Military  Court  censured  Gens.  Burnside,  Ledlie,  Ferrero, 
Willcox,  and  Col.  Bliss,  commanding  a  brigade.  They  also  ex- 
pressed their  opinion :  — 

"  That  explicit  orders  should  have  been  given  assigning  one  officer  to 
the  command  of  all  the  troops  intended  to  engage  in  the  assault  when 
the  Commanding  General  was  not  present  in  person  to  witness  the 
operations." 

There  is  nothing  in  the  Reports  to  explain  this.  Grant  sent  a 
despatch  to  Halleck  at  10  A.M.,  saying  that  he  "was  just  from  the 
front,"  and  about  that  time  Humphreys  reports  that  Meade, 
with  Grant's  concurrence,  ordered  the  cessation  of  all  offensive 
movements. 


CHAPTER  XXIII 
THE  FALL  OF  1864 

The  "Situation  in  August.  Hood  appointed  to  succeed  Johnston.  Evacua- 
tion of  Atlanta.  Capture  of  Mobile.  Reelection  of  Lincoln.  Battle 
of  Franklin.  Sherman's  March.  Fort  Fisher.  Conference  at  For- 
tress Monroe.  Fort  Stedman.  Movements  of  Grant.  Five  Forks. 
Fort  Whitworth  and  Fort  Gregg.  Evacuation  of  Petersburg.  Appo- 
mattox.  Correspondence  between  Lee  and  Grant.  Conversations 
with  Lee.  The  Meeting  at  Appomattox.  The  Surrender.  Visit  to 
Washington.  Conversations  with  Mr.  Washburne.  Return  Home. 
Record  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia. 

GEN.  HUMPHREYS  writes  of  the  situation  in  Aug.,  soon  after 
the  fiasco  of  the  Mine,  as  follows : *  — 

"Between  this  time  and  the  month  of  March,  1865,  several  movements 
of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  and  the  Army  of  the  James  were  made  to  the 
right  and  to  the  left,  which  resulted  in  the  extension  of  our  line  of  intrench- 
ments  in  both  directions,  and  caused  a  corresponding  extension  of  the 
Confederate  intrenchments  on  our  left,  and  their  occupation  in  stronger 
force  of  their  intrenchments  on  the  north  bank  of  the  James.  By  this 
process  their  lines  finally  became  so  thinly  manned,  when  the  last  move- 
ment to  our  left  was  made  in  March,  1865,  as  to  be  vulnerable  at  one  or 
two  points,  where  some  of  the  obstructions  in  their  front  had  been  in  a 
great  measure  destroyed  by  the  exigencies  of  the  winter." 

In  other  words,  attacks  upon  our  lines  were  now  abandoned 
for  a  succession  of  feints,  first  upon  one  flank  and  then  upon 
the  other,  by  which  our  lines  were  extended  at  both  ends  to  the 
point  of  breaking.  This  point  was  reached  in  eight  months  at 
one  or  two  places,  where  the  Confederates  had  been  tempted  by 
the  severity  of  the  winter  to  burn  the  abattis  in  front  of  their 
breastworks.  We  will  not  attempt  to  follow  either  these  efforts 
of  the  enemy,  or  Lee's  aggressive  counter-movements,  of  which 

1  Virginia  Campaign,  p.  267. 

574 


THE  FALL  OF  1864  575 

there  was  no  lack,  though  all  were  attended  with  much  hard 
fighting. 

Besides  the  heavy  casualties  of  these  incessant  affairs,  which 
followed  each  other  at  short  intervals  from  Aug.  1  to  Nov.  1, 
there  was  daily  sharpshooting  and  much  mortar  and  artillery 
practice,  which  helped  swell  the  totals.  Confederate  reports  are 
entirely  lacking,  but  losses  were  fully  as  heavy  in  proportion  to 
the  numbers  engaged,  as  were  the  Federal  losses ;  for  on  several 
occasions  Lee  was  the  aggressor  and  lost  heavily.  On  one, 
Oct.  7,  on  the  Darbytown  road,  Field's  division  was  sent  to 
charge  two  brigades  in  breastworks,  which  proved  to  be  armed 
with  the  Spencer  magazine-guns.  He  was  quickly  repulsed  with 
severe  loss,  which  included  Gregg  of  Texas  killed,  and  Bratton 
of  S.C.  wounded.  The  total  Federal  casualties  for  this  period, 
Aug.  1  to  Dec.  31,  are  given  as:  killed,  2172;  wounded,  11,138; 
missing,  11,311;  total,  24,621.  The  corresponding  Confederate 
losses  were  probably  between  12,000  and  14,000. 

It  will  afford  •&  better  view  of  the  situation  as  a  whole  to 
glance  at  those  events  referred  to  by  Swinton,  where  he  says :  — 

"Had  not  success  elsewhere  come  to  brighten  the  horizon,  it  would 
have  been  difficult  to  raise  new  forces  to  recruit  the  Army  of  the  Poto- 
mac." 

The  first  and  most  important  of  the  events  resulting  in  "suc- 
cess elsewhere"  was  President  Davis  relieving  Joseph  E.  Johnston 
of  the  command  of  the  army  opposing  Sherman  at  Atlanta,  and 
appointing  Hood  to  succeed  him.  This  step  was  taken  with 
great  reluctance,  and  under  great  popular  and  political  pressure 
brought  by  Gov.  Brown  and  Sen.  Hill  of  Ga.,  who  claimed  that 
Johnston  intended  to  surrender  Atlanta  without  giving  battle. 
After  many  reiterations  of  such  charges,  Davis  was  at  length  led 
to  give  a  promise  to  relieve  Johnston  if,  on  being  asked  for  some 
assurance  of  his  intention  to  fight,  he  failed  to  give  it.  Gen. 
Bragg  was  sent  to  interview  him,  and  after  spending  two  days 
with  him,  wired :  — 

"He  has  not  sought  my  advice,  and  it  was  not  volunteered.     I  cannot 
learn  that  he  has  any  more  plan  in  the  future  than  he  has  had  in  the  past." 

Davis  then  wired  to  Johnston  a  direct  inquiry,  as  follows :  — 


576  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

"I  wish  to  hear  from  you  as  to  present  situation,  and  your  plan  of 
operations,  so  specifically  as  will  enable  me  to  anticipate  events." 

This  was  sent  July  16,  and  Johnston  replied  the  same  day :  — 

"...  As  the  enemy  has  double  our  number,  we  must  be  on  the  defen- 
sive. My  plan  of  operations  must,  therefore,  depend  upon  that  of  the 
enemy.  It  is  mainly  to  watch  for  an  opportunity  to  fight  to  advantage. 
We  are  trying  to  put  Atlanta  into  condition  to  be  held  for  a  day  or  two  by 
the  Ga.  militia,  that  army  movements  may  be  freer  and  wider." 

This  reply  was  certainly  not  specific,  and  was  considered 
evasive.  It  will  be  remembered  that,  in  April,  1862,  the  rela- 
tions between  the  President  and  Johnston  had  been  strained  to 
the  verge  of  breaking  by  the  general's  reticence  as  to  his  plans, 
and  avoidance  of  interviews,  even  by  galloping  to  the  front  on 
seeing  the  President  approach  near  the  field  of  Seven  Pines. 
There  a  crisis  was  avoided  by  Johnston's  wound  and  loss  of  the 
command  of  the  army. 

Now,  a  very  similar  issue  had  arisen,  and  with  it  the  old 
and  bitter  feelings  on  each  side.  On  the  17th  Adjt.-Gen.  Cooper 
wired  Johnson :  — 

"  I  am  directed  by  the  Sec.  of  War  to  inform  you  that  as  you  have 
failed  to  arrest  the  advance  of  the  enemy  to  the  vicinity  of  Atlanta,  and 
express  no  confidence  that  you  can  defeat  or  repel  him,  you  are  hereby 
relieved  from  the  command  of  the  Army  and  Department  of  the  Tenn., 
which  you  will  immediately  turn  over  to  Gen.  Hood." 

To  this  Johnston  replied  that  the  order  had  been  received 
and  obeyed,  and  added :  — 

"As  to  the  alleged  cause  of  my  removal  I  assert  that  Sherman's  army 
is  much  stronger,  compared  with  that  of  Tenn.,  than  Grant's  compared 
with  that  of  northern  Va.  Yet  the  enemy  has  been  compelled  to  advance 
much  more  slowly  to  the  vicinity  o£  Atlanta  than  to  that  of  Richmond 
and  Petersburg,  and  penetrated  much  deeper  into  Va.  than  into  Ga.  Con- 
fident language  by  a  military  commander  is  not  usually  regarded  as  evi- 
dence of  competence." 

It  is  vain  to  speculate  on  what  might  have  happened  had 
Johnston  been  left  in  command.  Had  Lee  been  commander-in- 
chief ,  he  would  not  have  been  relieved,  as  was  indicated  by  his 
restoring  Johnston  to  command  on  his  taking  that  position  in 


THE  FALL  OF  1864  577 

February.  But  it  is  a  fact  that  Johnston  had  never  fought  but 
one  aggressive  battle,  the  battle  of  Seven  Pines,  which  was 
phenomenally  mismanaged. 

On  the  20th  and  21st,  Hood  attacked  Sherman,  but  was  de- 
feated, and  after  a  month  of  minor  operations  was  finally,  on 
Sept.  1,  compelled  to  evacuate  Atlanta.  Meanwhile,  a  naval 
expedition,  sent  under  Farragut  against  Mobile,  had  captured 
the  forts  commanding  the  harbor  of  that  city  on  Aug.  23.  These 
two  events,  the  capture  of  Mobile  and  Atlanta,  following  each 
other  within  a  few  days,  came  at  perhaps  the  period  of  the 
greatest  political  depression  of  the  administration.  On  Aug. 
23,  Mr.  Lincoln  had  written  on  a  slip  of  paper :  — 

"This  morning,  as  for  some  days  past,  it  seems  exceedingly  probable 
that  this  administration  will  not  be  reelected.  Then  it  will  be  my  duty 
to  so  cooperate  with  the  President-elect,  as  to  save  the  Union  between  the 
election  and  the  inauguration,  as  he  will  have  secured  his  election  on  such 
grounds  that  he  cannot  possibly  save  it  afterward." 

This  paper  he  folded  and  had  the  Cabinet  put  their  names  on 
its  back. 

The  victories  came  like  an  interposition  of  Providence,  and 
proved  to  be  the  final  turning  of  the  balance  in  the  Federal 
favor.  The  Democratic  party  had  nominated  McClellan  on 
a  peace  platform,  mistaking  the  general  discontent  and  depres- 
sion, for  a  desire  for  peace  at  any  price.  McClellan  himself  had 
repudiated  the  platform,  but,  as  victory  now  seemed  inclining  to 
the  Federal  banners,  all  opposition  to  the  administration  died 
out.  At  the  election  in  Nov.,  Mr.  Lincoln  received  212  elec- 
toral votes  and  McClellan  but  21. 

The  attacks  which  Hood  had  made  upon  Sherman  on  the  20th 
and  22d  had  both  been  judiciously  planned  and  had  stood 
excellent  chances  of  success.  The  failure  in  both  cases  was 
from  want  of  strict  compliance  with  orders  on  the  part  of  one 
of  his  corps  commanders,  Gen.  Hardee.  To  trace  it  further 
would  bring  it  home  to  himself  for  failure  to  supervise  the  execu- 
tion of  important  orders  —  a  sort  of  failure  from  which  even  the 
most  eminent  commanders  have  never  been  exempt. 

Another  and  striking  example  of  it  attended  Hood's  next  cam- 


578  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

paign,  this  time  involving  practically  a  death-blow  to  his  army. 
Having  manoeuvred  to  draw  Sherman  out  of  intrenchments  at 
Atlanta  by  moving  upon  his  communications,  he  succeeded  in 
drawing  him  as  far  north  as  Dalton,  and  then  crossed  into 
Alabama  at  Gadsden,  where  he  arrived  Oct.  20.  Here  he  had 
hoped  to  deliver  battle,  but  Sherman  declined  to  follow,  and 
returned  to  Atlanta,  making  preparations  for  the  march  to 
Savannah,  upon  which  he  set  out  Nov.  15. 

In  this  event,  Hood's  orders  from  the  President  were  to  follow 
Sherman  and  hang  upon  his  rear.  But,  with  the  approval  of 
Beauregard,  who  had  been  placed  in  command  of  the  depart- 
ment, Hood  decided,  instead,  to  advance  upon  Nashville,  where 
Thomas  commanded,  with  an  inferior  force  under  Schofield,  hold- 
ing the  country  to  the  south.  Pres.  Davis  had  not  imagined 
that  any  demonstration  Hood  could  possibly  make  upon  Nash- 
ville would  be  seriously  regarded  by  Grant.  The  result,  how- 
ever, proved  that  it  was  thought  to  threaten  Ky.,  and  it  was 
considered  of  such  grave  importance  that  Grant  had  threatened 
to  relieve  Thomas  for  delay  in  attacking  Hood.  Grant  was 
actually  on  his  way  to  Nashville  perhaps  to  do  this  when  Thomas 
won  his  victory.  So  much  in  explanation  of  Hood's  campaign. 
The  issue  at  stake  was  now  lost  by  the  non-compliance  with 
orders  of  Gen.  Cheatham,  commanding  one  of  Hood's  corps. 

Schofield  had  taken  position  on  the  north  side  of  Duck  River, 
opposing  Hood's  crossing.  Hood  left  Lee's  corps  to  demonstrate 
against  Schofield,  while  he  threw  a  pontoon  bridge  across  the 
river  three  miles  above  and  crossed  Cheatham's  and  Stewart's 
corps  which  marched  to  Spring  Hill  on  the  Franklin  pike,  12  miles 
in  Schofield's  rear,  arriving  about  3  P.M.  This  place  was  held 
by  the  2d  division  of  the  4th  corps,  about  4000  strong;  Hood's 
force  was  about  18,000  infantry.  Hood  took  Cheatham  with 
Cleburne,  a  division  commander,  within  sight  of  the  pike,  along 
which  the  enemy  could  now  be  seen  retreating  at  double-quick, 
with  wagons  in  a  trot,  and  gave  explicit  orders  for  an  immediate 
attack  and  occupation  of  the  pike.  Similar  orders,  too,  were 
given  to  Stewart's  corps,  and  when  Hood  found  later  that 
nothing  was  being  done,  he  sent  more  messages  by  staff-officers, 
which  also  failed  of  effect.  The  head  of  Schofield's  infantry 


THE  FALL  OF   1864  579 

arrived  about  nine  o'clock  and  passed  unmolested,  except  by 
some  random  picket  shots  to  which  they  made  no  reply.  Both 
Confederate  divisions  had  bivouacked  within  gunshot  of  the  pike, 
but  no  effort  was  made  to  occupy  it  or  to  cross  it.  Undoubtedly, 
here  Hood  should  have  ridden  to  the  front  and  led  the  troops 
into  action  himself.  In  his  book,  he  calls  the  opportunity  "the 
best  move  in  my  career  as  a  soldier. ' '  A  few  days  after,  Cheatham 
frankly  admitted  his  delinquency.  It  was  rumored  that  both 
he  and  Gen.  Stewart  had  that  evening  absented  themselves  from 
their  divisions.  Both  had  been  often  distinguished  for  gallantry, 
and  Hood  now  overlooked  it,  believing  it  had  been  a  lesson  not 
to  be  forgotten.  Nevertheless,  it  proved  the  death-blow  to 
Hood's  army. 

On  the  next  day,  Schofield  took  a  strong  position  at  Franklin 
for  the  protection  of  his  wagon-trains,  resting  both  flanks  on  the 
Harpeth  River  across  a  concave  bend.  His  intrenched  main 
line  was  but  a  mile  in  length.  It  was  well  protected  with  abattis, 
and,  280  yards  in  front,  an  entire  division,  Wagner's  of  the  4th 
corps,  held  an  advanced  line,  with  its  flanks  drawn  back  nearly 
to  the  main  line,  and  also  well  protected  by  abattis.  His  in- 
fantry, about  23,000,  was  a  little  more  than  Hood's  and  was 
ample  to  man  both  lines,  and  to  hold  a  strong  reserve  in  a  well 
sheltered  position  close  in  the  rear.  One  of  his  infantry  brigades, 
Casement's,  was  armed  with  magazine  breech  loaders.  The 
ground  in  front  was  mostly  level  and  open  pasture-land,  and 
batteries  across  the  Harpeth  could  fire  upon  the  approaches. 

To  assault  was  a  terrible  proposition  to  troops  who,  during 
Johnston's  long  retreat,  had  been  trained  to  avoid  charging 
breastworks.  But  Hood  saw  no  alternative,  since  he  had  lost 
the  one  opportunity  of  the  campaign  at  Spring  Hill  the  night 
before.  For  Schofield  was  now  within  a  day's  march  of  Nash- 
ville. He  ordered  the  attack,  and  for  the  credit  of  his  army  it 
must  be  said  that  officers  and  men  responded  valiantly,  and  went 
down  to  defeat  in  a  blaze  of  glory.  Over  10  per  cent  of  the 
force  engaged  were  killed  outright  on  the  field,  over  20  per  cent 
were  carried  to  hospitals  with  severe  wounds,  and  as  many  more 
suffered  less  severe  wounds  or  were  captured.  The  loss  of  general 
officers  was  unparalleled  on  either  side  in  any  action  of  the  war. 


580  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

Cleburne,  Gist,  Adams,  Strahl,  and  Granberrty  were  killed; 
Brown,  Carter,  Manigault,  Quarles,  Cockrell,  and  Scott  were 
wounded,  and  Gordon  was  captured.  Fifty-three  regimental 
commanders  were  killed,  wounded,  or  captured.  The  result  might 
have  been  different,  but  for  three  handicaps :  1.  Hood,  most  un- 
wisely, did  not  precede  his  charge  with  a  severe  cannonade,  be- 
cause the  village  of  Franklin  was  but  a  half-mile  in  rear  of  his 
line.  The  enemy's  position  was  quite  crowded,  and  all  his  lines 
were  subject  to  enfilade.  It  would  have  severely  shaken  the 
enemy,  and  with  little  danger  to  non-combatants,  which  they 
could  not  avoid.  2.  The  action  was  not  begun  until  4  P.M.  The 
sun  set  at  4.50  P.M.  and  darkness  prevented  Hood  from  getting 
in  two  of  Lee's  divisions.  There  was  no  moon.  3.  The  presence 
on  the  field  of  Casement's  brigade  with  magazine  breech  loaders. 
It  was  said  by  a  correspondent  that  never  before  had  men  been 
killed  so  fast  as  they  were  during  this  charge  by  the  fire  of  this 
brigade.  The  action  was  hand  to  hand  all  along  the  enemy's 
main  line.  It  was  carried  for  quite  a  space,  at  one  point,  but 
was  restored  by  a  charge  of  the  reserve.  At  some  points  men 
were  dragged  across  the  parapets  and  captured.  The  battle  con- 
tinued with  violence  until  9  P.M.  and  firing  was  kept  up  until 
3  A.M.,  when  the  enemy  withdrew  from  the  field,  leaving  his  dead 
and  wounded.  Schofield's  losses  were:  killed,  189;  wounded, 
1033;  missing,  1104;  total  2326.  Hood  left  1750  dead  on  the 
field  and  3800  in  hospitals.  The  slightly  wounded  and  prisoners 
were  about  2000. 

His  losses  in  the  battle  of  Franklin  made  it  impossible  for 
Hood  to  attack  at  Nashville,  but  he  hoped  to  fortify  and  threaten 
until  he  was  attacked,  and  then  to  gain  a  victory.  What  a  vain 
hope  !  Efforts  were  being  made  to  bring  troops  from  Texas  across 
the  Mississippi,  which  also,  of  course,  proved  vain.  They  never 
even  started.  His  force  was  now  reduced  to  about  18,000  infantry 
and  5000  cavalry,  with  which  he  took  position  before  Nashville 
on  Dec.  2.  Here  he  intrenched  himself  and  awaited  Thomas's 
attack,  which  the  latter  delayed  until  Dec.  15.  By  this  date  he 
had  accumulated  a  force  of  over  53,000  men.  With  these  he 
attacked  on  the  15th,  but  with  little  success  and  with  severe 
losses  at  points  where  he  assailed  Hood's  intrenchments. 


THE  FALL  OF  1864  581 

On  the  15th,  the  Federals  renewed  their  assaults  and 
during  the  morning  were  again  repulsed.  About  3  P.M., 
they  massed  a  large  force  under  cover  behind  a  hill  about 
Hood's  left  centre,  and  under  cover  of  a  heavy  fire  of 
artillery  made  a  gallant  charge  and  carried  Hood's  line,  which, 
seeing  the  disaster,  broke  in  all  directions,  and  all  efforts  to 
rally  it  failed. 

During  the  night,  Hood  withdrew,  losing  54  guns  and  4500 
prisoners.  There  was  no  return  made  of  his  casualties,  but  he 
reported  them  as  "very  small."  Thomas  reported :  killed,  387; 
wounded,  2562 ;  missing,  112;  total,  3061.  Hood  made  good  his 
retreat  to  Tupelo,  Miss.,  where  his  army  rested  for  reorganiza- 
tion on  Jan.  10,  1865.  In  the  spring,  it  was  transferred  to  N.C., 
where  it  served  under  A.  P.  Stewart  and,  about  7000  strong, 
was  included  in  Johnston's  surrender.  The  battle  of  Frank- 
lin had  proved  its  death-blow. 

Besides  the  loss  of  Atlanta  and  the  destruction  of  Hood's  army, 
there  remains  a  third  sequence  of  the  change  of  commanders 
which  deserves  notice  among  the  "successes  elsewhere,"  prepar- 
ing the  ground  for  Grant  when  he  again  became  able  to 
inaugurate  a  campaign.  This  was  the  unopposed  march 
of  Sherman  from  Atlanta  to  Savannah  between  Nov.  15 
and  Dec.  25,  with  the  capture  of  Savannah  on  the  latter  date. 
It  was  preceded  by  the  deliberate  burning  of  every  house  in 
Atlanta.  "  Not  a  single  one  was  spared,  not  even  a  church." 
This  was  excused  on  the  ground  that  "War  is  Hell."  It 
depends  somewhat  upon  the  warrior.  The  conduct  of  Lee's 
army  in  Pa.  presents  a  pleasing  contrast. 

It  had  been  hoped  that  the  few  troops  which  could  be  gathered 
in  Ga.,  aided  by  the  militia  of  the  State,  and  by  13  brigades  of 
Confederate  cavalry  under  Wheeler,  might  effectively  harass  and 
delay  such  a  march,  but  all  such  expectations  proved  utterly 
vain.  Though  little  was  said  in  the  press  at  the  time,  and  our 
public  speakers  belittled  the  achievement,  there  is  no  question 
that  the  moral  effect  of  this  march,  upon  the  country  at  large, 
both  at  the  North  and  the  South  and  also  upon  foreign 
nations,  was  greater  than  would  have  been  the  most  decided 


582  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

victory.  Already  it  cast  the  ominous  shadow  of  Sherman's 
advance  up  the  coast  in  the  coming  spring. 

In  this  connection,  there  now  began  demonstrations  against 
Wilmington,  which  was  the  last  port  of  the  Confederacy  holding 
out  opportunities  to  blockade  runners.  These  came  in  under 
the  protection  of  Fort  Fisher  at  the  mouth  of  the  river  20  miles 
below  the  city.  The  fort  was  a  formidable  one,  mounting  44 
guns,  and  had  a  garrison  of  1400  men  under  Col.  Lamb.  A 
military  and  naval  expedition  set  out  against  it  on  Dec.  13,  1864, 
under  Gen.  Butler  and  Adm.  Porter  in  a  fleet  of  50  war  vessels 
and  100  transports  carrying  6500  infantry.  The  fleet  was  the 
largest  ever  assembled  under  the  Federal  flag,  and  it  had  been 
specially  intended  by  Grant  that  the  infantry  force  should  be 
commanded  by  Gen.  Weitzel.  It  was  never  contemplated  that 
Butler  should  even  accompany  it.  In  the  expressive  language 
of  modern  slang  he  had  not  only  "butted  in,"  and  had  taken 
the  command  from  Weitzel,  but  had  devised  a  new  mode  of 
attack  upon  Fort  Fisher.  This  was  to  be  a  disguised  blockade 
runner  loaded  with  215  tons  of  gunpowder  to  be  run  at  night 
close  to.  Fort  Fisher  and  exploded.  It  was  supposed  that  this 
would  put  the  whole  fort  hors  de  combat.  Gen.  Delafield,  chief 
engineer,  submitted  to  the  War  Department  a  report  on  destruc- 
tive effects  of  explosions  of  gunpowder  in  open  air,  indicating 
their  very  limited  range.  Butler  was  notoriously  a  military 
charlatan,  who  had  been  forced  upon  Grant  as  commander  of 
the  Army  of  the  James  by  political  considerations.  During  all 
the  summer  campaign,  he  knew  and  felt  his  importance,  and 
had  been  able  even  successfully  to  bully  Grant  himself,  who 
was  already  under  sharp  criticism  for  his  terrible  losses  in  battle, 
and  for  the  rumors  in  the  army  of  his  intemperance. 

Early  in  July,  after  some  preliminary  correspondence,  indicat- 
ing a  doubt  how  Butler  would  relish  any  interference  with  him- 
self, Halleck  issued  an  order  assigning  the  troops  under  him  to 
the  command  of  W.  F.  Smith,  and  sending  Butler  to  Fortress 
Monroe.  On  receipt  of  this  order,  he  said  to  his  staff,  who  were 
near,  "Gentlemen,  this  order  will  be  revoked  to-morrow."  The 
next  day,  clad  in  full  uniform,  he  called  at  Grant's  headquarters, 
where  he  found  Mr.  Dana,  Asst.  Sec.  of  War.  Gen.  James 


THE  FALL  OF  1864  583 

H.  Wilson,  in  a  memoir  on  the  Life  and  Services  of  W.  F.  Smith, 
gives  the  following  account  of  the  interview :  — 

"Dana  describes  Butler  as  entering  the  general's  presence  with  a 
flushed  face  and  a  haughty  air,  holding  out  the  order  relieving  him  from 
command  in  the  field,  and  asking :  '  Gen.  Grant,  did  you  issue  this  order  ? ' 
To  which  Grant,  in  a  hesitating  manner,  replied :  'No,  not  in  that  form.' 
Dana,  perceiving  at  this  point  that  the  subject  under  discussion  was  likely 
to  be  unpleasant,  if  not  stormy,  at  once  took  his  leave,  but  the  impression 
made  upon  his  mind  by  what  he  saw  while  present  was  that  Butler 
had  in  some  measure  'cowed'  his  commanding  officer.  What  further 
took  place  neither  he  nor  Mr.  Dana  has  ever  said.  Butler's  book,  however, 
contains  what  purports  to  be  a  full  account  of  the  interview,  but  it  is  to 
be  observed  that  it  signally  fails  to  recite  any  circumstance  of  an  over- 
bearing nature." 

Not  only  was  the  order  promptly  revoked  by  Special  Orders 
No.  62,  July  19,  but  Butler's  command  on  the  field  was  extended 
to  include  the  newly  arrived  19th  corps,  and  this  disposition  of 
command  was  still  in  force  when  Butler  "butted  in"  to  the 
Fort  Fisher  expedition,  taking  his  powder  boat  with  him,  regard- 
less of  Delafield's  discussion  of  the  value  of  powder  boats. 

The  boat  was  towed  into  position  by  Commander  Rhind  of  the 
Navy  who  reported  placing  it  "within  300  yards  of  the  north- 
east salient  of  Fort  Fisher,"  whieh  bore  "west  southwest  a  half 
west"  about  midnight  of  Dec.  23,  1864.  It  was  fired  by  several 
lines  of  Gomez  fuse  running  through  the  mass  of  powder  and 
ignited  by  several  devices  arranged  to  act  an  hour  and  a  half 
after  the  ship  was  deserted.  The  explosion  occurred  at  2  A.M., 
and  was  supposed  by  the  garrison  of  the  fort  to  be  the  accidental 
explosion  of  a  Federal  gunboat.  Not  the  slightest  damage  was 
done  to  the  fort,  whose  garrison  remained  in  ignorance  of 
Butler's  plans  until  published  afterward. 

On  the  24th  and  25th,  the  fort  was  subjected  to  a  terrific 
bombardment  at  the  rate  of  40  to  50  shells  per  minute  for 
hours  at  a  time,  until  the  fleet  had  practically  exhausted  its 
ammunition.  It  had  not  silenced  the  fort  nor  materially  damaged 
it,  which,  being  reported  by  the  land  forces  who  had  been  put 
ashore,  they  reembarked  without  assaulting,  on  the  night  of 
the  26th,  and  the  next  day  the  expedition  returned  to  Fortress 
Monroe.  The  casualties  in  the  fort  from  the  fire  of  the  ships 


584  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

were  61,  and  a  greater  number  were  suffered  in  the  fleet  from  the 
662  shots  fired  by  the  fort. 

Another  and  a  still  larger  expedition  was  soon  gotten  together 
and  despatched  against  Fort  Fisher,  but,  though  his  own  cam- 
paign was  still  in  abeyance,  the  political  situation  was  now  so 
improved  by  the  "successes  elsewhere"  that  Grant  was  no  longer 
afraid  to  exercise  his  authority,  and  on  Jan.  4,  he  wrote  to 
Halleck  demanding  Butler's  official  head.  With  a  celerity  indic- 
ative of  the  pleasure  with  which  both  Halleck  and  Lincoln  com- 
plied with  the  request,  it  was  presented  to  him.  On  Jan.  7,  in 
General  Orders  No.  1,  "By  direction  of  the  President,"  Maj.- 
'Gen.  Butler  was  relieved  from  command  and  ordered  to  repair 
to  Lowell,  Mass. 

On  Jan.  5,  a  new  expedition,  under  the  command  of  Porter  and 
Gen.  Terry,  set  sail,  carrying  about  9500  infantry  and  a  heavy 
siege-train.  It  arrived  before  Fort  Fisher  and  opened  fire  on 
Jan.  13,  in  even  greater  force  than  on  the  previous  occasion. 
A  land  force  of  about  7000  infantry  was  at  hand  for  its  defence. 
Mr.  Davis  sent  Bragg  to  command  it,  who  made  no  effort  to  pre- 
vent the  enemy's  landing.  It  might  have  been  difficult  to  pre- 
vent him,  but  to  make  no  effort  brought  complaint  and 
discouragement.  The  bombardment  was,  on  this  occasion, 
kept  up  without  intermission  day  or  night,  and,  instead  of 
being  general,  was  concentrated  upon  the  land  defences.  On 
the  afternoon  of  the  second  day,  the  palisades  and  guns  of  those 
defences  being  destroyed  and  a  breach  opened,  two  assaults  were 
made  about  3  P.M.,  one  by  Ames's  division  of  the  23d  corps, 
about  4500  strong,  and  one  by  2000  sailors  and  marines  from 
the  fleet  under  Capt.  Breese.  The  latter  assaulted  the  breach, 
but  were  repulsed  with  severe  loss.  The  infantry,  passing 
around  and  through  the  palisades,  made  a  lodgment  between  the 
traverses,  and  after  seven  hours'  fighting  possessed  the  fort. 
When  Bragg  took  command  of  the  land  forces,  Whiting,  who 
had  commanded  the  whole  post  before,  took  command  of  the 
fort.  He  was  mortally,  and  Col.  Lamb  desperately,  wounded  in 
the  defence.  The  loss  of  the  infantry  assaulting  column  was 
110  killed,  536  wounded. 

During  the  winter,  the  Confederate  lines  about  Petersburg  had 


THE   FALL  OF   1864  585 

been  constantly  extended  at  both  ends,  it  has  been  already 
explained  how.  The  troops  were  extended  with  them  until  it 
was  about  37  miles  by  the  shortest  routes  from  our  extreme  left 
on  White  Oak  Swamp  below  Richmond  on  the  north  side,  to 
•our  extreme  right  below  Petersburg.  Lee's  force  at  this  time 
was  about  50,000  and  Grant's  about  124,000.  Humphreys  gives 
the  following  brief  statement  of  the  Confederate  condition :  — 

"  The  winter  of  '64-65  was  one  of  unusual  severity,  making  the  picket 
duty  in  front  of  the  intrenchments  very  severe.  It  was  especially  so  to 
the  Confederate  troops  with  their  threadbare,  insufficient  clothing  and 
meagre  food.  Meat  they  had  but  little  of,  and  their  Subsistence  Depart- 
ment was  actually  importing  it  from  abroad.  Of  coffee  or  tea  or  sugar, 
they  had  none  except  in  the  hospitals. 

"'It  is  stated  that  in  a  secret  session  of  the  Confederate  Congress  the 
condition  of  the  Confederacy  as  to  subsistence  was  declared  to  be :  — 
'That  there  was  not  meat  enough  in  the  Southern  Confederacy  for  the 

armies  it  had  in  the  field, 
'That  there  was  not  in  Va.  either  meat  or  bread  enough  for  the  armies 

within  her  limits, 

'That  the  supply  of  bread  for  those  armies  to  be  obtained  from  other 
places  depended  absolutely  upon  keeping  open  the  railroad  connec- 
tions of  the  South, 

'That  the  meat  must  be  obtained  from  abroad  through  a  seaport, 
'  That  the  transportation  was  not  now  adequate,  from  whatever  cause, 

to  meet  the  necessary  demands  of  the  service.'  .  .  . 
"The  condition  of  the  deserters  who  constantly  came  into  our  lines 
during  the  winter  appeared  to  prove  that  there  was  no  exaggeration  in 
this  statement." 

In  addition  to  the  scarcity  of  provisions,  there  was  also 
threatened  a  deficiency  of  percussion  caps.  The  supply  for  the 
campaign  of  1864  had  been  maintained  only  by  cutting  up  the 
copper  stills  of  the  country,  but  they  were  now  exhausted  and 
there  was  no  more  copper  in  sight. 

Col.  Taylor,  in  Four  Years  with  Lee,  writes  that  during  the 
last  30  days  before  Petersburg :  — 

"  The  loss  to  the  army  by  desertion  averaged  a  hundred  men  a  day.  .  .  . 
The  condition  of  affairs  throughout  the  South  at  that  period  was  truly 
deplorable.  Hundreds  of  letters  addressed  to  soldiers  were  intercepted 
and  sent  to  army  headquarters,  in  which  mothers,  wives,  and  sisters  told 
of  their  inability  to  respond  to  the  appeals  of  hungry  children  for  bread,  or 


586  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

to  provide  proper  care  and  remedies  for  the  sick,  and  in  the  name  of  all  that 
was  dear  appealed  to  the  men  to  come  home  and  rescue  them  from  the 
ills  which  they  suffered  and  the  starvation  which  threatened  them.  Surely 
never  was  devotion  to  one's  country  and  to  one's  duty  more  sorely  tested 
than  was  the  case  with  the  soldiers  of  Lee's  army  during  the  last  year  of 
the  war." 

Early  in  Feb.,  there  occurred  the  last  of  the  many  affairs  on 
our  right  flank.  Grant  had  found  that  we  were  still  hauling 
supplies  from  the  Weldon  R.R.  and  had  sent  Gregg's  cavalry  to 
destroy  it,  and  tear  it  up  for  40  miles  south,  and  the  2d  and  5th 
corps  were  sent  across  Hatcher's  Run  to  guard  their  rear.  Lee, 
hearing  of  the  Federals  outside  of  their  intrenchments,  sent  three 
divisions  under  Mahone,  Evans,  and  Pegram  to  attack  them. 
There  was  sharp  fighting  for  two  days  without  material  success 
on  either  side.  The  Federal  losses  were  1474  and  probably  the 
Confederate  were  1000.  Among  them,  unfortunately,  was  Gen. 
Pegram,  whose  loss  was  universally  deplored.  Col.  Taylor,  under 
date  of  Dec.  4,  has  noted  the  loss  of  another  brilliant  and  popular 
young  officer  who  had  been  a  classmate  of  Pegram's  at  West 
Point  in  1854,  as  follows :  — 

"Gen.  Gracie,  who  showed  such  tact  in  getting  Gen.  Lee  to  descend 
from  a  dangerous  position,  was  killed  near  the  lines  a  day  or  so  ago.  He 
was  an  excellent  officer,  had  passed  through  many  hard-fought  battles, 
escaped  numberless  dangers,  and  was  finally  killed  while  quietly  viewing 
the  enemy  from  a  point  where  no  one  dreamed  of  danger." 

Col.  Taylor,  in  a  letter,  describes  the  incident  referred  to  as 
follows :  — 

"  Gen.  Lee  was  making  an  inspection  along  the  line  occupied  by  Gen. 
Grade's  troops ;  the  fire  of  the  enemy's  sharpshooters  was  uncomfortably 
accurate  along  there  and  the  orders  were  against  needless  exposure.  To 
get  a  good  view  Gen.  Lee  mounted  the  parapet  or  stepped  out  in  front  of 
the  works.  Of  course  all  who  saw  it  realized  his  danger,  but  who  was  to 
direct  his  attention  to  it  ?  Gen.  Gracie  at  once  stepped  to  his  side.  The 
minnies  whistled  viciously.  Gen.  Lee,  oblivious  to  his  own  danger, 
quickly  realized  Gen.  Gracie 's  and  immediately  removed  from  the  point 
of  danger.  That  is  all  but  it  showed  tact  on  the  part  of  the  latter." 1 

1  Gen.  Gracie  was  killed  Dec.  3  by  a  shrapnel  shot  from  Battery  Morton 
which  killed  also  two  others  with  him.  He  had  just  received  a  furlough  to 
visit  his  wife  and  child  in  Richmond  but  had  missed  his  train. 


THE  FALL  OF  1864  587 

I  have  already  said  that  the  fall  of  1864  was  the  period  of 
the  war  when  the  Confederate  authorities  might  have  made 
peace  with  greatest  advantage  to  their  people.  Had  they  then 
offered  a  return  to  the  Union,  they  might  have  secured  liberal 
compensation  for  their  slaves  and  generally  more  liberal  terms 
financially  and  politically  than  at  any  other  period  of  the  con- 
test. What  these  concessions  might  have  been  was  suggested 
in  the  conference  held  at  Fortress  Monroe  on  Jan.  30,  between 
Messrs.  Lincoln  and  Seward,  and  the  commissioners  sent  by  Mr. 
Davis,  Messrs.  Stephens,  Hunter,  and  Campbell.  After  this 
conference  adjourned,  without  coming  to  any  agreement,  there 
were  rumors  that  Mr.  Lincoln  had  offered  to  pay  the  South 
$400,000,000  in  bonds  as  compensation  for  the  slaves,  if  the 
South  would  return  to  the  Union.  This  was  denied  by  some  of 
Mr.  Davis's  cabinet,  and  the  discussion  brought  out  informal 
statements  which  Mr.  Lincoln  had  made  in  the  conversation 
which  had  taken  place. 

One  was :  — 

"Take  a  sheet  of  paper  and  let  me  write  at  the  top  Union,  and  you  may 
fill  in  the  rest  to  suit  yourselves." 

To  this  Mr.  Stephens  had  to  reply  that  the  power  to  write 
that  word  was  the  single  power  which  had  been  denied  the 
commission. 

Next,  Mr.  Lincoln  said  that  he  had  always  felt  that  slavery 
having  had  the  sanction  of  the  government  as  a  whole,  it  was 
unfair  that  the  whole  financial  loss  of  its  abolition  should  be 
thrown  upon  the  South ;  that  he  had  always  felt  ready  to  vote 
bonds  to  compensate  her  for  this  loss,  and  that  he  had  heard  as 
much  as  $400,000,000  suggested  for  this  purpose. 

There  was  no  formal  proposition  made,  for  the  Conference 
never  reached  that  stage,  but  it  is  well  known  that  until  the 
day  of  his  death,  Mr.  Lincoln  cherished  a  desire  to  see  the  South 
compensated  for  the  loss  of  her  slaves,  and  that  on  Feb.  5,  im- 
mediately after  the  failure  of  the  Fortress  Monroe  Conference, 
he  submitted  to  his  cabinet  a  proposition  to  offer  the  South 
$400,000,000  in  six  per  cent  bonds  in  payment  for  peace  with 
the  abolition  of  slavery.  His  cabinet  unanimously  disapproved 


588  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

it,  to  his  surprise  and  chagrin,  whereon  he  dropped  the  matter, 
saying  sadly,  "You  are  all  opposed  to  me."  l 

"Few  cabinet  secrets  were  better  kept  than  this,"  Nicolay 
says,  but  the  diary  of  Sec.  Welles  refers  to  it  as  follows :  — 

"The  President  had  matured  a  scheme  which  he  hoped  would  be  useful 
in  promoting  peace.  It  was  a  proposition  for  paying  the  expense  of  the 
war  for  200  days,  or  $400,000,000,  to  the  rebel  States  to  be  for  the  extin- 
guishment of  slavery,  or  for  such  purpose  as  the  States  were  disposed. 
This  in  a  few  words  was  the  scheme.  It  did  not  meet  with  favor,  but  was 
dropped.  ..." 

Early  in  March,  Sherman's  army  moved  into  N.C.  where  it 
was  confronted  by  Gen.  Joseph  E.  Johnston,  recalled  by  the  Con- 
federate Congress  to  command  the  army  composed  of  the  gar- 
risons of  Savannah  and  Charleston,  and  the  remnants  of  the 
army  of  Hood  which  had  been  brought  over  from  Tupelo,  Miss. 
It  was  plain  that  Lee  would  soon  be  forced  to  abandon  Rich- 
mond and  Petersburg,  and  take  advantage  of  his  interior  lines  to 
unite  with  Johnston,  and  endeavor  to  crush  Sherman  before  he 
could  unite  with  Grant.  Before  undertaking  this,  which  was 
felt  to  be  an  almost  impossible  task,  however,  he  determined 
upon  one  last  effort  to  break  up  Grant  in  his  immediate 
front,  in  spite  of  all  of  his  fortifications.  He  selected  for  his 
point  of  attack  Fort  Stedman,  about  a  mile  from  the  Appo- 
mattox  River  on  Grant's  right,  and  assigned  Gordon  to  com- 
mand the  assault  which  was  to  be  made  Mar.  25.  A  surprise 
was  relied  on  to  secure  Fort  Stedman.  Three  columns  of 
100  men  each,  with  local  guides,  were  to  seize  what  Gordon 
took  to  be  three  redoubts  commanding  Stedman  on  each  side ;  a 
division  was  to  follow  them,  and,  through  the  gap  thus  made, 
the  lines  were  to  be  swept  in  both  directions  and  a  force  of 
cavalry  was  to  ride  and  destroy  the  pontoon  bridges  across  the 
Appomattox,  and  to  raid  City  Point. 

Taking  advantage  of  an  order  allowing  deserters  to  come  in 
with  their  arms,  several  pickets  were  captured,  the  trench  guard 
rushed,  the  fraise  and  abattis  cut  quickly  by  a  strong  pioneer 
party,  and  Fort  Stedman  was  assaulted  and  occupied  with  two 

1  Told  by  Nicolay  and  Hay,  X.,  137. 


THE  FALL  OF  1864  589 

adjacent  batteries.  But  the  three  "redoubts"  were  found  to  be 
only  some  old  open  lines  at  commanding  points  now  unoccupied. 
Federal  infantry  presently  came  in  force  and  killed  or  captured 
all  of  the  three  columns  sent  under  a  misapprehension  very 
likely  to  occur  where  earthworks  have  to  be  guessed  at  from 
imperfect  observation.  Field's  division,  which  had  been  or- 
dered over  by  rail  from  the  north  side,  was  delayed  by  the 
breaking  down  of  the  train.  The  column  which  had  taken 
Fort  Stedman  was  caught  like  rats  in  a  trap.  Humphreys 
writes :  — 

"The  cross-fire  of  artillery  and  infantry  on  the  space  between  the  lines 
prevented  the  enemy  from  escaping  and  reenforcements  from  coming  to 
them.  Many  were  killed  and  wounded  trying  to  get  back  to  their  own 
lines;  1949  prisoners,  including  71  officers  and  9  stand  of  colors,  fell  into 
Gen.  Parke's  hands.  His  loss  was  494  killed  and  wounded,  and  523  miss- 
ing, a  total  of  1017." 

While  this  fighting  was  going  on,  the  other  Federal  corps  were 
ordered  to  feel  the  lines  in  their  fronts,  it  being  hoped  they 
might  find  some  weak  spots  from  which  men  had  been  drawn 
for  Gordon's  attack.  Much  sharp  fighting  resulted  at  many 
points,  the  total  casualties  for  the  day  reaching  2000  for  the 
Federals  and  4000  for  the  Confederates.  These  attacks,  how- 
ever, everywhere  failed  entirely  of  their  purpose  except  at  a 
single  point,  on  the  lines  of  the  6th  corps,  about  nine  miles  to 
our  right  from  the  point  of  Gordon's  attack.  Here,  opposite  a 
fort  called  Fort  Fisher,  our  abattis  had  been  weakened  to  get  in 
fire  wood  from  the  front,  and  here  the  enemy  were  able  to  make 
a  lodgment  within  our  intrenched  picket-line.  When  Grant's 
general  assault  was  made  at  4  A.M.,  April  2,  this  was  the  spot, 
and  the  only  one,  where  at  first  it  was  successful.  Humphreys 
states  that  it  was  — 

"through  openings  made  by  the  enemy  for  his  convenience  of  access 
to  the  front,  Gen.  Wright  told  me  that  this  was  the  weakest  part  of  all 
the  line  he  saw,  and  the  only  point  where  it  could  have  been  carried.  His 
loss  in  killed  and  wounded  was  1100,  all  of  which  occurred  in  the  space  of 
15  minutes." 

Apprehensive  now  that  Lee  might  abandon  Petersburg  and 
Richmond  at  any  moment,  Grant  determined  to  delay  no  longer, 


590  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

taking  the  initiative  in  moving  around  his  right  flank.  His 
effective  force,  by  his  latest  returns,  was  101,000  infantry,  9000 
artillery,  14,700  cavalry,  total,  124,700,  with  369  guns.  Lee's 
forces  by  his  latest  return,  Feb.  28,  were  46,000  infantry,  5000 
artillery,  and  6000  cavalry,  total  57,000,  from  which  3000  should 
be  deducted  for  desertions  in  March.  In  N.C.,  Sherman  was 
about  Goldsboro  with  about  100,000,  against  which  Johnston  in 
front  of  Greensboro  had,  perhaps,  25,000.  There  was  really  no 
need  that  Grant  should  have  hurried  himself,  for,  though  by  all 
the  maxims  of  strategy,  Lee  should  now  unite  with  Johnston 
and  both  attack  Sherman,  his  deficiencies  in  transportation  were 
so  great  that  no  such  movement  was  practicable. 

On  March  27,  Sheridan  with  two  divisions  of  his  excellent 
cavalry  with  their  magazine  carbines  had  rejoined  the  army,  and 
Grant  began  to  transfer  his  forces  to  his  extreme  left.  A  single 
division  only,  Devens  of  the  24th  corps,  was  left  north  of  the 
James.  Two  divisions  of  the  25th  corps  under  Weitzel  held  the 
Bermuda  Hundreds  lines.  All  the  rest  of  the  infantry,  about 
90,000  muskets  and  the  whole  of  the  cavalry,  thoroughly  or- 
ganized and  abundantly  equipped  with  transportation  for  rapid 
motion,  on  March  28  only  awaited  Grant's  word  to  launch  them- 
selves upon  Lee's  communications. 

On  this  occasion,  Grant  narrowly  avoided  one  mistake  of 
previous  campaigns  made,  not  only  by  himself  in  May,  1864, 
but  by  Hooker  in  May,  1863,  and  by  Lee  in  June,  1863.  He  kept 
his  cavalry  moving  and  acting  with  his  infantry  instead  of  send- 
ing it  off  on  a  raid,  having  suspended  on  the  29th  orders  of  the 
previous  day  to  move  against  the  railroads.  It  is  noticeable,  too, 
that  Grant,  on  this  occasion,  concentrated  practically  his  entire 
force  in  the  attack  upon  our  right,  whereas,  in  the  fall,  he  had 
never  attacked  upon  one  flank  without  some  demonstration,  at 
least,  upon  the  other. 

On  the  30th,  Wilcox's  division  on  the  north,  and  Heth's  on  the 
south,  of  Hatchers  Run  had  sharp  affairs  with  the  approaching 
Federals,  whom  they  went  out  to  meet  in  some  cases,  but  were 
finally  driven  back  within  their  lines.  The  Federal  losses  for 
the  day  were  1780.  There  are  no  returns  for  ours. 

Meanwhile,  Lee  was  bringing  up  Pickett's  and  Johnson's  divi- 


THE  FALL  OF  1864  591 

sions  of  infantry,  about  6600  men,  and  two  of  Lee's  divisions  of 
cavalry,  about  5760  men,  for  an  expedition  against  Sheridan. 
They  attacked  him  on  the  31st,  and  drove  him  back  in  much 
confusion  nearly  to  Dinwiddie  C.  H.  Night  ended  the  fight- 
ing, with  Pickett  so  far  in  advance  that  he  would  have  been 
cut  off  by  Warren's  corps,  during  the  night,  had  he  waited  un- 
til morning.  But  he  fell  back,  and  took  position  in  the  morning 
at  Five  Forks,  four  miles  from  our  right  at  Burgess  Mills. 

Here  he  made  the  fatal  mistake  of  halting  and  proceeding 
to  intrench,  as  well  as  the  time  and  the  scarcity  of  intrenching 
tools  would  permit.  He  was  four  miles  away  from  where  other 
troops  could  help  him  or  they  could  be  helped  by  him.  He 
should  never  have  stopped  until  he  had  connected  with  our  right 
flank. 

Longstreet  writes :  — 

"The  position  was  not  of  Pickett 's  choosing  but  of  his  orders,  and  from 
his  orders  he  assumed  that  he  would  be  reenforced." 

As  it  was,  in  the  morning,  April  1,  Sheridan,  reenforced  now 
by  the  5th  corps,  some  15,000  men,  followed,  and  massing  a  force 
of  cavalry  on  Pickett's  right,  with  the  5th  corps  he  turned  his 
left  flank  and  routed  him,  capturing,  as  stated  by  Warren,  3244 
men,  11  colors,  and  4  guns,  with  a  loss  of  only  634  men.  The 
Federal  Gen.,  Winthrop,  was  killed,  and  on  the  Confederate  side 
Col.  Pegram,  a  brother  of  the  Gen.  Pegram  killed  Feb.  6,  and 
highly  distinguished  as  an  artillerist. 

This  battle  was  fought  between  four  and  six  in  the  afternoon, 
and  Humphreys  notices  a  peculiar  phenomenon  of  acoustic 
shadows,  such  as  has  been  spoken  of  before  in  telling  of  other 
battles.  He  writes:  — 

"  A  singular  circumstance  connected  with  this  battle  is  the  fact  that 
Gen.  Pickett  was,  all  of  this  time  and  until  near  the  close  of  the  action, 
on  the  north  side  of  Hatchers  Run  where  he  had  heard  no  sound  of  the 
engagement,  nor  had  he  received  any  information  concerning  it." 

The  distance  was  but  little  over  a  mile,  and  Fitz-Leeand  Pickett 
were  in  company.  Neither  were  on  the  field  until  the  action  was 
decided. 


592  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

Although  this  action  was  a  complete  success,  after  it  was  over 
Warren  was  removed  from  the  command  of  the  5th  corps  by 
Sheridan,  under  charges  of  which  Warren  was  afterward  fully 
acquitted  by  a  Court  of  Inquiry. 

When  Grant  heard  at  9  P.M.  of  Sheridan's  success,  he  was  as- 
sured that  he  must  now  have  Lee's  long  lines  stretched  to  near 
the  breaking  strain,  and  that  the  time  had  come  when  he  could 
renew  his  assaults,  suspended  since  the  occasion  of  the  mine. 
With  his  usual  promptness,  he  ordered  the  2d  corps,  which  was 
near  him,  south  of  Hatchers  Run,  to  feel  our  works  in  its  front 
at  once.  The  other  corps,  stretching  back  to  Petersburg,  were 
ordered  to  cannonade  our  lines  during  the  night,  and,  at  his 
favorite  hour  of  4  A.M.,  to  assault  all  the  soft  spots,  of  which, 
for  two  or  three  days,  each  corps  commander  had  been  ordered 
to  make  a  study. 

The  midnight  demonstration  by  the  2d  corps  waked  a 
heavy  fire  of  musketry  and  artillery,  but  produced  no  other 
results.  The  assault  of  the  6th  corps  at  dawn,  however,  under 
Wright,  was  made  at  the  point  where  our  abattis  had  been 
weakened,  and  the  enemy  had  made  a  lodgment,  on  Mar.  25. 
As  before  mentioned,  here  their  assault  was  entirely  successful, 
after  incurring  a  loss  of  1100  men.  They  then  turned  to  the  left 
and  swept  the  Confederate  line  to  its  extremity.  At  the  crossing 
of  the  Jerusalem  Plank  road,  Parke  got  possession  of  an  ad- 
vanced line,  with  12  guns  and  800  prisoners,  but  he  failed  to  carry 
our  main  line  in  the  rear,  and  the  fighting  was  kept  up  all  day. 
At  all  other  points,  the  morning  assaults  were  repulsed. 

After  capturing  all  the  works  to  the  south  and  west,  the  enemy 
now  turned  toward  Petersburg,  where  two  isolated  works,  Forts 
Gregg  and  Whitworth,  about  300  yards  apart,  stood  about 
1000  yards  in  front  of  our  main  line  of  intrenchments.  The 
rear  of  Fort  Gregg  was  closed  with  a  palisade,  and  its  ditch  was 
generally  impassable.  On  the  right  flank,  however,  a  line  to 
connect  with  Whitworth  had  been  started,  and  here  the  un- 
finished ditch  and  parapet  gave  a  narrow  access  to  the  parapet 
of  Gregg.  It  was  by  this  route  that  the  enemy  finally  reached  it. 
It  was  defended  by  two  guns  of  the  Washington  artillery  under 
Lt.  McElroy,  and  Lt.-Col.  Duncan,  with  the  12th  and  16th  Miss., 


THE  FALL  OF  1864  593 

214  men  in  all.  Fort  Whitworth  was  open  at  the  gorge  and  was 
held  by  three  guns  of  the  Washington  artillery  and  the  19th  and 
48th  Miss,  until  the  final  charge  was  being  made  upon  Fort 
Gregg,  when,  by  Lee's  order,  the  garrison  was  withdrawn. 

The  defence  of  Fort  Gregg  was  notable,  as  was  also  the  at- 
tack. The  Federal  forces  were  evidently  feeling  the  inspiration 
of  success  and  the  Confederates  the  desperation  of  defeat. 
Several  attacks  by  Foster's  division,  of  the  24th  corps,  were 
repulsed.  The  last,  aided  by  two  brigades  of  Turner's  division 
(while  the  3d  brigade  advanced  upon  Whitworth)  swarmed  over 
the  parapet  of  Gregg  and  captured,  inside,  the  two  guns  with 
two  colors.  Of  the  garrison,  55  were  killed,  129  were  wounded, 
and  only  30  were  found  uninjured  of  the  214.  Gibbon's  loss 
was  122  killed,  592  wounded,  total,  714. 

Lee  and  Longstreet,  from  the  main  line  of  intrenchments,  wit- 
nessed the  gallant  defence  of  Fort  Gregg  and  its  final  fall.  A.  P. 
Hill,  aroused  by  the  terrific  cannonade  and  musketry  at  daylight 
and  riding  to  join  his  troops,  had  been  killed  by  some  stragglers 
of  the  6th  corps,  which,  as  has  been  told,  had  carried  our  lines  and 
penetrated  far  inside  of  them.  When  Lee,  on  the  night  of  April 
1,  had  heard  of  the  disaster  to  Pickett  at  Five  Forks,  he  had 
wired  for  Longstreet  with  Field's  division.  This  left  only  Ker- 
shaw's  division  and  the  local  troops  to  hold  Richmond,  but  Weit- 
zel's  force  had  already  been  so  reduced  that  no  aggressive  idea 
was  left  him.  Had  he  known  of  the  withdrawal  of  Field's  divi- 
sion, he  might  have  been  tempted  to  make  an  effort  to  take  the 
city.  On  Longstreet's  arrival  in  Petersburg,  his  troops  were 
hurried  to  the  intrenchments,  whence  they  saw  the  gallant  defence 
made  by  Fort  Gregg,  which  had  been  done  under  the  assurance 
that  "Longstreet  is  coming.  Hold  for  two  hours  and  all  will  be 
well." 

When  these  saw  the  forts  captured,  they  expected  nothing  else 
but  that  the  heavy  blue  columns  and  long  lines  would  now  move 
to  crush  them.  But  the  lesson  of  Fort  Gregg  had  not  been 
thrown  away.  Grant  recognized  that  Lee  must  retreat  during 
the  night,  and  that  from  his  own  position  he  would  have  the 
advantage  in  the  start,  and  he  preferred  to  order  things  prepared 
for  the  march  westward  in  the  morning.  Lee  had  already 


594  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

advised  Mr.  Davis  of  the  necessity  of  abandoning  the  lines  that 
night,  and,  having  noted  Grant's  pause  after  the  capture  of 
Fort  Gregg,  now,  about  3  P.M.,  he  issued  the  formal  orders  for  the 
evacuation  in  time  to  have  the  troops  begin  to  move  at  dark. 

My  headquarters  had  been  on  the  Richmond  side  for  some 
months,  and  my  duty  included  the  command  of  Drury's  and 
Chaffin's  bluffs,  and  the  defence  of  the  river.  It  happened  that 
on  April  2, 1  had  prepared  several  torpedoes  to  be  placed  in  the 
river  that  night,  and  early  in  the  morning  I  went  down  into  the 
swamp  and  was  detained  until  late  in  the  afternoon,  when  the 
orders  of  evacuation  reached  me.  Part  of  my  command  was  to 
cross  the  river  at  Drury's  Bluff  and  part  at  Richmond.  After 
giving  necessary  instructions,  I  rode  into  Richmond,  and  took  my 
post  at  the  bridge  to  see  my  batteries  go  by.  Many  accounts 
have  been  given  of  the  scenes  in  Richmond  that  night,  and  I 
will  not  refer  to  them. 

The  freight  depot  of  the  Danville  Road  was  close  by  the 
bridge,  and  I  walked  into  it  and  saw  large  quantities  of  pro- 
visions and  goods  which  had  evidently  run  the  blockade  at 
Wilmington.  I  treated  my  horse  to  an  English  bridle  and  a 
felt  saddle-blanket,  and  I  hung  to  a  ring  on  my  saddle  a  mag- 
nificent side  of  English  bacon,  which  proved  a  great  acquisition 
during  the  next  few  days.  These  provisions  were  intended  for 
Lee's  army,  and  had  been  sent  to  Amelia  C.  H.  from  Dan- 
ville, the  train  being  ordered  to  come  on  to  Richmond  to  take  off 
the  personnel  and  property  of  the  government.  Unfortunately, 
the  officer  in  charge  of  it  misunderstood  his  orders  and  came  on 
without  unloading  at  Amelia.  Near  my  station  in  the  street,  a 
cellar  door  opened  in  the  sidewalk,  and  while  I  waited  for  my 
batteries  a  solitary  Irish  woman  brought  many  bales  of  blankets 
from  the  freight  depot  in  a  wheelbarrow  and  tumbled  them  in  to  the 
cellar.  Many  fires  were  burning  in  the  city,  and  a  canal-boat  in 
flames  came  floating  under  the  bridge  at  which  I  stood.  I  could 
not  see  by  what  agency,  but  it  was  soon  dragged  away.  The 
explosions  of  our  little  fleet  of  gunboats  under  Admiral  Semmes 
at  Drury's  Bluff  were  plainly  heard  and  the  terrific  explosion 
of  the  arsenal  in  Richmond.  About  sunrise,  my  last  battalion 
passed  and  I  followed,  taking  a  farewell  look  at  the  city  from  the 


THE  FALL  OF  1864  595 

Manchester  side.  The  whole  river  front  appeared  to  be  in 
flames.  Its  formal  surrender  was  made  to  Weitzel  at  8.15  A.M. 

We  marched  24  miles  that  day  and  bivouacked  at  night  in  some 
tall  pine  woods  near  Tomahawk  Church.  I  had  barely  gotten 
supper  when  I  was  ordered  to  join  two  engineers  being  sent  to 
find  a  wagon  route  for  our  guns  and  trains  to  an  overhead  rail- 
road bridge  across  the  Appomattox  River.  We  travelled  all 
night  in  mud  and  darkness,  waking  up  residents  to  ask  direc- 
tions, but  we  finally  got  the  whole  column  safely  across  the 
railroad  bridge  and  went  into  camp  near  sundown  about  three 
miles  from  Amelia  C.  H. 

The  next  morning  we  passed  through  the  village,  where  we 
should  have  gotten  rations,  but  they  did  not  meet  us.  They 
had  gone  on  to  Richmond  and  been  destroyed  there,  as  has, been 
told.  Here  a  few  of  the  best-equipped  battalions  of  artillery 
were  selected  to  accompany  the  troops,  while  all  the  excess  was 
turned  over  to  Walker,  chief  of  the  3d  corps  artillery,  to  take 
on  a  direct  road  to  Lynchburg.  About  1  P.M.,  with  Lee  and 
Longstreet  at  the  head  of  the  column,  we  took  the  road  for 
Jetersville,  where  it  was  reported  that  Sheridan  was  across  our 
path  and  Lee  intended  to  attack  him.  We  were  not  long  in 
coming  to  where  our  skirmish  line  was  already  engaged,  and  a 
long  conference  took  place  between  the  generals  and  W.  H.  F. 
Lee  in  command  of  the  cavalry.  It  appeared  that  the  2d  and 
6th  corps  were  in  front  of  us,  but  might  be  passed  in  the  night 
by  a  flank  march.  We  countermarched  a  short  distance,  and 
then  turning  to  the  right,  we  marched  all  night,  passing  Amelia 
Springs,  and  arrived  at  daylight  at  Rice's  Turnout,  six  miles  west 
of  Burkesville.1  Here  I  was  ordered  to  select  a  line  of  battle 
and  take  position  to  resist  attack,  and  here  we  waited  for  the 
remainder  of  the  army  to  come  up  and  pass  us,  but  we  waited 
in  vain. 

While  the  2d  corps  had  closely  pressed  the  rear  of  the  column 

1  During  this  night's  march  a  widespread  and  long-continued  panic  was 
started  by  a  large  black  stallion  carrying  a  fence  rail  swinging  to  his  bridle 
and  running  away  along  the  roads  on  which  the  troops  were  marching.  The 
first  false  alarm  started  the  troops  to  firing  on  each  other,  and  this  spread  and 
was  kept  up  a  long  time.  Among  the  valuable  officers  killed  in  it  by  his 
own  men  was  Maj.  Smith,  who  commanded  our  Drury's  Bluff  batteries. 


596  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

all  day,  the  cavalry  and  the  6th  corps  had  struck  its  flank  under 
Ewell  at  Sailor's  Creek.  Besides  Kershaw's  division,  this  force 
comprised  no  veteran  soldiers,  but  the  employees  of  the  depart- 
ments under  Custis  Lee,  the  marines  and  sailors  of  our  little 
fleet  under  Admiral  Tucker,  and  the  heavy  artillerists  of  Drury's 
and  Chaffin's  bluffs,  under  Col.  Crutchfield  and  Maj.  Stiles. 
This  force,  though  largely  composed  of  men  who  had  never 
before  been  under  fire,  surprised  the  enemy  with  an  unexpected 
display  of  courage,  such  as  had  already  been  shown  at  Fort  Sted- 
man  and  Fort  Gregg,  and  would  still  with  flashes  illuminate  our 
last  days.  It  formed  line  of  battle  on  the  edge  of  a  pine  wood, 
in  full  view  of  two  lines  of  battle  in  open  ground  across  a  little 
stream.  It  had  no  artillery  to  make  reply,  and  it  lay  still  while 
other  Federal  infantry  was  marched  around  them,  and  sub- 
mitted to  an  accurate  and  deliberate  cannonade  for  20  minutes, 
followed  quickly  by  a  charge  of  the  two  lines.  Not  a  gun  was 
fired  until  the  enemy  approached  within  100  yards,  showing 
handkerchiefs  as  an  invitation  to  the  men  to  surrender.  Then 
two  volleys  broke  both  of  their  lines,  and  the  excited  Confed- 
erates charged  in  pursuit  of  the  fleeing  enemy,  but  were  soon 
driven  back  by  the  fire  of  the  guns.  A  second  charge  of  the 
Federals  soon  followed,  in  which  the  two  lines  mingled  in  one 
promiscuous  and  prolonged  mele'e  with  clubbed  muskets  and 
bayonets,  as  if  bent  upon  exterminating  each  other  individually. 
Gen.  Custis  Lee  in  his  official  report  thus  describes  the  ending :  — 

"  Finding  .  .  .  that  my  command  was  entirely  surrounded,  to  prevent 
useless  sacrifice  of  life,  the  firing  was  stopped  by  some  of  my  officers  aided 
by  some  of  the  enemy's,  and  the  officers  and  men  were  taken  as  prisoners 
of  war."1 

Toward  noon,  the  enemy  began  to  appear  in  our  front  at  Rice's 
Turnout,  and  made  demonstrations,  but  were  easily  held  off  by 
the  artillery.  Meanwhile,  Lee  had  become  very  anxious  over  the 
non-arrival  of  Anderson's  command  (the  remnants  of  Pickett's 
and  Johnson's  divisions),  and  at  last  rode  to  the  rear  to  investigate. 
He  did  not  return  until  near  sundown  and  with  him  came  fuller 

1  Col.  Crutchfield,  who  was  Jackson's  chief  of  artillery,  and  lost  a  leg  at 
Chancellorsville,  was  killed  in  this  action.  A  graphic  and  detailed  account 
of  it  is  given  in  Stiles' s  Four  Years  under  Marse  Robert. 


THE  FALL  OF  1864  597 

news  of  the  battle  at  Sailor's  Creek  in  which  Anderson  was  also 
involved.  Our  loss  had  been  about  8000  men,  with  six  generals  — 
Ewell,  Kershaw,  Custis  Lee,  Dubose,  Hunton,  and  Corse — all 
captured. 

One  notable  affair  had  taken  place  on  this  date,  between  a 
small  force  under  Gen.  Read,  sent  ahead  by  Ord  to  burn  the 
High  Bridge  on  the  Lynchburg  road,  and  Bearing's  and  Rosser's 
cavalry.  The  expedition  consisted  of  two  regiments  of  infantry 
and  about  80  cavalry.  They  had  gotten  within  a  mile  of  the 
bridge,  when  our  cavalry,  in  much  larger  force,  attacked  them. 
Humphreys  writes :  — 

"A  most  gallant  fight  ensued  in  which  Gen.  Read,  Col.  Washburn,  and 
three  other  cavalry  officers  were  killed.  After  heavy  loss  the  rest  of  the 
force  surrendered.  Gen.  Bearing,  Col.  Boston,  and  Maj.  Thompson  of 
Rosser's  command  were  among  the  killed." 

About  sundown,  the  enemy  at  Rice's  showed  a  disposition  to 
advance,  and  Lee  soon  gave  orders  to  resume  our  retreat.  In 
the  morning  we  might  have  gone  on  toward  Danville,  but  now 
we  turned  to  the  right  and  took  the  road  to  Lynchburg.  I 
remember  the  night  as  one  peculiarly  uncomfortable.  The  road 
was  crowded  with  disorganized  men  and  deep  in  mud.  We 
were  moving  all  night  and  scarcely  made  six  miles.  About  sun- 
rise, we  got  to  Farmville  and  crossed  the  river  on  a  bridge  to  the 
north  side  of  the  Appomattox,  and  here  we  received  a  small 
supply  of  rations. 

Here  we  found  Gen.  Lee.  While  we  were  getting  breakfast,  he 
sent  for  me  and,  taking  out  his  map,  showed  me  that  the  enemy 
had  taken  a  highway  bridge  across  the  Appomattox  near 
the  High  Bridge,  were  crossing  on  it,  and  would  come  in  upon 
our  road  about  three  miles  ahead.  He  directed  me  to  send 
artillery  there  to  cover  our  passage  and,  meanwhile,  to  take  per- 
sonal charge  of  the  two  bridges  at  Farmville  (the  railroad  and 
the  highway),  prepare  them  for  burning,  see  that  they  were  not 
fired  too  soon,  so  as  to  cut  off  our  own  men,  nor  so  late  that  the 
enemy  might  save  them. 

While  he  explained,  my  eyes  ran  over  the  map  and  I  saw 
another  road  to  Lynchburg  than  the  one  we  were  taking.  This 


598  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

other  kept  the  south  side  of  the  river  and  was  the  straighter  of 
the  two,  our  road  joining  it  near  Appomattox  C.  H.  I  pointed 
this  out,  and  he  asked  if  I  could  find  some  one  whom  he 
might  question.  I  had  seen  at  a  house  near  by  an  intelligent 
man  whom  I  brought  up  and  who  confirmed  the  map.  The 
Federals  would  have  the  shortest  road  to  Appomattox  station, 
a  common  point  a  little  beyond  Appomattox  C.  H.  Saying 
there  would  be  time  enough  to  look  after  that,  the  general 
folded  up  his  map  and  I  went  to  look  after  the  bridges. 

As  the  enemy  were  already  in  sight,  I  set  fire  to  the  railroad 
bridge  at  once,  and,  having  well  prepared  the  highway  bridge, 
I  left  my  aide,  Lt.  Mason,  to  fire  it  on  a  signal  from  me.  It  was 
also  successfully  burned.  In  the  End  of  an  Era  by  John  S.  Wise, 
he  has  described  an  interview  occurring  between  his  father,  Gen. 
Wise,  and  Gen.  Lee  at  Farmville  at  this  time,  which  I  quote:  — 

"We  found  Gen.  Lee  on  the  rear  portico  of  the  house  I  have  mentioned. 
He  had  washed  his  face  in  a  tin  basin  and  stood  drying  his  beard  with  a 
coarse  towel  as  we  approached.  'Gen.  Lee,'  exclaimed  my  father,  'my 
poor  brave  men  are  lying  on  yonder  hill  more  dead  than  alive.  For  more 
than  a  week  they  have  been  fighting  day  and  night,  without  food,  and, 
by  God,  Sir,  they  shall  not  move  another  step  until  somebody  gives  them 
something  to  eat.' 

"'Come  in,  General/ said  Gen.  Lee,  soothingly.  ' They  deserve  some- 
thing to  eat  and  shall  have  it ;  and  meanwhile  you  shall  share  my  break- 
fast.' He  disarmed  everything  like  defiance  by  his  kindness.  .  .  .  Gen. 
Lee  inquired  what  he  thought  of  the  situation.  '  Situation  ? '  said  the  bold 
old  man.  'There  is  no  situation.  Nothing  remains,  Gen.  Lee,  but  to  put 
your  poor  men  on  your  poor  mules  and  send  them  home  in  time  for  the 
spring  ploughing.  This  army  is  hopelessly  whipped,  and  is  fast  becoming 
demoralized.  These  men  have  already  endured  more  than  I  believed 
flesh  and  blood  could  stand,  and  I  say  to  you,  Sir,  emphatically,  that  to 
prolong  the  struggle  is  murder,  and  the  blood  of  every  man  who  is  killed 
from  this  time  forth  is  on  your  head,  Gen.  Lee.' 

"  This  last  expression  seemed  to  cause  Gen.  Lee  great  pain.  With  a 
gesture  of  remonstrance,  and  even  of  impatience,  he  protested.  'Oh, 
General,  do  not  talk  so  wildly.  My  burdens  are  heavy  enough !  What 
would  the  country  think  of  me,  if  I  did  what  you  suggest?' 

'"Country  be  d — d,'  was  the  quick  reply.  'There  is  no  country. 
There  has  been  no  country,  General,  for  a  year  or  more.  You  are  the  country 
to  these  men.  They  have  fought  for  you.  They  have  shivered  through 
a  long  winter  for  you.  Without  pay  or  clothes  or  care  of  any  sort  their 
devotion  to  you  and  faith  in  you  have  been  the  only  things  that  have  held 


THE  FALL  OF  1864  599 

this  army  together.  If  you  demand  the  sacrifice,  there  are  still  left  thou- 
sands of  us  who  will  die  for  you.  You  know  the  game  is  desperate  beyond 
redemption,  and  that,  if  you  so  announce,  no  man,  or  government,  or 
people  will  gainsay  your  decision.  That  is  why  I  repeat  that  the  blood  of 
any  man  killed  hereafter  is  on  your  head.'  Gen.  Lee  stood  for  some  time 
at  an  open  window  looking  out  at  the  throng  now  surging  by  upon  the 
roads  and  in  the  fields,  and  made  no  response." 

Well  might  Lee  say,  "My  burdens  are  heavy  enough !"  Gen. 
Wise  had  in  no  way  exaggerated  them. 

Poague's  battalion  of  artillery  had  gone  ahead  to  the  inter- 
secting road  Lee  had  mentioned,  and  Mahone's  division  (now 
assigned  to  our  corps)  supported  by  Poague's  guns,  took 
a  good  position  and  began  to  fortify.  They  held  the  position 
all  day,  being  charged  in  the  afternoon,  repulsing  the  enemy 
and  charging  in  turn.  They  captured  the  colors  of  the  5th 
N.H.,  and  regained  one  of  our  guns  which  had  been  over- 
run by  numbers.  The  enemy,  Miles's  division,  reported  a  loss 
for  the  day  of  571.  The  march  of  our  column  was  continued 
under  the  protection  of  Mahone's  division,  with  but  one  slight 
interruption. 

Crook's  division  of  cavalry  forded  the  river  on  our  left  and 
moved  toward  our  train.  Gregg's  brigade,  in  the  lead,  was 
charged  by  Mumford  and  Rosser,  and  Gregg  and  a  bunch  of 
prisoners  were  captured,  on  which  the  rest  of  the  division  was 
withdrawn.  Our  march  was  now  kept  up  all  night  and  the  next 
day  until  sundown.  I  rode  off  from  the  road,  after  midnight, 
with  my  staff  and  found  a  fence  corner  where  we  could  rest  awhile 
without  having  our  horses  stolen  as  we  slept,  for  I  had  now 
had  but  one  night's  rest  out  of  six. 

After  sundown  on  the  7th,  Mahone,  still  holding  the  road 
against  the  2d  corps  under  Humphreys,  asked  a  flag  of  truce  to 
enable  him  to  remove  the  wounded,  left  in  front  of  his  line  when 
he  charged  and  captured  the  colors  of  the  5th  N.H.  When  the 
reply  came,  granting  the  truce  for  an  hour,  it  brought  also  a 
letter  from  Grant  to  Lee,  as  follows :  — 

"APRIL  7,  1865. 

"  GENERAL  :  The  result  of  the  last  week  must  convince  you  of  the  hope- 
lessness of  further  resistance  on  the  part  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Vir- 


600  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

ginia  in  this  struggle.  I  feel  that  it  is  so,  and  regard  it  as  my  duty  to 
shift  from  myself  the  responsibility  of  any  further  effusion  of  blood,  by 
asking  of  you  the  surrender  of  that  portion  of  the  Confederate  army  known 
as  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia. 

"U.  S.  GRANT,  Lt.-Gen." 

Lee,  at  that  moment,  happened  to  be  near  Mahone's  lines,  and 
within  an  hour  the  following  reply  was  delivered  to  Gen.  Seth 
Williams,  the  bearer: — 

"APRIL  7,  1865. 

"GENERAL:  I  have  received  your  note  of  this  date.  Though  not 
entertaining  the  opinion  you  express  on  the  hopelessness  of  further  resist- 
ance on  the  part  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  I  reciprocate  your 
desire  to  avoid  useless  effusion  of  blood,  and  therefore,  before  considering 
your  proposition,  ask  the  terms  you  will  offer  on  condition  of  its  sur- 
render. 

"R.  E.  LEE,  Gen." 

The  next  day,  the  8th,  was  the  first  quiet  day  of  our  retreat. 
The  2d  corps  followed  us  up  closely,  but  there  was  no  collision. 
All  the  rest  of  the  Federal  army  had  taken  the  more  direct  road 
which  I  had  seen  on  Lee's  map,  and  was  marching  to  get  ahead 
of  us  at  Appomattox  C.  H.  During  the  day  I  rode  for  a 
while  with  Gen.  Pendleton,  our  chief  of  artillery.  He  told  me 
that  some  of  the  leading  generals  had  conferred,  and  decided  that 
it  would  be  well  to  represent  to  Lee  that,  in  their  opinion, 
the  cause  was  now  hopeless,  in  order  that  he  might  surrender 
and  allow  the  odium  of  making  the  first  proposition  to  be 
placed  upon  them. 

But  it  was  thought  that  Longstreet  was  the  man  to  make 
the  proposition  to  Lee.  Longstreet  had  not  been  consulted, 
and  Pendleton  had  undertaken  to  broach  the  matter  to  him,  and 
had  done  so.  Longstreet  had  indignantly  rejected  the  propo- 
sition, saying  that  his  duty  was  to  help  hold  up  Lee's  hands,  not 
to  beat  them  down;  that  his  corps  could  still  whip  twice  its 
number  and  as  long  as  that  was  the  case  he  would  never  be 
the  one  to  suggest  a  surrender. 

On  this,  Pendleton  himself  had  made  bold  to  make  the  suggestion 
to  Lee.  From  his  report  of  the  conversation,  he  had  met  a  de- 


THE  FALL  OF  1864  601 

cided  snub,  and  was  plainly  embarrassed  in  telling  of  it.  Lee 
had  answered  very  coldly,  "There  are  too  many  men  here  to 
talk  of  laying  down  their  arms  without  fighting." 

Evidently  Lee  preferred  to  himself  take  the  whole  responsi- 
bility of  surrender,  as  he  had  always  taken  that  of  his  battles, 
whatever  their  issue,  entirely  alone. 

Some  time  hi  the  afternoon  he  received  Grant's  reply  to  his 
inquiry  as  to  the  terms  proposed.  It  was  as  follows :  — 

"FARMVILLE,  April  8,  1865. 

"  GENERAL  :  Your  note  of  last  evening  in  reply  to  mine  of  same  date, 
asking  the  condition  on  which  I  will  accept  the  surrender  of  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia  is  received.  In  reply  I  would  say  that  peace  being 
my  great  desire,  there  is  but  one  condition  I  would  insist  upon,  namely, 
that  the  men  and  officers  surrendered  shall  be  disqualified  from  taking  up 
arms  again  against  the  government  of  the  United  States  until  properly  ex- 
changed. I  will  meet  you,  or  will  designate  officers  to  meet  any  officers 
you  may  name  for  the  same  purpose  at  any  point  agreeable  to  you  for  the 
purpose  of  arranging  definitely  the  terms  upon  which  the  surrender  of  the 
Army  of  Northern  Virginia  will  be  received. 

"U.  S.  GRANT,  Lt.-Gen." 

Lee  received  this  late  in  the  afternoon  of  the  8th.  It  was 
answered  from  the  roadside  and  delivered  to  Humphreys  after 
sundown  for  transmission  to  Grant.  Lee  had  but  recently  been 
appointed  commander-in-chief  of  all  the  Confederate  armies, 
and  he  now  delays  the  surrender  of  his  own  army  in  order 
that  the  negotiation  may  include  that  of  all  the  Confed- 
erate forces  under  his  command.  In  accomplishing  this  he 
might  reasonably  hope  to  secure  the  best  possible  terms, 
as  it  would  bring  instant  peace  everywhere.  His  letter  was 
as  follows:  — 

"APRIL  8,  1865. 

"  GENERAL  :  I  received  at  a  late  hour  your  note  of  to-day.  In  mine  of 
yesterday  I  did  not  intend  to  propose  the  surrender  of  the  Army  of  North- 
ern Virginia,  but  to  ask  the  terms  of  your  proposition.  To  be  frank,  I  do 
not  think  the  emergency  has  arisen  to  call  for  the  surrender  of  this  army, 
but,  as  the  restoration  of  peace  should  be  the  object  of  all,  I  desire  to  know 
whether  your  proposals  would  lead  to  that  end.  I  cannot  therefore  meet 
you  with  a  view  to  surrender  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  but  as  far 


602  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

as  your  proposal  may  affect  the  Confederate  States'  forces  under  my  com- 
mand, and  tend  to  the  restoration  of  peace,  I  should  be  pleased  to  meet 
you  at  10  A.M.  to-morrow  on  the  old  stage  road  to  Richmond  between  the 
picket-lines  of  the  two  armies. 

"R.  E.  LEE,  Gen." 

This  letter  was  received  by  Grant  at  Curdsville,  a  roadside 
village  on  the  road  Lee  had  travelled,  about  midnight.  It  was 
not  answered  until  in  the  morning,  as  Grant  did  not  intend  to 
accept  Lee's  invitation  to  meet  him  at  10  A.M.  Grant  had 
doubtless  had  an  early  interview  in  his  mind  when  he  sent  his 
second  letter,  and  was  probably  accompanying  the  2d  corps,  that 
he  might  be  conveniently  near.  But  he  had  been  recently  cau- 
tioned from  Washington  about  making  or  discussing  any  political 
terms,  and,  as  Lee's  letter  seemed  to  involve  a  chance  of  such 
discussions,  he  apparently  decided  to  make  the  proposed  meeting 
impossible  by  at  once  leaving  that  road  and  riding  across  to  the 
road  being  travelled  by  Ord  and  Sheridan. 

Before  starting,  however,  he  replied  to  Lee  from  Curdsville, 
as  follows :  — 

"APRIL  9,  1865. 

"  GENERAL  :  Your  note  of  yesterday  is  received.  I  have  no  authority  to 
treat  on  the  subject  of  peace.  The  meeting  proposed  for  10  A.M.  to-day 
could  lead  to  no  good.  I  will  state,  however,  General,  that  I  am  equally 
anxious  for  peace  with  yourself,  and  the  whole  North  entertains  the  same 
feeling.  The  terms  upon  which  peace  can  be  had  are  well  understood. 
By  the  South  laying  down  their  arms  they  will  hasten  that  most  desirable 
event,  save  thousands  of  human  lives  and  hundreds  of  millions  of  prop- 
erty not  yet  destroyed. 

"  Seriously  hoping  that  all  our  difficulties  may  be  settled  without  the 
loss  of  another  life,  I  subscribe  myself,  etc. 

"  U.  S.  GRANT,  Lt.-Gen." 

Meanwhile,  during  the  afternoon,  we  had  approached  Appo- 
mattox  C.  H.,  two  miles  beyond  which  was  the  junction  of 
our  road  with  the  one  on  which  Sheridan  and  Ord  were  now 
approaching,  and  already  the  advanced  guards  of  the  two  forces 
were  in  collision.  Lee  arranged  during  the  evening  with  Gor- 
don and  Fitz-Lee,  who  had  the  advance,  that  they  should  make 
a  vigorous  attack  at  dawn  and  endeavor  to  clear  the  road. 


THE  FALL  OF   1864  603 

This  was  done,  and,  in  evidence  of  it,  a  battery  of  12-Pr.  Napo- 
leons was  presently  sent  in  to  me,  having  been  captured  by  a 
cavalry  charge  of  Robert's  brigade.  Though  this  evidenced 
good  spirit  on  the  part  of  our  men,  our  advance  made  no  progress, 
and  the  increased  fire  told  of  large  forces  already  in  our  front. 
Lee  was  up  at  an  early  hour  and  sent  Col.  Venable  to  Gordon  to 
inquire  how  he  progressed.  Gordon's  answer  was:  — 

"Tell  Gen.  Lee  I  have  fought  my  corps  to  a  frazzle,  and  I  fear  I  can  do 
nothing  unless  I  am  heavily  supported  by  Longstreet's  corps." 

When  Lee  received  this  message,  he  exclaimed :  — 

"Then  there  is  nothing  left  me  but  to  go  and  see  Gen.  Grant,  and  I  would 
rather  die  a  thousand  deaths." 

Venable  writes :  — 

"  Convulsed  with  passionate  grief,  many  were  the  wild  words  which  we 
spoke  as  we  stood  around  him.  Said  one,  'Oh,  General !  What  will  his- 
tory say  of  the  surrender  of  the  army  in  the  field?'  He  replied,  'Yes, 
I  know  they  will  say  hard  things  of  us.  They  will  not  understand  how  we 
were  overwhelmed  by  numbers.  But  that  is  not  the  question,  Colonel. 
The  question  is,  Is  it  right  to  surrender  this  army  ?  If  it  is  right,  then  I 
will  take  all  the  responsibility.' " 

Meanwhile,  the  march  of  the  army  had  come  to  a  halt  in  front, 
while,  for  a  time,  the  rear  closed  slowly  up.  I  had  bivouacked 
near  the  road,  and  soon  after  sunrise  I  came  upon  Lee  with  his 
staff  by  the  roadside,  at  the  top  of  a  hill.  The  general  called  me 
to  him,  and  taking  his  seat  upon  a  felled  oak,  peeled  off  its  bark, 
and  referring  to  the  map  we  had  looked  at  together  on  the  7th, 
he  said : *  — 

"Well,  we  have  come  to  the  Junction,  and  they  seem  to  be  here  ahead 
of  us.  What  have  we  got  to  do  to-day?" 

I  had  been  somewhat  prepared  by  my  talk  with  Pendleton, 
had  formulated  a  plan  of  my  own,  and  was  glad  to  have  a 
chance  to  present  it.  My  command  having  been  north  of  the 

1 1  still  cherish  a  rectangle  of  that  Confederate  photographic  map  linen 
mounted,  labelled  S.  Side  James  River,  and  with  Lee's  autograph  upon  it. 
He  had  carried  it  in  his  breast  pocket  for  months,  and  when  he  finally 
rode  to  meet  Grant,  Venable  took  it  to  burn.  I  cut  off  and  preserved  the 
outside  fold  with  his  label  and  signature. 


604  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

James  had  had  no  share  in  the  fighting  about  Petersburg,  and 
but  little  in  the  retreat.  They  had  now  begun  to  hear  of  a  sur- 
render, and  would  hint  their  sentiments  in  loud  voices  when  I 
rode  by. 

"We  don't  want  to  surrender  any  ammunition.  We've  been  saving 
ammunition  all  this  war.  Hope  we  were  not  saving  it  for  a  surrender." 

I  told  the  general  of  this  and  said  that  if  he  saw  fit  to  try  and  cut 
our  way  out,  my  command  would  do  as  well  as  they  had  ever  done. 
He  answered :  — 

"I  have  left  only  two  divisions,  Field's  and  Mahone's,  sufficiently  or- 
ganized to  be  relied  upon.  All  the  rest  have  been  broken  and  routed  and 
can  do  little  good.  Those  divisions  are  now  scarcely  4000  apiece,  and  that 
is  far  too  little  to  meet  the  force  now  in  front  of  us." 

This  was  just  the  opportunity  wished,  and  I  hastened  to  lay 
my  plan  before  him.  I  said :  — 

"Then  we  have  only  choice  of  two  courses.  Either  to  surrender,  or 
to  take  to  the  woods  and  bushes,  with  orders,  either  to  rally  on  Johnston, 
or  perhaps  better,  on  the  Governors  of  the  respective  States.  If  we  sur- 
render this  army,  it  is  the  end  of  the  Confederacy.  I  think  our  best 
course  would  be  to  order  each  man  to  go  to  the  Governor  of  his  own 
State  with  his  arms." 

"What  would  you  hope  to  accomplish  by  that?"  said  he.  "In  the 
first  place,"  said  I, "  to  stand  the  chances.  If  we  surrender  this  army,  every 
other  army  will  have  to  follow  suit.  All  will  go  like  a  row  of  bricks,  and  if 
the  rumors  of  help  from  France  have  any  foundation,  the  news  of  our  sur- 
render will  put  an  end  to  them. 

"But  the  one  thing  which  may  be  possible  in  our  present  situation  is 
to  get  some  sort  of  terms.  None  of  our  armies  are  likely  to  be  able  to  get 
them,  and  that  is  why  we  should  try  with  the  different  States.  Already 
it  has  been  said  that  Vance  can  make  terms  for  N.C.,  and  Jo  Brown  for  Ga. 
Let  the  Governor  of  each  State  make  some  sort  of  a  show  of  force  and  then 
surrender  on  terms  which  may  save  us  from  trials  for  treason  and  con- 
fiscations." 

As  I  talked,  it  all  looked  to  me  so  reasonable  that  I  hoped 
he  was  convinced,  for  he  listened  in  silence.  So  I  went  on 
more  confidently:  — 

"  But,  General,  apart  from  all  that  —  if  all  fails  and  there  is  no  hope  — 
the  men  who  have  fought  under  you  for  four  years  have  got  the  right  this 
morning  to  ask  one  favor  of  you.  We  know  that  you  do  not  care  for  mili- 


THE  FALL  OF   1864  605 

tary  glory.  But  we  are  proud  of  the  record  of  this  army.  We  want  to 
leave  it  untarnished  to  our  children.  It  is  a  clear  record  so  far  and  now  is 
about  to  be  closed.  A  little  blood  more  or  less  now  makes  no  difference, 
and  we  have  the  right  to  ask  of  you  to  spare  us  the  mortification  of  having 
you  ask  Grant  for  terms  and  have  him  answer  that  he  has  no  terms  to 
offer.  That  it  is  'U.S.,  Unconditional  Surrender.'  That  was  his  reply 
to  Buckner  at  Fort  Donelson,  and  to  Pemberton  at  Vicksburg,  and  that 
is  what  is  threatened  us.  General,  spare  us  the  mortification  of  asking 
terms  and  getting  that  reply." 

He  heard  it  all  so  quietly,  and  it  was  all  so  true,  it  seemed 
to  me,  and  so  undeniable,  that  I  felt  sure  that  I  had  him  con- 
vinced. His  first  words  were :  — 

"  If  I  should  take  your  advice,  how  many  men  do  you  suppose  would  get 
away?" 

"Two-thirds  of  us,"  I  answered.  "We  would  be  like  rabbits  and  par- 
tridges in  the  bushes,  and  they  could  not  scatter  to  follow  us."  He  said : 
"  I  have  not  over  15,000  muskets  left.  Two-thirds  of  them  divided  among 
the  States,  even  if  all  could  be  collected,  would  be  too  small  a  force  to 
accomplish  anything.  All  could  not  be  collected.  Their  homes  have  been 
overrun,  and  many  would  go  to  look  after  their  families. 

"Then,  General,  you  and  I  as  Christian  men  have  no  right  to  consider 
only  how  this  would  affect  us.  We  must  consider  its  effect  on  the  country 
as  a  whole.  Already  it  is  demoralized  by  the  four  years  of  war.  If  I 
took  your  advice,  the  men  would  be  without  rations  and  under  no  control 
of  officers.  They  would  be  compelled  to  rob  and  steal  in  order  to  live. 
They  would  become  mere  bands  of  marauders,  and  the  enemy's  cavalry 
would  pursue  them  and  overrun  many  wide  sections  they  may  never  have 
occasion  to  visit.  We  would  bring  on  a  state  of  affairs  it  would  take  the 
country  years  to  recover  from. 

"And,  as  for  myself,  you  young  fellows  might  go  to  bushwhacking, 
but  the  only  dignified  course  for  me  would  be,  to  go  to  Gen.  Grant  and 
surrender  myself  and  take  the  consequences  of  my  acts." 

He  paused  for  only  a  moment  and  then  went  on. 

"But  I  can  tell  you  one  thing  for  your  comfort.  Grant  will  not  de- 
mand an  unconditional  surrender.  He  will  give  us  as  good  terms  as  this 
army  has  the  right  to  demand,  and  I  am  going  to  meet  him  in  the  rear  at 
10  A.M.  and  surrender  the  army  on  the  condition  of  not  fighting  again  until 
exchanged." 

I  had  not  a  single  word  to  say  in  reply.  He  had  answered  my 
suggestion  from  a  plane  so  far  above  it,  that  I  was  ashamed  of 
having  made  it.  With  several  friends,  I  had  planned  to  make 


606  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

an  escape  on  seeing  a  flag  of  truce,  but  that  idea  was  at  once 
abandoned  by  all  of  them  on  hearing  my  report. 

At  this  time  the  negotiations  had  been  definitely  broken  off 
by  Lee's  second  letter.  The  meeting  which  this  proposed  had 
been  declined  by  Grant  in  a  letter  now  on  its  way  to  Lee,  but  not 
yet  received.  He  had  told  me  Grant's  terms  as  if  he  knew  them, 
but  later  he  felt  some  uneasiness  lest  Grant  might  not  feel  bound 
by  his  offer  after  it  had  once  been  declined.  Longstreet,  in 
Manassas  to  Appomattox,  mentions  his  apprehensions  on  this 
subject,  but  states  that  he,  from  personal  acquaintance  with 
Grant,  felt  able  to  assure  Lee  that  there  would  be  no  humiliating 
demands,  and  the  event  justified  that  assurance. 

About  8.30  o'clock  Lee,  in  a  full  suit  of  new  uniform,  with 
sword  and  sash  and  an  embroidered  belt,  boots,  and  gold  spurs, 
rode  to  the  rear,  hoping  soon  to  meet  Grant  and  to  be  able  to 
make  the  surrender.  Instead,  he  learned  of  Grant's  change  of 
route  and  was  handed  Grant's  letter,  dated  that  morning,  and 
declining  the  interview.  He  at  once  wrote  a  reply  as  follows,  and 
asked  to  have  it  sent  to  overtake  Grant  on  his  long  ride. 

"APRIL  9,  1865. 

"GENERAL:  I  received  your  note  of  this  morning  on  the  picket  line 
whither  I  had  come  to  meet  you,  and  ascertain  definitely  what  terms  were 
embraced  in  your  proposal  of  yesterday  with  reference  to  the  surrender  of 
this  army.  I  now  ask  an  interview  in  accordance  with  the  offer  contained 
in  your  letter  of  yesterday  for  that  purpose. 

"R.  E.  LEE,  General." 

While  this  last  message  was  being  prepared,  a  messenger  riding 
like  the  wind  dashed  around  a  curve,  and  seeing  Lee,  and  having 
but  one  arm,  with  difficulty  stopped  his  horse  nearly  100  yards 
beyond.  All  recognized  the  rider,  Col.  John  Haskell  of  Long- 
street's  artillery,  and,  as  his  horse  was  checked,  Lee  went  to 
meet  him,  exclaiming:  "What  is  it?  What  is  it?"  and  then, 
without  waiting  for  a  reply :  "  Oh,  why  did  you  do  it  ?  You  have 
killed  your  beautiful  horse!"1 

1  Haskell' s  horse  was  well  known  in  the  army  for  its  beauty  and  speed. 
It  had  been  led  all  the  way  from  Richmond  on  the  retreat,  with  a  view  to 
making  an  escape  in  case  of  a  surrender,  which  intent  had  now  just  been 
abandoned,  as  already  told.  The  horse  recovered  and  was  sold  to  a  Federal 
officer  for  a  handsome  sum  in  gold. 


THE  FALL  OF  1864  607 

Haskell  explained  that  Fitz-Lee  had  sent  in  a  report  that  he 
had  found  a  road  by  which  the  army  could  escape,  and  that 
Longstreet  had  ordered  him  to  overtake  Lee,  before  he  could 
send  a  note  to  Grant,  and  to  kill  his  horse  to  do  it.  Longstreet, 
in  his  book,  says  that  Haskell 's  arrival  was  too  late,  that  the  note 
had  gone.  But  Humphreys's  narrative  shows  that  Col.  Whittier, 
who  took  the  note,  witnessed  Haskell's  arrival  before  the  note 
was  finished.  Lee,  however,  had  not  credited  the  report,  and  a 
later  messenger  soon  came  to  say  that  the  report  was  a  mistake. 

When  Field's  division  had  been  halted  by  the  flag  of  truce, 
Humphreys's  corps  was  within  a  half-mile,  and  under  his  orders 
it  soon  appeared  to  be  making  preparation  for  a  further  advance. 
Field,  meanwhile,  went  to  intrenching.  Grant  had  instructed 
Humphreys  not  to  let  the  correspondence  delay  his  movements. 

In  Longstreet's  front  Gordon  had  all  the  morning  been  en- 
gaged with  Sheridan,  arid  firing,  both  of  musketry  and  artillery, 
was  still  in  progress.  Lee  had  at  first  neglected  to  give  author- 
ity to  ask  for  a  truce,  but  later  sent  it  to  Gordon  who  sent  Maj. 
Sims  of  Longstreet's  staff  to  request  one.  Sims  met  Ouster  who 
had  himself  conducted  to  Gordon,  and  dernanded  the  imme- 
diate and  unconditional  surrender  of  the  army,  which  Gordon 
refused.  Ouster  said :  — 

"  Sheridan  directs  me  to  say  to  you,  General,  if  there  is  any  hesitation 
about  your  surrender,  that  he  has  you  surrounded  and  can  annihilate 
your  command  in  an  hour." 

Gordon  replied :  — 

"There  is  a  flag  between  Lee  and  Grant  for  the  purpose  of  surrender, 
and  if  Gen.  Sheridan  decides  to  continue  the  fighting  in  the  face  of  the  flag 
of  truce,  the  responsibility  for  the  bloodshed  will  be  his  and  not  mine." 

On  this,  Gordon  says,  Ouster  rode  off  with  Maj.  Hunter  of 
Gordon's  staff,  "asking  to  be  guided  to  Longstreet's  position." 
Finding  Longstreet,  he  made  the  same  demand  for  immediate 
and  unconditional  surrender.  I  have  told  of  this  scene  elsewhere l 
more  at  length,  but  did  not  know  until  the  recent  publication  of 
Gordon's  book,  that  it  was  Ouster's  second  attempt  that  morn- 
ing to  secure  the  surrender  of  the  army  to  himself.  Longstreet 

1  Century,  April,  1903. 


608  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

rebuffed  him,  however,  very  roughly,  far  more  so  than  appears 
in  Longstreet's  account  of  the  interview. 

Meanwhile,  in  our  rear,  more  serious  trouble  threatened.  The 
2d  corps,  closely  followed  by  the  6th,  began  to  advance.  Lee, 
who  was  still  awaiting  between  the  lines  Grant's  reply  to  his  let- 
ter (which  had  over  15  miles  to  go,  and  did  not  reach  Grant  until 
11.50  A.M.),  sent  by  his  staff-officers  two  earnest  verbal  requests 
to  Humphrey  snot  to  press  upon  him,  as  negotiations  were  going 
on  for  a  surrender.  Humphreys,  under  his  orders,  felt  unable  to 
comply,  although  the  second  request  was  very  urgent.  He  sent 
word  to  Lee,  who  was  in  full  sight  on  the  road,  within  100  yards 
of  the  head  of  the  2d  corps,  that  he  must  withdraw  at  once. 

Lee  then  withdrew,  and  the  2d  corps  continued  to  advance, 
and  deployed  in  front  of  Field's  intrenchments,  and  the  6th 
corps  also  deployed,  on  the  right  of  the  2d,  ready  to  assault. 
At  the  critical  moment  when  this  assault  was  about  to  begin,  it 
was  suspended  by  the  opportune  arrival  on  the  ground  of  Meade. 
Meade  had  read  Lee's  letter  to  Grant  of  that  morning,  and  he 
took  the  responsibility  of  sending  Lee  a  letter  granting  a  truce 
of  one  hour,  in  view  of  the  negotiations  for  a  surrender.  This 
letter  was  delivered  at  Field's  lines,  and,  Humphreys  says,  was 
received  by  Lee  between  eleven  and  twelve  o'clock.  This  truce 
may  have  been  prolonged,  for  it  must  have  been  as  late  as  1  P.M. 
before  the  message  sent  by  Babcock  from  the  front,  to  be  pres- 
ently told  of,  could  have  been  started. 

Meanwhile,  during  the  morning,  and  before  the  first  flag  of 
truce  was  sent,  Longstreet  had  directed  me  to  form  a  line  of 
battle  on  which  all  of  our  available  force  could  be  rallied  for  a 
last  stand.  I  got  up  all  the  organized  infantry  and  artillery  in 
the  column,  and  took  up  a  fairly  good  position  behind  the  North 
Fork  of  the  Appomattox  River.  To  our  left  the  enemy  was 
still  extending  his  lines,  and  some  of  my  battery  commanders 
were  anxious  to  expend  on  them  some  of  the  ammunition  they 
had  hauled  so  far,  for  the  firing  had  not  yet  ceased.  But  I  knew 
that  Lee  would  not  approve  an  unnecessary  shot,  and  not  one 
was  fired  from  our  line.1 

1  The  last  cannon  shot  was  fired  from  Gordon' s  lines  under  orders  to  cease 
firing,  conveyed  by  Maj.  W.  W.  Parker  of  Huger's  battalion.     It  was  fired 


THE  FALL  OF  1864  609 

When  the  truce  in  our  rear  was  for  the  time  arranged,  Lee  re- 
turned to  our  front  and  stopped  in  an  apple  orchard  a  hundred 
yards  or  so  in  advance  of  our  line  where  I  had  some  fence  rails 
piled  under  a  tree  to  make  him  a  seat.1  Here  Longstreet  joined 
him,  and  they  again  discussed  the  chances  of  Grant's  making 
some  humiliating  demands.  Humphreys's  refusal  to  recognize 
Lee's  presence  between  the  lines  as  constituting  a  truce,  while 
awaiting  the  reply  to  Lee's  proposal  to  surrender  on  Grant's 
terms,  and  the  reluctantly  allowed  single  hour  of  truce  as  the 
alternative  of  instant  battle,  naturally  made  them,  perhaps,  sus- 
picious. Few  in  either  army  yet  knew  of  the  liberality  with 
which  Grant  was  prepared  to  treat  us.  The  general  temper  had 
been  illustrated  in  the  fight  at  Sailor's  Creek  by  the  Chaffin's 
Bluff  battalion,  under  Stiles,  who  tried  to  insist  upon  fighting  to 
the  last  ditch.  Even  Lee  and  Longstreet,  under  the  present  cir- 
cumstances, could  not  feel  confidence  in  their  hope  that  he  might 
not  demand  unconditional  surrender.  So  as  they  sat  together 
under  the  apple  tree  awaiting  the  coming  of  Grant's  messenger 
to  summon  Lee  to  the  conference,  silence  gradually  fell  be- 
tween them.  The  conversation  dropped  to  broken  sentences, 
and  there  were  occasional  long  silences  between  them.  The 
last  thing  said  was  by  Longstreet  to  Lee,  as  Grant's  messenger 
was  seen  approaching.  It  was :  — 

"General,  unless  he  offers  us  honorable  terms,  come  back  and  let  us 
fight  it  out." 

Grant's  messenger  was  Col.  Babcock  of  his  staff,  who  had 
ridden  ahead  for  eight  miles  with  the  reply  to  Lee's  last  note. 
Less  formal  than  the  previous  correspondence  had  been,  and 
using  for  the  first  time  the  customary  terms  of  courtesy,  it  con- 
veyed assurance  that  no  unpleasant  surprises  were  to  be  ex- 
pected. It  read:  — 

by  a  section  under  command  of  Lt.  Wright  of  Clutter's  battery.  The 
battery  was  one  of  Mclntosh's  battalion  of  the  3d  corps  and  was  com- 
manded by  Lt.  Mclntosh,  a  brother  of  Col.  Mclntosh. 

1  Within  two  days  this  tree  was  cut  down  for  mementoes  and  relics  and 
the  roots  dug  up.  This  was  begun  by  the  Confederate  soldiers  and  finished 
by  the  Federals. 


610  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

"APRIL  9,  1865. 
"GEN.  R.  E.  LEE,  Commanding  C.S.A:  — 

"Your  note  of  this  date  is  but  this  moment,  11.50  A.M.,  received.  In 
consequence  of  my  having  passed  from  the  Richmond  and  Lynchburg 
road  to  the  Farmville  and  Lynchburg  road  I  am  at  this  writing  about  four 
miles  west  of  Walker's  Church  and  will  push  forward  for  the  purpose  of 
meeting  you.  Notice  sent  to  me  on  this  road  where  you  wish  the  interview 
to  take  place  will  meet  me. 

"Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

"U.S.  GRANT,  Lt.-Gen." 

After  reading  this  note  Lee  said  that  he  would  ride  forward 
to  meet  Gen.  Grant,  but  that  he  was  apprehensive  lest  hostilities 
might  begin  in  the  rear  on  the  termination  of  Meade's  truce. 
Babcock  accordingly  wrote  requesting  Meade  to  maintain  the 
truce  until  orders  from  Grant  could  be  received.  To  save  time 
this  was  taken  at  once  through  our  lines  by  Col.  Forsyth  of 
Sheridan's  staff,  who  was  accompanied  by  Col.  Taylor,  Lee's 
adjutant. 

The  meeting,  by  strange  coincidence,  took  place  in  the  house 
of  Maj.  Wilmer  McLean,  who  had  owned  the  farm  on  Bull  Run 
on  which  had  occurred  the  first  collision  between  the  two  armies 
at  Blackburn's  Ford  on  July  18,  1861,  and  who  also  owned  the 
farm  and  house  used  for  similar  purposes  to-day,  as  told  in 
the  account  of  that  battle.  Lee  was  accompanied  to  the 
meeting  only  by  Col.  Marshall,  his  military  secretary,  and  a  single 
courier,  who  held  their  horses  during  the  two  or  three  hours 
consumed.  A  quiet  dignity  characterized  Lee's  bearing  through- 
out the  scene,  and  on  the  part  of  aU  Federal  officers  present 
there  an  evident  desire  to  show  only  the  friendliest  feelings.  The 
formal  proceedings  were  limited  to  an  exchange  of  notes,  Grant's 
note  being  as  follows :  — 

"APPOMATTOX  C.  H.,  VA., 

"April  9,  1865. 

"  GENERAL  :  In  accordance  with  the  substance  of  my  letter  to  you  of  the 
8th  instant,  I  propose  to  receive  the  surrender  of  the  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia  on  the  following  terms,  to  wit :  Rolls  of  all  officers  and  men  to  be 
made  in  duplicate,  one  copy  to  be  given  to  an  officer  to  be  designated  by 
me,  the  other  to  be  retained  by  such  officer  or  officers  as  you  may  desig- 
nate. The  officers  to  give  their  individual  paroles  not  to  take  up  arms 


THE  FALL  OF  1864  611 

against  the  government  of  the  United  States  until  properly  exchanged, 
and  each  company  or  regimental  commander  sign  a  like  parole  for  the 
men  of  their  commands.  The  arms,  artillery,  and  public  property  to  be 
parked  and  stacked  and  turned  over  to  the  officers  appointed  by  me  to 
receive  them.  This  will  not  embrace  the  side  arms  of  the  officers  nor  the 
private  horses  or  baggage. 

"  This  done  each  officer  and  man  will  be  allowed  to  return  to  his  home, 
not  to  be  disturbed  by  United  States  authority  so  long  as  they  observe 
their  paroles  and  the  laws  in  force  where  they  may  reside. 

"U.S.  GRANT,  Lt.-Gen. 
"GEN.  R.  E.  LEE." 

This  was  accepted  by  Lee  in  the  following  note :  — 

"HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OP  NORTHERN  VA., 

"April  9J  1865. 

"  GENERAL  :  I  received  your  note  of  this  date  containing  the  terms  of  the 
surrender  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  as  proposed  by  you.  As  they 
are  substantially  the  same  as  those  expressed  in  your  letter  of  the  8th,  they 
are  accepted.  I  will  proceed  to  designate  the  proper  officers  to  carry  the 
stipulation  into  effect. 

"R.  E.  LEE,  Gen. 
"LT.-GEN.  U.  S.  GRANT." 

Some  conversation  had  accompanied  the  preparation  of  the 
letters  in  which  Lee  had  explained  that  our  cavalry  had  been 
required  to  furnish  their  own  horses,  and  it  was  very  desirable 
that  they  might  be  allowed  to  retain  them,  that  the  men  might 
plant  crops  for  the  summer.  Having  been  in  public  service  they 
were  legally  captured  property,  but  Grant  cordially  yielded  the 
title,  not  making  it  part  of  his  terms,  but  instructions  were  given 
all  quartermasters  to  allow  all  claims  of  horses  as  private  prop- 
erty without  question.  Gen.  Lee  expressed  much  pleasure  at 
this  concession,  saying  to  Grant :  — 

"This  will  have  the  best  possible  effect.  It  will  be  very  gratifying 
and  will  do  much  toward  the  conciliation  of  our  people." 

Grant's  commissary  was  also  ordered  to  immediately  deliver  to 
Lee  25,000  rations.  The  conference  then  terminated,  and  Lee 
rode  back  to  his  camp.  As  he  was  seen  approaching  the  artil- 
lery commands  were  formed  by  the  roadside  with  instructions  to 
uncover  in  silence  as  he  passed,  but  the  line  of  battle  which  had 


612  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

been  maintained  all  day,  seeing  the  movement  of  the  cannoneers, 
broke  their  ranks  and  overwhelmed  all  with  a  great  crowd, 
wrought  to  a  high  pitch  of  emotional  affection  for  its  beloved 
leader  of  the  cause  now  forever  lost.  With  alternate  cheers  and 
tears  they  flocked  around  him  so  that  his  progress  was  obstructed, 
and  he  presently  stopped  and  made  a  few  remarks  to  the  men, 
after  which  he  was  allowed  to  pass  on  to  his  camp.  He  told  the 
men  that  in  making  the  surrender  he  had  made  the  best  terms 
possible  for  them,  and  advised  all  to  go  to  their  homes,  plant 
crops,  repair  the  ravages  of  the  war,  and  show  themselves  as 
good  citizens  as  they  had  been  good  soldiers.  This  was  but  the 
second  address  which  he  ever  made.  .  On  his  way  to  Richmond 
at  the  beginning  of  the  war,  as  his  train  passed  Gordonsville,  he 
was  called  upon  for  a  speech  and  responded  briefly,  advising  his 
hearers  not  to  lounge  about  stations,  but  to  be  putting  their  affairs 
in  order  for  a  long  and  bloody  war,  which  was  sure  to  strain 
all  their  resources  to  support  it. 

The  firing  of  salutes  was  soon  begun  in  the  Federal  camps  and 
the  playing  of  bands,  but  Grant  requested  that  all  such  demon- 
strations be  suppressed,  which  was  quickly  done. 

Without  any  further  mention  of  the  subject  it  was  assumed  as 
a  matter  of  course,  by  Grant,  that  our  paroles  would  protect 
every  one  who  surrendered  from  political  prosecutions,  and  he  had 
it  so  arranged  that  each  one  was  furnished  with  an  official  copy 
of  Gen.  Orders  No.  43,  issued  from  the  headquarters  of  the  24th 
corps,  which  had  a  printing  press  along.  It  read  as  fol- 
lows :  — 

"By  agreement  between  the  officers  appointed  by  Generals  Lee  and 
Grant  to  carry  out  the  stipulations  of  the  surrender  of  the  Army  of  North- 
ern Virignia,  the  evidence  that  an  officer  or  enlisted  man  is  a  paroled 
prisoner  of  war  is  the  fact  of  his  possessing  a  printed  certificate,  certifying 
to  the  fact,  dated  at  Appomattox  C.H.,  April  10,  1865,  and  signed  by  his 
commanding  officer  or  the  staff -officer  of  the  same. 

"All  guards,  patrols,  officers,  and  soldiers  of  the  United  States  forces 
will  respect  such  certificates,  allow  free  passage  to  the  holders  thereof, 
and  observe,  in  good  faith,  the  provisions  of  the  surrender  that  the  holders 
shall  remain  unmolested  in  every  respect. 

"By  command  of  Maj.-Gen.  Gibbon, 

"EDWARD  MOALE,  Lt.-Col.  &  A.A.G." 


THE  FALL  OF  1864  613 

Our  paroles  had  printed  across  the  ends  "  Paroled  Prisoners' 
Pass"  in  some  ornamental  work  between  top  and  bottom  lines, 
the  paper  being  about  three  inches  by  eight.  Mine  read :  — 

"  Brig.-Gen.  E.  P.  Alexander,  chief  of  artillery,  1st  corps  A.N.V.  of  Ga., 
a  paroled  prisoner  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  has  permission  to  go 
to  his  home  and  there  remain  undisturbed  with  four  private  horses. 

"W.  N.  PENDLETON,  Brig.-Gen.  &  Chief  of  Artillery." 

After  the  assassination  of  Lincoln,  there  came  a  wave  of 
bloodthirsty  resentment  over  the  administration,  which  found 
victims  both  among  the  innocent  and  the  guilty.  Powerful  in- 
fluences sought  to  involve  Lee  and  others  among  his  officers 
in  the  destruction  they  planned.  They  sought  to  read  into  the 
terms  given  by  Grant  a  single  word  "  military,"  that  the  immunity 
promised  might  read  that  paroled  prisoners  should  not  be  dis- 
turbed by  U.  S.  "military"  authority  so  long  as  they  obeyed  the 
laws  in  force  where  they  resided.  Then  they  hoped  that  "the 
hanging  might  begin."  Gen.  Lee  was  already  indicted  for 
treason  by  a  grand  jury  summoned  in  Norfolk,  early  in  June, 
1865.  Grant  immediately  notified  President  Johnson  that  no 
man  protected  by  his  parole  could  be  interfered  with,  and  this 
effectually  stopped  all  such  proceedings. 

The  report  of  our  ordnance  officers  on  the  morning  of  the  9th 
had  shown  only  7892  organized  infantry  with  75  rounds  of  am- 
munition and  63  guns  with  an  average  of  93  rounds.  The  infan- 
try were  directed  to  march  out  and  stack  their  arms  and  retire. 
The  Federal  officers  then  took  possession. 

I  was  directed  to  form  all  the  guns  and  caissons  in  single  column 
along  the  road,  that  the  Federal  officers  might  then  conduct  it  to 
their  camps.  The  artillery  horses  had  already  been  out  of 
rations  for  some  days.  The  Federal  officers  had  reported  their 
own  supplies  of  forage  exhausted.  With  a  heart  full  of  sym- 
pathy for  the  poor  brutes,  I  formed  the  column  on  Tuesday, 
April  11,  and  left  them  standing  in  the  road,  which  they  filled 
for  about  a  mile.  The  next  morning  I  bade  good-by  to  Appo- 
mattox,  and  as  I  rode  off  from  the  scene  I  saw  the  mournful 
column  of  artillery  still  standing  in  the  road  unattended,  but  with 
many  of  its  poor  horses  now  down  in  the  mud  and  unable  to  rise. 


614  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

Grant  had  left  Appomattox  on  the  10th,  after  a  call  of  courtesy 
on  Gen.  Lee,  in  which  he  had  suggested  that  Lee  might  serve 
the  cause  of  peace  by  a  visit  to  N.C.,  where  he  might  see  President 
Davis  and  Gen.  Johnston.  But  Lee  felt  that  the  surrender 
had  made  him  but  a  private  citizen  and  without  authority,  and 
he  naturally  avoided  even  the  appearance  of  wishing  to  interfere, 
and  declined  to  go. 

At  that  time  Brazil  was  going  to  war  with  Paraguay,  and,  fear- 
ing that  I  might  find  difficulty  in  getting  employment  as  a  civilian 
and  being  already  so  far  on  my  way,  I  determined,  before  return- 
ing to  Ga.,  to  go  to  Washington,  D.C.,  and  interview  the  Bra- 
zilian minister  as  to  the  chances  of  a  position  in  the  Brazilian 
army.  So  from  Appomattox  I  started  on  April  12  for  Washing- 
ton, sending  my  horses  to  Ga.,  by  friends,  and  joining  a  mixed 
party  of  Federals  and  Confederates  riding  to  Burkesville,  where 
we  could  take  a  train.  The  party  had  an  escort  of  cavalry,  and 
included  Hon.  E.  B.  Washburne  of  111.,  well  known  as  the  special 
friend  of  Gen.  Grant,  and  Confederate  Maj.-Gen.  Wilcox  of  Ala. 
In  the  course  of  the  ride  Wilcox  and  I  had  a  conversation  with 
Mr.  Washburne,  which  impressed  us  both  deeply  at  the  time, 
and  which,  I  am  sure,  I  can  even  now  repeat  without  mate- 
rial variation. 

In  common  with  all  of  Grant's  army,  the  officers  and  soldiers 
of  our  escort  and  company  treated  the  paroled  Confederates 
with  a  marked  kindness  which  indicated  a  universal  desire  to 
replace  our  former  hostility  with  special  friendship.  All  Fed- 
eral privates  would  salute  our  uniforms,  horsemen  and  team- 
sters would  give  us  the  roads,  and  in  all  conversations  with 
officers  or  men  special  care  would  be  evident  to  avoid  painful 
topics.  At  one  time,  when  the  three  mentioned  were  riding 
together,  Mr.  Washburne  asked  us,  — 

"What,  in  your  opinion,  will  now  be  the  course  of  your  other  armies? 
Will  they  seek  to  prolong  the  war,  or  will  the  surrender  of  Lee  be  accepted 
as  ending  it  ?  " 

We  both  answered  that  we  had  no  doubt  of  the  latter  course 
being  followed  by  the  remaining  armies,  nearly  as  fast  as  the 
news  could  reach  them.  And  we  then  said  to  him :  — 


THE  FALL  OF  1864  615 

"  The  question  will  not  be  what  are  we  going  to  do,  Mr.  Washburne, 
but  what  is  Mr.  Lincoln  going  to  do?"  "Well,  gentlemen,"  said  he,  "let 
me  tell  you  something.  When  the  news  came  that  Richmond  had  fallen, 
and  that  Grant's  army  was  in  a  position  to  intercept  Lee's  retreat,  I  went 
up  to  the  White  House  to  congratulate  Mr.  Lincoln,  and  I  had  the  oppor- 
tunity to  have  a  talk  with  him  on  this  very  topic.  Of  course,  it  would  not 
be  proper  for  me  to  violate  Mr.  Lincoln's  confidence  by  disclosing  any  de- 
tails of  his  plans  for  restoring  the  Union,  but  I  am  going  to  make  you  a 
prophecy. 

"His  plan  will  not  only  astonish  the  South,  but  it  will  astonish  Europe 
and  foreign  nations  as  well.  And  I  will  make  you  a  prediction.  Within  a 
year  Mr.  Lincoln  will  be  as  popular  with  you  of  the  South  as  he  is  now  with 
the  North." 

As  soon  as  we  were  alone  together,  we  compared  notes  as  to 
what  Washburne  could  have  meant.  In  view  of  our  poverty  it 
could  only  have  meant  that  in  some  way  the  South  would  receive 
money.  In  view  of  the  lack  of  any  other  plausible  excuse  for 
paying  it  to  us,  and  of  the  arguments  used  by  him  at  the  Fortress 
Monroe  conference  why  the  South  should  be  compensated  for  the 
emancipation  of  the  negro,  I  have  ever  since  felt  convinced  that 
Lincoln,  in  that  interview  with  Washburne,  recurred  to  his  well- 
known  wish  to  do  that  act  of  justice  to  the  South,  and  that  Wash- 
burne believed  that  he  would  now  be  able  to  accomplish  it  with 
the  prestige  which  success  in  the  war  would  bring,  and  with 
the  spread  of  the  good  feeling  already  inspired  in  the  army 
by  Grant's  act  of  generosity.  Unfortunately,  and  without  fault 
of  her  own,  the  work  of  an  assassin,  only  three  days  later,  changed 
everything,  converting  into  gall  the  very  milk  of  human  kind- 
ness in  every  breast,  and  blasting  the  South  with  a  whirlwind  of 
resentment,  the  effects  of  which  will  not  disappear  for  generations. 
But  one  of  its  first  effects  was  one  for  which  I  will  ever  remain 
grateful.  It  made  it  utterly  impossible  for  me  to  go  to  Brazil. 
I  called  on  the  Brazilian  minister  in  Washington  on  the  18th, 
while  the  President's  body  was  lying  in  state  in  the  White  House, 
and  the  streets  swarmed  with  angry  crowds  ready  to  mob  any 
one  known  to  be  a  Confederate.  His  Excellency  kindly  advised 
me  to  give  up  all  ideas  of  Brazil,  and  to  take  myself  out  of 
Washington  City  with  the  least  possible  delay.  This  I  was  for- 
tunately able  to  do,  with  one  narrow  escape  from  a  detective, 


616  MILITARY   MEMOIRS 

who  saw  something  suspicious  in  my  five  hundred  dollar  Confed- 
erate boots  and  blue  soldier's  overcoat  dyed  black.  But  I  was 
able  to  elude  him,  and  take  a  train  to  New  York  whence  I 
sailed  to  Port  Royal,  S.C.  Thence  via  Savannah  and  through 
the  country  ravaged  by  Sherman,  with  many  delays  and  diffi- 
culties, I  made  my  way  to  my  boyhood's  home  at  Washington, 
Ga.,  where  my  wife  and  family  were. 

This  place  was  now  on  the  only  route  of  travel  possible  between 
the  eastern  states  of  the  Confederacy  and  the  Gulf  States. 
Through  it  passed,  not  only  President  Davis  with  his  family, 
but  the  whole  Confederate  government,  which  here  disbanded, 
and  beyond  this  point  became  fugitives,  and  also  the  entire 
debris  of  all  the  eastern  armies  whose  homes  lay  west  of  the 
Savannah  River.  I,  therefore,  anticipated  that  I  would  here 
meet  Mr.  Davis,  and  would  be  able  to  give  him  more  news  than 
had  reached  him  by  the  land  route  he  had  travelled,  on  which 
there  were  but  few  and  disjointed  pieces  of  railroad  in  operation, 
and  no  through  telegraph  lines  nor  mail  service. 

So  not  only  was  I  full  to  overflowing  with  important  infor- 
mation, but  in  my  talk  with  Gen.  Lee  on  the  morning  of  the  sur- 
render I  had  gotten  to  appreciate  the  spirit  of  dignified  submis- 
sion in  which  he  was  meeting  what  had  befallen  him,  and  was 
advising  the  same  course  to  all.  As  I  recalled  what  he  had  said 
about  my  proposition  to  disperse  the  army  in  the  woods  and 
bushes,  — 

"that  the  only  dignified  course  open  to  him  would  be  to  go  and  sur- 
render himself  to  Gen.  Grant  and  take  the  consequences  of  his  actions," 

I  felt  a  passionate  longing  to  repeat  that  conversation  to  Mr. 
Davis,  and  to  beg  him  to  take  advantage  of  the  oppor- 
tunity opened  to  him  by  the  government's  offer  of  a  reward 
of  $100,000  for  his  capture  as  concerned  in  the  assassination 
of  Lincoln.  It  seemed  to  me  to  offer  the  only  dignified 
escape  from  his  perilous  and  impossible  position  as  a  fugitive, 
that,  with  the  example  of  Lee's  approval  of  such  a  course  before 
him,  he  would  welcome  the  opportunity  to  go  to  the  nearest 
Federal  officer  and  surrender  himself  and  demand  a  trial  on  the 
charge  of  complicity  in  the  assassination. 


THE  FALL  OF   1864 


617 


But  it  was  not  to  be.  I  am  not  sure  whether  or  not  the  news 
of  the  rewards  being  offered  for  his  apprehension  ever  reached 
Mr.  Davis,  before  his  capture  on  May  10  in  Southwestern  Ga.  I 
had  lost  twenty-four  hours  in  leaving  Savannah  by  my  horse 
shying  at  a  dead  mule  by  the  roadside,  and  breaking  my  buggy, 
and  that  loss  brought  me  to  Washington,  Ga.,  on  May  5. 
Mr  Davis  had  left  Washington  on  May  4  with  a  small  escort 
of  friends,  planning  to  make  his  way  across  the  Mississippi 
and  to  carry  on  the  war  with  forces  to  be  raised  there.  It 
was  the  disappointment  of  my  life,  even  though  in  later  years 
and  after  the  death  of  Mr.  Davis,  Mrs.  Davis  has  assured  me 
that  nothing  could  have  ever  induced  him  to  thus  abandon  the 
cause  of  the  Confederacy. 

But  he  would  have  seen  before  him  the  parting  of  the 
ways,  and  down  the  road  of  dignified  submission  even  to 
injustice,  wrong,  and  robbery,  as  we  still  conceive  it,  he 
would  have  seen  the  figure  of  Lee  preceding  him  and  calling 
upon  all  to  follow. 

Who  knows  but  what  he  might  have  been  moved  to  do  so  ? 

The  Federal  casualties  in  the  closing  operations  from  March 
29  to  April  9  are  shown  in  the  following  table :  — 


CORPS 

KILLED  AND  WOUNDED 

MISSING 

TOTAL 

2d 

1394 

630 

2024 

5th 

1919 

546 

2465 

6th 

1542 

1542 

9th 

1548 

161 

1709 

24th 

714 

714 

Cavalry 

1151 

339 

1490 

Total 

8268 

1676 

9944 

The  Confederate  casualties,  of  course,  can  never  be  accurately 
known.  In  killed  and  wounded  they  were  probably  about  the 
same  as  the  Federal  losses,  but  the  captured  or  missing  would  be 
much  greater. 

The  following  table  gives  the  total  numbers  of  officers  and 
enlisted  men  paroled  on  April  9 :  — 


618 


MILITARY  MEMOIRS 


OFFICERS 

MEN 

TOTAL 

Lee  and  Staff 

15 

15 

Longstreet's  Corps 
Gordon's  Corps 

1,521 
695 

13,312 
6,505 

14,833 
7,200 

Ewell's  Corps 

19 

268 

287 

Cavalry  Corps 

132 

1,654 

1,786 

Artillery  Corps 

192 

2,394 

2,586 

Miscel.  Detachments  and  Civil- 

ian Employees 

288 

1,361 

1,649 

Total 

2,862 

25,494 

28,356 

Gen.  Humphreys  states  that  of  the  troops  surrendered  only 
about  8000  had  arms.  The  miscellaneous  detachments  included 
the  remnants  of  the  Naval  and  Heavy  Artillery  battalions, 
provost  guards,  departmental  employees,  and  some  odds  and  ends 
of  troops. 

I  cannot  bring  my  narrative  to  a  close  without  a  brief  summary 
of  the  record  made  by  the  Confederate  Army  of  Northern  Virginia 
in  the  two  years,  nine  months,  and  nine  days  during  which  it  was 
under  the  command  of  Gen.  Robert  E.  Lee,  from  June  1, 1862,  to 
April  9,  1865.  In  this  brief  period  of  a  thousand  days,  with 
inferior  numbers,  poorly  equipped  and  but  badly  supplied  with 
food  and  clothing,  it  fought  seven  great  campaigns,  against 
six  picked  generals  of  the  enemy,  as  follows :  — 

1st  against  McClellan  before  Richmond. 

2d  against  Pope  before  Washington. 

3d  against  McClellan  in  Maryland. 

4th  against  Burnside  before  Fredericksburg. 

5th  against  Hooker  on  the  Rappahannock. 

6th  against  Meade  in  Pennsylvania. 

7th  against  Grant  before  Richmond. 

This  last  campaign  endured  for  eleven  months,  during  which 
the  guns  were  scarcely  silent  a  single  day.  Lee's  army  at  its 
greatest  numbered  less  than  85,000  men.  It  put  hors  de 
combat  more  than  262,000  Federals  within  the  period  men- 
tioned. 

The  following  figures  are  from  the  official  archives,  in  the  War 


THE  FALL  OF  1864 


619 


Record  Office  in  Washington,  showing  the  Federal  numbers 
killed,  wounded,  and  missing  in  each  campaign,  with  a  deduc- 
tion of  2000  from  the  first  for  the  casualties  occurring  before 
June  1,  1862. 


CAMPAIGNS 

DATES 

AGGREGATE  Loss 

McClellan 
Pope 
McClellan 
Burnside 
Hooker 
Meade 
Grant 

June    1,  1862,  to  Aug.    8,  1862 
June  26,  1862,  to  Sept.    2,  1862 
Sept.   3,  1862,  to  Nov.  14,  1862 
Nov.  15,  1862,  to  Jan.  25,  1863 
Jan.  26,  1863,  to  Jan.   27,  1863 
June  28,  1863,  to  May     4,  1864 
May    4,  1864,  to  April    9,  1865 

22,448 
16,955 
28,577 
13,214 
25,027 
31,530 
124,390 

Aggregate 

262,141 

These  figures  include  nothing  for  Longstreet's  corps  at  Chicka- 
mauga  and  Knoxville,  it  having  been  detached  from  Lee  from 
Sept.  1, 1863,  to  April  30, 1864.  They  would  add  many  thousands 
to  this  list  of  casualties  could  they  be  included. 

Briefly  it  may  be  said  that  Lee,  in  a  fight  to  a  finish  against 
heavy  odds,  prolonged  the  struggle  for  a  thousand  days, 
and  put  out  of  action,  in  the  meantime,  more  than  three  of  the 
enemy  for  every  man  in  his  own  army  at  its  maximum  of  strength. 
Scarcely  in  the  history  of  Napoleon's  twenty  years  in  power  can 
the  record  of  such  fighting  as  this  be  paralleled. 

The  number  of  the  enemy  placed  hors  de  combat,  in  the  Grant 
campaign  alone,  are  said  to  double  the  losses  inflicted  upon  his 
opponents  by  the  Duke  of  Wellington  in  all  his  battles  in  India, 
Spain,  and  at  Waterloo.  No  modern  European  war  has  ap- 
proached this  for  carnage.1  Even  in  the  recent  conflict  between 
Russia  and  Japan,  where  the  armies  were  of  immense  size  and 
the  weapons  of  peculiar  power,  one  is  almost  amazed  after  read- 

1  Grant's  Casualties  were  subdivided  as  follows  : 

Killed  Wounded  Missing  Total 

15,139  77,748  31,403  124,390 

The  losses  of  the  Japanese  in  the  Port  Arthur  Campaign,  in  killed  and 
wounded  only  (excluding  losses  from  sickness)  as  given  by  their  chief  medi- 
cal officer,  were  65,000.  Corroborative  data  from  various  sources  confirm 
the  figure.  Losses  of  the  Russians  have  not  been  published. 


620  MILITARY  MEMOIRS 

ing  the  popular  accounts  to  find  the  killed  and  wounded  among 
the  Japanese  in  the  siege  of  Port  Arthur  largely  exceeded  by 
those  of  Grant  in  his  last  compaign.  Bravery  in  battle  is  the 
religion  of  Japan,  and  the  whole  nation  is  a  religious  unit.  It 
is  encouraging  to  realize  that  the  loyalty  to  his  flag  and  country 
of  the  Anglo-Saxon  has  shown  itself  capable  of  enduring  equal 
tests  of  devotion. 

It  would  be  strange  indeed  if  in  critically  reviewing  the  de- 
tails of  Lee 's  rapidly  conducted  campaigns  we  found  no 
instances  of  grave  errors  of  judgment  when  brought  to  the 
test  of  being  viewed  in  retrospect.  We  do  find  them,  and  have 
not  hesitated  to  note  and  to  criticise  them  as  frankly  and  freely 
as  he  himself  would  have  done  had  he  lived  to  write  his  own 
memoirs.  No  more  intimate  idea  can  be  gained  of  his  personal 
character  than  can  be  had  from  the  study  of  his  attitude  upon 
such  occasions. 

Knowing  how  quickly  and  clearly  he  must  have  recognized 
mistakes  after  making  them,  and  how  keenly  he  must  have  felt 
them,  one  can  appreciate  the  greatness  of  mind  with  which  he 
always  assumed  the  entire  responsibility;  either  frankly  saying 
to  his  men,  as  at  Gettysburg,  "It  is  all  my  fault,"  or,  as  at  the 
"Crossing of  the  James,"  passing  over  whatever  had  happened  in 
silence,  without  any  attempt  to  impute  blame  elsewhere,  or 
any  apology,  excuse,  or  even  a  spoken  regret. 

This  was  equally  the  case  when  the  fault  was  altogether  that 
of  others,  as  his  official  reports  amply  testify.  The  same  mental 
poise  which  inspired  the  unparalleled  audacity  of  his  cam- 
paigns gave  him  the  strength  to  bear,  and  to  bear  alone  and  un- 
flinching, even  through  the  closing  scenes  of  the  surrender,  the 
burden  of  his  great  responsibility.  Surely  there  never  lived  a 
man  who  could  more  truly  say :  — 

"  I  am  the  master  of  my  fate, 
I  am  the  captain  of  my  soul." 


INDEX 


Abbot,  Gen.  H.  L.,  art'y  reg't  of,  560. 

Abbott,  Col.,  428. 

Abercrombie,  Gen.,  at  Seven  Pines,  86. 

Adams,  Gen.,  458. 

Alburtis,  Capt.,  36. 

Aldie,  engagement  at,  374. 

Alexander,  Gen.  E.  P.,  at  West  Point, 
1 ;  instructor  in  engineering,  3 ; 
marries,  4 ;  resigns  from  U.  S.  Army, 
5;  captain  engineers  C.S.A.,  12; 
at  Bull  Run,  31,  44,  45;  on  Big 
Bethel,  Va.,  44;  Chief  of  Ordnance, 
52 ;  discussion  of  arms  used,  53-54 ; 
of  the  campaigns  against  Richmond, 
60  et  seq. ;  of  Jackson's  engagement 
at  Kernstown,  62 ;  of  Williamsburg, 
66  et  seq.;  Chief  of  Ordnance,  109; 
duties  during  Seven  Days'  Campaign, 
172,  176;  at  Fredericksburg,  bat- 
talion of,  303,  309,  317,  318;  at 
Chancellorsville,  324,  325,  342,  348, 
358,  359;  artillery  of,  371,  388; 
in  charge  of  Longstreet's  artillery, 
391,  392,  395,  398,  399;  succeeded 
by  Huger,  498,  557;  conversation 
with  Lawley,  564 ;  starts  for  Spott- 
sylvania,  509,  518;  belief  that  Lee 
should  have  made  J.  E.  B.  Stuart 
successor  of  Stonewall  Jackson,  532, 
534,  539;  interview  with  Lee,  603, 
604,  605. 

Allabach,  Col.  P.  F.,  at  Fredericksburg, 
division  of,  307,  309. 

Allen,  Rev.  L.  W.,  144,  156. 

Ames,  Gen.  Adelbert,  brigade  of,  371, 
411. 

Anderson,  Gen.  G.  T.,  80;  Wilderness, 
505. 

Anderson,  Gen.  J.  R.,  at  Williamsburg, 
67;  at  Hanover  Junction,  73. 

Anderson,  G.  B.,  Antietam,  260;  killed, 
262,  264. 

Anderson,  Patton,  479. 

Anderson,   Major,   9. 

Anderson,  Gen.  R.  H.,  at  Seven  Pines, 
82 ;  Manassas,  195 ;  Chancellors- 
ville, 324,  325,  329,  332, 348,  355,  356 ; 
at  Gettysburg,  381  et  seq.;  brigade 


of,  202,  229,  231,  233,  254,  256,  260, 
262,  401,  402;  Wilderness,  504,  506 
et  seq.;  succeeds  Longstreet  in 
command  of  1st  corps,  509 ;  ordered 
to  march  for  Spottsylvania,  509; 
march  to  Cold  Harbor,  535. 

Andrews,  Col.  J.  W.,  at  Fredericksburg, 
302,  303. 

Antietam,  map,  243;  description,  246; 
Hunt's  account  of  position  of  artil- 
lery, 246-247;  D.  H.  Hill's  report, 
247;  Ropes's  comments,  247-248. 

Archer,  Col.  F.  H.,  550 ;  at  Chancellors- 
ville, brigade  of,  331,  333,  335,  345 
et  seq.;  at  Gettysburg,  383,  384. 

Archer,  Gen.  J.  J.,  at  Cedar  Mountain, 
183;  brigade  at  Antietam,  268,  295, 
298,  299. 

Armistead,  Gen.  L.  A.,  88;  Malvern 
Hill,  160,  161 ;  brigade  at  Antietam, 
256. 

Ashby,  Col.  Turner,  Valley  Campaign, 
99;  killed,  103. 

Averill,  Gen.,  277. 

Ayres,  Gen.,  at  Gettysburg,  404,  405, 
407 ;  Petersburg,  572. 

Bacon,  Lt.,  report  of,  238. 

Badham,  Lt.-Col.,  killed  at  Williams- 
burg, 69. 

Baird,  Gen.,  455,  461. 

Baker,  Gen.  Ed.  D.,  at  Ball's  Bluff,  57; 
killed,  58. 

Baldwin,  Col.  Briscoe  G.,  appointed 
Chief  of  Ordinance,  281;  Ball's 
Bluff,  engagement  at,  57-58 ;  casual- 
ties at,  58. 

Banks,  Gen.  N.  P.,  in  command  corps 
Army  of  Potomac,  59;  engagement 
at  Kernstown,  62;  at  Seven  Pines, 
73,  74;  Valley  Campaign,  95,  97,  100, 
101 ;  Cedar  Mountain,  177,  181,  182 ; 
at  Manassas,  195,  216. 

Barksdale,  Gen.  Wm.,  138,  234;  An- 
tietam, 259 ;  at  Chancellorsville, 
324,  349,  351,  352,  356,  357;  at  Get- 
tysburg, 394  et  seq.;  killed,  399, 
400. 


621 


622 


INDEX 


Barlow,  Gen.  F.  C.,  at  Antietam,  261; 
at  Chancellorsville,  brigade  of,  332 ; 
at  Gettysburg,  384 ;  Wilderness,  502, 
504,  514,  519  et  seq.;  at  North  Anna, 
529,  541  ;  at  Petersburg,  561. 

Barnard,  Gen.  J.  C.,  122. 

Barnes,  Col.  James,  at  Fredericksburg, 
brigade  of,  305. 

Barnes,  Gen.,  Gettysburg,  404. 

Barry,  Major,  at  Bull  Run,  40;  at 
Chancellorsville,  341. 

Bartlett,  Gen.  J.  J.,  brigade  of,  at 
Crampton's  Gap,  234,  353,  354;  at 
Petersburg,  572. 

Bartow,  Col.  F.  S.,  at  Bull  Run,  19, 
27,  31,  32,  33,  34. 

Bate,  Gen.,  459. 

Battle,  Gen.  C.  A.,  brigade  of,  517. 

Baxter,  brigade  of,  501,  503 ;  wounded, 
505. 

Baylor,  Col.  W.  S.  H.,  at  Manassas,  199, 
200. 

Beauregard,  Gen.,  at  Bull  Run,  14  et 
seq.,  56  et  seq.;  transferred  to  West- 
ern Army,  58 ;  Seven  Days '  Cam- 
paign, 114;  Malvern  Hill,  172;  at 
Corinth,  221 ;  Lee's  plan  to  place 
him  in  command  of  a  column,  366; 
battle  of  the  Wilderness,  497,  530, 
547,  550  et  seq.;  Petersburg,  571. 

Beaver  Dam  Creek,  Federal  position  at, 
73,  74. 

Beckham,  Capt.,  at  Bull  Run,  40;  at 
Seven  Pines,  78. 

Bee,  Gen.  Barnard  E.,  at  Bull  Run,  19, 
27,  31,  32,  33,  34,  35. 

Bell,  Capt.,  83. 

Benjamin,  Lt.,  487,  488. 

Bennett,  Col.,  263. 

Benning,  Gen.  H.  L.,  202 ;  Gettysburg, 
394,  396,  433,  462,  469,  471; 
Wilderness,  503;  wounded,  504. 

Berry,  Gen.,  at  Chancellorsville,  337, 
346. 

Bethesda  Church,  attack  at,  534. 

Big  Bethel,  Va.,  engagement  at,  44. 

Binney,  Lt.,  236. 

Birney,  Gen.  David  B.,  293,  297,  331; 
division  of,  343,  345 ;  battle  of  the 
Wilderness,  division  of,  503,  505, 
514,  515  et  seq. 

Blackburn's   Ford,  engagement  at,  22. 

Blenker,  Gen.  Louis,  ree'nforces  Fremont, 
60. 

"Bloody  Angle,"  515,  521  et  seq. 

Boggs,  Dr.,  anecdote  of  Lee,  494. 

Bonham,  Gen.  M.  L.,  at  Bull  Run,  22, 29, 
32,  35,  46  et  seq. 

Boonsboro,  232-239. 


Bowen,  Sergt.,  killed,  506. 

Boyce,  Capt.,  263. 

Brady,  Capt.,  90. 

Bragg,  Gen.  Braxton,  220,  364 ;  Gettys- 
burg, 459,  461,  467,  472,  479,  480, 
489 ;  part  in  connection  with  quarrel 
between  Jefferson  Davis  and  Gen. 
Johnston,  575 ;  organization  of  army 
of,  450-451,  453,  454,  455,  457. 

Branch,  Gen.  Louis  O'B.,  73,  117,  118; 
at  Cedar  Mountain,  183 ;  brigade  of, 
205,  217;  difference  with  Col. 
D'Utassy,  238;  Antietam,  268; 
death,  268. 

Branch,  Lt.-Col.,  557. 

Brandy  Station,  cavalry  battle  at,  371. 

Bratton,  Gen.  John,  53 ;  battle  of  Wilder- 
ness, commanding  Jenkins's  brigade, 
507,  523,  524. 

Breathed's  horse  art'y,  333. 

Breckenridge,  Gen.  J.  J.,  458;  battle 
of  the  Wilderness,  497,  530,  538,  562. 

Brewster,  Gen.,  Gettysburg,  406. 

Brockenbrough,  Gen.,  217,  268,  295. 

Brook,  Gen.,  at  Gettysburg,  404. 

Brooke,  J.  P.,  brigade  at  Crampton's 
Gap,  234;  Antietam,  261. 

Brooks,  General  W.  T.  H.,  316,  353, 
354 

Brown,  Col.  H.  W.,  353,  354,  459. 

Brown,  Col.,  Malvern  Hill,  159;  at 
Chancellorsville,  331. 

Brown,  Lt.,  of  Alexander's  Battalion, 
350. 

Bryan,  E.  P.,  55. 

Bryan,  Gen.  G.,  Chickamauga,  488,  503 ; 
Spottsylvania,  51 1 . 

Buchanan,  Gen.  R.  C.,  brigade  at  An- 
tietam, 264. 

Buchanan,  President,  9,  11. 

Buckner,  Gen.  S.  B.,  364,  365,  456,  457. 

Buell,  Gen.  Don  Carlos,  9. 

Buford,  Gen.  John,  division  of,  371,  375, 
380  et  seq. 

Bull  Run,  battle  of,  13  et  seq.;  map  of, 
12;  list  of  casualties,  50,  51. 

Bull  Run  Second  (Second  Manassas), 
203. 

Burbank,  Gen.,  Gettysburg,  404. 

Burling,  Col.,  Gettysburg,  406. 

Burnham,  Gen.  H.,  brigade  of,  351. 

Burns,  Gen.  W.  W.,  division  of,  at 
Fredericksburg,  304. 

Burnside,  Gen.  Ambrose  E.,  at  Bull  Run, 
36;  defeated  at  Fredericksburg,  60; 
at  Gordonsville,  186;  commands 
9th  corps  at  Antietam.  250,  265,  266  ; 
succeeds  McClellan  as  commander, 
282;  his  organization,  283;  blunder 


INDEX 


623 


at  opening  of  his  campaign,  284 ; 
commences  movement  upon  Freder- 
icksburg,  285,  286;  Swinton's  ac- 
count, 286,  288,  290,  293,  481,  489, 
490 ;  casualties,  449,  492 ;  at  Freder- 
icksburg,  300,  301,  302,  304  et  seq.; 
countermands  order  for  attack,  311; 
withdraws  in  safety,  312  et  seq.; 
relieved  of  command,  316;  battle 
of  the  Wilderness,  501 ;  at  Spottsyl- 
vania,  513,  521,  530,  531  et  seq. 

Buschbeck,  Col.  Adolph,  at  Chan- 
cellorsville,  brigade  of,  336. 

Butler,  Gen.  Benj.  F.,  at  Fortress  Mon- 
roe, 14;  at  Big  Bethel,  21,  44;  in 
Wilderness  campaign,  530,  534,  546, 
548,  549  et  seq.;  Petersburg,  566. 

Butterfield,  Gen.  Daniel,  327. 


Cabell,  Col.  H.  C.,  192,  353,  395,  498; 
Spottsylvania,  511,  524,  539. 

Caldwell,  Gen.  John  C.,  at  Antietam, 
261;  at  Fredericksburg,  302,304;  at 
Gettysburg,  404. 

Campbell,  Maj.,  at  Gettysburg,  396. 

Candy,  Col.,  at  Gettysburg,  406. 

Carlton,  Capt.,  at  Antietam,  259. 

Carnot,  quoted,  291. 

Carr,  Gen.  Jos.  B.,  at  Chancellorsville, 
339 ;  at  Gettysburg,  406. 

Carroll,  Col.  S.  S.,  103;  at  Fredericks- 
burg,  305,  306;  at  Chancellorsville, 
347;  at  Gettysburg,  411 ;  Battle  of 
Wilderness,  507 ;  wounded,  509,  515. 

Carter,  Col.,  at  Chancellorsville,  348;  at 
Gettysburg,  419. 

Casement's  brigade,  53. 

Casey,  Gen.  Silas,  4 ;  pursuit  of  Johnston, 
66,  76,  82. 

Casey,  Lt.  T.  L.,  4. 

Cashtown,  379. 

Cedar  Mountain,  battle  at,  181  et  seq. 

Cemetery  Hill,  384,  385  et  seq. 

Centreville,  203,  216,  217. 

Cesnola,  Gen.,  539. 

Chancellorsville,  battle  of,  317  et  seq.; 
situation  of,  325  ;  Confederate  casual- 
ties at,  360,  361 ;  Federal  casual- 
ties at,  362. 

Chase,  Sec.  S.  P.,  373. 

Cheatham,  Gen.,  457,  578,  579. 

Chickamauga,  battle  of,  losses  at,  359, 
463,  464. 

Chilton,  Col.  R.  H.,  109,  157. 

Chisholm,  Col.,  551. 

Christie,  Col.  D.  H.,  263. 

Clayton,  Col.,  459. 

Cleburne,  Gen.,  458,  474,  475,  478. 

Cobb,   Gen.   T.  R.    R.,    brigade  of,    at 


Malvern  Hill,  162;  Cram pton's  Gap, 
233,  234;  Antietam,  259;  killed, 
305. 

Cobb,  Gen.  Howell,  at  Yorktown,  65. 

Cobham,  Col.,  Gettysburg,  406 ;  Chicka- 
mauga, 471. 

Cochrane,  Gen.  John,  316. 

Cocke,  Gen.  Philip  St.  C.,  at  Bull  Run, 
22,  23,  31,  32,  37,  50. 

Cold  Harbor,  battle  at,  125;  fighting 
at,  535. 

Cole,  Gen.,  109. 

Colquftt,  Gen.  A.  H.,  167;  Antietam, 
254,  255,  260;  at  Chancellorsville, 
333,  335;  Petersburg,  565. 

Colston,  Capt.  Fred  M.,  anecdote  of  Lee, 
426. 

Colston,  Gen.  R.  E.,  78, 88,  324,  329, 333, 
336,  339,  342,  359,  426,  550. 

Connor,  Gen.,  Petersburg,  566. 

Cooke,  Gen.,  at  Fredericksburg,  brigade 
of,  303;  wounded,  305. 

Cooke,  Maj.  Giles  B.,  552. 

Corbin's  Bridge,  510. 

Corley,  Jas.  L.,  Lee's  Qr.  Mr.,  109. 

Corse,  Gen.  M.  D.,  brigade  of,  366. 

Coster,  Col.  Charles  R.,  brigade  of, 
385. 

Couch,  Gen.  D.  N.,  pursuit  of  Johnston, 
66 ;  at  Seven  Pines,  82,  84,  86 ;  bri- 
gade at  Sharpsburg,  243 ;  at  Mary- 
land Heights  (Antietam),  250,  270; 
at  Fredericksburg,  304,  306,  309; 
at  Chancellorsville,  327. 

Cox,  Gen.  J.  D.,  190;  265,  269. 

Crampton's  Gap,  229-234. 

Crawford,  Gen.  S.  W.,  at  Cedar  Moun- 
tain, 183,  405,  406,  407,  512,  515,  524. 

Crittenden,  Gen.,  division  of,  461,  521. 

Crook,  George,  265,  266,  267 ;  battle  of 
the  Wilderness,  496,  497. 

Cross,  Col.,  Antietam,  261;  killed  at 
Gettysburg,  404. 

Croxton,  Col.,  457. 

Cruft,  Gen.,  474. 

Crutchfield,  Col.  S.,  at  Chancellorsville, 
340;  wounded,  341. 

Culpeper,  180,  181. 

Gulp's  Hill,  386  et  seq. 

Gumming,  Alfred,  Governor  of  Utah,  1. 

Gumming  Lt.,  Chickamauga,  488. 

Cummings,  Col.  A.  C.,  39. 

Custer,  George  A.,  433,  607. 

Cutler,  Gen.  Lysander,  at  Gettysburg, 
383 ;  battle  of  the  Wilderness,  com- 
manding Wadsworth's  division,  512, 
515,  522  et  seq.,  531. 

Cutshaw's  battalion,  518,  520. 

Cutts,  Lt.-Col.,  Malvern  Hill,  159,  351. 


624 


INDEX 


Dahlgren,  Capt.  Ulric,  367. 

Dana,  Gen.,  wounded  at  Antietam,  258. 

Dana,  C.  A.,  Assistant  Sec.  of  War,  510, 
525. 

Daniel,  Gen.,  killed,  525. 

Darbytown  Road,  engagements  on,  53. 

Davidson,  Capt.,  at  Petersburg,  570. 

Da  vis's  brigade,  at  Gettysburg,  383, 
384;  battle  of  Wilderness,  505. 

Davis,  Jefferson,  12;  at  Manassas,  41 
et  seq.,  49,  56  et  seq. ;  Seven  Pines,  89, 
90,  91,  92;  Seven  Days'  Campaign, 
118,  119,  140;  calls  for  conscripts, 
175,  365;  proposed  to  Lee  for  con- 
trol of  troops,  366 ;  despatch  to 
Lee,  367 ;  visit  to  Bragg,  472,  489 ; 
strained  relations  with  Gen.  John- 
ston, 575-576,  617. 

Davis,  Col.,  236. 

Day,  Gen.,  Gettysburg,  404. 

Dearing,  Col.,  Gettysburg,  415;  550, 
553. 

Deas,  Gen.,  462,  479. 

Denison,  Gen.,  brigade  of,  524. 

Deshler,  Gen.,  458. 

Dickenson,  Lt.  George,  battery  of,  at 
Fredericksburg,  304;  killed,  305. 

Dickinson,  Capt.,  162. 

Doby,  Capt.,  killed,  506. 

Doles,  Gen.  George,  at  Chancellorsville, 
332,  335;  Wilderness,  516;  killed, 
539. 

Doubleday,  Gen.  A.,  199,  200,  201;  at 
Antietam,  251,  252,  294,  296,  297; 
Gettysburg,  406. 

Douglas,  Col.,  killed  at   Antietam,  252. 

Dray  ton's  brigade,  215 ;  at  Antietam, 
267. 

Drury's  Bluff,  71. 

Duane,  Capt.  James  C.,  1,  549. 

Duffy,  Maj.  George,  53. 

Dunker  Church,  contested  portion  of 
Antietam  battle-field,  255,  257,  258. 

D'Utassy,  Col.,  238. 

Early,  Gen.  Jubal  A.,  at  Bull  Run,  22, 
32,  35,  40  et  seq.;  demonstration  of 
July,  1864,  59 ;  at  Williamsburg,  67 
et  seq.;  at  Manassas,  190,  199,  200, 
204,  206,  209;  Antietam,  253,  254, 
255,  258,  292,  295;  at  Chancellors- 
ville, 324,  352,  354,  356,  357;  at 
Gettysburg,  371,  372,  376  et  seq.; 
report,  410,  411,  412,  414,  497  (battle 
of  the  Wilderness),  562,  563;  battle 
of  Wilderness,  508;  in  command  of 
Hill's  corps,  512,  513,  518;  succeeds 
to  command  of  Swell's  corps,  534, 
539,  544. 


Edwards,  Gen.  Oliver,  47. 

Elliott,  Gen.,  brigade  of,  561;  wounded  at 
Petersburg,  569. 

Ellison's  Mill,  125. 

Elzey,  Gen.  Arnold,  at  Bull  Run,  19,  40, 
45. 

Eshleman,  Capt.,  24;  Antietam,  265; 
Gettysburg,  425. 

Eubank,  Capt.,  at  Antietam,,  265. 

Evans,  Gen.  Nathan  G.,  at  Bull  Run,  22, 
23,  30,  31,  32,  33,  35  ;  at  Ball's  Bluff, 
57 ;  brigade  of,  210,  228 ;  Antietam, 
251. 

Evans,  Gen.  Clement  A.,  530. 

Ewell,  Gen.  Benj.  S.,  at  Bull  Run,  22,  27, 
29,  32,  46. 

Ewell,  Gen.  R.  S.,  95,  99,  104,  118,  214, 
129, 130,  133, 134;  Malvern  Hill,  157, 
167;  Cedar  Mountain,  181,  193;  Sec- 
ond Manassas,  194,  197,  199,  200,  204  ; 
at  Fredericksburg,  300;  succeeds  to 
command  of  Jackson's  corps,  360, 
371,  372,  380  et  seq.;  Gettysburg, 
405,  406,  408,  409,  410,  412,  415,  418, 
439,  441,  498,  499;  battle  of  the 
Wilderness,  500,  501,  502,  508,  515, 
517  et  seq.;  starts  for  Hanover  Junc- 
tion, 529;  surrenders  command  of 
his  corps  to  Early,  534. 

Fairfax  C.  H.,  216,  217. 

Fair  Oaks  Station,  86. 

Fairview,  fighting  at,  338  et  seq. 

Falls,  Major,  Cedar  Mountain,  184. 

Farnsworth,  Gen.  E.  J.,  killed,  434. 

Featherstone,  Gen.  Wm.  S.,  brigade  of, 
214,  215 ;  Antietam,  261,  264. 

Ferguson,  Capt.,  45. 

Ferrero,  Col.  Edward,  265,  267 ;  Peters- 
burg, 568;  at  Fredericksburg,  bri- 
gade of,  304,  305,  316. 

Fickling,  Capt.,  at  Gettysburg,  battery 
of,  399. 

Field,  Gen.  C.  W.,  53,  154,  182 ;  Wilder- 
ness, 503,  506  et  seq. ;  Spottsylvania, 
511,  515,  526,  550  et  seq. 

Finnegan's  brigade,  541,  542. 

Fisher,  Col.,  Gettysburg,  405. 

Fitzhugh,  Major,  187,  188. 

Fizer,  Lt.-Col.,  Chickamauga,  489. 

Flournoy,  Col.,  97. 

Forno,  Col.  H.,  199,  200,  204,  206. 

Forrest,  Gen.  N.  B.,  103,  456. 

Frank,  brigade  of,  504. 

Frank,  Capt.  John  D.,  battery  of,  at 
Fredericksburg,  306. 

Franklin,  Gen.  W.  B.,  pursuit  of  Johns- 
ton, 66;  Seven  Days'  Campaign,  123, 
151;  Malvern  Hill,  170,  177;  corps 


INDEX 


625 


of,  215,  216,  232-233 ;  at  Antietam, 
250,  259,  264;  Ropes 's  account  of, 
270;  278,  284,  290,  293,  294,  297; 
at  Fredericksburg,  300,  303,  304, 
311,  312,  313;  Burnside's  dissatis- 
faction with,  315,  316. 

Frazier,  Gen.,  449. 

Frazier's  Farm,  battle  at,  153. 

Fredericksburg,  battle  of,  301  et  seq. 

Fremont,  Gen.  J.  C.,  95,  102,  103,  104, 
107 ;  retires  from  service,  177. 

French,  Gen.  S.  G.,  123,  130;  in  com- 
mand at  Petersburg,  172. 

French,  Gen.  William  H.,  division  at 
Antietam,  257,  260,  261,  439;  at 
Fredericksburg,  302,  377,  381. 

Fulton,  Gen.,  459,  462. 

Gaines  Mill,  battle  at,  116. 

Gainesville,  207,  208. 

Garfield,  Gen.  J.  A.,  459. 

Garland,  Gen.  S.,  80;  Seven  Days' 
Campaign,  130,  230;  Antietam,  254, 
260. 

Garnett,  Gen.  R.  B.,  267,  424. 

Garnett,  Gen.  Robert  S.,  13;  death  of, 
14. 

Garnett,  Lt.-Col.  T.  S.,  182,  183. 

Garret,  Capt.,  263. 

Geary,  Gen.  John  W.,  at  Cedar  Mountain, 
183;  at  Chancellorsville,  337;  at 
Gettysburg,  389,  406 ;  Chickamauga, 
469,  470,  471,  474. 

Getty,  Gen.  George  W.,  at  Fredericks- 
burg, division  of,  304,  307,  309,  311 ; 
battle  of  the  Wilderness,  501,  502, 
503 ;  wounded,  and  division  with- 
drawn, 504. 

Gettysburg,  battle  of,  363  et  seq. ;  second 
day,  390  et  seq.;  third  day,  414  et 
seq.;  casualty  table,  443-446. 

Gibbes,  Maj.  H.,"  Petersburg,  570. 

Gibbon,  Gen.  J.,  199,  201,  294,  296, 
297,  298;  at  Fredericksburg,  300; 
at  Chancellorsville,  350,  354,  356; 
at  Spottsylvania,  514, 515,  519  et  seq., 
543. 

Gibson,  battery,  271. 

Goff,  Lt.  I.  M.,  263. 

Gordon,  Col.,  83. 

Gordon,  Gen.  G.  H.,  at  Cedar  Mountain, 
183. 

Gordon,  Gen.  J.  B.,  brigade  of,  352,  410 ; 
Wilderness,  attack  upon,  502,  507, 
508;  Spottsylvania,  512,  520;  pro- 
moted and  assigned  to  Johnson's 
division,  530. 

Gordonsville,  183. 

Gorgas,  Gen.  Josiah,  54. 
2s 


Gracie,  Gen  A.,  462,  484,  489 ;  wounded, 
490 ;  Petersburg,  457,  554,  565. 

Graham,  Gen.  C.  K.,  at  Chancellorsville, 
brigade  of,  346. 

Graham,  Capt.,  419. 

Grant,  Gen.  Ulysses  S.,  campaign  against 
Richmond,  60,  172,  363;  investing 
Vicksburg,  364,  474,  475,  477,  478, 
495,  496,  497,  498,  499 ;  strategy  at 
Petersburg,  557,  561,  562,  563,  582, 
583,  590,  602,  609 ;  battle  of  the  Wil- 
derness, 500,  501,  502,  505, 507  et  seq.  ; 
Spottsylvania,  509,  513,  515,  517, 
519  et  seq.;  famous  despatch  of,  526 
et  seq. ;  trap  for  Lee  at  North  Anna, 
529,  530 ;  moves  toward  the  Pamun- 
key,  532 ;  losses  at  North  Anna,  532, 
534,  535  et  seq. ;  movement  against 
Petersburg,  545,  546,  547  et  seq. 

Greble,  Lt.-Col.  John  F.,  at  Bull  Run,  44. 

Greene,  Gen.  Geo.  S.,  Antietam,  255,  257, 
259,  263;  Gettysburg,  406,  409; 
Chickamauga,  471. 

Gregg,  Gen.  D.  McM.,  brigade  of,  205; 
Antietam,  268;  wounded,  295,  298, 
299;  Gettysburg,  433,  459,  462. 

Gregg,  Gen.  Maxcy,  at  Bull  Run,  21 ; 
death  of,  53;  122;  division  of,  371, 
503,  504,  538. 

Griffin,  Gen.  Charles,  at  Bull  Run,  39 
et  seq.;  at  Fredericksburg,  302,  305, 
306;  at  Chancellorsville,  325,  326; 
Wilderness,  512,  522 ;  at  North  Anna, 
531. 

Grigsby,  Col.,  Antietam,  253,  258. 

Grover,  Gen.  C.,  brigade  of,  205,  206. 

Groveton  wood,  206. 

Guild,  Dr.  L.,  109. 

Hagood,  Gen.,  550. 

Hairston,  Lt.-Col.,  wounded  at  Williams- 
burg,  69. 

Hall,  Col.  Norman  A.,  brigade  of,  at 
Fredericksburg,  304 ;  Gettysburg, 
406. 

Halleck,  Gen.  H.  W.,  172;  appointed 
commander-in-chief  of  all  the  armies 
of  the  U.S.,  177,  178,  179,  185,  186, 
192 ;  225,  278,  282 ;  (ordered  to  re- 
lieve McClellan),  286;  373,  377,  544, 
582. 

Hamilton,  Capt.,  294. 

Hampton,  Gen.  Wade,  at  Bull  Run,  31, 
32,  35;  at  Seven  Pines,  85,  86; 
Seven  Days'  Campaign,  148,  149, 
190  ;  brigade  of,  375,  378 ;  at  Spott- 
sylvania, 510,  534. 

Hampton,  Gen.,  at  Petersburg,  562. 

Hancock,  Gen.  W.  S.,  at  Williamsburg, 


626 


INDEX 


67  et  seq.;  brigade  of,  263,  292; 
at  Fredericksburg,  302,  304,  306; 
battle  of  the  Wilderness,  500,  502, 
503,  504  et  seq.;  ordered  to  cross 
the  Potomac,  513,  514,  515,  518; 
formation,  for  charge,  May  12,  1864, 
519  et  seq. ;  at  North  Anna,  529,  530, 
548,  549,  553;  Petersburg,  566. 

Hanover,  skirmish  at,  376. 

Hardee,  Gen.  W.  J.,  474,  577. 

Hardie,  Gen.  J.  A.,  378. 

Harland,  Col.  Edward,  brigade  of,  at 
Fredericksburg,  309,  310,  311. 

Harper's  Ferry  (map),  222,  234-239; 
casualties,  239-240,  381. 

Harris,  Gen.  N.  H.,  brigade  of,  522. 

Harris,  Col.  D.  B.,  554. 

Harrison,  a  scout,  379. 

Harrow's  brigade  at  Gettysburg,  406. 

Haskell,  Maj .,  425, 429, 498 ;  Petersburg, 
570,  571. 

Haskell,  Col.  J.  C.,  battalion  of,  511. 

Hatch,  Gen.  John  P.,  179,  180,  199; 
brigade  of,  201. 

Hatton,  Gen.,  at  Seven  Pines,  85; 
killed,  86. 

Hawkins,  Col.  R.  C.,  brigade  of,  at 
Fredericksburg,  309,  310,  311. 

Hays,  Gen.  Alexander,  brigade  of,  at 
Chancellorsville,  339,  346. 

Hays,  Gen.  H.  T.,  brigade  at  Antietam, 
251,  252,  254;  349,  350,  352,  357;  in 
Early 's  report  at  Gettysburg, 
410. 

Hazard,  Capt.  J.  C.,  battery  of,  at 
Fredericksburg,  306. 

Hazel  Grove,  342,  343  et  seq. 

Hazen,  Gen.  W.  B.,  467. 

Heintzelman,  Gen.  S.  P.,  at  Bull  Run, 
28 ;  in  command  corps  Army  of 
Potomac,  59;  Seven  Days'  Cam- 
paign, 123,  138,  177,  195. 

Helm,  Gen.,  458. 

Henry,  Maj.,  battalion  of,  at  Gettysburg, 
392,  395. 

Henry  House,  engagement  at,  39. 

Herbert,  Lt.-Col.,  at  Chancellorsville, 
353. 

Heth,  Gen.  Henry,  333,  346,  355,  380, 
383  et  seq. ;  Gettysburg,  402 ;  battle 
of  the  Wilderness,  division  of,  500, 
501  et  seq.,  514,  515,  521;  Peters- 
burg, 441,  567,  590. 

Hill,  Gen.  A.  P.,  73,  74,  115,  118,  124, 
et  seq.,  134,  155;  Malvern  Hill,  167, 
170;  Cedar  Mountain,  180,  181,  182, 
197,  199;  209,  217,  228,  229,  230, 
231,  232,  235,  241 ;  at  Antietam,  251, 
266,  267,  268,  272,  294,  297,  298; 


at  Fredericksburg,  300;  at  Chancel- 
lorsville, 324,  329,  335  et  seq.;  in 
command  at  Jackson's  death,  341 ; 
wounded,  Stuart  succeeds,  341 ;  di- 
vision of,  342,  346 ;  at  Gettysburg, 
in  command  3d  corps,  367,  371,  372 ; 
marches  for  Culpeper,  374 ;  crosses 
Potomac,  377  et  seq.;  500,  501,  502, 
521 ;  at  North  Anna,  529,  531,  547, 
550;  Petersburg,  561. 

Hill,  Gen.  D.  H.,  on  the  defence  of  York- 
town,  64 ;  at  Williamsburg,  67  et  seq.  ; 
at  Seven  Pines,  74,  80  et  seq. ;  "Hill's 
Battle,"  Williamsburg  road,  82,  84, 
85,  89,  115,  118,  124,  130  et  seq.,  151 ; 
Malvern  Hill,  156,  157  et  seq.,  190, 
194;  Antietam,  249,  250,  252,  254, 
256,  258,  259;  report,  260,  263, 
292,  366. 

Hill,  Maj.  R.  C.,  at  Bull  Run,  49. 

Hindman,  Gen.,  454,  457,  459,  460,  475. 

Hinks,  Gen.,  division  of,  548,  553. 

Hobson,  Maj.,  at  Antietam,  261,  263. 

Hoke,  Gen.  R.  F.,  brigade  of,  299,  352, 
357,  530,  535,  536  et  seq.,  549  et  seq., 
556,  568,  570. 

Holmes,  Gen.  Theophilus,  at  Bull  Run, 
27,  29,  32,  35,  46;  at  Acquia,  59; 
Seven  Days'  Campaign,  139,  140, 
141;  Malvern  Hill,  157,  162, 
167. 

Hood,  Gen.  J.  B.,  at  Seven  Pines,  85,  86  ; 
Seven  Days'  Campaign,  131 ;  ordered 
to  Gordonsville,  183,  203;  brigade 
of,  210,  232;  Antietam,  250,  251, 
253,  254,  257,  294;  at  Chancellors- 
ville, 327,  364;  at  Gettysburg,  371, 
380  et  seq.;  severely  wounded,  396; 
Gettysburg,  405,  407,  416,  433,  456, 
459,  460,  469,  480,  577,  578,  579. 

Hooker,  Gen.  Joseph,  at  Bull  Run,  33 ; 
defeat  at  Chancellorsville,  60;  pur- 
suit of  Johnston,  66 ;  at  Seven  Pines, 
82,  153,  194,  195 ;  division  at  Centre- 
ville,  203 ;  Antietam,  commands  first 
corps,  250,  251;  report,  252,  254; 
wounded,  255 ;  succeeds  Porter,  282, 
284,  293,  467,  473,  474,  477;  at 
Fredericksburg,  302,  306,  311,  312 
et  seq.;  sobriquet,  316;  in  command, 
316;  at  Chancellorsville,  319;  his 
reorganization  of  army  under  his  com- 
mand, 319,  320  et  seq.,  326,  327  et 
seq.,  337,  338,  343,  344,  345,  347  et 
seq. ;  despatch  to  Sedgwick,  355,  356, 
357,  358,  364,  371,  372,  373;  resig- 
nation, 377. 

Howard,  Gen.  O.  O.,  at  Bull  Run,  28, 
32,  35,  41;  at  Fredericksburg,  302, 


INDEX 


627 


304;  at  Chancellorsville,  332,  334, 
337  ;  succeeds  Reynolds,  384  ;  report 
at  Gettysburg,  411 ;  acct.,  427. 

Howe,  Gen.  A.  P.,  at  Chancellorsville, 
350,  351,  355. 

Huger,  Col.  Frank,  succeeds  to  Alex- 
ander's battalion,  498;  Petersburg, 
570. 

Huger,  Gen.,  at  Seven  Pines,  74,  76,  79, 
93;  Seven  Days' Campaign,  123,  137, 
139,  140;  Malvern  Hill,  157,  162 
et  seq.;  Spottsylvania,  511,  539, 
541. 

Humphreys,  Gen.  A.  A.,  at  Fredericks- 
burg,  302,  306,  307 ;  splendid  charge 
of,  308,  309 ;  at  Chancellorsville,  325, 
326,  541,  543,  547,  555;  division  at 
Sharpsburg,  243,  488;  account  of 
situation  in  August,  1864,  574; 
quoted,  585. 

Humphreys,     Gen.    B.    C.,    503,     524. 

Hunt,  Gen.  Henry  J.,  291,  359,  370,  406. 

Hunter,  Gen.  David,  at  Bull  Run,  28, 
544,  562. 

Hunton,  Gen.  Eppa,  brigade  of,  538. 

Imboden,  Gen.  J.  D.,  brigade  of,  378, 
380  et  seq.;  435;  "Battles  and 
Leaders"  quoted,  436-437,  439. 

Irwin's  brigade,  263. 

Irwin,  Col.  R.  B.,  Anecdote  of  Lincoln, 
277-278. 

Iverson,  Gen.  Alfred,  263 ;  brigade  of, 
332,  335 ;  at  Gettysburg,  384. 

Ives,  Col.  Joseph  C.,  110. 

Jackson,  Gen.  C.  F.,  298. 

Jackson,  Stonewall,  at  Bull  Run,  19,  27, 
31,  32,  33;  nicknamed  "Stonewall," 
34,  35,  36 ;  wounded,  42 ;  his  appre- 
ciation of  the  opportunity  lost  at 
Bull  Run,  42 ;  after  Bull  Run,  59 ;  en- 
gagement at  Kernstown,  62 ;  at  Seven 
Pines,  74 ;  Valley  Campaign,  94 ; 
Commander  Valley  District,  95,  97, 
98  et  seq. ;  his  impatience,  106,  107 ; 
Seven  Days 'Campaign,  111,  11 2,  115, 
116  et  seq.;  great  military  genius, 
128,  132,  134  et  seq.;  Lee's  supreme 
confidence  in,  143,  144,  145;  inac- 
tion at  White  Oak  Swamp,  152,  153  ; 
Malvern  Hill,  161  et  seq.;  lack  of 
initiative,  167,  169 ;  protects  against 
attack,  171 ;  placed  in  command  of 
Wing,  175,  176 ;  excessive  reticence, 
181 ;  Cedar  Mountain,  182,  183,  190; 
march  to  Manassas  Junction,  191, 
192,  193,  194 ;  destruction  of  Manas- 
sas, 195;  masterpiece  of  strategy, 


197,  199,  200;  attacked  by  Pope, 
203;  joined  by  Lee,  203,  223,  229, 
235;  at  Antietam,  250,  272;  made 
Lt.-Gen.,  279,  287,  288,  294;  at 
Fredericksburg,  300 ;  headquarters 
at  Moss  Neck,  317 ;  at  Chancellors- 
ville, 322,  324 ;  march  through  Wil- 
derness, 329,  330,  331,  332  et  seq.; 
wounded,  341 ;  last  words,  341 ; 
death  on  May  10,  341. 

Jenifer,  Col.,  at  Ball's  Bluff,  58. 

Jenkins,  Gen.  M.,  at  Seven  Pines,  82, 
153;  at  Fredericksburg,  306,  366; 
Chickamauga,  469,  470,  471,  489; 
Wilderness,  505 ;  death  of,  506. 

Johnson,  Gen.  Bushrod  R.,  550. 

Johnson,  Col.  B.  T.,  198,  199;  brigade 
of,  206;  Gettysburg,  406;  report, 
409,  410,  411,  414,  415,  461,  484,  489, 
497;  Petersburg,  456,  561,  568. 

Johnson,  Gen.  Ed.,  95,  365, 371,  372,  381 
et  seq.;  at  Spottsylvania,  508,  512, 
525,  554,  555. 

Johnston,  Gen.  Albert  Sidney,  service  in 
Mormon  War,  1 ;  killed  at  Shiloh,  58. 

Johnston,  Gen.  Joseph  E.,  battle  of 
Seven  Pines,  9;  at  Bull  Run,  15  et 
seq.,  56 ;  organizes  his  army,  59 ; 
advises  President  Davis  regarding 
the  defence  of  Richmond,  63-64 ; 
sends  reinforcements  to  Magruder, 
64;  retires  from  Yorktown,  66;  at 
Williamsburg,  67;  at  Seven  Pines, 
71,  74,  75  et  seq.;  "Johnston's 
Battle,"  84,  86,  87;  wounded,  93; 
Antietam,  260 ;  relations  with  Jeffer- 
son Davis,  575-576. 

Jones,  Col.,  at  Chancellorsville,  348. 

Jones,  Gen.,  544. 

Jones,  Gen.  D.  R.,  at  Bull  Run,  22,  29, 
32,  35,  46;  Seven  Pines,  74;  Seven 
Days'  Campaign,  144,  202,  210,  215, 
228,  236;  Antietam,  251,  254,  264, 
268. 

Jones,  Gen.  J.  M.,  brigade  of,  378; 
killed,  500. 

Jones,  J.  R.,  wounded  at  Antietam,  252. 

Jordan,    Col.,    at    Bull    Run,    49. 

Jordan,  Capt.  Art'y,  Alexander's  Battn., 
325,  348,  399. 

Kautz,  Gen.  A.  V.,  at  Wilderness,  496; 
cavalry  of,  548,  550,  553;  Peters- 
burg, 561. 

Kearney,  Gen.  Philip,  pursuit  of  John- 
ston, 66 ;  at  Seven  Pines,  82,  89,  153  ; 
division  at  Centreville,  203,  205,  208 ; 
death,  217,  218. 

Kelley,  Gen.,  Gettysburg,  404,  462. 


628 


INDEX 


Kelton,  Col.,  223. 

Kemper,  Gen.  James  L.,  at  Bull  Run, 
21,  35,  44  et  seq.;  at  Seven  Pines,  82, 
231 ;  Antietam,  267. 

Kenly,  Col.,  97. 

Kennedy,  Col.  J.  D.,  Wilderness,  503; 
Spottsylvania,  511. 

Kernstown,  battle  of,  62. 

Kershaw,  Gen.  Joseph  B.,  at  Bull  Run, 
44  et  seq. ;  at  Williamsburg,  67 ; 
Seven  Days'  Campaign,  138 ;  Mal- 
vern  Hill,  164;  brigade  at  Antietam, 
259,  292;  at  Fredericksburg,  305; 
at  Chancellorsville,  332,  352;  at 
Gettysburg,  394  et  seq.;  Chicka- 
mauga,  490;  Wilderness,  503,  506, 
527,  536  et  seq.,  550,  551,  555; 
Petersburg,  566. 

Keyes,  Gen.  E.  D.,  at  Bull  Run,  33 
et  seq.;  in  command  corps  Army  of 
Potomac,  59;  at  Seven  Pines,  78, 
79;  Seven  Days 'Campaign,  123,  133. 

Kilpatrick,  Gen.  Judson,  cavalry  of,  376. 

Kimball,  Gen.  Nathan,  brigade  of,  at 
Fredericksburg,  302;  wounded,  303. 

King,  Gen.  Rufus,  198,  199,  201,  210. 

Kirby,  Capt.,  90. 

Kirkland,  Gen.  W.  W.,  542. 

Kirkpatrick's  report,  433. 

Kitching,  Col.,  brigade  of,  524,  528. 

Knipe,  Gen.,  brigade  of,  at  Chancellors- 
ville, 343. 

Knoxville,  map,  482. 

Lane,  Gen.  Jas.  H.,  295,  297,  298,  299, 
333,  340;  brigade  of,  343,  346,  359, 
521,  542. 

Lang,  Gen.,  at  Gettysburg,  400,  401  (re- 
port), 402. 

Latimer,  "Boy  Major,"  killed  at  Gettys- 
burg, 408. 

Law,  Gen.  E.  M.,  Seven  Days'  Cam- 
paign, 131;  Antietam,  253,  254, 
255,  256;  brigade  of,  380,  381  et 
seq.;  succeeds  to  commands  of 
Hood's  division,  396 ;  Gettysburg, 
462,  466,  469,  470,  471,  484;  battle 
of  the  Wilderness,  503;  wounded, 
542. 

Lawton,  E.  P.  (Capt.),  heroism  .men- 
tioned in  Evans's  report,  299;  died 
of  wound,  299,  note. 

Lawton,  Gen.  A.  R.,  Ill,  112;  Seven 
Days'  Campaign,  124,  129,  130; 
Second  Manassas,  199,  200,  204, 
206,  209,  235,  244;  Antietam,  251; 
wounded,  252,  253,  254,  299. 

Lay,  Col.  G.  W.,  at  Bull  Run,  48. 

Leadbetter,  Gen.,  485,  486. 


Ledlie,  Gen.,  554;  Petersburg,  568. 

Lee,  Col.  S.  D.,  reenforces  Jackson,  212; 
Antietam,  264,  269 ;  promoted  to 
Brig.-Gen.,  281. 

Lee,  Gen.  Custis,  report,  596. 

Lee,  Gen.  Fitzhugh,  Second  Manassas, 
187,  188;  at  Chancellorsville,  328, 
329,  330 ;  brigade  of,  232,  375 ;  Spott- 
sylvania, 510,  511,  535,  538,  539; 
Petersburg,  562,  567. 

Lee,  Gen.  Robert  E.,  drives  Pope  into 
Washington,  59 ;  consents  to  advance 
on  Richmond,  59 ;  in  command  of 
the  army,  Seven  Pines,  89,  91  ; 
Valley  Campaign,  95;  takes  com- 
mand of  army  of  Northern  Virginia, 
109 ;  estimate  of  Lee  as  commander, 
110,  111,  112,  113  et  seq.;  Seven 
Days'  Campaign,  the  pursuit,  133, 
134,  136,  140;  restraint  in  express- 
ing personal  feeling,  155;  Malvern 
Hill,  157,  160,  161,  167  et  seq.,  179, 
180,  takes  command  at  Gordonsville, 
183,  184,  186,  187,  189,  190,  191,  195  ; 
narrow  escape  from  capture,  196,  201 ; 
joins  Jackson,  203,  213,  214,  216, 
218,  220,  224,  225,  228,  232;  orders 
McLaws's  withdrawal  from  Mary- 
land Heights,  241 ;  letters  to  Presi- 
dent Davis,  244;  hopes  at  Antie- 
tam, 248-249,  250,  256 ;  .  his 
thorough  understanding  of  McClel- 
lan's  character,  269;  anecdote 
270;  271,  272,  281,  285,  286, 
287,  288,  290,  408,  410;  report  at 
Gettysburg,  414,  415;  report,  416, 
425 ;  anecdote  of,  426 ;  report,  431- 
432,  435;  joined  at  Gordonsville, 
Va.,  by  Longstreet,  491 ;  holds 
review,  493 ;  anecdote,  494 ;  Peters- 
burg, 561 ;  at  Fredericksburg,  302, 
314 ;  places  army  in  winter  quarters, 
317,  318,  319;  strength  of  his  army, 
March  21,  1863,  321,  322;  at  Chan- 
cellorsville, Lee 's  proposed  campaign 
322,  323,  324,  328;  decision  to 
attack,  329 ;  exchanges  last  words 
with  Jackson,  329,  332,  342;  meets 
Stuart  at  Chancellorsville,  349;  Lee's 
entire  command  of  army  and  of 
himself,  356,  358 ;  appreciation  of 
Jackson,  360 ;  phenomenal  prom- 
ise of  Lee  as  leader,  364;  decides 
upon  invasion  of  Pennsylvania,  365, 
366,  370;  leaves  for  Culpeper,  371, 
372,  373  et  seq. ;  the  battle  of  Gettys- 
burg, 376,  377,  378,  391,  397,  439, 
440,  442,  446,  448 ;  Wilderness,  503, 
506,  507  et  seq.;  Spottsylvania,  509, 


INDEX 


629 


511,  514,  518  et  seq.;  at  North  Anna, 
529,  530,  531,  532,  534;  plans  for 
attack  at  Cold  Harbor,  535,  536  et 
seq.,  546,  547,  549,  550  et  seq.;  mine 
at  Petersburg,  565,  567,  571,  593, 
597,  600,  602,  603,  604,  605,  606,  608, 
609,  610,  611. 

Lee,  W.  H.  F.,  189,  285,  375;  Peters- 
burg, 562,  567. 

Leyden's  battn.  art'y,  480. 

Liddell,  Col.,  mortally  wounded  at 
Antietam,  251. 

Lightfoot,  Lt.-Col.,  262. 

Lincoln,  Abraham,  loss  of  confidence  in 
Gen.  McClellan,  58;  Valley  Cam- 
paign, 101,  172,  175;  unwise  selec- 
tion of  Pope  as  commander,  176; 
appoints  Halleck  commander-in- 
chief,  177 ;  effect  of  Proclamation  of 
Emancipation  of  Gen.  McClellan, 
276 ;  he  visits  the  army,  and  his 
words  to  McClellan,  277 ;  relations 
with  McClellan,  278;  disagreement 
with  McClellan,  281 ;  orders  Halleck 
to  relieve  McClellan,  places  Burnside 
in  command  of  the  army,  Porter 
relieved,  succeeded  by  Hooker,  282, 
286,  314 ;  relieves  Burnside  of  com- 
mand and  assigns  it  to  Hooker,  316 ; 
373,  377,  577,  587. 

Local  Reserves,  550. 

Lockwood's  brigade  at  Gettysburg,  407. 

Long,  Col.  A.  L.,  108,  390;  "Memoirs 
of  Lee,"  quoted,  416. 

Longstreet,  Gen.  James,  at  Bull  Run, 
22,  23,  24,  29,  32,  46  et  seq.;  in 
command  of  division  of  Johnston's 
army,  59 ;  at  Williamsburg,  67  et 
seq.;  at  Seven  Pines,  74,  75,  76  et 
seq.;  Seven  Days'  Campaign,  115, 
118  et  seq.,  134,  139;  Malvern  Hill, 
157,  160,  161  et  seq.;  in  command  of 
Wing,  175;  made  Lt.-Gen.,  176; 
ordered  to  proceed  to  Gordonsville,. 
183;  Clark's  Mountain,  187,  189, 
191,  195,  201;  joins  Jackson,  203, 
206,  209,  210,  212,  213,  214,  216,  220, 
228,  232 ;  Antietam,  249,  251 ;  made 
Lt.-Gen.,  279,  281,  285,  286,  287;  at 
Fredericksburg,  302,  312;  encamped 
above  Fredericksburg,  317,  319; 
arrives  in  Petersburg  on  his  way  to 
rejoin  Lee,  364,  365;  at  Culpeper, 
372 ;  leaves  Culpeper,  374,  375,  377 
et  seq.;  at  Gettysburg,  second  day, 
397 ;  Gettysburg,  403,  404,  405,  407, 
411,  412,  415,  416;  "Manassas  to 
Appomattox,"  quoted,  416,  421,  423, 
424,  432,  460,  461,  466,  480,  481,  484, 


485,  486,  490,  491;  casualties,  439, 
448,  547,  491,  492,  497,  498,  556, 593 ; 
battle  of  the  Wilderness,  503,  504, 
505 ;  wounded,  506,  523  et  seq. ;  at 
North  Anna,  529, 530, 535 ;  wounded, 
536,  547,  550. 

Magruder,  Gen.  Joseph  B.,  at  Bull  Run, 
44,  48;  at  Yorktown,  63;  defences 
at  Williamsburg,  66 ;  at  Seven  Pines, 
75,  76,  89;  Seven  Days'  Campaign, 
123;  the  pursuit,  134,  135,  137,  138 
et  seq. ;  Malvern  Hill,  157,  162  et  seq. 

Mahone,  Gen.  Wm.,  88,  162,  164;  bri- 
gade of  infantry  at  Crampton's  Gap, 
233,  234 ;  Antietam,  261 ;  at  Chan- 
cellorsville,  325,  352;  Gettysburg, 
400,  401 ;  battle  of  Wilderness,  505 ; 
Spottsylvania,  513,  514,  518,  538; 
Petersburg,  561,  568,  570,  571.  572. 

Malvern  Hill,  battle  of,  156  et  seq. 

Manassas  Depot,  destruction  of,  195. 

Manassas  Second  (Second  Bull  Run), 
200 ;  casualties,  201 ;  arrangement 
of  opposing  armies,  203-204 ;  casual- 
ties, 219. 

Manigault,  Gen.,  461,  462,  475;  account, 
476-477,  478,  479. 

Mansfield,  Gen.  J.  H.  F.,  commands 
12th  corps,  Antietam,  250, 251 ;  killed, 
255. 

Marshall,  Maj.,  109. 

Marye's  Hill,  assault  of,  301,  302. 

Maryland  Campaign,  Table  of  Confed- 
erate Casualties,  273,  274;  Federal, 
275. 

Maurin,  battery  of,  at  Fredericksburg, 
303. 

Mayne,  Capt.,  at  Bull  Run,  24. 

McCall,  Gen.,  108,  153,  155. 

McCandless,  Gen.,  at  Gettysburg,  405, 
433. 

McClellan,  Gen.  Geo.  B.,  in  West  Vir- 
ginia, 14;  in  Virginia,  55  et  seq.; 
advance  on  Richmond,  59;  defeat 
at  Gaines  Mill,  60 ;  at  Fortress  Mon- 
roe, 63 ;  Yorktown,  65 ;  pursuit  of 
Johnston,  66;  McDowell's  army 
assigned  to,  71  et  seq.;  Valley  Cam- 
paign, 97,  101 ;  Seven  Days'  Cam- 
paign, 111,  112,  114,  123  et  seq.; 
Seven  Days'  Campaign,  the  pursuit, 
133,  138 ;  reason  for  severe  criticism 
of,  139;  Malvern  Hill,  169,  170,  171  ; 
recalled  to  Washington,  172;  lack 
of  enterprise  and  audacity,  178 ; 
leaves  Harrison's  Landing,  185; 
assigned  command  of  troops,  223— 
224,  229;  at  Sharpsburg,  243;  ac- 


630 


INDEX 


count  of  Antietam,  248;  pursuit  of 
Lee,  249,  250,  251 ;  report  at  An  tie- 
tain,  255 ;  error  in  generalship,  256, 
264,  265;  orders  advance  of  Burn- 
side,  266-267;  Lee's  knowledge 
of  McClellan,  269 ;  his  plan  at  Antie- 
tam, 270;  alienated  from,  the  ad- 
ministration, 276;  Lincoln's  visit  to 
army,  276 ;  his  words  to  McClellan, 
277 ;  growing  dissatisfaction  of  gov- 
ernment with  him,  277 ;  relations 
with  Lincoln,  278 ;  disagreement  with 
Lincoln,  281 ;  relieved  from  com- 
mand by  Lincoln,  succeeded  by 
Burnside,  282,  577. 

McCook,  Gen.,  453,  461. 

McDowell,  Gen.  Irvin,  at  Bull  Run,  14 
et  seq.;  in  command  of  corps  Army 
of  Potomac,  59 ;  defeat  at  Manassas, 
60;  at  Seven  Pines,  73,  74  et  seq.; 
Valley  Campaign,  100,  101,  108; 
Cedar  Mountain,  177 :  Gainesville, 
195,  196,  197,  199,  202,  207. 

McElroy,  Col.,  killed  at  Chickamauga, 
489. 

McGowan,  Gen.,  at  Chancellorsville, 
333,  343,  345  et  seq.;  battle  of  the 
Wilderness,  503;  wounded,  522. 

McGregor's  brigade  at  Chancellorsville, 
347. 

Mclntosh,  Gen.,  Antietam,  268 ;  at  Chan- 
cellorsville, 348. 

McKinney,  Col.,  at  Yorktown,  65. 

McLaws,  Maj.-Gen.  Lafayette,  229,  233, 
241;  Antietam,  251/256,  257,  258; 
report  of  Antietam,  259,  286,  289; 
at  Chancellorsville,  324,  325,  329, 
332,  348,  352,  353;  at  Gettys- 
burg, 371,  380  et  seq.;  Gettysburg, 
404,  405,  407,  416,  432,  433,  480. 

McLean's  brigade  at  Chancellorsville,  334. 

McMaster,  Col.,  Petersburg,  569,  570. 

McNair,  Gen.,  459,  462. 

McNeil,  Col.,  mortally  wounded  at  An- 
tietam, 251. 

McParlin,  Surgeon  Thomas  A.,  528. 

McPherson,  Lt.,  5 ;  death  of,  7. 

McRae,  Col.  D.  K.,  commands  Gar- 
land's brigade  (Antietam),  254,  255, 
260  (wounded). 

Meade,  Gen.  George  G.,  48;  campaign 
against  Richmond,  60 ;  at  Antietam, 
251,  270,  294,  296,  297,  298;  at 
Fredericksburg,  300;  at  Gettysburg, 
367 ;  succeeds  Hooker  in  command, 
377,  378,  379  et  seq. ;  his  fine  example 
of  efficient  command,  393 ;  Gettys- 
burg, 404,  406,  407,  410;  lost  op- 
portunity, 432,  567  (Petersburg),  439, 


440,  442;    ordered  to  Spottsylvania, 

509,  528,  541,  549,  555. 
Meagher,    Gen.    Thomas    F.,    123,    130; 

at  Chancellorsville,  339. 
Mechanicsville,  battle  of,   120. 
Meredith,  Gen.  Solomon,  at  Gettysburg, 

brigade  of,  383. 

Middleburg,  engagement  at,  374. 
Miles,  Col.  Dixon  S.,  225,  237. 
Miles,  Col.    Nelson   A.,   at   Chancellors- 
ville, 46,  332,  518. 
Milledge,  Capt.,  427. 
Milroy,  Gen.,  95. 
Milroy,  Gen.  R.  H.,  brigade  of,  203,  204, 

205,  371. 
Mitchell's  Ford,  engagement  at,  23,  34 

et  seq. 

Moody,  Capt.  Geo.  V.,  battery  of,  399. 
Morell,  Gen.  G.  W.,  73 ;  division,  208, 272. 
Morgan,  Gen.,  103. 
Mormon  War,  The,  1-3. 
Mosby,  a  scout,  379. 
Mott's   brigade  at  Chancellorsville,  339 ; 

at  battle  of  the  Wilderness,  503,  507, 

517  et  seq.;   Petersburg,  561. 
Moultrie,  Fort,  9,  11. 
Munford,    Gen.    T.    T.,    cavalry   of,    at 

Crampton's  Gap,  148,  233,  599. 
Myer,  Assistant-Surgeon  A.  J.,  3. 

Nagle,  Col.  James,  brigade  of,  at  Fred- 
ericksburg, 265,  267,  305. 

Naglee,  Gen.,  153. 

Negley,  Gen.,  461. 

Nelson,  William,  Gettysburg,  418;  re- 
port, 427. 

Newton,  Gen.  John,  69 ;  brigade  at 
Crampton's  Gap,  234,  297;  at 
Fredericksburg,  316 ;  at  Chancel- 
lorsville, 351,  352,  353. 

Nichols,  Gen.,  at  Chancellorsville,  333, 
335. 

Norris,  Col.  William,  52. 

North  Anna,  The,  529  et  seq. 

Northern  Virginia,  Army  of,  reorganiza- 
tion of,  367,  368. 

Oak  Grove,  skirmish  115. 

Gates,  Col.  Wm.  C.,  at  Gettysburg,  396, 

404. 
O'Neal,  Col.  Ed.  A.,  at  Chancellorsville, 

332. 

Ord,  Gen.,  Valley  Campaign,  102. 
Orr,  Col.,  299. 
Osterhaus,  Gen.,  474. 
Ox  Hill,  217,  218. 
Owen,  brigade  of,  at  Fredericksburg,  304. 

Page's  battalion,  518,  520. 


INDEX 


631 


Palmer,  Gen.,  at  Fredericksburg,  302, 
303,  455,  461. 

Parham,  Gen.,  commanding  at  Cramp- 
ton's  Gap,  233. 

Parker,  Capt.  W.  W.,  battery  of,  at  Fred- 
ericksburg,303, 309, 484, 485, 486, 490. 

Patrick,  Gen.,  199;   brigade  of,  201. 

Patterson,  Gen.  Robert,  at  Bull  Run,  14, 
16,  20,  26,  32. 

Fatten,  Gen.,  105,  107. 

Paxton,  brigade  of,  330,  335,  347 ;  killed, 
347. 

Peach  Orchard,  392,  394  et  seq. 

Pearce,  Lt.  Isaac  E.,  263. 

Peck,  Gen.,  at  Seven  Pines,  82. 

Pegram,  Gen.,  182;   wounded,  509,  528. 

Pegram,  Maj.  W.  P.,  at  Chancellorsville, 
348,  561. 

Pelham,  Maj.  John,  168;  raid,  277;  "the 
gallant  Pelham,"  296,  297. 

Pemberton,  Gen.,  364. 

Fender,  Gen.  W.  D.,  205;  Antietam, 
268,  295;  at  Chancellorsville,  333, 
•  359,  380  et  seq. 

Pendleton,  Gen.  W.  N.,  at  Bull  Run,  36 ; 
Malvern  Hill,  158,  171,  271,  272,  281, 
285,  297,  370 ;  Gettysburg,  418,  420 ; 
600,  601. 

Pendleton,  Maj.,  100;  at  Chancellors- 
ville, 324. 

Perry,  Gen.  E.  A.,  brigade  of,  at  Chan- 
cellorsville, 325,  355, ;  Gettysburg, 
400,  401,  405 ;  Wilderness,  wounded 
at,  509 ;  killed,  522. 

Petersburg,  movement  against,  545  et 
seq.;  casualties  at,  559,  572,  573. 

Pettigrew,  Gen.,  at  Seven  Pines,  85,  86, 
375,  380;  killed  at  Gettysburg,  441. 

Peyton's  report,  429^131. 

Philip's  legion,    at  Fredericksburg,  303. 

Pickett,  Gen.,  at  Seven  Pines,  85,  88, 175. 

Pickett,  Gen.  George  E.,  231;  division 
of,  364,  380,  381  et  seq. ;  Gettysburg, 
402,  415,  418,  420,  422,  423,  424; 
unjust  report,  429;  battle  of  the 
Wilderness,  497,  530,  537,  550,  551. 

Pleasonton,  Gen.  Alfred,  264,  271,  277; 
at  Chancellorsville,  332. 

Pleasants,  Lt.-Col.,  mine  at  Petersburg, 
564. 

Poague,  Maj.  W.  T.,  501,  503. 

Polk,  Gen.  456,  457,  458,  459. 

Pollard,  editor  of  Richmond  Examiner, 
110. 

Pope,  Gen.  John,  60;  in  command  of 
the  new  army,  108 ;  arrival  at  Wash- 
ington, reputation,  176,  177, 180, 187  ; 
plan  to  cross  the  Rapidan  forbidden 
by  Halleck,  185 ;  marches  to  the  Rap- 


pahannock,  189,  190,  192,  193,  194, 
195 ;  march  upon  Manassas,  196, 198 ; 
attacks  Jackson,  203,  208;  prefers 
charges  against  Porter,  208,  210,  211, 
216 ;  relieved  from  command,  223. 

Porter,  Gen.  F.  J.,  73,  74,  112,  122,  123 
et  seq.,  133,  141;  Malvern  Hill,  160, 
162,  163;  Cedar  Mountain,  177; 
Second  Manassas,  195,  207,  208; 
accused  by  Pope,  208;  dismissed 
from  army,  208;  investigation  and 
remission  of  sentence,  208;  5th 
corps  of,  at  Antietam,  250,  264,  271, 
272;  relieved  from  command  and 
succeeded  by  Hooker,  282. 

Posey,  Gen.  C.,  brigade  of,  at  Chancel- 
lorsville, 325-332,  355;  Gettysburg, 
400,  401. 

Potomac,  Army  of  the,  June  30,  '63,  369 ; 
organization,  494. 

Potter,  Gen.  R.  B.,  division  of,  502,  504, 
521,  554. 

Potts,  Capt.,  killed,  511. 

Preston,  Gen.,  459. 

Prince,  Gen.  H.,  at  Cedar  Mountain,  183. 

Pryor,  Gen.  R.  A.,  at  Williamsburg,  67; 
Williamsburg  road,  83 ;  Seven  Pines, 
88;  brigade  of,  214,  215 ;  Antietam, 
261,  264. 

Rains,  Gen.,  at  Williamsburg,  68;  at 
Seven  Pines,  80,  81. 

Ramsay,  Lt.,  at  Bull  Run,  40. 

Ramseur,  Gen.  S.  D.,  at  Chancellorsville, 
brigade  of,  333,  335;  Wilderness, 
520;  wounded,  525,  528;  succeeds 
Early,  534. 

Randol,  Capt.,  154. 

Ransom,  Gen.  Robert,  157,  162,  167;  at 
Antietam,  259;  at  Fredericksburg, 
303,  305 ;  Chickamauga,  490 ;  Peters- 
burg, 570. 

Read,  Capt.,  Antietam,  259. 

Reno,  Gen.  J.  L.,  division  at  Centreville, 
203,  205,  208,  217. 

Revere,  Gen.  J.  W.,  at  Chancellorsville, 
329 

Reynolds,  Gen.  J.  F.,  190,  105,  196; 
Pennsylvania  Reserves,  203,  204,  209, 
294;  at  Chancellorsville,  329,  382; 
killed,  383 ;  Gettysburg,  460, 461, 455. 

Rice,  Col.,  428. 

Rice,  Gen.,  mortally  wounded,  515. 

Richardson,  Gen.  Israel  B.,  at  Bull 
Run,  23,  86,  153;  division  at 
Antietam,  257,  260;  mortally 
wounded,  262,  263,  265;  420. 

Richmond,  McClellan's  advance  on,  59; 
seven  campaigns  against,  60,  62. 


632 


INDEX 


Ricketts,  Gen.  James  B.,  39;  captured, 
40,  182,  199,  202 ;  blunder,  206,  207 ; 
at  Antietam,  251,  563 ;  division  of, 
522. 

Ripley,  Gen.  R.  S.,  119,  130,  167;  bri- 
gade of  (Antietam),  254,  255',  260. 

Robertson's  battery,  271 ;  Gettysburg, 
462,  469,  484. 

Robertson,  Gen.  J.  B.,  brigade  of,  378, 
380  et  seq. 

Robinson,  Gen.  John  C.,  division  of,  at 
Gettysburg,  383,  406 ;  Spottsylvania, 
wounded,  511. 

Rodes,  Gen.  R.  E.,  at  Seven  Pines,  76, 
78,  79  et  seq.;  official  report,  Will- 
iamsburg  road,  83 ;  Seven  Days ' 
Campaign,  130;  Malvern  Hill,  167, 
231;  Antietam,  261  (report),  262; 
at  Chancellorsville,  324,  329,  330, 
332,  333,  334  et  seq.;  consents  to 
Stuart's  taking  command  at  Jack- 
son's death,  341 ;  brilliant  career, 
342;  division  of,  342,  371;  reaches 
Williamsport,  372,  381  et  seq.;  in 
Early 's  report  at  Gettysburg,  410, 
411;  report,  412,  414,  441,  442;  at 
Spottsylvania,  512. 

Rodman's  division  at  Antietam,  265, 266, 
268. 

Roman,  Col.  Alfred,  552. 

Rosecrans,  Gen.  Wm.  S.,  364,  365,  460, 
465,  466,  467 ;  army  of,  452,  453,  454, 
455;  superseded,  473. 

Rosser,  Gen.  T.  L.,  brigade  of,  511. 

Rowley,  Gen.  Thos.  A.,  division  of,  383. 

Ruff,  Col.,  Chickamauga,  488;  killed, 
489. 

Ruger,  Gen.  Thomas  H.,  at  Chancellors- 
ville, 343 ;  at  Gettysburg,  408. 

Russell's  brigade,  371. 

Scammon,  Gen.,  267. 

Schenck,  Gen.,  at  Bull  Run,  21,  37; 
Valley  Campaign,  95. 

Schofield,  Gen.,  578,  579. 

Schurz,  Maj.  Gen.  Carl,  at  Chancellors- 
ville, 335,  336 ;  at  Gettysburg,  384 ; 
411. 

Second  Manassas,  185  et  seq. 

Seddon,  Secretary,  365. 

Sedgwick,-  Gen.  John,  at  Seven  Pines, 
86,  153;  division  at  Antietam,  257, 
258,  259,  262;  at  Chancellorsville, 
323,  324;  Hooker's  orders  to,  344; 
inability  to  reach  Chancellorsville, 
345  ;  venture  against  Lee's  rear,  349, 
350,  352  et  seq.;  attack  upon  Sedg- 
wick, 355,  356  et  seq.;  battle  of  the 
Wilderness,  502,  504;  at  Spottsyl- 


vania, ordered  to  reenforce  Warren 
and  attack,  512;  killed  at  Spottsyl- 
vania, 513. 

Sellers,  Major,  263. 

Seminary  Ridge,  390. 

Semmes,  Gen.  P.  J.,  at  Williamsburg, 
66  et  seq.;  Seven  Days'  Campaign, 
138;  at  Malvern  Hill,  162,  164; 
brigade  at  Cramp  ton's  Gap,  233,  234  ; 
Antietam,  259;  at  Chancellorsville, 
326,  332,  352,  354;  at  Gettysburg, 
394  et  seq.;  mortally  wounded,  399. 

Seven  Days'  Campaign,  109  et  seq. 

Seven  Pines,  battle  of,  9,  71,  72,  73  et 
seq.,  81 ;  total  casualties  at,  89. 

Seymour,  brigade  of,  508. 

Shackelford,  Gen.,  Chickamauga,  490. 

Shaler's  brigade,  508. 

Sharpsburg,  map,  243. 

Sheridan,  Maj.  Gen.  Philip  H.,  504,  511, 
513 ;  returns  from  expedition  to  the 
James,  532 ;  Petersburg,  566,  567. 

Sherman,  Gen.  Wm.  T.,  at  Bull  Run,  33 
et  seq.;  report,  474,  477,  478,  490, 
577,  581,  588. 

Shields,  Gen.,  73,  97,  101,  102,  103,  105. 

Sickles,  Gen.  D.  E.,  11;  at  Fredericks- 
burg,  293;  at  Chancellorsville,  331, 
332,  337  et  seq.;  ordered  to  attack, 
343 ;  recalled  by  Hooker,  345 ;  asks 
for  re  enforcements,  348;  at  Gettys- 
burg, 392,  405. 

Sigel,  Gen.  F.,  182,  195,  196,  197 ;  corps 
of,  203-204,  284 ;  at  Fredericksburg, 
314 ;  Wilderness,  496,  497,  530. 

Slaughter,  Maj.,  287. 

Slocum,  Gen.  Henry  W.,  69,  123,  153; 
division  at  Crampton's  Gap,  234, 
284;  at  Chancellorsville,  325,  326. 

Smith,  Gen.  E.  Kirby,  at  Bull  Run,  19, 
27,  36 ;  wounded,  40 ;  in  command 
one  division  of  Johnston's  army,  59; 
220. 

Smith,  Gen.  G.  W.,  57;  in  command  one 
division  of  Johnston's  army,  59; 
Seven  Pines,  75,  76,  77  et  seq.; 
succeeds  Johnston  in  command 
"Smith's  Battle,"  87,  88,  93,  153; 
Fredericksburg,  316. 

Smith,  Gen.  M.  L.,  Lee's  chief  engineer, 
504;  appreciation  of,  505,  506. 

Smith,  Gen.  W.  F.,  at  Yorktown,  65; 
note,  466 ;  at  Petersburg,  548,  549. 

Smith,  W.  H.,  535,  537,  538. 

Smith,  Gen.  W.  S.,  brigade  of,  352. 

Sorrel,  Col.  G.  M.,  Longstreet's  Adjt.- 
Gen.,  505,  506. 

Spottsylvania,  509  et  seq. 

Squires,  Capt.,  24. 


INDEX 


633 


Stafford,  Col.  L.  A.,  182 ;  Antietam,  253, 
258;  killed  at  Wilderness,  500. 

Stanton,  Edwin  M.,  Secretary  of  War, 
114,  373,  377. 

Stannard,  Gen.,  Gettysburg,  407. 

Starke,  Gen.  W.  E.,  199,  204,  206; 
killed  at  Antietam,  252. 

Steinwehr,  Gen.  A.  von,  at  Gettysburg, 
division  of,  384. 

Steuart,  Gen.  George  H.,  99,  100,  371  ; 
Gettysburg,  409;  captured,  520. 

Stevens,  Maj.,  at  Bull  Run,  34. 

Stevenson,  Maj. -Gen.  C.  L.,  division  of, 
474,  502,  504. 

Stevenson,  Gen.  Thomas  C.,  killed,  517. 

Stockton,  Col.  T.  B.  W.,  brigade  of,  at 
Fredericksburg,  305,  306. 

Stone  Bridge,  engagement  at,  29. 

Stone,  Gen.  C.  P.,  at  Ball's  Bluff,  57. 

Stoneman,  cavalry  of,  at  Chancellors- 
ville,  322,  323. 

Stonewall  brigade,  371. 

Stovall,  Gen.,  458. 

Stringfellow,  a  scout,  379. 

Stuart,  Col.,  afterward  Gen.  J.  E.  B.,  at 
Bull  Run,  39  et  seq.;  Seven -Days' 
Campaign,  113,  114,  117  et  seq.,  133; 
Malvern  Hill,  168,  169,  170;  Rac- 
coon Ford,  187,  188,  189,  190;  joins 
Jackson  at  Gainesville,  193,  197,  207, 
216,  230;  Antietam,  250,  253;  raid, 
277,  285,  294,  297;  at  Chancellors- 
ville,  selected  by  A.  P.  Hill  to  suc- 
ceed Jackson,  341,  342 ;  orders  attack, 
345,  347  ;  personal  conduct,  347,  359; 
energy  and  efficiency  of,  360;  loss 
at  Brandy  Station,  371 ;  unwise 
proposition  to  Lee,  374  et  seq.; 
Gettysburg,  433,  442;  Wilderness, 
504 ;  killed  at  Yellow  Tavern  on 
May  11,  532. 

Sturgis,  Gen.  S.  D.,  190,  265,  267,  268; 
at  Fredericksburg,  304,  305,  316. 

Sudley,  engagement  at,  32. 

Sully,  Gen.  Alfred,  brigade  of,  at  Freder- 
icksburg, 304. 

Sumner,  Gen.  E.  V.,  in  command  corps 
Army  of  Potomac,  59 ;  at  Seven 
Pines,  84,  86,  87;  Seven  Days' 
Campaign,  123,  138;  Malvern  Hill, 
160,  162,  216;  at  Antietam,  250, 
251,  256 ;  testimony  in  regard  to 
Antietam,  257,  259,  260,  262,  263, 
264,  284,  285,  286,  287,  293,  294;  at 
Fredericksburg,  301,  302,  311. 

Sumter,  Fort,  firing  on,  9-11. 

Sweitzer,  Col.  J.  B.,  brigade  of,  at  Fred- 
ericksburg, 305,  306 ;  at  Gettysburg, 
404. 


Swinton,  William,  description  of  con- 
flict at  Antietam,  261 ;  account  of 
Burnside,  286 ;  at  Fredericksburg, 
315;  at  Gettysburg,  396,  541,  546; 
quoted,  575. 

Sykes,  Gen.  George,  272 ;  at  Fredericks- 
burg, 302,  306,  311,  312;  at  Chancel- 
lorsville,  325-326;  Gettysburg,  405. 

Talcott,  Maj.  T.  M.  R.,  109. 

Taliaferro,  A.  G.,  brigade,  200;  report 
of,  200;  brigade  commanded  by 
Starke,  204,  295. 

Taliaferro,  Gen.  W.  B.,  at  Cedar  Moun- 
tain, 175;  second  Manassas,  183, 
194,  197,  199. 

Taylor,  Col.  W.  H.  (Adjt.-Gen.),  ac- 
count, 244,  385;  quoted,  585,  586. 

Taylor,  Gen.  G.  W.,  killed  at  Manassas, 
194. 

Taylor,  Maj.,  109,  144. 

Terry,  Col.,  wounded  at  Williamsburg, 
69. 

Thomas,  Brig.  Gen.,  Chancellorsville,  347. 

Thomas,  Col.,  killed  at  Chickamauga, 
489. 

Thomas,  Col.  E.  L.,  brigade  of,  205; 
242,  295,  298,  299,  477,  478;  at 
Chancellorsville,  331,  333,  335. 

Thompson,  Capt.,  at  Antietam,  260. 

Thoroughfare  Gap,  201,  202. 

Tidball's  battery,  271. 

Tilton,  Gen.,  Gettysburg,  404. 

Toombs,  Gen.  R.,  Malvern  Hill,  166; 
Raccoon  Ford,  188,  265,  266,  268. 

Torbert,  Gen.  Alfred  T.  A.,  brigade  at 
Crampton's  Gap,  234;  brigade  of, 
at  Chancellorsville,  353,  535. 

Trigg,  Gen.,  462. 

Trimble,  Gen.  I.  R.,  Valley  Campaign, 
105,  107;  Seven  Days'  Campaign, 
117,  131;  volunteers  to  capture 
Manassas,  194,  199;  brigade  of, 
200,  204;  Antietam,  251,  252,  253. 

Turner's  Gap,  228,  229,  230. 

Tyler,  Col.  R.  O.,  104;   division  of,  528. 

Tyler,  Gen.  Daniel,  at  Bull  Run,  22, 
23,  25,  27,  29,  31,  33,  237,  238,  307, 
308,  309. 

Upperville,  engagement  at,  374. 
Upton,  Col.  E.,  516,  517,  518. 

Valley    Campaign,    94    et    seq.;     total 

casualties,  107. 
Valley  of  Virginia,  94. 
Van  Cleve,  Gen.  H.  P.,  461. 
Van    Dorn,    Gen.    Earl,    in    command 

one  division  Johnston's  army,  59. 


634 


INDEX 


Venable,  Col.  C.  S.,  109,  494,  603. 

Verdiersville,  187,  188. 

Vienna,  Va.,  engagement  at,  21. 

Vincent,  Col.  S.,  brigade  of,  at  Gettys- 
burg, 396;  killed,  396. 

Vincent,  Gen.,  Gettysburg,  404. 

Von  Borcke,  Maj.,  295. 

Von  Gilsa,  Col.  Leopold,  at  Chan- 
cellorsville,  334. 

Wadsworth,  Gen.  James  S.,  at  Gettys- 
burg, 383,  386 ;  battle  of  the  Wilder- 
ness, 501,  503;  killed,  505. 

Walker,  Col.  J.  A.,  190,  229;  Loudon 
Heights,  235,  241 ;  wounded  at 
Antietam  commanding  Trimble's 
brigade,  253,  258,  260,  267;  his 
anecdote  of  Gen.  Lee,  270,  419,  458, 
524. 

Walker,  Gen.  H.  H.,  wounded,  514. 

Walker,  Hon.  L.  P.,  Sec.  of  War,  C.S.A., 
8,  35. 

Wallace,  Gen.  Lewis,  563. 

Walton,  Col.  J.  B.,  at  Fredericksburg, 
303. 

Ward's  brigade,  507. 

Warren  Col.,  E.  T.  H.,  73;  at  Chan- 
cellorsville,  brigade  of,  333,  335. 

Warren,  Gen.  G.  K.,  Hooker's  chief 
engineer,  at  Chancellorsville,  345 ; 
at  Gettysburg,  396;  battle  of  the 
Wilderness,  501,  502,  504,  511,  512, 
515,  523  el  seq.;  at  North  Anna,  531, 
539,  548,  549. 

Warren,  Lt.,  78. 

Warren  ton  pike,  engagement  on,  35. 

Washington  Artillery,  371,  388,  395. 

Washington,  defence  of,  59—60. 

Wauhatchie,  map,  468;  battle  of,  542. 

Webb,  Gen.  A.  S.,  brigade  of,  515. 

Weber,  Maj.,  441. 

Weed,  Gen.,  Gettysburg,  404. 

Weisiger,  Col.,  brigade  of,  521,  571. 

Wheat,  Maj.  Robert,  at  Bull  Run,  25,  31, 
33,  note,  34. 

Wheeler,  Gen.,  456,  457,  480. 

White,  Gen.  O.  B.,  letter  to  Tyler,  237- 
238. 

Whiting,  Major,  at  Bull  Run,  48. 

Whiting,  General,  69,  74,  76,  77,  78,  85, 
86,  88;  Seven  Days' Campaign,  111, 
112,  124,  130;  Malvern  Hill,  157, 
159,  161  et  seq.;  232. 

Whipple,  Gen.  A.  W.,  at  Fredericks- 
burg,  302,  305;  at  Chancellorsville, 
332,  345. 


Wiedrich,  Capt.,  in  Howard's  report, 
411. 

Wilbourn,  Capt.,  at  Chancellorsville, 
341. 

Wilcox,  Gen.  C.  M.,  82,  83,  84,  88,  154; 
at  Fredericksburg,  304;  at  Chan- 
cellorsville, 325,  329,  350,  352,  353, 
354;  at  Gettysburg,  392  et  seq.; 
brigade  of,  203,  210,  214,  215,  234, 
261,  264,  267;  Gettysburg,  400 
(report),  401,  405,  418",  425,  432; 
Wilderness,  500,  501  et  seq.,  518; 
division  of,  502,  504,  529,  538; 
Petersburg,  561,  566,  590. 

Wilder,  Gen.,  461. 

Wilderness,  battle  of  the,  500  et  seq. 

Willard,  Gen.,  killed  at  Gettysburg,  406. 

Willcox,  Gen.  O.  B.,  division  of,  268, 
269,  521. 

Williams,  Gen.  A.  S.,  Antietam,  255, 
256;  Gettysburg,  406;  at  Chan- 
cellorsville, 332,  346 ;  at  Gettysburg, 
division  of,  389. 

Williamsburg,  engagement  at,  66  et  seq.; 
casualties,  69. 

Williamsburg  road,  battle  of,  76,  82; 
casualties,  "Hill's  Battle,"  83,  85. 

Willis,  Gen.  Edward,  killed,  534. 

Wilson,  Gen.  James  A.,  cavalry  division 
of,  511,  539,  549,  561;  quoted,  583. 

Winder,  Gen.,  Valley  Campaign,  106; 
Seven  Days'  Campaign,  129,  130; 
Cedar  Mountain,  181 ;  death  of,  182. 

Wise,  Gen.,  550,  555,  556 ;  at  Petersburg, 
570;  quoted,  598-599. 

Wofford,  Col.  W.  T.,  Antietam,  254,  255, 
256;  brigade  of,  at  Chancellorsville, 
352 ;  at  Gettysburg,  394,  395  et  seq.  ; 
Chickamauga,  488 ;  battle  of  Wilder- 
ness, 505;  Spottsylvania,  511. 

Wood,  Gen.,  458,  459,  460. 

Woolfolk,  Capt.  P.,  396. 

Wright,  Gen.  A.  R.,  142,  162,  163;  at 
Chancellorsville,  325,  355. 

Wright,  Gen.  H.  G.,  Antietam,  261; 
Gettysburg,  400,  401 ;  report,  402- 
403,  405,  421,  432,  570,  572;  suc- 
ceeds to  command  of  6th  corps, 
513,  527. 

Yorktown,  defence  of,  63  et  seq. 
Young,   Brigham,   2. 
Young,  John  Russell,  11. 

Zook,  Gen.  S.  K.,  at  Fredericksburg,  302, 
304 ;  killed  at  Gettysburg,  404. 


2. 


